DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

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1995 .
Harman , Gilbert. “ The Intrinsic Quality of Experience , ” in Philosophical
Perspectives 4 , Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind , edited by J.
Tomberlin , 53 – 79 . Atascadero, CA : Ridgeview , 1990 .
___. “ Explaining Objective Color in Terms of Subjective Reactions , ” in
Philosophical Issues 7 , Perception , edited by E. Villanueva , 1 – 17 .
Atascadero, CA : Ridgeview , 1996 .
Kind , Amy . “ What ’ s so Transparent about Transparency? ” Philosophical
Studies no. 115 ( 2003 ): 225 – 44 .
Moore , G. E. “ The Refutation of Idealism . ” Mind , New Series 12 , 48 ( 1903 ):
433 – 53 .
Robinson , Howard . Perception . London : Routledge , 1994 .
Russell , Bertrand . The Problems of Philosophy . Oxford : Oxford University
Press , 1980 .
Shoemaker , Sydney . “ Color, Subjective Relations and Qualia , ” in Philosophical
Issues 7 , Perception , edited by E. Villanueva , 55 – 66 . Atascadero, CA :
Ridgeview , 1996 .
Tye , Michael . Ten Problems of Consciousness . Cambridge, MA : The MIT
Press , 1995 .
___. Consciousness, Color and Content . Cambridge, MA : The MIT Press ,
2000 .
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
The Transparency of Experience Argument 143
This is one of the main arguments in the philosophy of perception and
epistemology. It was canonically presented by G. E. Moore. This argument
challenges the thesis that by having sensations we are directly conscious of
features of sensations or experiences. It makes explicit a commonsense
intuition on what appears to be diaphanous by having sensations, that is,
sensory awareness relations – in the words of Moore: “ in respect of which
all sensations are alike ” (444). In general, the argument is about what it is
epistemically available by having sensations.
In principle, this is an epistemic argument, but it has metaphysical conclusions
depending on the theoretical framework. In general, the transparency
of experience argument (henceforth, TEA) is often understood as going
against the reduction of the contents of sensations (say, colors) to a kind
of “ veil of perception ” or “ mental paint ” (Harman, “ Intrinsic Quality ” and
“ Explaining ” ) – in other words, in Berkeley ’ s empiricism, something constituting
the external world itself. Other philosophers have criticized such
a conclusion (see Block).
The intuition framing the TEA was sketched by Moore as follows: when
“ we try to fi x our attention upon consciousness and to see what, distinctly,
it is, it seems to vanish: it seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness.
When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue:
the other element is as if it were diaphanous ” (Moore 450). This quote is
often used to uphold the following: (a) An epistemological inference: by
merely having sensations, we are never able to introspect sensory awareness
relations; therefore, we are directly aware of what our sensations are about,
for example, the color green (Tye Ten Problems , 30). (b) A metaphysical
inference: by merely having sensations, we are never able to introspect
sensory awareness relations or features of sensations themselves; therefore,
there are no perceptual intermediaries. The consequent of (a) is not necessarily
the consequent of (b), despite the antecedent being the same. To
clarify the relations between such antecedent and such consequents is the
core issue in the debate (see Dretske, Harman “ Explaining, ” Block, and
Shoemaker). The antecedent was not defended by Moore. I shall return to
this issue below.
The abstract structure of the reasoning behind the TEA is as follows:
P1. [Content Premise:] If a subject, S, has a sensation, v , v is a sensation of
x .
P2. [Transparency Premise:] By having v , S only has direct knowledge of y .
C1. [Epistemological conclusion] S is directly aware of y .
C2. [Metaphysical conclusion]
(If v = y or ( y = P and Pv )) There are y - like entities between S and x .
(If v ≠ y or ( y = P and 􀀝 Pv )) There are no y - like entities between S and x .
144 Carlos Mario Muñoz-Suárez
The TEA is not an argument concluding that transparency is true but
takes it as a premise. The argument has ab initio two plausible interpretations
depending on the metaphysical character and role ascribed to that
what sensation are about: (i) The strong content version: what fi gures as
the content of a sensation is a subject - independent particular and its properties.
(ii) The weak content version: what fi gures as the content of a sensation
is a subject - dependent entity (e.g., sensory properties, qualia , and so on).
Philosophers endorsing (i) appeal to TEA to justify objective (physical)
relations between sensations and external mind - independent physical entities
(Harman “ Intrinsic, ” Dretske, and Tye Consciousness ]. Accordingly,
philosophers endorsing (ii) appeal to TEA to justify (mental) relations
between sensations and mind - dependent entities (Robinson IX § 3). Further
on, “ transparency ” has ab initio two plausible interpretations depending
on the epistemic role ascribed to sensations (see Kind): (i * ) Strong transparency:
by having a sensation, V, one cannot introspect features of v , but just
what v is about. (ii * ) Weak transparency: by having a sensation, V, one
could introspect some feature of V. The latter was the version endorsed by
Moore and the former is the antecedent of the epistemological inference
and the metaphysical inference.
(i) and (i * ) can be coupled, and we obtain a version of TEA motivating
direct realism. Call this version strong TEA: by having a sensation, V, one
cannot introspect features of V but just the subject - independent entity that
v is about (Tye Consciousness and Harman “ Intrinsic, ” 39). It might be
synthesized as follows:
P1. If a subject, S, has the sensation, V, then, V is a sensation of a subject -
independent entity, X (strong content version).
P2. By having V, S cannot introspect features of V but just what V is about
(strong transparency).
C1. There are no perceptual intermediaries between S and X (metaphysical
inference * ).
Accordingly, (ii) and (ii * ) can be coupled, and we obtain a version of
TEA motivating idealism. Weak TEA holds that by having a sensation, V,
one is sensory aware of a mind - dependent entity and one could introspect

