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4,007,993 |
Collisions with early warning satellites causes miscalc and goes nuclear – magnified by the Kessler effect
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Blatt 20
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Blatt 20 [Talia, joint concentration in Social Studies and Integrative Biology at Harvard, specialization in East Asian geopolitics and security issues] “Anti-Satellite Weapons and the Emerging Space Arms Race,” Harvard International Review, May 26, 2020, https://hir.harvard.edu/anti-satellite-weapons-and-the-emerging-space-arms-race/ TG
|
risk to early warning satellites. These satellites are a crucial element of US ballistic missile defense, capable of detecting missiles immediately after launch and tracking their paths
Suppose a US early warning satellite goes dark, or is shut down. Going dark could signal the beginning of an attack. Without early warning satellites, the United States is much more susceptible to nuclear missiles. Given the strategy of counterforcing—targeting nuclear silos rather than populous cities to prevent a nuclear counterattack—the Americans might believe their nuclear weapons are imminently at risk. It could be twelve hours before the United States regains satellite function, which is too long to wait to put together a nuclear counterattack. The United States, therefore, might move to mobilize a nuclear attack against Russia or China over what might just be a piece of debris shutting off a satellite.
accidental warfare, or strategic miscalculation, is uniquely likely in space Space is therefore considered offense-dominant; offensive tactics like weapons development are prioritized over defensive measures, such as improving GPS or making satellites more resistant to jamming.
countries are left with poorly defended space systems and rely on offensive posturing, which increases the risk that their actions are perceived as aggressive and incentivizes rapid, risky counterattacks because militaries cannot rely on their spaced-based systems after first strikes.
There are several hotspots in Early warning satellites play a central role in US readiness in the event of a conflict involving North Korea. News of North Korean missile launches comes from these satellites. Given North Korea’s history of nuclear provocations, unflinchingly hostile rhetoric towards the United States and South Korea, and diplomatic opacity, North Korea is always a threatening, unknowable adversary, but recent developments have magnified the risk of loose nukes. If the regime is terminal, traditional MAD risk calculus will become moot; with nothing to lose, North Korea would have no reason to hold back its nuclear arsenal If the US does not have its early warning satellites the US, South Korea, and Japan are all in imminent nuclear peril, while China could be in a position to fundamentally reshape East Asian geopolitics.
The South China Sea is another hotspot China is developing Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD) in the South China Sea, a combination of long range radar with air and maritime defense meant to deny US freedom of navigation in the region. Given the disputed nature of territory in the South China Sea, the United States and its allies do not want China to successfully close off the region.
|
sat s are crucial capable of detecting missiles and tracking
early warning sat Going dark could signal an attack. Americans believe nuc s are at risk twelve hours before regains sat function U S mobilize a nuclear attack
miscalc uniquely likely in space Space is offense-dominant;
countries rely on offensive posturing actions incentivizes rapid counterattacks
News of No Ko missile launches comes from sat s developments magnified risk MAD risk calc will become moot US, So Ko Japan in nuclear peril China could
S C S hotspot
|
Despite their deterrent functions, ASATs are more likely to provoke or exacerbate conflicts than dampen them, especially given the risk they pose to early warning satellites. These satellites are a crucial element of US ballistic missile defense, capable of detecting missiles immediately after launch and tracking their paths.
Suppose a US early warning satellite goes dark, or is shut down. Going dark could signal a glitch, but in a world in which other countries have ASATs, it could also signal the beginning of an attack. Without early warning satellites, the United States is much more susceptible to nuclear missiles. Given the strategy of counterforcing—targeting nuclear silos rather than populous cities to prevent a nuclear counterattack—the Americans might believe their nuclear weapons are imminently at risk. It could be twelve hours before the United States regains satellite function, which is too long to wait to put together a nuclear counterattack. The United States, therefore, might move to mobilize a nuclear attack against Russia or China over what might just be a piece of debris shutting off a satellite.
Additionally, accidental warfare, or strategic miscalculation, is uniquely likely in space. It is much easier to hold an adversary’s space systems in jeopardy with destructive ASATs than it is to sustainably defend a system, which is expensive and in some cases not technologically feasible because of limitations on satellite movement. Space is therefore considered offense-dominant; offensive tactics like weapons development are prioritized over defensive measures, such as improving GPS or making satellites more resistant to jamming.
As a result, countries are left with poorly defended space systems and rely on offensive posturing, which increases the risk that their actions are perceived as aggressive and incentivizes rapid, risky counterattacks because militaries cannot rely on their spaced-based systems after first strikes.
There are several hotspots in which ASATs and offensive-dominant systems are particularly relevant. Early warning satellites play a central role in US readiness in the event of a conflict involving North Korea. News of North Korean missile launches comes from these satellites. Given North Korea’s history of nuclear provocations, unflinchingly hostile rhetoric towards the United States and South Korea, and diplomatic opacity, North Korea is always a threatening, unknowable adversary, but recent developments have magnified the risk. With the health of Kim Jong-un potentially in jeopardy, a succession battle or even civil war on the peninsula raises the chances of loose nukes. If the regime is terminal, traditional MAD risk calculus will become moot; with nothing to lose, North Korea would have no reason to hold back its nuclear arsenal. Or China might decide to seize military assets and infrastructure of the regime. If the US does not have its early warning satellites because they have been taken out in an ASAT attack, the US, South Korea, and Japan are all in imminent nuclear peril, while China could be in a position to fundamentally reshape East Asian geopolitics.
The South China Sea is another hotspot in which ASATs could risk escalation. China is developing Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD) in the South China Sea, a combination of long range radar with air and maritime defense meant to deny US freedom of navigation in the region. Given the disputed nature of territory in the South China Sea, the United States and its allies do not want China to successfully close off the region.
| 3,574 |
<h4>Collisions with early warning satellites causes miscalc and goes nuclear – magnified by the Kessler effect</h4><p><u><strong>Blatt 20</u></strong> [Talia, joint concentration in Social Studies and Integrative Biology at Harvard, specialization in East Asian geopolitics and security issues] “Anti-Satellite Weapons and the Emerging Space Arms Race,” Harvard International Review, May 26, 2020, https://hir.harvard.edu/anti-satellite-weapons-and-the-emerging-space-arms-race/ TG</p><p>Despite their deterrent functions, ASATs are more likely to provoke or exacerbate conflicts than dampen them, especially given the <u><strong>risk</u></strong> they pose <u><strong>to early warning satellites. These <mark>sat</mark>ellite<mark>s are</mark> a <mark>crucial</mark> element of US ballistic missile defense, <mark>capable of detecting missiles</mark> immediately after launch <mark>and tracking</mark> their paths</u></strong>.</p><p><u><strong>Suppose a US <mark>early warning sat</mark>ellite goes dark, or is shut down. <mark>Going dark could signal</u></strong></mark> a glitch, but in a world in which other countries have ASATs, it could also signal <u><strong>the beginning of <mark>an attack. </mark>Without early warning satellites, the United States is much more susceptible to nuclear missiles. Given the strategy of counterforcing—targeting nuclear silos rather than populous cities to prevent a nuclear counterattack—the <mark>Americans</mark> might <mark>believe</mark> their <mark>nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s are</mark> imminently <mark>at risk</mark>. It could be <mark>twelve hours before</mark> the United States <mark>regains sat</mark>ellite <mark>function</mark>, which is too long to wait to put together a nuclear counterattack. The <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates, therefore, might move to <mark>mobilize a nuclear attack</mark> against Russia or China over what might just be a piece of debris shutting off a satellite.</p><p></u></strong>Additionally, <u><strong>accidental warfare, or strategic <mark>miscalc</mark>ulation, is <mark>uniquely likely in space</u></strong></mark>. It is much easier to hold an adversary’s space systems in jeopardy with destructive ASATs than it is to sustainably defend a system, which is expensive and in some cases not technologically feasible because of limitations on satellite movement. <u><strong><mark>Space is</mark> therefore considered <mark>offense-dominant;</mark> offensive tactics like weapons development are prioritized over defensive measures, such as improving GPS or making satellites more resistant to jamming.</p><p></u></strong>As a result, <u><strong><mark>countries</mark> are left with poorly defended space systems and <mark>rely on offensive posturing</mark>, which increases the risk that their <mark>actions </mark>are perceived as aggressive and <mark>incentivizes rapid</mark>, risky <mark>counterattacks</mark> because militaries cannot rely on their spaced-based systems after first strikes.</p><p>There are several hotspots in</u></strong> which ASATs and offensive-dominant systems are particularly relevant. <u><strong>Early warning satellites play a central role in US readiness in the event of a conflict involving North Korea. <mark>News of No</mark>rth <mark>Ko</mark>rean <mark>missile launches comes from</mark> these <mark>sat</mark>ellite<mark>s</mark>. Given North Korea’s history of nuclear provocations, unflinchingly hostile rhetoric towards the United States and South Korea, and diplomatic opacity, North Korea is always a threatening, unknowable adversary, but recent <mark>developments</mark> have <mark>magnified</mark> the <mark>risk</u></strong></mark>. With the health of Kim Jong-un potentially in jeopardy, a succession battle or even civil war on the peninsula raises the chances <u><strong>of loose nukes. If the regime is terminal, traditional <mark>MAD risk calc</mark>ulus <mark>will become</mark> <mark>moot</mark>; with nothing to lose, North Korea would have no reason to hold back its nuclear arsenal</u></strong>. Or China might decide to seize military assets and infrastructure of the regime. <u><strong>If the US does not have its early warning satellites</u></strong> because they have been taken out in an ASAT attack, <u><strong>the <mark>US, So</mark>uth <mark>Ko</mark>rea, and <mark>Japan</mark> are all <mark>in</mark> imminent <mark>nuclear peril</mark>, while <mark>China could</mark> be in a position to fundamentally reshape East Asian geopolitics.</p><p>The <mark>S</mark>outh <mark>C</mark>hina <mark>S</mark>ea is another <mark>hotspot</u></strong></mark> in which ASATs could risk escalation. <u><strong>China is developing Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD) in the South China Sea, a combination of long range radar with air and maritime defense meant to deny US freedom of navigation in the region. Given the disputed nature of territory in the South China Sea, the United States and its allies do not want China to successfully close off the region.</p></u></strong>
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1AC
| null |
Adv – Collisions
| 4,771 | 239 | 135,545 |
./documents/hsld21/Sage/Pe/Sage-Perin-Aff-King%20RR-Finals.docx
| 897,607 |
A
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King RR
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Finals
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Harker AR
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Danielle Dosche, Phoenix Pittman, Nolan Burdett
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ac large satellites
nc t government t appropriation asia disasters pic 6g pic
1ar all condo pics rvi
2nr 6g pic
2ar rvi (
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hsld21/Sage/Pe/Sage-Perin-Aff-King%20RR-Finals.docx
| null | 75,289 |
MaPe
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Sage MaPe
| null |
Ma.....
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Pe.....
| null | null | 25,149 |
Sage
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Sage
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CA
| null | 1,029 |
hsld21
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HS LD 2021-22
| 2,021 |
ld
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hs
| 1 |
548,087 |
Viruses evolve past countermeasures – increased transmission and lethality
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Diamandis 21
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Diamandis 21 [Eleftheriosi, biochemist specializing in clinical chemistry, Prof and Head of Clinical Biochemistry in the Dept of Laboratory Medicine and Pathobiology at the University of Toronto] “The Mother of All Battles: Viruses vs Humans. Can Humans Avoid Extinction in 50-100 Years?” Preprints, April 13, 2021, https://www.preprints.org/manuscript/202104.0397/v1 TG
|
Viruses evolve continuously, eventually leading to variants that are more transmissible and some times more lethal than the original strains. The SARS-CoV-2 is a good contemporary example. Multiple variants of SARS-CoV-2 are rapidly spreading New variants with additional mutations could become able to evade our currently available vaccines by weakening the ability of vaccine-induced antibodies to neutralize/block viral entry, and by strengthening the ability of the virus to enter the cells via surface receptors.
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Viruses evolve continuously variants more transmissible and lethal New variants with mutations evade available vaccines by weakening antibodies and strengthening the virus
|
Viruses evolve continuously, eventually leading to variants that are more transmissible and some times more lethal than the original strains. The SARS-CoV-2 is a good contemporary example. Multiple variants of SARS-CoV-2 are rapidly spreading and are becoming dominant in certain geographic areas (15, 16). For example, the B.1.1.7 variant (United Kingdom) has 23 mutations and 17 amino acid changes; variant 501Y.V2 (South Africa) has 23 mutations and 17 amino acid changes and P.1 variant (Brazil) has approximately 35 mutations with17 amino acid changes. New variants with additional mutations could become able to evade our currently available vaccines by weakening the ability of vaccine-induced antibodies to neutralize/block viral entry, and by strengthening the ability of the virus to enter the cells via surface receptors.
| 832 |
<h4>Viruses evolve past countermeasures – increased transmission and lethality</h4><p><strong>Diamandis 21</strong> [Eleftheriosi, biochemist specializing in clinical chemistry, Prof and Head of Clinical Biochemistry in the Dept of Laboratory Medicine and Pathobiology at the University of Toronto] “The Mother of All Battles: Viruses vs Humans. Can Humans Avoid Extinction in 50-100 Years?” Preprints, April 13, 2021, https://www.preprints.org/manuscript/202104.0397/v1<u> TG</p><p><mark>Viruses evolve continuously</mark>, eventually leading to <mark>variants</mark> that are <mark>more transmissible and</mark> some times more <mark>lethal</mark> than the original strains. The SARS-CoV-2 is a good contemporary example. Multiple variants of SARS-CoV-2 are rapidly spreading</u> and are becoming dominant in certain geographic areas (15, 16). For example, the B.1.1.7 variant (United Kingdom) has 23 mutations and 17 amino acid changes; variant 501Y.V2 (South Africa) has 23 mutations and 17 amino acid changes and P.1 variant (Brazil) has approximately 35 mutations with17 amino acid changes. <u><mark>New variants with</mark> additional <mark>mutations</mark> could become able to <mark>evade</mark> our currently <mark>available vaccines by weakening</mark> the ability of vaccine-induced <mark>antibodies</mark> to neutralize/block viral entry, <mark>and</mark> by <mark>strengthening</mark> the ability of <mark>the virus</mark> to enter the cells via surface receptors.</p></u>
| null | null |
Adv – Pandemics – Long
| 9,760 | 316 | 7,912 |
./documents/hsld22/CharlotteLatin/EvLi/CharlotteLatin-EvLi-Aff-Mid-America-Cup-Round-4.docx
| 928,966 |
A
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Mid America Cup
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4
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Eagan Aerin Engelstad
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Shi
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Telehealth 1AC
T-Essential Services, AI CP, Tax CP
Condo Bad, Process CP Bad, All
Condo Bad, Process CP Bad, AI CP
Process CP Bad
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hsld22/CharlotteLatin/EvLi/CharlotteLatin-EvLi-Aff-Mid-America-Cup-Round-4.docx
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2022-09-25 01:16:03
| 79,975 |
EvLi
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Charlotte Latin EvLi
| null |
Ev.....
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Li.....
| null | null | 26,546 |
CharlotteLatin
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Charlotte Latin
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NC
| null | 2,003 |
hsld22
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HS LD 2022-23
| 2,022 |
ld
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hs
| 1 |
4,629,519 |
Exclusion is seen as a double-standard—enflames populism and decks EU unity.
|
Stanishev ’17
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Stanishev ’17 [Sergei; 12-12-17; Bulgarian MEP and president of the Party of European Socialists. EURACTIV; “Four (and a half) reasons why Schengen would be better off with Bulgaria and Romania,” https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/opinion/four-and-a-half-reasons-why-schengen-would-be-better-off-with-bulgaria-and-romania/] brett
|
It’s been more than seven years since Bulgaria and Romania fulfilled all legal and technical requirements for joining the Schengen area it has been certified on several occasions by the European Council, the Council of Ministers, the Parliament and the Commission
abolition of internal border controls has been one of the greatest and most tangible achievements of European integration Building trust, ensuring safety and removing walls
free movement of people, goods, services and capital fosters our sense of belonging to a common entity a common space of shared freedom, peace and prosperity It is the essence of the EU’s sense of self
the citizens of Bulgaria and Romania do not enjoy this benefit yet due to political inaction.
Political inaction fuels populist voices
The cost of this political inaction is deep and wide It reinforces populist voices in a number of member states who use this as an example of double standards bashing the EU institutions for treating Eastern Europeans as second-class citizens
foments a feeling of injustice and erodes the popularity of the EU in our societies undermining public support for common European action in times when unity is most needed No wonder we see decreasing turnout in European elections, declining support for ‘traditional’ parties, and the rise of anti-EU forces
|
Bulgaria and Romania fulfilled all legal requirements certified by the Council Parliament and Commission
free movement fosters sense of belonging the essence of the EU’s sense of self
inaction fuels populist voices
double standards treating Eastern Europeans as second-class
foments injustice undermining unity No wonder we see decreasing turnout and anti-EU forces
|
It’s been more than seven years since Bulgaria and Romania fulfilled all legal and technical requirements for joining the Schengen area. This is not just another political fairy tale – it has been certified on several occasions by the European Council, the Council of Ministers, the Parliament and the Commission.
Why do we want it, why now, and why would it make everyone better off?
Free movement is among the most recognisable EU achievements
The abolition of internal border controls has been one of the greatest and most tangible achievements of European integration. Building trust, ensuring safety and removing walls after a long history of wars and bloodshed took many years.
The resulting free movement of people, goods, services and capital that we know today is what most fosters our sense of belonging to a common entity, a common space of shared freedom, peace and prosperity. It is the essence of the EU’s sense of self.
‘United in diversity’ for me means that we can be European and Bulgarian/Romanian/German/Dutch etc. Feeling European should not be a political position or a Brussels-bureaucrat label. It’s rather the notion of togetherness, having a lot in common despite the different ethnic or national backgrounds.
Today, we have TGV, Eurostar, even trams that travel between France and Germany – and going abroad no longer makes you feel like a foreigner. Different, maybe, but not a ‘foreigner’. Millions of Europeans now take this for granted and wouldn’t have it any other way.
However, the citizens of Bulgaria and Romania, as well as those travelling to or through these countries, do not enjoy this benefit yet due to political inaction.
Political inaction fuels populist voices
The cost of this political inaction is deep and wide. It reinforces populist voices in a number of member states who use this as an example of double standards, bashing the EU institutions for treating Eastern Europeans as second-class citizens.
This foments a feeling of injustice and erodes the popularity of the EU in our societies, ultimately further undermining public support for common European action in times when unity is most needed. No wonder we see decreasing turnout in European elections, declining support for ‘traditional’ parties, and the rise of anti-EU forces.
| 2,287 |
<h4><u>Exclusion</u> is seen as a <u>double-standard</u>—enflames <u>populism</u> and decks <u>EU unity</u>.</h4><p><strong>Stanishev ’17</strong> [Sergei; 12-12-17; Bulgarian MEP and president of the Party of European Socialists. EURACTIV; “Four (and a half) reasons why Schengen would be better off with Bulgaria and Romania,” https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/opinion/four-and-a-half-reasons-why-schengen-would-be-better-off-with-bulgaria-and-romania/] brett</p><p><u>It’s been more than <strong>seven years</strong> since <strong><mark>Bulgaria</strong> and <strong>Romania</strong></mark> <mark>fulfilled all</mark> <mark>legal</mark> and technical <mark>requirements</mark> for <strong>joining the Schengen area</u></strong>. This is not just another political fairy tale – <u>it has been <mark>certified</mark> on several occasions <mark>by the</mark> <strong>European <mark>Council</strong></mark>, the <strong>Council of Ministers</strong>, the <strong><mark>Parliament</strong> and</mark> the <strong><mark>Commission</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>Why do we want it, why now, and why would it make everyone better off?</p><p>Free movement is among the most recognisable EU achievements</p><p>The <u><strong>abolition of internal border controls</u></strong> <u>has been one of the greatest and most tangible achievements of <strong>European integration</u></strong>. <u><strong>Building trust, ensuring safety and removing walls</u></strong> after a long history of wars and bloodshed took many years.</p><p>The resulting <u><strong><mark>free movement</mark> of people, goods, services and capital</u></strong> that we know today is what most <u><mark>fosters</mark> our <strong><mark>sense of belonging</strong></mark> to a <strong>common entity</u></strong>, <u>a common space of shared freedom, peace and prosperity</u>. <u>It is <mark>the essence of the EU’s <strong>sense of self</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>‘United in diversity’ for me means that we can be European and Bulgarian/Romanian/German/Dutch etc. Feeling European should not be a political position or a Brussels-bureaucrat label. It’s rather the notion of togetherness, having a lot in common despite the different ethnic or national backgrounds.</p><p>Today, we have TGV, Eurostar, even trams that travel between France and Germany – and going abroad no longer makes you feel like a foreigner. Different, maybe, but not a ‘foreigner’. Millions of Europeans now take this for granted and wouldn’t have it any other way.</p><p>However, <u>the citizens of <strong>Bulgaria and Romania</u></strong>, as well as those travelling to or through these countries, <u>do not enjoy this benefit yet due to <strong>political inaction.</p><p>Political <mark>inaction fuels populist voices</p><p></strong></mark>The cost of this political inaction is <strong>deep</strong> and <strong>wide</u></strong>. <u>It reinforces populist voices in a number of member states who use this as an example of <strong><mark>double standards</u></strong></mark>, <u>bashing the <strong>EU institutions</strong> for <mark>treating</mark> <strong><mark>Eastern Europeans</strong> as <strong>second-class</mark> citizens</u></strong>.</p><p>This <u><mark>foments</mark> a feeling of <strong><mark>injustice</strong></mark> and erodes the <strong>popularity</strong> of the EU in our societies</u>, ultimately further <u><mark>undermining</mark> <strong>public support</strong> for common European action in times when <strong><mark>unity</strong></mark> is most needed</u>. <u><mark>No wonder we see</mark> <strong><mark>decreasing turnout</strong></mark> in European elections, <strong>declining support</strong> for ‘<strong>traditional’</strong> parties, <mark>and</mark> the rise of <strong><mark>anti-EU forces</u></strong></mark>.</p>
| null | null |
1AC—ADV—Unity
| 1,705,363 | 96 | 153,869 |
./documents/hsld22/Westwood/DaLi/Westwood-DaLi-Aff-The-48th-Churchill-Classic-TOC-and-NIETOC-Qualifier-Round-4.docx
| 960,391 |
A
|
The 48th Churchill Classic TOC and NIETOC Qualifier
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4
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CypWoo Christopher Lester
|
Myers
|
1AC - Romania
2NR - nothing :(
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hsld22/Westwood/DaLi/Westwood-DaLi-Aff-The-48th-Churchill-Classic-TOC-and-NIETOC-Qualifier-Round-4.docx
|
2023-01-07 18:38:34
| 80,293 |
DaLi
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Westwood DaLi
|
Hi
If you're aff please for the love of everything good do not read a 1ar theory restart. I hate these debates with a passion and they only incentivize writing theory blocks all day and not actual prep. Condo bad, PICs bad, sure, but all I ask is that you actually try to engage the negative strategy on a substantive level.
I will not make this an argument in the debate but hopefully we can have mutual respect :)
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Da.....
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Li.....
| null | null | 26,697 |
Westwood
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Westwood
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TX
| 10,966 | 2,003 |
hsld22
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HS LD 2022-23
| 2,022 |
ld
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hs
| 1 |
4,654,906 |
Extinction
|
Starr 22
|
Starr 22, Steven. “Fred Reed Indicates What Nuclear War Would Be Like, but Steven Starr’s Comment Better Describes the Death of the Planet,” Oct 24, 2022, https://www.paulcraigroberts.org/2022/10/24/fred-reed-indicates-what-nuclear-war-would-be-like-but-steven-starrs-comment-better-describes-the-death-of-the-planet/ TG
|
Russia has about 700 strategic nuclear warheads that each have an explosive power of 800,000 tons of TNT among the “launch-ready” weapons they can launch in a few minutes time. Each of these warheads will ignite fires over an area of 150 square miles these fires will coalesce into a single gigantic nuclear firestorm hurricane force winds blowing towards the center of the fire zone. No one in the fire zone will survive
A war fought with hundreds or thousands of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons would ignite immense nuclear firestorms covering land surface areas of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles. Peer-reviewed studies have calculated that up to 180 million tons of smoke and soot would be created by these nuclear firestorms. See the https://nuclearfamine.org/ and http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/robock/robock_nwpapers.html for details.
Most of the smoke from these firestorms would rapidly rise above cloud level into the stratosphere, where it would rapidly spread around the earth. In a matter of a few weeks, a global stratospheric smoke layer would form, which would block up to 70% of warming sunlight from reaching earth’s surface The smoke, being above cloud level, could not be rained out and it would remain in the stratosphere for a decade or longer.
The loss of warming sunlight would cause daily temperatures to fall below freezing every day for up to 3 years in North American and Eurasia intense cold weather would endure for many years, preventing crops from being grown. Most humans and animal populations would perish from starvation.
a nuclear war would amount to a mass extinction event
|
nuclear firestorm hurricane force winds No one will survive
strategic nuclear weapons ignite immense nuclear firestorms tens of thousands of square miles 180 million tons of smoke
rapidly rise above cloud level into stratosphere spread around the earth global stratospheric smoke layer block 70% of sunlight not rained out for a decade or longer
freezing cold weather for many years, preventing crops perish from starvation
nuclear war mass extinction event
|
Russia has about 700 strategic nuclear warheads that each have an explosive power of 800,000 tons of TNT. These are among the “launch-ready” weapons they can launch in a few minutes time. Each of these warheads, on an average weather day, will ignite fires over an area of 150 square miles. In a matter of 10-15 minutes, these fires will coalesce into a single gigantic nuclear firestorm, with air temperatures of 500 -600 degrees Fahrenheit and hurricane force winds blowing towards the center of the fire zone. No one in the fire zone will survive the fire. For details, see an article that I co-authored in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “What would happen if an 800-kiloton nuclear warhead detonated above midtown Manhattan?”. https://thebulletin.org/2015/02/what-would-happen-if-an-800-kiloton-nuclear-warhead-detonated-above-midtown-manhattan/
A war fought with hundreds or thousands of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons would ignite immense nuclear firestorms covering land surface areas of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles. Peer-reviewed studies have calculated that up to 180 million tons of smoke and soot would be created by these nuclear firestorms. See the https://nuclearfamine.org/ and http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/robock/robock_nwpapers.html for details.
Most of the smoke from these firestorms would rapidly rise above cloud level into the stratosphere, where it would rapidly spread around the earth. In a matter of a few weeks, a global stratospheric smoke layer would form, which would block up to 70% of warming sunlight from reaching earth’s surface in the Northern Hemisphere and 35% in the Southern Hemisphere. The smoke, being above cloud level, could not be rained out and it would remain in the stratosphere for a decade or longer.
The loss of warming sunlight would cause daily temperatures to fall below freezing every day for up to 3 years in central North American and central Eurasia. The intense cold weather would endure for many years, preventing crops from being grown. Most humans and animal populations would perish from starvation.
Unfortunately, those in charge of the US military have rejected the findings of the scientific studies on nuclear winter. I wrote about this for the Federation of American Scientists, see “Turning a Blind Eye Towards Armageddon — U.S. Leaders Reject Nuclear Winter Studies” at https://fas.org/2017/01/turning-a-blind-eye-towards-armageddon-u-s-leaders-reject-nuclear-winter-studies/
In 2010, at the UN meetings of the First Committee, I asked Rose Gottemoeller and Anatoly Atonov (during their briefing on New START) if they were familiar with the new studies on nuclear winter, which predict that a US-Russian nuclear war would wipe out most of humanity. Both answered “no”.
Perhaps they have learned more about nuclear winter since 2010. But it is willful blindness to chose to ignore such information and criminal insanity to start a nuclear war that would amount to a mass extinction event.
| 3,006 |
<h4>Extinction</h4><p><strong>Starr 22</strong>, Steven. “Fred Reed Indicates What <u>Nuclear War Would Be Like</u>, but Steven Starr’s Comment Better Describes the <u>Death of the Planet</u>,” Oct 24, 2022, https://www.paulcraigroberts.org/2022/10/24/fred-reed-indicates-what-nuclear-war-would-be-like-but-steven-starrs-comment-better-describes-the-death-of-the-planet/ TG</p><p><u>Russia has about 700 strategic nuclear warheads that each have an explosive power of 800,000 tons of TNT</u>. These are <u>among the “launch-ready” weapons they can launch in a few minutes time. Each of these warheads</u>, on an average weather day, <u>will ignite fires over an area of 150 square miles</u>. In a matter of 10-15 minutes, <u>these fires will coalesce into a single gigantic <mark>nuclear firestorm</u></mark>, with air temperatures of 500 -600 degrees Fahrenheit and <u><mark>hurricane force winds</mark> blowing towards the center of the fire zone. <mark>No<strong> </strong>one</mark> in the fire zone <mark>will survive</u></mark> the fire. For details, see an article that I co-authored in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “What would happen if an 800-kiloton nuclear warhead detonated above midtown Manhattan?”. https://thebulletin.org/2015/02/what-would-happen-if-an-800-kiloton-nuclear-warhead-detonated-above-midtown-manhattan/</p><p><u>A war fought with hundreds or thousands of U.S. and Russian <mark>strategic nuclear weapons</mark> would <mark>ignite immense nuclear firestorms</mark> covering land surface areas of many thousands or <mark>tens of thousands of square miles</mark>. Peer-reviewed studies have calculated that up to <mark>180 million tons of smoke</mark> and soot would be created by these nuclear firestorms. See the https://nuclearfamine.org/ and http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/robock/robock_nwpapers.html for details.</p><p>Most of the smoke from these firestorms would <mark>rapidly rise above cloud level into</mark> the <mark>stratosphere</mark>, where it would rapidly <mark>spread around the earth</mark>. In a matter of a few weeks, a <mark>global stratospheric smoke layer</mark> would form, which would <mark>block</mark> up to <mark>70% of</mark> warming <mark>sunlight</mark> from reaching earth’s surface</u> in the Northern Hemisphere and 35% in the Southern Hemisphere. <u>The smoke, being above cloud level, could <mark>not</mark> be <mark>rained out</mark> and it would remain in the stratosphere <mark>for a decade or longer</mark>.</p><p>The loss of warming sunlight would cause daily temperatures to fall below <mark>freezing</mark> every day for up to 3 years in</u> central <u>North American and</u> central <u>Eurasia</u>. The <u>intense <mark>cold weather</mark> would endure <mark>for many years, preventing crops</mark> from being grown. Most humans and animal populations would <mark>perish from starvation</mark>.</p><p></u>Unfortunately, those in charge of the US military have rejected the findings of the scientific studies on nuclear winter. I wrote about this for the Federation of American Scientists, see “Turning a Blind Eye Towards Armageddon — U.S. Leaders Reject Nuclear Winter Studies” at https://fas.org/2017/01/turning-a-blind-eye-towards-armageddon-u-s-leaders-reject-nuclear-winter-studies/</p><p>In 2010, at the UN meetings of the First Committee, I asked Rose Gottemoeller and Anatoly Atonov (during their briefing on New START) if they were familiar with the new studies on nuclear winter, which predict that a US-Russian nuclear war would wipe out most of humanity. Both answered “no”.</p><p>Perhaps they have learned more about nuclear winter since 2010. But it is willful blindness to chose to ignore such information and criminal insanity to start <u>a <mark>nuclear war</u></mark> that <u>would amount to a <mark>mass extinction event</u></mark>.</p>
|
1AC—Hukou
| null |
Advantage
| 1,727,571 | 139 | 161,462 |
./documents/hsld22/Brophy/ChCh/Brophy-ChCh-Aff-37th-Annual-Stanford-Invitational-Round-1.docx
| 973,975 |
A
|
37th Annual Stanford Invitational
|
1
|
Sugar Land SpiderSmart VS
|
JAMES STUCKERT
|
1ac - hukou
1nc - Hobbes nc, moral anti-realism
1ar - all + hobbes voter
2nr - all
2ar - voter
|
hsld22/Brophy/ChCh/Brophy-ChCh-Aff-37th-Annual-Stanford-Invitational-Round-1.docx
|
2023-02-11 17:55:32
| 79,633 |
ChCh
|
Brophy ChCh
| null |
Ch.....
|
Ch.....
| null | null | 26,543 |
Brophy
|
Brophy
|
AZ
| null | 2,003 |
hsld22
|
HS LD 2022-23
| 2,022 |
ld
|
hs
| 1 |
4,796,916 |
Populism is low now – support has diminished post-COVID.
|
Taylor 22
|
Taylor 22 Chloe Taylor 1-17-2022 "Populist politics lost support globally during the pandemic, research finds" https://www.cnbc.com/2022/01/18/populist-politics-lost-support-during-the-pandemic-research-finds.html (news assistant at CNBC)//Elmer
|
Populist parties and politicians lost support all over the world during the coronavirus pandemic, a survey of more than half a million people has found. the study had more than half a million participants across 109 countries there are clear signs that the so-called “populist wave” — which saw radical and anti-establishment leaders, including former U.S. President Donald Trump, rise to power — could be diminishing mishandling of the Covid-19 crisis by populist leaders, a desire for stability and decline in polarizing attitudes were swaying public opinion away Foa added that support for anti-establishment parties had collapsed worldwide in a way that wasn’t being seen for more “mainstream” politicians This could help explain why populist leaders are struggling to mobilise support,” he said. Between the spring of 2020 and the final quarter of 2021, populist leaders have seen an average approval rating decline of 10 percentage points, the study found
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Populist parties lost support during coronavirus survey of half a million people the populist wave average approval rating decline of 10 percentage points
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Populist parties and politicians lost support all over the world during the coronavirus pandemic, a survey of more than half a million people has found. Published Tuesday by Cambridge University’s Bennett Institute for Public Policy, the study had more than half a million participants across 109 countries. The research team has been monitoring participants’ political attitudes since 2020. According to the report, there are clear signs that the so-called “populist wave” — which saw radical and anti-establishment leaders, including former U.S. President Donald Trump, rise to power — could be diminishing. The mishandling of the Covid-19 crisis by populist leaders, a desire for stability and a decline in polarizing attitudes were swaying public opinion away from populist sentiment, researchers said. Populist leaders were also considered to be less trustworthy as sources of Covid-related information than their centrist counterparts, the poll found. The pandemic prompted a shift toward technocratic politics, the paper said, which bolstered trust in governments and experts such as scientists. “The story of politics in recent years has been the emergence of anti-establishment politicians who thrive on the growing distrust of experts,” Roberto Foa, the report’s lead author, said in a press release Tuesday. “From [Turkey’s] Erdogan and [Brazil’s] Bolsonaro to the ‘strong men’ of Eastern Europe, the planet has experienced a wave of political populism. Covid-19 may have caused that wave to crest.” Foa added that support for anti-establishment parties had collapsed worldwide in a way that wasn’t being seen for more “mainstream” politicians. Co-author Xavier Romero-Vidal added that the pandemic had created “a sense of shared purpose that may have reduced the political polarization we’ve seen over the last decade.” “This could help explain why populist leaders are struggling to mobilise support,” he said. Between the spring of 2020 and the final quarter of 2021, populist leaders have seen an average approval rating decline of 10 percentage points, the study found. In Europe, the proportion of people intending to vote for a populist party fell by an average of 11 percentage points to 27% during the same period.
| 2,234 |
<h4>Populism is <u>low now</u> – support has diminished post-COVID.</h4><p><strong>Taylor 22</strong> Chloe Taylor 1-17-2022 "Populist politics lost support globally during the pandemic, research finds" <u>https://www.cnbc.com/2022/01/18/populist-politics-lost-support-during-the-pandemic-research-finds.html</u> (news assistant at CNBC)//Elmer</p><p><u><strong><mark>Populist parties</u></strong> <u></mark>and politicians</u> <u><strong><mark>lost support</u></strong> <u></mark>all over the world <strong><mark>during</strong> </mark>the <strong><mark>coronavirus</strong> </mark>pandemic, a <strong><mark>survey of </strong></mark>more than <strong><mark>half a million people</strong> </mark>has found.</u> Published Tuesday by Cambridge University’s Bennett Institute for Public Policy, <u>the study had more than half a million participants across 109 countries</u>. The research team has been monitoring participants’ political attitudes since 2020. According to the report, <u>there are clear signs that <strong><mark>the</strong> </mark>so-called “<strong><mark>populist wave</strong></mark>” — which saw radical and anti-establishment leaders, including former U.S. President Donald Trump, rise to power — could be <strong>diminishing</u></strong>. The <u><strong>mishandling of</u></strong> <u>the</u> <u><strong>Covid</strong>-19 crisis by populist leaders, a</u> <u><strong>desire for stability</u></strong> <u><strong>and</u></strong> a <u><strong>decline</u></strong> <u><strong>in polarizing attitudes</u></strong> <u>were</u> <u><strong>swaying public opinion away</u></strong> from populist sentiment, researchers said. Populist leaders were also considered to be less trustworthy as sources of Covid-related information than their centrist counterparts, the poll found. The pandemic prompted a shift toward technocratic politics, the paper said, which bolstered trust in governments and experts such as scientists. “The story of politics in recent years has been the emergence of anti-establishment politicians who thrive on the growing distrust of experts,” Roberto Foa, the report’s lead author, said in a press release Tuesday. “From [Turkey’s] Erdogan and [Brazil’s] Bolsonaro to the ‘strong men’ of Eastern Europe, the planet has experienced a wave of political populism. Covid-19 may have caused that wave to crest.” <u>Foa added that support for anti-establishment parties had collapsed worldwide in a way that wasn’t being seen for more “mainstream” politicians</u>. Co-author Xavier Romero-Vidal added that the pandemic had created “a sense of shared purpose that may have reduced the political polarization we’ve seen over the last decade.” “<u>This could help explain why populist leaders are struggling to mobilise support,” he said. Between the spring of 2020 and the final quarter of 2021, populist leaders have seen an <strong><mark>average approval rating decline of 10 percentage points</strong></mark>, the study found</u>. In Europe, the proportion of people intending to vote for a populist party fell by an average of 11 percentage points to 27% during the same period.</p>
| null |
1
| null | 49 | 109 | 168,126 |
./documents/hsld22/StrakeJesuitCollegePreparatory/MiSt/StrakeJesuitCollegePreparatory-MiSt-Neg-49th-Harvard-National-Forensics-Tournament-Triples.docx
| 981,495 |
N
|
49th Harvard National Forensics Tournament
|
Triples
|
Chaminade ZS
|
Niya Flemming-Rodriguez, Antonina Clementi, Amanda Ciocca
|
1AC - Trad
1N - Populism - Solve Climate CP - Brain Drain - Case
1AR - All
2NR - CP - Populism
2AR - Case - Populism - CP
|
hsld22/StrakeJesuitCollegePreparatory/MiSt/StrakeJesuitCollegePreparatory-MiSt-Neg-49th-Harvard-National-Forensics-Tournament-Triples.docx
|
2023-02-20 01:23:17
| 80,551 |
MiSt
|
Strake Jesuit College Preparatory MiSt
| null |
Mi.....
|
St.....
| null | null | 27,049 |
StrakeJesuitCollegePreparatory
|
Strake Jesuit College Preparatory
|
TX
| 36,501 | 2,003 |
hsld22
|
HS LD 2022-23
| 2,022 |
ld
|
hs
| 1 |
759,463 |
Goes nuclear
|
Pazner 8
|
Pazner 8 (Michael J., Faculty – New York Institute of Finance, Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, p. 137-138)
|
The rise in protectionism will bring about dangerous confrontations Disputes will become commonplace tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters nations may divert attention from domestic problems by channeling populist sentiment toward other countries terrorist groups will boost the frequency and scale of attacks Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling by rogue nations China will assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan while Iran may embark on overt colonization Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will cause widespread destruction Many will interpret conflicts as the beginnings of a new world war
|
protectionism will bring about dangerous confrontations tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters nations may divert populist sentiment toward other countries terrorist groups will boost the frequency and scale of attacks China will assume a belligerent posture toward Taiwan while Iran may embark on overt colonization biological or nuclear weapons will cause widespread destruction as the beginnings of a new world war
|
The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientists at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.
| 2,565 |
<h4>Goes <u>nuclear</h4><p></u><strong>Pazner 8</strong> (Michael J., Faculty – New York Institute of Finance, Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, p. 137-138)</p><p><u>The rise in</u> isolationism and <u><mark>protectionism will bring about</u></mark> ever more heated arguments and <u><mark>dangerous confrontations</u></mark> over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. <u>Disputes</u> over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources <u>will become</u> more <u>commonplace</u>. Around the world, such <u><mark>tensions will give rise to <strong>full-scale military encounters</u></strong></mark>, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, <u><mark>nations may</u></mark> look to <u><mark>divert</u> <u></mark>attention</u> away <u>from domestic problems by channeling</u> frustration and <u><mark>populist sentiment toward other countries</u></mark> and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, <u><mark>terrorist groups will</u></mark> likely <u><mark>boost the frequency and scale of</u></mark> their horrifying <u><mark>attacks</u></mark>, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. <u>Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling</u> and interdictions <u>by rogue nations</u> running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. <u><mark>China will</u></mark> likely <u><mark>assume a</mark>n increasingly <strong><mark>belligerent posture</strong> toward Taiwan</u></mark>, <u><mark>while Iran may embark on <strong>overt colonization</u></strong></mark> of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientists at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. <u>Terrorists employing <strong><mark>biological</strong> or <strong>nuclear weapons</strong> will</u> </mark>vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to <u><mark>cause <strong>widespread destruction</u></strong></mark>. <u>Many will interpret</u> stepped-up <u>conflicts</u> between Muslims and Western societies <u><mark>as the</u></mark> <u><mark>beginnings of a new <strong>world war</u></strong></mark>. </p>
|
Round 3 vs. James Madison MP
|
1AC
|
WTO – 1AC
| 39,217 | 627 | 17,724 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Georgia/PaMa/Georgia-Patel-Marshall-Aff-GSU-Round3.docx
| 566,400 |
A
|
GSU
|
3
|
James Madison MP
|
Joe Herndon
|
1AC - Online Gambling with black markets (terrorism and balkan instability) WTO with protectionism
1NC Taoism K Terrorism DA Midterms
2NR Taoism K
|
ndtceda14/Georgia/PaMa/Georgia-Patel-Marshall-Aff-GSU-Round3.docx
| null | 48,549 |
PaMa
|
Georgia PaMa
| null |
Fl.....
|
Pa.....
