DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

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is from Book 2, pp. 358-9. Later statements of a similar view
include John Rawls, A Theory of Justice; J. L. Mackie, Ethics chap. 5;
and David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford, 1986). They exclude
animals from the centre of morality, although they soften the impact
of this exclusion in various ways (see, for example, A Theory of Justice,
p. 512, and Ethics, pp. 193-5). Narveson also considers the reciprocity
notion of ethics in 'Animal Rights'. My discussion of the looser version
of the reciprocity view draws on Edward Johnson, Species and Morality,
Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University, 1976, University Microfilms International.
Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1981, p. 145.
Chapter 4: What's wrong with killing?
Andrew Stinson's treatment is described by Robert and Peggy Stinson
in The Long Dying of Baby Andrew (Boston, 1983).
Joseph Fletcher'S article 'Indicators of Humanhood: A Tentative Profile
of Man' appeared in The Hastings Center Report, vol. 2, no. 5 (1972).
John Locke's definition of 'person' is taken from his Essay Concerning
Human Understanding, bk. 1. chap. 9, par. 29. Aristotle's views on
infanticide are in his Politics, bk. 7, p. 1335b; Plato's are in the Republic,
bk. 5, p.460. Support for the claim that our present attitudes to infanticide
are largely the effect of the influence of Christianity on our
thought can be found in the historical material on infanticide cited in
the notes on chap. 6, below. (See especially the article by W. L. Langer,
364
Notes and References
pp. 353-5.) For Aquinas's statement that killing a human being offends
against God as killing a slave offends against the master of the slave,
see Summa Theologica, 2, ii, Question 64, article 5.
Hare propounds and defends his two-level view of moral reasoning
in Moral Thinking (Oxford, 1981).
Michael Tooley's 'Abortion and Infanticide' was first published in
Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 2 (1972) The passage quoted here is
from a revised version in J. Feinberg (ed.), The Problem of Abortion
(Belmont. 1973), p. 60. His book Abortion and Infanticide was published
in Oxford in 1983.
For further discussion of respect for autonomy as an objection to
killing, see Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives (Harmondsworth,
Middlesex, 1977), chap. 5. and H. J. McCloskey, 'The
Right to Life', Mind, vol. 84 (1975).
My discussion of the 'total' and 'prior existence' versions of utilitarianism
owes much to Derek Parfit. I originally tried to defend the
prior existence view in 'A Utilitarian Population Principle', in M. Bayles
(ed.), Ethics and Population (Cambridge, Mass., 1976), but Parfit's reply,
'On Doing the Best for Our Children', in the same volume, persuaded
me to change my mind. Parfit's Reasons and Persons (Oxford, 1984) is
required reading for anyone wishing to pursue this topic in depth. See
also his short account of some of the issues in 'Overpopulation and
the Quality of Life', in P. Singer (ed.), Applied Ethics (Oxford, 1986).
Parfit uses the term 'person-affecting' where I use 'prior existence'. The
reason for the change is that the view has no special reference to
persons, as distinct from other sentient creatures.
The distinction between the two versions of utilitarianism appears
to have been first noticed by Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics
(London, 1907), pp. 414-16. Later discussions include, in addition to
those cited above, J. Narveson, 'Moral Problems of Population', The
Monist, vol. 57 (1973); T. G. Roupas, The Value of Life', Philosophy
and Public Affairs, vol. 7 (1978); and R.1. Sikora, 'Is It Wrong to Prevent
the Existence of Future Generations', in B. Barry and R. Sikora (eds.),
Obligations to Future Generations (Philadelphia, 1978).
Mill's famous passage comparing Socrates and the fool appeared in
his Utilitarianism (London, 1960; first published 1863), pp. 8-9.
Chapter 5: Taking life: animals
The break-through in talking to other species was first announced in
R. and B. Gardner, 'Teaching Sign Language to a Chimpanzee', Science,
365
Notes and References
vol. 165 (1969): 664-72. Since then the literature has multiplied rapidly.
The information on language use in chimpanzees, gorillas and an
orangutan in the section 'Can a Non-human Animal Be a Person?' is
drawn from the articles by Roger and Deborah Fouts, Francine Patterson
and Wendy Gordon, and H. Lyn Miles, in Paola Cavalieri and
Peter Singer (eds.), Toward a New Equality: The Great Ape Project (forthcoming).
Erik Eckholm, 'Language Acquisition in Nonhuman Primates',
in T. Regan and P. Singer (eds.), Animal Rights and Human
Obligations, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1989), provides a brief popular
account.
The quotation in the same section from Stuart Hampshire is to be
found in his Thought and Action (London, 1959), pp. 98-9. Others
who have held related views are Anthony Kenny, in Will, Freedom and
Power (Oxford, 1975); Donald Davidson, 'Thought and Talk', in S.
Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language (Oxford, 1975); and Michael
Leahy, Against Liberation (London, 1991).
Julia's problem-solving abilities were demonstrated by J. Dohl and
B. Rensch; their work is described in Jane Goodall, The Chimpanzees
ofGombe, p. 31. Frans de Waal reports his observations of chimpanzees
in Chimpanzee Politics (New York, 1983). Goodall's account of Figan's
thoughtful manner of obtaining his banana is taken from p. 107 of In
the Shadow of Man. Robert Mitchell assesses the evidence for selfconsciousness
in apes in 'Humans, Nonhumans and Personhood', in
Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer (eds.), Toward a New Equality: The
Great Ape Project. The anecdotal evidence of a sense of time in a guide
dog comes from Sheila Hocken, Emma and I (London, 1978), p. 63;
and the story of the feral cats is from the chapter on intelligence in
Muriel Beadle, The Cat: History, Biology and Behaviour (London, 1977).
lowe these last two references to Mary Midgley, Animals and Why They
Matter (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1983), p. 58.
Goodall's estimate of the number of chimpanzees who die for every
one to reach our shores alive is on p. 257 of In the Shadow of Man. See
also Geza Teleki's account of the chimpanzee trade in Paola Cavalieri
and Peter Singer (eds.), Toward a New Equality: The Great Ape Project.
Leslie Stephen's claim that eating bacon is kind to pigs comes from