1995 .

Harman , Gilbert. “ The Intrinsic Quality of Experience , ” in Philosophical

Perspectives 4 , Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind , edited by J.

Tomberlin , 53 – 79 . Atascadero, CA : Ridgeview , 1990 .

___. “ Explaining Objective Color in Terms of Subjective Reactions , ” in

Philosophical Issues 7 , Perception , edited by E. Villanueva , 1 – 17 .

Atascadero, CA : Ridgeview , 1996 .

Kind , Amy . “ What ’ s so Transparent about Transparency? ” Philosophical

Studies no. 115 ( 2003 ): 225 – 44 .

Moore , G. E. “ The Refutation of Idealism . ” Mind , New Series 12 , 48 ( 1903 ):

433 – 53 .

Robinson , Howard . Perception . London : Routledge , 1994 .

Russell , Bertrand . The Problems of Philosophy . Oxford : Oxford University

Press , 1980 .

Shoemaker , Sydney . “ Color, Subjective Relations and Qualia , ” in Philosophical

Issues 7 , Perception , edited by E. Villanueva , 55 – 66 . Atascadero, CA :

Ridgeview , 1996 .

Tye , Michael . Ten Problems of Consciousness . Cambridge, MA : The MIT

Press , 1995 .

___. Consciousness, Color and Content . Cambridge, MA : The MIT Press ,

2000 .

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

The Transparency of Experience Argument 143

This is one of the main arguments in the philosophy of perception and

epistemology. It was canonically presented by G. E. Moore. This argument

challenges the thesis that by having sensations we are directly conscious of

features of sensations or experiences. It makes explicit a commonsense

intuition on what appears to be diaphanous by having sensations, that is,

sensory awareness relations – in the words of Moore: “ in respect of which

all sensations are alike ” (444). In general, the argument is about what it is

epistemically available by having sensations.

