DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

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their premises fail because they beg the question. Reasoning should be a
kind of progress, where we get somewhere, increase our knowledge, resolve
disagreements, and answer questions. If we assume our conclusions at the
beginning and tell our justifying stories for them in light of them, we have
at most been consistent, but that is about as much as we can say in favor
of the reasoning.
The principle of fi nite justifi cation is simply that infi nite series of reasons
are not completable by fi nite creatures such as us. We do not have infi nite
time, nor do we have infi nite reasons for our beliefs – our minds are limited
only to the things we ’ ve experienced, thought about, and learned. The
requirement that knowledge be more than that is absurd. Further, it seems,
as Sextus notes above, even were there an infi nite chain of reasons, we are
unsure how reasoning on such a chain of reasons could either ever get
started or ever fi nish.
The corollaries of no unjustifi ed justifi ers and no unjustifi ed chain - enders
are contrapositives of the principle of inferential justifi cation and the corollary
of recursive justifi cation. The requirement of inferential justifi cation is
that (in epistemology lingo) if S has a justifi ed belief that p, S has a justifi ed
belief that q that justifi es p. The corollary is that without a justifi ed belief
that q that justifi es p, S does not have a justifi ed belief that p. There are no
unjustifi ed justifi ers.
The trilemma is that once chains of reasons begin to be extended, there
are only three options: they either (a) stop with some belief or other, without
further support, (b) circle back on themselves, or (c) go on to infi nity. So
long as we think that reasons must come in recursive chains, these are the
only three options.
Despite the fact that all the premises of the argument are each individually
appealing, they together entail an unappealing conclusion, namely, that
we have no justifi cation for any of our beliefs. This unacceptable conclusion
has forced many to return to the premises of the argument with a more
critical eye. One of the premises, if we do in fact know things, must be
false. The project of anti - skepticism, in light of the regress problem, is that
of making the case for the falsity of at least one of these premises.
The oldest and most widely favored anti - skeptical strategy is called
“ foundationalism. ” The foundationalist holds that premise 1 is false, or at
least, that there are notable exceptions. There are some beliefs that stand
on their own, and they can then serve as a foundation for further beliefs.
Call these beliefs with autonomous justifi cation “ basic beliefs. ” The foundationalist
accepts that reasons come in chains, but if the reasons are justifying,
those chains of reasons all end with beliefs that are justifi ed
independently of other reasons. Take three examples, your beliefs: (i) that
The Regress Argument for Skepticism 149
you exist, (ii) that you have a book in front of you, and (iii) that 2 + 2 = 4.
Each of these beliefs is justifi ed because you just see that they it is true.
You, in believing (i), furnish the reason for its truth (it can ’ t be false if you
believe it). Your visual experiences of this book in front of you give you a
reason to believe (ii), and you don ’ t need more reasons for that. Your concepts
of addition, equality, two, and four give you the understanding to
make it so that you don ’ t need any more reason to believe (iii) than just
that you understand it. Beliefs such as these are regress - enders.
The “ coherentist ” accepts the principle of inferential justifi cation and
holds that only justifi ed beliefs can justify beliefs. However, the coherentist
denies the principle of the noncircularity of justifi cation. Justifying stories
come as packages, in that we reasonably believe things when they fi t well
enough with other things that we believe. And once these systems of belief
are up and running, the beliefs in them are mutually supporting. For
example, you believe that there are physical forces, such as gravity. You
also believe that a bowling ball falling down on a fragile porcelain mouse
will crush it. You also believe that the last time you dropped your keys,
they fell on the ground. These beliefs all hang together, and they function,
with many others, as a system for you to make sense of your past experiences
and make predictions about future ones. Justifi cation emerges from
these interdependent and mutually supporting systems of beliefs.
The “ contextualist, ” like the foundationalist, holds that there are exceptions
to the principle of inferential justifi cation. However, the beliefs that
need no further reasons are dependent on what kinds of questions our
justifi cations are out to answer. For example, if you ’ re trying to decide
whether to go to Las Vegas for your holiday, it may be reasonable to doubt
that your year - old information about hotel prices is accurate. So you may
go to a recent source. But you ’ re not going to worry about whether they
accept American dollars or whether you can expect that you can get service
in English. But if you were thinking about going to Monte Carlo (in
Monaco), instead, you ’ d not only want to get better information about
hotel prices, but you ’ d also want to check into what kind of currency you ’ ll
need and whether you ’ ll need to take a crash course in French. Depending
on what ’ s at issue, some questions aren ’ t worth asking, because their
answers are reasonably assumed in the context. But in others they are worth
asking, because you cannot reasonably assume their answers.
“ Infi nitism ” is a recent development in epistemology, as for the over
2,000 years folks have been thinking about the regress problem, it wasn ’ t
until the last 10 years that anyone ’ s tried to work this view out in any detail.
The infi nitist denies the principle of fi nite justifi cation. And so the infi nitist
holds that only an infi nite series of reasons can yield justifi ed belief. The
basic thought is that the person who really knows something can answer
“ why ” questions until there just aren ’ t any more. And, in principle, there
150 Scott Aikin
is no reason why such questions must end. This is certainly a heavy task,
and it seems troublesome, because it is clear that we don ’ t ever actually give
those very long arguments. But the infi nitist holds that one may not have
to give those arguments but only be able to give them as far as they are
needed by critical questioners. Persistent questioners are troublesome, but
they are useful to us in that they allow us to plumb the depths of our
reasons. They may break certain rules of context in questioning things we
don ’ t normally question, but that is how we really know – we can answer
questions that otherwise we ’ d just say we ’ d assumed.
The success of the regress argument for skepticism hinges on whether
these four anti - skeptical programs are correct in denying or modifying the
argument ’ s premises. If these anti - skeptical programs are right, they must
be able to answer some simple questions. The question for the foundationalist
is whether, in arguing that there are regress - ending basic beliefs, the

