DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 0 1.71k
Hume ’ s argument for his claim that no such inferences have a rational
foundation.
176 James E. Taylor and Stefanie Rocknak
P1. If the (inductive) inference from (a) to (b) has a rational foundation,
then it must be based on intuition, reasoning that is based on intuition
( “ demonstrative ” or deductive reasoning) or reasoning that is based on
direct observation ( “ experimental ” or inductive reasoning).
P2. The (inductive) inference from (a) to (b) is not based on intuition, reasoning
that is based on intuition, or reasoning that is based on direct
observation.
C1. The (inductive) inference from (a) to (b) does not have a rational
foundation ( modus tollens , P1, P2).
Argument for P2:
P3. The connection between (a) and (b) of the example inference is not
intuitive (i.e., it isn ’ t self - evident that if (a) is true, then (b) is true).
P4. The inference from (a) to (b) is not based on demonstrative reasoning
(since demonstrative reasoning can only establish claims that are not
possibly false and the claim that if (a) is true, then (b) is true is possibly
false).
P5. The inference from (a) to (b) is not based on experimental reasoning
(because all experimental reasoning presupposes that similar causes have
similar effects and the inference in question is an instance of this very
presupposition, so an experimental (inductive) argument for that inference
would be circular).
C2. P2 is true: the (inductive) inference from (a) to (b) is not based on
intuition, reasoning that is based on intuition, or reasoning that is
based on direct observation (conjunction, P3, P4, P5; De Morgan ’ s).
Hume ’ s Negative Argument concerning Induction
Hume , David . A Treatise of Human Nature , edited by D. F. and M. J. Norton.
Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2002 .
Arnold , N. Scott . “ Hume ’ s Skepticism about Inductive Inferences . ” Journal
of the History of Philosophy 21 , 1 ( 1983 ): 31 – 55 .
Baier , Annette . A Progress of Sentiments . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University
Press , 1991 .
Beauchamp , Tom , and Alexander Rosenberg . Hume and the Problem of
Causation . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1981 .
Broughton , J. “ Hume ’ s Skepticism about Causal Inferences . ” Pacifi c
Philosophical Quarterly 64 ( 1983 ): 3 – 18 .
Stefanie Rocknak
Hume and the Problem of Induction 177
Where does the necessity that seems to accompany causal inferences come
from? “ Why [do] we conclude that [ … ] particular causes must necessarily
have such particular effects? ” (Hume, 1.3.2.15) In 1.3.6 of the Treatise ,
Hume entertains the possibility that this necessity is a function of reason.
However, he eventually dismisses this possibility, where this dismissal consists
of Hume ’ s “ negative ” argument concerning induction. This argument
has received, and continues to receive, a tremendous amount of attention.
How could causal inferences be justifi ed if they are not justifi ed by reason?
If we believe that p causes q , isn ’ t it reason that allows us to conclude with
some assurance – that is, with some necessity – that q whenever we see p ?
The responses to these questions are many, but they may be parsed into
four groups. (1) Some argue that Hume ’ s negative argument shows that he
thought that inductive inferences are worthless. Hume was actually a closet
“ deductivist, ” where he meant to show that any method that does not rely
on a priori principles is useless (e.g., Stove). (2) Others have alleged that
Hume ’ s negative argument only meant to show that we cannot use demonstrative
reason to justify inductive inferences, but we can, apparently, justify
them with probable reason (e.g., Beauchamp and Rosenberg, Arnold,
Broughton, and Baier). (3) Still others argue that Hume ’ s notion of justifi cation
(in regard to beliefs in general, including beliefs in causal inferences)
should be understood in two stages in Book I of the Treatise . In the fi rst,
Hume does lay out a theory of justifi cation. In the second (particularly in
1.4.7), he retracts it (e.g., Passmore, Immerwahr, Schmitt, and Loeb). (4)
Finally, there are those who claim that no “ justifi cation ” is needed for
causal inferences. In fact, asking for it amounts to a misplaced demand for
Garrett , Don . Cognition and Commitment in Hume ’ s Philosophy . Oxford :
Oxford University Press , 1997 .
Immerwahr , John . “ The Failure of Hume ’ s Treatise . ” Hume Studies 3 , 2
( 1977 ): 57 – 71 .
Loeb , L. E. Stability and Justifi cation in Hume ’ s Treatise . Oxford : Oxford
University Press , 2002 .
Owen , David . Hume ’ s Reason . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1999 .
Passmore , John . Hume ’ s Intentions . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University
Press , 1952/1968 .
Schmitt , F. E. Knowledge and Belief . London : Routledge , 1992 .
Smith , Norman K. The Philosophy of David Hume: A Critical Study of its
Origins and Central Doctrines . New York : Macmillan , 1941 .
Stove , D. C. Probability and Hume ’ s Inductive Skepticism . Oxford : Oxford
University Press , 1973 .
Strawson , P. F. Introduction to Logical Theory . London : Methuen , 1952 .
178 James E. Taylor and Stefanie Rocknak
epistemic explanation; to some degree, this is what the negative argument
shows us. What we must do instead is give a descriptive psychological
explanation where this explanation consists of Hume ’ s “ positive ” account
of induction; see, for instance, Treatise 1.3.14, “ of the idea of necessary
connexion ” (e.g., Strawson, Garrett, and Owen).
In the arguments that rule out demonstrative and probable reasoning,
Hume assumes that the principle of uniformity is justifi ed by, respectively,
demonstrative reason and probable reason, and then he respectively shows
why these assumptions are incorrect. In the concluding argument, he
shows that this means that the principle of uniformity is not justifi ed by
reason, nor is the necessity that obtains of our causal inferences a function
of reason. To do so, he draws on the premises established in his introduction
and the conclusions established in the arguments that rule out demonstrative
and probable reason.
[We must now] discover the nature of that necessary connexion, which
makes so essential a part of [the relation of cause and effect] [ . . . ]. Since it
appears, that the transition from an impression present to the memory or
senses to the idea of an object, we call cause and effect, is founded on past
experience, and our resemblance of their constant conjunction, the next question