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Ka.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,774 |
Georgia
|
Georgia
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
756,462 |
Life is a pre-requisite to death’s symbolic value
|
Kalnow 9
|
Kalnow 9 (Cara, A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of MPhil at the University of St. Andrews “WHY DEATH CAN BE BAD AND IMMORTALITY IS WORSE”, https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/10023/724/3/Cara%20Kalnow%20MPhil%20thesis.PDF)
|
our lives accumulate value through the satisfaction of our desires beyond the boundaries of the natural termination of life. But finitude is a necessary condition for the value of life as such and our human values rely on the finite temporal structure of life the finitude of life is instrumentally good as it provides the recognition that life itself is valuable. Although the finitude of life cannot be an evil, this conclusion was not reached from the Epicurean arguments against the badness of death my position still negotiates a middle ground between the Epicureans and Williams it is rational to fear death and regard it as an evil to be avoided we can rationally fear our future deaths, as categorical desires provide a disutility by which the prospect of death is rationally held as an evil to be avoided Epicureans were right: death—when it occurs—is nothing to us it is rational to fear death not because death is bad, but rather because the prospect of our deaths may be presented to us as bad for us if our deaths would prevent the satisfaction of our categorical desires. Though we have good reasons to rationally regard the prospect of our own death as an evil for us, the fact that life is finite cannot be an evil and is in fact instrumentally good, because it takes the threat of losing life to recognize that life as such is valuable even though death cannot be of any moral worth for us once it occurs, we can attach two distinct values to death while we are alive: we can attach a value of disutility (or utility) to the prospect of our deaths, and we must attach an instrumentally good value to the fact of death as such. How to decide on the balance of those values is a matter for psychological judgment.
|
our lives accumulate value through satisfaction of our desires finitude is a necessary condition for the value of life finitude provides recognition that life itself is valuable this conclusion was not reached from arguments against the badness of death it is rational to fear death and regard it as an evil to be avoided it is rational because the prospect may be presented as bad for us if our deaths would prevent the satisfaction of our categorical desires it takes the threat of losing life to recognize that life as such is valuable we can attach distinct values to death while we are alive: we can attach a value of disutility (or utility) to the prospect How to decide those values is a matter for judgment
|
(PA) also provided us with good reason to reject the Epicurean claim that the finitude of life cannot be bad for us. With (PA), we saw that our lives could accumulate value through the satisfaction of our desires beyond the boundaries of the natural termination of life. But Chapter Four determined that the finitude of life is a necessary condition for the value of life as such and that many of our human values rely on the finite temporal structure of life. I therefore argued that an indefinite life cannot present a desirable alternative to our finite life, because life as such would not be recognized as valuable. In this chapter, I have argued that the finitude of life is instrumentally good as it provides the recognition that life itself is valuable. Although I ultimately agree with the Epicureans that the finitude of life cannot be an evil, this conclusion was not reached from the Epicurean arguments against the badness of death, and I maintain that (HA) and (EA) are insufficient to justify changing our attitudes towards our future deaths and the finitude of life. Nonetheless, the instrumental good of the finitude of life that we arrived at through the consideration of immortality should make us realize that the finitude of life cannot be an evil; it is a necessary condition for the recognition that life as such is valuable.¶ Although my arguments pertaining to the nature of death and its moral implications have yielded several of the Epicurean conclusions, my position still negotiates a middle ground between the Epicureans and Williams, as (PA) accounts for the intuition that it is rational to fear death and regard it as an evil to be avoided. I have therefore reached three of the Epicurean conclusions pertaining to the moral worth of the nature of death: (1) that the state of being dead is nothing to us, (2) death simpliciter is nothing to us, and (3) the finitude of life is a matter for contentment. But against the Epicureans, I have argued that we can rationally fear our future deaths, as categorical desires provide a disutility by which the prospect of death is rationally held as an evil to be avoided. Finally, I also claimed against the Epicureans, that the prospect of death can rationally be regarded as morally good for one if one no longer desires to continue living.¶ 5.3 Conclusion¶ I began this thesis with the suggestion that in part, the Epicureans were right: death—when it occurs—is nothing to us. I went on to defend the Epicurean position against the objections raised by the deprivation theorists and Williams. I argued that the state of being dead, and death simpliciter, cannot be an evil of deprivation or prevention for the person who dies because (once dead), the person—and the grounds for any misfortune—cease to exist. I accounted for the anti-Epicurean intuition 115 that it is rational to fear death and to regard death as an evil to be avoided, not because death simpliciter is bad, but rather because the prospect of our deaths may be presented to us as bad for us if our deaths would prevent the satisfaction of our categorical desires. Though we have good reasons to rationally regard the prospect of our own death as an evil for us, the fact that life is finite cannot be an evil and is in fact instrumentally good, because it takes the threat of losing life to recognize that life as such is valuable. In this chapter, I concluded that even though death cannot be of any moral worth for us once it occurs, we can attach two distinct values to death while we are alive: we can attach a value of disutility (or utility) to the prospect of our own individual deaths, and we must attach an instrumentally good value to the fact of death as such. How to decide on the balance of those values is a matter for psychological judgment.
| 3,802 |
<h4>Life is a pre-requisite to death’s symbolic value</h4><p><strong>Kalnow 9<u></strong> (Cara, A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of MPhil at the University of St. Andrews “WHY DEATH CAN BE BAD AND IMMORTALITY IS WORSE”, https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/10023/724/3/Cara%20Kalnow%20MPhil%20thesis.PDF)</p><p></u>(PA) also provided us with good reason to reject the Epicurean claim that the finitude of life cannot be bad for us. With (PA), we saw that <u><strong><mark>our lives</u></strong></mark> could <u><strong><mark>accumulate value through</mark> the <mark>satisfaction of our desires</mark> beyond the boundaries of the natural termination of life. But </u></strong>Chapter Four determined that the <u><strong><mark>finitude</u></strong></mark> of life <u><strong><mark>is a necessary condition for the value of life</mark> as such and</u></strong> that many of <u><strong>our human values rely on the finite temporal structure of life</u></strong>. I therefore argued that an indefinite life cannot present a desirable alternative to our finite life, because life as such would not be recognized as valuable. In this chapter, I have argued that <u><strong>the <mark>finitude</mark> of life is instrumentally good as it <mark>provides</mark> the <mark>recognition that life itself is valuable</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>Although</u></strong> I ultimately agree with the Epicureans that <u><strong>the finitude of life cannot be an evil, <mark>this conclusion was not reached from</mark> the Epicurean <mark>arguments against the badness of death</u></strong></mark>, and I maintain that (HA) and (EA) are insufficient to justify changing our attitudes towards our future deaths and the finitude of life. Nonetheless, the instrumental good of the finitude of life that we arrived at through the consideration of immortality should make us realize that the finitude of life cannot be an evil; it is a necessary condition for the recognition that life as such is valuable.¶ Although my arguments pertaining to the nature of death and its moral implications have yielded several of the Epicurean conclusions, <u><strong>my position still negotiates a middle ground between the Epicureans and Williams</u></strong>, as (PA) accounts for the intuition that <u><strong><mark>it is rational to fear death and regard it as an evil to be avoided</u></strong></mark>. I have therefore reached three of the Epicurean conclusions pertaining to the moral worth of the nature of death: (1) that the state of being dead is nothing to us, (2) death simpliciter is nothing to us, and (3) the finitude of life is a matter for contentment. But against the Epicureans, I have argued that <u><strong>we can rationally fear our future deaths, as categorical desires provide a disutility by which the prospect of death is rationally held as an evil to be avoided</u></strong>. Finally, I also claimed against the Epicureans, that the prospect of death can rationally be regarded as morally good for one if one no longer desires to continue living.¶ 5.3 Conclusion¶ I began this thesis with the suggestion that in part, the <u><strong>Epicureans were right: death—when it occurs—is nothing to us</u></strong>. I went on to defend the Epicurean position against the objections raised by the deprivation theorists and Williams. I argued that the state of being dead, and death simpliciter, cannot be an evil of deprivation or prevention for the person who dies because (once dead), the person—and the grounds for any misfortune—cease to exist. I accounted for the anti-Epicurean intuition 115 that <u><strong><mark>it is rational </mark>to fear death</u></strong> and to regard death as an evil to be avoided, <u><strong>not because death</u> </strong>simpliciter <u><strong>is bad, but rather <mark>because the prospect</mark> of our deaths <mark>may be presented</mark> to us <mark>as bad for us if our deaths would prevent the satisfaction of our categorical desires</mark>. Though we have good reasons to rationally regard the prospect of our own death as an evil for us, the fact that life is finite cannot be an evil and is in fact instrumentally good, because <mark>it takes the threat of losing life to recognize that life as such is valuable</u></strong></mark>. In this chapter, I concluded that <u><strong>even though death cannot be of any moral worth for us once it occurs, <mark>we can attach</mark> two <mark>distinct values to death while we are alive: we can attach a value of disutility (or utility) to the prospect</mark> of our</u></strong> own individual <u><strong>deaths, and we must attach an instrumentally good value to the fact of death as such. <mark>How to decide</mark> on the balance of <mark>those values is a matter for</mark> psychological <mark>judgment</mark>.</p></u></strong>
|
UGA FB Round 5
|
1NC
|
Case
| 195,186 | 102 | 17,655 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Georgia/FeBo/Georgia-Feinberg-Boyce-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 566,371 |
N
|
Navy
|
5
|
Pittsburgh Chebrolu-Piekos
|
Sawyer
|
1AC PAS
1NC Keystone DA Death Penalty CP Healthcare Conditions CP T Case with PAS Bad
2NC Death Penalty CP Warming DA
1NR Case with PAS Bad
2NR CP PAS Bad
|
ndtceda14/Georgia/FeBo/Georgia-Feinberg-Boyce-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,545 |
FeBo
|
Georgia FeBo
| null |
Am.....
|
Fe.....
|
Tu.....
|
Bo.....
| 18,774 |
Georgia
|
Georgia
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
1,295,250 |
B). Deforestation
|
Goldstein 16
|
Dominik Goldstein 16, “Eliminating deforestation and forest degradation in order to prevent species from extinction, especially with regard to areas in Asia, Africa and South America,” http://www.balmun.de/fileadmin/2016/Research_Reports/RR_EC_I_Deforestation.pdf
|
Deforestation and forest degradation are the largest environmental problems our world is facing Not only does this threaten the balance of important environmental factors such as water cycles and greenhouse gas decomposition it also endangers many different species, as 80% of all biodiversity is found in forests The entire planet and its population rely on the fate of forests, it is vital that deforestation and forest degradation are tackled thoroughly
|
Deforestation and forest degradation are the largest environmental problems our world is facing Not only does this threaten water cycles and g h g decomposition it endangers many species 80% of all biodiversity is in forests. The entire planet and its population rely on the fate of forests
|
Deforestation and forest degradation are undoubtedly part of the largest environmental problems our world is facing today. Of the 16 million square kilometers of forest that once covered the earth’s surface, only 6.2 million remain up to date. 2.3 million have been destroyed between 2000 and 2012 alone. Not only does this threaten the balance of local important environmental factors such as water cycles and greenhouse gas decomposition and harm the economy and society of affected areas, but it also endangers many different species, as 80% of all biodiversity is found in forests. The entire planet and its population rely on the fate of forests, it is vital that the issues of deforestation and forest degradation are tackled thoroughly, however, it can only be achieved through close cooperation amongst all UN member nations.
| 833 |
<h4><strong>B). Deforestation</h4><p></strong>Dominik <strong>Goldstein 16</strong>, “Eliminating deforestation and forest degradation in order to prevent species from extinction, especially with regard to areas in Asia, Africa and South America,” http://www.balmun.de/fileadmin/2016/Research_Reports/RR_EC_I_Deforestation.pdf</p><p><u><mark>Deforestation and forest degradation are</u></mark> undoubtedly part of <u><mark>the <strong>largest environmental problems</strong> our world is facing</u></mark> today. Of the 16 million square kilometers of forest that once covered the earth’s surface, only 6.2 million remain up to date. 2.3 million have been destroyed between 2000 and 2012 alone. <u><mark>Not only does this threaten</mark> the balance of</u> local <u>important environmental factors such as <strong><mark>water cycles</strong> and <strong>g</strong></mark>reen<strong><mark>h</strong></mark>ouse <strong><mark>g</strong></mark>as <mark>decomposition</u></mark> and harm the economy and society of affected areas, but <u><mark>it</mark> also <strong><mark>endangers many</mark> different <mark>species</strong></mark>, as <strong><mark>80% of all biodiversity</strong> is</mark> found <mark>in forests</u>. <u><strong>The entire planet and its population</strong> rely on the fate of forests</mark>, it is vital that</u> the issues of <u>deforestation and forest degradation are tackled thoroughly</u><strong>, however, it can only be achieved through close cooperation amongst all UN member nations. </p></strong>
| null |
Case
|
1NC – Econ
| 33,584 | 151 | 32,616 |
./documents/hsld21/Harker/Sh1/Harker-Sheth-Neg-Apple%20Valley-Octas.docx
| 887,103 |
N
|
Apple Valley
|
Octas
|
Saratoga AG
|
Panel
|
1AC - US AG
1NC - T-Nebel T-Just CP-NLRB DA-Politics
2NR - CP-NLRB
|
hsld21/Harker/Sh1/Harker-Sheth-Neg-Apple%20Valley-Octas.docx
| null | 74,692 |
AnSh
|
Harker AnSh
| null |
An.....
|
Sh.....
| null | null | 25,008 |
Harker
|
Harker
|
CA
| null | 1,029 |
hsld21
|
HS LD 2021-22
| 2,021 |
ld
|
hs
| 1 |
3,664,470 |
The deliberative process of argument testing inculcates the skills necessary to address global existential risks like climate change
|
Lundberg 10
|
Lundberg 10 (Christian O. Lundberg 10 Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p311)
|
the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech debate builds capacity for critical thinking informed decision making, and better public judgment If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid change and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy place such a high premium on education Debate builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life. Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including issues of class, gender, and racial justice wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change threats to international stability and increasing challenges of rapid globalization More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with existential challenges
|
debate builds capacity for critical thinking informed decision making, Debate builds the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed debate plays a critical role in fostering problem-solving skills The unique combination argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life and serves as an unmatched practice for meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life. Expanding this practice is crucial to produce revisions of democratic life necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including class, gender, and racial justice environmental destruction climate change threats to international stability and challenges of globalization More than any specific policy an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill provides one of the best hopes for dealing with existential challenges
|
The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them. The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life. Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.
| 6,395 |
<h4>The deliberative process of argument testing inculcates the skills necessary to address global existential risks like climate change</h4><p><strong>Lundberg 10</strong> (Christian O. Lundberg 10 Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in <u>Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century</u> By Allan D. Louden, p311)</p><p>The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But <u>the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech</u>—as indicated earlier, <u><mark>debate builds capacity for <strong>critical thinking</u></strong></mark>, analysis of public claims, <u><strong><mark>informed decision making</strong>, </mark>and <strong>better public judgment</u></strong>. <u>If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid</u> scientific and technological <u>change</u> outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, <u>and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a <strong>puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate</u></strong>. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because <u>as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, <strong>the citizenry's capacities can change</strong>, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy</u> such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems <u>place such a high premium on education</u> (Dewey 1988,63, 154). <u><mark>Debate</u></mark> provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it <u><mark>builds</mark> precisely <mark>the skills that allow the citizenry <strong>to research and be informed</strong></mark> about policy decisions that impact them</u>, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them. <u>The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy</u>. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that <u><mark>debate</mark> in the college classroom <mark>plays a critical role in fostering</mark> the kind of <strong><mark>problem-solving skills</strong></mark> demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity</u>. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, <u>the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice</u> in the classroom as a technology <u><strong>for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities</u></strong>. <u><mark>The unique combination</mark> of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues <mark>argues for debate as a <strong>crucial component</strong> of a rich and vital democratic life</u></mark>. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, <u><mark>and serves as an unmatched practice for</mark> creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of <strong><mark>meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life.</strong></mark> <mark>Expanding this practice is crucial</mark>, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are <mark>to produce revisions of democratic life</mark> that are <mark>necessary if democracy is <strong>not only to survive, but to thrive.</u></strong> <u>Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including</u></mark>: domestic and international <u>issues of <mark>class, gender, and racial justice</u></mark>; <u>wholesale <strong><mark>environmental destruction</u></strong></mark> <u>and the potential for <strong>rapid <mark>climate change</u></strong></mark>; emerging <u><mark>threats to international stability</u></mark> in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; <u><mark>and</mark> increasing <mark>challenges of</mark> rapid <mark>globalization</u></mark> including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. <u><mark>More than any specific policy</mark> or proposal, <mark>an informed and active citizenry that <strong>deliberates with greater skill</u></strong></mark> and sensitivity <u><mark>provides one of <strong>the best hopes</strong> for</mark> responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for <mark>dealing with</u></mark> the <u><strong><mark>existential challenges</u></strong></mark> to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world. </p>
|
Liberty Round 3 – All Neg Docs vs. Binghampton MX
|
1NC
|
1
| 54,857 | 497 | 122,621 |
./documents/ndtceda16/Georgia/StRi/Georgia-Stupek-Rice-Neg-Liberty-Round3.docx
| 588,583 |
N
|
Liberty
|
3
|
Binghamton Montero-Xu
|
Poapst
|
1AC Geocommunism
1NC Framework Carbon Tax CP Econ DA Cap Good on Case
2NC Econ DA Framework Cap Good
1NR Carbon Tax CP Case Defense
2NR Econ DA Carbon Tax CP Case with Cap Good
|
ndtceda16/Georgia/StRi/Georgia-Stupek-Rice-Neg-Liberty-Round3.docx
| null | 50,259 |
StRi
|
Georgia StRi
| null |
Jo.....
|
St.....
|
Na.....
|
Ri.....
| 19,028 |
Georgia
|
Georgia
| null | null | 1,006 |
ndtceda16
|
NDT/CEDA 2016-17
| 2,016 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
3,838,292 |
Emissions cause acidification, causes food collapse
|
Griffin 15
|
Griffin 15 - emeritus professor of philosophy of religion at Claremont School of Theology and Claremont Graduate University, Co-Director of the Center for Process Studies
|
Although ocean acidification is sometimes called simply “the other CO2 problem,” Jane Lubchenco - who headed the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration – referred to it as global warming’s “equally evil twin.” 30 percent of our CO2 emissions have been absorbed by the ocean Tests have shown that “for more than 600,000 years the ocean had a pH of approximately 8.2 But since the industrial revolution, the ocean’s pH has dropped by 0.1 unit. That may not sound like much, “but pH is a logarithmic scale, so the decline in fact represents a whopping 30 percent increase in acidity.” the pH may drop down to 7.8, which “would correspond to a 150 percent increase in acidity since preindustrial times acidification eats out limestone caves. Its relevance here is that it does this to animals with chalky skeletons – that is, ones that calcify – “which make up more than a third of the planet’s marine life.” corals and plankton are the base of the marine food web. Phytoplankton Besides providing about half of the biosphere’s oxygen, phytoplankton also account for about half of the total organic matter on Earth they provide the basic currency for everything going on in the ocean they ultimately support all of our fishes a reduction in the ocean’s phytoplankton is extremely serious there has been an astounding reduction: 40 percent since the 1950s A 40 percent decline would represent a massive change to the global biosphere a decline of phytoplankton affects everything up the food chain phytoplankton are very sensitive to warmer water the North Atlantic’s water temperatures were “among the warmest on record” and the springtime plankton blooms of northern New England were well below normal Corals coral reefs play host to much of the oceans’ life. threatened by bleaching, which is caused by global warming, they are now further threatened Corals form their skeletons by means of calcium carbonate in the sea water As the water becomes more acidic, it is harder for the corals to calcify calcification rates of corals on the Great Barrier Reef have declined by 40 percent ut more CO2 into the air above and it dissolves into the oceans in the Caribbean many have either stopped growing or are on the threshold of starting to erode due to difficulty in accumulating sufficient calcium carbonate accumulation of carbonate is necessary for the reef to grow vertically corals, being plants, need to be close enough to the surface for sunlight to reach them. the pH level was “going down 10 to 20 times faster than the previous models predicted.” CO2 in the atmosphere is now at about 400 parts per million. If it reaches roughly 500 ppm you put calcification out of business in the oceans phytoplankton and corals will die, and their death will mean that crabs, clams, oysters, and scallops will disappear The disappearance of the phytoplankton will also lead to the death of sardines, which are just above them in the food chain Eventually, the disappearance of phytoplankton and corals will mean that all fish will go Continued rise in the acidity of the oceans will cause most of the world’s fisheries to experience a total bottom-up collapse the world’s largest source of protein, with over 2.6 billion people depending on it as their primary source of protein, the ocean also serves as the primary source of food for 3.5 billion people
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30 percent of CO2 have been absorbed by the ocean the decline represents 30 percent increase in acidity animals with chalky skeletons make up more than a third of the planet’s marine life corals and plankton are the base of the marine food web phytoplankton account for half of total organic matter they provide everything going on in the ocean phytoplankton are very sensitive to warmer water Corals play host to much of the oceans’ life. calcification rates have declined by 40 percent the pH level was “going down 20 times faster than models predicted the disappearance of phytoplankton and corals will mean that all fish will go Continued rise in acidity will cause total bottom-up collapse as the primary source of food for 3.5 billion people
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(David Ray, “Unprecedented: Can Civilization Survive the CO2 Crisis?”, P100-104, Clarity Press)
“The CO2 problem” has traditionally been understood as the fact that excessive CO2 produces global warming. But near the end of the 20th century, scientists started talking about a second CO2 problem, “ocean acidification” (although the term was not coined until 2003). Although ocean acidification is sometimes called simply “the other CO2 problem,” Jane Lubchenco - who headed the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration – referred to it as global warming’s “equally evil twin.” 33 Ocean acidification results from the fact that about 30 percent of our CO2 emissions have been absorbed by the ocean. This absorption keeps down the warming of the atmosphere that would otherwise be produced by these emissions. Far from sounding “evil,” this would seem to be a good thing, and scientists at first focused on this benefit. An article in Discover magazine said: “It all seemed so convenient: As our smokestacks and automobile tailpipes spewed ever more carbon dioxide into the air, the oceans absorbed the excess. Like a vast global vacuum cleaner, the world’s seas sucked CO2right out of the atmosphere, mitigating the dire consequences of global warming and forestalling the melting of glaciers, the submergence of coastlines, and extremes of weather from floods to droughts.” However, scientists now know that the oceans cannot absorb large quantities of CO2 with no serious consequences.34 Ocean acidification involves the ocean’s pH, changes in which make the water become either more alkaline or more acidic. Tests have shown that “for more than 600,000 years the ocean had a pH of approximately 8.2 (pH is the acidity of a solution measured on a 14-point scale).” But since the industrial revolution, the ocean’s pH has dropped by 0.1 unit. That may not sound like much, “but pH is a logarithmic scale, so the decline in fact represents a whopping 30 percent increase in acidity.” Moreover, the IPCC has said that if business as usual continues, the pH may drop down to 7.8, which “would correspond to a 150 percent increase in acidity since preindustrial times.”35 Why is acidification destructive? When CO2 is combined with water, it produces carbonic acid – which is the ingredient that, besides giving soft drinks their fizz, also eats out limestone caves. Its relevance here is that it does this to animals with chalky skeletons – that is, ones that calcify – “which make up more than a third of the planet’s marine life.” Elevating the percentage of carbonic acid will make it increasingly difficult for calcifying organisms to make their skeletons – organisms such as plankton, corals, sea butterflies, molluscs, crabs, clams, mussels, oysters, and snails.36 Most of us are, of course, especially interested in the ones we like to eat. More important for the cycle of life, however, are two tiny organisms, corals and plankton, which are at the base of the marine food web. Phytoplankton There are two basic types of plankton: phytoplankton, which are microscopic plants, and zooplankton, which are microscopic animals. The most basic type is phytoplankton, because they are capable of photosynthesis and are thereby the food for zooplankton (which in turn provide food for bigger animals). Besides providing about half of the biosphere’s oxygen, phytoplankton also, in the words of marine biologist Boris Worm, “account for about half of the total organic matter on Earth,” so they provide “the basic currency for everything going on in the ocean.” We do not, of course, feast directly on phytoplankton, but they “ultimately support all of our fishes.”37 Therefore, a reduction in the ocean’s phytoplankton is extremely serious:. A major study in 2010 has already indicated that there has been an astounding reduction: 40 percent since the 1950s. “A 40 percent decline,” said Worm (one of the study’s coauthors), “would represent a massive change to the global biosphere.” Indeed, he said, he could not think of a biological change that would be bigger. Referring to this 2010 study, Joe Romm said: “Scientists may have found the most devastating impact yet of human-caused global warming.” Explaining the importance of the study, its lead author, Daniel Boyce, said that “a decline of phytoplankton affects everything up the food chain.”38In 2013, additional studies suggested that phytoplankton are very sensitive to warmer water. In one study, scientists at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration reported on the normal spring surge of phytoplankton, which provides food for various types of fish when they are producing offspring. In the spring of 2013, the North Atlantic’s water temperatures were “among the warmest on record” and the springtime plankton blooms of northern New England were well below normal, “leading to the lowest levels ever seen for the tiny organisms.”39 Corals Corals form coral reefs, which have been called the “rainforests of the sea,” because they play host to much of the oceans’ life.40 Already threatened by bleaching, which is caused by global warming, they are now further threatened by global warming’s evil twin. Corals form their skeletons by means of calcium carbonate in the sea water. As the water becomes more acidic, it is harder for the corals to calcify. In the past 30 years, calcification rates of corals on the Great Barrier Reef have declined by 40 percent. “There’s not much debate,” said Professor Ove Hoegh-Guldberg of the University of Queensland, “about how [the decline] happens: put more CO2 into the air above and it dissolves into the oceans.”41This decline has not only occurred off Australia. A 2013 study of coral reefs in the Caribbean found that many of them “have either stopped growing or are on the threshold of starting to erode,” due to difficulty in accumulating sufficient calcium carbonate. The amount of new carbonate being added to the reefs was found to be far below historical rates, in some cases 70 percent lower. And yet the accumulation of carbonate is necessary for the reef to grow vertically, which is essential, given the rising sea level; corals, being plants, need to be close enough to the surface for sunlight to reach them. The leader of the study said: “Our estimates of current rates of reef growth in the Caribbean are extremely alarming.”42 Marine biologist Joanie Kleypas of the National Center for Atmospheric Research said she first understood the urgency of ocean acidification in 1998, while she was attending one of the first scientific meetings on the subject. “As she realized what rapidly rising acidity could mean for coral reef ecosystems, she left the room, went to the bathroom, and threw up.”43 A World without Seafood Acidification, which threatens both phytoplankton and corals, has speeded up. Professor Timothy Wootten of the University of Chicago reported in 2008 that the pH level was “going down 10 to 20 times faster than the previous models predicted.” The more it goes down, the more difficult it will be for organisms such as corals and phytoplankton to calcify. CO2 in the atmosphere is now at about 400 parts per million. If it reaches roughly 500 ppm, according to Ove Hoegh-Guldberg, “you put calcification out of business in the oceans.”44 If and when this occurs, phytoplankton and corals will die, and their death will mean that crabs, clams, oysters, and scallops will disappear. And they are already disappearing, faster every year. In the Pacific Northwest and British Columbia, the waters have become so acidic that the once-thriving shellfish industry there is on life support.” In 2014, scallop growers in a location near Vancouver, B.C., reported that 10 million scallops over the past two years had died, with the mortality rate hitting between 95 to 100 percent.45 The disappearance of the phytoplankton will also lead to the death of sardines, which are just above them in the food chain. And “the sardine population from California to Canada is vanishing,” resulting in starving sea lion and seal pups, and brown pelicans are showing signs of starvation, not raising any chicks in the past four years. Eventually, the disappearance of phytoplankton and corals will mean that all fish will go, as emphasized by a film subtitled Imagine a World without Fish. “Continued rise in the acidity of the oceans,” the script forewarns, “will cause most of the world’s fisheries to experience a total bottom-up collapse.”46 A world without fish and other kinds of seafood is hard to imagine. It would be even harder for the planet’s people to live without seafood: Besides being the world’s largest source of protein, with over 2.6 billion people depending on it as their primary source of protein, the ocean also serves as the primary source of food for 3.5 billion people.47 How would we survive if three and a half-billion people can no longer rely upon what has always been their primary source of food? “Global warming is incredibly serious,” said Hoegh-Guldberg, “but ocean acidification could be even more so.”48 Nevertheless, although the world’s governments have been warned about acidification for many years, already in 2010 the oceans were “acidifying 10 times faster today than 55 million years ago when a mass extinction of marine species occurred.” Probably not coincidentally, the NOAA in 2014 added 20 new species of coral to the list of threatened species.49
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<h4>Emissions cause acidification, causes food collapse</h4><p><strong>Griffin 15</strong> - emeritus professor of philosophy of religion at Claremont School of Theology and Claremont Graduate University, Co-Director of the Center for Process Studies</p><p>(David Ray, “Unprecedented: Can Civilization Survive the CO2 Crisis?”, P100-104, Clarity Press)</p><p>“The CO2 problem” has traditionally been understood as the fact that excessive CO2 produces global warming. But near the end of the 20th century, scientists started talking about a second CO2 problem, “ocean acidification” (although the term was not coined until 2003). <u><strong>Although ocean acidification is sometimes called simply “the other CO2 problem,” Jane Lubchenco - who headed the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration – referred to it as global warming’s “equally evil twin.” </u></strong>33 Ocean acidification results from the fact that about <u><strong><mark>30 percent of</mark> our <mark>CO2</mark> emissions <mark>have been absorbed by the ocean</u></strong></mark>. This absorption keeps down the warming of the atmosphere that would otherwise be produced by these emissions. Far from sounding “evil,” this would seem to be a good thing, and scientists at first focused on this benefit. An article in Discover magazine said: “It all seemed so convenient: As our smokestacks and automobile tailpipes spewed ever more carbon dioxide into the air, the oceans absorbed the excess. Like a vast global vacuum cleaner, the world’s seas sucked CO2right out of the atmosphere, mitigating the dire consequences of global warming and forestalling the melting of glaciers, the submergence of coastlines, and extremes of weather from floods to droughts.” However, scientists now know that the oceans cannot absorb large quantities of CO2 with no serious consequences.34 Ocean acidification involves the ocean’s pH, changes in which make the water become either more alkaline or more acidic. <u><strong>Tests have shown that “for more than 600,000 years the ocean had a pH of approximately 8.2</u></strong> (pH is the acidity of a solution measured on a 14-point scale).” <u><strong>But since the industrial revolution, the ocean’s pH has dropped by 0.1 unit. That may not sound like much, “but pH is a logarithmic scale, so <mark>the decline</mark> in fact <mark>represents</mark> a whopping <mark>30 percent increase in acidity</mark>.”</u></strong> Moreover, the IPCC has said that if business as usual continues, <u><strong>the pH may drop down to 7.8, which “would correspond to a 150 percent increase in acidity since preindustrial times</u></strong>.”35 Why is <u><strong>acidification</u></strong> destructive? When CO2 is combined with water, it produces carbonic acid – which is the ingredient that, besides giving soft drinks their fizz, also <u><strong>eats out limestone caves. Its relevance here is that it does this to <mark>animals with chalky skeletons</mark> – that is, ones that calcify – “which <mark>make up more than a third of the planet’s marine life</mark>.”</u></strong> Elevating the percentage of carbonic acid will make it increasingly difficult for calcifying organisms to make their skeletons – organisms such as plankton, corals, sea butterflies, molluscs, crabs, clams, mussels, oysters, and snails.36 Most of us are, of course, especially interested in the ones we like to eat. More important for the cycle of life, however, are two tiny organisms, <u><strong><mark>corals and plankton</u></strong></mark>, which <u><strong><mark>are</u></strong></mark> at <u><strong><mark>the base of the marine food web</mark>. Phytoplankton</u></strong> There are two basic types of plankton: phytoplankton, which are microscopic plants, and zooplankton, which are microscopic animals. The most basic type is phytoplankton, because they are capable of photosynthesis and are thereby the food for zooplankton (which in turn provide food for bigger animals). <u><strong>Besides providing about half of the biosphere’s oxygen, <mark>phytoplankton</mark> also</u></strong>, in the words of marine biologist Boris Worm, “<u><strong><mark>account for</mark> about <mark>half of</mark> the <mark>total organic matter</mark> on Earth</u></strong>,” so <u><strong><mark>they provide</u></strong></mark> “<u><strong>the basic currency for <mark>everything going on in the ocean</u></strong></mark>.” We do not, of course, feast directly on phytoplankton, but <u><strong>they</u></strong> “<u><strong>ultimately support all of our fishes</u></strong>.”37 Therefore, <u><strong>a reduction in the ocean’s phytoplankton is extremely serious</u></strong>:. A major study in 2010 has already indicated that <u><strong>there has been an astounding reduction: 40 percent since the 1950s</u></strong>. “<u><strong>A 40 percent decline</u></strong>,” said Worm (one of the study’s coauthors), “<u><strong>would represent a massive change to the global biosphere</u></strong>.” Indeed, he said, he could not think of a biological change that would be bigger. Referring to this 2010 study, Joe Romm said: “Scientists may have found the most devastating impact yet of human-caused global warming.” Explaining the importance of the study, its lead author, Daniel Boyce, said that “<u><strong>a decline of phytoplankton affects everything up the food chain</u></strong>.”38In 2013, additional studies suggested that <u><strong><mark>phytoplankton are very sensitive to warmer water</u></strong></mark>. In one study, scientists at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration reported on the normal spring surge of phytoplankton, which provides food for various types of fish when they are producing offspring. In the spring of 2013, <u><strong>the North Atlantic’s water temperatures were “among the warmest on record” and the springtime plankton blooms of northern New England were well below normal</u></strong>, “leading to the lowest levels ever seen for the tiny organisms.”39 <u><strong><mark>Corals</u></strong></mark> Corals form <u><strong>coral reefs</u></strong>, which have been called the “rainforests of the sea,” because they <u><strong><mark>play host to much of the oceans’ life.</u></strong></mark>40 Already <u><strong>threatened by bleaching, which is caused by global warming, they are now further threatened</u></strong> by global warming’s evil twin. <u><strong>Corals form their skeletons by means of calcium carbonate in the sea water</u></strong>. <u><strong>As the water becomes more acidic, it is harder for the corals to calcify</u></strong>. In the past 30 years, <u><strong><mark>calcification rates</mark> of corals on the Great Barrier Reef <mark>have declined by 40 percent</u></strong></mark>. “There’s not much debate,” said Professor Ove Hoegh-Guldberg of the University of Queensland, “about how [the decline] happens: p<u><strong>ut more CO2 into the air above and it dissolves into the oceans</u></strong>.”41This decline has not only occurred off Australia. A 2013 study of coral reefs <u><strong>in the Caribbean</u></strong> found that <u><strong>many</u></strong> of them “<u><strong>have either stopped growing or are on the threshold of starting to erode</u></strong>,” <u><strong>due to difficulty in accumulating sufficient calcium carbonate</u></strong>. The amount of new carbonate being added to the reefs was found to be far below historical rates, in some cases 70 percent lower. And yet the <u><strong>accumulation of carbonate is necessary for the reef to grow vertically</u></strong>, which is essential, given the rising sea level; <u><strong>corals, being plants, need to be close enough to the surface for sunlight to reach them.</u></strong> The leader of the study said: “Our estimates of current rates of reef growth in the Caribbean are extremely alarming.”42 Marine biologist Joanie Kleypas of the National Center for Atmospheric Research said she first understood the urgency of ocean acidification in 1998, while she was attending one of the first scientific meetings on the subject. “As she realized what rapidly rising acidity could mean for coral reef ecosystems, she left the room, went to the bathroom, and threw up.”43 A World without Seafood Acidification, which threatens both phytoplankton and corals, has speeded up. Professor Timothy Wootten of the University of Chicago reported in 2008 that <u><strong><mark>the pH level was “going down</mark> 10 to <mark>20 times faster than</mark> the previous <mark>models predicted</mark>.”</u></strong> The more it goes down, the more difficult it will be for organisms such as corals and phytoplankton to calcify. <u><strong>CO2 in the atmosphere is now at about 400 parts per million. If it reaches roughly 500 ppm</u></strong>, according to Ove Hoegh-Guldberg, “<u><strong>you put calcification out of business in the oceans</u></strong>.”44 If and when this occurs, <u><strong>phytoplankton and corals will die, and their death will mean that crabs, clams, oysters, and scallops will disappear</u></strong>. And they are already disappearing, faster every year. In the Pacific Northwest and British Columbia, the waters have become so acidic that the once-thriving shellfish industry there is on life support.” In 2014, scallop growers in a location near Vancouver, B.C., reported that 10 million scallops over the past two years had died, with the mortality rate hitting between 95 to 100 percent.45 <u><strong>The disappearance of the phytoplankton will also lead to the death of sardines, which are just above them in the food chain</u></strong>. And “the sardine population from California to Canada is vanishing,” resulting in starving sea lion and seal pups, and brown pelicans are showing signs of starvation, not raising any chicks in the past four years. <u><strong>Eventually, <mark>the disappearance of phytoplankton and corals will mean that all fish will go</u></strong></mark>, as emphasized by a film subtitled Imagine a World without Fish. “<u><strong><mark>Continued rise in</mark> the <mark>acidity</mark> of the oceans</u></strong>,” the script forewarns, “<u><strong><mark>will cause</mark> most of the world’s fisheries to experience a <mark>total bottom-up collapse</u></strong></mark>.”46 A world without fish and other kinds of seafood is hard to imagine. It would be even harder for the planet’s people to live without seafood: Besides being <u><strong>the world’s largest source of protein, with over 2.6 billion people depending on it as their primary source of protein, the ocean also serves <mark>as the primary source of food for 3.5 billion people</u></strong></mark>.47 How would we survive if three and a half-billion people can no longer rely upon what has always been their primary source of food? “Global warming is incredibly serious,” said Hoegh-Guldberg, “but ocean acidification could be even more so.”48 Nevertheless, although the world’s governments have been warned about acidification for many years, already in 2010 the oceans were “acidifying 10 times faster today than 55 million years ago when a mass extinction of marine species occurred.” Probably not coincidentally, the NOAA in 2014 added 20 new species of coral to the list of threatened species.49</p>
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1NC - T no qpqs DA JASTA CP CCS Warming adv counterplan K fem DA Russia
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1NR - CP CCS DA JASTA
2AR - Case Outweighs and Turns DA
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China is the lone holdout – getting them to an agreement creates broader IHL application to cyberspace
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Segal, 12
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Segal, 12 – Adam Segal, Ira A. Lipman Chair in Emerging Technologies and National Security and Director of the Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program at the Council on Foreign Relations, 10-2-2012, "Asia Unbound » China, International Law, and Cyberspace," Council on Foreign Relations - Asia Unbound, http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2012/10/02/china-international-law-and-cyberspace/
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. “International law principles do apply in cyberspace in 2004 he U.S. and UK declared IHL covered the use of information and communication technologies greater willingness of the administration to speak about offensive cyber capabilities At least one country has questioned whether existing bodies of international law apply to the cutting edge issues presented by the Internet existing international law is not up to the task, and that we need entirely new treaties to impose a unique set of rules on cyberspace China appears to be both “at least one country” and among the “some” who think new treaties are necessary Beijing’s opposition to the U.S. position stems in part because the focus is too narrow. Chinese analysts see extreme difficulties in applying LOAC) to new a domain failure to agree on these norms is destabilizing. One country may see its action as permissible, the other as an act of war we should study the feasibility of applying the principles of the Law of Armed Conflict to cyberspace and push for the formulation of a code of conduct for cyberconflict The most important driver may be that Beijing could soon find itself isolated. U S needs to keep engaging Beijing on this issue it is likely to get better traction with China by scheduling more meetings in other countries’ capitals.
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I law principles do apply in cyberspace, existing i law is not up to the task we need entirely new treaties to impose a unique set of rules on cyberspace China think new treaties are necessary Chinese see extreme difficulties in applying LOAC) to new a domain failure to agree on these norms is destabilizing we should study feasibility of applying L o A C to cyberspace and push for the formulation of a code of conduct for cyberconflict Beijing could soon find itself isolated U S needs to keep engaging Beijing on this issue
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Note: all experts on international law use “law of armed conflict” and “international humanitarian law” synonymously
In a speech two weeks ago, Harold Koh stated that the United States government believes that cyberattacks can amount to armed attacks and are subject to international law. “International law principles do apply in cyberspace,” said Koh. “Cyber activities that proximately result in death, injury, or significant destruction would likely be viewed as a use of force.” Self-defense, proportionality, neutrality, and distinction should all apply in cyberspace, though there remain questions and ambiguities about defining the use of force, distinguishing between military and civilian-use networks, and the continuing problem of attribution. This is not the first time the United States has made such an announcement—in 2004, for example, the U.S. and UK declared in a submission to the UN Secretary General that (IHL) international humanitarian law covered the use of information and communication technologies. But as the New York Times noted, the speech is part of a greater willingness of the administration to speak about offensive cyber capabilities. In his speech, Koh also noted that this view is not “universal”: At least one country has questioned whether existing bodies of international law apply to the cutting edge issues presented by the Internet. Some have also said that existing international law is not up to the task, and that we need entirely new treaties to impose a unique set of rules on cyberspace. China appears to be both “at least one country” and among the “some” who think new treaties are necessary. Given Chinese concerns about the free flow of information, Beijing’s opposition to the U.S. position stems in part because the focus is too narrow. The International Code of Conduct for Information Security, submitted to the UN by China and Russia along with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, is much more expansive, allowing countries room to interpret the spread of rumors, gossip, and other malicious information through the use of communication technologies as a security threat. In addition, through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Beijing has suggested that a new treaty is needed to “curb proliferation and use of information weapons . . .” Some Chinese analysts see extreme difficulties in applying the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) to new a domain. For example, Shi Haiming, a researcher at the National University of Defense Technology, argues that LOAC is not applicable because: cyberattacks, despite being acts of “aggression”, do not threaten territorial integrity or sovereignty; there can be no neutrality in cyberspace since attacks would undoubtedly transit through neutral countries networks; it is impossible to distinguish between civilian and military assets; and the proportionality requirement is much more difficult in cyberspace because of the expanse and penetration of the Internet and the difficulty in containing unintended effects of attacks. A failure to agree on these norms is destabilizing. One country may see its action as permissible, the other as an act of war. It is unclear how wedded Beijing is to its opposition to cyber and LOAC, and we could begin to see some modification of the Chinese position. Wang Tianlong of the China Center for International Economic Exchanges writing in the Shanghai Securities News last week argued “we should study the feasibility of applying the principles of the Law of Armed Conflict to cyberspace and push for the formulation of a code of conduct for cyberconflict.” The United States has certainly upped its rhetorical pressure on China over the last year. The more open discussion of offensive cyber has been accompanied by the increasing number of U.S. government officials naming and shaming Chinese hackers (the most recent is Rear Admiral Samuel Cox stating that the pace of attack was actually increasing). Secretary Clinton and Secretary Panetta both raised cyber with their Chinese counterparts during recent meetings. The most important driver may be that Beijing could soon find itself isolated. Russia has been much more receptive to discussing how LOAC applies to cyber, and has been less adamant about the International Code of Conduct in multilateral meetings recently. The United States needs to keep engaging Beijing on this issue, but, as with so many issues, it is likely to get better traction with China by scheduling more meetings in other countries’ capitals.
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<h4>China is the lone holdout – getting them to an agreement creates broader IHL application to cyberspace</h4><p><strong>Segal, 12</strong> – Adam Segal, Ira A. Lipman Chair in Emerging Technologies and National Security and Director of the Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program at the Council on Foreign Relations, 10-2-2012, "Asia Unbound » China, International Law, and Cyberspace," Council on Foreign Relations - Asia Unbound, http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2012/10/02/china-international-law-and-cyberspace/</p><p>Note: all experts on international law use “law of armed conflict” and “international humanitarian law” synonymously</p><p>In a speech two weeks ago, Harold Koh stated that the United States government believes that cyberattacks can amount to armed attacks and are subject to international law<u>. “<mark>I</mark>nternational <mark>law principles do apply in cyberspace</u>,</mark>” said Koh. “Cyber activities that proximately result in death, injury, or significant destruction would likely be viewed as a use of force.” Self-defense, proportionality, neutrality, and distinction should all apply in cyberspace, though there remain questions and ambiguities about defining the use of force, distinguishing between military and civilian-use networks, and the continuing problem of attribution. This is not the first time the United States has made such an announcement—<u>in 2004</u>, for example, t<u>he U.S. and UK declared</u> in a submission to the UN Secretary General that (<u>IHL</u>) international humanitarian law <u>covered the use of information and communication technologies</u>. But as the New York Times noted, the speech is part of a <u>greater willingness of the administration to speak about offensive cyber capabilities</u>. In his speech, Koh also noted that this view is not “universal”: <u>At least one country has questioned whether existing bodies of international law apply to the cutting edge issues presented by the Internet</u>. Some have also said that <u><strong><mark>existing</mark> <mark>i</mark>nternational <mark>law is not up to the task</mark>, and that <mark>we need entirely new treaties to impose a unique set of rules on cyberspace</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>China</strong></mark> appears to be both “at least one country” and among the “some” who <strong><mark>think new treaties are necessary</u></strong></mark>. Given Chinese concerns about the free flow of information, <u>Beijing’s opposition to the U.S. position stems in part because the focus is too narrow.</u> The International Code of Conduct for Information Security, submitted to the UN by China and Russia along with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, is much more expansive, allowing countries room to interpret the spread of rumors, gossip, and other malicious information through the use of communication technologies as a security threat. In addition, through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Beijing has suggested that a new treaty is needed to “curb proliferation and use of information weapons . . .” Some <u><strong><mark>Chinese</mark> analysts <mark>see extreme difficulties in applying</u></strong></mark> the Law of Armed Conflict (<u><strong><mark>LOAC) to new a domain</u></strong></mark>. For example, Shi Haiming, a researcher at the National University of Defense Technology, argues that LOAC is not applicable because: cyberattacks, despite being acts of “aggression”, do not threaten territorial integrity or sovereignty; there can be no neutrality in cyberspace since attacks would undoubtedly transit through neutral countries networks; it is impossible to distinguish between civilian and military assets; and the proportionality requirement is much more difficult in cyberspace because of the expanse and penetration of the Internet and the difficulty in containing unintended effects of attacks. A <u><strong><mark>failure to agree on these norms is destabilizing</strong></mark>. One country may see its action as permissible, the other as an act of war</u>. It is unclear how wedded Beijing is to its opposition to cyber and LOAC, and we could begin to see some modification of the Chinese position. Wang Tianlong of the China Center for International Economic Exchanges writing in the Shanghai Securities News last week argued “<u><mark>we should study</mark> the <mark>feasibility of applying</mark> the principles of the <mark>L</mark>aw <mark>o</mark>f <mark>A</mark>rmed <mark>C</mark>onflict <mark>to cyberspace and push for the formulation of a code of conduct for cyberconflict</u></mark>.” The United States has certainly upped its rhetorical pressure on China over the last year. The more open discussion of offensive cyber has been accompanied by the increasing number of U.S. government officials naming and shaming Chinese hackers (the most recent is Rear Admiral Samuel Cox stating that the pace of attack was actually increasing). Secretary Clinton and Secretary Panetta both raised cyber with their Chinese counterparts during recent meetings. <u>The most important driver may be that <mark>Beijing could soon find itself isolated</mark>.</u> Russia has been much more receptive to discussing how LOAC applies to cyber, and has been less adamant about the International Code of Conduct in multilateral meetings recently. The <u><strong><mark>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>needs to keep engaging Beijing on this issue</u></strong></mark>, but, as with so many issues, <u>it is likely to get better traction with China by scheduling more meetings in other countries’ capitals.</p></u>
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1AC
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Contention 3 is IHL
| 1,567,950 | 90 | 126,940 |
./documents/hspolicy16/MontgomeryBellAcademy/GrZe/Montgomery%20Bell%20Academy-Graham-Zeuthen-Aff-Chattahoochee-Round5.docx
| 663,104 |
A
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Chattahoochee
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5
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Northview GD
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1AC- Cyber
2NR- Security K T mil
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hspolicy16/MontgomeryBellAcademy/GrZe/Montgomery%20Bell%20Academy-Graham-Zeuthen-Aff-Chattahoochee-Round5.docx
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GrZe
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Montgomery Bell Academy GrZe
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Jo.....
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Gr.....
