DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

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analyticity. This deep entrenchment is what further explains our reluctance
to revise such truths. Quine would come to emphasize that the main issue
surrounding the analytic – synthetic distinction turns less on the availability
of its sharp delineation (he later suggests and endorses his own way of
marking the difference), but rather with its general epistemological signifi -
cance. Here he claims that no such distinction is of any real import in
helping us to understand the structure of human knowledge (Hylton,
68 – 80).
Many philosophers infl uenced by logical empiricism and its specifi c conception
of scientifi c philosophy viewed some form of the analytic – synthetic
distinction as central for making sense of a priori truth. After Quine ’ s
famous criticisms, it became increasingly diffi cult simply to assume that
some form of this distinction was viable. This also led to a fundamental
change in conceptions of philosophy and philosophical practice. Carnap ’ s
use of the analytic – synthetic distinction supported his view of philosophy
as concerned with the logical structure of scientifi c language and as distinct
from empirical science. Quine ’ s criticisms of analyticity further challenged
this view of philosophy by rejecting any sharp difference between philosophy
and empirical science. The result was Quine ’ s infl uential naturalistic
view of philosophy, which conceives of philosophical pursuits as continuous
with those found in the empirical sciences.
There have been many critical responses to Quine ’ s circularity argument
against analyticity, and there are various ongoing attempts to resurrect
alternative conceptions of analyticity. It has been recently suggested that
new innovations in the theory of meaning offer support for an account of
analytic truth in terms of meaning (Russell, 712 – 29).
In formal and informal work alike, thus, we fi nd that defi nition [ . . . ]
hinges on prior relations of synonymy. Recognizing then that the notion of
defi nition does not hold the key to synonymy and analyticity, let us look
further into synonymy and say no more of defi nition [ . . . ] we must recognize
that interchangeability salva veritate , if construed in relation to an extensional
language, is not a suffi cient condition of cognitive synonymy in the sense
needed for deriving analyticity. [ . . . ] If a language contains an intensional
adverb ‘ necessarily ’ [ . . . ] then interchangeability salva veritate in such a
language does afford a suffi cient condition of cognitive synonymy; but such
a language is intelligible only in so far as the notion of analyticity is already
understood in advance [ . . . ]. The dogma of reductionism, even in its attenuated
form, is intimately connected with the other dogma – that there is a
cleavage between the analytic and synthetic [ . . . ] the one dogma clearly supports
the other in this way: as long as it is taken to be signifi cant in general
to speak of the confi rmation and information of a statement, it seems signifi -
cant to speak also of a limiting kind of statement which is vacuously confi
rmed, ipso facto , come what may; and such a statement is analytic [ . . . ].
172 Robert Sinclair
My present suggestion is that it is nonsense, and the root of much nonsense,
to speak of a linguistic component and a factual component in the truth of
any individual statement. Taken collectively, science has its double dependence
upon language and experience; but this duality is not signifi cantly traceable
into the statements of science taken one by one. (Quine 27, 31, 41 – 2)
P1. Analytic truths are defi ned as true in virtue of the meaning of their
terms and independently of empirical fact.
P2. Meaning is not to be confused with reference (e.g., ‘ creature with a
heart ’ and ‘ creature with kidneys ’ refers to the same class of objects, but
the expressions differ in meaning).
P3. There is no need to appeal to a special set of things called “ meanings ”
to explain this difference, since the concept of meaning can be shown to
be theoretically adequate if we focus on cases of sameness of meaning
or synonymy (where we say that x and y are alike in meaning). If we
proceed to use the concept of “ meaning ” to defi ne analyticity, we should
then appeal to synonymy between terms.
C1. We can now defi ne analytic truths as logical truths achieved by
substituting synonyms for synonyms ( ‘ No bachelor is married ’ becomes
the logical truth ‘ No unmarried man is married ’ if we substitute
‘ unmarried man ’ for ‘ bachelor ’ ) ( modus ponens , P1, P3).
P4. If truth - by - sameness of meaning (C1) relies on our understanding of
truth - by - meaning, which in turn rests on a prior understanding of
‘ meaning ’ , then this explanation of analyticity by use of synonymy is no
clearer than our starting point.
C2. This explanation of analyticity by use of synonymy is no clearer than
our starting point ( modus ponens , C1, P4).
P5. What if we understand synonymy as involving the defi nition of terms?
P6. If we understand synonymy as involving the defi nition of terms, then
this only provides a report of which terms mean the same as others, but
no further indication of what synonymy or sameness of meaning consists
in.
C3. Synonymy defi ned as defi nition is then no help in clarifying analyticity
( modus ponens , P5, P6).
P7. What if we take two phrases or expressions as synonymous when sentences
containing them remain true when one is substituted for the other?
P8. If we take two phrases or expressions as synonymous when sentences
containing them remain true when one is substituted for the other, then
in extensional languages, where substituting co - extensive expressions
preserves truth - value, the interchangeability does not give us sameness
of meaning (e.g., substituting ‘ creature with a heart ’ with ‘ creature with
kidneys ’ preserves truth - value, but we would not claim that these expressions
have the same meaning).
Quine’s Two Dogmas of Empiricism 173
C4. In extensional languages, interchangeability does not give us sameness
of meaning and is no help in understanding analyticity ( modus
ponens , P7, P8).
P9. However, English is not extensional and in such nonextensional
languages, interchangeability salva veritate is the right criterion for
synonymy; that is, it preserves sameness of meaning (e.g., ‘ Necessarily,
every unmarried man is unmarried ’ and ‘ Necessarily, every bachelor is
unmarried ’ is a case where truth value is preserved when we switch
‘ unmarried man ’ for ‘ bachelor ’ , and they are also synonyms).
P10. But necessity statements of this kind are thought to be true precisely
because the statement in question ( ‘ every unmarried man is unmarried ’ )
is already taken to be analytic. In this way, interchangeability salva veritate
provides the right account of synonymy, but only by already relying