In principle, this is an epistemic argument, but it has metaphysical conclusions

depending on the theoretical framework. In general, the transparency

of experience argument (henceforth, TEA) is often understood as going

against the reduction of the contents of sensations (say, colors) to a kind

of “ veil of perception ” or “ mental paint ” (Harman, “ Intrinsic Quality ” and

“ Explaining ” ) – in other words, in Berkeley ’ s empiricism, something constituting

the external world itself. Other philosophers have criticized such

a conclusion (see Block).

The intuition framing the TEA was sketched by Moore as follows: when

“ we try to fi x our attention upon consciousness and to see what, distinctly,

it is, it seems to vanish: it seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness.

When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue:

the other element is as if it were diaphanous ” (Moore 450). This quote is

often used to uphold the following: (a) An epistemological inference: by

merely having sensations, we are never able to introspect sensory awareness

relations; therefore, we are directly aware of what our sensations are about,

for example, the color green (Tye Ten Problems , 30). (b) A metaphysical

inference: by merely having sensations, we are never able to introspect

sensory awareness relations or features of sensations themselves; therefore,

there are no perceptual intermediaries. The consequent of (a) is not necessarily

the consequent of (b), despite the antecedent being the same. To

clarify the relations between such antecedent and such consequents is the

core issue in the debate (see Dretske, Harman “ Explaining, ” Block, and

Shoemaker). The antecedent was not defended by Moore. I shall return to

this issue below.

The abstract structure of the reasoning behind the TEA is as follows:

P1. [Content Premise:] If a subject, S, has a sensation, v , v is a sensation of

x .

P2. [Transparency Premise:] By having v , S only has direct knowledge of y .

C1. [Epistemological conclusion] S is directly aware of y .

C2. [Metaphysical conclusion]

(If v = y or ( y = P and Pv )) There are y - like entities between S and x .

(If v ≠ y or ( y = P and 􀀝 Pv )) There are no y - like entities between S and x .

144 Carlos Mario Muñoz-Suárez

The TEA is not an argument concluding that transparency is true but

takes it as a premise. The argument has ab initio two plausible interpretations

depending on the metaphysical character and role ascribed to that

what sensation are about: (i) The strong content version: what fi gures as

the content of a sensation is a subject - independent particular and its properties.

(ii) The weak content version: what fi gures as the content of a sensation

is a subject - dependent entity (e.g., sensory properties, qualia , and so on).

Philosophers endorsing (i) appeal to TEA to justify objective (physical)

relations between sensations and external mind - independent physical entities

(Harman “ Intrinsic, ” Dretske, and Tye Consciousness ]. Accordingly,

philosophers endorsing (ii) appeal to TEA to justify (mental) relations

between sensations and mind - dependent entities (Robinson IX § 3). Further

on, “ transparency ” has ab initio two plausible interpretations depending

on the epistemic role ascribed to sensations (see Kind): (i * ) Strong transparency:

by having a sensation, V, one cannot introspect features of v , but just

what v is about. (ii * ) Weak transparency: by having a sensation, V, one

could introspect some feature of V. The latter was the version endorsed by

Moore and the former is the antecedent of the epistemological inference

and the metaphysical inference.

(i) and (i * ) can be coupled, and we obtain a version of TEA motivating

direct realism. Call this version strong TEA: by having a sensation, V, one

cannot introspect features of V but just the subject - independent entity that

v is about (Tye Consciousness and Harman “ Intrinsic, ” 39). It might be

synthesized as follows:

P1. If a subject, S, has the sensation, V, then, V is a sensation of a subject -

independent entity, X (strong content version).

P2. By having V, S cannot introspect features of V but just what V is about

(strong transparency).

C1. There are no perceptual intermediaries between S and X (metaphysical

inference * ).

Accordingly, (ii) and (ii * ) can be coupled, and we obtain a version of

TEA motivating idealism. Weak TEA holds that by having a sensation, V,

one is sensory aware of a mind - dependent entity and one could introspect