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MontgomeryBellAcademy
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Montgomery Bell Academy
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HS Policy 2016-17
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hs
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Infusing dialogue with health deescalates a laundry list of hotspots
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Nang & Martin 17,
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Col Roberto N. Nang & Keith Martin 17, Col Roberto N. Nang, MC, Global Health Division, Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences and Keith Martin, MD, Consortium of Universities for Global Health, “Global Health Diplomacy: A New Strategic Defense Pillar”, Military Medicine, 182, 1/2, January, p. 1456-1458
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The world appears unhinged. Instability from the Middle East, Caucasus, Africa, and Central America to Asia abound many of these areas of instability give rise to threats to the the global community When causes result in poor provision of health services people lose confidence They become violent and overthrow governments or result in mass migrations conditions create desperate people undermining stability enormous opportunities are available to use nonkinetic capabilitie to address the underlying causes of instability. Global health diplomacy is an underutilized strategic asset to do this it will save lives, decrease economic losses, reduce the need for kinetic military operations, increase security cooperation, improve diplomatic relations, encourage trade, and create the foundations for longterm stability Health is a national security imperative. The effects of a global health issue that severely impacts a far-distant nation can have broad and multiplying effects that become global security threats public health absence [undermines] a nation’s ability to support a foundation for stability It breeds corruption, poverty, poor health outcomes, spread of lethal diseases, gross human rights abuses and conflict. This we have seen played out with grim efficiency in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Nigeria, Honduras, and beyond. All have had disastrous regional effects However, global health diplomacy is a promising strategic tool that should be employed to address global health problems and improve international security The United States, by virtue of its strengths across diplomacy, defense, development, trade, and its inherent domestic civilian capabilities, has an opportunity to exercise its leadership and mobilize these assets. Using global health diplomacy to comprehensively strengthen public service and governance capabilities has been chronically neglected by the international development community. It needs a leader to start this process and the United States has the ability and authority to do so in the national and international interest
|
Instability from the Middle East, Caucasus, Africa, and Central America to Asia abound in poor provision of health services people become violent and overthrow governments Global health diplomacy is an underutilized strategic asset to reduce the need for military op s, increase security , improve relations and create longterm stability public health absence breeds corruption human rights abuses and conflict seen in Afghanistan Iraq, Syria Congo Somalia and beyond The U S has an opportunity to exercise leadership and mobilize these assets
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INTRODUCTION: FORCE IF NECESSARY BUT NOT NECESSARILY FORCE The world appears unhinged. Instability from the Middle East, Caucasus, Africa, and Central America to Asia abound. The Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism database identified fewer than 300 major terrorist incidents between 1998 and 2004 in the Middle East and North Africa. In 2013, they listed 4,650 such incidents.1 Quieter cracks tear at the fabric of South America and parts of Asia. Although geographically distinct, many of these areas of instability share underlying causes that give rise to threats to the United States and the global community. Human-generated causes include corruption, poor governance, absence of the rule of law, violence, gross human rights abuses, climate change, environmental degradation, a weak civil society, and a lack of professional capabilities across skill sets within the government departments needed to effectively manage the operations of a well-run state.2 Natural causes include disasters, disease, demographic changes, and limited access to the resources essential for life. When these human or natural causes create conditions that result in poor provision of, or unequal access to essential services, such as water, food, shelter, health services, education, and economic opportunity, people lose confidence in government and hope for their children and their future. They become restless, demonstrate, can become violent and overthrow their governments (such as the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, the Tunisian cart vendor, which sparked 35 more selfimmolations by extralegal businessmen and started the Arab Spring), or can result in mass migrations.3 Desperate human security, conditions create desperate people undermining stability and creating even more demands from host nation governments and governments in neighboring states. Although force and counter terrorism programs are sometimes needed to address security threats, enormous opportunities are available to use nonkinetic capabilities within the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, other U.S. Government agencies, and civilian organizations to address the underlying causes of instability. Global health diplomacy is an underutilized strategic asset to do this. At a far lower cost, it will save lives, decrease economic losses, reduce the need for kinetic military operations, increase security cooperation, improve diplomatic relations, encourage trade, and create the foundations for longterm stability. HEALTH IS A NATIONAL SECURITY IMPERATIVE—DISTANT HEALTH THREATS ARE GLOBAL THREATS Health is a national security imperative. The second- and thirdorder effects of a strategic health or global health issue that severely impacts and overwhelms the stability of a far-distant nation can have broad and multiplying effects that transcend boundaries and can become regional and global security threats. When human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome first started to be seen in the United States, there were U.S. leaders that were not too concerned about its impact on the general public, alluding to the fact that it was a disease that mostly affected the four H’s: homosexuals, heroin addicts, hemophiliacs, and Haitians.4 From its first known cases in 1981 up to 2013, human immunodeficiency virus has infected almost 78 million people and killed about 39 million.5 The Chernobyl power plant accident that occurred on October 26, 1986, was a catastrophic nuclear accident. Several studies have been done to estimate the increase in health effects and cancer-related morbidity and mortality in Europe.6 Communicable diseases can be easily carried from a distant area of the world to a teeming metropolis within 24 hours because of the ease and affordability of plane travel. The interconnectedness of countries as a result of trade has its drawbacks— biological or chemical contamination of food or products commonly occur across oceans and continents.7 Noncommunicable diseases are also affecting not just high income countries but also low-to-middle income countries. Ubiquitous exports of fast-food meals, high-fructose drinks, and salty, fried foods have contributed to a tremendous increase in obesity and hypertension.8 Obese and sedentary populations negatively impact the workforce of a nation and its productivity. The offices of military personnel and readiness cite obesity as the number one disqualifying reason for new recruits.9 Twenty seven percent of the U.S. young adults are not fit to serve in the military.10 Addiction to illegal drugs is an important global health threat. The problems created by the manufacture of opium in Afghanistan, methamphetamine in Mexico, and cocaine in Peru and Columbia create tremendous and devastating health effects, loss of productivity, social disruptions, breed corruption in a nation’s military and police forces, and create turbulent violence all along its wake, both in the countries manufacturing the drugs and the countries importing them. Weather forecasters often discuss the multiplying effects that the fluttering of a butterfly’s wings in one country may have on the regional weather of another distant country. Global health professionals and more and more of our military and political leaders are now concerned that the disease that we see in a child in Africa or a pig in Asia may have tremendous impacts on the public health, economic productivity, military readiness, and strategic security interests of their nation. In addition, a weak health and political system anywhere can be a threat everywhere. LINKAGES: GLOBAL HEALTH, SECURITY, AND STRATEGIC CHALLENGES Global health encompasses the basic needs required for human security: respect for people’s universal rights, personal protection, the rule of law, access to food, water, health care, education, basic infrastructure, and shelter.11 Their absence leaves populations vulnerable to the depredations of insurgent groups and corrupt, venal cabals that can hijack a region or state for the benefit of themselves and a select group of people. This creates an environment of the privileged and abused, the included and excluded, and an environment ripe for insecurity and conflict.12 For a nation to provide the environment where people’s basic needs can be met requires capabilities within their governing infrastructure and communities. This includes management, finance, education, social sciences, law,medicine, public health, engineering, veterinary medicine, agronomy, and more. Their absence [undermines] cripples a nation’s ability to support a foundation for human security and stability, inhibits its ability to thrive in good times, and respond effectively to natural and man-made threats in bad times. It breeds corruption, poverty, poor health outcomes, spread of lethal diseases, gross human rights abuses and conflict. This we have seen played out with grim efficiency in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Nigeria, Honduras, and beyond. All have had disastrous regional effects, many have created direct threats to U.S. interests. Islamic State in Iraq and Syria was borne out of the brutal kleptocracy of Assad’s Syria and a destructive government in Iraq. Al-Shabaab was created in the failed state of Somalia. Boko Haram grew in the destitute and neglected regions of northern Nigeria. Al Qaeda and the Taliban secured a haven in the lawless western regions of Pakistan. Weak governments in Central America created a fertile ground for organized criminal gangs to terrorize the populace and profiteer off the illegal drug trade that destroys lives, and drives people to desperately flee northward into the United States. Insurgencies, terrorist organizations, and other nonstate actors thrive in the presence of an incompetent or abusive state government that violates segments of its citizenry and fails to provide an environment where peoples’ rights are protected and their basic needs met. These groups divine counter narratives that take advantage of people’s lack of hope and fears. They create a refuge and an outlet for people’s rage. Such messages and place of belonging can be a powerfulmagnet for youths, the poor, and the disenfranchised,who see little hope in the future. Security threats are not only manmade but also can come from nature. The international community’s failure to dramatically reduce our carbon footprint leaves us vulnerable to an increasing number of extreme weather events that threaten everything from coastal communities to food and water security. This will amplify existing tensions over natural resources and could result in the forced migrations of massive numbers of vulnerable people. The world’s population is expected to reach 9 billion by 2030. The growth will primarily occur in cities in the developing world most of which already have fractured or nonexistent infrastructure. Climate change will have a dramatic effect on densely populated poor urban areas, especially those in arid zones and in littoral areas. This is a recipe for disaster. Environmental degradation is also increasing the spread of infectious diseases and facilitating zoonoses to jump the species barrier and infect humans. The Ebola outbreak, like severe acute respiratory syndrome and H1N1 before it, is part of a long list of diseases that have infected humans from an animal reservoir with devastating impact. Many zoonoses exist and more will come. Using history’s guide, the next pandemic will likely be a zoonotic agent. Recognizing this, the United States last year led the creation of the Global Health Security Agenda to prevent, detect, and respond to deadly disease outbreaks.13 Though accepted by many countries, it has been implemented by few. No amount of force can resolve these challenges. However, global health diplomacy, exercised through civil-military and military-military programs, is a promising strategic tool that should be employed to address these wicked strategic or global health problems and improve domestic and international security. AN OPPORTUNITY TO ACT Despite a growing level of interest in academia and government agencies, there is little agreement on how to define “global health diplomacy.”14 Michaud defined it as “international diplomatic activities that (directly or indirectly) address issues of global health importance, and is concerned with how and why global health issues play out in a foreign policy context.”14 The World Health Organization (WHO) states that it “brings together the disciplines of public health, international affairs, management, law, and economics, and focuses on negotiations that shape and manage the global policy environment for health.”15 We summarize global health diplomacy as the application of a broad range of skill sets to cooperatively improve human security throughout the world. A vital area of focus must be to strengthen public service, governance capabilities, and civil society in unstable regions. Doing so will enable nations to create an environment where their citizens’ basic needs can be met, universal rights respected, and the ability to hold a government to account, secure. This includes building and retaining capabilities to manage effective, noncorrupt, justice, finance, health, education, defense, public works, and environmental departments. The absence of these structures cripples a country’s ability to govern itself and leaves it vulnerable to the causes of instability, both human and natural. The United States, by virtue of its strengths across diplomacy, defense, development, trade, and its inherent domestic civilian capabilities, has an opportunity to exercise its leadership and mobilize these assets. Using global health diplomacy to comprehensively strengthen public service and governance capabilities has been chronically neglected by the international development community. It needs a leader to start this process and the United States has the ability and authority to do so in the national and international interest.
| 12,170 |
<h4>Infusing dialogue with <u>health</u> deescalates a <u>laundry list</u> of hotspots</h4><p>Col Roberto N.<u><strong> Nang &</u></strong> Keith<u><strong> Martin 17, </u></strong>Col Roberto N. Nang, MC, Global Health Division, Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences and Keith Martin, MD, Consortium of Universities for Global Health, “Global Health Diplomacy: A New Strategic Defense Pillar”, Military Medicine, 182, 1/2, January, p. 1456-1458</p><p>INTRODUCTION: FORCE IF NECESSARY BUT NOT NECESSARILY FORCE <u><strong>The world appears unhinged</strong>. <mark>Instability from the <strong>Middle East</strong>, <strong>Caucasus</strong>, <strong>Africa</strong>, and <strong>Central America</strong> to <strong>Asia</strong> abound</u></mark>. The Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism database identified fewer than 300 major terrorist incidents between 1998 and 2004 in the Middle East and North Africa. In 2013, they listed 4,650 such incidents.1 Quieter cracks tear at the fabric of South America and parts of Asia. Although geographically distinct, <u>many of these areas of instability</u> share underlying causes that <u>give rise to threats to the</u> United States and <u>the <strong>global community</u></strong>. Human-generated causes include corruption, poor governance, absence of the rule of law, violence, gross human rights abuses, climate change, environmental degradation, a weak civil society, and a lack of professional capabilities across skill sets within the government departments needed to effectively manage the operations of a well-run state.2 Natural causes include disasters, disease, demographic changes, and limited access to the resources essential for life. <u>When</u> these human or natural <u>causes</u> create conditions that <u>result <mark>in poor provision of</u></mark>, or unequal access to essential services, such as water, food, shelter, <u><mark>health services</u></mark>, education, and economic opportunity, <u><mark>people</mark> lose confidence</u> in government and hope for their children and their future. <u>They <mark>become</u></mark> restless, demonstrate, can become <u><mark>violent and overthrow</u></mark> their <u><mark>governments</u></mark> (such as the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, the Tunisian cart vendor, which sparked 35 more selfimmolations by extralegal businessmen and started the Arab Spring), <u>or</u> can <u>result in mass migrations</u>.3 Desperate human security, <u>conditions create desperate people <strong>undermining stability</u></strong> and creating even more demands from host nation governments and governments in neighboring states. Although force and counter terrorism programs are sometimes needed to address security threats, <u>enormous opportunities are available to use nonkinetic capabilitie</u>s within the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, other U.S. Government agencies, and civilian organizations <u>to address the underlying causes of instability. <strong><mark>Global health diplomacy is an underutilized strategic asset to</mark> do this</u></strong>. At a far lower cost, <u>it will save lives, decrease economic losses, <mark>reduce the need for</mark> kinetic <mark>military op</mark>eration<mark>s, increase security </mark>cooperation<mark>, improve</mark> diplomatic <mark>relations</mark>, encourage trade, <mark>and <strong>create </mark>the foundations for <mark>longterm stability</u></strong></mark>. HEALTH IS A NATIONAL SECURITY IMPERATIVE—DISTANT HEALTH THREATS ARE GLOBAL THREATS <u>Health is a national security imperative. The</u> second- and thirdorder <u>effects of a</u> strategic health or <u>global health issue that severely impacts</u> and overwhelms the stability of <u>a far-distant nation can have <strong>broad and multiplying effects</strong> that</u> transcend boundaries and can <u>become</u> regional and <u><strong>global security threats</u></strong>. When human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome first started to be seen in the United States, there were U.S. leaders that were not too concerned about its impact on the general public, alluding to the fact that it was a disease that mostly affected the four H’s: homosexuals, heroin addicts, hemophiliacs, and Haitians.4 From its first known cases in 1981 up to 2013, human immunodeficiency virus has infected almost 78 million people and killed about 39 million.5 The Chernobyl power plant accident that occurred on October 26, 1986, was a catastrophic nuclear accident. Several studies have been done to estimate the increase in health effects and cancer-related morbidity and mortality in Europe.6 Communicable diseases can be easily carried from a distant area of the world to a teeming metropolis within 24 hours because of the ease and affordability of plane travel. The interconnectedness of countries as a result of trade has its drawbacks— biological or chemical contamination of food or products commonly occur across oceans and continents.7 Noncommunicable diseases are also affecting not just high income countries but also low-to-middle income countries. Ubiquitous exports of fast-food meals, high-fructose drinks, and salty, fried foods have contributed to a tremendous increase in obesity and hypertension.8 Obese and sedentary populations negatively impact the workforce of a nation and its productivity. The offices of military personnel and readiness cite obesity as the number one disqualifying reason for new recruits.9 Twenty seven percent of the U.S. young adults are not fit to serve in the military.10 Addiction to illegal drugs is an important global health threat. The problems created by the manufacture of opium in Afghanistan, methamphetamine in Mexico, and cocaine in Peru and Columbia create tremendous and devastating health effects, loss of productivity, social disruptions, breed corruption in a nation’s military and police forces, and create turbulent violence all along its wake, both in the countries manufacturing the drugs and the countries importing them. Weather forecasters often discuss the multiplying effects that the fluttering of a butterfly’s wings in one country may have on the regional weather of another distant country. Global health professionals and more and more of our military and political leaders are now concerned that the disease that we see in a child in Africa or a pig in Asia may have tremendous impacts on the public health, economic productivity, military readiness, and strategic security interests of their nation. In addition, a weak health and political system anywhere can be a threat everywhere. LINKAGES: GLOBAL HEALTH, SECURITY, AND STRATEGIC CHALLENGES Global health encompasses the basic needs required for human security: respect for people’s universal rights, personal protection, the rule of law, access to food, water, health care, education, basic infrastructure, and shelter.11 Their absence leaves populations vulnerable to the depredations of insurgent groups and corrupt, venal cabals that can hijack a region or state for the benefit of themselves and a select group of people. This creates an environment of the privileged and abused, the included and excluded, and an environment ripe for insecurity and conflict.12 For a nation to provide the environment where people’s basic needs can be met requires capabilities within their governing infrastructure and communities. This includes management, finance, education, social sciences, law,medicine, <u><mark>public health</u></mark>, engineering, veterinary medicine, agronomy, and more. Their <u><mark>absence</mark> [undermines]</u> cripples <u>a nation’s ability to support a foundation for</u> human security and <u>stability</u>, inhibits its ability to thrive in good times, and respond effectively to natural and man-made threats in bad times. <u>It <mark>breeds corruption</mark>, poverty, poor health outcomes, spread of lethal diseases, gross <mark>human rights abuses and conflict</mark>. This we have <mark>seen</mark> played out with grim efficiency <mark>in Afghanistan</mark>, Pakistan, <mark>Iraq, Syria</mark>, Sudan, Democratic Republic of the <mark>Congo</mark>, Central African Republic, Libya, Yemen, <mark>Somalia</mark>, Nigeria, Honduras, <mark>and beyond</mark>. All have had <strong>disastrous regional effects</u></strong>, many have created direct threats to U.S. interests. Islamic State in Iraq and Syria was borne out of the brutal kleptocracy of Assad’s Syria and a destructive government in Iraq. Al-Shabaab was created in the failed state of Somalia. Boko Haram grew in the destitute and neglected regions of northern Nigeria. Al Qaeda and the Taliban secured a haven in the lawless western regions of Pakistan. Weak governments in Central America created a fertile ground for organized criminal gangs to terrorize the populace and profiteer off the illegal drug trade that destroys lives, and drives people to desperately flee northward into the United States. Insurgencies, terrorist organizations, and other nonstate actors thrive in the presence of an incompetent or abusive state government that violates segments of its citizenry and fails to provide an environment where peoples’ rights are protected and their basic needs met. These groups divine counter narratives that take advantage of people’s lack of hope and fears. They create a refuge and an outlet for people’s rage. Such messages and place of belonging can be a powerfulmagnet for youths, the poor, and the disenfranchised,who see little hope in the future. Security threats are not only manmade but also can come from nature. The international community’s failure to dramatically reduce our carbon footprint leaves us vulnerable to an increasing number of extreme weather events that threaten everything from coastal communities to food and water security. This will amplify existing tensions over natural resources and could result in the forced migrations of massive numbers of vulnerable people. The world’s population is expected to reach 9 billion by 2030. The growth will primarily occur in cities in the developing world most of which already have fractured or nonexistent infrastructure. Climate change will have a dramatic effect on densely populated poor urban areas, especially those in arid zones and in littoral areas. This is a recipe for disaster. Environmental degradation is also increasing the spread of infectious diseases and facilitating zoonoses to jump the species barrier and infect humans. The Ebola outbreak, like severe acute respiratory syndrome and H1N1 before it, is part of a long list of diseases that have infected humans from an animal reservoir with devastating impact. Many zoonoses exist and more will come. Using history’s guide, the next pandemic will likely be a zoonotic agent. Recognizing this, the United States last year led the creation of the Global Health Security Agenda to prevent, detect, and respond to deadly disease outbreaks.13 Though accepted by many countries, it has been implemented by few. No amount of force can resolve these challenges. <u>However, global health diplomacy</u>, exercised through civil-military and military-military programs, <u>is a promising strategic tool that should be employed to address</u> these wicked strategic or <u>global health problems and improve</u> domestic and <u>international security</u>. AN OPPORTUNITY TO ACT Despite a growing level of interest in academia and government agencies, there is little agreement on how to define “global health diplomacy.”14 Michaud defined it as “international diplomatic activities that (directly or indirectly) address issues of global health importance, and is concerned with how and why global health issues play out in a foreign policy context.”14 The World Health Organization (WHO) states that it “brings together the disciplines of public health, international affairs, management, law, and economics, and focuses on negotiations that shape and manage the global policy environment for health.”15 We summarize global health diplomacy as the application of a broad range of skill sets to cooperatively improve human security throughout the world. A vital area of focus must be to strengthen public service, governance capabilities, and civil society in unstable regions. Doing so will enable nations to create an environment where their citizens’ basic needs can be met, universal rights respected, and the ability to hold a government to account, secure. This includes building and retaining capabilities to manage effective, noncorrupt, justice, finance, health, education, defense, public works, and environmental departments. The absence of these structures cripples a country’s ability to govern itself and leaves it vulnerable to the causes of instability, both human and natural. <u><mark>The U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates, <strong>by virtue of its strengths across diplomacy, defense, development, trade, and its inherent domestic civilian capabilities</strong>, <mark>has an opportunity to <strong>exercise</mark> its <mark>leadership</strong> and <strong>mobilize these assets</strong></mark>. Using global health diplomacy to comprehensively strengthen public service and governance capabilities has been chronically neglected by the international development community. It <strong>needs a leader</strong> to start this process and the United States has the <strong>ability</strong> and <strong>authority</strong> to do so in the national and international interest</u>.</p>
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1NR
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2NC---Disease
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2NC---AT: Bioterror Impact
| 342,900 | 94 | 113,387 |
./documents/ndtceda17/CalBerkeley/GrFl/Cal%20Berkeley-Gray-Fleming-Neg-Gonzaga-Doubles.docx
| 594,345 |
N
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Gonzaga
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Doubles
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Georgetown KB
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Gliniecki Moczulski Lastovica
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1AC - Telehealth
1NC - T Comprehensive States CP Midterms DA Doctor Trust DA F22 CP
2NR - Trust DA Ban Telehealth Plank from CP
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ndtceda17/CalBerkeley/GrFl/Cal%20Berkeley-Gray-Fleming-Neg-Gonzaga-Doubles.docx
| null | 50,699 |
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Cal Berkeley GrFl
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Cal Berkeley
| null | null | 1,007 |
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NDT/CEDA 2017-18
| 2,017 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
3,236,166 |
Reducing restrictions should be measured by the increase in overall immigration
|
Lowell 7
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Lowell 7 - Director of Policy Studies, Institute for the Study of International Migration, Georgetown University (B. Lindsay, “Trends in International Migration Flows and Stocks, 1975-2005” http://www.oecd.org/migration/mig/39415229.pdf
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reducing restrictions on immigration, by either lifting caps or easing admission requirements, should increase overall levels of immigration
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reducing restrictions on immigration, by lifting caps or easing admission requirements, should increase overall levels of immigration
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22. However, whereas some researchers believe that policies reflect the political economy and play only an indirect role in the level of mobility, they raise some interesting points. They do not necessarily agree on whether policies impose a cost affecting migrants’ decisions or are a quantity constraint that conditions the impacts of push/pull factors. But empirical analyses find that policies matter. Analysis of emigration to the United States finds that quota consolidations reduced Asian immigration in the 1970s while the legalization of nearly 3 million workers doubled Latino migration in the 1990s.10 At the same time, an analysis of emigration to 14 nations found that pull factors are the dominant driver and that push factors play no substantive role. So this analysis based on a large sample of nations suggests that economic pull factors are the driving force of international flows.11 In fact, an interaction of policy regimes with pull variables suggests that laxer admission policies increase the power of pull factors in the host economy.12 As long as economic conditions favor migration, then reducing restrictions on immigration, by either lifting caps or easing admission requirements, should increase overall levels of immigration. This is hardly a surprising conclusion but it is at least consistent with recent trends in skilled mobility.
| 1,365 |
<h4>Reducing restrictions should be measured by the increase in <u>overall </u>immigration<u> </h4><p></u><strong>Lowell 7 </strong>- Director of Policy Studies, Institute for the Study of International Migration, Georgetown University (B. Lindsay, “Trends in International Migration Flows and Stocks, 1975-2005” http://www.oecd.org/migration/mig/39415229.pdf</p><p>22. However, whereas some researchers believe that policies reflect the political economy and play only an indirect role in the level of mobility, they raise some interesting points. They do not necessarily agree on whether policies impose a cost affecting migrants’ decisions or are a quantity constraint that conditions the impacts of push/pull factors. But empirical analyses find that policies matter. Analysis of emigration to the United States finds that quota consolidations reduced Asian immigration in the 1970s while the legalization of nearly 3 million workers doubled Latino migration in the 1990s.10 At the same time, an analysis of emigration to 14 nations found that pull factors are the dominant driver and that push factors play no substantive role. So this analysis based on a large sample of nations suggests that economic pull factors are the driving force of international flows.11 In fact, an interaction of policy regimes with pull variables suggests that laxer admission policies increase the power of pull factors in the host economy.12 As long as economic conditions favor migration, then <u><mark>reducing restrictions on immigration, by</mark> either <strong><mark>lifting caps</strong> or <strong>easing admission requirements</strong>, should increase <strong>overall</strong> levels of immigration</u></mark>. This is hardly a surprising conclusion but it is at least consistent with recent trends in skilled mobility. </p>
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1nc
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t
| null | 113,283 | 154 | 104,973 |
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Dowling
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2
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Rosemount PJ
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Juan Chavez
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1ac - public charge
1nc - t-substantial t-to t-quotas abolition k case
2nr - abolition k
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Minneapolis South StCh
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HS Policy 2018-19
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1,844,372 |
China prefers peaceful rise
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Heer 19
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Paul Heer 19. Served as National Intelligence Officer for East Asia in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence from 2007 to 2015, since served as Robert E. Wilhelm Research Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Center for International Studies and as Adjunct Professor at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. 1-8-2019. "Rethinking U.S. Primacy in East Asia." National Interest. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/rethinking-us-primacy-east-asia-40972
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policy mantra mischaracterizes China’s strategic intentions and is based on a U.S. strategic objective that is no longer achievable First, China is pursuing hegemony in East Asia, but not exclusive hostile hegemony. It is not trying to extrude the U S from the region or deny American access there. The Chinese have long recognized the utility of U.S. engagement with the region, and they have indicated receptivity to peaceful coexistence and overlapping spheres of influence with the U S there. Moreover, China is not trying to impose its political or economic system on neighbors, and it does not seek to obstruct commercial freedom of navigation in the region no country is more dependent on freedom of the seas than China itself In short, Beijing wants to extend its power and influence within East Asia, but not as part of a “winner-take-all” contest China does have unsettled and vexing sovereignty claims over Taiwan Although Beijing has demonstrated a willingness to use force in defense or pursuit of these claims, it is not looking for excuses to do so. Whether these disputes can be managed or resolved in a way that is mutually acceptable to the relevant parties is an open, long-term question. But that possibility should not be ruled out on the basis of false assumptions of irreconcilable interests. On the contrary, it should be pursued on the basis of a recognition that all the parties want to avoid conflict Of course, China would prefer not to have forward-deployed U.S. military forces but Beijing has long tolerated and could indefinitely tolerate an American military presence in the region—unless that presence is aimed at coercing China Chinese “hegemony” in East Asia much like American primacy in the Western Hemisphere: a model in which China is generally recognized and acknowledged as the de facto central or primary power in the region, but has little need or incentive for militarily adventurism because the benefits of economic interdependence prevail A standard counterargument is that Beijing would not be content This is a valid hypothesis, but it usually overlooks the greater possibility that China’s external ambitions will expand not because inherent capabilities have grown, but because Beijing sees the need to be more assertive in response to external challenges to Chinese security. Indeed, much of China’s “assertiveness” within East Asia over the past decade has been a reaction to perceived challenges
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China is pursuing heg but not hostile heg long recognized the utility of U.S. engagement with the region, and indicated receptivity to peaceful coexistence not trying to impose its system and does not seek to obstruct f o n though willing to use force not looking for excuses all want to avoid conflict Beijing indefinitely tolerate military presence economic interdependence prevail that Beijing would not be content overlooks that external ambitions expand in response to external challenges over the past decade
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But this policy mantra has two fundamental problems: it mischaracterizes China’s strategic intentions in the region, and it is based on a U.S. strategic objective that is probably no longer achievable. First, China is pursuing hegemony in East Asia, but not an exclusive hostile hegemony. It is not trying to extrude the United States from the region or deny American access there. The Chinese have long recognized the utility—and the benefits to China itself—of U.S. engagement with the region, and they have indicated receptivity to peaceful coexistence and overlapping spheres of influence with the United States there. Moreover, China is not trying to impose its political or economic system on its neighbors, and it does not seek to obstruct commercial freedom of navigation in the region (because no country is more dependent on freedom of the seas than China itself). In short, Beijing wants to extend its power and influence within East Asia, but not as part of a “winner-take-all” contest. China does have unsettled and vexing sovereignty claims over Taiwan, most of the islands and other features in the East and South China Seas, and their adjacent waters. Although Beijing has demonstrated a willingness to use force in defense or pursuit of these claims, it is not looking for excuses to do so. Whether these disputes can be managed or resolved in a way that is mutually acceptable to the relevant parties and consistent with U.S. interests in the region is an open, long-term question. But that possibility should not be ruled out on the basis of—or made more difficult by—false assumptions of irreconcilable interests. On the contrary, it should be pursued on the basis of a recognition that all the parties want to avoid conflict—and that the sovereignty disputes in the region ultimately are not military problems requiring military solutions. And since Washington has never been opposed in principle to reunification between China and Taiwan as long as it is peaceful, and similarly takes no position on the ultimate sovereignty of the other disputed features, their long-term disposition need not be the litmus test of either U.S. or Chinese hegemony in the region. Of course, China would prefer not to have forward-deployed U.S. military forces in the Western Pacific that could be used against it, but Beijing has long tolerated and arguably could indefinitely tolerate an American military presence in the region—unless that presence is clearly and exclusively aimed at coercing or containing China. It is also true that Beijing disagrees with American principles of military freedom of navigation in the region; and this constitutes a significant challenge in waters where China claims territorial jurisdiction in violation of the UN Commission on the Law of the Sea. But this should not be conflated with a Chinese desire or intention to exclusively “control” all the waters within the first island chain in the Western Pacific. The Chinese almost certainly recognize that exclusive control or “domination” of the neighborhood is not achievable at any reasonable cost, and that pursuing it would be counterproductive by inviting pushback and challenges that would negate the objective. So what would Chinese “hegemony” in East Asia mean or look like? Beijing probably thinks in terms of something much like American primacy in the Western Hemisphere: a model in which China is generally recognized and acknowledged as the de facto central or primary power in the region, but has little need or incentive for militarily adventurism because the mutual benefits of economic interdependence prevail and the neighbors have no reason—and inherent disincentives—to challenge China’s vital interests or security. And as a parallel to China’s economic and diplomatic engagement in Latin America, Beijing would neither exclude nor be hostile to continued U.S. engagement in East Asia. A standard counterargument to this relatively benign scenario is that Beijing would not be content with it for long because China’s strategic ambitions will expand as its capabilities grow. This is a valid hypothesis, but it usually overlooks the greater possibility that China’s external ambitions will expand not because its inherent capabilities have grown, but because Beijing sees the need to be more assertive in response to external challenges to Chinese interests or security. Indeed, much of China’s “assertiveness” within East Asia over the past decade—when Beijing probably would prefer to focus on domestic priorities—has been a reaction to such perceived challenges. Accordingly, Beijing’s willingness to settle for a narrowly-defined, peaceable version of regional preeminence will depend heavily on whether it perceives other countries—especially the United States—as trying to deny China this option and instead obstruct Chinese interests or security in the region.
| 4,880 |
<h4>China prefers peaceful rise</h4><p>Paul <strong>Heer 19</strong>. Served as National Intelligence Officer for East Asia in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence from 2007 to 2015, since served as Robert E. Wilhelm Research Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Center for International Studies and as Adjunct Professor at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. 1-8-2019. "Rethinking U.S. Primacy in East Asia." National Interest. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/rethinking-us-primacy-east-asia-40972</p><p>But this <u>policy mantra</u> has two fundamental problems: it <u><strong>mischaracterizes China’s strategic intentions</u></strong> in the region, <u>and</u> it <u>is based on a U.S. strategic objective that is</u> probably <u><strong>no longer achievable</u></strong>. <u>First, <mark>China is pursuing <strong>heg</strong></mark>emony in East Asia, <mark>but <strong>not</u></strong></mark> an <u><strong>exclusive <mark>hostile heg</mark>emony</strong>. It is not trying to</u> <u><strong>extrude the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u>from the region or deny American access there. The Chinese have <mark>long recognized the <strong>utility</u></strong></mark>—and the benefits to China itself—<u><mark>of U.S. engagement with the region, and</mark> they have <mark>indicated receptivity to</u> <u><strong>peaceful coexistence</u></strong></mark> <u>and</u> <u><strong>overlapping spheres of influence</u></strong> <u>with the <strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u>there. Moreover, China is <strong><mark>not trying to impose its</mark> political or economic <mark>system</mark> on</u></strong> its <u><strong>neighbors</strong>, <mark>and</mark> it <mark>does not seek to <strong>obstruct</mark> commercial <mark>f</strong></mark>reedom</u> <u><strong><mark>o</strong></mark>f <strong><mark>n</strong></mark>avigation</u> <u>in the region</u> (because <u>no country is more dependent on freedom of the seas than China itself</u>). <u>In short, Beijing wants to extend its power and influence within East Asia, but</u> <u><strong>not as part of a “winner-take-all” contest</u></strong>. <u>China does have unsettled and vexing sovereignty claims over Taiwan</u>, most of the islands and other features in the East and South China Seas, and their adjacent waters. <u>Al<strong><mark>though</strong></mark> Beijing has demonstrated a <strong><mark>willing</strong></mark>ness <mark>to use force</mark> in defense or pursuit of these claims, it is <strong><mark>not looking for excuses</strong></mark> to do so. Whether these disputes can be managed or resolved in a way that is mutually acceptable to the relevant parties</u> and consistent with U.S. interests in the region <u>is an open, long-term question. But that possibility should not be ruled out on the basis of</u>—or made more difficult by—<u><strong>false assumptions of irreconcilable interests</strong>. On the contrary, it should be pursued on the basis of a recognition that <strong><mark>all</mark> the parties <mark>want to avoid conflict</u></strong></mark>—and that the sovereignty disputes in the region ultimately are not military problems requiring military solutions. And since Washington has never been opposed in principle to reunification between China and Taiwan as long as it is peaceful, and similarly takes no position on the ultimate sovereignty of the other disputed features, their long-term disposition need not be the litmus test of either U.S. or Chinese hegemony in the region. <u>Of course, China would prefer not to have forward-deployed U.S. military forces</u> in the Western Pacific that could be used against it, <u>but <mark>Beijing</mark> has</u> <u><strong>long tolerated</u></strong> <u>and</u> arguably <u>could</u> <u><strong><mark>indefinitely tolerate</u></strong></mark> <u>an American <mark>military presence</mark> in the region—unless that presence is</u> clearly and exclusively <u><strong>aimed at coercing</u></strong> or containing <u><strong>China</u></strong>. It is also true that Beijing disagrees with American principles of military freedom of navigation in the region; and this constitutes a significant challenge in waters where China claims territorial jurisdiction in violation of the UN Commission on the Law of the Sea. But this should not be conflated with a Chinese desire or intention to exclusively “control” all the waters within the first island chain in the Western Pacific. The Chinese almost certainly recognize that exclusive control or “domination” of the neighborhood is not achievable at any reasonable cost, and that pursuing it would be counterproductive by inviting pushback and challenges that would negate the objective. So what would <u>Chinese “hegemony” in East Asia</u> mean or look like? Beijing probably thinks in terms of something <u>much like American primacy in the Western Hemisphere: a model in which China is generally recognized and acknowledged as the de facto central or primary power in the region, but has little need or incentive for</u> <u><strong>militarily adventurism</u></strong> <u>because the</u> mutual <u><strong>benefits of <mark>economic interdependence prevail</u></strong></mark> and the neighbors have no reason—and inherent disincentives—to challenge China’s vital interests or security. And as a parallel to China’s economic and diplomatic engagement in Latin America, Beijing would neither exclude nor be hostile to continued U.S. engagement in East Asia. <u>A standard</u> <u><strong>counterargument</u></strong> to this relatively benign scenario <u>is <mark>that Beijing would <strong>not be content</u></strong></mark> with it for long because China’s strategic ambitions will expand as its capabilities grow. <u>This is a valid</u> <u><strong>hypothesis</strong>, but it usually <mark>overlooks</mark> the greater possibility <mark>that</mark> China’s <mark>external ambitions</mark> will <mark>expand</mark> <strong>not because</u></strong> its <u><strong>inherent capabilities have grown</strong>, but because Beijing sees the need to be more assertive <mark>in <strong>response to external challenges</mark> to Chinese</u></strong> interests or <u><strong>security</strong>. Indeed, much of China’s “assertiveness” within East Asia <mark>over the <strong>past decade</u></strong></mark>—when Beijing probably would prefer to focus on domestic priorities—<u>has been a</u> <u><strong>reaction to</u></strong> such <u><strong>perceived challenges</u></strong>. Accordingly, Beijing’s willingness to settle for a narrowly-defined, peaceable version of regional preeminence will depend heavily on whether it perceives other countries—especially the United States—as trying to deny China this option and instead obstruct Chinese interests or security in the region.</p>
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1NC -- Stanford Round 1
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Case
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China Rise D---1NC
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./documents/hspolicy20/AsianDebateLeague/TaBa/Asian%20Debate%20League-Tai-Baba-Neg-Stanford-Round1.docx
| 724,287 |
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Stanford
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1
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College Prep LM
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Daniel Iskhakov
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1AC - Corporate Espionage
2NR - Cap K
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hspolicy20/AsianDebateLeague/TaBa/Asian%20Debate%20League-Tai-Baba-Neg-Stanford-Round1.docx
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Asian Debate League TaBa
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hspolicy20
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HS Policy 2020-21
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hs
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3,138,460 |
3---Trump is unique---he’s more likely to escalate hotspots
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Blair 16
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Blair 16 [Bruce Blair is a member of the Princeton University research faculty in the Program on Science 11-16-2016 https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/11/trump-north-korea-nuclear-crises-214457
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quotes from Trump’s campaign rallies in which he says “I would bomb the shit out of ’em,”
there will be no shortage of combustible tensions around the globe And Trump will make critical decisions
These tensions are present and show no signs of easing For starters NATO and Russia military forces are shadow boxing with increasing intensity intimidation is steadily escalating
In East Asia North Korea will soon brandish nuclear-armed missiles
There are other crises brewing the South China Sea and the Middle East As China lays claim to this sea the U.S. has intensified its operations increasing chances of hostile encounters. In the Middle East in the Syrian theater the specter of a region going nuclear looms larger than ever as Trump warns he will tear up the Iran nuclear deal This would set Iran free to resume its nuclear program, while spurring Iran’s enemies to follow suit,
All of these are percolating at once They threaten to overwhelm even the savviest president Can we rely on Trump to act with restraint? He is ill-informed about nuclear weapons and the policies that govern their use He offhandedly entertains their use, raising doubts whether he can be trusted with the nuclear codes. The danger exists Trump national security team headed by an inexperienced and hot-headed commander in chief will prove too inept to defuse a crisis, and that it will escalate to nuclear conflict with devastating consequences for the world
An imminent threat would surely cause intense emotion and unsettle the steadiest of leaders With only three to seven minutes and decide whether and how to retaliate any leader could make a bad call This system needs to be reformed But Trump’s erratic and volatile personality makes for low confidence in his ability to reach the right decision a mistake would be irrevocable If the president gives the order missiles fire within five minutes and from their submarine tubes within 15 minutes. The missiles cannot be recalled or destroyed in flight once they are launched. They would reach their targets on the other side of the planet in 15 to 30 minutes.
Game over.
One thing is certain Trump will have sole authority to launch nuclear weapons whenever with a single phone call advisers might demur but if they do object they have no recourse but to excuse themselves from the proceedings and take what comes. there simply are no checks and balances on his authority
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no shortage of combustible tensions Trump make critical decisions
NATO and Russian
North Korea
the S C S Middle East nuclear Iran
All percolating Trump is ill-informed about nuc s offhandedly entertains use The danger Trump will escalate to nuclear conflict with devastating consequences
threat would unsettle the steadiest This system needs reform
Trump have sole authority to launch whenever with a single phone call there are no checks
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I was the former nuclear missile launch officer who in October appeared in a TV advertisement for Hillary Clinton, saying: “The thought of Donald Trump with nuclear weapons scares me to death. It should scare everyone.” The ad featured various quotes from Trump’s campaign rallies and interviews, in which he says, among other things: “I would bomb the shit out of ’em,” “I wanna be unpredictable,” and “I love war.” As I walked through a nuclear missile launch center in the ad, I explained that “self-control may be all that keeps these missiles from firing.”
We will see all of our fears—and the new president-elect’s self-control—put to the test over the next four years. When Trump takes the oath of office on Jan. 20, 2017, there will be no shortage of combustible tensions around the globe. And Trump will need to make some critical decisions quickly—including whether he truly wants, as he suggested during the campaign, a world in which there are even more nuclear powers than we have today.
These tensions are present even now and show no signs of easing. For starters, U.S.-led NATO and Russian military forces are shadow boxing with increasing intensity. The mutual intimidation is steadily escalating, and Trump’s soft commitment to NATO’s defense has not helped. Rather than assuaging the Russians, it has only stoked insecurity in Europe and perhaps tempted Russia to intervene in the Baltic states. In other words, appeasement only makes matters more unstable.
In East Asia, meanwhile, a mercurial and belligerent leader of North Korea will soon be able to brandish nuclear-armed missiles to credibly threaten South Korea, Japan and the U.S. homeland with nuclear devastation. The timeline for this threat to materialize is very short—months or a low number of years. (Trump himself mentioned the threat in his “60 Minutes” interview on Sunday.) Kim Jong Un’s provocations combined with Trump’s soft-pedaling of the U.S. defense commitment in Asia have put the entire region on edge and provoked South Korea to consider acquiring a nuclear arsenal in self defense.
There are other crises brewing as well, including in the South China Sea and the Middle East. As China lays claim to nearly all of this sea in part to create safe bastions for its new fleet of ballistic missile submarines, the U.S. has intensified its air, sea, and undersea surveillance and anti-submarine warfare operations, increasing the chances of hostile encounters. In the Middle East, U.S. and Russian forces are operating in very close and not-so-friendly quarters in the Syrian theater, and the specter of a region going nuclear looms larger than ever as Trump warns he will tear up and re-negotiate the hard-won Iranian nuclear deal. This ill-advised move would set Iran free to resume its nuclear program, while spurring Iran’s enemies to follow suit, as well as re-opening the debate over U.S.-Israeli pre-emptive strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities.
***
All of these crises are percolating at once. They threaten to overwhelm even the savviest of presidents and advisers. Can we rely on Trump to act with diligence, competence, diplomatic skill, reason and restraint? The verdict of a plurality of the electorate who voted for Clinton and of the vast majority of foreign policy experts is one of profound doubt that he can handle the pressure. He has proved himself over and over again to be quick-tempered, defensive, prone to lash out, adamant in dividing the world into winners and losers, and quick to invoke either the use of force or the backing away from U.S. defense commitments. He is ill-informed about nuclear weapons and the policies that govern their role and use. He offhandedly entertains their use, raising doubts whether he can be trusted with the nuclear codes. The danger exists that the Trump national security team headed by an inexperienced and hot-headed commander in chief will prove too inept to defuse a crisis, and that it will escalate to nuclear conflict with devastating consequences for the country, our allies and the world.
Given that unpredictability appears to be the crux of his national security game plan, predicting his behavior is perhaps a fool’s errand. But let’s consider the two most immediate and fraught crises that he will inherit—the U.S.-Russian stand-off and the imminent nuclear threat from North Korea.
There are grounds for some optimism that the former can be defused. In past, confrontations with the Soviets, such as the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, presidents sometimes rattled the nuclear saber but rejected using it. Trump has been much more open to the first use of nukes than any of his predecessors since Eisenhower. The better news is that he seems determined to improve relations with Russia. Many of the leading candidates for appointment to his national security team are ideologues who are very likely to advise against extending an olive branch to the Russian bear. They harbor deep-seated suspicions of Russia and will attempt to smother any pragmatic moves toward rapprochement. But if Trump’s pragmatism prevails without eroding NATO solidarity and weakening its security, then he might succeed not only in de-escalating the situation but also in paving the way for security cooperation on many fronts.
One intriguing possibility is that he would pursue détente with Russia through nuclear arms control. A breakthrough in the relationship might even yield a grand bargain that, say, reduces nuclear arms by one-third to 1,000 on each side, pledges both sides not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, stands down their nuclear missiles on hair-trigger launch readiness, establishes a joint center to process early warning data in order to prevent false alarms from inducing an inadvertent launch, reaffirms their obligations to existing treaties and scraps the missile defense systems in Europe that Russia so vehemently opposes.
Trump’s deal-making talent may prove wanting, however as congressional Republicans adamantly support missile defenses and comprehensive modernization of U.S. nuclear strike forces. Other factors could also thwart an overture to Russia, including intentional acts or accidents between rival fighter aircraft that result in loss of life, triggering further escalation of tensions that could ultimately spin out of control. A conventional conflict could ensue and precipitate a nuclear response, probably by Russia, which relies much more on nuclear weapons than does the United States, but who knows how an unpredictable commander in chief who consults mainly with himself might behave.
This raises the perennial question of Trump’s reaction to indications of a Russian nuclear missile attack received in the wee hours of the night in the midst of an escalating crisis. Would he have a steady hand, or lose his composure and convulse with a knee-jerk reaction?
Nobody knows the answer, but we do know two things. First, such a challenge plays to Trump’s cognitive and emotional weaknesses. An imminent threat to the White House from incoming nuclear warheads flying at four miles per second would surely cause intense emotion and unsettle the steadiest of leaders. With only three to seven minutes allowed to assess whether the indications are true or false and decide whether and how to retaliate, any leader could make a bad call. (This system clearly needs to be reformed to greatly increase warning and decision time.) But Trump’s erratic and volatile personality makes for low confidence in his ability to reach the right decision. Second, a mistake would be irrevocable. If the president gives the order, which takes seconds to convey to his military, missiles would fire from their underground silos within five minutes and from their submarine tubes within 15 minutes. The missiles cannot be recalled or destroyed in flight once they are launched. They would reach their targets on the other side of the planet in 15 to 30 minutes.
Game over.
***
Perhaps the biggest unknown is how Trump will handle North Korea. He suggested that we outsource the problem of disarming this pariah state to China, which could bring it to heel under U.S. pressure. What else might he attempt to do to defang North Korea of its ability to lob nukes at its neighbors and the United States? Sanctions have proved toothless. High-tailing it out of the region would be counterproductive. He needs to do just the opposite of retreat, in fact, and reassure our Asian allies while engaging more deeply than ever with China and North Korea. If Trump can resist his instinct to bail and instead pursue an out-of-the box solution that allays the insecurity of the North Korean regime and China’s fear of a reunited Korean peninsula allied with the U.S.—then his penchant for defying long-held premises and shibboleths may be the ticket that’s needed to dismantle the Dear Leader’s arsenal.
But the trajectory of this crisis is ominous, and it could easily escalate to the brink of nuclear use. Again, this would test the mettle of any national security apparatus. Managing a complex crisis is hard enough for the most talented security officials, diplomats and military commanders. History shows that in the heat of crisis, the national security apparatus of the belligerent states often verge on collapse from situational confusion, miscalculation, breakdown of communications, fatigue, failure of imagination and lack of empathy. Exasperated leaders tend to get caught up in strong escalatory updrafts. In this case, escalation could all too easily culminate in the outbreak of military conflict and lead to nuclear war.
Nobody knows what could happen inside Trump’s head if Kim Jong Un begins deploying nuclear missiles into battle positions and prepares for all-out war while threatening to turn his enemies’ countries into radiating rubble. But here is a hypothetical scenario that at least plausibly aligns with the evident temperament and judgment of Donald Trump.
Imagine the following:
—Trump receives urgent intelligence of North Korea’s prepping for nuclear attack and calls an emergency session of his National Security Council in the Situation Room. All his key military commanders around the world are patched into the call. The secretary of state reports that his counterparts in Japan and South Korea are appealing urgently for action to protect their nations from the erratic, volatile, and maniacal commander of the North’s nuclear forces. The CIA reports that communications intercepts and space reconnaissance reveal the Dear Leader’s forces are at maximum readiness poised for immediate launch and that he has instructed his military to prepare for nuclear conflict. And then Dear Leader slings vitriol at Trump himself, and demands an immediate cessation of joint U.S.-South Korean-Japanese military exercises in the region or else suffer the consequences of thermonuclear strikes.
—An irked Trump decides to teach the Dear Leader a lesson and returns the insults and the ultimatum: Stand down your nuclear missiles within 24 hours or else they will be taken out. The secretary of state delivers the demarche. Trump orders his military commanders to prepare their forces for a quick surgical strike on the North’s nuclear bases. He is told that a strike with U.S. and allied precision-guided conventional weapons delivered by aircraft and cruise missile stands a 95 percent chance of wiping out the nuclear threat. Trump says he believes that winning requires the destruction of 100 percent, and orders the Strategic Command to prepare to use nuclear weapons in order to ensure that none of the North’s nuclear weapons would survive and that the Kim dynasty is finally ended.
—During the next 24 hours, senior officials and military commanders discuss and debate the pros and cons of attacking the North, let alone employing nuclear weapons, and speculate on the president’s true intentions. Is it all a bluff, or does he in fact intend to strike and bring down the regime along with its nuclear forces. Might he actually order the use of nuclear weapons?
—North Korea, as is its wont, will not stand down—indeed becomes only more belligerent and defiant. A consensus then jells among most U.S. officials that the North’s outrageous behavior and rhetoric are par for the course and that the hot air does not warrant a pre-emptive military strike by U.S. coalition forces, much less a nuclear strike. But the situation on the ground has dramatically changed since the North’s nuclear missile forces became capable of destroying the major cities of its enemies. And when the 24-hour deadline arrives, and the CIA reports that nothing has changed except that intercepts reveal peak readiness to fire the missiles, the denizens of the Situation Room have internalized the distinct possibility that the president will in fact order a nuclear strike. They have prepared for it, and thus tacitly accommodated the decision.
Again, nobody knows how Trump and his senior advisers would behave. It is quite possible that serious objections would be voiced, perhaps with great vehemence. Would Trump listen to them and revise his thinking? Perhaps not. He brags (vacuously) that he has a big brain and primarily consults with himself. Surrounded by many hard-liners, it is also possible that a kind of group-think prevails bearing great deference to the commander in chief’s decision, however convoluted and emotion-racked his thinking seems to be. His team has come to regard the nuclear option as legitimate and perhaps even necessary.
