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© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Davidson on the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme 163
schemes – the central idea of which is that different conceptual schemes
result in different worlds.
Donald Davidson (1917 – 2003) argues that conceptual relativism is incoherent
because the very idea of a conceptual scheme is incoherent. Davidson
reaches these conclusions by arguing that the idea of a conceptual scheme
depends on the notion of failure of translation between differing schemes.
According to Davidson, sense cannot be made of either complete or partial
failure of translation, and so it does not make sense to speak of different
conceptual schemes. Since it does not make sense to speak of different
conceptual schemes, he claims that it does not make sense to speak of
there being only one conceptual scheme.
Davidson ’ s argument against the intelligibility of the idea of a conceptual
scheme, and thus the possibility of conceptual relativism, is important given
its implications for the way that we know the world, the relationship
between us and the world, and the relationship between language and
world. For if he is right, then there is not a dualism of conceptual scheme
and content (world/experience), and it becomes even more diffi cult to make
sense of the idea that radically different accounts of what exists and how
the world is could all be true, and those forms of skepticism that depend
on a dualism of scheme and content are also called into question.
We may accept the doctrine that associates having a language with having
a conceptual scheme. The relation may be supposed to be this: where conceptual
schemes differ, so do languages. But speakers of different languages
may share a conceptual scheme provided there is a way of translating one
language into the other. Studying the criteria of translation is therefore a way
of focusing on criteria of identity for conceptual schemes. [ . . . ]
I consider two kinds of cases that might be expected to arise: complete,
and partial, failures of translatability. There would be complete failure if
no signifi cant range of sentences in one language could be translated into
the other; there would be partial failure if some range could be translated
and some range could not. [ . . . ] My strategy will be to argue that we cannot
make sense of total failure, and then to examine more briefl y cases of partial
failure.[ . . . ]
[Regarding partial failure], when others think differently from us, no
general principle, or appeal to evidence, can force us to decide that the difference
lies in our beliefs rather than our concepts.
We must conclude, I think, that the attempt to give a solid meaning to the
idea of conceptual relativism, and hence to the idea of a conceptual scheme,
fares no better when based on partial failure of translation than when based
on total failure. (Davidson Inquiries , 197)
Both the shorter version (Part I) and longer version (Part II) consist of
three arguments: (1) an argument against the idea of complete failure
of translation; (2) an argument against partial failure of translation; and
164 George Wrisley
(3) a capstone argument drawing on (1) and (2) for the conclusion that the
very idea of a conceptual scheme is unintelligible rather than its being false
that there is only one conceptual scheme or that there could be different
conceptual schemes.
Part I : Shorter Version (Leaves Key Premises Unsupported)
P1. If the idea of different conceptual schemes is intelligible, then we can
make sense of a difference in conceptual schemes consisting in complete
failure of translation between schemes, or If the idea of different conceptual
schemes is intelligible, then we can make sense of a difference in
conceptual schemes consisting in partial failure of translation between
schemes.
P2. If the idea of complete failure of translation as a way to individuate
conceptual schemes makes sense, then we can make sense of the idea of
the scheme organizing the content, or If the idea of complete failure of
translation as a way to individuate conceptual schemes makes sense, then
we can make sense of the idea of the scheme fi tting the content.
P3. We can neither make sense of the idea of the scheme organizing the
content, nor the idea of the idea of the scheme fi tting the content.
C1. We cannot make sense of the idea of complete failure of translation
as a way to individuate conceptual schemes (destructive dilemma,
P2, P3).
P4. If the idea of partial failure of translation as a way to individuate conceptual
schemes makes sense, then there is either a general principle or
evidence that could determine whether our disagreement with those
operating with a purportedly different scheme about the truth of sentences
X, Y, Z is a difference in scheme or a difference in belief.
P5. There is neither a general principle nor evidence that could determine
whether our disagreement with those operating with a purportedly different
scheme about the truth of sentences X, Y, Z is a difference in
scheme or a difference in belief.
C2. We cannot make sense of the idea of partial failure of translation as
a way to individuate conceptual schemes ( modus tollens , P4, P5).
C3. The idea of different conceptual schemes is not intelligible (destructive
dilemma P1, C1, C2).
P6. If there is only one conceptual scheme, then it is false that there are
different conceptual schemes.
P7. If the idea of different conceptual schemes is not intelligible, then it is
not false that there are different conceptual schemes.
P8. It is not false that there are different conceptual schemes ( modus ponens ,
C3, P7).
Davidson on the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme 165
P9. There is not only one conceptual scheme ( modus ponens , P6, P8).
P10. If the idea of different conceptual schemes is not intelligible and there
is not only one conceptual scheme, then the very idea of a conceptual
scheme is unintelligible.
C4. Therefore, the very idea of a conceptual scheme is unintelligible
( modus ponens , P10, C3, P9).
Part II : Detailed Version
P1. If the idea of different conceptual schemes is intelligible, then we can
make sense of a difference in conceptual schemes consisting in complete
failure of translation between schemes, or If the idea of different conceptual
schemes is intelligible, then we can make sense of a difference in
conceptual schemes consisting in partial failure of translation between
schemes.