is from Book 2, pp. 358-9. Later statements of a similar view

include John Rawls, A Theory of Justice; J. L. Mackie, Ethics chap. 5;

and David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford, 1986). They exclude

animals from the centre of morality, although they soften the impact

of this exclusion in various ways (see, for example, A Theory of Justice,

p. 512, and Ethics, pp. 193-5). Narveson also considers the reciprocity

notion of ethics in 'Animal Rights'. My discussion of the looser version

of the reciprocity view draws on Edward Johnson, Species and Morality,

Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University, 1976, University Microfilms International.

Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1981, p. 145.

Chapter 4: What's wrong with killing?

Andrew Stinson's treatment is described by Robert and Peggy Stinson

in The Long Dying of Baby Andrew (Boston, 1983).

Joseph Fletcher'S article 'Indicators of Humanhood: A Tentative Profile

of Man' appeared in The Hastings Center Report, vol. 2, no. 5 (1972).

John Locke's definition of 'person' is taken from his Essay Concerning

Human Understanding, bk. 1. chap. 9, par. 29. Aristotle's views on

infanticide are in his Politics, bk. 7, p. 1335b; Plato's are in the Republic,

bk. 5, p.460. Support for the claim that our present attitudes to infanticide

are largely the effect of the influence of Christianity on our

thought can be found in the historical material on infanticide cited in

the notes on chap. 6, below. (See especially the article by W. L. Langer,

364

Notes and References

pp. 353-5.) For Aquinas's statement that killing a human being offends

against God as killing a slave offends against the master of the slave,

see Summa Theologica, 2, ii, Question 64, article 5.

Hare propounds and defends his two-level view of moral reasoning

in Moral Thinking (Oxford, 1981).

Michael Tooley's 'Abortion and Infanticide' was first published in

Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 2 (1972) The passage quoted here is

from a revised version in J. Feinberg (ed.), The Problem of Abortion

(Belmont. 1973), p. 60. His book Abortion and Infanticide was published

in Oxford in 1983.