One thing is certain: Trump will have the sole authority to launch nuclear weapons whenever he chooses with a single phone call. This (oversimplified) scenario suggests that even if Trump, consulting nobody, lashes out because of pique over Kim’s disrespect, his advisers might well simply demur, but if they do object and refuse they have no recourse but to excuse themselves from the proceedings and take what comes. That’s because there simply are no checks and balances on his authority, which is derived from the Constitution. There is no congressional or Supreme Court veto. And there would be no veto by anyone in the president’s circle of advisers or the military.
| 14,230 |
<h4>3---Trump is <u>unique</u>---he’s <u>more likely</u> to <u>escalate</u> hotspots</h4><p><u><strong>Blair 16</u></strong> [Bruce Blair is a member of the Princeton University research faculty in the Program on Science 11-16-2016 https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/11/trump-north-korea-nuclear-crises-214457</p><p>I was the former nuclear missile launch officer who in October appeared in a TV advertisement for Hillary Clinton, saying: “The thought of Donald Trump with nuclear weapons scares me to death. It should scare everyone.” The ad featured various <u><strong>quotes</u></strong> <u><strong>from Trump’s campaign rallies</u></strong> and interviews, <u><strong>in which he says</u></strong>, among other things: <u><strong>“I would bomb the shit out of ’em,”</u></strong> “I wanna be unpredictable,” and “I love war.” As I walked through a nuclear missile launch center in the ad, I explained that “self-control may be all that keeps these missiles from firing.”</p><p>We will see all of our fears—and the new president-elect’s self-control—put to the test over the next four years. When Trump takes the oath of office on Jan. 20, 2017, <u><strong>there will be <mark>no</u></strong> <u><strong>shortage</u></strong> <u><strong>of</mark> <mark>combustible tensions</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>around the globe</u></strong>. <u><strong>And <mark>Trump </mark>will</u></strong> need to <u><strong><mark>make</u></strong></mark> some <u><strong><mark>critical decisions</u></strong></mark> quickly—including whether he truly wants, as he suggested during the campaign, a world in which there are even more nuclear powers than we have today.</p><p><u><strong>These tensions</u></strong> <u><strong>are present</u></strong> even now <u><strong>and show no signs of easing</u></strong>. <u><strong>For starters</u></strong>, U.S.-led <u><strong><mark>NATO and Russia</u></strong>n</mark> <u><strong>military forces are</u></strong> <u><strong>shadow boxing with</u></strong> <u><strong>increasing intensity</u></strong>. The mutual <u><strong>intimidation is steadily escalating</u></strong>, and Trump’s soft commitment to NATO’s defense has not helped. Rather than assuaging the Russians, it has only stoked insecurity in Europe and perhaps tempted Russia to intervene in the Baltic states. In other words, appeasement only makes matters more unstable.</p><p><u><strong>In East Asia</u></strong>, meanwhile, a mercurial and belligerent leader of <u><strong><mark>North Korea</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>will soon</u></strong> be able to <u><strong>brandish</u></strong> <u><strong>nuclear-armed missiles</u></strong> to credibly threaten South Korea, Japan and the U.S. homeland with nuclear devastation. The timeline for this threat to materialize is very short—months or a low number of years. (Trump himself mentioned the threat in his “60 Minutes” interview on Sunday.) Kim Jong Un’s provocations combined with Trump’s soft-pedaling of the U.S. defense commitment in Asia have put the entire region on edge and provoked South Korea to consider acquiring a nuclear arsenal in self defense.</p><p><u><strong>There are other crises brewing</u></strong> as well, including in <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong> <u><strong>S</mark>outh <mark>C</mark>hina <mark>S</mark>ea</u></strong> <u><strong>and the</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Middle East</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>As China lays claim to </u></strong>nearly all of <u><strong>this sea</u></strong> in part to create safe bastions for its new fleet of ballistic missile submarines, <u><strong>the U.S. has intensified its</u></strong> air, sea, and undersea surveillance and anti-submarine warfare <u><strong>operations</u></strong>, <u><strong>increasing</u></strong> the <u><strong>chances of hostile encounters. In the Middle East</u></strong>, U.S. and Russian forces are operating in very close and not-so-friendly quarters <u><strong>in the Syrian theater</u></strong>, and <u><strong>the specter of a region</u></strong> <u><strong>going <mark>nuclear</mark> looms larger than ever</u></strong> <u><strong>as Trump warns he will tear up</u></strong> and re-negotiate <u><strong>the</u></strong> hard-won <u><strong><mark>Iran</u></strong></mark>ian <u><strong>nuclear deal</u></strong>. <u><strong>This</u></strong> ill-advised move <u><strong>would</u></strong> <u><strong>set Iran free to resume</u></strong> <u><strong>its nuclear program, while spurring Iran’s enemies to follow suit,</u></strong> as well as re-opening the debate over U.S.-Israeli pre-emptive strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities.</p><p>***</p><p><u><strong><mark>All</mark> of these</u></strong> crises <u><strong>are <mark>percolating</mark> at once</u></strong>. <u><strong>They threaten to overwhelm</u></strong> <u><strong>even the savviest</u></strong> of <u><strong>president</u></strong>s and advisers. <u><strong>Can we rely</u></strong> <u><strong>on <mark>Trump</mark> to act with</u></strong> diligence, competence, diplomatic skill, reason and <u><strong>restraint?</u></strong> The verdict of a plurality of the electorate who voted for Clinton and of the vast majority of foreign policy experts is one of profound doubt that he can handle the pressure. He has proved himself over and over again to be quick-tempered, defensive, prone to lash out, adamant in dividing the world into winners and losers, and quick to invoke either the use of force or the backing away from U.S. defense commitments. <u><strong>He <mark>is ill-informed</mark> <mark>about</mark> <mark>nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s</mark> and the policies that govern their </u></strong>role and <u><strong>use</u></strong>. <u><strong>He <mark>offhandedly entertains</mark> their <mark>use</mark>, raising</u></strong> <u><strong>doubts</u></strong> <u><strong>whether he can be trusted with the nuclear codes.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>The danger</mark> exists</u></strong> that the <u><strong><mark>Trump</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>national security team headed by an</u></strong> <u><strong>inexperienced and hot-headed commander in chief</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>will</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>prove too inept to defuse a crisis, and that it will</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>escalate to</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>nuclear conflict</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>with</u></strong> <u><strong>devastating consequences</mark> for</u></strong> the country, our allies and <u><strong>the world</u></strong>.</p><p>Given that unpredictability appears to be the crux of his national security game plan, predicting his behavior is perhaps a fool’s errand. But let’s consider the two most immediate and fraught crises that he will inherit—the U.S.-Russian stand-off and the imminent nuclear threat from North Korea.</p><p>There are grounds for some optimism that the former can be defused. In past, confrontations with the Soviets, such as the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, presidents sometimes rattled the nuclear saber but rejected using it. Trump has been much more open to the first use of nukes than any of his predecessors since Eisenhower. The better news is that he seems determined to improve relations with Russia. Many of the leading candidates for appointment to his national security team are ideologues who are very likely to advise against extending an olive branch to the Russian bear. They harbor deep-seated suspicions of Russia and will attempt to smother any pragmatic moves toward rapprochement. But if Trump’s pragmatism prevails without eroding NATO solidarity and weakening its security, then he might succeed not only in de-escalating the situation but also in paving the way for security cooperation on many fronts.</p><p>One intriguing possibility is that he would pursue détente with Russia through nuclear arms control. A breakthrough in the relationship might even yield a grand bargain that, say, reduces nuclear arms by one-third to 1,000 on each side, pledges both sides not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, stands down their nuclear missiles on hair-trigger launch readiness, establishes a joint center to process early warning data in order to prevent false alarms from inducing an inadvertent launch, reaffirms their obligations to existing treaties and scraps the missile defense systems in Europe that Russia so vehemently opposes.</p><p>Trump’s deal-making talent may prove wanting, however as congressional Republicans adamantly support missile defenses and comprehensive modernization of U.S. nuclear strike forces. Other factors could also thwart an overture to Russia, including intentional acts or accidents between rival fighter aircraft that result in loss of life, triggering further escalation of tensions that could ultimately spin out of control. A conventional conflict could ensue and precipitate a nuclear response, probably by Russia, which relies much more on nuclear weapons than does the United States, but who knows how an unpredictable commander in chief who consults mainly with himself might behave.</p><p>This raises the perennial question of Trump’s reaction to indications of a Russian nuclear missile attack received in the wee hours of the night in the midst of an escalating crisis. Would he have a steady hand, or lose his composure and convulse with a knee-jerk reaction?</p><p>Nobody knows the answer, but we do know two things. First, such a challenge plays to Trump’s cognitive and emotional weaknesses. <u><strong>An imminent <mark>threat</u></strong></mark> to the White House from incoming nuclear warheads flying at four miles per second <u><strong><mark>would</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>surely cause</u></strong> <u><strong>intense</u></strong> <u><strong>emotion and <mark>unsettle the steadiest</mark> of leaders</u></strong>. <u><strong>With only three to seven minutes</u></strong> allowed to assess whether the indications are true or false <u><strong>and decide whether and how to retaliate</u></strong>, <u><strong>any leader could make a bad call</u></strong>. (<u><strong><mark>This system</u></strong></mark> clearly <u><strong><mark>needs</mark> to be <mark>reform</mark>ed</u></strong> to greatly increase warning and decision time.) <u><strong>But</u></strong> <u><strong>Trump’s</u></strong> <u><strong>erratic</u></strong> <u><strong>and volatile personality</u></strong> <u><strong>makes</u></strong> <u><strong>for low confidence in his ability to reach the right decision</u></strong>. Second, <u><strong>a mistake would be irrevocable</u></strong>. <u><strong>If the president gives the order</u></strong>, which takes seconds to convey to his military, <u><strong>missiles</u></strong> would <u><strong>fire</u></strong> from their underground silos <u><strong>within five minutes and from their submarine tubes within 15 minutes. The missiles cannot be recalled or destroyed in flight once they are launched. They would reach their targets on the other side of the planet in 15 to 30 minutes.</p><p>Game over.</p><p></u></strong>***</p><p>Perhaps the biggest unknown is how Trump will handle North Korea. He suggested that we outsource the problem of disarming this pariah state to China, which could bring it to heel under U.S. pressure. What else might he attempt to do to defang North Korea of its ability to lob nukes at its neighbors and the United States? Sanctions have proved toothless. High-tailing it out of the region would be counterproductive. He needs to do just the opposite of retreat, in fact, and reassure our Asian allies while engaging more deeply than ever with China and North Korea. If Trump can resist his instinct to bail and instead pursue an out-of-the box solution that allays the insecurity of the North Korean regime and China’s fear of a reunited Korean peninsula allied with the U.S.—then his penchant for defying long-held premises and shibboleths may be the ticket that’s needed to dismantle the Dear Leader’s arsenal.</p><p>But the trajectory of this crisis is ominous, and it could easily escalate to the brink of nuclear use. Again, this would test the mettle of any national security apparatus. Managing a complex crisis is hard enough for the most talented security officials, diplomats and military commanders. History shows that in the heat of crisis, the national security apparatus of the belligerent states often verge on collapse from situational confusion, miscalculation, breakdown of communications, fatigue, failure of imagination and lack of empathy. Exasperated leaders tend to get caught up in strong escalatory updrafts. In this case, escalation could all too easily culminate in the outbreak of military conflict and lead to nuclear war.</p><p>Nobody knows what could happen inside Trump’s head if Kim Jong Un begins deploying nuclear missiles into battle positions and prepares for all-out war while threatening to turn his enemies’ countries into radiating rubble. But here is a hypothetical scenario that at least plausibly aligns with the evident temperament and judgment of Donald Trump.</p><p>Imagine the following:</p><p>—Trump receives urgent intelligence of North Korea’s prepping for nuclear attack and calls an emergency session of his National Security Council in the Situation Room. All his key military commanders around the world are patched into the call. The secretary of state reports that his counterparts in Japan and South Korea are appealing urgently for action to protect their nations from the erratic, volatile, and maniacal commander of the North’s nuclear forces. The CIA reports that communications intercepts and space reconnaissance reveal the Dear Leader’s forces are at maximum readiness poised for immediate launch and that he has instructed his military to prepare for nuclear conflict. And then Dear Leader slings vitriol at Trump himself, and demands an immediate cessation of joint U.S.-South Korean-Japanese military exercises in the region or else suffer the consequences of thermonuclear strikes.</p><p>—An irked Trump decides to teach the Dear Leader a lesson and returns the insults and the ultimatum: Stand down your nuclear missiles within 24 hours or else they will be taken out. The secretary of state delivers the demarche. Trump orders his military commanders to prepare their forces for a quick surgical strike on the North’s nuclear bases. He is told that a strike with U.S. and allied precision-guided conventional weapons delivered by aircraft and cruise missile stands a 95 percent chance of wiping out the nuclear threat. Trump says he believes that winning requires the destruction of 100 percent, and orders the Strategic Command to prepare to use nuclear weapons in order to ensure that none of the North’s nuclear weapons would survive and that the Kim dynasty is finally ended.</p><p>—During the next 24 hours, senior officials and military commanders discuss and debate the pros and cons of attacking the North, let alone employing nuclear weapons, and speculate on the president’s true intentions. Is it all a bluff, or does he in fact intend to strike and bring down the regime along with its nuclear forces. Might he actually order the use of nuclear weapons?</p><p>—North Korea, as is its wont, will not stand down—indeed becomes only more belligerent and defiant. A consensus then jells among most U.S. officials that the North’s outrageous behavior and rhetoric are par for the course and that the hot air does not warrant a pre-emptive military strike by U.S. coalition forces, much less a nuclear strike. But the situation on the ground has dramatically changed since the North’s nuclear missile forces became capable of destroying the major cities of its enemies. And when the 24-hour deadline arrives, and the CIA reports that nothing has changed except that intercepts reveal peak readiness to fire the missiles, the denizens of the Situation Room have internalized the distinct possibility that the president will in fact order a nuclear strike. They have prepared for it, and thus tacitly accommodated the decision.</p><p>Again, nobody knows how Trump and his senior advisers would behave. It is quite possible that serious objections would be voiced, perhaps with great vehemence. Would Trump listen to them and revise his thinking? Perhaps not. He brags (vacuously) that he has a big brain and primarily consults with himself. Surrounded by many hard-liners, it is also possible that a kind of group-think prevails bearing great deference to the commander in chief’s decision, however convoluted and emotion-racked his thinking seems to be. His team has come to regard the nuclear option as legitimate and perhaps even necessary.</p><p><u><strong>One thing is certain</u></strong>: <u><strong><mark>Trump</mark> will <mark>have</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>sole authority</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>to launch</mark> nuclear weapons</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>whenever</u></strong></mark> he chooses <u><strong><mark>with a single phone</u></strong> <u><strong>call</u></strong></mark>. This (oversimplified) scenario suggests that even if Trump, consulting nobody, lashes out because of pique over Kim’s disrespect, his <u><strong>advisers</u></strong> <u><strong>might</u></strong> well simply <u><strong>demur</u></strong>, <u><strong>but if they do object</u></strong> and refuse <u><strong>they have no recourse</u></strong> <u><strong>but to excuse themselves from the proceedings and take what comes.</u></strong> That’s because <u><strong><mark>there </mark>simply<mark> are no checks</mark> and balances on his authority</u></strong>, which is derived from the Constitution. There is no congressional or Supreme Court veto. And there would be no veto by anyone in the president’s circle of advisers or the military.</p>
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1AC
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Crisis
| 51,005 | 183 | 102,011 |
./documents/ndtceda18/Minnesota/JaFe/Minnesota-Jamal-Ferguson-Aff-Wake-Round7.docx
| 606,633 |
A
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Wake
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7
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Miami HL
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Jalisa Jackson
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1ac - crisis norms congress
1nc - ESR Farm Bill Modernization PIC Deter on case
Block - Mod PIC Deter Flex
2nr Deter Flex
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ndtceda18/Minnesota/JaFe/Minnesota-Jamal-Ferguson-Aff-Wake-Round7.docx
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Minnesota
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Minnesota
| null | null | 1,008 |
ndtceda18
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NDT/CEDA 2018-19
| 2,018 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
3,151,027 |
Expansionism escalates --- their evidence doesn’t assume hybrid warfare.
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Davis 17 Malcolm DAVIS
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Davis 17 (Malcolm DAVIS. Senior Analyst, ASPI; PhD in Military Strategic Studies, University of Hull, “Russia, military modernisation and lowering the nuclear threshold.” Australian Strategic Policy Institute. January. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/russia-military-modernisation-lowering-nuclear-threshold/.)
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Three developments suggest a willingness by Russia to use nuclear weapons in a manner that lowers the threshold of nuclear war First, the concept of preventative de-escalation is important Second, the integration of conventional pre-nuclear and nuclear forces reinforces Russia’s coercive power against NATO in the pre-war ‘Phase Zero’ in a future regional crisis in the Baltics third, the Russians are clearly conscious of that coercive power given their recent nuclear signaling that suggests Russia continues to see such weapons as a means of national strength Russia has undertaken sabre rattling through simulated nuclear strikes in large-scale exercises and aggressive probing of NATO airspace with nuclear-capable bombers That has been backed by public statements which reinforce Russia’s nuclear weapons capability and even explicit nuclear threats to NATO states Russian nuclear forces are being swiftly upgraded with the focus on ICBM modernisation while the Russian Air Force is restarting the Tu-160 Blackjack production line to produce the updated Tu-160M2 bomber the integration of Russia’s conventional pre-nuclear forces with its large ‘non-strategic nuclear forces’ that’s of greatest significance That’s shaping Russian thinking on the use of nuclear weapons, particularly during Hybrid Warfare, in a way that makes the risk of a crisis with Russia much more dangerous Russia is increasingly focusing on the use of its nuclear forces to enhance its ability to undertake military adventurism at the conventional level in a manner that’s highly threatening to NATO However the reliance on nuclear signaling, the changing operational posture of dual-role forces and concepts like ’preventative de-escalation’, increases the risk of miscalculation in a crisis that could lead to an escalation through the nuclear threshold
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in the Baltics Russia has undertaken sabre rattling of NATO with nuclear bombers Hybrid Warfare makes the risk of a crisis dangerous. Russia is focusing on nuclear to undertake military adventurism at the conventional level reliance on nuclear signaling increases the risk of miscalculation that could lead to escalation through the nuclear threshold
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Three developments suggest a willingness by Russia to use nuclear weapons in response to non-nuclear attacks in a manner that lowers the threshold of nuclear war. First, the concept of preventative de-escalation is important. A recent IISS analysis explained de-escalation in which limited nuclear war could be used to: ‘…de-escalate and terminate combat actions on terms acceptable to Russia through the threat of inflicting unacceptable damage upon the enemy. Such limited nuclear use may deter both nuclear and conventional aggression.’ Second, the integration of conventional pre-nuclear and nuclear forces reinforces Russia’s coercive power against NATO in the pre-war ‘Phase Zero’ in a future regional crisis—for example, in the Baltics. And third, the Russians are clearly conscious of that coercive power given their recent nuclear signaling that suggests Russia continues to see such weapons as a means of national strength. Russia has undertaken sabre rattling through simulated nuclear strikes in large-scale exercises and aggressive probing of NATO airspace with nuclear-capable bombers. It has demonstrated the dual-role Kalibr NK sea-launched cruise missile in deadly strikes against Syria, and deployed dual-role Iskander short-range ballistic missiles into Kaliningrad in a manner that was highly threatening to NATO. That has been backed by public statements which reinforce Russia’s nuclear weapons capability and even explicit nuclear threats to NATO states, notably Denmark. Russian nuclear forces are being swiftly upgraded with the focus on ICBM modernisation, based on introducing the SS-27 ‘Yars’ road-mobile missile, and from 2018 the silo-based RS-28 ‘Sarmat’ heavy ICBM. Yars and Sarmat replace much of Russia’s aging Soviet strategic rocket forces with significantly more capable delivery systems. Russia’s Navy is transitioning to modern Sineva and Bulava sea-launched ballistic missiles, on the modern Borei class SSBNs, while the Russian Air Force is restarting the Tu-160 Blackjack production line to produce the updated Tu-160M2 bomber that eventually will be complemented by the ‘PAK-DA’ advanced bomber sometime in the 2020s. The strategic nuclear force modernisation is important but it’s the integration of Russia’s conventional pre-nuclear forces with its large ‘non-strategic nuclear forces’ that’s of greatest significance. That’s shaping Russian thinking on the use of nuclear weapons, particularly during Hybrid Warfare, in a way that makes the risk of a crisis with Russia much more dangerous. Russia is increasingly focusing on the use of its nuclear forces to enhance its ability to undertake military adventurism at the conventional level in a manner that’s highly threatening to NATO. However the reliance on nuclear signaling, the changing operational posture of dual-role forces and concepts like ’preventative de-escalation’, increases the risk of miscalculation in a crisis that could lead to an escalation through the nuclear threshold.
| 2,988 |
<h4>Expansionism escalates --- their evidence doesn’t assume hybrid warfare.</h4><p><strong>Davis 17</strong> (<u><strong>Malcolm DAVIS</u></strong>. Senior Analyst, ASPI; PhD in Military Strategic Studies, University of Hull, “Russia, military modernisation and lowering the nuclear threshold.” Australian Strategic Policy Institute. January. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/russia-military-modernisation-lowering-nuclear-threshold/.)</p><p><u>Three developments suggest a willingness by Russia to use nuclear weapons</u> in response to non-nuclear attacks <u>in a manner that lowers the threshold of nuclear war</u>. <u>First, the concept of preventative de-escalation is important</u>. A recent IISS analysis explained de-escalation in which limited nuclear war could be used to: ‘…de-escalate and terminate combat actions on terms acceptable to Russia through the threat of inflicting unacceptable damage upon the enemy. Such limited nuclear use may deter both nuclear and conventional aggression.’ <u>Second, the integration of conventional pre-nuclear and nuclear forces reinforces Russia’s coercive power against NATO in the pre-war ‘Phase Zero’ in a future regional crisis</u>—for example, <u><mark>in the <strong>Baltics</u></strong></mark>. And <u>third, the Russians are clearly conscious of that coercive power given their recent nuclear signaling that suggests Russia continues to see such weapons as a means of national strength</u>. <u><mark>Russia has undertaken <strong>sabre rattling</strong></mark> through <strong>simulated nuclear strikes</strong> in large-scale exercises and <strong>aggressive probing</strong> <mark>of NATO</mark> airspace <mark>with nuclear</mark>-capable <mark>bombers</u></mark>. It has demonstrated the dual-role Kalibr NK sea-launched cruise missile in deadly strikes against Syria, and deployed dual-role Iskander short-range ballistic missiles into Kaliningrad in a manner that was highly threatening to NATO. <u>That has been backed by public statements which reinforce Russia’s nuclear weapons capability and even explicit nuclear threats to NATO states</u>, notably Denmark. <u>Russian nuclear forces are being <strong>swiftly upgraded</strong> with the focus on ICBM modernisation</u>, based on introducing the SS-27 ‘Yars’ road-mobile missile, and from 2018 the silo-based RS-28 ‘Sarmat’ heavy ICBM. Yars and Sarmat replace much of Russia’s aging Soviet strategic rocket forces with significantly more capable delivery systems. Russia’s Navy is transitioning to modern Sineva and Bulava sea-launched ballistic missiles, on the modern Borei class SSBNs, <u>while the Russian Air Force is restarting the Tu-160 Blackjack production line to produce the updated Tu-160M2 bomber</u> that eventually will be complemented by the ‘PAK-DA’ advanced bomber sometime in the 2020s. The strategic nuclear force modernisation is important but it’s <u>the <strong>integration</strong> of Russia’s conventional <strong>pre-nuclear forces</strong> with its large <strong>‘non-strategic nuclear forces’</strong> that’s of greatest significance</u>. <u>That’s shaping Russian thinking on the use of nuclear weapons, particularly during <strong><mark>Hybrid Warfare</strong></mark>, in a way that <mark>makes the <strong>risk of a crisis</strong></mark> with Russia much more <strong><mark>dangerous</u></strong>. <u>Russia is</mark> increasingly <mark>focusing on</mark> the use of its <mark>nuclear</mark> forces to enhance its ability <mark>to <strong>undertake military adventurism</strong> at the <strong>conventional level</strong></mark> in a manner that’s <strong>highly threatening</strong> to NATO</u>. <u>However the <mark>reliance on nuclear signaling</mark>, the changing operational posture of dual-role forces and concepts like ’preventative de-escalation’, <mark>increases the <strong>risk of miscalculation</strong></mark> in a crisis <mark>that could lead to</mark> an <strong><mark>escalation</strong> through the <strong>nuclear threshold</u></strong></mark>.</p>
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2NC
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***2NC – Miller DA***
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2NC – AT: Impact Defense
| 32,185 | 122 | 106,242 |
./documents/hspolicy18/StrathHaven/DiPa/Strath%20Haven-Ding-Pak-Neg-Wake%20Forest-Round4.docx
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N
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Wake Forest
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4
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Northview JR
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Alexander Lennon
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1AC
-Trafficking
1NC
-Midterms DA
-Canada CP
-Horsetrading DA
-Courts CP
-Parole CP
-T-LPR
-Miller DA
Block
-Midterms DA
-Canada CP
-Miller DA
2NR
-Canada CP
-Miller DA
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Strath Haven DiPa
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An.....
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Strath Haven
| null | null | 1,017 |
hspolicy18
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HS Policy 2018-19
| 2,018 |
cx
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hs
| 2 |
3,906,690 |
3000 scientists agree nuclear arsenals themselves are the largest risk of extinction – err aff because they have compared arsenal elimination to alternatives and determined complete removal is key. Relying on never ending luck is unsustainable
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Tucker 19
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Tucker 19 [Patrick Tucker is technology editor for Defense One. He’s also the author of The Naked Future: What Happens in a World That Anticipates Your Every Move? (Current, 2014). Previously, Tucker was deputy editor for The Futurist for nine years. Tucker has written about emerging technology in Slate, The Sun, MIT Technology Review, Wilson Quarterly, The American Legion Magazine, BBC News Magazine, Utne Reader, and elsewhere. Nuclear Weapons Are Getting Less Predictable, and More Dangerous. May 16, 2019. https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2019/05/everyones-nuclear-weapons-are-getting-less-predictable-and-more-dangerous/157052/]
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30 Nobel Laureates a former U.S. Secretary of Defense and over 3,000 other scientists from 84 countries have signed an open letter
From the public debate one might think that the cold war threat is over that’s not what nerdy number crunching reveals
superpower nuclear war so risky? there are 14,000 nuclear weapons hundreds of times more powerful than those dropped on Japan 90 percent belong to Russia and the US who keep thousands on hair-trigger alert
even a limited nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan could cause enough cooling and agricultural disruption to endanger 2 billion people
nuclear war
is more likely because it can start by mistake miscalculation or terrorist provocation There is a steady stream of accidents and false alarms that could trigger all-out war and relying on never-ending luck is not a sustainable strategy. Many nuclear powers have larger nuclear arsenals than needed for deterrence, yet prioritize making them more lethal over reducing them and the risk that they get used.
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30 Nobel Laureates, a former U.S. Sec Def and 3,000 scientists from 84 countries signed an open letter
From public debate the cold war threat is over that’s not what number crunching reveals
there are 14,000 nuclear weapons hundreds of times more powerful than those dropped on Japan 90 percent belong to Russia and the US on hair-trigger alert
even limited exchange between India and Pakistan could cause endanger 2 billion
nuclear war
can start by mistake miscalc or terrorist provocation There is a steady stream of accidents and false alarms that could trigger all-out war relying on never-ending luck is not sustainable
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Delegates from most United Nations member states are gathering in New York next month to negotiate a nuclear weapons ban, and 30 Nobel Laureates, a former U.S. Secretary of Defense and over 3,000 other scientists from 84 countries have signed an open letter in support. Why?
We scientists like to geek out about probabilities, megatons and impact calculations, so we see the nuclear situation differently than many politicians and pundits. From the public debate, one might think that the cold war threat is over and that the most likely way to be killed by a nuke is by being attacked by Iran, North Korea or terrorists, but that’s not what nerdy number crunching reveals. Those media-dominating scenarios could potentially kill millions of people—except that Iran has no nukes and North Korea lacks missiles capable of reliably delivering their dozen or so Hiroshima-scale bombs.
But scientific research has shown that a nuclear war between the superpowers might kill hundreds or potentially even thousands of times more people, and since it’s not a hundred times less likely to occur, the laws of statistics tell us that it’s the nuke scenario most likely to kill you.
Why is superpower nuclear war so risky? First of all, massive firepower: there are more than 14,000 nuclear weapons today, some of which are hundreds of times more powerful than North Korea’s and those dropped on Japan. Over 90 percent of these belong to Russia and the US, who keep thousands on hair-trigger alert, ready launch on minutes notice. A 1979 report by the US Government estimated that all-out war would kill 28-88 percent of Americans and 22-50 percent of Soviets (150-450 million people with today’s populations).
But this was before the risk of nuclear winter was discovered in the 1980’s.Researchers realized that regardless of whose cities burned, massive amounts of smoke could spread around the globe, blocking sunlight and transforming summers into winters, much like when asteroids or supervolcanoes caused mass extinctions in the past. A peer-reviewed analysis published by Robock et al (2007) showed cooling by about 20°C (36°F) in much of the core farming regions of the US, Europe, Russia and China (by 35°C in parts of Russia) for the first two summers, and about half that even a full decade later. Years of near-freezing summer temperatures would eliminate most of our food production. It is hard to predict exactly what would happen if thousands of Earth’s largest cities were reduced to rubble and global infrastructure collapsed, but whatever small fraction of all humans didn’t succumb to starvation, hypothermia or epidemics would probably need to cope with roving, armed gangs desperate for food.
There are large uncertainties in Nuclear Winter predictions. For example, how much smoke is produced and how high up it rises would determine its severity and longevity. Given this uncertainty, there is no guarantee that most people would survive. It has therefore been argued that the traditional nuclear doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) be replaced by Self-Assured Destruction (SAD): even if one of the two superpowers were able to launch its full nuclear arsenal against the other without any retaliation whatsoever, nuclear winter might still assure the attacking country’s self-destruction. Recent research has suggested that even a limited nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan could cause enough cooling and agricultural disruption to endanger up to 2 billion people, mostly outside the warring countries.
The fact that nuclear powers are taking the liberty to endanger everyone else without asking their permission has led to growing consternation in the world’s non-nuclear nations. This has been exacerbated by a seemingly endless series of near-misses in which nuclear war has come close to starting by accident, and leaders of many non-nuclear nations feel less than thrilled by the idea of being destroyed by something as banal as a malfunctioning early warning-system in a nation that they are not threatening.
Such concerns prompted 185 non-nuclear nations to sign the 1970 Non-Proliferation-Treaty (NPT), promising to remain nuke-free in return for the nuclear nations phasing out theirs in accordance with NPT Article VI, whereby each party "undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”. Nearly 50 years later, many of these "have-nots” have concluded that they were tricked, and that the "haves” have no intention of ever keeping their end of the bargain. Rather than disarming, the U.S. and Russia have recently announced massive investments in novel nuclear weapons. Russia has recently touted a cobalt-encased doomsday bomb reminiscent of the dark comedy "Dr. Strangelove,” and the U.S. plans to spend a trillion dollars replacing most of its nuclear weapons with new ones that are more effective for a first strike.
Adding insult to injury, India, Pakistan and Israel have been allowed to join the nuclear club without major repercussions. "The probability of a nuclear calamity is higher today, I believe, that it was during the cold war," said former U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, who signed the open letter.
This disillusionment from the “have-nots” prompted 123 of them to launch an initiative in the United Nations General Assembly, where the nuclear nations lack veto power. In late 2016, they voted to launch the aforementioned UN negotiations that may produce a nuclear weapons ban treaty this summer. But a ban obviously wouldn’t persuade the nuclear ``haves” to eliminate their nukes the next morning, so what’s the point of it?
The way I see it, most governments are frustrated that a small group of countries with a minority of the world's population insist on retaining the right to ruin life on Earth for everyone else with nuclear weapons. Such “might makes right” policy has precedent. In South Africa, for example, the minority in control of the unethical Apartheid system didn't give it up spontaneously, but because they were pressured into doing so by the majority. Similarly, the minority in control of unethical nuclear weapons won't give them up spontaneously on their own initiative, but only if they're pressured into doing so by the majority of the world's nations and citizens. The key point of the ban is to provide such pressure by stigmatizing nuclear weapons.
Nuclear ban supporters draw inspiration from the 1997 Ottawa treaty banning landmines. Although the superpowers still refuse to sign it, it created enough stigma that many people now associate mines not with national security, but with images of children who have had limbs blown off while playing in peace-time. This stigma caused leading arms manufactures to half production in response to investor pressure and dwindling demand. In 2014, the Pentagon announced that it was halting landmine use outside of the Korean peninsula. Today, the global landmine market has nearly collapsed, with merely a single manufacturer (South Korean Hanwa) remaining.
The "have-not” negotiators hope that a nuclear ban treaty will similarly stigmatize nuclear weapons, persuading us all that we’re less safe with more nukes—even if they are our own. If this happens, it will increase the likelihood that the ``haves” trim their nuclear arsenals down to the minimum size needed for effective deterrence, reverting from SAD back to MAD and making us all safer.
Here is the text of the letter. A list of some of the notable signatories follows.
AN OPEN LETTER FROM SCIENTISTS IN SUPPORT OF THE UN NUCLEAR WEAPONS NEGOTIATIONS
Nuclear arms are the only weapons of mass destruction not yet prohibited by an international convention, even though they are the most destructive and indiscriminate weapons ever created. We scientists bear a special responsibility for nuclear weapons, since it was scientists who invented them and discovered that their effects are even more horrific than first thought. Individual explosions can obliterate cities, radioactive fallout can contaminate regions, and a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse may cause mayhem by frying electrical grids and electronics across a continent. The most horrible hazard is a nuclear-induced winter, in which the fires and smoke from as few as a thousand detonations might darken the atmosphere enough to trigger a global mini ice age with year-round winter-like conditions. This could cause a complete collapse of the global food system and apocalyptic unrest, potentially killing most people on Earth – even if the nuclear war involved only a small fraction of the roughly 14,000 nuclear weapons that today’s nine nuclear powers control. As Ronald Reagan said: “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”
Unfortunately, such a war is more likely than one may hope, because it can start by mistake, miscalculation or terrorist provocation. There is a steady stream of accidents and false alarms that could trigger all-out war, and relying on never-ending luck is not a sustainable strategy. Many nuclear powers have larger nuclear arsenals than needed for deterrence, yet prioritize making them more lethal over reducing them and the risk that they get used.
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<h4><u>3000 scientists</u> agree nuclear <u>arsenals themselves</u> are the <u>largest risk</u> of extinction – <u>err aff</u> because <u>they</u> have <u>compared arsenal elimination</u> to alternatives and determined <u>complete removal</u> is key. Relying on never ending <u>luck</u> is <u>unsustainable</h4><p></u><strong>Tucker 19</strong> [Patrick Tucker is technology editor for Defense One. He’s also the author of The Naked Future: What Happens in a World That Anticipates Your Every Move? (Current, 2014). Previously, Tucker was deputy editor for The Futurist for nine years. Tucker has written about emerging technology in Slate, The Sun, MIT Technology Review, Wilson Quarterly, The American Legion Magazine, BBC News Magazine, Utne Reader, and elsewhere. Nuclear Weapons Are Getting Less Predictable, and More Dangerous. May 16, 2019. https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2019/05/everyones-nuclear-weapons-are-getting-less-predictable-and-more-dangerous/157052/]</p><p>Delegates from most United Nations member states are gathering in New York next month to negotiate a nuclear weapons ban, and <u><strong><mark>30 Nobel Laureates</u></strong>, <u>a former <strong>U.S. Sec</strong></mark>retary of <strong><mark>Def</strong></mark>ense <mark>and</mark> over <strong><mark>3,000</strong></mark> other <strong><mark>scientists</strong> from <strong>84 countries</strong></mark> have <mark>signed an open letter</u></mark> in support. Why?</p><p>We scientists like to geek out about probabilities, megatons and impact calculations, so we see the nuclear situation differently than many politicians and pundits. <u><mark>From</mark> the <strong><mark>public debate</u></strong></mark>, <u>one might think that <mark>the <strong>cold war threat is over</u></strong></mark> and that the most likely way to be killed by a nuke is by being attacked by Iran, North Korea or terrorists, but <u><mark>that’s not what</mark> nerdy <strong><mark>number crunching</strong> reveals</u></mark>. Those media-dominating scenarios could potentially kill millions of people—except that Iran has no nukes and North Korea lacks missiles capable of reliably delivering their dozen or so Hiroshima-scale bombs.</p><p>But scientific research has shown that a nuclear war between the superpowers might kill hundreds or potentially even thousands of times more people, and since it’s not a hundred times less likely to occur, the laws of statistics tell us that it’s the nuke scenario most likely to kill you.</p><p>Why is <u><strong>superpower nuclear war</strong> so risky?</u> First of all, massive firepower: <u><mark>there are</u></mark> more than <u><strong><mark>14,000 nuclear weapons</u></strong></mark> today, some of which are <u><mark>hundreds of times more powerful than</u></mark> North Korea’s and <u><mark>those dropped on Japan</u></mark>. Over <u><strong><mark>90 percent</u></strong></mark> of these <u><mark>belong to <strong>Russia and the US</u></strong></mark>, <u>who keep thousands <mark>on <strong>hair-trigger alert</u></strong></mark>, ready launch on minutes notice. A 1979 report by the US Government estimated that all-out war would kill 28-88 percent of Americans and 22-50 percent of Soviets (150-450 million people with today’s populations).</p><p>But this was before the risk of nuclear winter was discovered in the 1980’s.Researchers realized that regardless of whose cities burned, massive amounts of smoke could spread around the globe, blocking sunlight and transforming summers into winters, much like when asteroids or supervolcanoes caused mass extinctions in the past. A peer-reviewed analysis published by Robock et al (2007) showed cooling by about 20°C (36°F) in much of the core farming regions of the US, Europe, Russia and China (by 35°C in parts of Russia) for the first two summers, and about half that even a full decade later. Years of near-freezing summer temperatures would eliminate most of our food production. It is hard to predict exactly what would happen if thousands of Earth’s largest cities were reduced to rubble and global infrastructure collapsed, but whatever small fraction of all humans didn’t succumb to starvation, hypothermia or epidemics would probably need to cope with roving, armed gangs desperate for food.</p><p>There are large uncertainties in Nuclear Winter predictions. For example, how much smoke is produced and how high up it rises would determine its severity and longevity. Given this uncertainty, there is no guarantee that most people would survive. It has therefore been argued that the traditional nuclear doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) be replaced by Self-Assured Destruction (SAD): even if one of the two superpowers were able to launch its full nuclear arsenal against the other without any retaliation whatsoever, nuclear winter might still assure the attacking country’s self-destruction. Recent research has suggested that <u><strong><mark>even</u></strong></mark> <u>a <strong><mark>limited</strong></mark> nuclear <mark>exchange between <strong>India and Pakistan</strong> could cause</mark> enough <strong>cooling</strong> and <strong>agricultural disruption</strong> to <mark>endanger</u></mark> up to <u><strong><mark>2 billion</u></strong></mark> <u>people</u>, mostly outside the warring countries.</p><p>The fact that nuclear powers are taking the liberty to endanger everyone else without asking their permission has led to growing consternation in the world’s non-nuclear nations. This has been exacerbated by a seemingly endless series of near-misses in which nuclear war has come close to starting by accident, and leaders of many non-nuclear nations feel less than thrilled by the idea of being destroyed by something as banal as a malfunctioning early warning-system in a nation that they are not threatening.</p><p>Such concerns prompted 185 non-nuclear nations to sign the 1970 Non-Proliferation-Treaty (NPT), promising to remain nuke-free in return for the nuclear nations phasing out theirs in accordance with NPT Article VI, whereby each party "undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”. Nearly 50 years later, many of these "have-nots” have concluded that they were tricked, and that the "haves” have no intention of ever keeping their end of the bargain. Rather than disarming, the U.S. and Russia have recently announced massive investments in novel nuclear weapons. Russia has recently touted a cobalt-encased doomsday bomb reminiscent of the dark comedy "Dr. Strangelove,” and the U.S. plans to spend a trillion dollars replacing most of its nuclear weapons with new ones that are more effective for a first strike.</p><p>Adding insult to injury, India, Pakistan and Israel have been allowed to join the nuclear club without major repercussions. "The probability of a nuclear calamity is higher today, I believe, that it was during the cold war," said former U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, who signed the open letter.</p><p>This disillusionment from the “have-nots” prompted 123 of them to launch an initiative in the United Nations General Assembly, where the nuclear nations lack veto power. In late 2016, they voted to launch the aforementioned UN negotiations that may produce a nuclear weapons ban treaty this summer. But a ban obviously wouldn’t persuade the nuclear ``haves” to eliminate their nukes the next morning, so what’s the point of it?</p><p>The way I see it, most governments are frustrated that a small group of countries with a minority of the world's population insist on retaining the right to ruin life on Earth for everyone else with nuclear weapons. Such “might makes right” policy has precedent. In South Africa, for example, the minority in control of the unethical Apartheid system didn't give it up spontaneously, but because they were pressured into doing so by the majority. Similarly, the minority in control of unethical nuclear weapons won't give them up spontaneously on their own initiative, but only if they're pressured into doing so by the majority of the world's nations and citizens. The key point of the ban is to provide such pressure by stigmatizing nuclear weapons.</p><p>Nuclear ban supporters draw inspiration from the 1997 Ottawa treaty banning landmines. Although the superpowers still refuse to sign it, it created enough stigma that many people now associate mines not with national security, but with images of children who have had limbs blown off while playing in peace-time. This stigma caused leading arms manufactures to half production in response to investor pressure and dwindling demand. In 2014, the Pentagon announced that it was halting landmine use outside of the Korean peninsula. Today, the global landmine market has nearly collapsed, with merely a single manufacturer (South Korean Hanwa) remaining.</p><p>The "have-not” negotiators hope that a nuclear ban treaty will similarly stigmatize nuclear weapons, persuading us all that we’re less safe with more nukes—even if they are our own. If this happens, it will increase the likelihood that the ``haves” trim their nuclear arsenals down to the minimum size needed for effective deterrence, reverting from SAD back to MAD and making us all safer.</p><p>Here is the text of the letter. A list of some of the notable signatories follows. </p><p>AN OPEN LETTER FROM SCIENTISTS IN SUPPORT OF THE UN NUCLEAR WEAPONS NEGOTIATIONS</p><p>Nuclear arms are the only weapons of mass destruction not yet prohibited by an international convention, even though they are the most destructive and indiscriminate weapons ever created. We scientists bear a special responsibility for nuclear weapons, since it was scientists who invented them and discovered that their effects are even more horrific than first thought. Individual explosions can obliterate cities, radioactive fallout can contaminate regions, and a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse may cause mayhem by frying electrical grids and electronics across a continent. The most horrible hazard is a nuclear-induced winter, in which the fires and smoke from as few as a thousand detonations might darken the atmosphere enough to trigger a global mini ice age with year-round winter-like conditions. This could cause a complete collapse of the global food system and apocalyptic unrest, potentially killing most people on Earth – even if the nuclear war involved only a small fraction of the roughly 14,000 nuclear weapons that today’s nine nuclear powers control. As Ronald Reagan said: “A <u><mark>nuclear war</u></mark> cannot be won and must never be fought.”</p><p>Unfortunately, such a war <u>is more likely</u> than one may hope, <u>because it <mark>can start by <strong>mistake</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>miscalc</mark>ulation</u></strong> <u><mark>or <strong>terrorist provocation</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>There is a <strong>steady stream</strong> of <strong>accidents</strong> and <strong>false alarms</strong> that could trigger <strong>all-out war</u></strong></mark>, <u>and <strong><mark>relying</strong> on <strong>never-ending luck</strong> is <strong>not</strong></mark> a <strong><mark>sustainable</strong></mark> strategy. Many nuclear powers have larger nuclear arsenals than needed for deterrence, yet prioritize making them more lethal over reducing them and the risk that they get used.</p></u>
| null | null | null | 321,216 | 295 | 130,748 |
./documents/hsld19/Harker/Sh/Harker-Shah-Aff-Stanford-Round1.docx
| 838,299 |
A
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Stanford
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1
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Loyola JA
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Mihir Rai
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1AC-Miscalc
1NC-State spec NFU CP DIB DA US-China DA Asteroids CP
1AR-All neg fiat bad condo bad PICs bad
2NR-State spec NFU CP US-China DA DIB DA theory
2AR-All substance in 2NR state spec neg fiat bad
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hsld19/Harker/Sh/Harker-Shah-Aff-Stanford-Round1.docx
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SaSh
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Harker SaSh
| null |
Sa.....
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Sh.....
| null | null | 24,119 |
Harker
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Harker
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CA
| null | 1,027 |
hsld19
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HS LD 2019-20
| 2,019 |
ld
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hs
| 1 |
650,083 |
1) Eliminate means a complete removal – their interp is unreasonable
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District Court of Minnesota ‘10
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District Court of Minnesota ‘10 Buetow v. ALS Enterprises, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 2d 832 - Dist. Court, Minnesota 2010
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The word "eliminate" is subject to only one reasonable interpretation—complete elimination. The Compact Oxford English Dictionary provides that the word "eliminate" means "[t]o expel, exclude, remove, get rid of." The Compact Oxford English Dictionary 141 (2d ed. 1989). The American Heritage Dictionary provides that the word "eliminate" means "to wipe out someone or something, especially by using drastic methods such as banishment or execution." The American Heritage Dictionary 580 (4th ed. 2000). Thus, the word "eliminate" denotes a complete removal such that the word "complete" is unnecessary and repetitive.[9]
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The word "eliminate" is subject to only one reasonable interpretation—complete elimination. The O E D provides that eliminate means "[t]o remove, get rid of the word "eliminate" denotes a complete removal such that the word "complete" is unnecessary and repetitive
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The word "eliminate" is subject to only one reasonable interpretation—complete elimination. In determining the meaning of challenged advertisements, a court may reference dictionary definitions. See Am. Italian Pasta Co. v. New World Pasta Co., 371 F.3d 387, 391 (8th Cir.2004) (referencing a dictionary definition of "favorite"). The Compact Oxford English Dictionary provides that the word "eliminate" means "[t]o expel, exclude, remove, get rid of." The Compact Oxford English Dictionary 141 (2d ed. 1989). The American Heritage Dictionary provides that the word "eliminate" means "to wipe out someone or something, especially by using drastic methods such as banishment or execution." The American Heritage Dictionary 580 (4th ed. 2000). Thus, the word "eliminate" denotes a complete removal such that the word "complete" is unnecessary and repetitive.[9]
| 859 |
<h4>1) Eliminate means a <u>complete removal</u> – their interp is unreasonable</h4><p><strong>District Court of Minnesota ‘10</strong> Buetow<u> v. ALS Enterprises, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 2d 832 - Dist. Court, Minnesota 2010</p><p><mark>The word "eliminate" is subject to <strong>only one reasonable interpretation</strong>—complete elimination.</u></mark> In determining the meaning of challenged advertisements, a court may reference dictionary definitions. See Am. Italian Pasta Co. v. New World Pasta Co., 371 F.3d 387, 391 (8th Cir.2004) (referencing a dictionary definition of "favorite"). <u><mark>The</mark> Compact <strong><mark>O</strong></mark>xford <strong><mark>E</strong></mark>nglish <strong><mark>D</strong></mark>ictionary <mark>provides that</mark> the word "<mark>eliminate</mark>" <mark>means</mark> <mark>"[t]o </mark>expel, exclude, <mark>remove, get rid of</mark>." The Compact Oxford English Dictionary 141 (2d ed. 1989). The <strong>American Heritage</strong> Dictionary <strong>provides that</strong> the word <strong>"eliminate" means "to wipe out</strong> someone or something, especially by using drastic methods such as banishment or execution." The American Heritage Dictionary 580 (4th ed. 2000). Thus, <mark>the word "eliminate" denotes a complete removal such that the word "complete" is unnecessary and repetitive</mark>.[9]</p></u>
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1
| null | 374,669 | 366 | 12,746 |
./documents/hsld19/CrescentaValley/To/Crescenta%20Valley-Towner-Neg-Glenbrooks-Round4.docx
| 835,126 |
N
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Glenbrooks
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4
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McNeil AR
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Jasmine Stidham
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1AC Coal
1NC T Eliminate - Base DA - BLDTF PIC - Royalties PIC - SCOTUS CP - Case
1AR Condo PICs Bad - All
2NR BLDTF PIC - 1AR Theory
2AR Condo PICs Bad
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hsld19/CrescentaValley/To/Crescenta%20Valley-Towner-Neg-Glenbrooks-Round4.docx
| null | 71,403 |
AsTo
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Crescenta Valley AsTo
| null |
As.....
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To.....
| null | null | 24,052 |
CrescentaValley
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Crescenta Valley
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CA
| null | 1,027 |
hsld19
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HS LD 2019-20
| 2,019 |
ld
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hs
| 1 |
628,649 |
1---Cyberattacks cause false flags that are met with intentional launch---old principles of deterrence can’t explain cyber warfare.
