DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

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on the intelligibility of analyticity. This is circular, and so analytic truth
is still not clarifi ed.
P11. If English is not extensional (P9), and necessity statements are taken
to be analytic (P10), then this view of synonymy does not then explain
analyticity.
C5. This view of synonymy does not then explain analyticity ( modus
ponens , P11, conjunction, P9, P10).
P11. Reductionism claims that any signifi cant nonanalytic statement is
equivalent to a statement about sensory experience. The meaning of a
statement is then directly tied to a set of sensory experiences.
P12. Given this view, we can defi ne analytic truths as those statements
confi rmed by every experience or, in other words, as statements that
contain no empirical content or information.
P13. However, the reductionism project cannot be completed because of
holistic considerations that prevent a simple reduction of theoretical
sentences to specifi c sensory experiences.
P14. But if reductionism is untenable, then we cannot assign specifi c empirical
content to individual sentences or then specify when a sentence is
analytic in the sense of being confi rmed by any experience whatsoever.
C6. There is then no way to use reductionism to clarify those statements
which depend on sensory experience for their confi rmation and those
that do not, that is, analytic truths. Reductionism then fails to clarify
the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements ( modus
ponens , P13, P14).
C7. A consideration of these various proposals for clarifying analytic
truths has shown them all to be wanting. We have no reason to hold
such a fi rm distinction or the form of reductionism often used to
support it. Both are dogmas of modern empiricism that should be
rejected (conjunction, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6).
45
Hume and the Problem
of Induction
Hume , David . An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding . Indianapolis :
Hackett , 1993 .
Editors ’ note: We have included two versions of Hume ’ s argument concerning
induction in order to highlight different approaches to the seminal issue.
Hume ’ s Problem of Induction
James E. Taylor
Hume ’ s argument for skepticism about induction presupposes his distinction
between “ relations of ideas, ” which are intuitively or demonstratively
certain because their denials are contradictory (e.g., “ All bachelors are
unmarried ” ) and “ matters of fact and existence, ” which are not certain
because their denials are possibly true (e.g., “ The sun will rise tomorrow ” ).
Hume holds that all of our beliefs about matters of fact and existence are
based on either the present testimony of our senses, our memories of what
we have experienced on the basis of our senses, or reasoning about relations
of cause and effect on the basis of our senses and memory beliefs. For
instance, we infer that a friend of ours is in a distant place on the grounds
that a letter we are currently looking at indicates that it was sent by our
friend from that place; so we infer a currently unobserved cause from a
currently observed effect of that cause. We also infer more generally from
cause - and - effect relationships we have observed in the past that similar
causes will have similar effects in the future. Thus, according to Hume,
the foundation of all our reasoning about matters of fact and existence is
experience. But Hume argues that these sorts of inferences from experience
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Hume and the Problem of Induction 175
are not based on any further reasoning. The way this claim is typically put
today is that there is no rational justifi cation for inductive inferences. If this
claim is true, then no one can be rationally justifi ed in believing anything
that goes beyond what one is currently observing, and if that is the case,
then there is no rational justifi cation for any theory of empirical science.
Since Hume was the fi rst philosopher to make this claim and argue for it,
the problem facing philosophers who deny it is called “ Hume ’ s Problem of
Induction. ” Though many attempts have been made to solve this problem,
none of these attempts is widely believed to be successful. Consequently,
Hume ’ s problem of induction continues to be a central topic of philosophical
conversation.
All reasonings may be divided into two kinds, namely, demonstrative
reasoning, or that concerning relations of ideas, and moral reasoning, or that
concerning matter of fact and existence. That there are no demonstrative
arguments in the case seems evident; since it implies no contradiction that the
course of nature may change, and that an object, seemingly like those which
we have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects. May
I not clearly and distinctly conceive that a body, falling from the clouds, and
which, in all other respects, resembles snow, has yet the taste of salt or feeling
of fi re? Is there any more intelligible proposition than to affi rm, that all the
trees will fl ourish in December and January, and decay in May and June?
Now whatever is intelligible, and can be distinctly conceived, implies no
contradiction, and can never be proved false by any demonstrative argument
or abstract reasoning a priori .
If we be, therefore, engaged by arguments to put trust in past experience,
and make it the standard of our future judgement, these arguments must be
probable only, or such as regard matter of fact and real existence, according
to the division above mentioned. But that there is no argument of this kind,
must appear, if our explication of that species of reasoning be admitted as
solid and satisfactory. We have said that all arguments concerning existence
are founded on the relation of cause and effect; that our knowledge of that
relation is derived entirely from experience; and that all our experimental
conclusions proceed upon the supposition that the future will be conformable
to the past. To endeavour, therefore, the proof of this last supposition by
probable arguments, or arguments regarding existence, must be evidently
going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the very point in question.
(IV.ii)
An example of an inductive inference employed by Hume (which can
represent all inductive inferences) is the inference from (a) “ All the bread
I have eaten has nourished me ” to (b) “ The bread I am about to eat
will nourish me. ” I will refer to this example in my reconstruction of

on the intelligibility of analyticity. This is circular, and so analytic truth

is still not clarifi ed.