For further discussion of respect for autonomy as an objection to

killing, see Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives (Harmondsworth,

Middlesex, 1977), chap. 5. and H. J. McCloskey, 'The

Right to Life', Mind, vol. 84 (1975).

My discussion of the 'total' and 'prior existence' versions of utilitarianism

owes much to Derek Parfit. I originally tried to defend the

prior existence view in 'A Utilitarian Population Principle', in M. Bayles

(ed.), Ethics and Population (Cambridge, Mass., 1976), but Parfit's reply,

'On Doing the Best for Our Children', in the same volume, persuaded

me to change my mind. Parfit's Reasons and Persons (Oxford, 1984) is

required reading for anyone wishing to pursue this topic in depth. See

also his short account of some of the issues in 'Overpopulation and

the Quality of Life', in P. Singer (ed.), Applied Ethics (Oxford, 1986).

Parfit uses the term 'person-affecting' where I use 'prior existence'. The

reason for the change is that the view has no special reference to

persons, as distinct from other sentient creatures.

The distinction between the two versions of utilitarianism appears

to have been first noticed by Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics

(London, 1907), pp. 414-16. Later discussions include, in addition to

those cited above, J. Narveson, 'Moral Problems of Population', The

Monist, vol. 57 (1973); T. G. Roupas, The Value of Life', Philosophy

and Public Affairs, vol. 7 (1978); and R.1. Sikora, 'Is It Wrong to Prevent

the Existence of Future Generations', in B. Barry and R. Sikora (eds.),

Obligations to Future Generations (Philadelphia, 1978).

Mill's famous passage comparing Socrates and the fool appeared in

his Utilitarianism (London, 1960; first published 1863), pp. 8-9.

Chapter 5: Taking life: animals

The break-through in talking to other species was first announced in

R. and B. Gardner, 'Teaching Sign Language to a Chimpanzee', Science,

365

Notes and References

vol. 165 (1969): 664-72. Since then the literature has multiplied rapidly.

The information on language use in chimpanzees, gorillas and an

orangutan in the section 'Can a Non-human Animal Be a Person?' is

drawn from the articles by Roger and Deborah Fouts, Francine Patterson

and Wendy Gordon, and H. Lyn Miles, in Paola Cavalieri and

Peter Singer (eds.), Toward a New Equality: The Great Ape Project (forthcoming).

Erik Eckholm, 'Language Acquisition in Nonhuman Primates',

in T. Regan and P. Singer (eds.), Animal Rights and Human

Obligations, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1989), provides a brief popular

account.

The quotation in the same section from Stuart Hampshire is to be

found in his Thought and Action (London, 1959), pp. 98-9. Others

who have held related views are Anthony Kenny, in Will, Freedom and

Power (Oxford, 1975); Donald Davidson, 'Thought and Talk', in S.

Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language (Oxford, 1975); and Michael

Leahy, Against Liberation (London, 1991).

Julia's problem-solving abilities were demonstrated by J. Dohl and

B. Rensch; their work is described in Jane Goodall, The Chimpanzees

ofGombe, p. 31. Frans de Waal reports his observations of chimpanzees

in Chimpanzee Politics (New York, 1983). Goodall's account of Figan's

thoughtful manner of obtaining his banana is taken from p. 107 of In

the Shadow of Man. Robert Mitchell assesses the evidence for selfconsciousness

in apes in 'Humans, Nonhumans and Personhood', in

Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer (eds.), Toward a New Equality: The

Great Ape Project. The anecdotal evidence of a sense of time in a guide

dog comes from Sheila Hocken, Emma and I (London, 1978), p. 63;

and the story of the feral cats is from the chapter on intelligence in

Muriel Beadle, The Cat: History, Biology and Behaviour (London, 1977).

lowe these last two references to Mary Midgley, Animals and Why They

Matter (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1983), p. 58.

Goodall's estimate of the number of chimpanzees who die for every

one to reach our shores alive is on p. 257 of In the Shadow of Man. See

also Geza Teleki's account of the chimpanzee trade in Paola Cavalieri

and Peter Singer (eds.), Toward a New Equality: The Great Ape Project.

Leslie Stephen's claim that eating bacon is kind to pigs comes from