Hume ’ s argument for his claim that no such inferences have a rational

foundation.

176 James E. Taylor and Stefanie Rocknak

P1. If the (inductive) inference from (a) to (b) has a rational foundation,

then it must be based on intuition, reasoning that is based on intuition

( “ demonstrative ” or deductive reasoning) or reasoning that is based on

direct observation ( “ experimental ” or inductive reasoning).

P2. The (inductive) inference from (a) to (b) is not based on intuition, reasoning

that is based on intuition, or reasoning that is based on direct

observation.

C1. The (inductive) inference from (a) to (b) does not have a rational

foundation ( modus tollens , P1, P2).

Argument for P2:

P3. The connection between (a) and (b) of the example inference is not

intuitive (i.e., it isn ’ t self - evident that if (a) is true, then (b) is true).

P4. The inference from (a) to (b) is not based on demonstrative reasoning

(since demonstrative reasoning can only establish claims that are not

possibly false and the claim that if (a) is true, then (b) is true is possibly

false).

P5. The inference from (a) to (b) is not based on experimental reasoning

(because all experimental reasoning presupposes that similar causes have

similar effects and the inference in question is an instance of this very

presupposition, so an experimental (inductive) argument for that inference

would be circular).

C2. P2 is true: the (inductive) inference from (a) to (b) is not based on

intuition, reasoning that is based on intuition, or reasoning that is

based on direct observation (conjunction, P3, P4, P5; De Morgan ’ s).

Hume ’ s Negative Argument concerning Induction

Hume , David . A Treatise of Human Nature , edited by D. F. and M. J. Norton.

Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2002 .

Arnold , N. Scott . “ Hume ’ s Skepticism about Inductive Inferences . ” Journal

of the History of Philosophy 21 , 1 ( 1983 ): 31 – 55 .

Baier , Annette . A Progress of Sentiments . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University

Press , 1991 .

Beauchamp , Tom , and Alexander Rosenberg . Hume and the Problem of

Causation . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1981 .