analyticity. This deep entrenchment is what further explains our reluctance

to revise such truths. Quine would come to emphasize that the main issue

surrounding the analytic – synthetic distinction turns less on the availability

of its sharp delineation (he later suggests and endorses his own way of

marking the difference), but rather with its general epistemological signifi -

cance. Here he claims that no such distinction is of any real import in

helping us to understand the structure of human knowledge (Hylton,

68 – 80).

Many philosophers infl uenced by logical empiricism and its specifi c conception

of scientifi c philosophy viewed some form of the analytic – synthetic

distinction as central for making sense of a priori truth. After Quine ’ s

famous criticisms, it became increasingly diffi cult simply to assume that

some form of this distinction was viable. This also led to a fundamental

change in conceptions of philosophy and philosophical practice. Carnap ’ s

use of the analytic – synthetic distinction supported his view of philosophy

as concerned with the logical structure of scientifi c language and as distinct

from empirical science. Quine ’ s criticisms of analyticity further challenged

this view of philosophy by rejecting any sharp difference between philosophy

and empirical science. The result was Quine ’ s infl uential naturalistic

view of philosophy, which conceives of philosophical pursuits as continuous

with those found in the empirical sciences.

There have been many critical responses to Quine ’ s circularity argument

against analyticity, and there are various ongoing attempts to resurrect

alternative conceptions of analyticity. It has been recently suggested that

new innovations in the theory of meaning offer support for an account of

analytic truth in terms of meaning (Russell, 712 – 29).