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Futter '18
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Futter '18 (Andrew Futter; Andrew Futter is an associate professor in the School of History, Politics, and International Relations at the University of Leicester. He is the author of The Politics of Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile Defence and US National Security Policy, the editor of The United Kingdom and the Future of Nuclear Weapons, and co-editor of Reassessing the Revolution in Military Affairs; Hacking the Bomb: Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons; 2-15-2018; accessed 12-1-2019; JPark)
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even if nuclear systems are successfully guarded against malicious hackers the threat of use of cyber capabilities will raise perceived vulnerabilities cyber capabilities lead to an inadvertent deepening of a crisis up to the nuclear level cyber operations are offense-dominant. Along with arms racing this makes cyber capabilities more likely to be employed early in a crisis The result could be unmanageable escalation during a crisis hackers could destroy communications channels the veracity of the information flowing from their computers including command and control utilize commercial infrastructure that could be vulnerable to an attack linkages required for nuclear second-strike capabilities could also be unreliable Aggressors prevent communication hamper management systems, magnify confusion, and make it more difficult to identify what is happening attacks might be particularly acute for nuclear dyads that are in close geographical proximity deliberate interference from a third-party actor or unauthorized insider deepen the crisis through false flag operations it is difficult to know which computer systems support which weapons and operations cyberattacks might reduce the ability to signal, causing flawed images of intentions and capabilities used to "spoof early warning systems" First, cyber make communicating with an adversary complicated Second cyberattacks may be worse than traditional methods. operations are hard for commanders and policymakers to understand given the difficulties of attribution , decision makers are under pressure, the use of cyberattacks thereby compressing the escalation ladder the steps between conventional and nuclear use. a nuclear-armed state bombarded with cyberattacks might opt for preemption in the worst case with nuclear weapons cyber capabilities appear to augment conventional first-strike possibilities dynamics raise the likelihood of uncontrollable escalation
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even if systems are guarded the threat of cyber deepen a crisis to the nuclear level cyber operations are offense-dominant this makes capabilities likely to be early in a crisis unmanageable escalation hackers destroy communications including command and control linkages for second-strike could be unreliable magnify confusion attacks dyads in close geographical proximity from a third-party acto or insider false flag operations cyberattacks reduce the ability to signal thereby compressing the escalation ladder between conventional and nuclear a state might preempt
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What, then, might this cyber-enabled conflict, or warfare involving cyber operations, look like? And how might these pressures involve thinking about nuclear weapons? The first thing to note is that even if nuclear systems are not targeted directly or are successfully guarded against malicious hackers, it seems very likely that the use—or even the threat of use—of cyber capabilities against an opponent during a crisis will raise tensions, concerns, and perceived vulnerabilities, and that this will make nuclear crisis resolution more complicated and perhaps more dangerous." The second thing to note is that the use of cyber capabilities is likely to obfuscate and complicate the escalation ladder, and possibly lead to an inadvertent deepening of a crisis, perhaps even up to the nuclear level. It is likely to do this in different ways from those theorized in the past, and probably at a much greater speed. It could also, for example, include attacks in both civilian and military domains. Taken together, new cyber dynamics—both operations and context might even necessitate a rethinking of these established nuclear concepts altogether. Perhaps the most important thing to note about cyber operations in future crises and warfare is that they are likely to be offense-dominant. That is, in cyberspace the advantage will be held by the attackers rather than the defenders. Although this forecast is challenged by some, and is contingent on several variables—particularly the target and intention of the attack—it does have rather significant implications for the broader security dilemma, and especially for strategic stability.51 Along with creating pressures for arms racing, this also makes cyber capabilities more likely to be employed early in a crisis, particularly given the policy of active defense mentioned above.52 The result could potentially be greater insecurity for all, and possibly unintended, and in the worst-case scenario perhaps even unmanageable escalation. By way of an example, an Israeli war game conducted in 2013 demonstrated how the use and threat of cyberattacks might very quickly escalate a crisis, in this case bringing the United States and Russia to the brink of conflict in a possible Middle East war.53 Such conflicts might begin and play out in a number of different ways, but all will likely create new pressures for crisis management. First, during a crisis hackers could potentially disrupt or destroy communications channels, making it difficult to manage forces, including nuclear forces, and reducing commanders' confidence in their weapons systems and the ability of officials to communicate. Even a relatively small-scale attack could create considerable doubt about the security and reliability of communications, and particularly about the veracity of the information flowing from their computers.54 Moreover, despite often-held beliefs to the contrary, many military communications systems—including even some used for nuclear command and control—utilize commercial infrastructure or are based on networks that could be vulnerable to an attack or disruption.55 It must therefore be assumed that the linkages required for nuclear second-strike capabilities could also be unreliable, and possibly vulnerable to an opponents cyber operations.56 Aggressors might also employ distributed denial-of-service attacks to prevent communication, of-service attacks to prevent communication, hamper battle management systems, magnify confusion, and make it more difficult to identify what is happening and perhaps to conduct a coordinated response. Such attacks might be particularly acute for nuclear dyads that are in close geographical proximity—and therefore face limited decision-making time—such as India and Pakistan." Second, the use of cyberattack capabilities might inadvertently escalate a crisis—very much building on the model of "inadvertent nuclear escalation" developed by Barry Posen back in the early 1990s.58 This might be due either to deliberate interference from a third-party actor—such as a terrorist group—or from an unauthorized insider, or by another state seeking to deepen the crisis through false flag operations (that is, operations conducted to look like they were carried out by someone else). Alternatively, it might involve accidentally targeting the wrong systems. This risk is amplified considerably in the cyber context because it is increasingly difficult to know which computer systems support which weapons and operations. For example, as Lawrence Cavaiola and his colleagues explain, "an attack [by the United States] on a Chinese system that is used to increase the readiness of tactical forces might also inadvertently degrade the readiness of Chinese strategic nuclear forces, with grave risks of misinterpretation and escalation, up to and including launch on warning."59 Thus, a cyberattack on computer systems thought to control conventional weapons might be mistaken (and interpreted) as a direct attack on an adversary's ability to use its nuclear forces. Moreover, even if enemy cyberattacks are detected and mitigated, this could still lead to a "spiral of mistrust" and worst-case scenario thinking.' Third, cyberattacks might reduce the ability to signal, causing flawed images of intentions and capabilities, or be used to "spoof early warning systems"—again, a particular concern given the possibility of false flag cyber interference by third parties. It is perfectly possible that the ability to clearly signal intentions could be one of the biggest challenges created by cyber operations for nuclear crisis management. The concern here is twofold. First, the cyber context will make communicating with an adversary (and your own forces) much more complicated. Second, it is far from clear that cyberattacks themselves offer a very useful way of signaling, and may in fact be worse than traditional methods. As Erik Gartzke and Jon Lindsay explain, this is because cyber operations "are complex, esoteric, and hard for commanders and policymakers to understand."6' Previous methods of signaling—such as seeking to indicate intentions or red lines to an adversary through limited conventional action, already a complicated and delicate endeavor—will probably be even more difficult to implement when cyberattacks are also involved.62 Moreover, given the difficulties of attribution—particularly when time is short, decision makers are under pressure, and third-party cyber activities abound—it may not be straightforward to ascertain when a conflict has actually stopped.63 In this way, cyber operations are likely to further complicate and "muddy" signaling between adversaries during a crisis or conflict, either deliberately or inadvertently." This would also, therefore, make the functioning of leadership far more complicated in any future nuclear crisis too. Fourth, the use of cyberattacks might reduce the search for viable alternatives, thereby compressing—or at least muddying —the escalation ladder, particularly the steps between conventional and nuclear use. Once hostilities begin, leaders may not feel confident that the information they are receiving is genuine; the same might also be true for commanders in the field. Each decision would be underpinned by an uneasiness about the veracity of the information and data being used, possibly leading to different types of calculations and actions.65 In addition to this, leaders would fear that cyber operations would be used early in a crisis to disable or retard their most important weapons systems and to prevent them from being used against an adversary. Unfortunately, this might create a spiral effect, and more pressure to "use them or lose them," when it comes to a state's most important military capabilities.66 In a worst-case scenario, these concerns might increase perceived time pressures to act or respond, and the option to act preemptively. Stephen Cimbala has even gone as far as to warn that a nuclear-armed state bombarded with cyberattacks—particularly on its command, control, communications, and early warning networks—might feel so vulnerable that it would opt for preemption, in the worst case with nuclear weapons.° This exacerbates the feeling that cyber operations could undermine the ability to threaten retaliation, and therefore to strike second, because cyber capabilities appear to augment conventional first-strike possibilities against key enemy systems and forces, including their nuclear weapons.68 Taken together, these dynamics raise the likelihood of unintended and potentially uncontrollable escalation and make the management of such crises more complicated and dangerous.69
| 8,683 |
<h4>1---Cyberattacks cause <u>false flags</u> that are met with intentional launch---old principles of deterrence can’t explain <u>cyber warfare</u>.</h4><p><strong>Futter '18</strong> (Andrew Futter; Andrew Futter is an associate professor in the School of History, Politics, and International Relations at the University of Leicester. He is the author of The Politics of Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile Defence and US National Security Policy, the editor of The United Kingdom and the Future of Nuclear Weapons, and co-editor of Reassessing the Revolution in Military Affairs; Hacking the Bomb: Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons; 2-15-2018; accessed 12-1-2019; JPark) </p><p>What, then, might this cyber-enabled conflict, or warfare involving cyber operations, look like? And how might these pressures involve thinking about nuclear weapons? The first thing to note is that <u><mark>even if</u> <u></mark>nuclear <mark>systems</mark> <mark>are</u></mark> not targeted directly or are <u>successfully <mark>guarded</mark> against malicious hackers</u>, it seems very likely that <u><mark>the</u></mark> use—or even the <u><mark>threat of</mark> use</u>—<u>of <mark>cyber</mark> capabilities</u> against an opponent during a crisis <u>will raise </u>tensions, concerns, and<u> perceived vulnerabilities</u>, and that this will make nuclear crisis resolution more complicated and perhaps more dangerous." The second thing to note is that the use of <u>cyber capabilities </u>is likely to obfuscate and complicate the escalation ladder, and possibly <u>lead to an inadvertent <mark>deepen</mark>ing of <mark>a crisis</u></mark>, perhaps even <u>up <mark>to the nuclear level</u></mark>. It is likely to do this in different ways from those theorized in the past, and probably at a much greater speed. It could also, for example, include attacks in both civilian and military domains. Taken together, new cyber dynamics—both operations and context might even necessitate a rethinking of these established nuclear concepts altogether. Perhaps the most important thing to note about <u><mark>cyber operations</mark> </u>in future crises and warfare is that they <u><mark>are</u></mark> likely to be <u><mark>offense-dominant</mark>. </u>That is, in cyberspace the advantage will be held by the attackers rather than the defenders. Although this forecast is challenged by some, and is contingent on several variables—particularly the target and intention of the attack—it does have rather significant implications for the broader security dilemma, and especially for strategic stability.51 <u>Along with </u>creating pressures for <u>arms racing</u>, <u><mark>this</u></mark> also <u><mark>makes</mark> cyber <mark>capabilities </mark>more <mark>likely to be</mark> employed <mark>early in a crisis</u></mark>, particularly given the policy of active defense mentioned above.52 <u>The result could </u>potentially <u>be</u> greater insecurity for all, and possibly unintended, and in the worst-case scenario perhaps even <u><mark>unmanageable escalation</u></mark>. By way of an example, an Israeli war game conducted in 2013 demonstrated how the use and threat of cyberattacks might very quickly escalate a crisis, in this case bringing the United States and Russia to the brink of conflict in a possible Middle East war.53 Such conflicts might begin and play out in a number of different ways, but all will likely create new pressures for crisis management. First, <u>during a crisis <mark>hackers</mark> could</u> potentially disrupt or <u><mark>destroy communications</mark> channels</u>, making it difficult to manage forces, including nuclear forces, and reducing commanders' confidence in their weapons systems and the ability of officials to communicate. Even a relatively small-scale attack could create considerable doubt about the security and reliability of communications, and particularly about <u>the veracity of the information flowing from their computers</u>.54 Moreover, despite often-held beliefs to the contrary, many military communications systems—<u><mark>including</u></mark> even some used for nuclear <u><mark>command and control</u></mark>—<u>utilize commercial infrastructure</u> or are based on networks <u>that could be vulnerable to an attack</u> or disruption.55 It must therefore be assumed that the <u><mark>linkages</mark> required <mark>for</mark> nuclear <mark>second-strike</mark> capabilities <mark>could</mark> also <mark>be unreliable</u></mark>, and possibly vulnerable to an opponents cyber operations.56 <u>Aggressors </u>might also employ distributed denial-of-service attacks to <u>prevent communication</u>, of-service attacks to prevent communication, <u>hamper</u> battle <u>management systems, <mark>magnify confusion</mark>, and make it more difficult to identify what is happening </u>and perhaps to conduct a coordinated response. Such <u><mark>attacks</mark> might be particularly acute for nuclear <mark>dyads</mark> that are <mark>in close geographical proximity</u></mark>—and therefore face limited decision-making time—such as India and Pakistan." Second, the use of cyberattack capabilities might inadvertently escalate a crisis—very much building on the model of "inadvertent nuclear escalation" developed by Barry Posen back in the early 1990s.58 This might be due either to <u>deliberate interference <mark>from a third-party acto</mark>r</u>—such as a terrorist group—<u><mark>or</u></mark> from an <u>unauthorized <mark>insider</u></mark>, or by another state seeking to <u>deepen the crisis through <mark>false flag operations</u></mark> (that is, operations conducted to look like they were carried out by someone else). Alternatively, it might involve accidentally targeting the wrong systems. This risk is amplified considerably in the cyber context because <u>it is </u>increasingly<u> difficult to know which computer systems support which weapons and operations</u>. For example, as Lawrence Cavaiola and his colleagues explain, "an attack [by the United States] on a Chinese system that is used to increase the readiness of tactical forces might also inadvertently degrade the readiness of Chinese strategic nuclear forces, with grave risks of misinterpretation and escalation, up to and including launch on warning."59 Thus, a cyberattack on computer systems thought to control conventional weapons might be mistaken (and interpreted) as a direct attack on an adversary's ability to use its nuclear forces. Moreover, even if enemy cyberattacks are detected and mitigated, this could still lead to a "spiral of mistrust" and worst-case scenario thinking.' Third, <u><mark>cyberattacks</mark> might <mark>reduce the ability to signal</mark>, causing flawed images of intentions and capabilities</u>, or be <u>used to "spoof early warning systems"</u>—again, a particular concern given the possibility of false flag cyber interference by third parties. It is perfectly possible that the ability to clearly signal intentions could be one of the biggest challenges created by cyber operations for nuclear crisis management. The concern here is twofold. <u>First, </u>the<u> cyber </u>context will <u>make communicating with an adversary</u> (and your own forces) much more <u>complicated</u>. <u>Second</u>, it is far from clear that <u>cyberattacks</u> themselves offer a very useful way of signaling, and <u>may</u> in fact <u>be worse than traditional methods. </u>As Erik Gartzke and Jon Lindsay explain, this is because cyber <u>operations</u> "<u>are</u> complex, esoteric, and <u>hard for commanders and policymakers to understand</u>."6' Previous methods of signaling—such as seeking to indicate intentions or red lines to an adversary through limited conventional action, already a complicated and delicate endeavor—will probably be even more difficult to implement when cyberattacks are also involved.62 Moreover, <u>given the difficulties of attribution</u>—particularly when time is short<u>, decision makers are under pressure,</u> and third-party cyber activities abound—it may not be straightforward to ascertain when a conflict has actually stopped.63 In this way, cyber operations are likely to further complicate and "muddy" signaling between adversaries during a crisis or conflict, either deliberately or inadvertently." This would also, therefore, make the functioning of leadership far more complicated in any future nuclear crisis too. Fourth, <u>the use of cyberattacks</u> might reduce the search for viable alternatives, <u><mark>thereby compressing</u></mark>—or at least muddying —<u><mark>the escalation ladder</u></mark>, particularly <u>the steps <mark>between conventional and nuclear</mark> use.</u> Once hostilities begin, leaders may not feel confident that the information they are receiving is genuine; the same might also be true for commanders in the field. Each decision would be underpinned by an uneasiness about the veracity of the information and data being used, possibly leading to different types of calculations and actions.65 In addition to this, leaders would fear that cyber operations would be used early in a crisis to disable or retard their most important weapons systems and to prevent them from being used against an adversary. Unfortunately, this might create a spiral effect, and more pressure to "use them or lose them," when it comes to a state's most important military capabilities.66 In a worst-case scenario, these concerns might increase perceived time pressures to act or respond, and the option to act preemptively. Stephen Cimbala has even gone as far as to warn that <u><mark>a</mark> nuclear-armed <mark>state</mark> bombarded with cyberattacks</u>—particularly on its command, control, communications, and early warning networks—<u><mark>might</u></mark> feel so vulnerable that it would <u>opt for <mark>preempt</mark>ion</u>, <u>in the worst case with nuclear weapons</u>.° This exacerbates the feeling that cyber operations could undermine the ability to threaten retaliation, and therefore to strike second, because <u>cyber capabilities appear to augment conventional first-strike possibilities</u> against key enemy systems and forces, including their nuclear weapons.68 Taken together, these <u>dynamics</u> <u>raise the likelihood of</u> unintended and potentially <u>uncontrollable escalation</u> and make the management of such crises more complicated and dangerous.69</p>
| null | null |
1AC---Prolif
| 372,334 | 106 | 11,762 |
./documents/hsld19/Needham/Lu/Needham-Lu-Aff-Harvard-Round5.docx
| 845,217 |
A
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Harvard
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5
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New Jersey Independent AT
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Jharick Shields
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1ac - prolif
1nc - cbw circumvention case
1ar - all
2nr - all
2ar - all
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hsld19/Needham/Lu/Needham-Lu-Aff-Harvard-Round5.docx
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ZaLu
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Needham ZaLu
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Za.....
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Lu.....
| null | null | 24,238 |
Needham
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Needham
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MA
| null | 1,027 |
hsld19
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HS LD 2019-20
| 2,019 |
ld
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hs
| 1 |
1,541,380 |
MAD checks space escalation – nuclear response and debris
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Bowen 18
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Bowen 18 [Bleddyn Bowen, Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Leicester. The Art of Space Deterrence. February 20, 2018. https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-art-of-space-deterrence/]
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the ubiquity of space infrastructure and fragility of the space environment may create existential deterrence As space is so useful to modern economies and military forces, a large-scale disruption of space infrastructure may be so intuitively escalatory to decision-makers that there may be natural caution against a wholesale assault on space capabilities because consequences approach mentalities of total war or nuclear responses problem of space debris mean explosive events in space can render a region of Earth orbit unusable for everyone This could caution a country like China from kinetic intercept missions because its own military and economy is increasingly reliant on space . The usefulness, sensitivity, and fragility of space may have some existential deterrent effect China’s anti-satellite weapons test in 2007 is a lesson for all
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ubiquity of space infrastructure and fragility of space create existential deterrence space is so useful to economies and military forces disruption may be so intuitively escalatory that there may be natural caution against assault on space capabilities because consequences approach nuclear responses problem of space debris mean explosive events can render a region of orbit unusable This could caution a country like China from intercept missions because its own military and economy is reliant China’s a sat test is a lesson for all
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Fourth, the ubiquity of space infrastructure and the fragility of the space environment may create a degree of existential deterrence. As space is so useful to modern economies and military forces, a large-scale disruption of space infrastructure may be so intuitively escalatory to decision-makers that there may be a natural caution against a wholesale assault on a state’s entire space capabilities because the consequences of doing so approach the mentalities of total war, or nuclear responses if a society begins tearing itself apart because of the collapse of optimised energy grids and just-in-time supply chains. In addition, the problem of space debris and the political-legal hurdles to conducting debris clean-up operations mean that even a handful of explosive events in space can render a region of Earth orbit unusable for everyone. This could caution a country like China from excessive kinetic intercept missions because its own military and economy is increasingly reliant on outer space, but perhaps not a country like North Korea which does not rely on space. The usefulness, sensitivity, and fragility of space may have some existential deterrent effect. China’s catastrophic anti-satellite weapons test in 2007 is a valuable lesson for all on the potentially devastating effect of kinetic warfare in orbit.
| 1,328 |
<h4><u>MAD</u> checks space escalation – <u>nuclear response</u> and <u>debris</h4><p></u><strong>Bowen 18</strong> [Bleddyn Bowen, Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Leicester. The Art of Space Deterrence. February 20, 2018. https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-art-of-space-deterrence/]</p><p>Fourth, <u>the <strong><mark>ubiquity</strong> of <strong>space infrastructure</strong> and</u></mark> the <u><strong><mark>fragility</u></strong> <u>of</mark> the <mark>space</mark> environment may <mark>create</u></mark> a degree of <u><strong><mark>existential deterrence</u></strong></mark>. <u>As <mark>space is <strong>so useful</strong> to</mark> modern <mark>economies and military forces</mark>, a large-scale <mark>disruption</mark> of space infrastructure <mark>may be so <strong>intuitively escalatory</u></strong></mark> <u>to decision-makers <mark>that there may be</u></mark> a <u><strong><mark>natural caution</u></strong> <u>against</mark> a wholesale <mark>assault on</u></mark> a state’s entire <u><mark>space</mark> <mark>capabilities</u> <u>because</u></mark> the <u><mark>consequences</u></mark> of doing so <u><mark>approach</u></mark> the <u>mentalities of <strong>total war</u></strong>, <u>or <strong><mark>nuclear responses</u></strong></mark> if a society begins tearing itself apart because of the collapse of optimised energy grids and just-in-time supply chains. In addition, the <u><mark>problem of <strong>space debris</u></strong></mark> and the political-legal hurdles to conducting debris clean-up operations <u><mark>mean</u></mark> that even a handful of <u><mark>explosive events</mark> in space <mark>can render a region of</mark> Earth <mark>orbit unusable</mark> for everyone</u>. <u><mark>This</mark> <mark>could <strong>caution</strong> a <strong>country like China</strong> from</mark> </u>excessive <u>kinetic <mark>intercept missions because its <strong>own military</strong> and <strong>economy</strong> is</mark> <strong>increasingly <mark>reliant</strong></mark> on</u> outer <u>space</u>, but perhaps not a country like North Korea which does not rely on space<u>. The usefulness, sensitivity, and fragility of space may have some <strong>existential deterrent effect</u></strong>. <u><mark>China’s</u></mark> catastrophic <u><strong><mark>a</strong></mark>nti-<strong><mark>sat</strong></mark>ellite weapons <mark>test</mark> in 2007 <mark>is a</u></mark> valuable <u><strong><mark>lesson for all</u></strong></mark> on the potentially devastating effect of kinetic warfare in orbit.</p>
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1NC
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Case
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AT space wars
| 44,461 | 385 | 44,123 |
./documents/hsld21/Unionville/Wa/Unionville-Wan-Neg-Emory-Round2.docx
| 901,336 |
N
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Emory
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2
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Southlake Caroll PK
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Grant Brown
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1AC - metaconstellations
1NC - T-outer-space K-baudrillard case
1AR - all rvi
2NR - no rvis K case
2AR - case K
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hsld21/Unionville/Wa/Unionville-Wan-Neg-Emory-Round2.docx
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PhWa
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Ph.....
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Unionville
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Unionville
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PA
| null | 1,029 |
hsld21
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HS LD 2021-22
| 2,021 |
ld
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hs
| 1 |
2,556,395 |
Specifically, US-China miscalc and nuclear war likely absent SSA coop – plan familiarizes each with institutional climates
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Fabian 19
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Fabian 19 [Christopher David, Bachelor of Science, USAFA. Master of Science in Space Studies Thesis. “A Neoclassical Realist’s Analysis Of Sino-U.S. Space Policy” January 2019 https://commons.und.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3456&context=theses]
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danger of nuclear apocalypse is real and a risk of miscalc has increased. a strategy that preempts conflict and has an acute sense of competitor culture may subvert structural determinism miscalc it is difficult to underestimate the importance of understanding a competitor’s decision making apparatus. Strategic culture interactions are the core of this apparatus. Johnson-Freese East Asia and space policy expert asserts it might be possible to grasp the mechanics of the Chinese space program but truly understanding without contextual info is superficial at best competitive strategy will be ineffective continual diplomatic engagement between the two is key to peace misapprehension of Chinese intent by western powers has repeatedly resulted in conflict, which could be avoided with better understanding of Chinese strategic culture. feedback loop results from conflicting strategic perspectives From the outsider compartmentalization and ambiguity in the Chinese bureaucracy are confusing research paints U.S. and China as diametrically opposed cultures designed to create misunderstanding Therefore, being aware of cultural sensitives is necessary to create sound strategy
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danger of nuclear apocalypse and miscalc increased an acute sense of competitor culture subvert miscalc it is difficult to underestimate importance of understanding a competitor’s decision apparatus. Strategic culture interactions are core it might be possible to grasp mechanics of the Chinese space program truly understanding without contextual info is superficial at best competitive strategy will be ineffective engagement is key to peace misapprehension of Chinese intent repeatedly resulted in conflict could be avoided with understanding strategic culture. feedback loop results from conflicting perspectives research paints U.S. and China diametrically opposed cultures designed to create misunderstanding being aware of cultur is necessary
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Morgan points out that the nature of space deterrence has fundamentally changed since the end of the Cold War. First, a decoupling of space and nuclear warfare has destroyed the tacit red lines that guaranteed an attack on space systems would result in nuclear retaliation.60 Furthermore, technologies have been developed that allow for incremental escalation and nonlethal functional kills of space assets.61 A paradigm is created where escalation is probable, but the extent to which it will happen is unknown. This is a problem for Sino-U.S. space relations because China is a nuclear capable power who believes itself to have achieved nuclear deterrence with the United States, yet does not have the implied strategic understanding that it took the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. four decades to build. The rules of the game have changed, but the danger of nuclear apocalypse is still real and a risk of miscalculation has increased. Morgan echoes Johnson-Freese’s assertion that the dual-use phenomenon complicates deterrence and extends the reasoning on offensive dominance by adding valuable insight on the state of first-strike stability. In short, first-strike stability is difficult to maintain because the disproportionate gain from a first strike outweighs any cost a recipient can impose in response. The United States’ overwhelming reliance on and comparative advantage from space based effects gives a prospective attacker very high payoff and satellites being relatively soft targets increases the likelihood of success and further adds to the benefit of a first-strike.62 Conversely, the emphasis on system based warfare means that an effective attack on space assets drastically reduces the ability of the U.S. to impose costs. Also, its overreliance on space and the fragility of the space environment require an asymmetric response to both avoid a tit-for-tat spiral and protect the continued use of the domain. Furthermore, a lack of space situational awareness (SSA) prevents a rapid response.63 Chinese military planners are acutely aware of the asymmetric advantage to be gained from a first-strike in space and have integrated it into military doctrine. This further strengthens the argument of space warfare as a flash point in East Asia. The structural factors examined in the literature thus far paint a bleak picture for a peaceful restructuring of East Asia. However, a bipartisan grand strategy that preempts conflict, is sustained and refined over decades, and has an acute sense of both a competitor and one’s own culture and history may be able to subvert structural determinism.64 When imperfect rationality and miscalculation results in deterrence failure it is difficult to underestimate the importance of understanding a competitor’s decision making apparatus. Strategic culture, political climate, and soft power interactions are the core of this apparatus. Joan Johnson-Freese, who is equal parts East Asia policy and space policy expert, asserts that, “it might be generally possible to grasp the mechanics of the Chinese space program without the benefits of historical information, but the likelihood of truly understanding the policy aspects without this contextual information is slightly less, and attempts at analysis and extrapolation become superficial at best.”65 Likewise, competitive strategy will be ineffective absent an understanding of one’s own limitations. Resources such as latent military capacity, budget, political capitol, strategic culture, and soft power/international prestige should be easy to calculate, but many times within the space program’s short history the failure to grasp internal limitations has been a stumbling block. Henry Kissinger’s On China is a nuanced examination of Chinese strategic culture that benefits from the author’s understanding of Chinese history and the nation’s role in late20th/early-21st century global power politics. He conveys a unified message through On China, that continual diplomatic engagement between the two powers is the key to peace and develops two motifs throughout the work. First, misapprehension of Chinese intent by western powers has repeatedly resulted in conflict, which could be avoided with better understanding of Chinese strategic culture. Traditional Chinese strategic culture, shaped for millennia by geography and Confucian principals, was not destroyed by Mao and the communist revolution as many assert. Kissinger uses the traditional martial games of wei qi (go) and chess to exemplify Chinese and western strategic cultures respectively. Where wei qi teaches the art of strategic flexibility by emphasizing encirclement, protracted and asymmetric warfare, generating unperceptively small advantages, and momentum; chess teaches total victory achieved by attrition, decisive moves, centers of gravity, and symmetry. Carl von Clausewitz teaches that war is policy by other means, inferring war as a distinct phase of politics; while Sun Tsu emphasizes victory before fighting by achieving psychological advantage with military means as a small part of overall strategy. The ideal Chinese military conflict is geographically limited and easily contained; the American way of war concludes only upon total victory. Kissinger then describes the feedback loop that results from conflicting strategic perspectives. The western desire for control threatens Chinese freedom of maneuver and exacerbates their siege mentality. In response, China assumes a policy of active defense (preemption) in order to maintain the strategic initiative. This, in turn, is seen as hostile by the west and typically results in escalation in order to establish deterrence through cost imposition. The western idea of deterrence is incompatible with ambiguity and flexibility while Chinese preemption demands it.67 This results in a distinguishable pattern. First, a state consolidates power on China’s periphery, surrounding China and threatening its structural integrity on both physical and psychological levels. Second, ever aware of shi, Chinese strategists employ measures to maintain their strategic flexibility and prevent total encirclement. Third, the peripheral power misinterprets preemption for aggression and escalates the conflict. At this point, China is either able to contain the threat and achieve its geopolitical aims or it is too weak to do so and is thrown into existential crisis. In the 20th century, this pattern has been exemplified by Chinese involvement in the Korean War and its continued support of an independent state to buffer the U.S. alliance bloc from a historical ingress point to the Chinese mainland; its own Vietnam War to prevent the emergence of a competitive power bloc led by Vietnam in Southeast Asia; and Chinese political maneuvering against the Soviet Union to prevent its consolidation of power over the Eurasian landmass. Disregarding the similarities between these disputes and the current Sino-U.S. position in East Asia is impossible.68 Second, the Sino-centric worldview is rising in China as she emerges from a century of humiliation to become an economic and military superpower. The over-proselytized American belief that the implementation of democracy should be the end goal of global politics and unapologetically moralist positions conflict with Sino-centrism. It is seen by China as an extension of colonial interventionism and a threat to their fiercely held autonomy. U.S. diplomacy is often contingent on the improvement of China’s human rights record. Widespread support for China’s various separatist movements and public outcry over the Tiananmen Square incident has exacerbated this problem. American reluctance to recognize the legitimacy of a communist government, give up democratization as long term policy goals, or give China its due in international relations has weakened Sino-U.S. relations. America’s moralist rather than pragmatic approach to policy threatens China’s delicate social order and undermines CCP legitimacy, resulting in missed diplomatic opportunities. Other policy analysts are certainly influenced by Kissinger, but add their own insight into Chinese Strategic culture. Kenneth Johnson and Andrew Scobell writing for the Strategic Studies Institute both attribute the apparent cognitive dissonance in Chinese policy to a curious blend of Confucian ideals and realpolitik thought, supporting Kissinger’s assertion that Confucianism is not dead. There is a cult of defense within China, accompanying a deeply held belief that China’s strategic culture is overwhelmingly pacifist. However, preemptive action is permissible as long as it can be a justifiable “defense” of Chinese strategic interests.70 In addition, China bemoans aggressive territorial expansion and hegemony by force. This historical sensitivity has only been exacerbated by the “century of humiliation” at the hands of European powers.71 However, the benevolent expansion of influence and the use of force for Chinese national unification is just. Furthermore, the Chinese fear of encirclement could cause a disproportionate reaction to the U.S. force realignment and restructuring of alliances in East Asia. This could exacerbate the worsening of the security dilemma that alliance forming typically causes. Joan-Johnson Freese emphasizes the influence of Confucianism in internal decision making and the penchant for isolationism. Confucianism emphasizes peace, order, and knowing one’s place within society. This invites authoritarianism and the Chinese people have little experience with participation in the political process. Rather, there is an instability lurking beneath the calm surface of society that leaders must constrain and satisfy in order to maintain their mandate to rule. The social contract has a simple results based nature where political stability and prosperity is exchanged for the continued political power. The Chinese Communist Party then is less beholden to communist ideology than it is to continued prosperity. Also, despite the negative connotation of nepotism in the West, it is an institution of Chinese culture (known as Guan Xi). From the outsider, the familial ties, importance of relationships, compartmentalization, and ambiguity in the Chinese bureaucracy are confusing and frustrating. This research paints the picture of the U.S. and China as diametrically opposed cultures that are almost designed to create misunderstanding between the two. Therefore, being aware of cultural and political sensitives is necessary to create sound strategy. Michael Pillsbury identifies 16 psycho-cultural pressure points where, if correctly considered in reassurance, cost imposition, or dissuasion strategies, will yield disproportionately effects whether they be positive or negative. Each of these factors are referred to as “fears”. Eleven of the sixteen fears are linked to the ability of the U.S. military to project power into East Asia and the strategic sea lines of communication from the Strait of Malacca to the Bohai Gulf, which is contingent on the ability to deliver space effects in support of U.S. military operation. Pillsbury identifies the fear of attack on their anti-satellite capabilities as a specific Chinese fear, but warfighting in the space domain is intrinsically linked to the other 11. Another of the sixteen fears is the fear of escalation and loss of control. This is particularly important because the Chinese view ASAT weaponry as a legitimate cost imposition option designed to limit conflict. Contrast that with the American strategy of threatening escalation in order to prevent the spread of the conflict into space and implicit red lines that fail to account for limited conflict in a strategic domain. Space’s role in soft power links it to two final fears, the fear of regional competitors and the fear of internal instability. Space technology development is essential to the CCP’s techno-nationalist narrative as it is assigned great importance internally to strengthen CCP’s mandate to rule and externally to legitimize China as a regional leader.
| 12,078 |
<h4>Specifically, US-China <u>miscalc</u> and <u>nuclear war</u> likely absent SSA coop – plan <u>familiarizes</u> each with <u>institutional climates</h4><p></u><strong>Fabian 19</strong> [Christopher David, Bachelor of Science, USAFA. Master of Science in Space Studies Thesis. “A Neoclassical Realist’s Analysis Of Sino-U.S. Space Policy” January 2019 https://commons.und.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3456&context=theses]</p><p>Morgan points out that the nature of space deterrence has fundamentally changed since the end of the Cold War. First, a decoupling of space and nuclear warfare has destroyed the tacit red lines that guaranteed an attack on space systems would result in nuclear retaliation.60 Furthermore, technologies have been developed that allow for incremental escalation and nonlethal functional kills of space assets.61 A paradigm is created where escalation is probable, but the extent to which it will happen is unknown. This is a problem for Sino-U.S. space relations because China is a nuclear capable power who believes itself to have achieved nuclear deterrence with the United States, yet does not have the implied strategic understanding that it took the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. four decades to build. The rules of the game have changed, but the <u><strong><mark>danger of nuclear apocalypse</mark> is</u></strong> still <u><strong>real</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong></mark> <u>a risk of <strong><mark>miscalc</u></strong></mark>ulation <u>has <strong><mark>increased</strong></mark>.</u> Morgan echoes Johnson-Freese’s assertion that the dual-use phenomenon complicates deterrence and extends the reasoning on offensive dominance by adding valuable insight on the state of first-strike stability. In short, first-strike stability is difficult to maintain because the disproportionate gain from a first strike outweighs any cost a recipient can impose in response. The United States’ overwhelming reliance on and comparative advantage from space based effects gives a prospective attacker very high payoff and satellites being relatively soft targets increases the likelihood of success and further adds to the benefit of a first-strike.62 Conversely, the emphasis on system based warfare means that an effective attack on space assets drastically reduces the ability of the U.S. to impose costs. Also, its overreliance on space and the fragility of the space environment require an asymmetric response to both avoid a tit-for-tat spiral and protect the continued use of the domain. Furthermore, a lack of space situational awareness (SSA) prevents a rapid response.63 Chinese military planners are acutely aware of the asymmetric advantage to be gained from a first-strike in space and have integrated it into military doctrine. This further strengthens the argument of space warfare as a flash point in East Asia. The structural factors examined in the literature thus far paint a bleak picture for a peaceful restructuring of East Asia. However, <u>a</u> bipartisan grand <u>strategy that preempts conflict</u>, is sustained and refined over decades, <u>and has <mark>an acute sense of</u></mark> both a <u><mark>competitor</u></mark> and one’s own <u><strong><mark>culture</u></strong></mark> and history <u>may</u> be able to <u><strong><mark>subvert</mark> </strong>structural determinism</u>.64 When imperfect rationality and <u><strong><mark>miscalc</u></strong></mark>ulation results in deterrence failure <u><mark>it is difficult to underestimate</mark> the <mark>importance of <strong>understanding a competitor’s decision</mark> making <mark>apparatus.</strong></mark> <strong><mark>Strategic culture</u></strong></mark>, political climate, and soft power <u><mark>interactions are</mark> the <strong><mark>core</strong></mark> of this apparatus.</u> Joan <u>Johnson-Freese</u>, who is equal parts <u>East Asia</u> policy <u>and space policy expert</u>, <u>asserts</u> that, “<u><mark>it might be</u></mark> generally <u><mark>possible to grasp</mark> the <mark>mechanics of the <strong>Chinese space program</strong></mark> </u>without the benefits of historical information, <u>but</u> the likelihood of <u><strong><mark>truly understanding</u></strong></mark> the policy aspects <u><strong><mark>without</u></strong></mark> this <u><strong><mark>contextual info</u></strong></mark>rmation <u><mark>is</u></mark> slightly less, and attempts at analysis and extrapolation become <u><strong><mark>superficial at best</u></strong></mark>.”65 Likewise, <u><strong><mark>competitive strategy will be ineffective</u></strong></mark> absent an understanding of one’s own limitations. Resources such as latent military capacity, budget, political capitol, strategic culture, and soft power/international prestige should be easy to calculate, but many times within the space program’s short history the failure to grasp internal limitations has been a stumbling block. Henry Kissinger’s On China is a nuanced examination of Chinese strategic culture that benefits from the author’s understanding of Chinese history and the nation’s role in late20th/early-21st century global power politics. He conveys a unified message through On China, that <u>continual <strong>diplomatic <mark>engagement</u></strong></mark> <u>between the two</u> powers <u><mark>is</u></mark> the <u><strong><mark>key to peace</u></strong></mark> and develops two motifs throughout the work. First, <u><strong><mark>misapprehension of Chinese intent</strong></mark> by western powers <strong>has <mark>repeatedly resulted in conflict</strong></mark>, which <strong><mark>could be avoided</strong> with</mark> better <strong><mark>understanding</strong></mark> of Chinese <strong><mark>strategic culture.</strong></mark> </u>Traditional Chinese strategic culture, shaped for millennia by geography and Confucian principals, was not destroyed by Mao and the communist revolution as many assert. Kissinger uses the traditional martial games of wei qi (go) and chess to exemplify Chinese and western strategic cultures respectively. Where wei qi teaches the art of strategic flexibility by emphasizing encirclement, protracted and asymmetric warfare, generating unperceptively small advantages, and momentum; chess teaches total victory achieved by attrition, decisive moves, centers of gravity, and symmetry. Carl von Clausewitz teaches that war is policy by other means, inferring war as a distinct phase of politics; while Sun Tsu emphasizes victory before fighting by achieving psychological advantage with military means as a small part of overall strategy. The ideal Chinese military conflict is geographically limited and easily contained; the American way of war concludes only upon total victory. Kissinger then describes the <u><strong><mark>feedback loop</u></strong></mark> that <u><mark>results from <strong>conflicting</strong></mark> strategic <strong><mark>perspectives</u></strong></mark>. The western desire for control threatens Chinese freedom of maneuver and exacerbates their siege mentality. In response, China assumes a policy of active defense (preemption) in order to maintain the strategic initiative. This, in turn, is seen as hostile by the west and typically results in escalation in order to establish deterrence through cost imposition. The western idea of deterrence is incompatible with ambiguity and flexibility while Chinese preemption demands it.67 This results in a distinguishable pattern. First, a state consolidates power on China’s periphery, surrounding China and threatening its structural integrity on both physical and psychological levels. Second, ever aware of shi, Chinese strategists employ measures to maintain their strategic flexibility and prevent total encirclement. Third, the peripheral power misinterprets preemption for aggression and escalates the conflict. At this point, China is either able to contain the threat and achieve its geopolitical aims or it is too weak to do so and is thrown into existential crisis. In the 20th century, this pattern has been exemplified by Chinese involvement in the Korean War and its continued support of an independent state to buffer the U.S. alliance bloc from a historical ingress point to the Chinese mainland; its own Vietnam War to prevent the emergence of a competitive power bloc led by Vietnam in Southeast Asia; and Chinese political maneuvering against the Soviet Union to prevent its consolidation of power over the Eurasian landmass. Disregarding the similarities between these disputes and the current Sino-U.S. position in East Asia is impossible.68 Second, the Sino-centric worldview is rising in China as she emerges from a century of humiliation to become an economic and military superpower. The over-proselytized American belief that the implementation of democracy should be the end goal of global politics and unapologetically moralist positions conflict with Sino-centrism. It is seen by China as an extension of colonial interventionism and a threat to their fiercely held autonomy. U.S. diplomacy is often contingent on the improvement of China’s human rights record. Widespread support for China’s various separatist movements and public outcry over the Tiananmen Square incident has exacerbated this problem. American reluctance to recognize the legitimacy of a communist government, give up democratization as long term policy goals, or give China its due in international relations has weakened Sino-U.S. relations. America’s moralist rather than pragmatic approach to policy threatens China’s delicate social order and undermines CCP legitimacy, resulting in missed diplomatic opportunities. Other policy analysts are certainly influenced by Kissinger, but add their own insight into Chinese Strategic culture. Kenneth Johnson and Andrew Scobell writing for the Strategic Studies Institute both attribute the apparent cognitive dissonance in Chinese policy to a curious blend of Confucian ideals and realpolitik thought, supporting Kissinger’s assertion that Confucianism is not dead. There is a cult of defense within China, accompanying a deeply held belief that China’s strategic culture is overwhelmingly pacifist. However, preemptive action is permissible as long as it can be a justifiable “defense” of Chinese strategic interests.70 In addition, China bemoans aggressive territorial expansion and hegemony by force. This historical sensitivity has only been exacerbated by the “century of humiliation” at the hands of European powers.71 However, the benevolent expansion of influence and the use of force for Chinese national unification is just. Furthermore, the Chinese fear of encirclement could cause a disproportionate reaction to the U.S. force realignment and restructuring of alliances in East Asia. This could exacerbate the worsening of the security dilemma that alliance forming typically causes. Joan-Johnson Freese emphasizes the influence of Confucianism in internal decision making and the penchant for isolationism. Confucianism emphasizes peace, order, and knowing one’s place within society. This invites authoritarianism and the Chinese people have little experience with participation in the political process. Rather, there is an instability lurking beneath the calm surface of society that leaders must constrain and satisfy in order to maintain their mandate to rule. The social contract has a simple results based nature where political stability and prosperity is exchanged for the continued political power. The Chinese Communist Party then is less beholden to communist ideology than it is to continued prosperity. Also, despite the negative connotation of nepotism in the West, it is an institution of Chinese culture (known as Guan Xi). <u>From the outsider</u>, the familial ties, importance of relationships, <u>compartmentalization</u>, <u>and ambiguity in the Chinese bureaucracy are confusing</u> and frustrating. This <u><mark>research paints</u></mark> the picture of the <u><mark>U.S. and China</mark> as <strong><mark>diametrically opposed cultures</u></strong></mark> that are almost <u><strong><mark>designed to create misunderstanding</u></strong></mark> between the two. <u>Therefore, <mark>being aware of cultur</mark>al</u> and political <u>sensitives <mark>is <strong>necessary</strong></mark> to create sound strategy</u>. Michael Pillsbury identifies 16 psycho-cultural pressure points where, if correctly considered in reassurance, cost imposition, or dissuasion strategies, will yield disproportionately effects whether they be positive or negative. Each of these factors are referred to as “fears”. Eleven of the sixteen fears are linked to the ability of the U.S. military to project power into East Asia and the strategic sea lines of communication from the Strait of Malacca to the Bohai Gulf, which is contingent on the ability to deliver space effects in support of U.S. military operation. Pillsbury identifies the fear of attack on their anti-satellite capabilities as a specific Chinese fear, but warfighting in the space domain is intrinsically linked to the other 11. Another of the sixteen fears is the fear of escalation and loss of control. This is particularly important because the Chinese view ASAT weaponry as a legitimate cost imposition option designed to limit conflict. Contrast that with the American strategy of threatening escalation in order to prevent the spread of the conflict into space and implicit red lines that fail to account for limited conflict in a strategic domain. Space’s role in soft power links it to two final fears, the fear of regional competitors and the fear of internal instability. Space technology development is essential to the CCP’s techno-nationalist narrative as it is assigned great importance internally to strengthen CCP’s mandate to rule and externally to legitimize China as a regional leader. </p>
| null |
1ac
|
1ac – collisions
| 396,496 | 245 | 82,308 |
./documents/ndtceda19/MichiganState/FaJo/Michigan%20State-Farber-Jones-Aff-Wake%20Forest-Round2.docx
| 613,575 |
A
|
Wake Forest
|
2
|
Kansas MM
|
Cody Crunkilton
|
1ac - ssa
2nr - adv cp removal da
|
ndtceda19/MichiganState/FaJo/Michigan%20State-Farber-Jones-Aff-Wake%20Forest-Round2.docx
| null | 51,950 |
FaJo
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Michigan State FaJo
| null |
Ev.....
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Fa.....
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Ev.....
|
Jo.....
| 19,271 |
MichiganState
|
Michigan State
| null | null | 1,009 |
ndtceda19
|
NDT/CEDA 2019-20
| 2,019 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
2,684,118 |
Investors are shifting to defense stocks now---key to overall market health.
|
Root 19
|
Al Root 19. Senior Special Writer for Barrons. 5-6-2019. “Defense Stocks Like Lockheed Martin Offer a Haven When the Dow Drops.” Barrons. https://www.barrons.com/articles/defense-stocks-lockheed-martin-haven-dow-51557162289.
|
Companies deriving a majority of revenue from defense contracts is uncorrelated with the broader stock market Defense contractor sales are less dependent on the state of the global economy That can be a good thing for investors looking for a haven from global macroeconomic fears Defense stocks have been solid performers because of growing U.S. defense budgets as well as continuing global conflict. Shares have returned 17% a year on average over the past 5 years, better than the 13% return of the Dow Jones Industrial Average Military spending is forecast by Wall Street analysts to rise in 2019 a positive for defense stocks As trade-war fears heat up, defense could become a haven for industrial investors looking to shift exposure The defense prime contractors traded at a 30% premium The defense premium to the overall market is a measure investors can use for two purposes: as a fear gauge as the trade conflict reemerges, and to determine how much safety the defense sector can offer investors the defense space looks like a good bet
|
Defense contractor sales are less dependent on econ good for investors looking for a haven from global fears Defense stocks solid performers Shares returned 17% better Military spending is positive As trade-war fears heat up, defense haven for investors looking to shift
|
Companies deriving a majority of revenue from defense contracts were off 0.2% Monday afternoon. Often times, the defense sector is uncorrelated with the broader stock market. Defense contractor sales are dependent on conflict and government budgets. They are less dependent on the state of the global economy. That can be a good thing for investors looking for a haven from global macroeconomic fears. The back story: Defense stocks have been solid performers over recent history because of growing U.S. defense budgets as well as continuing global conflict. Shares of defense primes—the so-called largest U.S. defense contractors—have returned 17% a year on average over the past 5 years, better than the 13% return of the Dow Jones Industrial Average. What’s more, the defense primes trade for 16.3 times estimated 2019 earning, in line with historical averages. The defense primes are generally taken to be: Boeing (ticker: BA), Lockheed Martin (LMT), General Dynamics (GD), Northrop Grumman (NOC), Raytheon (RTN) and L3 Technologies (LLL). Barron’s excludes Boeing from defense-only calculations because it derives more of its sales from commercial aerospace. What’s new: The move into the Middle East with more fire power has the potential to escalate tensions there. For defense stocks, the aggressive move could also mean more funding for overseas contingency operations, or OCO. OCO spending is a supplement defense dollars dependent on the level of global conflict. According to the Congressional Budget Office, since 2001, the Department of Defense has received large appropriations to augment the base defense budget totaling about $2.2 trillion, or 20% of total defense appropriations over that span. Military spending is forecast by Wall Street analysts to rise in 2019—a positive for defense stocks. Additional Middle East operations should add to the amount of money the government will allocate to defense contractors. Looking ahead: As trade-war fears heat up, defense could become a haven for industrial investors looking to shift exposure away from China. The defense prime contractors traded at a 30% premium to the Dow Jones Industrial Average early in 2018. The defense premium to the overall market is a measure investors can use for two purposes: as a fear gauge as the trade conflict reemerges, and to determine how much safety the defense sector can offer investors. At valuation parity, the defense space looks like a good bet, but at a premium valuation multiple even the solid defense space might not offer investors much additional safety for their capital.
| 2,587 |
<h4>Investors are shifting to defense stocks now---key to overall market health.</h4><p>Al <strong>Root 19</strong>. Senior Special Writer for Barrons. 5-6-2019. “Defense Stocks Like Lockheed Martin Offer a Haven When the Dow Drops.” Barrons. https://www.barrons.com/articles/defense-stocks-lockheed-martin-haven-dow-51557162289.</p><p><u>Companies deriving a majority of revenue from defense contracts</u> were off 0.2% Monday afternoon. Often times, the defense sector <u>is uncorrelated with the broader stock market</u>. <u><mark>Defense contractor sales are</u></mark> dependent on conflict and government budgets. They are <u><mark>less dependent on </mark>the state of the global <mark>econ</mark>omy</u>. <u><strong>That can be a <mark>good </mark>thing <mark>for investors looking for a haven from global </mark>macroeconomic <mark>fears</u></strong></mark>. The back story: <u><mark>Defense stocks </mark>have been <strong><mark>solid performers</u></strong></mark> over recent history <u>because of growing U.S. defense budgets as well as continuing global conflict. <mark>Shares</u></mark> of defense primes—the so-called largest U.S. defense contractors—<u>have <mark>returned 17%</mark> a year on average over the past 5 years, <strong><mark>better </mark>than the 13%</strong> return of the Dow Jones Industrial Average</u>. What’s more, the defense primes trade for 16.3 times estimated 2019 earning, in line with historical averages. The defense primes are generally taken to be: Boeing (ticker: BA), Lockheed Martin (LMT), General Dynamics (GD), Northrop Grumman (NOC), Raytheon (RTN) and L3 Technologies (LLL). Barron’s excludes Boeing from defense-only calculations because it derives more of its sales from commercial aerospace. What’s new: The move into the Middle East with more fire power has the potential to escalate tensions there. For defense stocks, the aggressive move could also mean more funding for overseas contingency operations, or OCO. OCO spending is a supplement defense dollars dependent on the level of global conflict. According to the Congressional Budget Office, since 2001, the Department of Defense has received large appropriations to augment the base defense budget totaling about $2.2 trillion, or 20% of total defense appropriations over that span. <u><mark>Military spending is</mark> forecast by Wall Street analysts to rise in 2019</u>—<u><strong>a <mark>positive </mark>for defense stocks</u></strong>. Additional Middle East operations should add to the amount of money the government will allocate to defense contractors. Looking ahead: <u><mark>As trade-war fears heat</mark> <mark>up, defense <strong></mark>could become a <mark>haven for </mark>industrial <mark>investors looking to shift</mark> exposure</u></strong> away from China. <u>The defense prime contractors traded at a 30% premium</u> to the Dow Jones Industrial Average early in 2018. <u>The defense premium to the overall market is a measure investors can use for two purposes: as a fear gauge as the trade conflict reemerges, and to determine how much safety the defense sector can offer investors</u>. At valuation parity, <u>the defense space looks like a <strong>good be</strong>t</u>, but at a premium valuation multiple even the solid defense space might not offer investors much additional safety for their capital.</p>
|
1NC
|
Off
|
1NC -- Stocks
| 74,910 | 130 | 85,085 |
./documents/hspolicy19/Casady/BaHe/Casady-Barreto-Henry-Neg-University%20of%20Michigan-Round5.docx
| 708,540 |
N
|
University of Michigan
|
5
|
St Ignatius AC
|
Luke Bledsoe
|
1AC- Saudi Soft left
1NC - Relations DA T Pearson T subs Fill in DA USMCA DA stocks DA negotiations CP Saudi ends the war CP
2NR- Saudi ends the war CP Stocks DA
|
hspolicy19/Casady/BaHe/Casady-Barreto-Henry-Neg-University%20of%20Michigan-Round5.docx
| null | 60,300 |
BaHe
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Casady BaHe
| null |
Al.....