Broughton , J. “ Hume ’ s Skepticism about Causal Inferences . ” Pacifi c

Philosophical Quarterly 64 ( 1983 ): 3 – 18 .

Stefanie Rocknak

Hume and the Problem of Induction 177

Where does the necessity that seems to accompany causal inferences come

from? “ Why [do] we conclude that [ … ] particular causes must necessarily

have such particular effects? ” (Hume, 1.3.2.15) In 1.3.6 of the Treatise ,

Hume entertains the possibility that this necessity is a function of reason.

However, he eventually dismisses this possibility, where this dismissal consists

of Hume ’ s “ negative ” argument concerning induction. This argument

has received, and continues to receive, a tremendous amount of attention.

How could causal inferences be justifi ed if they are not justifi ed by reason?

If we believe that p causes q , isn ’ t it reason that allows us to conclude with

some assurance – that is, with some necessity – that q whenever we see p ?

The responses to these questions are many, but they may be parsed into

four groups. (1) Some argue that Hume ’ s negative argument shows that he

thought that inductive inferences are worthless. Hume was actually a closet

“ deductivist, ” where he meant to show that any method that does not rely

on a priori principles is useless (e.g., Stove). (2) Others have alleged that

Hume ’ s negative argument only meant to show that we cannot use demonstrative

reason to justify inductive inferences, but we can, apparently, justify

them with probable reason (e.g., Beauchamp and Rosenberg, Arnold,

Broughton, and Baier). (3) Still others argue that Hume ’ s notion of justifi cation

(in regard to beliefs in general, including beliefs in causal inferences)

should be understood in two stages in Book I of the Treatise . In the fi rst,

Hume does lay out a theory of justifi cation. In the second (particularly in

1.4.7), he retracts it (e.g., Passmore, Immerwahr, Schmitt, and Loeb). (4)

Finally, there are those who claim that no “ justifi cation ” is needed for

causal inferences. In fact, asking for it amounts to a misplaced demand for

Garrett , Don . Cognition and Commitment in Hume ’ s Philosophy . Oxford :

Oxford University Press , 1997 .

Immerwahr , John . “ The Failure of Hume ’ s Treatise . ” Hume Studies 3 , 2

( 1977 ): 57 – 71 .

Loeb , L. E. Stability and Justifi cation in Hume ’ s Treatise . Oxford : Oxford

University Press , 2002 .

Owen , David . Hume ’ s Reason . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1999 .

Passmore , John . Hume ’ s Intentions . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University

Press , 1952/1968 .

Schmitt , F. E. Knowledge and Belief . London : Routledge , 1992 .

Smith , Norman K. The Philosophy of David Hume: A Critical Study of its

Origins and Central Doctrines . New York : Macmillan , 1941 .

Stove , D. C. Probability and Hume ’ s Inductive Skepticism . Oxford : Oxford

University Press , 1973 .

Strawson , P. F. Introduction to Logical Theory . London : Methuen , 1952 .

178 James E. Taylor and Stefanie Rocknak

epistemic explanation; to some degree, this is what the negative argument

shows us. What we must do instead is give a descriptive psychological

explanation where this explanation consists of Hume ’ s “ positive ” account

of induction; see, for instance, Treatise 1.3.14, “ of the idea of necessary

connexion ” (e.g., Strawson, Garrett, and Owen).

In the arguments that rule out demonstrative and probable reasoning,

Hume assumes that the principle of uniformity is justifi ed by, respectively,

demonstrative reason and probable reason, and then he respectively shows

why these assumptions are incorrect. In the concluding argument, he

shows that this means that the principle of uniformity is not justifi ed by

reason, nor is the necessity that obtains of our causal inferences a function

of reason. To do so, he draws on the premises established in his introduction

and the conclusions established in the arguments that rule out demonstrative

and probable reason.

[We must now] discover the nature of that necessary connexion, which

makes so essential a part of [the relation of cause and effect] [ . . . ]. Since it

appears, that the transition from an impression present to the memory or

senses to the idea of an object, we call cause and effect, is founded on past

experience, and our resemblance of their constant conjunction, the next question