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pp.30-7.
For a typical defence of equality of opportunity as the only justifiable
form of equality, see Daniel Bell, 'A "Just" Equality', Dialogue (Washington,
D.C.), vol. 8, no. 2 (1975). The quotation on pp. 38-9 is from
Jeffrey Gray, 'Why Should Society Reward Intelligence?' The Times
(London), 8 September 1972. For an acute statement of the dilemmas
raised by equal opportunity, see J. Fishkin, Justice, Equal Opportunity
and the Family (New Haven, 1983).
The leading case on reverse discrimination in the United States,
Regents of the University of California v Allan Bakke, was decided by the
U.S. Supreme Court on 5 July 1978. M. Cohen, T. Nagel, and T. Scanlon
have brought together some relevant essays on this topic in their anthology,
Equality and Preferential Treatment (Princeton, 1976). See also
Bernard Boxill, 'Equality, Discrimination and Preferential Treatment',
in P. Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics and the same author's Blacks
and Social Justice (Totowa, N.J., 1983).
Chapter 3: Equality for animals
My views on animals first appeared in The New York Review of Books,
S April 1973, under the title 'Animal Liberation'. This article was a
review of R. and S. Godlovitch and J. Harris (eds.), Animals, Men and
Morals (London,_ 1972). A more complete statement was published as
Animal Liberation, 2d ed. (New York, 1990). Richard Ryder charts the
history of changing attitudes towards speciesism in Animal Revolution
(Oxford, 1989).
Among other works arguing for a drastic revision in our present
attitudes to animals are Stephen Clark, The Moral Status of Animals
(Oxford, 1977); and Tom Regan The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley,
1983). Animal Rights and Human Obligations, 2d ed., edited by T. Regan
and P. Singer (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1989) is a collection of essays,
old and new, both for and against attributing rights to animals or duties
to humans in respect of animals. P. Singer (ed.), In Defence of Animals
(Oxford, 1985), collects essays by both activists and theorists involved
with the animal liberation movement. Steve Sapontzis, Morals, Reason
and Animals (Philadelphia, 1987), is a detailed and sympathetic philosophical
analysis of arguments about animal liberation, while R. G.
Frey, Rights, Killing and Suffering (Oxford, 1983), and Michael Leahy,
Against Liberation (London, 1991), offer philosophical critiques of the
animal liberation position. Mary Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter
362
Notes and References
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1983), is a readable and often penetrating
account of these issues. James Rachels, Created from Animals (Oxford,
1990), draws the moral implications of the Darwinian revolution
in our thinking about our place among the animals. Finally, Lori
Gruen's 'Animals' in P. Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics, explores
the predominant recent approaches to the issue.
Bentham's defence of animals, quoted in the section 'Racism and
Speciesism' is from his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,
chap. 18, sec. I, n.
A more detailed description of modem farming conditions can be
found in Animal Liberation, chap. 3; and in James Mason and Peter
Singer, Animal Factories, 2d ed. (New York, 1990). Similarly, Animal
Liberation, chap. 2, contains a fuller discussion of the use of animals
in research than is possible in this book, but see also Richard Ryder,
Victims of Science, 2d ed. (Fontwell, Sussex, 1983). Publication details
of the experiment on rhesus monkeys carried out at the U.S. Armed
Forces Radiobiology Institute are: Carol Frantz, 'Effects of Mixed Neutron-
gamma Total-body Irradiation on Physical Activity Performance
of Rhesus Monkeys', Radiation Research, vol. lOl (1985): 434-41. The
experiments at Princeton University on starving rats, and those by H.
F. Harlow on isolating monkeys, referred to in the sub-section 'Experimenting
on Animals', were originally published in Journal of Comparative
and Physiological Psychology, vol. 78 (1972): 202, Proceedings of
the National Academy of Science, vol. 54 (1965): 90, and Engineering and
Science, vol. 33, no. 6 (April 1970) : 8. On the continuation of Harlow's
work, see Animal Liberation, 2d ed., pp. 34-5.
Among the objections, the claim that animals are incapable of feeling
pain has standardly been associated with Descartes. But Descartes' view
is less clear (and less consistent) than most have assumed. See John
Cottingham, 'A Brute to the Brutes?: Descartes' Treatment of Animals',
Philosophy, vol. 53 (1978): 551. In The Unheeded Cry (Oxford, 1989),
Bernard Rollin describes and criticises more recent ideologies that have
denied the reality of animal pain.
The source for the anecdote about Benjamin Franklin is his Autobiography
(New York, 1950), p. 41. The same objection has been more
seriously considered by John Benson in 'Duty and the Beast', Philosophy,
vol. 53 (1978): 545-7.
Jane Goodall's observations of chimpanzees are engagingly recounted
in In the Shadow of Man (Boston, 1971) and Through a Window
(London, 1990); her own more scholarly account is The Chimpanzees
of Gombe (Cambridge, Mass., 1986). For more information on the ca-
363
Notes and References
pacities of the great apes, see Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer (eds.),
Toward a New Equality: The Great Ape Project (forthcoming). The 'argument
from marginal cases' was thus christened by Jan Narveson,
'Animal Rights', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 7 (1977). Of the
objections to this argument discussed in the sub-section 'Differences
between Humans and Animals', the first was made by Stanley Benn,
'Egalitarianism and Equal Consideration of Interests', in J. Pennock
and J. Chapman (eds.), Nomos IX: Equality (New York, 1967), pp. 62ff.;
the second by John Benson, 'Duty and the Beast', Philosophy, vol. 53
(the quotation from 'one reviewer of Animal Liberation' is from p. 536
of this article) and related points are made by Bonnie Steinbock, 'Speciesism
and the Idea of Equality', Philosophy, vol. 53 (1978): 255-6,
and at greater length by Leslie Pickering Francis and Richard Norman,
'Some Animals Are More Equal Than Others', Philosophy, vol. 53
(1978): 518-27. The third objection can be found in Philip Devine,
'The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism', Philosophy, vol. 53 (19): 496-8.
The quotation from Plato's Republic in the section 'Ethics and Reciprocity'