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Ba.....
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Ca.....
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He.....
| 21,128 |
Casady
|
Casady
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OK
| null | 1,018 |
hspolicy19
|
HS Policy 2019-20
| 2,019 |
cx
|
hs
| 2 |
2,669,999 |
The CP is a PIC out of the word “reduce” which requires a smaller number of arms to be sold---the CP sets a boundary, BUT never enforces it.
|
Ingram 88
|
Ingram 88 – law student (Cindi M. Ingram, Plaintiff's Right to Recover from Non-Settling Tortfeasor When Settlement with Joint Tortfeasor Exceeds the Jury Award, 53 Mo. L. Rev. (1988) Available at: http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol53/iss2/8.
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Consideration of the "plain meaning" of the words used is a basic principle of determining legislative intent The court discussed the "plain meaning" of reduce as meaning "to diminish in size, amount, extent or number to bring down a quantity
|
the "plain meaning" of reduce as meaning "to diminish in amount or number
|
In answering this question, the Hampton court turned to various principles for guidance. The court looked first to the "plain meaning" of the statute.6 " Interpretation of a statute involves ascertaining the legislative intent behind the enactment of the statute. Consideration of the "plain meaning" of the words used in the statute is a basic principle of statutory construction in determining legislative intent.6 7 The Hampton court discussed the "plain meaning" of the words "reduce" and "claim" in reaching its construction of the statute. The court referred to the dictionary definition of "reduce" as meaning "to diminish in size, amount, extent or number; to make small or to lower, bring down or to change the denomination of a quantity." 68 The court then judicially defined "claim" as "the amount of damages as determined by an impartial fact finder - the jury."'
| 875 |
<h4>The CP is a PIC out of the word “reduce” which requires a smaller number of arms to be sold---the CP sets a boundary, BUT never enforces it.</h4><p><strong>Ingram 88 </strong>– law student (Cindi M. Ingram, Plaintiff's Right to Recover from Non-Settling Tortfeasor When Settlement with Joint Tortfeasor Exceeds the Jury Award, 53 Mo. L. Rev. (1988) Available at: http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol53/iss2/8.</p><p>In answering this question, the Hampton court turned to various principles for guidance. The court looked first to the "plain meaning" of the statute.6 " Interpretation of a statute involves ascertaining the legislative intent behind the enactment of the statute. <u>Consideration of the "plain meaning" of the words used</u> in the statute <u>is a basic principle of</u> statutory construction in <u>determining legislative intent</u>.6 7 <u>The</u> Hampton <u>court discussed</u> <u><mark>the "plain meaning" of</mark> </u>the words "<u><mark>reduce</u></mark>" and "claim" in reaching its construction of the statute. The court referred to the dictionary definition of "reduce" <u><mark>as meaning "to diminish in</mark> size, <mark>amount</mark>, extent <mark>or number</u></mark>; <u>to</u> make small or to lower, <u>bring down</u> or to change the denomination of <u>a quantity</u>." 68 The court then judicially defined "claim" as "the amount of damages as determined by an impartial fact finder - the jury."'</p>
|
2NC
|
2NC---Impeach CP
|
1NC – AT: NoKo
| 76,025 | 420 | 84,660 |
./documents/hspolicy19/Alpharetta/DiSa/Alpharetta-Di-Sandhu-Neg-Greenhill-Round2.docx
| 706,111 |
N
|
Greenhill
|
2
|
Niles West DS
|
Sam Shore
|
1AC - Ukraine
1NC - New AFFs Bad T-Substantial T-Subsets Flex CP Impeach CP State Suits CP NATO CP Stocks DA Esper DA Containment DA Case
2NC - T-Substantial Impeach CP Flex CP Case
1NR - Stocks DA Containment DA
2NR - Impeach CP Case
|
hspolicy19/Alpharetta/DiSa/Alpharetta-Di-Sandhu-Neg-Greenhill-Round2.docx
| null | 60,083 |
DiSa
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Alpharetta DiSa
| null |
Jo.....
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Di.....
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Ha.....
|
Sa.....
| 21,077 |
Alpharetta
|
Alpharetta
|
GA
| null | 1,018 |
hspolicy19
|
HS Policy 2019-20
| 2,019 |
cx
|
hs
| 2 |
2,903,826 |
That causes extinction
|
Millett, 17
|
Millett, 17 - PhD, is a Senior Research Fellow at Oxford (Piers, Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5576214/)
|
advanced bioweapons could threaten human existence Although the probability of human extinction from bioweapons may be low the expected value of reducing the risk could still be large since such risks jeopardize the existence of all future generations disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population while other pandemics are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations overcome rare genetic resistances and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off While these arguments point to a small risk they do not rule the possibility out entirely there are recorded instances of species going extinct due to disease especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European diseases, In the modern context no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach But advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of diseases that combine such traits controversy has already emerged over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective studies have shown that other disease traits could be modified as well Delivery capabilities have been subject to the cutting edge of technical development with Canadian, US, and UK bioweapon efforts playing a critical role in developing the discipline of aerobiology While there is no evidence of programs directly attempting to deploy bioweapons the logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction could create such incentives in more unstable political environments or following a breakdown of the Biological Weapons Convention The possibility of a war between great powers could also increase the pressure to use such weapons
|
bioweapons could threaten human existence expected value of reducing the risk could still be large, risks jeopardize the existence of all future generations disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity species go extinct due to disease advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of diseases that combine enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and the ability to overcome therapeuti experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate other disease traits could be modified Delivery capabilities have been subject to the cutting edge of technical development,
|
In the decades to come, advanced bioweapons could threaten human existence. Although the probability of human extinction from bioweapons may be low, the expected value of reducing the risk could still be large, since such risks jeopardize the existence of all future generations. We provide an overview of biotechnological extinction risk, make some rough initial estimates for how severe the risks might be, and compare the cost-effectiveness of reducing these extinction-level risks with existing biosecurity work. We find that reducing human extinction risk can be more cost-effective than reducing smaller-scale risks, even when using conservative estimates. This suggests that the risks are not low enough to ignore and that more ought to be done to prevent the worst-case scenarios. How worthwhile is it spending resources to study and mitigate the chance of human extinction from biological risks? The risks of such a catastrophe are presumably low, so a skeptic might argue that addressing such risks would be a waste of scarce resources. In this article, we investigate this position using a cost-effectiveness approach and ultimately conclude that the expected value of reducing these risks is large, especially since such risks jeopardize the existence of all future human lives. Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone.2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population,3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10% of the world's population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization. A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations, overcome rare genetic resistances, and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures. Even evolution itself may work in humanity's favor: Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6 While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they do not rule the possibility out entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of species going extinct due to disease—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and the Western Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population).9 In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be realized independently. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. But advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of diseases that combine such traits. Recent controversy has already emerged over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics.13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-21 Although these experiments had scientific merit and were not conducted with malicious intent, their implications are still worrying. This is especially true given that there is also a long historical track record of state-run bioweapon research applying cutting-edge science and technology to design agents not previously seen in nature. The Soviet bioweapons program developed agents with traits such as enhanced virulence, resistance to therapies, greater environmental resilience, increased difficulty to diagnose or treat, and which caused unexpected disease presentations and outcomes.22 Delivery capabilities have also been subject to the cutting edge of technical development, with Canadian, US, and UK bioweapon efforts playing a critical role in developing the discipline of aerobiology.23,24 While there is no evidence of state-run bioweapons programs directly attempting to develop or deploy bioweapons that would pose an existential risk, the logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction could create such incentives in more unstable political environments or following a breakdown of the Biological Weapons Convention.25 The possibility of a war between great powers could also increase the pressure to use such weapons—during the World Wars, bioweapons were used across multiple continents, with Germany targeting animals in WWI,26 and Japan using plague to cause an epidemic in China during WWII.27
| 6,034 |
<h4>That causes extinction </h4><p><u><strong>Millett, 17</u></strong> - PhD, is a Senior Research Fellow at Oxford (Piers, Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5576214/) </p><p>In the decades to come, <u><strong>advanced <mark>bioweapons</strong> could <strong>threaten human existence</u></strong></mark>. <u>Although the probability of human extinction from bioweapons may be low</u>, <u>the</u> <u><strong><mark>expected value</u></strong> <u>of</u> <u><strong>reducing the risk</u></strong> <u>could still be <strong>large</u></strong>,</mark> <u>since such <mark>risks jeopardize the existence of <strong>all future generations</u></strong></mark>. We provide an overview of biotechnological extinction risk, make some rough initial estimates for how severe the risks might be, and compare the cost-effectiveness of reducing these extinction-level risks with existing biosecurity work. We find that reducing human extinction risk can be more cost-effective than reducing smaller-scale risks, even when using conservative estimates. This suggests that the risks are not low enough to ignore and that more ought to be done to prevent the worst-case scenarios. How worthwhile is it spending resources to study and mitigate the chance of human extinction from biological risks? The risks of such a catastrophe are presumably low, so a skeptic might argue that addressing such risks would be a waste of scarce resources. In this article, we investigate this position using a cost-effectiveness approach and ultimately conclude that the expected value of reducing these risks is large, especially since such risks jeopardize the existence of all future human lives. Historically, <u><strong><mark>disease events</u></strong> <u>have been responsible for the <strong>greatest death tolls on humanity</u></strong></mark>. <u>The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone</u>.2 <u>The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population</u>,3 <u>while other pandemics</u>, such as the plague of Justinian, <u>are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century</u>—constituting over 10% of the world's population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization. <u>A</u> <u><strong>skeptic</u></strong> <u>would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is <strong>unlikely</u></strong>. <u>Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations</u>, <u>overcome rare genetic resistances</u>, <u>and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures</u>. Even evolution itself may work in humanity's favor: <u>Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off</u>, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6 <u>While these arguments point to a</u> very <u>small risk</u> of human extinction, <u><strong>they do not rule the possibility out entirely</u></strong>. Although rare, <u>there are <strong>recorded instances</strong> of <mark>species go</mark>ing<mark> extinct due to disease</u></mark>—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out by disease, <u>especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity</u>. <u>The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European diseases,</u> such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and the Western Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population).9 <u>In the modern context</u>, <u>no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach</u>. But many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be realized independently. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. <u><strong>But <mark>advances in biotechnology</u></strong> <u>might allow the creation of diseases that <strong>combine </mark>such traits</u></strong>. Recent <u><strong>controversy has already emerged</u></strong> <u>over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with <mark>enhanced <strong>transmissibility</strong>, <strong>lethality</strong>, and</mark>/or <mark>the ability to <strong>overcome therapeuti</mark>cs</u></strong>.13-17 <u>Other <mark>experiments demonstrated that <strong>mousepox</strong> could be modified to have a <strong>100% case fatality rate</strong></mark> and render a vaccine ineffective</u>.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, <u>studies have shown that <mark>other disease traits</u></mark>, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, <u><strong><mark>could be modified</mark> as well</u></strong>.19-21 Although these experiments had scientific merit and were not conducted with malicious intent, their implications are still worrying. This is especially true given that there is also a long historical track record of state-run bioweapon research applying cutting-edge science and technology to design agents not previously seen in nature. The Soviet bioweapons program developed agents with traits such as enhanced virulence, resistance to therapies, greater environmental resilience, increased difficulty to diagnose or treat, and which caused unexpected disease presentations and outcomes.22 <u><strong><mark>Delivery capabilities</u></strong> <u>have</u></mark> also <u><mark>been subject to the <strong>cutting edge of technical development</u></strong>,</mark> <u>with Canadian, US, and UK bioweapon efforts playing a <strong>critical role</strong> in developing the discipline of aerobiology</u>.23,24 <u>While there is no evidence of</u> state-run bioweapons <u>programs directly attempting to</u> develop or <u>deploy bioweapons</u> that would pose an existential risk, <u>the logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction could</u> <u><strong>create such incentives</u></strong> <u>in more <strong>unstable political environments</u></strong> <u>or following a breakdown of the Biological Weapons Convention</u>.25 <u><strong>The possibility of a war between great powers could also increase the pressure to use such weapons</u></strong>—during the World Wars, bioweapons were used across multiple continents, with Germany targeting animals in WWI,26 and Japan using plague to cause an epidemic in China during WWII.27</p>
| null | null |
2
| 2,127 | 2,005 | 93,497 |
./documents/hsld19/Marlborough/Re/Marlborough-Renwick-Neg-Berkeley-Round5.docx
| 844,066 |
N
|
Berkeley
|
5
|
Brentwood HT
|
Yang, Amanda
|
AC Whole Res
NC Con Shift DA IndoPak DA Bio Shift DA
1AR all
NR Con Shift DA Bio Shift DA
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hsld19/Marlborough/Re/Marlborough-Renwick-Neg-Berkeley-Round5.docx
| null | 72,000 |
WyRe
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Marlborough WyRe
| null |
Wy.....
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Re.....
| null | null | 24,202 |
Marlborough
|
Marlborough
|
CA
| null | 1,027 |
hsld19
|
HS LD 2019-20
| 2,019 |
ld
|
hs
| 1 |
1,736,928 |
Trump thumps—disproves the link.
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Gordon 20
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Gordon 20—(senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, former assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, PHD in international relations and international economics from Johns Hopkins University). Gordon, Philip, and Pete Buttigieg. 2020. “Trump Has Destroyed America’s Power and Influence.” Foreign Policy, July 14, 2020. https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:OgJ_mT4u_-8J:https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/14/trump-biden-foreign-policy-alliances/+&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.
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Trump s done serious damage to NATO, repeatedly questioning whether the United States would uphold its treaty commitment to stand by its partners—the underlying principle of any collective defense—unless they “pay their bills.” That undermines the solemn word of the United States . Trump falsely claimed NATO was “going down like a roller coaster” . Trump’s argument that the United States pays 90 percent of the costs of defending Europe reflects deep ignorance or a deliberate attempt to mislead his supporters into turning against the alliance. Trump’s decision in June to unilaterally withdraw troops from Germany raised further questions in Europe about the reliability of the United States
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Trump s done serious damage to NATO, questioning U S commitment to collective defense unless they “pay .” claimed NATO was “going down ” . decision to unilaterally withdraw from Germany raised further questions
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Trump has also done serious damage to NATO, repeatedly questioning whether the United States would uphold its treaty commitment to stand by its partners—the underlying principle of any collective defense—unless they “pay their bills.” That approach not only undermines the solemn word of the United States but could make an attack on a NATO member more likely. Trump falsely claimed that NATO was “going down like a roller coaster” when he took over and pretends to have persuaded allies to contribute “hundreds of billions” of dollars more to the alliance. In fact, defense spending in Europe has been rising since the Russian invasion of Ukraine more than two years before Trump took office. Trump’s repeated argument that the United States pays up to 90 percent of the costs of defending Europe reflects either deep ignorance about NATO and defense budgeting or, worse, a deliberate attempt to mislead his supporters into turning against the alliance. It also fails to recognize that U.S. spending on NATO—a fraction of the overall defense budget—is not a charity project: European allies provide land, infrastructure, and financial subsidies for American bases that are used to protect U.S. interests not just in Europe but in Africa and the Middle East. Trump’s decision in June to unilaterally withdraw troops from Germany doubtless pleased Putin, but it only raised further questions in Europe about the reliability of the United States.
| 1,444 |
<h4><u>Trump</u> thumps—disproves the link.</h4><p><u><strong>Gordon 20</u></strong>—(senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, former assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, PHD in international relations and international economics from Johns Hopkins University). Gordon, Philip, and Pete Buttigieg. 2020. “Trump Has Destroyed America’s Power and Influence.” Foreign Policy, July 14, 2020. https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:OgJ_mT4u_-8J:https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/14/trump-biden-foreign-policy-alliances/+&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.</p><p><u><strong><mark>Trump</u></strong></mark> ha<u><strong><mark>s</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>done serious damage to NATO, </mark>repeatedly <mark>questioning </mark>whether the <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates would uphold its treaty <mark>commitment to</mark> stand by its partners—the underlying principle of any <mark>collective defense</mark>—<mark>unless they “pay </mark>their bills<mark>.”</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>That </u></strong>approach not only <u><strong>undermines the solemn word of the United States</u></strong> but could make an attack on a NATO member more likely<u><strong>. Trump falsely <mark>claimed</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>NATO was “going down </mark>like a roller coaster<mark>”</mark> </u></strong>when he took over and pretends to have persuaded allies to contribute “hundreds of billions” of dollars more to the alliance<u><strong><mark>.</u></strong></mark> In fact, defense spending in Europe has been rising since the Russian invasion of Ukraine more than two years before Trump took office. <u><strong>Trump’s</u></strong> repeated <u><strong>argument that the United States pays</u></strong> up to <u><strong>90 percent of the costs of defending Europe reflects</u></strong> either <u><strong>deep ignorance</u></strong> about NATO and defense budgeting <u><strong>or</u></strong>, worse, <u><strong>a deliberate attempt to mislead his supporters into turning against the alliance.</u></strong> It also fails to recognize that U.S. spending on NATO—a fraction of the overall defense budget—is not a charity project: European allies provide land, infrastructure, and financial subsidies for American bases that are used to protect U.S. interests not just in Europe but in Africa and the Middle East. <u><strong>Trump’s <mark>decision </mark>in June <mark>to unilaterally withdraw </mark>troops <mark>from Germany</u></strong></mark> doubtless pleased Putin, but it only <u><strong><mark>raised further questions </mark>in Europe about the reliability of the United States</u></strong>.</p>
|
2AC
|
DASKA DA (Core): 2AC
|
Consult JCS CP: 2AC
| 798,729 | 101 | 51,438 |
./documents/ndtceda20/Minnesota/AmSu/Minnesota-Amundsen-Sun-Aff-5-ADA-Round3.docx
| 620,403 |
A
|
5-ADA
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3
|
Emory DM
|
Marge Strong
|
1AC-NATO Ukr-Georgia
1NC-T Member States T substantial Turkey Prolif JCS CP DASKA DA Case
2NR-T Member States Severance
|
ndtceda20/Minnesota/AmSu/Minnesota-Amundsen-Sun-Aff-5-ADA-Round3.docx
| null | 52,400 |
AmSu
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Minnesota AmSu
| null |
Ab.....
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Am.....
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Ke.....
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Su.....
| 19,336 |
Minnesota
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Minnesota
| null | null | 1,010 |
ndtceda20
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NDT/CEDA 2020-21
| 2,020 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
4,626,014 |
1] Induction first
|
Sayre-McCord 1
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Sayre-McCord 1 Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Philosophy, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, "Mill's “Proof” Of The Principle of Utility: A More Than Half-Hearted Defense", Social Philosophy and Policy, 2001, accessed: 1 April 2020, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/mills-proof-of-the-principle-of-utility-a-more-than-halfhearted-defense/FDBE07CBE08D4E17523930BF8C7BBC32, R.S.
|
-- for the first premises of our knowledge is provided by "our senses, and our internal consciousness." Mill's suggestion is that, when it comes to the first principles of conduct, desire play the same epistemic role that the senses play the evidence we have for our judgments concerning value traces back to what is desired, to the content of our desires. When we are having sensations of red, when what we are looking at appears red to us, we have evidence (albeit overrideable and pdefeasible evidence) that the thing is red. Moreover, if things never looked red to us, we could never get evidence that things were red, and would indeed never have developed the concept of redness. Similarly, when we are desiring things, when what we are considering appears good to us, we have evidence (albeit overrideable and defeasible evidence) that the thing is good. Moreover, if we never desired things, we could never get evidence that things were good, and would indeed never have developed the concept of value. we have the concepts, evidence, and knowledge we do only thanks to our having experiences of a certain sort. In the absence of the relevant experiences, he holds (with other empiricists), we would not only lack the required evidence for our judgments, we would lack the capacity to make the judgments in the first place. In the presence of the relevant experiences, though, we have both the concepts and the required evidence --
|
knowledge is provided by senses, and consciousness when what we look at appears red we have evidence the thing is red. if things never looked red we could never get evidence things were red if we never desired we could never get evidence things were good, and develop value. In absence of experiences we would lack evidence for judgments, we would lack capacity to make judgments
|
When it comes to visibility, no less than desirability, Mill explicitly denies that a "proof" in the "ordinary acceptation of the term" can be offered.25 As he notes, "To be incapable of proof by reasoning is com mon to all first principles; to the first premises of our knowledge, as well as to those of our conduct."26 Nonetheless, support -- that is, evidence, though not proof -- for the first premises of our knowledge is provided by "our senses, and our internal consciousness." Mill's suggestion is that, when it comes to the first principles of conduct, desire play the same epistemic role that the senses play, when it comes to the first principles of knowledge. To understand this role, it is important to distinguish the fact that someone is sensing something from what is sensed, which is a distinction mirrored in the contrast bet ween the fact that someone is desiring something and what is desired. In the case of our senses, the evidence we have for our judgments concerning sensible qualities traces back to what is sensed, to the content of our sense-experience. Likewise, Mill is suggesting, in the case of value, the evidence we have for our judgments concerning value traces back to what is desired, to the content of our desires. Ultimately, the grounds we have for holding the principles we do must, he thinks, be traced back to our experience, to our senses and desires. Yet the evidence we have is not that we are sensing or desiring something but what it is that is sensed or desired. When we are having sensations of red, when what we are looking at appears red to us, we have evidence (albeit overrideable and pdefeasible evidence) that the thing is red. Moreover, if things never looked red to us, we could never get evidence that things were red, and would indeed never have developed the concept of redness. Similarly, when we are desiring things, when what we are considering appears good to us, we have evidence (albeit overrideable and defeasible evidence) that the thing is good. Moreover, if we never desired things, we could never get evidence that things were good, and would indeed never have developed the concept of value. Recall that desire, for Mill, like taste, touch, sight, and smell, is a "passive sensibility." All of these, he holds, provide us with both the content that makes thought possible and the evidence we have for the conclusions that thought leads us to embrace. "Desiring a thing" and "thinking of it as desirable (unless for the sake of its consequences)" are treated by Mill as one an d the same, just as seeing a thing as red and thinking of it as red are one and the same. Accordingly, a person who desires x is a person who ipso facto sees x as desirable. Desiring something, for Mill, is a matter of seeing it under the guise of the good. This means that it is important, in the context of Mill's argument, that one not think of desires as mere preferences or as just any sort of motive. They constitute, according to Mill, a distinctive subclass of our motivational states, and are distinguished (at least in part) by t heir evaluative content. Thus, Mill is neither assuming nor arguing that something is good because we desire it; rather, he is depending on our desiring it as establishing that we see it as good. At the same time, while desiring something is a matter of seeing it as good, one could, on Mill's view, believe that something is good without desiring it, just as one can believe something is red without seeing it as red. While desire is supposed to be the fundamental source of our concept of, and evidence for, desirability, once the concept is in place there are contexts in which we will have reason to think it applies even when the corresponding sensible experience is lacking. Indeed, in Chapter IV, Mill is concerned not with generating a desire, but with justifying the belief that happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable, as an end, and so concerned with defending the standard for determining what should be desired. Mill's aim is to take what people already, and he thinks inevitably, see as desirable and argue that those views commit them to the value of the general happiness (whet her or not their desires follow the deliverances of t heir reason). Those who, like Mill, desire the general happiness already hold the view that the general happiness is desirable. They accept the claim that Mill is trying to defend. As Mill knows, however, there are many who do not have this desire -- many who desire only their own happiness, and some who even desire that others suffer. These are the people he sets out to persuade, along with others who are more generous and benevolent, but who nonetheless do not see happiness as desirable, and the only thin g desirable, as an end. Mill's argument is directed at convincing t hem all -- whether their desires follow or not -- that they have grounds for, and are in fact already com mitted to, regarding the happiness of others as valuable as an end. Mill recognizes that whatever argument he might hope to offer will need to appeal to evaluative claims people already accept (since he takes to heart Hume's caution concerning inferring an 'ought' from an 'is'). The claim Mill thinks he can appeal to -- that one's own happiness is a good (i.e. desirable) -- is something licensed as available by people desiring their own happiness. Yet he is not supposing here that the fact that they desire their own happiness, or anything else, is proof that it is desirable, just as he would not suppose that the fact that someone sees something as red is proof that it is. Rather, he is supposing that if people desire their own happiness, or see something as red, one can rely on t hem having available, as a premise for further argument, the claim that their own happiness is desirable or that the thing is red (at least absent contrary evidence). As he puts it in the third paragraph, "If the end which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, in theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an end nothing could ever convince any person that it was so." Thus, in appealing to the analogy bet ween judgments of sensible qualities and judgments of value, Mill is not trading on an ambiguity, nor does his argument here involve identifying being desirable with being desired or assuming that "desirable" means "desired." He is instead relying consistently on an empiricist account of concepts and their application -- on a view according to which we have the concepts, evidence, and knowledge we do only thanks to our having experiences of a certain sort. In the absence of the relevant experiences, he holds (with other empiricists), we would not only lack the required evidence for our judgments, we would lack the capacity to make the judgments in the first place. In the presence of the relevant experiences, though, we have both the concepts and the required evidence -- "not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require."
| 7,023 |
<h4>1] Induction first</h4><p><strong>Sayre-McCord 1 </strong>Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Philosophy, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, "Mill's “Proof” Of The Principle of Utility: A More Than Half-Hearted Defense", Social Philosophy and Policy, 2001, accessed: 1 April 2020, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/mills-proof-of-the-principle-of-utility-a-more-than-halfhearted-defense/FDBE07CBE08D4E17523930BF8C7BBC32, R.S. </p><p>When it comes to visibility, no less than desirability, Mill explicitly denies that a "proof" in the "ordinary acceptation of the term" can be offered.25 As he notes, "To be incapable of proof by reasoning is com mon to all first principles; to the first premises of our knowledge, as well as to those of our conduct."26 Nonetheless, support -- that is, evidence, though not proof <u><strong>-- for the first premises of our <mark>knowledge is provided by</mark> "our <mark>senses, and</mark> our internal <mark>consciousness</mark>." Mill's suggestion is that, when it comes to the first principles of conduct, desire play the same epistemic role that the senses play</u></strong>, when it comes to the first principles of knowledge. To understand this role, it is important to distinguish the fact that someone is sensing something from what is sensed, which is a distinction mirrored in the contrast bet ween the fact that someone is desiring something and what is desired. In the case of our senses, the evidence we have for our judgments concerning sensible qualities traces back to what is sensed, to the content of our sense-experience. Likewise, Mill is suggesting, in the case of value, <u>the evidence we have for our judgments concerning value traces back to what is desired, to the content of our desires.</u> Ultimately, the grounds we have for holding the principles we do must, he thinks, be traced back to our experience, to our senses and desires. Yet the evidence we have is not that we are sensing or desiring something but what it is that is sensed or desired. <u><strong>When we are having sensations of red, <mark>when what we</mark> are <mark>look</mark>ing<mark> at appears red</mark> to us, <mark>we have evidence</mark> (albeit overrideable and pdefeasible evidence) that <mark>the thing is red.</mark> Moreover, <mark>if things never looked red</mark> to us, <mark>we could never get evidence</mark> that <mark>things were red</mark>, and would indeed never have developed the concept of redness. Similarly, when we are desiring things, when what we are considering appears good to us, we have evidence (albeit overrideable and defeasible evidence) that the thing is good. Moreover, <mark>if we never desired</mark> things, <mark>we could never get evidence</mark> that <mark>things were good, and</mark> would indeed never have <mark>develop</mark>ed the concept of <mark>value.</mark> </u></strong>Recall that desire, for Mill, like taste, touch, sight, and smell, is a "passive sensibility." All of these, he holds, provide us with both the content that makes thought possible and the evidence we have for the conclusions that thought leads us to embrace. "Desiring a thing" and "thinking of it as desirable (unless for the sake of its consequences)" are treated by Mill as one an d the same, just as seeing a thing as red and thinking of it as red are one and the same. Accordingly, a person who desires x is a person who ipso facto sees x as desirable. Desiring something, for Mill, is a matter of seeing it under the guise of the good. This means that it is important, in the context of Mill's argument, that one not think of desires as mere preferences or as just any sort of motive. They constitute, according to Mill, a distinctive subclass of our motivational states, and are distinguished (at least in part) by t heir evaluative content. Thus, Mill is neither assuming nor arguing that something is good because we desire it; rather, he is depending on our desiring it as establishing that we see it as good. At the same time, while desiring something is a matter of seeing it as good, one could, on Mill's view, believe that something is good without desiring it, just as one can believe something is red without seeing it as red. While desire is supposed to be the fundamental source of our concept of, and evidence for, desirability, once the concept is in place there are contexts in which we will have reason to think it applies even when the corresponding sensible experience is lacking. Indeed, in Chapter IV, Mill is concerned not with generating a desire, but with justifying the belief that happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable, as an end, and so concerned with defending the standard for determining what should be desired. Mill's aim is to take what people already, and he thinks inevitably, see as desirable and argue that those views commit them to the value of the general happiness (whet her or not their desires follow the deliverances of t heir reason). Those who, like Mill, desire the general happiness already hold the view that the general happiness is desirable. They accept the claim that Mill is trying to defend. As Mill knows, however, there are many who do not have this desire -- many who desire only their own happiness, and some who even desire that others suffer. These are the people he sets out to persuade, along with others who are more generous and benevolent, but who nonetheless do not see happiness as desirable, and the only thin g desirable, as an end. Mill's argument is directed at convincing t hem all -- whether their desires follow or not -- that they have grounds for, and are in fact already com mitted to, regarding the happiness of others as valuable as an end. Mill recognizes that whatever argument he might hope to offer will need to appeal to evaluative claims people already accept (since he takes to heart Hume's caution concerning inferring an 'ought' from an 'is'). The claim Mill thinks he can appeal to -- that one's own happiness is a good (i.e. desirable) -- is something licensed as available by people desiring their own happiness. Yet he is not supposing here that the fact that they desire their own happiness, or anything else, is proof that it is desirable, just as he would not suppose that the fact that someone sees something as red is proof that it is. Rather, he is supposing that if people desire their own happiness, or see something as red, one can rely on t hem having available, as a premise for further argument, the claim that their own happiness is desirable or that the thing is red (at least absent contrary evidence). As he puts it in the third paragraph, "If the end which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, in theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an end nothing could ever convince any person that it was so." Thus, in appealing to the analogy bet ween judgments of sensible qualities and judgments of value, Mill is not trading on an ambiguity, nor does his argument here involve identifying being desirable with being desired or assuming that "desirable" means "desired." He is instead relying consistently on an empiricist account of concepts and their application -- on a view according to which <u>we have the concepts, evidence, and knowledge we do only <strong>thanks to our having experiences of a certain sort. <mark>In</mark> the <mark>absence of</mark> the relevant <mark>experiences</mark>, he holds (with other empiricists), <mark>we would</mark> not only <mark>lack </mark>the required <mark>evidence</mark> <mark>for</mark> our <mark>judgments, we would lack</mark> the <mark>capacity to make</mark> the <mark>judgments</mark> in the first place. In the presence of the relevant experiences, though, we have both the concepts and the required evidence --</u></strong> "not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require."</p>
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Democracy solves extinction.
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Twining 21
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Twining 21, PhD, president of the International Republican Institute, former director of the Asia Program at the German Marshall Fund. (Daniel, 10-10-2021, "America must double down on democracy", The Hill, https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/575693-america-must-double-down-on-democracy) *language edited
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a world that is less free is one that is less stable The greatest dangers to the American way of life emanate from hostile autocracies the best antidotes to great-power conflict, terrorism and mass migration lie in building democratic institutions Democratic freedoms are under assault in many nations American isolationism compound the danger Western retreat emboldens autocrats in ways that amplify dangers to American national security. violent extremism flourishes under dictatorship In nations without democratic accountability, citizens become drawn to the only forms of expression available to them, which are often violent and extreme. The free world cannot be neutral in the face of autocracy’s resurgence America’s closest allies are democracies. Democracies don’t fight each other, export violent extremism, or produce the conflicts that drive mass migration Democracies are better partners in fighting terrorism and poverty as well as establishing reliable trad Open societies incubate the technologies that will help solve the world’s most pressing problems, including climate change. Citizens can hold leaders accountable when they fall short, and democratic institutions are stronger than any individual
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the best antidotes to great-power conflict terrorism and mass migration lie in democratic institutions Western retreat emboldens autocrats extremism flourishes under dictatorship Democracies don’t fight each other, export extremism or produce conflicts Democracies are better partners in fighting terrorism as well as establishing trad Open societies incubate the tech that will solve pressing problems, including climate change
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The hard truth is that a world that is less free is one that is less secure, stable and prosperous. The greatest dangers to the American way of life emanate from hostile autocracies. There are no quick fixes, but the best antidotes to the challenges of great-power conflict, terrorism and mass migration of desperate refugees lie in the building of inclusive democratic institutions — and working with allied democracies to sustain the free and open order that China, in particular, wishes to replace with a world that’s safe for autocracy. The conventional wisdom that authoritarianism has popular momentum is wrong. No one anywhere is taking to the street to demand more corrupt governance, the adoption of one-man rule, a stronger surveillance state, or greater intervention by malign foreign powers. Democratic freedoms are unquestionably under assault in many nations. Autocrats are aggressive precisely because of the growing demands for change in their more modern, connected societies — and the rising risk that middle classes in nations such as China and Russia will not be willing forever to forfeit political rights for prosperity. American retrenchment and isolationism compound the danger. It would be nice to live in a world where failed states and dictatorships were a problem for someone else to worry about. But rather than producing stability, Western retreat only emboldens autocrats in ways that amplify dangers to American national security. We know that violent extremism flourishes under state failure and dictatorship. Broken states become breeding grounds for extremist groups because they leave vacuums that terrorists are only too happy to fill. In nations without democratic accountability, citizens become drawn to the only forms of expression available to them, which are often violent and extreme. The good news is that we have billions of allies around the world: citizens on every continent chafing for greater freedom and dignity. They do not want U.S. military-led nation-building. They want peaceful support for their independent efforts to create democratic space in systems distorted by overweening government control, dangerous governance gaps and foreign malign influence. The free world cannot be neutral in the face of autocracy’s resurgence. Rather, it should play to its strengths. The appeal of democratic opportunity is a strategic asset for the United States — despite our own shortcomings — because people around the world similarly aspire to live in societies that guarantee justice, rights and dignity. America’s closest allies are democracies. Democracies don’t fight each other, export violent extremism, or produce the conflicts that drive mass migration. Democracies are better partners in fighting terrorism, human trafficking and poverty, as well as establishing reliable trading relationships. Open societies incubate the technologies that will help solve the world’s most pressing problems, including climate change. Citizens can hold leaders accountable when they fall short, and democratic institutions are stronger than any [individual] man — as America itself witnessed after the assault on the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6.
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<h4>Democracy solves extinction.</h4><p><strong>Twining 21</strong>, PhD, president of the International Republican Institute, former director of the Asia Program at the German Marshall Fund. (Daniel, 10-10-2021, "America must double down on democracy", The Hill, https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/575693-america-must-double-down-on-democracy) *language edited </p><p>The hard truth is that <u>a world that is <strong>less free</strong> is one that is <strong>less</u></strong> secure, <u><strong>stable</u></strong> and prosperous. <u>The <strong>greatest dangers</strong> to the American way of life emanate from <strong>hostile autocracies</u></strong>. There are no quick fixes, but <u><mark>the <strong>best antidotes</strong> to</u></mark> the challenges of <u><strong><mark>great-power conflict</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>terrorism</strong></mark> <mark>and <strong>mass migration</u></strong></mark> of desperate refugees <u><mark>lie in</u></mark> the <u><strong>building</u></strong> of inclusive <u><strong><mark>democratic institutions</u></strong></mark> — and working with allied democracies to sustain the free and open order that China, in particular, wishes to replace with a world that’s safe for autocracy. The conventional wisdom that authoritarianism has popular momentum is wrong. No one anywhere is taking to the street to demand more corrupt governance, the adoption of one-man rule, a stronger surveillance state, or greater intervention by malign foreign powers. <u>Democratic freedoms are</u> unquestionably <u>under assault in many nations</u>. Autocrats are aggressive precisely because of the growing demands for change in their more modern, connected societies — and the rising risk that middle classes in nations such as China and Russia will not be willing forever to forfeit political rights for prosperity. <u>American</u> retrenchment and <u>isolationism <strong>compound the danger</u></strong>. It would be nice to live in a world where failed states and dictatorships were a problem for someone else to worry about. But rather than producing stability, <u><mark>Western retreat</u></mark> only <u><strong><mark>emboldens autocrats</strong></mark> in ways that <strong>amplify dangers</strong> to American national security. </u>We know that <u>violent <mark>extremism <strong>flourishes</strong> under</u></mark> state failure and <u><strong><mark>dictatorship</u></strong></mark>. Broken states become breeding grounds for extremist groups because they leave vacuums that terrorists are only too happy to fill. <u>In nations without <strong>democratic accountability</strong>, citizens become drawn to the only forms of expression available to them, which are often <strong>violent</strong> and <strong>extreme</strong>. </u>The good news is that we have billions of allies around the world: citizens on every continent chafing for greater freedom and dignity. They do not want U.S. military-led nation-building. They want peaceful support for their independent efforts to create democratic space in systems distorted by overweening government control, dangerous governance gaps and foreign malign influence. <u>The free world <strong>cannot be neutral</strong> in the face of <strong>autocracy’s resurgence</u></strong>. Rather, it should play to its strengths. The appeal of democratic opportunity is a strategic asset for the United States — despite our own shortcomings — because people around the world similarly aspire to live in societies that guarantee justice, rights and dignity. <u>America’s <strong>closest allies are democracies</strong>. <mark>Democracies <strong>don’t fight each other</strong>, <strong>export</mark> violent <mark>extremism</strong></mark>, <mark>or <strong>produce</mark> the <mark>conflicts</strong></mark> that drive <strong>mass migration</u></strong>. <u><mark>Democracies are <strong>better partners</strong> in <strong>fighting terrorism</u></strong></mark>, human trafficking <u>and <strong>poverty</u></strong>, <u><mark>as well as establishing</mark> reliable <strong><mark>trad</u></strong></mark>ing relationships. <u><mark>Open societies <strong>incubate the tech</strong></mark>nologies <mark>that will</mark> help <strong><mark>solve</strong></mark> the world’s <strong>most <mark>pressing problems</strong>, including</mark> <strong><mark>climate change</strong></mark>. Citizens can <strong>hold leaders accountable</strong> when they fall short, and democratic <strong>institutions</strong> are <strong>stronger than any</u></strong> [<u><strong>individual</u></strong>] man — as America itself witnessed after the assault on the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6. </p>
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Upside AND downside risks are existential---effective governance is key.
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Tzimas 21
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Themistoklis Tzimas 21, Faculty of Law at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, “Chapter 2: The Expectations and Risks from AI”, in Legal and Ethical Challenges of Artificial Intelligence from an International Law Perspective, Springer, 2021, pp. 9–32 Open WorldCat, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78585-7
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it is natural to be skeptical towards a future with entities possessing equal or superior intelligence and levels of autonomy; the prospect even of existential risk looms as possible
Even AI in its current form poses risks because of its embedded-ness in an ever-growing number of crucial aspects of our lives The role of AI in military financial health educational environmental governance networks among others are areas where risk generated by AI—even limited can be diffused through non-linear networks with significant impact— even systemic
From such a perspective, the unprecedented—ness of potential AI developments and the mystery surrounding them emerges as not only the outcome of pop culture but of a radical transformation of our—until recently—self—obvious identification of humanity with highly evolved and dominant intelligence.14
The lack of understanding of intelligence and therefore of AI may be frightening but does not lead necessarily to regulation at least to a proper one. We could even be led into making potentially catastrophic choices on the basis of false assumptions.
On top of our lack of understanding, we should add a sentiment of anxiety which intensifies as an atmosphere of emergency grows
existential issues could emerge: first, an imbalance of intelligence at our expense in favor of non-biological entities and secondly a lack of even fundamental conceptual communication between the two most intelligent “species”. Both of them heighten the fear of irreversible changes
However, we need to consider the expectations as well The positive side focuses on the so-called friendly AI, meaning AI which will benefit and not harm humans, thanks to its advanced intelligence
AI bears the promise of significantly enhancing human life on various aspects, beginning from the already existing, narrow applications enhanced automation and the shift to autonomy the take—over by AI of tasks the service sector climate and weather forecasting disaster response the potentially better cooperation among different actors in complicated matters such as in matters of information geopolitics and international relations logistics resources
The realization of the positive expectations depends up to some extent upon the complementarity or not, of AI with human intelligence
Friendly AI for example bears the prospect of freeing us from hard labor or even further from unwanted labor; of generating further economic growth of dealing in unbiased, speedy, effective and cheaper ways with sectors such as policing justice health environmental crisis, natural disasters education governance defense and several more of them which necessitate decision-making, with the involvement of sophisticated intelligence
The synergies between human intelligence and AI “promise” the enhancement of humans in most of their aspects
The potential benefits are huge everything that civilization has to offer is a product of human intelligence; we cannot predict what we might achieve when this intelligence is magnified by the tools AI may provide, but the eradication of war disease and poverty would be high on anyone’s list. Success in creating AI would be the biggest event in human history Unfortunately, it might also be the last, unless we learn how to avoid the risks
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existential risk looms
AI embedded in military environmental, governance networks are where risk can be diffused even systemic
lack of understanding does not lead to regulation We could mak catastrophic choices
However the positive side
enhance automation climate disaster response coop in geopolitics and i r resources
growth justice, health, environment education, governance
everything civilization has to offer is intelligence AI may eradicat war, disease, and poverty would be the biggest event in history also the last, unless we avoid the risks
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Therefore, it is only natural to be at least skeptical towards a future with entities possessing equal or superior intelligence and levels of autonomy; the prospect even of existential risk looms as possible.7
AI that will have reached or surpassed our level of intelligence make us wonder why would highly autonomous and intelligent AI want to give up control back to its original creators?8 Why remain contained in pre-defined goals set for it by us, humans?
Even AI in its current form and narrow intelligence poses risks because of its embedded-ness in an ever-growing number of crucial aspects of our lives. The role of AI in military, financial,9 health, educational, environmental, governance networks-among others—are areas where risk generated by AI—even limited— autonomy can be diffused through non-linear networks, with significant impact— even systemic.10
The answer therefore to the question whether AI brings risk with it is yes; as Eliezer Yudkowski comments the greatest of them all is that people conclude too early that they understand it11 or that they assume that they can achieve it without necessarily having acquired complete and thorough understanding of what intelligence means.12
Our projection of our—lack of complete—understanding of the concept of intelligence on AI is owed to our lack of complete comprehension of human intelligence too, which is partially covered by the prevalent and until now self- obvious, anthropomorphism because of which we tend to identify higher intelligence with the human mind.
Yudkowski again however suggests that AI “refers to a vastly greater space of possibilities than does the term “Homo sapiens.” When we talk about “AIs” we are really talking about minds-in-general, or optimization processes in general. Imagine a map of mind design space. In one corner, a tiny little circle contains all humans; within a larger tiny circle containing all biological life; and all the rest of the huge map is the space of minds-in-general. The entire map floats in a still vaster space, the space of optimization processes.”13
Regardless of what our well-established ideas are, there are many, different intelligences and even more significantly, there are potentially, different intelli- gences equally or even more evolved than human.
From such a perspective, the unprecedented—ness of potential AI developments and the mystery surrounding them emerges as not only the outcome of pop culture but of a radical transformation of our—until recently—self—obvious identification of humanity with highly evolved and dominant intelligence.14
The lack of understanding of intelligence and therefore of AI may be frightening but does not lead necessarily to regulation—at least to a proper one. We could even be led into making potentially catastrophic choices, on the basis of false assumptions.
On top of our lack of understanding, we should add a sentiment of anxiety as well as of expectations, which intensifies as an atmosphere of emergency and of expected groundbreaking developments grows. The most graphic description of this feeling is the potential of a moment of singularity, as mentioned above according to the description by Vinge and Kurzweil.
As the mathematician I. J. Good–Alan Turing’s colleague in the team of the latter during World War II—has put it: “Let an ultraintelligent machine be defined as a machine that can far surpass all the intellectual activities of any man however clever. Since the design of machines is one of these intellectual activities, an ultraintelligent machine could design even better machines; there would then unquestionably be an “intelligence explosion,” and the intelligence of man would be left far behind. Thus the first ultraintelligent machine is the last invention that man need ever make, provided that the machine is docile enough to tell us how to keep it under control.”15 This is in a nutshell the moment of singularity.
The estimates currently foresee the emergence of ultra or super intelligence—as it is currently labelled—or in other words of singularity, somewhere between 20 and 50 years from today, further raising the sentiment of emergency.16 We cannot even foretell with precision how singularity would look like but we know that because of its expected groundbreaking impact, both states and private entities compete towards gaining the upper hand in the prospect of the singularity.17
Despite the fact that such predictions have been proven rather optimistic in the past18 and therefore up to some extent inaccurate, there are reasons to assume that their materialization will take place and that the urgency of regulation will be proven realistic.
After all, part of the disappointments from AI should be blamed on the fact that certain activities and standards, which were considered as epitomes of human intelligence have been surpassed by AI, only to indicate that they were not eventu- ally satisfactory thresholds for the surpassing of human intelligence.19 Partially because of AI progress we realize that human intelligence and its thresholds are much more complicated than assumed in the past.
The vastness’s of definitions of intelligence, as well as its etymological roots are enlightening of the difficulties: “to gather, to collect, to assemble or to choose, and to form an impression, thus leading one to finally understand, perceive, or know”.20
As with other relevant concepts, the truth is that until recently our main way to approach intelligence for far too long was “we know it, when we see it”. AI is an additional reason for looking deeper into intelligence and the more we examine it, the most complicated it seems.
The combination of lack of complete understanding of intelligence, the unpredictability of AI, its rapid evolution and the prospect of singularity explain both the fascination and the fear from AI. Once the latter emerges, we have no real knowledge about what will happen next but only speculations, which until recently belonged to the area of science fiction.
We are for example pretty confident that the speed of AI intelligence growth will accelerate, once self—improvement will have been achieved. The expected or possible chain of events will begin from AI capacity to re-write its own algorithms and exponentially self—improve, surpassing human intelligence, which lacks the capacity of such rapid self—improvement and setting its own goals.21
We can somehow guess the speed of AGI and ASI evolution and possibly some of its initial steps but we cannot guess the directions that such AI will choose to follow and the characteristics that it will demonstrate. Practically, we credibly guess the prospects of AI beyond a certain level of development.
Two existential issues could emerge: first, an imbalance of intelligence at our expense—with us, humans becoming the inferior species—in favor of non-biological entities and secondly a lack of even fundamental conceptual communication between the two most intelligent “species”. Both of them heighten the fear of irreversible changes, once we lose the possession of the superior intelligence.22
However, we need to consider the expectations as well. The positive side focuses on the so-called friendly AI, meaning AI which will benefit and not harm humans, thanks to its advanced intelligence.23
AI bears the promise of significantly enhancing human life on various aspects, beginning from the already existing, narrow applications. The enhanced automation24 in the industry and the shift to autonomy,25 the take—over by AI of tasks even at the service sector which can be considered as “tedious”—i.e. in the banking sector—climate and weather forecasting, disaster response,26 the potentially better cooperation among different actors in complicated matters such as in matters of information, geopolitics and international relations, logistics, resources ex.27
The realization of the positive expectations depends up to some extent upon the complementarity or not, of AI with human intelligence. However, what friendly AI will bring in our societies constitutes a matter of debate, given our lack of unanimous approach on what should be considered as beneficial and therefore friendly to humans—as is analyzed in the next chapter.
Friendly AI for example bears the prospect of freeing us from hard labor or even further from unwanted labor; of generating further economic growth; of dealing in unbiased, speedy, effective and cheaper ways with sectors such as policing, justice, health, environmental crisis, natural disasters, education, governance, defense and several more of them which necessitate decision-making, with the involvement of sophisticated intelligence.