their premises fail because they beg the question. Reasoning should be a

kind of progress, where we get somewhere, increase our knowledge, resolve

disagreements, and answer questions. If we assume our conclusions at the

beginning and tell our justifying stories for them in light of them, we have

at most been consistent, but that is about as much as we can say in favor

of the reasoning.

The principle of fi nite justifi cation is simply that infi nite series of reasons

are not completable by fi nite creatures such as us. We do not have infi nite

time, nor do we have infi nite reasons for our beliefs – our minds are limited

only to the things we ’ ve experienced, thought about, and learned. The

requirement that knowledge be more than that is absurd. Further, it seems,

as Sextus notes above, even were there an infi nite chain of reasons, we are

unsure how reasoning on such a chain of reasons could either ever get

started or ever fi nish.

The corollaries of no unjustifi ed justifi ers and no unjustifi ed chain - enders

are contrapositives of the principle of inferential justifi cation and the corollary

of recursive justifi cation. The requirement of inferential justifi cation is

that (in epistemology lingo) if S has a justifi ed belief that p, S has a justifi ed

belief that q that justifi es p. The corollary is that without a justifi ed belief

that q that justifi es p, S does not have a justifi ed belief that p. There are no

unjustifi ed justifi ers.

The trilemma is that once chains of reasons begin to be extended, there

are only three options: they either (a) stop with some belief or other, without

further support, (b) circle back on themselves, or (c) go on to infi nity. So

long as we think that reasons must come in recursive chains, these are the

only three options.

Despite the fact that all the premises of the argument are each individually

appealing, they together entail an unappealing conclusion, namely, that

we have no justifi cation for any of our beliefs. This unacceptable conclusion

has forced many to return to the premises of the argument with a more

critical eye. One of the premises, if we do in fact know things, must be

false. The project of anti - skepticism, in light of the regress problem, is that

of making the case for the falsity of at least one of these premises.