pp.30-7.

For a typical defence of equality of opportunity as the only justifiable

form of equality, see Daniel Bell, 'A "Just" Equality', Dialogue (Washington,

D.C.), vol. 8, no. 2 (1975). The quotation on pp. 38-9 is from

Jeffrey Gray, 'Why Should Society Reward Intelligence?' The Times

(London), 8 September 1972. For an acute statement of the dilemmas

raised by equal opportunity, see J. Fishkin, Justice, Equal Opportunity

and the Family (New Haven, 1983).

The leading case on reverse discrimination in the United States,

Regents of the University of California v Allan Bakke, was decided by the

U.S. Supreme Court on 5 July 1978. M. Cohen, T. Nagel, and T. Scanlon

have brought together some relevant essays on this topic in their anthology,

Equality and Preferential Treatment (Princeton, 1976). See also

Bernard Boxill, 'Equality, Discrimination and Preferential Treatment',

in P. Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics and the same author's Blacks

and Social Justice (Totowa, N.J., 1983).

Chapter 3: Equality for animals

My views on animals first appeared in The New York Review of Books,

S April 1973, under the title 'Animal Liberation'. This article was a

review of R. and S. Godlovitch and J. Harris (eds.), Animals, Men and

Morals (London,_ 1972). A more complete statement was published as

Animal Liberation, 2d ed. (New York, 1990). Richard Ryder charts the

history of changing attitudes towards speciesism in Animal Revolution

(Oxford, 1989).

Among other works arguing for a drastic revision in our present

attitudes to animals are Stephen Clark, The Moral Status of Animals

(Oxford, 1977); and Tom Regan The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley,

1983). Animal Rights and Human Obligations, 2d ed., edited by T. Regan

and P. Singer (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1989) is a collection of essays,

old and new, both for and against attributing rights to animals or duties

to humans in respect of animals. P. Singer (ed.), In Defence of Animals

(Oxford, 1985), collects essays by both activists and theorists involved

with the animal liberation movement. Steve Sapontzis, Morals, Reason

and Animals (Philadelphia, 1987), is a detailed and sympathetic philosophical

analysis of arguments about animal liberation, while R. G.