The synergies between human intelligence and AI “promise” the enhancement of humans in most of their aspects. Such synergies may remain external—humans using AI as external to themselves, in terms of analysis, forecasts, decision—making and in general as a type of assistant-28 or may evolve into the merging of the two forms of intelligence either temporarily or permanently.
The second profoundly enters humanity, existentially—speaking, into uncharted waters. Elon Musk argues in favor of “having some sort of merger of biological intelligence and machine intelligence” and his company “Neuralink” aims at implanting chips in human brain. Musk argues that through this way humans will keep artificial intelligence under control.29 The proposition is that of “mind design”, with humans playing the role that God had according to theologies.30
While the temptation is strong—exceeding human mind’s capacities, far beyond what nature “created”, by acquiring the capacity for example to connect directly to the cyberspace or to break the barriers of biology31—the risks are significant too: what if a microchip malfunction? Will such a brain be usurped or become captive to malfunctioning AI?
The merging of the two intelligences is most likely to evolve initially by invoking medical reasons, instead of human enhancement. But the merging of the two will most likely continue, as after all the limits between healing and enhancement are most often blurry. This development will give rise, as is analyzed below, to signif- icant questions and issues, the most of crucial of which is the setting of a threshold for the prevalence of the human aspect of intelligence over the artificial one.
Human nature is historically improved, enhanced, healed and now, potentially even re-designed in the future.32 Can a “medical science” endorsing such a goal be ethically acceptable and if yes, under what conditions, when, for whom and by what means? The answers are more difficult than it seems. As the World Health Organi- zation—WHO—provides in its constitution, “Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity”.33
Therefore, why discourage science which aims at human-enhancement, even reaching the levels of post-humanism?34 Or if restrictions are to be imposed on human enhancement, on what ethics and laws will they be justified? How ethically acceptable is it to prohibit or delay technological evolution, which among several other magnificent achievements, promises to treat death as a disease and cure it, by reducing soul to self, self to mind, and mind to brain, which will then be preserved as a “softwarized” program in a hardware other than the human body?35
After all, “According to the strong artificial intelligence program there is no fundamental difference between computers and brains: a computer is different machinery than a person in terms of speed and memory capacity.”36
While such a scientific development and the ones leading potentially to it will be undoubtedly, groundbreaking technologically-speaking, is it actually—ethically- speaking—as ambivalent as it may sound or is it already justified by our well— rooted human-centrism?37
Secular humanism may have very well outdated religious beliefs about afterlife in the area of science but has not diminished the hope for immortality; on the contrary, science, implicitly or explicitly predicts that matter can in various ways surpass death, albeit by means which belong in the realm of scientific proof, instead of that of metaphysical belief.38
If this is the philosophical case, the quest for immortality becomes ethically acceptable; it can be considered as embedded both in the existential anxiety of humans, as well as in the human-centrism of secular philosophical and political victory over the dei-centric approach to the world and to our existence.
From another perspective of course and for the not that distant philosophical reasons, the quest for immortality becomes ethically ambiguous or even unacceptable.39 By seeking endless life we may miss all these that make life worth living in the framework of finiteness. As the gerontologist Paul Hayflick cautioned “Given the possibility that you could replace all your parts, including your brain, then you lose your self-identity, your self-recognition. You lose who you are! You are who you are because of your memory.”40
In other words, once we begin to integrate the two types of intelligence, within ourselves, until when and how we will be sure that it is human intelligence that guides us, instead of the AI? And if we are not guided completely or—even further—at all by human intelligence but on the contrary we are guided by AI which we have embodied and which is trained by our human intelligence, will we be remaining humans or we will have evolved to some type of meta-human or transhumant species, being different persons as well?41
AI promises tor threatens to offer a solution by breaking down our consciousness into small “particles” of information—simplistically speaking—which can then be “software-ized” and therefore “uploaded” into different forms of physical or non-physical existence.
Diane Ackerman states that “The brain is silent, the brain is dark, the brain tastes nothing, the brain hears nothing. All it receives are electrical impulses--not the sumptuous chocolate melting sweetly, not the oboe solo like the flight of a bird, not the pastel pink and lavender sunset over the coral reef--only impulses.”42 Therefore, all that is needed—although it is of course much more complicated than we can imagine—is a way to code and reproduce such impulses.
Even if we consider that without death, we will no more be humans but something else, why should we remain humans once technologies allow us be something “more”, in the sense of an enhanced version of “being”? Why are we to remain bound by biological evolution if we can re-design it and our future form of existence?
Why not try to achieve the major breakthrough, the anticipated or hoped digita- lization of the human mind, which promises immortality of consciousness via the cyberspace or artificial bodies: the uploading of our consciousness so that it can live on forever, turning death into an optional condition.43
Either through an artificial body or emulation-a living, conscious avatar—we hope—or fear—that the domain of immortality will be within reach. It is the prospect of a “substrate-independent minds,” in which human and machine consciousness will merge, transcending biological limits of time, space and mem- ory” that fascinates us.44
As Anders Sandberg explained “The point of brain emulation is to recreate the function of the original brain: if ‘run’ it will be able to think and act as the original,” he says. Progress has been slow but steady. “We are now able to take small brain tissue samples and map them in 3D. These are at exquisite resolution, but the blocks are just a few microns across. We can run simulations of the size of a mouse brain on supercomputers—but we do not have the total connectivity yet. As methods improve, I expect to see automatic conversion of scanned tissue into models that can be run. The different parts exist, but so far there is no pipeline from brains to emulations.”45
The emulation is different from a simulation in the sense that the former mimics not only the outward outcome but also the “internal causal dynamics”, so that the emulated system and in this particular case the human mind behaves as the original.46 Obviously, this is a challenging task: we need to understand the human brain with the help of computational neuroscience and combine simplified parts such as simulated neurons with network structures so that the patterns of the brain are comprehended. We must combine effectively “biological realism (attempting to be faithful to biology), completeness (using all available empirical data about the system), tractability (the possibility of quantitative or qualitative simulation) and understanding (producing a compressed representation of the salient aspects of the system in the mind of the experimenter)”.47
The technological challenges are vast. Technologically speaking, the whole concept is based on some assumptions which must be proven both accurate and feasible.48 We must achieve technology capable of scanning completely the human brain, of creating software on the basis of the acquired information from its scanning and of the interpretation of information and the hardware which will be capable of uploading or downloading such software.49 The steps within these procedures are equally challenging. Their detailed analysis evades the scope of this book.
Some critical questions—they are further analyzed in the next chapters—emerge however: how will we interpret free will in emulation? What will be the impact of the environment and of what environment? How will be missing parts of the human brain re-constructed and emulated? What will be the status of the several emulations which will be created—i.e. failed attempts or emulations of parts of the human brain—in the course of the search for a complete and functioning emulation? Will they be considered as “persons” and therefore as having some right or will they be considered as mere objects in an experimental lab? How are we going to decode the actual subjective sentiments of these emulations? Essentially, are emulations the humans “themselves” who are emulated or a different person? Even further what will human and person mean in the era of emulation?
From a different perspective, the victory over death may be seen as a danger of mass extinction, absorption or de-humanization. In this new, vast universe of emulations will there be place for humans?50
From the above—mentioned discussion, it becomes obvious that at a large extent, the prospect of risk or of expectation is a matter of perspective, for which there is no unanimous agreement in the present. This may be the greatest danger of all, for which Asimov warned us: unleashing technology while we cannot communicate among us, in the face of it.
The existential prospect as well as the risks by AI may self-evidently emerge from technological advances but are determined on the basis of politico—philosophical or in the wider sense, ethical assumptions. This is where the need for legal regulation steps in. Such a need was often underestimated in the past in favor of a solely technologically oriented approach—although exceptions raising issues other than technological can be found too.51 The gradual raising of ethic—political, philosoph- ical and legal issues constitutes a rather recent development, partially because of the realization of the proximity of the risks and of the expectations.
The public debate is often divided between two “contradictory” views: fear of AI or enthusiastic optimism. The opinions of the experts differ respectively.
Kurzweil, who has come with a prediction for a date for the emergence of singularity—until 2045—expects such a development in a positive way: “What’s actually happening is [machines] are powering all of us,” Kurzweil said during the SXSW interview. “They’re making us smarter. They may not yet be inside our bodies, but, by the 2030s, we will connect our neocortex, the part of our brain where we do our thinking, to the cloud.”52
In a well-known article—issued on the occasion of a film—Stephen Hawking, Max Tegmark, Stuart Russell, and Frank Wilczek shared a moderate position: “The potential benefits are huge; everything that civilization has to offer is a product of human intelligence; we cannot predict what we might achieve when this intelligence is magnified by the tools AI may provide, but the eradication of war, disease, and poverty would be high on anyone’s list. Success in creating AI would be the biggest event in human history. . . Unfortunately, it might also be the last, unless we learn how to avoid the risks.”53
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<h4><u>Upside</u> AND <u>downside</u> risks are <u>existential</u>---effective <u>governance</u> is key.</h4><p>Themistoklis <strong>Tzimas 21</strong>, Faculty of Law at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, “Chapter 2: The Expectations and Risks from AI”, in Legal and Ethical Challenges of Artificial Intelligence from an International Law Perspective, Springer, 2021, pp. 9–32 Open WorldCat, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78585-7</p><p>Therefore, <u>it is</u> only <u>natural to be</u> at least <u>skeptical towards a future with entities possessing equal or superior intelligence and levels of autonomy; the prospect even of</u> <u><strong><mark>existential risk</u></strong> <u>looms</mark> as</u> <u><strong>possible</u></strong>.7 </p><p>AI that will have reached or surpassed our level of intelligence make us wonder why would highly autonomous and intelligent AI want to give up control back to its original creators?8 Why remain contained in pre-defined goals set for it by us, humans?</p><p><u>Even <mark>AI</mark> in its <strong>current</strong> form</u> and narrow intelligence <u>poses risks because of its</u> <u><strong><mark>embedded</mark>-ness</u></strong> <u><mark>in</mark> an ever-<strong>growing number</u></strong> <u>of</u> <u><strong>crucial aspects of our lives</u></strong>. <u>The role of AI in</u> <u><strong><mark>military</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>financial</u></strong>,9 <u><strong>health</u></strong>, <u><strong>educational</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>environmental</u></strong>, <u><strong>governance networks</u></strong></mark>-<u>among</u> <u><strong>others</u></strong>—<u><mark>are</mark> areas <mark>where</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>risk</u></strong></mark> <u>generated by AI—even</u> <u><strong>limited</u></strong>— autonomy <u><mark>can be</u> <u><strong>diffused</u></strong></mark> <u>through</u> <u><strong>non-linear networks</u></strong>, <u>with</u> <u><strong>significant</u></strong> <u>impact— <mark>even</u> <u><strong>systemic</u></strong></mark>.10 </p><p>The answer therefore to the question whether AI brings risk with it is yes; as Eliezer Yudkowski comments the greatest of them all is that people conclude too early that they understand it11 or that they assume that they can achieve it without necessarily having acquired complete and thorough understanding of what intelligence means.12 </p><p>Our projection of our—lack of complete—understanding of the concept of intelligence on AI is owed to our lack of complete comprehension of human intelligence too, which is partially covered by the prevalent and until now self- obvious, anthropomorphism because of which we tend to identify higher intelligence with the human mind.</p><p>Yudkowski again however suggests that AI “refers to a vastly greater space of possibilities than does the term “Homo sapiens.” When we talk about “AIs” we are really talking about minds-in-general, or optimization processes in general. Imagine a map of mind design space. In one corner, a tiny little circle contains all humans; within a larger tiny circle containing all biological life; and all the rest of the huge map is the space of minds-in-general. The entire map floats in a still vaster space, the space of optimization processes.”13</p><p>Regardless of what our well-established ideas are, there are many, different intelligences and even more significantly, there are potentially, different intelli- gences equally or even more evolved than human.</p><p><u>From such a perspective, the unprecedented—ness of potential AI developments and the mystery surrounding them emerges as not only the outcome of pop culture but of a radical transformation of our—until recently—self—obvious identification of humanity with highly evolved and dominant intelligence.14 </p><p>The</u> <u><strong><mark>lack of understanding</u></strong></mark> <u>of intelligence and therefore of AI may be</u> <u><strong>frightening</u></strong> <u>but</u> <u><strong><mark>does not lead</mark> necessarily <mark>to regulation</u></strong></mark>—<u>at least to a</u> <u><strong>proper</u></strong> <u>one. <mark>We could</u></mark> <u><strong>even</u></strong> <u>be led into</u> <u><strong><mark>mak</strong></mark>ing potentially</u> <u><strong><mark>catastrophic choices</u></strong></mark>, <u>on the basis of</u> <u><strong>false assumptions</strong>.</p><p>On top of our lack of understanding, we should add a sentiment of</u> <u><strong>anxiety</u></strong> as well as of expectations, <u>which intensifies as an atmosphere of emergency</u> and of expected groundbreaking developments <u>grows</u>. The most graphic description of this feeling is the potential of a moment of singularity, as mentioned above according to the description by Vinge and Kurzweil.</p><p>As the mathematician I. J. Good–Alan Turing’s colleague in the team of the latter during World War II—has put it: “Let an ultraintelligent machine be defined as a machine that can far surpass all the intellectual activities of any man however clever. Since the design of machines is one of these intellectual activities, an ultraintelligent machine could design even better machines; there would then unquestionably be an “intelligence explosion,” and the intelligence of man would be left far behind. Thus the first ultraintelligent machine is the last invention that man need ever make, provided that the machine is docile enough to tell us how to keep it under control.”15 This is in a nutshell the moment of singularity.</p><p>The estimates currently foresee the emergence of ultra or super intelligence—as it is currently labelled—or in other words of singularity, somewhere between 20 and 50 years from today, further raising the sentiment of emergency.16 We cannot even foretell with precision how singularity would look like but we know that because of its expected groundbreaking impact, both states and private entities compete towards gaining the upper hand in the prospect of the singularity.17</p><p>Despite the fact that such predictions have been proven rather optimistic in the past18 and therefore up to some extent inaccurate, there are reasons to assume that their materialization will take place and that the urgency of regulation will be proven realistic.</p><p>After all, part of the disappointments from AI should be blamed on the fact that certain activities and standards, which were considered as epitomes of human intelligence have been surpassed by AI, only to indicate that they were not eventu- ally satisfactory thresholds for the surpassing of human intelligence.19 Partially because of AI progress we realize that human intelligence and its thresholds are much more complicated than assumed in the past.</p><p>The vastness’s of definitions of intelligence, as well as its etymological roots are enlightening of the difficulties: “to gather, to collect, to assemble or to choose, and to form an impression, thus leading one to finally understand, perceive, or know”.20 </p><p>As with other relevant concepts, the truth is that until recently our main way to approach intelligence for far too long was “we know it, when we see it”. AI is an additional reason for looking deeper into intelligence and the more we examine it, the most complicated it seems.</p><p>The combination of lack of complete understanding of intelligence, the unpredictability of AI, its rapid evolution and the prospect of singularity explain both the fascination and the fear from AI. Once the latter emerges, we have no real knowledge about what will happen next but only speculations, which until recently belonged to the area of science fiction.</p><p>We are for example pretty confident that the speed of AI intelligence growth will accelerate, once self—improvement will have been achieved. The expected or possible chain of events will begin from AI capacity to re-write its own algorithms and exponentially self—improve, surpassing human intelligence, which lacks the capacity of such rapid self—improvement and setting its own goals.21 </p><p>We can somehow guess the speed of AGI and ASI evolution and possibly some of its initial steps but we cannot guess the directions that such AI will choose to follow and the characteristics that it will demonstrate. Practically, we credibly guess the prospects of AI beyond a certain level of development.</p><p>Two <u><strong>existential issues</u></strong> <u>could emerge: first, an imbalance of intelligence at</u> <u><strong>our expense</u></strong>—with us, humans becoming the inferior species—<u>in favor of non-biological entities and secondly a lack of even fundamental conceptual communication between the two most intelligent “species”. Both of them heighten the fear of</u> <u><strong>irreversible changes</u></strong>, once we lose the possession of the superior intelligence.22 </p><p><u><mark>However</mark>, we need to consider <mark>the</u></mark> <u><strong>expectations as well</u></strong>. <u>The</u> <u><strong><mark>positive side</u></strong></mark> <u>focuses on the so-called</u> <u><strong>friendly</u></strong> <u>AI, meaning AI which will</u> <u><strong>benefit</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>not harm</u></strong> <u>humans, thanks to its advanced intelligence</u>.23 </p><p><u>AI bears the promise of significantly enhancing human life on various aspects, beginning from the already existing, narrow applications</u>. The <u><strong><mark>enhance</strong></mark>d</u> <u><strong><mark>automation</u></strong></mark>24 in the industry <u>and the shift to</u> <u><strong>autonomy</u></strong>,25 <u>the take—over by AI of tasks</u> even at <u>the</u> <u><strong>service sector</u></strong> which can be considered as “tedious”—i.e. in the banking sector—<u><strong><mark>climate</u></strong></mark> <u>and</u> <u><strong>weather forecasting</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>disaster</u></strong> <u>response</u></mark>,26 <u>the potentially better</u> <u><strong><mark>coop</strong></mark>eration among different actors in complicated matters such as <mark>in</mark> matters of</u> <u><strong>information</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>geopolitics</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>i</strong></mark>nternational</u> <u><strong><mark>r</strong></mark>elations</u>, <u><strong>logistics</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>resources</u></strong></mark> ex.27</p><p><u>The realization of the positive expectations depends up to some extent upon the</u> <u><strong>complementarity</u></strong> <u>or not, of AI with</u> <u><strong>human</u></strong> <u>intelligence</u>. However, what friendly AI will bring in our societies constitutes a matter of debate, given our lack of unanimous approach on what should be considered as beneficial and therefore friendly to humans—as is analyzed in the next chapter.</p><p><u>Friendly AI for example bears the prospect of freeing us from hard labor or even further from</u> <u><strong>unwanted</u></strong> <u>labor; of generating further economic</u> <u><strong><mark>growth</u></strong></mark>; <u>of dealing in unbiased, speedy, effective and cheaper ways with sectors such as</u> <u><strong>policing</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>justice</u></strong>, <u><strong>health</u></strong>, <u><strong>environment</mark>al crisis</strong>, natural</u> <u><strong>disasters</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>education</u></strong>, <u><strong>governance</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>defense</u></strong> <u>and several more of them which necessitate decision-making, with the involvement of sophisticated intelligence</u>.</p><p><u>The synergies between human intelligence and AI “promise” the</u> <u><strong>enhancement of humans in most of their aspects</u></strong>. Such synergies may remain external—humans using AI as external to themselves, in terms of analysis, forecasts, decision—making and in general as a type of assistant-28 or may evolve into the merging of the two forms of intelligence either temporarily or permanently.</p><p>The second profoundly enters humanity, existentially—speaking, into uncharted waters. Elon Musk argues in favor of “having some sort of merger of biological intelligence and machine intelligence” and his company “Neuralink” aims at implanting chips in human brain. Musk argues that through this way humans will keep artificial intelligence under control.29 The proposition is that of “mind design”, with humans playing the role that God had according to theologies.30 </p><p>While the temptation is strong—exceeding human mind’s capacities, far beyond what nature “created”, by acquiring the capacity for example to connect directly to the cyberspace or to break the barriers of biology31—the risks are significant too: what if a microchip malfunction? Will such a brain be usurped or become captive to malfunctioning AI?</p><p>The merging of the two intelligences is most likely to evolve initially by invoking medical reasons, instead of human enhancement. But the merging of the two will most likely continue, as after all the limits between healing and enhancement are most often blurry. This development will give rise, as is analyzed below, to signif- icant questions and issues, the most of crucial of which is the setting of a threshold for the prevalence of the human aspect of intelligence over the artificial one.</p><p>Human nature is historically improved, enhanced, healed and now, potentially even re-designed in the future.32 Can a “medical science” endorsing such a goal be ethically acceptable and if yes, under what conditions, when, for whom and by what means? The answers are more difficult than it seems. As the World Health Organi- zation—WHO—provides in its constitution, “Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity”.33 </p><p>Therefore, why discourage science which aims at human-enhancement, even reaching the levels of post-humanism?34 Or if restrictions are to be imposed on human enhancement, on what ethics and laws will they be justified? How ethically acceptable is it to prohibit or delay technological evolution, which among several other magnificent achievements, promises to treat death as a disease and cure it, by reducing soul to self, self to mind, and mind to brain, which will then be preserved as a “softwarized” program in a hardware other than the human body?35 </p><p>After all, “According to the strong artificial intelligence program there is no fundamental difference between computers and brains: a computer is different machinery than a person in terms of speed and memory capacity.”36 </p><p>While such a scientific development and the ones leading potentially to it will be undoubtedly, groundbreaking technologically-speaking, is it actually—ethically- speaking—as ambivalent as it may sound or is it already justified by our well— rooted human-centrism?37 </p><p>Secular humanism may have very well outdated religious beliefs about afterlife in the area of science but has not diminished the hope for immortality; on the contrary, science, implicitly or explicitly predicts that matter can in various ways surpass death, albeit by means which belong in the realm of scientific proof, instead of that of metaphysical belief.38 </p><p>If this is the philosophical case, the quest for immortality becomes ethically acceptable; it can be considered as embedded both in the existential anxiety of humans, as well as in the human-centrism of secular philosophical and political victory over the dei-centric approach to the world and to our existence.</p><p>From another perspective of course and for the not that distant philosophical reasons, the quest for immortality becomes ethically ambiguous or even unacceptable.39 By seeking endless life we may miss all these that make life worth living in the framework of finiteness. As the gerontologist Paul Hayflick cautioned “Given the possibility that you could replace all your parts, including your brain, then you lose your self-identity, your self-recognition. You lose who you are! You are who you are because of your memory.”40 </p><p>In other words, once we begin to integrate the two types of intelligence, within ourselves, until when and how we will be sure that it is human intelligence that guides us, instead of the AI? And if we are not guided completely or—even further—at all by human intelligence but on the contrary we are guided by AI which we have embodied and which is trained by our human intelligence, will we be remaining humans or we will have evolved to some type of meta-human or transhumant species, being different persons as well?41 </p><p>AI promises tor threatens to offer a solution by breaking down our consciousness into small “particles” of information—simplistically speaking—which can then be “software-ized” and therefore “uploaded” into different forms of physical or non-physical existence.</p><p>Diane Ackerman states that “The brain is silent, the brain is dark, the brain tastes nothing, the brain hears nothing. All it receives are electrical impulses--not the sumptuous chocolate melting sweetly, not the oboe solo like the flight of a bird, not the pastel pink and lavender sunset over the coral reef--only impulses.”42 Therefore, all that is needed—although it is of course much more complicated than we can imagine—is a way to code and reproduce such impulses.</p><p>Even if we consider that without death, we will no more be humans but something else, why should we remain humans once technologies allow us be something “more”, in the sense of an enhanced version of “being”? Why are we to remain bound by biological evolution if we can re-design it and our future form of existence?</p><p>Why not try to achieve the major breakthrough, the anticipated or hoped digita- lization of the human mind, which promises immortality of consciousness via the cyberspace or artificial bodies: the uploading of our consciousness so that it can live on forever, turning death into an optional condition.43 </p><p>Either through an artificial body or emulation-a living, conscious avatar—we hope—or fear—that the domain of immortality will be within reach. It is the prospect of a “substrate-independent minds,” in which human and machine consciousness will merge, transcending biological limits of time, space and mem- ory” that fascinates us.44 </p><p>As Anders Sandberg explained “The point of brain emulation is to recreate the function of the original brain: if ‘run’ it will be able to think and act as the original,” he says. Progress has been slow but steady. “We are now able to take small brain tissue samples and map them in 3D. These are at exquisite resolution, but the blocks are just a few microns across. We can run simulations of the size of a mouse brain on supercomputers—but we do not have the total connectivity yet. As methods improve, I expect to see automatic conversion of scanned tissue into models that can be run. The different parts exist, but so far there is no pipeline from brains to emulations.”45 </p><p>The emulation is different from a simulation in the sense that the former mimics not only the outward outcome but also the “internal causal dynamics”, so that the emulated system and in this particular case the human mind behaves as the original.46 Obviously, this is a challenging task: we need to understand the human brain with the help of computational neuroscience and combine simplified parts such as simulated neurons with network structures so that the patterns of the brain are comprehended. We must combine effectively “biological realism (attempting to be faithful to biology), completeness (using all available empirical data about the system), tractability (the possibility of quantitative or qualitative simulation) and understanding (producing a compressed representation of the salient aspects of the system in the mind of the experimenter)”.47 </p><p>The technological challenges are vast. Technologically speaking, the whole concept is based on some assumptions which must be proven both accurate and feasible.48 We must achieve technology capable of scanning completely the human brain, of creating software on the basis of the acquired information from its scanning and of the interpretation of information and the hardware which will be capable of uploading or downloading such software.49 The steps within these procedures are equally challenging. Their detailed analysis evades the scope of this book.</p><p>Some critical questions—they are further analyzed in the next chapters—emerge however: how will we interpret free will in emulation? What will be the impact of the environment and of what environment? How will be missing parts of the human brain re-constructed and emulated? What will be the status of the several emulations which will be created—i.e. failed attempts or emulations of parts of the human brain—in the course of the search for a complete and functioning emulation? Will they be considered as “persons” and therefore as having some right or will they be considered as mere objects in an experimental lab? How are we going to decode the actual subjective sentiments of these emulations? Essentially, are emulations the humans “themselves” who are emulated or a different person? Even further what will human and person mean in the era of emulation?</p><p>From a different perspective, the victory over death may be seen as a danger of mass extinction, absorption or de-humanization. In this new, vast universe of emulations will there be place for humans?50 </p><p>From the above—mentioned discussion, it becomes obvious that at a large extent, the prospect of risk or of expectation is a matter of perspective, for which there is no unanimous agreement in the present. This may be the greatest danger of all, for which Asimov warned us: unleashing technology while we cannot communicate among us, in the face of it.</p><p>The existential prospect as well as the risks by AI may self-evidently emerge from technological advances but are determined on the basis of politico—philosophical or in the wider sense, ethical assumptions. This is where the need for legal regulation steps in. Such a need was often underestimated in the past in favor of a solely technologically oriented approach—although exceptions raising issues other than technological can be found too.51 The gradual raising of ethic—political, philosoph- ical and legal issues constitutes a rather recent development, partially because of the realization of the proximity of the risks and of the expectations.</p><p>The public debate is often divided between two “contradictory” views: fear of AI or enthusiastic optimism. The opinions of the experts differ respectively.</p><p>Kurzweil, who has come with a prediction for a date for the emergence of singularity—until 2045—expects such a development in a positive way: “What’s actually happening is [machines] are powering all of us,” Kurzweil said during the SXSW interview. “They’re making us smarter. They may not yet be inside our bodies, but, by the 2030s, we will connect our neocortex, the part of our brain where we do our thinking, to the cloud.”52 </p><p>In a well-known article—issued on the occasion of a film—Stephen Hawking, Max Tegmark, Stuart Russell, and Frank Wilczek shared a moderate position: “<u>The potential</u> <u><strong>benefits</u></strong> <u>are</u> <u><strong>huge</u></strong>; <u><strong><mark>everything</mark> that <mark>civilization has to offer</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>is</mark> a product of</u> <u><strong>human</u></strong> <u><mark>intelligence</mark>; we cannot</u> <u><strong>predict</u></strong> <u>what we might achieve when this intelligence is</u> <u><strong>magnified</u></strong> <u>by the tools</u> <u><strong><mark>AI</u></strong> <u>may</mark> provide, but the</u> <u><strong><mark>eradicat</strong></mark>ion of</u> <u><strong><mark>war</u></strong>, <u><strong>disease</u></strong>, <u><strong>and poverty</u></strong></mark> <u>would be high on anyone’s list. Success in creating AI <mark>would be the</u> <u><strong>biggest event in</mark> human <mark>history</u></strong></mark>. . .<u> Unfortunately, it</u> <u><strong>might <mark>also</mark> be <mark>the last, unless we</mark> learn how to <mark>avoid the risks</u></strong></mark>.”53 </p>
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Owen L Coon Memorial Tournament at Northwestern
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Rifkin ‘19
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Rifkin ‘19 [Jeremy, Honorary Doctorate in Economics at Hasselt University. Recipient of the 13th annual German Sustainability Award in December 2020. BS in Economics at UPenn – Wharton School. Founder of People’s Bicentennial Commission. The Green New Deal: Why the Fossil Fuel Civilization Will Collapse By 2028, and the Bold Economic Plan to Save Life on Earth. St Martin’s Press. P7-8. Google Book. //shree]
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decline in the price of generating solar and wind energy will lead to trillions of dollars of stranded assets across the corporate sector and hit petro-states that fail to reinvent while putting trillions at risk for unsavvy investors oblivious to the speed of the unfolding energy transition Stranded assets will remain in the ground because of falling demand as well as the abandonment of pipelines, ocean platforms, storage facilities, energy generation plants, backup power plants, petrochemical processing facilities, and industries coupled to the fossil fuel $100 trillion of assets could be ‘carbon stranded.’ The carbon bubble is the largest economic bubble in history the imminent collapse of the fossil fuel industrial civilization could occur sometime between 2023 and 2030 as sectors decouple from fossil fuels The United States will be caught between plummeting price of solar and wind and the fallout from peak oil demand and accumulating stranded assets in the oil industry
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decline in price of solar and wind will lead to stranded assets for investors oblivious to speed of the energy transition because of abandonment of pipelines storage power plants and industries $100 trillion could be stranded The carbon bubble is largest in history the collapse of industrial civilization could occur between 23 and 30 The U S will be caught between fallout from peak oil
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The Carbon Tracker Initiative, a London-based think tank serving the energy industry, reports that the steep decline in the price of generating solar and wind energy “will inevitably lead to trillions of dollars of stranded assets across the corporate sector and hit petro-states that fail to reinvent themselves,” while “putting trillions at risk for unsavvy investors oblivious to the speed of the unfolding energy transition.”19 “Stranded assets” are all the fossil fuels that will remain in the ground because of falling demand as well as the abandonment of pipelines, ocean platforms, storage facilities, energy generation plants, backup power plants, petrochemical processing facilities, and industries tightly coupled to the fossil fuel culture. Behind the scenes, a seismic struggle is taking place as four of the principal sectors responsible for global warming—the Information and Communications Technology (ICT)/telecommunications sector, the power and electric utility sector, the mobility and logistics sector, and the buildings sector—are beginning to decouple from the fossil fuel industry in favor of adopting the cheaper new green energies. The result is that within the fossil fuel industry, “around $100 trillion of assets could be ‘carbon stranded.’”20 The carbon bubble is the largest economic bubble in history. And studies and reports over the past twenty-four months—from within the global financial community, the insurance sector, global trade organizations, national governments, and many of the leading consulting agencies in the energy industry, the transportation sector, and the real estate sector—suggest that the imminent collapse of the fossil fuel industrial civilization could occur sometime between 2023 and 2030, as key sectors decouple from fossil fuels and rely on ever-cheaper solar, wind, and other renewable energies and accompanying zero-carbon technologies.21 The United States, currently the leading oil-producing nation, will be caught in the crosshairs between the plummeting price of solar and wind and the fallout from peak oil demand and accumulating stranded assets in the oil industry.22
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<h4>3---carbon and oil</h4><p><strong>Rifkin ‘19</strong> [Jeremy, Honorary Doctorate in Economics at Hasselt University. Recipient of the 13th annual German Sustainability Award in December 2020. BS in Economics at UPenn – Wharton School. Founder of People’s Bicentennial Commission. The Green New Deal: Why the Fossil Fuel Civilization Will Collapse By 2028, and the Bold Economic Plan to Save Life on Earth. St Martin’s Press. P7-8. Google Book. //shree]</p><p>The Carbon Tracker Initiative, a London-based think tank serving the energy industry, reports that the steep <u><mark>decline in</mark> the <mark>price of</mark> generating <strong><mark>solar</strong> and <strong>wind</strong></mark> energy</u> “<u><mark>will</u></mark> inevitably <u><mark>lead to <strong></mark>trillions</strong> of dollars of <strong><mark>stranded assets</strong></mark> across the corporate sector and hit petro-states that fail to reinvent </u>themselves,” <u>while</u> “<u>putting trillions at risk <mark>for</mark> unsavvy <mark>investors <strong>oblivious</strong> to</mark> the <strong><mark>speed</strong> of the</mark> unfolding <mark>energy transition</u></mark>.”19 “<u>Stranded assets</u>” are all the fossil fuels that <u>will remain in the ground <mark>because of <strong></mark>falling demand</strong> as well as the <strong><mark>abandonment</strong></mark> <mark>of pipelines</mark>, ocean platforms, <mark>storage</mark> facilities, energy generation plants, backup <mark>power plants</mark>, petrochemical processing facilities, <mark>and industries</u></mark> tightly <u>coupled to the fossil fuel</u> culture. Behind the scenes, a seismic struggle is taking place as four of the principal sectors responsible for global warming—the Information and Communications Technology (ICT)/telecommunications sector, the power and electric utility sector, the mobility and logistics sector, and the buildings sector—are beginning to decouple from the fossil fuel industry in favor of adopting the cheaper new green energies. The result is that within the fossil fuel industry, “around <u><mark>$<strong>100 trillion</strong></mark> of assets <mark>could be</mark> ‘carbon <mark>stranded</mark>.’</u>”20 <u><mark>The carbon bubble is</mark> the <strong><mark>largest</mark> economic bubble <mark>in history</u></strong></mark>. And studies and reports over the past twenty-four months—from within the global financial community, the insurance sector, global trade organizations, national governments, and many of the leading consulting agencies in the energy industry, the transportation sector, and the real estate sector—suggest that <u><strong><mark>the</mark> imminent <mark>collapse of</mark> the fossil fuel <mark>industrial civilization could occur</mark> sometime <mark>between</mark> 20<mark>23</mark> <mark>and</mark> 20<mark>30</u></strong></mark>, <u>as</u> key <u>sectors decouple from fossil fuels</u> and rely on ever-cheaper solar, wind, and other renewable energies and accompanying zero-carbon technologies.21 <u><mark>The U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u>, currently the leading oil-producing nation, <u><mark>will be caught</u></mark> in the crosshairs <u><mark>between</u></mark> the <u>plummeting price of solar and wind and the <mark>fallout from <strong>peak oil</strong></mark> demand and accumulating stranded assets in the oil industry</u>.22</p>
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2NC
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1
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St Marks School of Texas TS
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Jet Semrick
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1ac - right to water
1nc - t permitting cap k cil cp court ptx da states cp
2nr - t permitting
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Key to solve disease.
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Jackson ‘16 Incentivize Creation Of New Life-Saving Treatments; https://www.pacificresearch.org/article/free-market-policies-needed-to-incentivize-creation-of-new-life-saving-treatments/)
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Jackson ‘16 (Kerry, Pacific Research Institute; 12/19/16; Free Market Policies Needed To Incentivize Creation Of New Life-Saving Treatments; https://www.pacificresearch.org/article/free-market-policies-needed-to-incentivize-creation-of-new-life-saving-treatments/)
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Our strongest antibiotics don’t work and patients are left with potentially untreatable infections The evolution of antibiotic resistance is now occurring at an alarming rate and is outpacing the development of new countermeasures This situation threatens patient care, economic growth, public health, agriculture, economic security and national security.” Incenting the Development of Antimicrobial Medicines to Address the Problem of Drug-Resistant Infection the problem is caused by “a dearth of new antibiotic medicines.” At the same time that there’s been an increase in AMR, there has been “a sharp decline in the development of new antibiotic medicines But the hazards of AMR can be diminished. , the return on investment for developing new antimicrobial medicines is too low.” To overcome the steep hill that impedes the development of new AMR drugs, lawmakers must implement policies that unleash the incentives of the free market. government needs to let the market do what it does so well. In this case, that’s restoring patients’ health, enriching innovative companies that create jobs, and inspiring biotech start-up If the proper incentives are in place, the needed treatments will follow.
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a b r is occurring at an alarming rate and outpacing development of countermeasures there has been “a sharp decline in development of new antibiotic return on investment for developing is too low that impedes development unleash the incentives of the free market let the market do what it does restoring patients’ health, enriching innovative companies that create jobs If incentives are in place, the treatments
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“Our strongest antibiotics don’t work and patients are left with potentially untreatable infections,” Director Dr. Tom Frieden said when the CDC issued its warning. He asked doctors, hospitals and public health officials to “work together” to “stop these infections from spreading.” The 2014 Report to the President expressed a similar concern: “The evolution of antibiotic resistance is now occurring at an alarming rate and is outpacing the development of new countermeasures capable of thwarting infections in humans. This situation threatens patient care, economic growth, public health, agriculture, economic security and national security.” For those thinking this sort of thing shouldn’t be happening when medical science is more advanced than can almost be conceived, be assured that it is. And unless there are public policy interventions, it’s likely to get worse. “More and more microorganisms will continue to gain resistance to the current drug therapies because (antimicrobial resistance, or AMR) is basic evolution,” Wayne Winegarden writes in the Pacific Research Institute’s newly-released report “Incenting the Development of Antimicrobial Medicines to Address the Problem of Drug-Resistant Infections.” The International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers says the problem is caused by “a dearth of new antibiotic medicines.” At the same time that there’s been an increase in AMR, there has been “a sharp decline in the development of new antibiotic medicines.” The group reports that only two new classes of antibiotics have been discovered in the last three decades compared to 11 in the previous 50 years. The answers to many medical problems are still not within reach of researchers. But the hazards of AMR can be diminished. Winegarden suggests we begin with public health campaigns that encourage handwashing, which he calls a highly effective and low-cost way to reduce the spread of infection. He further recommends policy that would address the problem of antibiotic overuse and greater use of vaccines to cut the incidents of infection. But Winegarden’s primary concern is establishing the correct incentives for developing new antimicrobial medicines that would be effective against AMR microorganisms. He’s specifically referring to policies “based on a thorough understanding of the disincentives that are currently inhibiting their development.” “These disincentives are well-recognized,” he writes. “Despite the medical need, and despite the generally strong return on investment for many other drug classes, the return on investment for developing new antimicrobial medicines (particularly antibiotics) is too low.” Producing a new drug is a grinding and expensive endeavor. It can take 10 to 15 years to develop a single prescription drug that is introduced to the market, and a company can spend as much as $5.5 billion on research and development for each medication that is eventually approved and prescribed. Less than 2 percent of all projects launched to create new drugs succeed. This is not an environment in which pharmaceutical companies can get too amped up about pursuing new treatments. Yet new drug approvals increased over the last decade. Don’t look for a surge of antimicrobial drugs in that pipeline, though. Winegarden says that particular drug class is among several that “face unique impediments” that serve as disincentives for innovation. To overcome the steep hill that impedes the development of new AMR drugs, lawmakers must implement policies that unleash the incentives of the free market. Policymakers also should look at the 1983 federal Orphan Drug Act and its market-oriented reforms that increased the number of drugs developed to treat rare diseases. More than 400 have been introduced to the market since the law was enacted, compared to fewer than 10 in the 1970s. Put another way, government needs to remove its anchors from the process and let the market do what it does so well. In this case, that’s restoring patients’ health, enriching innovative companies that create jobs, and inspiring biotech start-ups such as the group of Stanford undergraduates that has been capitalized to develop new antibiotics. If the proper incentives are in place, the needed treatments will follow.
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<h4><strong>Key to solve disease. </h4><p>Jackson ‘16 </strong>(Kerry, Pacific Research Institute; 12/19/16; Free Market Policies Needed To<u><strong> Incentivize Creation Of New Life-Saving Treatments; https://www.pacificresearch.org/article/free-market-policies-needed-to-incentivize-creation-of-new-life-saving-treatments/)</p><p></u></strong> “<u><strong>Our strongest antibiotics don’t work and patients are left with potentially untreatable infections</u></strong>,” Director Dr. Tom Frieden said when the CDC issued its warning. He asked doctors, hospitals and public health officials to “work together” to “stop these infections from spreading.” The 2014 Report to the President expressed a similar concern: “<u><strong>The evolution of <mark>a</mark>nti<mark>b</mark>iotic <mark>r</mark>esistance <mark>is</mark> now <mark>occurring at an alarming rate and </mark>is<mark> outpacing </mark>the <mark>development of </mark>new <mark>countermeasures</u></strong></mark> capable of thwarting infections in humans. <u><strong>This situation threatens patient care, economic growth, public health, agriculture, economic security and national security.” </u></strong>For those thinking this sort of thing shouldn’t be happening when medical science is more advanced than can almost be conceived, be assured that it is. And unless there are public policy interventions, it’s likely to get worse. “More and more microorganisms will continue to gain resistance to the current drug therapies because (antimicrobial resistance, or AMR) is basic evolution,” Wayne Winegarden writes in the Pacific Research Institute’s newly-released report “<u><strong>Incenting the Development of Antimicrobial Medicines to Address the Problem of Drug-Resistant Infection</u></strong>s.” The International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers says <u><strong>the problem is caused by “a dearth of new antibiotic medicines.”</u></strong> <u><strong>At the same time that there’s been an increase in AMR, <mark>there has been “a sharp decline in </mark>the <mark>development of new antibiotic </mark>medicines</u></strong>.” The group reports that only two new classes of antibiotics have been discovered in the last three decades compared to 11 in the previous 50 years. The answers to many medical problems are still not within reach of researchers. <u><strong>But the hazards of AMR can be diminished. </u></strong>Winegarden suggests we begin with public health campaigns that encourage handwashing, which he calls a highly effective and low-cost way to reduce the spread of infection. He further recommends policy that would address the problem of antibiotic overuse and greater use of vaccines to cut the incidents of infection. But Winegarden’s primary concern is establishing the correct incentives for developing new antimicrobial medicines that would be effective against AMR microorganisms. He’s specifically referring to policies “based on a thorough understanding of the disincentives that are currently inhibiting their development.” “These disincentives are well-recognized,” he writes. “Despite the medical need, and despite the generally strong return on investment for many other drug classes<u><strong>, the <mark>return on investment for developing </mark>new antimicrobial medicines</u></strong> (particularly antibiotics) <u><strong><mark>is too low</mark>.” </u></strong>Producing a new drug is a grinding and expensive endeavor. It can take 10 to 15 years to develop a single prescription drug that is introduced to the market, and a company can spend as much as $5.5 billion on research and development for each medication that is eventually approved and prescribed. Less than 2 percent of all projects launched to create new drugs succeed. This is not an environment in which pharmaceutical companies can get too amped up about pursuing new treatments. Yet new drug approvals increased over the last decade. Don’t look for a surge of antimicrobial drugs in that pipeline, though. Winegarden says that particular drug class is among several that “face unique impediments” that serve as disincentives for innovation. <u><strong>To overcome the steep hill <mark>that</mark> <mark>impedes</mark> the <mark>development</mark> of new AMR drugs, lawmakers must implement policies that <mark>unleash the incentives of the free market</mark>.</u></strong> Policymakers also should look at the 1983 federal Orphan Drug Act and its market-oriented reforms that increased the number of drugs developed to treat rare diseases. More than 400 have been introduced to the market since the law was enacted, compared to fewer than 10 in the 1970s. Put another way, <u><strong>government needs to </u></strong>remove its anchors from the process and <u><strong><mark>let the market do what it does </mark>so well. In this case, that’s <mark>restoring patients’ health, enriching innovative companies that create jobs</mark>, and inspiring biotech start-up</u></strong>s such as the group of Stanford undergraduates that has been capitalized to develop new antibiotics. <u><strong><mark>If</mark> the proper <mark>incentives are in place, the </mark>needed <mark>treatments </mark>will follow.</p></u></strong>
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./documents/hsld21/ImmaculateHeart/Re/Immaculate%20Heart-Rees-Neg-TOC-Round4.docx
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TOC
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4
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Strake Jesuit MS
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Jackson Hanna
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1ac - adorno
1nc - asteroid mining da t-private entities t-implementation util case
1ar - all
2nr - t-private entities case
2ar - all
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HS LD 2021-22
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515,982 |
Existential risks are underrated.
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Wiener 16
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Jonathan B. Wiener 16, Law and Public Policy Professor at Duke University, University Fellow at the Resources for the Future, Past President of the Society for Risk Analysis, the scientific committee member at the International Risk Governance Council, “The Tragedy of the Uncommons: On the Politics of Apocalypse”, Global Policy, 7(S1): Too Big to Handle: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Question of Why Societies Ignore Looming Disasters, 6-6-16, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12319, Stras
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commenters suggested the public exhibits exaggerated paranoia about remote risks This may be the case for unusual but experienced events that are ‘available’ in the public mind and induce strong feelings such as dread But with regard to ultra‐low‐frequency catastrophic risks, events that perhaps only occur once in eons, and are not experienced it is experts, applying their quantitative methods while the public seems less interested if it takes these extreme risks seriously at all
‘tragedies of the uncommons’ add a twist to the typical debate
It predicts people become concerned about recent, visible, salient events that trigger strong feelings the rare mega‐catastrophic risks are not recent, visible or salient. They have not been experienced, so the trigger for mental availability is lacking
Describing such rare risks in a speech is less effective in stimulating public reaction Although people may envision humans going extinct at some point centuries in the future that viewpoint may not translate into concern about specific risks warranting policy responses in the present
the prefrontal cortex, when it envisions hypothetical scenarios of the future, appears to draw on experienced events to construct a collage or pastiche of the future – a ‘prospection’ the human brain relies on ‘available’ experienced events even for its analytic prospection about future scenarios
the ‘unavailability’ of rare extreme risks contributes to being neglected in public concern
The neglect of rare uncommons risks in public psychology may yield neglect in politics Individual neglect of rare global catastrophic risk may compounded by societal disdain for such warnings the person warning ‘the end is near’ is viewed as insane That most doomsday stories are unfounded does not mean that all rare catastrophic risks are illusory
second source is magnitude a surprising finding of recent psychology research is large or ‘mass’ impact yields ‘numbing’
psychic numbing’ or ‘mass numbing’ explain public neglect mass catastrophic impacts face undervaluation
as the number of lives rises, respondents feel overwhelmed and doubt their contribution can really make a difference to such a large problem. The ‘end of the world’ may be too much for people to act on; it may feel disabling rather than mobilizing people have limited capacity to worry and deflect problems so large that they would consume all of that capacity
The public may be eager to save the refugee child drowned on the beach but less willing to save a large and unidentified population of victims extreme mega‐catastrophic risks lack a single identified individual The public may be more eager to combat an identified villain than a faceless natural disaster This may explain public outcry at Osama Bin Laden compared with global climate change or large asteroids hitting the earth
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ultra risks are not experienced it is experts, applying quant methods while public seems less interested
Describing risks in a speech is less effective in stimulating reaction
the prefrontal cortex draw on experience brain relies on ‘available’ events even for analytic about scenarios
unavailability’
neglect compound disdain for warnings
second is magnitude psych large impact yields ‘numbing’
as lives rise respondents feel overwhelmed The ‘end of the world’ may be too much disabling rather than mobilizing people deflect problems so large they would consume capacity
public may be eager to save the refugee less willing to save a large unidentified population ex risks lack a single individual
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A typical assumption in these debates was that the public favored more regulation (at least of unusual risks) and the experts favored less. Thus this relationship might suggest that the public would also be more worried than experts about rare ‘uncommons’ risks. Indeed, some commenters have suggested that the public exhibits exaggerated paranoia about remote risks, overstating the likelihood and calling for precautionary policies that would be (in experts’ views) an overreaction (Efron, 1984; Wildavsky, 1997; Mazur, 2004). This may be the case for unusual but experienced events that are ‘available’ in the public mind and induce strong feelings such as dread; in response to experienced calamities, people are often highly motivated to take action, even if that action is ineffective or excessively costly (Wuthnow, 2010). For example, public reactions to the tragic 9/11 terrorist attacks included shifting from flying to driving with potentially greater injury risk (Deonandan and Backwell, 2011; Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer, 2012), and supporting two wars that were costly in money and lives (Stern and Wiener, 2008; Wuthnow, 2010). But with regard to ultra‐low‐frequency catastrophic risks, events that perhaps only occur once in eons, and hence are not experienced, it is not the case that the public is calling for overreaction while experts urge calm (Weber, 2006). Rather, it is experts, applying their quantitative methods, who are warning about future rare extreme risks such as abrupt climate change, artificial intelligence and large asteroid collisions (Posner, 2004; Bostrom and Cirkovic, 2008; Weitzman, 2009), while the public seems less interested if it takes these extreme risks seriously at all.