In formal and informal work alike, thus, we fi nd that defi nition [ . . . ]

hinges on prior relations of synonymy. Recognizing then that the notion of

defi nition does not hold the key to synonymy and analyticity, let us look

further into synonymy and say no more of defi nition [ . . . ] we must recognize

that interchangeability salva veritate , if construed in relation to an extensional

language, is not a suffi cient condition of cognitive synonymy in the sense

needed for deriving analyticity. [ . . . ] If a language contains an intensional

adverb ‘ necessarily ’ [ . . . ] then interchangeability salva veritate in such a

language does afford a suffi cient condition of cognitive synonymy; but such

a language is intelligible only in so far as the notion of analyticity is already

understood in advance [ . . . ]. The dogma of reductionism, even in its attenuated

form, is intimately connected with the other dogma – that there is a

cleavage between the analytic and synthetic [ . . . ] the one dogma clearly supports

the other in this way: as long as it is taken to be signifi cant in general

to speak of the confi rmation and information of a statement, it seems signifi -

cant to speak also of a limiting kind of statement which is vacuously confi

rmed, ipso facto , come what may; and such a statement is analytic [ . . . ].

172 Robert Sinclair

My present suggestion is that it is nonsense, and the root of much nonsense,

to speak of a linguistic component and a factual component in the truth of

any individual statement. Taken collectively, science has its double dependence

upon language and experience; but this duality is not signifi cantly traceable

into the statements of science taken one by one. (Quine 27, 31, 41 – 2)

P1. Analytic truths are defi ned as true in virtue of the meaning of their

terms and independently of empirical fact.

P2. Meaning is not to be confused with reference (e.g., ‘ creature with a

heart ’ and ‘ creature with kidneys ’ refers to the same class of objects, but

the expressions differ in meaning).

P3. There is no need to appeal to a special set of things called “ meanings ”

to explain this difference, since the concept of meaning can be shown to

be theoretically adequate if we focus on cases of sameness of meaning

or synonymy (where we say that x and y are alike in meaning). If we

proceed to use the concept of “ meaning ” to defi ne analyticity, we should

then appeal to synonymy between terms.

C1. We can now defi ne analytic truths as logical truths achieved by

substituting synonyms for synonyms ( ‘ No bachelor is married ’ becomes

the logical truth ‘ No unmarried man is married ’ if we substitute

‘ unmarried man ’ for ‘ bachelor ’ ) ( modus ponens , P1, P3).

P4. If truth - by - sameness of meaning (C1) relies on our understanding of

truth - by - meaning, which in turn rests on a prior understanding of

‘ meaning ’ , then this explanation of analyticity by use of synonymy is no

clearer than our starting point.

C2. This explanation of analyticity by use of synonymy is no clearer than

our starting point ( modus ponens , C1, P4).

P5. What if we understand synonymy as involving the defi nition of terms?

P6. If we understand synonymy as involving the defi nition of terms, then

this only provides a report of which terms mean the same as others, but

no further indication of what synonymy or sameness of meaning consists

in.

C3. Synonymy defi ned as defi nition is then no help in clarifying analyticity

( modus ponens , P5, P6).

P7. What if we take two phrases or expressions as synonymous when sentences

containing them remain true when one is substituted for the other?

P8. If we take two phrases or expressions as synonymous when sentences

containing them remain true when one is substituted for the other, then

in extensional languages, where substituting co - extensive expressions

preserves truth - value, the interchangeability does not give us sameness

of meaning (e.g., substituting ‘ creature with a heart ’ with ‘ creature with

kidneys ’ preserves truth - value, but we would not claim that these expressions

have the same meaning).

Quine’s Two Dogmas of Empiricism 173

C4. In extensional languages, interchangeability does not give us sameness

of meaning and is no help in understanding analyticity ( modus

ponens , P7, P8).

P9. However, English is not extensional and in such nonextensional

languages, interchangeability salva veritate is the right criterion for

synonymy; that is, it preserves sameness of meaning (e.g., ‘ Necessarily,

every unmarried man is unmarried ’ and ‘ Necessarily, every bachelor is

unmarried ’ is a case where truth value is preserved when we switch

‘ unmarried man ’ for ‘ bachelor ’ , and they are also synonyms).

P10. But necessity statements of this kind are thought to be true precisely

because the statement in question ( ‘ every unmarried man is unmarried ’ )

is already taken to be analytic. In this way, interchangeability salva veritate

provides the right account of synonymy, but only by already relying