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Stephen Hetherington
Descartes , Ren é . “ Meditation I , ” in Meditations on First Philosophy , in The
Philosophical Works of Descartes , vol. I , edited and translated by E. S.
Haldane and G. R. T. Ross . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University
Press , 1911 .
___. Discourse on the Method , in The Philosophical Works of Descartes ,
vol. I , edited and translated by E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross .
Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 1911 .
Sosa , Ernst . A Virtue Epistemology . Oxford : Clarendon Press , 2009 .
Stroud , Barry. The Signifi cance of Philosophical Scepticism . Oxford :
Clarendon Press , 1984 .
Wilson , M. D. Descartes . London : Routledge & Kegan Paul , 1978 .
Descartes ’ was not the fi rst worried philosophical reference to dreaming as
an epistemological issue. But he made the worry especially famous. It has
since developed into an argument – usually deemed Cartesian, at least in
spirit – which many epistemologists regard as needing to be defeated if
external - world knowledge is to be possible. (Descartes ’ use of the worry
helped even to defi ne the category of external - world knowledge in the fi rst
place. Such knowledge amounts, in his treatment of it, to knowledge of the
physical world.) Even if not always in the suggestive but elliptical way used
by Descartes, the skeptical argument is routinely taught in introductory
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
138 Stephen Hetherington
philosophy courses – general ones, as well as metaphysics and epistemology
ones.
This argument is epistemological, skeptically so. It challenges the thesis
– one which, for most of us, is an unquestioned presumption – that people
are able to have even some knowledge of a physical world, including of
their own physical aspects. The argument is generally called “ Cartesian ” in
honor of Ren é Descartes (1596 – 1650), even though a much earlier version
of the argument was advanced by Socrates in Plato ’ s dialogue Theaetetus
(at 158a – e). Descartes ’ version has been the historically infl uential one.
Most famously presented in his 1641 Meditations on First Philosophy
( “ Meditation I ” ), it was a dramatic moment within philosophy ’ s most celebrated
expression and exploration of sustained doubt. These skeptical
thoughts by Descartes – followed immediately within the Meditations by
his attempts to resolve them – were pivotal in the formation of modern
philosophy, let alone modern epistemology.
The argument has since been formulated more fully within contemporary
epistemology, along the way acquiring the status of a paradigm form of
skeptical challenge. Whenever contemporary epistemologists seek to defuse
skeptical reasoning, this particular piece of skeptical reasoning – the
Cartesian dreaming argument for external - world skepticism – often serves
as their representative target. This is partly because knowledge of the physical
world is something that people seem so manifestly and so often to have
and to use.
The importance of the Cartesian argument is also due partly to its apparent
metaphysical ramifi cations. It has either refl ected or suggested the possibility
of people living only as thinking things – within their “ inner ” worlds
of thoughts and apparent sensations, not knowing if there is any “ outer ”
world beyond these.
Descartes ’ argument reaches that stage by seizing upon the possibility of
something – dreaming – that can strike us as being a vivid yet deceitful sort
of experience. We believe we can be deceived, when dreaming, into thinking
that we are really experiencing the physical world as it is. The skeptical
argument challenges us to know that this is not happening whenever we
think we are really experiencing the physical world. If we do not know that
this is not happening, do we know that the world is at all as it seems to us
to be? The skeptical conclusion is that we do not, even when everything
seems normal to us.
That argument has inspired many attempted refutations because most
epistemologists are not skeptics. Many, even so, treat it as an important
way of challenging us, not to prove that we have knowledge of the physical
world, but to explain how we have such knowledge. We seem to rely just
on our sensory experiences. How could these be adequate, though, if they
can be mimicked in dreaming?
Cartesian Dreaming and External-World Skepticism 139
At the same time I must remember that I am a man, and that consequently
I am in the habit of sleeping, and in my dreams representing to myself the
same things or sometimes even less probable things, than do those who are
insane in their waking moments. How often has it happened to me that in
the night I dreamt that I found myself in this particular place, that I was
dressed and seated near the fi re, whilst in reality I was lying undressed in bed!
At this moment it does indeed seem to me that it is with eyes awake that I
am looking at this paper; that this head which I move is not asleep, that it is
deliberately and of set purpose that I extend my hand and perceive it; what
happens in sleep does not appear so clear and distinct as does all this. But in
thinking over this I remind myself that on many occasions I have in sleep
been deceived by similar illusions, and in dwelling carefully on this refl ection
I see so manifestly that there are no certain indications by which we may
clearly distinguish wakefulness from sleep that I am lost in astonishment. And
my astonishment is such that it is almost capable of persuading me that I now
dream. (Descartes Meditation I, 145 – 6)
Technical terms used in the ensuing argument:
Experience: an occurrence within someone ’ s awareness or consciousness.
Sensory experience: an experience resulting from the use of one or more
of the person ’ s senses (sight, hearing, etc.)
Content (of an experience): the details of what (according to the experience)
reality is like in some respect; how, in some respect, the experience
portrays the world as being.
Conclusive: rationally conclusive: ruling out all possible rational doubts
about the accuracy of the content at hand.
Certainty: rational certainty: having ruled out all possible rational doubts
about the accuracy of the content at hand.
P1. Consider at random any actual or possible experience (call it E) that
does or would feel like a sensory experience of the physical world.
P2. Any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a sensory
experience of the physical world has a content to the effect that the

Stephen Hetherington

Descartes , Ren é . “ Meditation I , ” in Meditations on First Philosophy , in The

Philosophical Works of Descartes , vol. I , edited and translated by E. S.