P11. If English is not extensional (P9), and necessity statements are taken

to be analytic (P10), then this view of synonymy does not then explain

analyticity.

C5. This view of synonymy does not then explain analyticity ( modus

ponens , P11, conjunction, P9, P10).

P11. Reductionism claims that any signifi cant nonanalytic statement is

equivalent to a statement about sensory experience. The meaning of a

statement is then directly tied to a set of sensory experiences.

P12. Given this view, we can defi ne analytic truths as those statements

confi rmed by every experience or, in other words, as statements that

contain no empirical content or information.

P13. However, the reductionism project cannot be completed because of

holistic considerations that prevent a simple reduction of theoretical

sentences to specifi c sensory experiences.

P14. But if reductionism is untenable, then we cannot assign specifi c empirical

content to individual sentences or then specify when a sentence is

analytic in the sense of being confi rmed by any experience whatsoever.

C6. There is then no way to use reductionism to clarify those statements

which depend on sensory experience for their confi rmation and those

that do not, that is, analytic truths. Reductionism then fails to clarify

the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements ( modus

ponens , P13, P14).

C7. A consideration of these various proposals for clarifying analytic

truths has shown them all to be wanting. We have no reason to hold

such a fi rm distinction or the form of reductionism often used to

support it. Both are dogmas of modern empiricism that should be

rejected (conjunction, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6).

45

Hume and the Problem

of Induction

Hume , David . An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding . Indianapolis :

Hackett , 1993 .

Editors ’ note: We have included two versions of Hume ’ s argument concerning

induction in order to highlight different approaches to the seminal issue.

Hume ’ s Problem of Induction

James E. Taylor

Hume ’ s argument for skepticism about induction presupposes his distinction

between “ relations of ideas, ” which are intuitively or demonstratively

certain because their denials are contradictory (e.g., “ All bachelors are

unmarried ” ) and “ matters of fact and existence, ” which are not certain

because their denials are possibly true (e.g., “ The sun will rise tomorrow ” ).

Hume holds that all of our beliefs about matters of fact and existence are

based on either the present testimony of our senses, our memories of what

we have experienced on the basis of our senses, or reasoning about relations

of cause and effect on the basis of our senses and memory beliefs. For

instance, we infer that a friend of ours is in a distant place on the grounds

that a letter we are currently looking at indicates that it was sent by our

friend from that place; so we infer a currently unobserved cause from a

currently observed effect of that cause. We also infer more generally from

cause - and - effect relationships we have observed in the past that similar

causes will have similar effects in the future. Thus, according to Hume,

the foundation of all our reasoning about matters of fact and existence is

experience. But Hume argues that these sorts of inferences from experience

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

Hume and the Problem of Induction 175

are not based on any further reasoning. The way this claim is typically put

today is that there is no rational justifi cation for inductive inferences. If this

claim is true, then no one can be rationally justifi ed in believing anything

that goes beyond what one is currently observing, and if that is the case,

then there is no rational justifi cation for any theory of empirical science.

Since Hume was the fi rst philosopher to make this claim and argue for it,

the problem facing philosophers who deny it is called “ Hume ’ s Problem of

Induction. ” Though many attempts have been made to solve this problem,

none of these attempts is widely believed to be successful. Consequently,

Hume ’ s problem of induction continues to be a central topic of philosophical

conversation.

All reasonings may be divided into two kinds, namely, demonstrative

reasoning, or that concerning relations of ideas, and moral reasoning, or that

concerning matter of fact and existence. That there are no demonstrative

arguments in the case seems evident; since it implies no contradiction that the

course of nature may change, and that an object, seemingly like those which

we have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects. May

I not clearly and distinctly conceive that a body, falling from the clouds, and

which, in all other respects, resembles snow, has yet the taste of salt or feeling

of fi re? Is there any more intelligible proposition than to affi rm, that all the

trees will fl ourish in December and January, and decay in May and June?

Now whatever is intelligible, and can be distinctly conceived, implies no

contradiction, and can never be proved false by any demonstrative argument

or abstract reasoning a priori .

If we be, therefore, engaged by arguments to put trust in past experience,

and make it the standard of our future judgement, these arguments must be

probable only, or such as regard matter of fact and real existence, according

to the division above mentioned. But that there is no argument of this kind,

must appear, if our explication of that species of reasoning be admitted as

solid and satisfactory. We have said that all arguments concerning existence

are founded on the relation of cause and effect; that our knowledge of that

relation is derived entirely from experience; and that all our experimental

conclusions proceed upon the supposition that the future will be conformable

to the past. To endeavour, therefore, the proof of this last supposition by

probable arguments, or arguments regarding existence, must be evidently

going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the very point in question.

(IV.ii)

An example of an inductive inference employed by Hume (which can

represent all inductive inferences) is the inference from (a) “ All the bread

I have eaten has nourished me ” to (b) “ The bread I am about to eat

will nourish me. ” I will refer to this example in my reconstruction of