DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 0 1.71k
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
126 Fernando Migura and Agustin Arrieta
Let us see the structure of the argument from which fatalism is concluded.
Let p be: “ It is going to rain tomorrow ” (or whatever declarative
sentence that describes an event that you think that can happen tomorrow).
Then the argument has the following structure:
P1. If it is true now that p , then necessarily p .
P2. If it is true now that not p , then necessarily not p .
P3. It is true now that p or it is true now that not p .
C1. Necessarily p or necessarily not p (constructive dilemma, P1, P2,
P3).
This argument is unsound because it is clear that the conclusion is false,
but it is not so clear where it goes wrong. The classical solution has to do
with a known ambiguity (amphiboly) associated with conditional sentences
of the form: “ If X, then, necessarily Y. ” This can be interpreted as (a) “ It
is a necessary truth that if X, then Y ” or as (b) “ If X, then it is a necessary
truth that Y. ” On the one hand, if premises 1 and 2 are read as (a), they
are clearly true but, then, the conclusion doesn ’ t follow from premises. On
the other hand, if premises 1 and 2 are interpreted as (b), the conclusion
does follow from them, but they presuppose fatalism. So, either the argument
is not logically valid or it begs the question.
The fi rst and best known argumentative version of fatalism can be found
in the sea - battle argument formulated by Aristotle in Chapter IX of On
Interpretation ( Peri Hermeneias , also De Interpretatione ):
For if every affi rmation or negation is true or false it is necessary for everything
either to be the case or not to be the case. For if one person says that
something will be and another denies this same thing, it is clearly necessary
for one of them to be saying what is true – if every affi rmation is true or false;
for both will not be the case together under such circumstances. [ … ] It follows
that nothing either is or is not happening, or will be or will not be, by chance
or as chance has it, but everything of necessity and not as chance has it (since
either he who says or he who denies is saying what it is true).
I mean, for example: it is necessary for there to be or not to be a sea - battle
tomorrow, but it is not necessary for a sea - battle to take place tomorrow, not
for one not to take place – though it is necessary for one to take place or not
to take place. (Aristotle On Interpretation , IX 18a34, 19a23)
But there are also other known formulations due to St. Augustine and
Thomas Aquinas relating to the associated problem of free will. St. Augustine
in On Free Choice of the Will (Book Three), considers an argument that
could be paraphrased as follows:
If God foreknows that Pope Benedict XVI will sin tomorrow, then necessarily
Pope Benedict XVI will sin tomorrow. God foreknows that Pope
Fatalism 127
Benedict XVI will sin tomorrow. So necessarily Pope Benedict XVI will sin
tomorrow.
Another example of this is Thomas Aquinas ’ discussion of the argument
that God ’ s Providence ( Summa Theologiae , First Part, Question 22) implies
fatalism. The argument is built from a supposition like this: During the
Creation, God foresaw everything, including, for example, Pope Benedict
XVI sinning tomorrow. So, necessarily Pope Benedict XVI will sin
tomorrow.
Assuming that what God foreknows or sees is always true, these versions
of fatalist arguments are essentially analyzed in the same way. Both arguments
count as modus ponens : “ If X, then, necessarily Y, and X, so, necessarily
Y. ” In both cases, the key issue has to do with the correct interpretation
of conditional sentence properly understood as “ It is necessarily true that
X, then Y. ”
Let us consider a more familiar example:
(e) “ If I know George Clooney is a bachelor, then necessarily George
Clooney is unmarried. ”
Given that I know George Clooney remains Hollywood ’ s most famous
bachelor today (September 1, 2010), if I don ’ t interpret correctly the conditional,
I can conclude by modus ponens , “ Necessarily, George Clooney
is unmarried. ” But this conclusion would be equivalent to saying, “ There
are no possible circumstances in which George Clooney is married, ” and
so a strong conclusion is not justifi ed by the premises. Obviously the correct
interpretation of (e) is, “ Necessarily, if I know George Clooney is a bachelor,
then George Clooney is unmarried. ”
One of the most known practical consequences of fatalism has to do
with the uselessness of decision - making. If someone assumes fatalism, why
should she bother making decisions if the outcome is already fi xed? This
direct consequence of fatalism is clearly illustrated in the famous “ lazy
argument. ” For instance, if you feel sick now, it is true now that you will
either recover or it is now true that you will die. In any case, by direct
application of the fatalist argument, necessarily you recover from your
illness or necessarily you die because of it. So, why should you call the
doctor or do anything at all? (As is easy to see, this argument has the form
of a dilemma too.)
Aristotle was entirely aware of this consequence of fatalism when he said
that if everything is and happens of necessity, there would be no need to
deliberate or to take trouble thinking that if we do this, this will happen,
but if we do not, it will not (see On Interpretation , IX 18b26).
34
Sartre ’ s Argument for Freedom
Jeffrey Gordon
Sartre , Jean - Paul . Being and Nothingness , translated by Hazel Barnes. New
York : Philosophical Library , 1956 .
Sartre ’ s argument for freedom is unique in the history of philosophy because
it treats freedom as the essential characteristic of human consciousness as
opposed to a property or capacity of consciousness or mind. In one of
Sartre ’ s famous formulations, “ Man is freedom, ” the idea is that consciousness
has no properties at all, that it is nothing more than a relation to real
existent things, and it relates to those things by defi ning their signifi cance.
The conscious person must interpret the signifi cance of the existent thing;
he must construct a coherent world from what is given. The given has no
meaning in itself; whatever meaning it will have derives from the agent ’ s
interpretation. For a given state of affairs to function as a cause of my
conduct, I must fi rst confer upon that state of affairs a certain meaning,
which in turn informs that situation with its power to cause. I, then, am

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

126 Fernando Migura and Agustin Arrieta

Let us see the structure of the argument from which fatalism is concluded.