Haldane and G. R. T. Ross . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University

Press , 1911 .

___. Discourse on the Method , in The Philosophical Works of Descartes ,

vol. I , edited and translated by E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross .

Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 1911 .

Sosa , Ernst . A Virtue Epistemology . Oxford : Clarendon Press , 2009 .

Stroud , Barry. The Signifi cance of Philosophical Scepticism . Oxford :

Clarendon Press , 1984 .

Wilson , M. D. Descartes . London : Routledge & Kegan Paul , 1978 .

Descartes ’ was not the fi rst worried philosophical reference to dreaming as

an epistemological issue. But he made the worry especially famous. It has

since developed into an argument – usually deemed Cartesian, at least in

spirit – which many epistemologists regard as needing to be defeated if

external - world knowledge is to be possible. (Descartes ’ use of the worry

helped even to defi ne the category of external - world knowledge in the fi rst

place. Such knowledge amounts, in his treatment of it, to knowledge of the

physical world.) Even if not always in the suggestive but elliptical way used

by Descartes, the skeptical argument is routinely taught in introductory

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

138 Stephen Hetherington

philosophy courses – general ones, as well as metaphysics and epistemology

ones.

This argument is epistemological, skeptically so. It challenges the thesis

– one which, for most of us, is an unquestioned presumption – that people

are able to have even some knowledge of a physical world, including of

their own physical aspects. The argument is generally called “ Cartesian ” in

honor of Ren é Descartes (1596 – 1650), even though a much earlier version

of the argument was advanced by Socrates in Plato ’ s dialogue Theaetetus

(at 158a – e). Descartes ’ version has been the historically infl uential one.

Most famously presented in his 1641 Meditations on First Philosophy

( “ Meditation I ” ), it was a dramatic moment within philosophy ’ s most celebrated

expression and exploration of sustained doubt. These skeptical

thoughts by Descartes – followed immediately within the Meditations by

his attempts to resolve them – were pivotal in the formation of modern

philosophy, let alone modern epistemology.

The argument has since been formulated more fully within contemporary

epistemology, along the way acquiring the status of a paradigm form of

skeptical challenge. Whenever contemporary epistemologists seek to defuse

skeptical reasoning, this particular piece of skeptical reasoning – the

Cartesian dreaming argument for external - world skepticism – often serves

as their representative target. This is partly because knowledge of the physical

world is something that people seem so manifestly and so often to have

and to use.

The importance of the Cartesian argument is also due partly to its apparent

metaphysical ramifi cations. It has either refl ected or suggested the possibility

of people living only as thinking things – within their “ inner ” worlds

of thoughts and apparent sensations, not knowing if there is any “ outer ”

world beyond these.

Descartes ’ argument reaches that stage by seizing upon the possibility of

something – dreaming – that can strike us as being a vivid yet deceitful sort

of experience. We believe we can be deceived, when dreaming, into thinking

that we are really experiencing the physical world as it is. The skeptical

argument challenges us to know that this is not happening whenever we

think we are really experiencing the physical world. If we do not know that

this is not happening, do we know that the world is at all as it seems to us

to be? The skeptical conclusion is that we do not, even when everything

seems normal to us.

That argument has inspired many attempted refutations because most

epistemologists are not skeptics. Many, even so, treat it as an important

way of challenging us, not to prove that we have knowledge of the physical

world, but to explain how we have such knowledge. We seem to rely just

on our sensory experiences. How could these be adequate, though, if they

can be mimicked in dreaming?

Cartesian Dreaming and External-World Skepticism 139

At the same time I must remember that I am a man, and that consequently

I am in the habit of sleeping, and in my dreams representing to myself the

same things or sometimes even less probable things, than do those who are

insane in their waking moments. How often has it happened to me that in

the night I dreamt that I found myself in this particular place, that I was

dressed and seated near the fi re, whilst in reality I was lying undressed in bed!

At this moment it does indeed seem to me that it is with eyes awake that I

am looking at this paper; that this head which I move is not asleep, that it is

deliberately and of set purpose that I extend my hand and perceive it; what

happens in sleep does not appear so clear and distinct as does all this. But in

thinking over this I remind myself that on many occasions I have in sleep

been deceived by similar illusions, and in dwelling carefully on this refl ection

I see so manifestly that there are no certain indications by which we may

clearly distinguish wakefulness from sleep that I am lost in astonishment. And

my astonishment is such that it is almost capable of persuading me that I now

dream. (Descartes Meditation I, 145 – 6)

Technical terms used in the ensuing argument:

Experience: an occurrence within someone ’ s awareness or consciousness.

Sensory experience: an experience resulting from the use of one or more

of the person ’ s senses (sight, hearing, etc.)

Content (of an experience): the details of what (according to the experience)

reality is like in some respect; how, in some respect, the experience

portrays the world as being.

Conclusive: rationally conclusive: ruling out all possible rational doubts

about the accuracy of the content at hand.

Certainty: rational certainty: having ruled out all possible rational doubts

about the accuracy of the content at hand.

P1. Consider at random any actual or possible experience (call it E) that

does or would feel like a sensory experience of the physical world.

P2. Any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a sensory

experience of the physical world has a content to the effect that the