Davidson on the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme 163

schemes – the central idea of which is that different conceptual schemes

result in different worlds.

Donald Davidson (1917 – 2003) argues that conceptual relativism is incoherent

because the very idea of a conceptual scheme is incoherent. Davidson

reaches these conclusions by arguing that the idea of a conceptual scheme

depends on the notion of failure of translation between differing schemes.

According to Davidson, sense cannot be made of either complete or partial

failure of translation, and so it does not make sense to speak of different

conceptual schemes. Since it does not make sense to speak of different

conceptual schemes, he claims that it does not make sense to speak of

there being only one conceptual scheme.

Davidson ’ s argument against the intelligibility of the idea of a conceptual

scheme, and thus the possibility of conceptual relativism, is important given

its implications for the way that we know the world, the relationship

between us and the world, and the relationship between language and

world. For if he is right, then there is not a dualism of conceptual scheme

and content (world/experience), and it becomes even more diffi cult to make

sense of the idea that radically different accounts of what exists and how

the world is could all be true, and those forms of skepticism that depend

on a dualism of scheme and content are also called into question.

We may accept the doctrine that associates having a language with having

a conceptual scheme. The relation may be supposed to be this: where conceptual

schemes differ, so do languages. But speakers of different languages

may share a conceptual scheme provided there is a way of translating one

language into the other. Studying the criteria of translation is therefore a way

of focusing on criteria of identity for conceptual schemes. [ . . . ]

I consider two kinds of cases that might be expected to arise: complete,

and partial, failures of translatability. There would be complete failure if

no signifi cant range of sentences in one language could be translated into

the other; there would be partial failure if some range could be translated

and some range could not. [ . . . ] My strategy will be to argue that we cannot

make sense of total failure, and then to examine more briefl y cases of partial

failure.[ . . . ]

[Regarding partial failure], when others think differently from us, no

general principle, or appeal to evidence, can force us to decide that the difference

lies in our beliefs rather than our concepts.

We must conclude, I think, that the attempt to give a solid meaning to the

idea of conceptual relativism, and hence to the idea of a conceptual scheme,

fares no better when based on partial failure of translation than when based

on total failure. (Davidson Inquiries , 197)

Both the shorter version (Part I) and longer version (Part II) consist of

three arguments: (1) an argument against the idea of complete failure

of translation; (2) an argument against partial failure of translation; and

164 George Wrisley

(3) a capstone argument drawing on (1) and (2) for the conclusion that the

very idea of a conceptual scheme is unintelligible rather than its being false

that there is only one conceptual scheme or that there could be different

conceptual schemes.

Part I : Shorter Version (Leaves Key Premises Unsupported)

P1. If the idea of different conceptual schemes is intelligible, then we can

make sense of a difference in conceptual schemes consisting in complete

failure of translation between schemes, or If the idea of different conceptual

schemes is intelligible, then we can make sense of a difference in

conceptual schemes consisting in partial failure of translation between

schemes.

P2. If the idea of complete failure of translation as a way to individuate

conceptual schemes makes sense, then we can make sense of the idea of

the scheme organizing the content, or If the idea of complete failure of

translation as a way to individuate conceptual schemes makes sense, then

we can make sense of the idea of the scheme fi tting the content.

P3. We can neither make sense of the idea of the scheme organizing the

content, nor the idea of the idea of the scheme fi tting the content.

C1. We cannot make sense of the idea of complete failure of translation

as a way to individuate conceptual schemes (destructive dilemma,

P2, P3).

P4. If the idea of partial failure of translation as a way to individuate conceptual

schemes makes sense, then there is either a general principle or

evidence that could determine whether our disagreement with those

operating with a purportedly different scheme about the truth of sentences

X, Y, Z is a difference in scheme or a difference in belief.

P5. There is neither a general principle nor evidence that could determine

whether our disagreement with those operating with a purportedly different

scheme about the truth of sentences X, Y, Z is a difference in

scheme or a difference in belief.

C2. We cannot make sense of the idea of partial failure of translation as

a way to individuate conceptual schemes ( modus tollens , P4, P5).

C3. The idea of different conceptual schemes is not intelligible (destructive

dilemma P1, C1, C2).

P6. If there is only one conceptual scheme, then it is false that there are

different conceptual schemes.

P7. If the idea of different conceptual schemes is not intelligible, then it is

not false that there are different conceptual schemes.

P8. It is not false that there are different conceptual schemes ( modus ponens ,

C3, P7).

Davidson on the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme 165

P9. There is not only one conceptual scheme ( modus ponens , P6, P8).

P10. If the idea of different conceptual schemes is not intelligible and there

is not only one conceptual scheme, then the very idea of a conceptual

scheme is unintelligible.

C4. Therefore, the very idea of a conceptual scheme is unintelligible