Let p be: “ It is going to rain tomorrow ” (or whatever declarative

sentence that describes an event that you think that can happen tomorrow).

Then the argument has the following structure:

P1. If it is true now that p , then necessarily p .

P2. If it is true now that not p , then necessarily not p .

P3. It is true now that p or it is true now that not p .

C1. Necessarily p or necessarily not p (constructive dilemma, P1, P2,

P3).

This argument is unsound because it is clear that the conclusion is false,

but it is not so clear where it goes wrong. The classical solution has to do

with a known ambiguity (amphiboly) associated with conditional sentences

of the form: “ If X, then, necessarily Y. ” This can be interpreted as (a) “ It

is a necessary truth that if X, then Y ” or as (b) “ If X, then it is a necessary

truth that Y. ” On the one hand, if premises 1 and 2 are read as (a), they

are clearly true but, then, the conclusion doesn ’ t follow from premises. On

the other hand, if premises 1 and 2 are interpreted as (b), the conclusion

does follow from them, but they presuppose fatalism. So, either the argument

is not logically valid or it begs the question.

The fi rst and best known argumentative version of fatalism can be found

in the sea - battle argument formulated by Aristotle in Chapter IX of On

Interpretation ( Peri Hermeneias , also De Interpretatione ):

For if every affi rmation or negation is true or false it is necessary for everything

either to be the case or not to be the case. For if one person says that

something will be and another denies this same thing, it is clearly necessary

for one of them to be saying what is true – if every affi rmation is true or false;

for both will not be the case together under such circumstances. [ … ] It follows

that nothing either is or is not happening, or will be or will not be, by chance

or as chance has it, but everything of necessity and not as chance has it (since

either he who says or he who denies is saying what it is true).

I mean, for example: it is necessary for there to be or not to be a sea - battle

tomorrow, but it is not necessary for a sea - battle to take place tomorrow, not

for one not to take place – though it is necessary for one to take place or not

to take place. (Aristotle On Interpretation , IX 18a34, 19a23)

But there are also other known formulations due to St. Augustine and

Thomas Aquinas relating to the associated problem of free will. St. Augustine

in On Free Choice of the Will (Book Three), considers an argument that

could be paraphrased as follows:

If God foreknows that Pope Benedict XVI will sin tomorrow, then necessarily

Pope Benedict XVI will sin tomorrow. God foreknows that Pope

Fatalism 127

Benedict XVI will sin tomorrow. So necessarily Pope Benedict XVI will sin

tomorrow.

Another example of this is Thomas Aquinas ’ discussion of the argument

that God ’ s Providence ( Summa Theologiae , First Part, Question 22) implies

fatalism. The argument is built from a supposition like this: During the

Creation, God foresaw everything, including, for example, Pope Benedict

XVI sinning tomorrow. So, necessarily Pope Benedict XVI will sin

tomorrow.

Assuming that what God foreknows or sees is always true, these versions

of fatalist arguments are essentially analyzed in the same way. Both arguments

count as modus ponens : “ If X, then, necessarily Y, and X, so, necessarily

Y. ” In both cases, the key issue has to do with the correct interpretation

of conditional sentence properly understood as “ It is necessarily true that

X, then Y. ”

Let us consider a more familiar example:

(e) “ If I know George Clooney is a bachelor, then necessarily George

Clooney is unmarried. ”

Given that I know George Clooney remains Hollywood ’ s most famous

bachelor today (September 1, 2010), if I don ’ t interpret correctly the conditional,

I can conclude by modus ponens , “ Necessarily, George Clooney

is unmarried. ” But this conclusion would be equivalent to saying, “ There

are no possible circumstances in which George Clooney is married, ” and

so a strong conclusion is not justifi ed by the premises. Obviously the correct

interpretation of (e) is, “ Necessarily, if I know George Clooney is a bachelor,

then George Clooney is unmarried. ”

One of the most known practical consequences of fatalism has to do

with the uselessness of decision - making. If someone assumes fatalism, why

should she bother making decisions if the outcome is already fi xed? This

direct consequence of fatalism is clearly illustrated in the famous “ lazy

argument. ” For instance, if you feel sick now, it is true now that you will

either recover or it is now true that you will die. In any case, by direct

application of the fatalist argument, necessarily you recover from your

illness or necessarily you die because of it. So, why should you call the

doctor or do anything at all? (As is easy to see, this argument has the form

of a dilemma too.)

Aristotle was entirely aware of this consequence of fatalism when he said

that if everything is and happens of necessity, there would be no need to

deliberate or to take trouble thinking that if we do this, this will happen,

but if we do not, it will not (see On Interpretation , IX 18b26).

34

Sartre ’ s Argument for Freedom

Jeffrey Gordon

Sartre , Jean - Paul . Being and Nothingness , translated by Hazel Barnes. New

York : Philosophical Library , 1956 .

Sartre ’ s argument for freedom is unique in the history of philosophy because

it treats freedom as the essential characteristic of human consciousness as

opposed to a property or capacity of consciousness or mind. In one of

Sartre ’ s famous formulations, “ Man is freedom, ” the idea is that consciousness

has no properties at all, that it is nothing more than a relation to real

existent things, and it relates to those things by defi ning their signifi cance.

The conscious person must interpret the signifi cance of the existent thing;

he must construct a coherent world from what is given. The given has no

meaning in itself; whatever meaning it will have derives from the agent ’ s

interpretation. For a given state of affairs to function as a cause of my

conduct, I must fi rst confer upon that state of affairs a certain meaning,

which in turn informs that situation with its power to cause. I, then, am