The oldest and most widely favored anti - skeptical strategy is called

“ foundationalism. ” The foundationalist holds that premise 1 is false, or at

least, that there are notable exceptions. There are some beliefs that stand

on their own, and they can then serve as a foundation for further beliefs.

Call these beliefs with autonomous justifi cation “ basic beliefs. ” The foundationalist

accepts that reasons come in chains, but if the reasons are justifying,

those chains of reasons all end with beliefs that are justifi ed

independently of other reasons. Take three examples, your beliefs: (i) that

The Regress Argument for Skepticism 149

you exist, (ii) that you have a book in front of you, and (iii) that 2 + 2 = 4.

Each of these beliefs is justifi ed because you just see that they it is true.

You, in believing (i), furnish the reason for its truth (it can ’ t be false if you

believe it). Your visual experiences of this book in front of you give you a

reason to believe (ii), and you don ’ t need more reasons for that. Your concepts

of addition, equality, two, and four give you the understanding to

make it so that you don ’ t need any more reason to believe (iii) than just

that you understand it. Beliefs such as these are regress - enders.

The “ coherentist ” accepts the principle of inferential justifi cation and

holds that only justifi ed beliefs can justify beliefs. However, the coherentist

denies the principle of the noncircularity of justifi cation. Justifying stories

come as packages, in that we reasonably believe things when they fi t well

enough with other things that we believe. And once these systems of belief

are up and running, the beliefs in them are mutually supporting. For

example, you believe that there are physical forces, such as gravity. You

also believe that a bowling ball falling down on a fragile porcelain mouse

will crush it. You also believe that the last time you dropped your keys,

they fell on the ground. These beliefs all hang together, and they function,

with many others, as a system for you to make sense of your past experiences

and make predictions about future ones. Justifi cation emerges from

these interdependent and mutually supporting systems of beliefs.

The “ contextualist, ” like the foundationalist, holds that there are exceptions

to the principle of inferential justifi cation. However, the beliefs that

need no further reasons are dependent on what kinds of questions our

justifi cations are out to answer. For example, if you ’ re trying to decide

whether to go to Las Vegas for your holiday, it may be reasonable to doubt

that your year - old information about hotel prices is accurate. So you may

go to a recent source. But you ’ re not going to worry about whether they

accept American dollars or whether you can expect that you can get service

in English. But if you were thinking about going to Monte Carlo (in

Monaco), instead, you ’ d not only want to get better information about

hotel prices, but you ’ d also want to check into what kind of currency you ’ ll

need and whether you ’ ll need to take a crash course in French. Depending

on what ’ s at issue, some questions aren ’ t worth asking, because their

answers are reasonably assumed in the context. But in others they are worth

asking, because you cannot reasonably assume their answers.

“ Infi nitism ” is a recent development in epistemology, as for the over

2,000 years folks have been thinking about the regress problem, it wasn ’ t

until the last 10 years that anyone ’ s tried to work this view out in any detail.

The infi nitist denies the principle of fi nite justifi cation. And so the infi nitist

holds that only an infi nite series of reasons can yield justifi ed belief. The

basic thought is that the person who really knows something can answer

“ why ” questions until there just aren ’ t any more. And, in principle, there

150 Scott Aikin

is no reason why such questions must end. This is certainly a heavy task,

and it seems troublesome, because it is clear that we don ’ t ever actually give

those very long arguments. But the infi nitist holds that one may not have

to give those arguments but only be able to give them as far as they are

needed by critical questioners. Persistent questioners are troublesome, but

they are useful to us in that they allow us to plumb the depths of our

reasons. They may break certain rules of context in questioning things we

don ’ t normally question, but that is how we really know – we can answer

questions that otherwise we ’ d just say we ’ d assumed.

The success of the regress argument for skepticism hinges on whether

these four anti - skeptical programs are correct in denying or modifying the

argument ’ s premises. If these anti - skeptical programs are right, they must

be able to answer some simple questions. The question for the foundationalist

is whether, in arguing that there are regress - ending basic beliefs, the