Frey, Rights, Killing and Suffering (Oxford, 1983), and Michael Leahy,

Against Liberation (London, 1991), offer philosophical critiques of the

animal liberation position. Mary Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter

362

Notes and References

(Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1983), is a readable and often penetrating

account of these issues. James Rachels, Created from Animals (Oxford,

1990), draws the moral implications of the Darwinian revolution

in our thinking about our place among the animals. Finally, Lori

Gruen's 'Animals' in P. Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics, explores

the predominant recent approaches to the issue.

Bentham's defence of animals, quoted in the section 'Racism and

Speciesism' is from his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,

chap. 18, sec. I, n.

A more detailed description of modem farming conditions can be

found in Animal Liberation, chap. 3; and in James Mason and Peter

Singer, Animal Factories, 2d ed. (New York, 1990). Similarly, Animal

Liberation, chap. 2, contains a fuller discussion of the use of animals

in research than is possible in this book, but see also Richard Ryder,

Victims of Science, 2d ed. (Fontwell, Sussex, 1983). Publication details

of the experiment on rhesus monkeys carried out at the U.S. Armed

Forces Radiobiology Institute are: Carol Frantz, 'Effects of Mixed Neutron-

gamma Total-body Irradiation on Physical Activity Performance

of Rhesus Monkeys', Radiation Research, vol. lOl (1985): 434-41. The

experiments at Princeton University on starving rats, and those by H.

F. Harlow on isolating monkeys, referred to in the sub-section 'Experimenting

on Animals', were originally published in Journal of Comparative

and Physiological Psychology, vol. 78 (1972): 202, Proceedings of

the National Academy of Science, vol. 54 (1965): 90, and Engineering and

Science, vol. 33, no. 6 (April 1970) : 8. On the continuation of Harlow's

work, see Animal Liberation, 2d ed., pp. 34-5.

Among the objections, the claim that animals are incapable of feeling

pain has standardly been associated with Descartes. But Descartes' view

is less clear (and less consistent) than most have assumed. See John

Cottingham, 'A Brute to the Brutes?: Descartes' Treatment of Animals',

Philosophy, vol. 53 (1978): 551. In The Unheeded Cry (Oxford, 1989),

Bernard Rollin describes and criticises more recent ideologies that have

denied the reality of animal pain.

The source for the anecdote about Benjamin Franklin is his Autobiography

(New York, 1950), p. 41. The same objection has been more

seriously considered by John Benson in 'Duty and the Beast', Philosophy,

vol. 53 (1978): 545-7.

Jane Goodall's observations of chimpanzees are engagingly recounted

in In the Shadow of Man (Boston, 1971) and Through a Window

(London, 1990); her own more scholarly account is The Chimpanzees

of Gombe (Cambridge, Mass., 1986). For more information on the ca-

363

Notes and References

pacities of the great apes, see Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer (eds.),

Toward a New Equality: The Great Ape Project (forthcoming). The 'argument

from marginal cases' was thus christened by Jan Narveson,

'Animal Rights', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 7 (1977). Of the

objections to this argument discussed in the sub-section 'Differences

between Humans and Animals', the first was made by Stanley Benn,

'Egalitarianism and Equal Consideration of Interests', in J. Pennock

and J. Chapman (eds.), Nomos IX: Equality (New York, 1967), pp. 62ff.;

the second by John Benson, 'Duty and the Beast', Philosophy, vol. 53

(the quotation from 'one reviewer of Animal Liberation' is from p. 536

of this article) and related points are made by Bonnie Steinbock, 'Speciesism

and the Idea of Equality', Philosophy, vol. 53 (1978): 255-6,

and at greater length by Leslie Pickering Francis and Richard Norman,

'Some Animals Are More Equal Than Others', Philosophy, vol. 53

(1978): 518-27. The third objection can be found in Philip Devine,

'The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism', Philosophy, vol. 53 (19): 496-8.

The quotation from Plato's Republic in the section 'Ethics and Reciprocity'