My conjecture, supported by the evidence cited above (but worth further study and refinement), is that ‘tragedies of the uncommons’ add a twist to the typical debate about public vs expert risk appraisal. Adding ultra‐low‐frequency (not experienced) risks to the picture shows that it is not the case that the public always favors more regulation and experts less. For both routine risks and ultra‐rare risks, it is often experts who favor more regulation than the public. My conjecture of this twist in relative concern is depicted conceptually in Figure 2. Here, public concern is higher than experts’ concern for unusual and experienced (hence available) risks, in the middle region of the frequency dimension; but public concern is lower than experts’ concern both for routine familiar risks, and for ultra‐low‐frequency rare extreme risks.
Figure 2, ‘Unavailability’ of extreme risks in expert vs public perceptions of risk, omitted.
The reason for this reversal in relative appraisal at the very low end of the frequency spectrum is again related to the ‘availability’ heuristic. It predicts that people become concerned about recent, visible, salient events that trigger strong feelings. But the rare mega‐catastrophic risks are not recent, visible or salient. They have not been experienced, so the trigger for mental availability is lacking (Weber, 2006).
Describing such rare risks, such as in a speech or in an opinion survey, is less effective in stimulating public reaction than an experienced risk (Weber, 2006). Relatedly, a longer time interval without experiencing a recurrence of a damaging event can lead to complacency (neglect due to unavailability) and increased vulnerability to a recurrence (which can then trigger new availability and alarm) (Turner, 1976). Although people may envision humans going extinct at some point centuries in the future (Tonn, 2009), and express pessimism about the future direction of humanity (Randle and Eckersley, 2015), that viewpoint may not translate into concern about specific risks warranting policy responses in the present (nor did these studies compare public with expert perceptions).
Movies depicting rare unexperienced risks (e.g. the large asteroid collision in Deep Impact or Armageddon ; alien pathogens in The Andromeda Strain ; the rise of the machines in The Matrix ) may be viewed as humorous entertainment and even elicit laughter – though perhaps that is nervous laughter rather than neglect. There is some evidence that those who watched the film The Day After Tomorrow were more concerned about climate change afterward (Leiserowitz, 2004), though the audience was not randomly selected and may have been more concerned going in. It is unclear whether films can effectively ‘synthesize availability’; perhaps new techniques of virtual reality can do better, but they still may not call public attention to the most important uncommons risks, nor to the best policy responses.
The role of experience in triggering the availability heuristic, and raising concern about available events in public appraisals of future risks, may be rooted in the ways the brain processes information. Humans process immediate risk stimuli in part through the amygdala, which manages fear and the instant choice to flee or fight (Ledoux, 2007). At the same time, using the prefrontal cortex, humans are able to envision hypothetical future scenarios and analyze choices among them (Gilbert and Wilson, 2007). These two neural pathways are sometimes dubbed ‘system 1’ and ‘system 2’ (Kahneman, 2011). One possibility is that the faster processing of system 1 is generating fear before the slower processing of system 2 can develop a more analytic appraisal; but the two systems may also be interacting, and system 2 can also generate fear after its analysis.
Even if system 2 analysis is applied, the prefrontal cortex, when it envisions hypothetical scenarios of the future, appears to draw on experienced events (from the brain's memory centers) in order to construct a collage or pastiche of the future – a ‘prospection’ (Gilbert and Wilson, 2007; Schachter et al., 2008). Thus the human brain typically relies on ‘available’ experienced events even for its analytic prospection about future scenarios.3
If so, the ‘unavailability’ of rare extreme risks contributes importantly to their being neglected in public concern. A mid‐level example is the increase in parents seeking exemptions from vaccines for their children: past success in controlling a disease may create unavailability and neglect (though subsequent disease outbreaks may revive concern). A more extreme example is that a very large asteroid (> 10 km diameter) has not hit the earth for about 65 million years (Reinhardt et al., 2016), evidently causing the demise of the dinosaurs and about 75 per cent of all life on earth (a 15 km asteroid hit Chicxulub, off the Yucatan peninsula of Mexico, and another dubbed Shiva may have hit near the Indian land mass about 40,000 years later (Lerbekmo, 2014)). Smaller objects hit the earth frequently, and regional damage was caused by the impacts at Tunguska (1908) and Chelyabinsk (2013) (about 19 m in diameter, see Borovicka et al., 2013). The Chelyabinsk impact prompted calls for increased detection efforts. Early detection enables a longer lead time to devise new deflection methods. Improved probabilistic analysis indicates that rare asteroid impacts, even < 1000 m diameter, may be more risky than commonly thought (Reinhardt et al., 2016).
The neglect of rare uncommons risks in public psychology may in turn yield neglect in politics. This is a distinct additional factor on top of others that may also contribute to such neglect, such as free‐riding (if the problem is also a ‘commons’ problem requiring collective action by multiple actors); short‐term costs vs long‐term benefits (if the risk would occur in the long‐term future) mismatched with the short‐term election cycles; inattention to the plight of people far away in other countries and cultures; and others. Individual neglect of rare global catastrophic risk may be compounded by societal disdain for such warnings; despite the prevalence of apocalyptic scenarios in religion and literature (Lisboa, 2011), the person warning that ‘the end is near’ is often viewed as insane (and might be). That most doomsday stories are unfounded, though, does not mean that all rare catastrophic risks are illusory.
Mass numbing
A second source of the neglect of uncommons risks is their large magnitude of impact. It might seem that larger impacts should prompt more, not less, concern. For experts applying quantitative analytic methods, this appears to be the case. But for the general public, a surprising finding of recent psychology research is that a large or ‘mass’ impact yields ‘numbing’ (Slovic, 2007; Slovic et al., 2013). In these studies, people are asked in opinion polls (stated preference surveys) their willingness to pay (WTP) to save different numbers of other people from some risk. One might expect people to offer more money to save more people (a linear relationship, with each life valued the same), or even an increasing amount to reflect the greater value of averting a catastrophe (supra‐linear). Or, one might expect people to offer amounts that rise but at a declining rate, such as if willingness to pay (WTP) reaches some plateau when the risk becomes large (diminishing marginal value of life saving). (In stated preference surveys, ability to pay may not be a strong constraint on responses.) These relationships are illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3, ‘Mass numbing’ in valuation of risk, omitted.
Surprisingly, Slovic recounts several studies finding that none of these depicts public attitudes; rather, in these studies, willingness to pay rises at first, but then as the number of people at risk grows, willingness to pay declines – not just marginally (as in the plateau relationship) but absolutely, to levels below the amount people were willing to pay to save one or two individuals. And the number of people at which the stated willingness to pay peaks and begins to decline is not very high – sometimes fewer than ten people at risk.
Slovic (2007) terms this ‘psychic numbing’ or ‘mass numbing’, and argues that it helps explain public neglect of genocide and other mass calamities (for further evidence, see Rheinberger and Treich, 2015). There is also evidence that it occurs for valuing nonhuman life (environmental conservation) (Markowitz et al., 2013). Hence the mass catastrophic impacts of uncommons risks may face undervaluation.
One reason for this response may be feelings of personal inefficacy (Vastfjall et al., 2015): as the number of lives rises, respondents may feel overwhelmed and doubt that their contribution can really make a difference to such a large problem. The ‘end of the world’ may be too much for people to act on; it may feel disabling rather than mobilizing. Relatedly, people may have a limited capacity to worry (Weber, 2006), and thus may deflect problems so large that they would consume all of that capacity.
A second reason for mass numbing may be the stronger public response to an identified individual – such as an identified victim or an identified villain. The public may be eager to save the baby who fell down the well, or the refugee child drowned on the beach, or the three whales stuck in the ice, but less willing to save a large and unidentified population of victims (Kogut and Ritov, 2005; Small and Loewenstein, 2005; Small, Loewenstein and Slovic, 2007). Kogut and Ritov (2005) and Slovic (2007) report that WTP to save a single victim also increases if the victim is described in more detail, and even more if the victim is given a face. Vastfjall et al. (2014) find that compassion is highest for a single child, and may decline after just one. Slovic (2007, p.79) quotes Mother Teresa: ‘If I look at the mass I will never act. If I look at the one, I will.’ These studies explain why charitable organizations try to feature a ‘poster child’ for a broader cause. But extreme mega‐catastrophic risks typically lack a single identified individual, unless rendered in fiction (e.g. a movie). The public may also be more eager to combat an identified villain than a faceless natural disaster or a ubiquitous social problem (Sunstein, 2007, p. 63, on the ‘Goldstein effect’). This may help explain public outcry at villains highlighted in the news media, such as Osama Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein, compared with the apparently lesser public outcry regarding tsunamis (Indian Ocean 2006, killing 200,000 people; Japan 2011, killing 20,000 people), global climate change harming large populations, or large asteroids hitting the earth.
| 12,480 |
<h4>Existential risks are <u>underrated</u>. </h4><p>Jonathan B. <strong>Wiener 16</strong>, Law and Public Policy Professor at Duke University, University Fellow at the Resources for the Future, Past President of the Society for Risk Analysis, the scientific committee member at the International Risk Governance Council, “The Tragedy of the Uncommons: On the Politics of Apocalypse”, Global Policy, 7(S1): Too Big to Handle: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Question of Why Societies Ignore Looming Disasters, 6-6-16, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12319, Stras</p><p>A typical assumption in these debates was that the public favored more regulation (at least of unusual risks) and the experts favored less. Thus this relationship might suggest that the public would also be more worried than experts about rare ‘uncommons’ risks. Indeed, some <u>commenters</u> have <u>suggested</u> that <u>the public exhibits <strong>exaggerated paranoia</strong> about remote risks</u>, overstating the likelihood and calling for precautionary policies that would be (in experts’ views) an overreaction (Efron, 1984; Wildavsky, 1997; Mazur, 2004). <u>This may be the case for <strong>unusual but experienced events</strong> that are ‘available’ in the public mind and induce strong feelings such as dread</u>; in response to experienced calamities, people are often highly motivated to take action, even if that action is ineffective or excessively costly (Wuthnow, 2010). For example, public reactions to the tragic 9/11 terrorist attacks included shifting from flying to driving with potentially greater injury risk (Deonandan and Backwell, 2011; Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer, 2012), and supporting two wars that were costly in money and lives (Stern and Wiener, 2008; Wuthnow, 2010). <u>But with regard to <strong><mark>ultra</mark>‐low‐frequency catastrophic <mark>risks</strong></mark>, events that perhaps <strong>only occur once in eons</strong>, and</u> hence <u><mark>are not <strong>experienced</u></strong></mark>, it is not the case that the public is calling for overreaction while experts urge calm (Weber, 2006). Rather, <u><mark>it is experts, applying</mark> <strong>their <mark>quant</mark>itative <mark>methods</u></strong></mark>, who are warning about future rare extreme risks such as abrupt climate change, artificial intelligence and large asteroid collisions (Posner, 2004; Bostrom and Cirkovic, 2008; Weitzman, 2009), <u><mark>while</mark> the <mark>public seems <strong>less interested</strong></mark> if it takes these extreme risks <strong>seriously at all</u></strong>.</p><p>My conjecture, supported by the evidence cited above (but worth further study and refinement), is that <u>‘tragedies of the uncommons’ add a twist to <strong>the typical debate</u></strong> about public vs expert risk appraisal. Adding ultra‐low‐frequency (not experienced) risks to the picture shows that it is not the case that the public always favors more regulation and experts less. For both routine risks and ultra‐rare risks, it is often experts who favor more regulation than the public. My conjecture of this twist in relative concern is depicted conceptually in Figure 2. Here, public concern is higher than experts’ concern for unusual and experienced (hence available) risks, in the middle region of the frequency dimension; but public concern is lower than experts’ concern both for routine familiar risks, and for ultra‐low‐frequency rare extreme risks.</p><p>Figure 2, ‘Unavailability’ of extreme risks in expert vs public perceptions of risk, omitted.</p><p>The reason for this reversal in relative appraisal at the very low end of the frequency spectrum is again related to the ‘availability’ heuristic. <u>It predicts</u> that <u>people become concerned about <strong>recent</strong>, <strong>visible</strong>, <strong>salient events</strong> that trigger <strong>strong feelings</u></strong>. But <u>the rare mega‐catastrophic risks are not <strong>recent</strong>, <strong>visible</strong> or <strong>salient</strong>. They have not been experienced, so the trigger for <strong>mental availability</strong> is <strong>lacking</u></strong> (Weber, 2006).</p><p><u><mark>Describing</mark> <strong>such rare <mark>risks</u></strong></mark>, such as <u><strong><mark>in a speech</u></strong></mark> or in an opinion survey, <u><mark>is <strong>less effective</strong> in stimulating</mark> <strong>public <mark>reaction</u></strong></mark> than an experienced risk (Weber, 2006). Relatedly, a longer time interval without experiencing a recurrence of a damaging event can lead to complacency (neglect due to unavailability) and increased vulnerability to a recurrence (which can then trigger new availability and alarm) (Turner, 1976). <u>Although people may envision humans going extinct at some point centuries in the future</u> (Tonn, 2009), and express pessimism about the future direction of humanity (Randle and Eckersley, 2015), <u><strong>that viewpoint</strong> may not translate into <strong>concern</strong> about <strong>specific risks</strong> warranting <strong>policy responses</strong> in the present</u> (nor did these studies compare public with expert perceptions).</p><p>Movies depicting rare unexperienced risks (e.g. the large asteroid collision in Deep Impact or Armageddon ; alien pathogens in The Andromeda Strain ; the rise of the machines in The Matrix ) may be viewed as humorous entertainment and even elicit laughter – though perhaps that is nervous laughter rather than neglect. There is some evidence that those who watched the film The Day After Tomorrow were more concerned about climate change afterward (Leiserowitz, 2004), though the audience was not randomly selected and may have been more concerned going in. It is unclear whether films can effectively ‘synthesize availability’; perhaps new techniques of virtual reality can do better, but they still may not call public attention to the most important uncommons risks, nor to the best policy responses.</p><p>The role of experience in triggering the availability heuristic, and raising concern about available events in public appraisals of future risks, may be rooted in the ways the brain processes information. Humans process immediate risk stimuli in part through the amygdala, which manages fear and the instant choice to flee or fight (Ledoux, 2007). At the same time, using the prefrontal cortex, humans are able to envision hypothetical future scenarios and analyze choices among them (Gilbert and Wilson, 2007). These two neural pathways are sometimes dubbed ‘system 1’ and ‘system 2’ (Kahneman, 2011). One possibility is that the faster processing of system 1 is generating fear before the slower processing of system 2 can develop a more analytic appraisal; but the two systems may also be interacting, and system 2 can also generate fear after its analysis.</p><p>Even if system 2 analysis is applied, <u><strong><mark>the prefrontal cortex</strong></mark>, when it envisions <strong>hypothetical scenarios of the future</strong>, appears to <mark>draw on <strong>experience</mark>d events</u></strong> (from the brain's memory centers) in order <u>to construct <strong>a collage or pastiche</u></strong> <u>of the future – a ‘prospection’</u> (Gilbert and Wilson, 2007; Schachter et al., 2008). Thus <u><strong>the human <mark>brain</u></strong></mark> typically <u><mark>relies on <strong>‘available’</mark> experienced <mark>events</strong> even for</mark> <strong>its <mark>analytic</mark> prospection</strong> <mark>about</mark> <strong>future <mark>scenarios</u></strong></mark>.3</p><p>If so, <u><strong>the ‘<mark>unavailability’</mark> of rare extreme risks</strong> contributes</u> importantly <u>to</u> their <u>being neglected in public concern</u>. A mid‐level example is the increase in parents seeking exemptions from vaccines for their children: past success in controlling a disease may create unavailability and neglect (though subsequent disease outbreaks may revive concern). A more extreme example is that a very large asteroid (> 10 km diameter) has not hit the earth for about 65 million years (Reinhardt et al., 2016), evidently causing the demise of the dinosaurs and about 75 per cent of all life on earth (a 15 km asteroid hit Chicxulub, off the Yucatan peninsula of Mexico, and another dubbed Shiva may have hit near the Indian land mass about 40,000 years later (Lerbekmo, 2014)). Smaller objects hit the earth frequently, and regional damage was caused by the impacts at Tunguska (1908) and Chelyabinsk (2013) (about 19 m in diameter, see Borovicka et al., 2013). The Chelyabinsk impact prompted calls for increased detection efforts. Early detection enables a longer lead time to devise new deflection methods. Improved probabilistic analysis indicates that rare asteroid impacts, even < 1000 m diameter, may be more risky than commonly thought (Reinhardt et al., 2016).</p><p><u>The neglect of rare uncommons risks in <strong>public psychology</strong> may</u> in turn <u>yield <strong>neglect in politics</u></strong>. This is a distinct additional factor on top of others that may also contribute to such neglect, such as free‐riding (if the problem is also a ‘commons’ problem requiring collective action by multiple actors); short‐term costs vs long‐term benefits (if the risk would occur in the long‐term future) mismatched with the short‐term election cycles; inattention to the plight of people far away in other countries and cultures; and others. <u><strong>Individual <mark>neglect</strong></mark> of rare global catastrophic risk may</u> be <u><mark>compound</mark>ed by <strong>societal <mark>disdain</strong> for</mark> such <mark>warnings</u></mark>; despite the prevalence of apocalyptic scenarios in religion and literature (Lisboa, 2011), <u>the person warning</u> that <u>‘the end is near’ is</u> often <u><strong>viewed as insane</u></strong> (and might be). <u>That most doomsday stories are unfounded</u>, though, <u>does not mean that all rare catastrophic risks are illusory</u>.</p><p>Mass numbing</p><p>A <u><mark>second</mark> source</u> of the neglect of uncommons risks <u><mark>is</u></mark> their large <u><strong><mark>magnitude</u></strong></mark> of impact. It might seem that larger impacts should prompt more, not less, concern. For experts applying quantitative analytic methods, this appears to be the case. But for the general public, <u><strong>a surprising finding</strong> of <strong>recent <mark>psych</mark>ology research</strong> is</u> that a <u><strong><mark>large</mark> or ‘mass’ <mark>impact</strong> yields ‘<strong>numbing’</u></strong></mark> (Slovic, 2007; Slovic et al., 2013). In these studies, people are asked in opinion polls (stated preference surveys) their willingness to pay (WTP) to save different numbers of other people from some risk. One might expect people to offer more money to save more people (a linear relationship, with each life valued the same), or even an increasing amount to reflect the greater value of averting a catastrophe (supra‐linear). Or, one might expect people to offer amounts that rise but at a declining rate, such as if willingness to pay (WTP) reaches some plateau when the risk becomes large (diminishing marginal value of life saving). (In stated preference surveys, ability to pay may not be a strong constraint on responses.) These relationships are illustrated in Figure 3.</p><p>Figure 3, ‘Mass numbing’ in valuation of risk, omitted.</p><p>Surprisingly, Slovic recounts several studies finding that none of these depicts public attitudes; rather, in these studies, willingness to pay rises at first, but then as the number of people at risk grows, willingness to pay declines – not just marginally (as in the plateau relationship) but absolutely, to levels below the amount people were willing to pay to save one or two individuals. And the number of people at which the stated willingness to pay peaks and begins to decline is not very high – sometimes fewer than ten people at risk.</p><p>Slovic (2007) terms this ‘<u><strong>psychic numbing’ or ‘mass numbing’</u></strong>, and argues that it helps <u>explain <strong>public neglect</u></strong> of genocide and other mass calamities (for further evidence, see Rheinberger and Treich, 2015). There is also evidence that it occurs for valuing nonhuman life (environmental conservation) (Markowitz et al., 2013). Hence the <u><strong>mass catastrophic impacts</u></strong> of uncommons risks may <u>face <strong>undervaluation</u></strong>.</p><p>One reason for this response may be feelings of personal inefficacy (Vastfjall et al., 2015): <u><mark>as</mark> <strong>the number of <mark>lives</strong> rise</mark>s, <mark>respondents</u></mark> may <u><mark>feel</mark> <strong><mark>overwhelmed</strong></mark> and <strong>doubt</u></strong> that <u>their contribution can <strong>really make a difference</strong> to such <strong>a large problem</strong>. <mark>The ‘end of the world’ may be <strong>too much</strong></mark> for people to act on; it may feel <strong><mark>disabling rather than mobilizing</u></strong></mark>. Relatedly, <u><mark>people</u></mark> may <u>have</u> a <u><strong>limited capacity to worry</u></strong> (Weber, 2006), <u>and</u> thus may <u><strong><mark>deflect</strong> problems so large</mark> that <mark>they would consume</u></mark> <u><strong>all of that <mark>capacity</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>A second reason for mass numbing may be the stronger public response to an identified individual – such as an identified victim or an identified villain. <u>The <mark>public may be <strong>eager</strong> to save</u></mark> the baby who fell down the well, or <u><strong><mark>the refugee</mark> child</strong> drowned on the beach</u>, or the three whales stuck in the ice, <u>but <mark>less willing to save <strong>a large</mark> and <mark>unidentified population</mark> of victims</u></strong> (Kogut and Ritov, 2005; Small and Loewenstein, 2005; Small, Loewenstein and Slovic, 2007). Kogut and Ritov (2005) and Slovic (2007) report that WTP to save a single victim also increases if the victim is described in more detail, and even more if the victim is given a face. Vastfjall et al. (2014) find that compassion is highest for a single child, and may decline after just one. Slovic (2007, p.79) quotes Mother Teresa: ‘If I look at the mass I will never act. If I look at the one, I will.’ These studies explain why charitable organizations try to feature a ‘poster child’ for a broader cause. But <u><strong><mark>ex</mark>treme mega‐catastrophic <mark>risks</u></strong></mark> typically <u><mark>lack <strong>a single</mark> identified <mark>individual</u></strong></mark>, unless rendered in fiction (e.g. a movie). <u>The public may</u> also <u>be <strong>more eager</strong> to combat <strong>an identified villain</strong> than a <strong>faceless natural disaster</u></strong> or a ubiquitous social problem (Sunstein, 2007, p. 63, on the ‘Goldstein effect’). <u>This may</u> help <u>explain public outcry at</u> villains highlighted in the news media, such as <u>Osama Bin Laden</u> and Saddam Hussein, <u>compared with</u> the apparently lesser public outcry regarding tsunamis (Indian Ocean 2006, killing 200,000 people; Japan 2011, killing 20,000 people), <u><strong>global climate change</u></strong> harming large populations, <u>or <strong>large asteroids</strong> hitting the earth</u>.</p>
|
1NC---Rd 3
|
Case
| null | 20,599 | 454 | 6,835 |
./documents/ndtceda22/Michigan/HoSk/Michigan-HoSk-Neg-Owen-L-Coon-Memorial-Tournament-at-Northwestern-Round-3.docx
| 927,484 |
N
|
Owen L Coon Memorial Tournament at Northwestern
|
3
|
Wake Forest BD
|
Ferolie
|
1AC---Manoomin
2NR---Court Clog DA
|
ndtceda22/Michigan/HoSk/Michigan-HoSk-Neg-Owen-L-Coon-Memorial-Tournament-at-Northwestern-Round-3.docx
|
2022-09-22 17:50:24
| 81,263 |
HoSk
|
Michigan HoSk
| null |
Az.....
|
Ho.....
|
Ke.....
|
Sk.....
| 26,992 |
Michigan
|
Michigan
| null | null | 2,001 |
ndtceda22
|
NDT/CEDA College 2022-23
| 2,022 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
1,698,655 |
No escalation – disagreements remain limited thanks to economics and MAD
|
Weitz 11 )
|
Weitz 11 (Richard, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor 9/27/2011, “Global Insights: Putin not a Game-Changer for U.S.-Russia Ties,” http://www.scribd.com/doc/66579517/Global-Insights-Putin-not-a-Game-Changer-for-U-S-Russia-Ties)
|
there will inevitably be areas of conflict between Russia and the , the Russians will always object to NATO's missile defense efforts these conflicts can be managed, since they will likely remain limited and compartmentalized Russia and the West do not have fundamentally conflicting vital interests of the kind countries would go to war over nuclear weapons are a great pacifier under such conditions. that Russia is much more integrated into the international economy and global society than the Soviet Union was, and Putin's popularity depends heavily on his economic track record the smaller size of the Russian population and economy as well as the difficulty of controlling modern means of social communication, that will constrain whoever is in charge of Russia
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there will inevitably be areas of conflict Russians will always object to missile defense conflicts will remain limited and compartmentalized. Russia and the West do not have fundamentally conflicting interests of the kind countries go to war over nuclear weapons are a pacifier Russia is integrated into the economy difficulty controlling communication will constrain Russia
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Fifth, there will inevitably be areas of conflict between Russia and the United States regardless of who is in the Kremlin. Putin and his entourage can never be happy with having NATO be Europe's most powerful security institution, since Moscow is not a member and cannot become one. Similarly, the Russians will always object to NATO's missile defense efforts since they can neither match them nor join them in any meaningful way. In the case of Iran, Russian officials genuinely perceive less of a threat from Tehran than do most Americans, and Russia has more to lose from a cessation of economic ties with Iran -- as well as from an Iranian-Western reconciliation. On the other hand, these conflicts can be managed, since they will likely remain limited and compartmentalized. Russia and the West do not have fundamentally conflicting vital interests of the kind countries would go to war over. And as the Cold War demonstrated, nuclear weapons are a great pacifier under such conditions. Another novel development is that Russia is much more integrated into the international economy and global society than the Soviet Union was, and Putin's popularity depends heavily on his economic track record. Beyond that, there are objective criteria, such as the smaller size of the Russian population and economy as well as the difficulty of controlling modern means of social communication, that will constrain whoever is in charge of Russia.
| 1,440 |
<h4>No escalation – disagreements remain limited thanks to economics and MAD </h4><p><strong>Weitz 11 </strong>(Richard, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor 9/27/2011, “Global Insights: Putin not a Game-Changer for U.S.-Russia Ties,”<strong> </strong>http://www.scribd.com/doc/66579517/Global-Insights-Putin-not-a-Game-Changer-for-U-S-Russia-Ties<strong>)</p><p></strong>Fifth, <u><mark>there will inevitably be areas of conflict</mark> between Russia and the</u> United States regardless of who is in the Kremlin. Putin and his entourage can never be happy with having NATO be Europe's most powerful security institution, since Moscow is not a member and cannot become one. Similarly<u>, the <mark>Russians will always object to</mark> NATO's <mark>missile defense</mark> efforts</u> since they can neither match them nor join them in any meaningful way. In the case of Iran, Russian officials genuinely perceive less of a threat from Tehran than do most Americans, and Russia has more to lose from a cessation of economic ties with Iran -- as well as from an Iranian-Western reconciliation. On the other hand, <u>these <mark>conflicts</mark> can be managed, since they <mark>will</mark> likely <mark>remain limited and compartmentalized</u>. <u>Russia and the West do not have fundamentally conflicting</mark> vital <mark>interests of the kind countries</mark> would <mark>go to war over</u></mark>. And as the Cold War demonstrated, <u><mark>nuclear weapons are a</mark> great <mark>pacifier</mark> under such conditions.</u> Another novel development is <u>that <mark>Russia is</mark> much more <mark>integrated into the</mark> international <mark>economy</mark> and global society than the Soviet Union was, and Putin's popularity depends heavily on his economic track record</u>. Beyond that, there are objective criteria, such as <u>the smaller size of the Russian population and economy as well as the <mark>difficulty</mark> of <mark>controlling</mark> modern means of social <mark>communication</mark>, that <mark>will constrain</mark> whoever is in charge of <mark>Russia</u></mark>.</p>
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2NC
|
Regime Advantage
|
--Economics + MAD
| 88,953 | 119 | 50,566 |
./documents/ndtceda20/Kansas/MaRe/Kansas-Martin-Revare-Neg-FullerTown-Round6.docx
| 618,863 |
N
|
FullerTown
|
6
|
Minnesota JP
|
Christopher Callahan
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FullerTown Round 6 Neg vs Minnesota JP
1AC - NATO Enlargement
1NC - T-Casus T-Substantially Limiting CP-Litigation K-Security DA-Turkey Prolif DA-China DA-Russia Deterrence
2NR - T-Casus
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ndtceda20/Kansas/MaRe/Kansas-Martin-Revare-Neg-FullerTown-Round6.docx
| null | 52,323 |
MaRe
|
Kansas MaRe
| null |
Na.....
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Ma.....
|
Gr.....
|
Re.....
| 19,328 |
Kansas
|
Kansas
| null | null | 1,010 |
ndtceda20
|
NDT/CEDA 2020-21
| 2,020 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
4,123,668 |
B – Or immediacy
|
PTE 9
|
PTE 9 – Online Plain Text English Dictionary 2009
(http://www.onelook.com/?other=web1913&w=Resolve)
|
Resolve to determine after reflection
|
Resolve determine after reflection
|
Resolve: “To form a purpose; to make a decision; especially, to determine after reflection; as, to resolve on a better course of life.”
| 135 |
<h4><strong>B – Or immediacy</h4><p>PTE 9</strong> – Online Plain Text English Dictionary 2009</p><p>(http://www.onelook.com/?other=web1913&w=Resolve)</p><p><u><mark>Resolve</u></mark>: “To form a purpose; to make a decision; especially, <u>to <mark>determine after reflection</u></mark>; as, to resolve on a better course of life.” </p>
|
WR R1 – Aff v. BVSW HL
|
2AC
|
2AC — burden sharing QPQ
| 1,673,637 | 1 | 141,287 |
./documents/hspolicy22/WichitaEast/HaLi/WichitaEast-HaLi-Aff-01---washburn-rural-Round-2.docx
| 927,576 |
A
|
01 - washburn rural
|
2
|
bvsw hl
|
kevin krouse
|
1ac - ai subs
1nc - dos cp burden sharing qpq cp eu cp dod tradeoff da strategic stability da
2nr - dos cp dod da
|
hspolicy22/WichitaEast/HaLi/WichitaEast-HaLi-Aff-01---washburn-rural-Round-2.docx
|
2022-09-23 12:32:41
| 79,460 |
HaLi
|
Wichita East HaLi
|
esther liu - she/her - 2n
kate halabi - she/her - 2a
[email protected]
|
Ka.....
|
Ha.....
|
Es.....
|
Li.....
| 26,636 |
WichitaEast
|
Wichita East
|
KS
| 13,923 | 2,002 |
hspolicy22
|
HS Policy 2022-23
| 2,022 |
cx
|
hs
| 2 |
715,204 |
1. The state is inevitable- policymaking is the only way to create change.
|
Coverstone 5
|
Coverstone 5 Alan Coverstone (masters in communication from Wake Forest, longtime debate coach) “Acting on Activism: Realizing the Vision of Debate with Pro-social Impact” Paper presented at the National Communication Association Annual Conference November 17th 2005
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Control of the government is what active, participatory citizenry is supposed to be about citizens bear the obligation to discuss and debate what the government should be doing. Absent that discussion motivation for personal political activism is lost personal narratives unconnected to political power are co-opted by those who do learn the language of power role-playing that public policy contest debates encourage promotes active learning of the vocabulary and levers of power in America Imagining the ability to use arguments to influence government action is one of the great virtues of academic debate students’ lack of faith in the power of persuasion reflects the waning of the ideal of civic participation The power to imagine public advocacy makes a difference is one of the great virtues of fiat Simulation is far more empowering than completely abandoning all notions of personal power in the face of governmental hegemony Imagining myself starting a socialist revolution is no less of a fantasy than making a difference on Capitol Hill. One fantasy does make a greater difference one speaks the language of political power The other disables action by making one a laughingstock language of power paves the way for genuine political activism political strategies for pro-social change must confront governmental power
|
Control of government is what citizenry is about citizens bear the obligation to discuss what the government should be doing Absent that motivation for activism is lost narratives unconnected to political power are co-opted role-playing promotes active learning of power Simulation is more empowering than abandoning power in the face of hegemony Imagining socialist revolution is no less of a fantasy than a difference on Capitol Hill One fantasy speaks the language of power The other disables action strategies must confront governmental power
|
An important concern emerges when Mitchell describes reflexive fiat as a contest strategy capable of “eschewing the power to directly control external actors” (1998b, p. 20). Describing debates about what our government should do as attempts to control outside actors is debilitating and disempowering. Control of the US government is exactly what an active, participatory citizenry is supposed to be all about. After all, if democracy means anything, it means that citizens not only have the right, they also bear the obligation to discuss and debate what the government should be doing. Absent that discussion and debate, much of the motivation for personal political activism is also lost. Those who have co-opted Mitchell’s argument for individual advocacy often quickly respond that nothing we do in a debate round can actually change government policy, and unfortunately, an entire generation of debaters has now swallowed this assertion as an article of faith. The best most will muster is, “Of course not, but you don’t either!” The assertion that nothing we do in debate has any impact on government policy is one that carries the potential to undermine Mitchell’s entire project. If there is nothing we can do in a debate round to change government policy, then we are left with precious little in the way of pro-social options for addressing problems we face. At best, we can pursue some Pilot-like hand washing that can purify us as individuals through quixotic activism but offer little to society as a whole. It is very important to note that Mitchell (1998b) tries carefully to limit and bound his notion of reflexive fiat by maintaining that because it “views fiat as a concrete course of action, it is bounded by the limits of pragmatism” (p. 20). Pursued properly, the debates that Mitchell would like to see are those in which the relative efficacy of concrete political strategies for pro-social change is debated. In a few noteworthy examples, this approach has been employed successfully, and I must say that I have thoroughly enjoyed judging and coaching those debates. The students in my program have learned to stretch their understanding of their role in the political process because of the experience. Therefore, those who say I am opposed to Mitchell’s goals here should take care at such a blanket assertion. However, contest debate teaches students to combine personal experience with the language of political power. Powerful personal narratives unconnected to political power are regularly co-opted by those who do learn the language of power. One need look no further than the annual state of the Union Address where personal story after personal story is used to support the political agenda of those in power. The so-called role-playing that public policy contest debates encourage promotes active learning of the vocabulary and levers of power in America. Imagining the ability to use our own arguments to influence government action is one of the great virtues of academic debate. Gerald Graff (2003) analyzed the decline of argumentation in academic discourse and found a source of student antipathy to public argument in an interesting place. I’m up against…their aversion to the role of public spokesperson that formal writing presupposes. It’s as if such students can’t imagine any rewards for being a public actor or even imagining themselves in such a role. This lack of interest in the public sphere may in turn reflect a loss of confidence in the possibility that the arguments we make in public will have an effect on the world. Today’s students’ lack of faith in the power of persuasion reflects the waning of the ideal of civic participation that led educators for centuries to place rhetorical and argumentative training at the center of the school and college curriculum. (Graff, 2003, p. 57) The power to imagine public advocacy that actually makes a difference is one of the great virtues of the traditional notion of fiat that critics deride as mere simulation. Simulation of success in the public realm is far more empowering to students than completely abandoning all notions of personal power in the face of governmental hegemony by teaching students that “nothing they can do in a contest debate can ever make any difference in public policy.” Contest debating is well suited to rewarding public activism if it stops accepting as an article of faith that personal agency is somehow undermined by the so-called role playing in debate. Debate is role-playing whether we imagine government action or imagine individual action. Imagining myself starting a socialist revolution in America is no less of a fantasy than imagining myself making a difference on Capitol Hill. Furthermore, both fantasies influenced my personal and political development virtually ensuring a life of active, pro-social, political participation. Neither fantasy reduced the likelihood that I would spend my life trying to make the difference I imagined. One fantasy actually does make a greater difference: the one that speaks the language of political power. The other fantasy disables action by making one a laughingstock to those who wield the language of power. Fantasy motivates and role-playing trains through visualization. Until we can imagine it, we cannot really do it. Role-playing without question teaches students to be comfortable with the language of power, and that language paves the way for genuine and effective political activism. Debates over the relative efficacy of political strategies for pro-social change must confront governmental power at some point. There is a fallacy in arguing that movements represent a better political strategy than voting and person-to-person advocacy. Sure, a full-scale movement would be better than the limited voice I have as a participating citizen going from door to door in a campaign, but so would full-scale government action. Unfortunately, the gap between my individual decision to pursue movement politics and the emergence of a full-scale movement is at least as great as the gap between my vote and democratic change. They both represent utopian fiat. Invocation of Mitchell to support utopian movement fiat is simply not supported by his work, and too often, such invocation discourages the concrete actions he argues for in favor of the personal rejectionism that under girds the political cynicism that is a fundamental cause of voter and participatory abstention in America today.
| 6,481 |
<h4>1. The state is inevitable- policymaking is the only way to create change.</h4><p><strong>Coverstone 5</strong> Alan Coverstone (masters in communication from Wake Forest, longtime debate coach) “Acting on Activism: Realizing the Vision of Debate with Pro-social Impact” Paper presented at the National Communication Association Annual Conference November 17th 2005</p><p> An important concern emerges when Mitchell describes reflexive fiat as a contest strategy capable of “eschewing the power to directly control external actors” (1998b, p. 20). Describing debates about what our government should do as attempts to control outside actors is debilitating and disempowering. <u><strong><mark>Control of</mark> the</u></strong> US <u><strong><mark>government is</u></strong></mark> exactly <u><strong><mark>what</u></strong></mark> an <u><strong>active, participatory <mark>citizenry is</mark> supposed to be</u></strong> all <u><strong><mark>about</u></strong></mark>. After all, if democracy means anything, it means that <u><strong><mark>citizens</u></strong></mark> not only have the right, they also <u><strong><mark>bear the obligation to discuss</mark> and debate <mark>what the government should be doing</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Absent that</mark> discussion</u></strong> and debate, much of the <u><strong><mark>motivation for</mark> personal political <mark>activism is</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>lost</u></strong></mark>. Those who have co-opted Mitchell’s argument for individual advocacy often quickly respond that nothing we do in a debate round can actually change government policy, and unfortunately, an entire generation of debaters has now swallowed this assertion as an article of faith. The best most will muster is, “Of course not, but you don’t either!” The assertion that nothing we do in debate has any impact on government policy is one that carries the potential to undermine Mitchell’s entire project. If there is nothing we can do in a debate round to change government policy, then we are left with precious little in the way of pro-social options for addressing problems we face. At best, we can pursue some Pilot-like hand washing that can purify us as individuals through quixotic activism but offer little to society as a whole. It is very important to note that Mitchell (1998b) tries carefully to limit and bound his notion of reflexive fiat by maintaining that because it “views fiat as a concrete course of action, it is bounded by the limits of pragmatism” (p. 20). Pursued properly, the debates that Mitchell would like to see are those in which the relative efficacy of concrete political strategies for pro-social change is debated. In a few noteworthy examples, this approach has been employed successfully, and I must say that I have thoroughly enjoyed judging and coaching those debates. The students in my program have learned to stretch their understanding of their role in the political process because of the experience. Therefore, those who say I am opposed to Mitchell’s goals here should take care at such a blanket assertion. However, contest debate teaches students to combine personal experience with the language of political power. Powerful <u><strong>personal <mark>narratives unconnected to political power are</u></strong></mark> regularly <u><strong><mark>co-opted</mark> by those who do learn the language of power</u></strong>. One need look no further than the annual state of the Union Address where personal story after personal story is used to support the political agenda of those in power. The so-called <u><strong><mark>role-playing</mark> that public policy contest debates encourage <mark>promotes active learning of</mark> the vocabulary and levers of <mark>power </mark>in America</u></strong>. <u><strong>Imagining the ability to use</u></strong> our own <u><strong>arguments to influence government action is one of the great virtues of academic debate</u></strong>. Gerald Graff (2003) analyzed the decline of argumentation in academic discourse and found a source of student antipathy to public argument in an interesting place. I’m up against…their aversion to the role of public spokesperson that formal writing presupposes. It’s as if such students can’t imagine any rewards for being a public actor or even imagining themselves in such a role. This lack of interest in the public sphere may in turn reflect a loss of confidence in the possibility that the arguments we make in public will have an effect on the world. Today’s <u><strong>students’ lack of faith in the power of persuasion reflects the waning of the ideal of civic participation</u></strong> that led educators for centuries to place rhetorical and argumentative training at the center of the school and college curriculum. (Graff, 2003, p. 57) <u><strong>The power to imagine public advocacy</u></strong> that actually <u><strong>makes a difference is one of the great virtues of</u></strong> the traditional notion of <u><strong>fiat</u></strong> that critics deride as mere simulation. <u><strong><mark>Simulation</u></strong></mark> of success in the public realm <u><strong><mark>is</mark> far <mark>more empowering</u></strong></mark> to students <u><strong><mark>than</mark> completely <mark>abandoning </mark>all notions of personal <mark>power in the face of</mark> governmental <mark>hegemony</u></strong></mark> by teaching students that “nothing they can do in a contest debate can ever make any difference in public policy.” Contest debating is well suited to rewarding public activism if it stops accepting as an article of faith that personal agency is somehow undermined by the so-called role playing in debate. Debate is role-playing whether we imagine government action or imagine individual action. <u><strong><mark>Imagining</mark> myself starting a <mark>socialist revolution</u></strong></mark> in America <u><strong><mark>is no less of a fantasy than</u></strong></mark> imagining myself <u><strong>making <mark>a difference on Capitol Hill</mark>.</u></strong> Furthermore, both fantasies influenced my personal and political development virtually ensuring a life of active, pro-social, political participation. Neither fantasy reduced the likelihood that I would spend my life trying to make the difference I imagined. <u><strong><mark>One fantasy</u></strong></mark> actually <u><strong>does make a greater difference</u></strong>: the <u><strong>one</u></strong> that <u><strong><mark>speaks the language of </mark>political <mark>power</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>The other</u></strong></mark> fantasy <u><strong><mark>disables action</mark> by making one a laughingstock</u></strong> to those who wield the language of power. Fantasy motivates and role-playing trains through visualization. Until we can imagine it, we cannot really do it. Role-playing without question teaches students to be comfortable with the <u><strong>language of power</u></strong>, and that language <u><strong>paves the way for genuine</u></strong> and effective <u><strong>political activism</u></strong>. Debates over the relative efficacy of <u><strong>political <mark>strategies</mark> for pro-social change <mark>must confront governmental power</u></strong></mark> at some point. There is a fallacy in arguing that movements represent a better political strategy than voting and person-to-person advocacy. Sure, a full-scale movement would be better than the limited voice I have as a participating citizen going from door to door in a campaign, but so would full-scale government action. Unfortunately, the gap between my individual decision to pursue movement politics and the emergence of a full-scale movement is at least as great as the gap between my vote and democratic change. They both represent utopian fiat. Invocation of Mitchell to support utopian movement fiat is simply not supported by his work, and too often, such invocation discourages the concrete actions he argues for in favor of the personal rejectionism that under girds the political cynicism that is a fundamental cause of voter and participatory abstention in America today.</p>
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1AC
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Part 1: Framework:
| 94,094 | 320 | 15,988 |
./documents/hsld16/WestRanch/Wo/West%20Ranch-Won-Aff-Voices%20RR-Round1.docx
| 776,147 |
A
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Voices RR
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1
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Presentation AS
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Tinuola Dada, Vaishnavi Sinnarkar
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1AC Russia-Middle East AC
1NC Disclosure theory case defense
1AR theory case
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hsld16/WestRanch/Wo/West%20Ranch-Won-Aff-Voices%20RR-Round1.docx
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JoWo
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West Ranch JoWo
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Jo.....
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Wo.....
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WestRanch
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West Ranch
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HS LD 2016-17
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3,122,312 |
US-China war goes nuclear – most credible scenario
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Hallin 17 https://www.fairobserver.com/region/asia_pacific/china-news-donald-trump-chinese-world-news-35405/
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Hallin 17 (Columnist for Foreign Policy in Focus, "A Think Tank Without Walls," and an independent journalist. He oversaw the journalism program at the University of California, Santa Cruz for 23 years “How Trump Could Blunder Into War With China” accessed online 3/9/17 https://www.fairobserver.com/region/asia_pacific/china-news-donald-trump-chinese-world-news-35405/
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Washington charges that the Chinese are playing the bully with small countries like Vietnam and the Philippines, The US has some 400 military bases surrounding China and is deploying anti-ballistic missiles in South Korea and Japan, ostensibly to guard against North Korean nuclear weapons. But the interceptors could also down Chinese missiles posing a threat to Beijing’s nuclear deterrence While Air/Sea Battle does not envision using nuclear weapons, it could still lead to a nuclear war. It would be very difficult to figure out whether missiles were targeting command centers or China’s nukes. the Chinese might fear their missiles were endangered and launch them. The last thing one wants to do with a nuclear-armed power is make it guess. decline of US influence has a dangerous side Washington may not be able to dictate the world’s economy, but it has immense military power For all its modernization, China is no match for the US. However, defeating China is far beyond Washington’s capacity such a clash would be catastrophic It would torpedo global trade, inflict trillions of dollars of damage on each side, the odds are distressingly high that the war could go nuclear.
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The US has some 400 military bases surrounding China and is deploying anti-ballistic missiles in South Korea and Japan posing a threat to Beijing’s nuclear deterrence could lead to a nuclear war. It would be very difficult to figure out whether missiles were targeting command centers or China’s nukes decline of US influence has a dangerous side such a clash would be catastrophic It would torpedo global trade, inflict trillions of dollars of damage on each side the odds are distressingly high that the war could go nuclear
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Rather than trying to assuage China’s paranoia, the US made things worse by adopting a military strategy to checkmate “Area Denial.” Called “Air/Sea Battle”—later renamed “Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons”—it envisions attacking China’s navy, air force, radar facilities and command centers with air and naval power. Missiles would be used to take out targets deep into Chinese territory. China’s recent seizure of a US underwater drone off the Philippines is part of an ongoing chess game in the region. The drone was almost certainly mapping sea floor bottoms and collecting data that would allow the US to track Chinese submarines, including those armed with nuclear missiles. While the heist was a provocative thing to do—it was seized right under the nose of an unarmed US Navy ship—it’s a reflection of how nervous the Chinese are about their vulnerability to Air/Sea Battle. China’s leaders “have good reason to worry about this emerging U.S. naval strategy [use of undersea drones] against China in East Asia,” Li Mingjiang, a China expert at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, told the Financial Times. “If this strategy becomes reality, it could be quite detrimental to China’s national security.” Washington charges that the Chinese are playing the bully with small countries like Vietnam and the Philippines, and there is some truth to that charge. China has been throwing its weight around with several nations in Southeast Asia. But it also true that the Chinese have a lot of evidence that the Americans are gunning for them. The US has some 400 military bases surrounding China and is deploying anti-ballistic missiles in South Korea and Japan, ostensibly to guard against North Korean nuclear weapons. But the interceptors could also down Chinese missiles, posing a threat to Beijing’s nuclear deterrence. While Air/Sea Battle does not envision using nuclear weapons, it could still lead to a nuclear war. It would be very difficult to figure out whether missiles were targeting command centers or China’s nukes. Under the stricture “use them or lose them,” the Chinese might fear their missiles were endangered and launch them. The last thing one wants to do with a nuclear-armed power is make it guess. Embed from Getty Images SUPERPOWER CONFLICT The Trump administration has opened a broad front on China, questioning the “One China” policy, accusing Beijing of being in cahoots with Islamic terrorists and threatening a trade war. The first would upend more than 30 years of diplomacy, the second is bizarre—if anything, China is overly aggressive in suppressing terrorism in its western Xinjiang Province—and the third makes no sense. China is America’s major trading partner and holds $1.24 trillion in US treasury bonds. While Trump charges that the Chinese have hollowed out the American economy by undermining its industrial base with cheap labor and goods, China didn’t force Apple or General Motors to pull up stakes and decamp elsewhere. Capital goes where wages are low and unions are weak. A trade war would hurt China, but it would also hurt the US and the global economy as well. When Trump says he wants to make America great again, what he really means is that he wants to go back to that post-World War II period when the US dominated much of the globe with a combination of economic strength and military power. But that era is gone, and dreams of a unipolar world run by Washington are a hallucination. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “by 2030 Asia will have surpassed North America and Europe combined in terms of global power based on GDP [gross domestic product], population size, military spending and technological investments.” By 2025, two-thirds of the world will live in Asia, 7% in Europe and 5% in the US. Those are the demographics of eclipse. If Trump starts a trade war, he will find little support among America’s allies. China is the number one trading partner for Japan, Australia, South Korea, Vietnam and India, and the third largest for Indonesia and the Philippines. Over the past year, a number of countries like Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines have also distanced themselves from Washington and moved closer to China. When President Barack Obama tried to get US allies not to sign on to China’s new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, they ignored him. But the decline of US influence has a dangerous side. Washington may not be able to dictate the world’s economy, but it has immense military power. Chinese military expert Yang Chengjun says “China does not stir up troubles, but we are not afraid of them when they come.” They should be. For all its modernization, China is no match for the US. However, defeating China is far beyond Washington’s capacity. The only wars the US has “won” since 1945 are Grenada and Panama. Nonetheless, such a clash would be catastrophic. It would torpedo global trade, inflict trillions of dollars of damage on each side, and the odds are distressingly high that the war could go nuclear.
| 5,067 |
<h4>US-China war goes nuclear – most credible scenario </h4><p><strong>Hallin 17</strong> (Columnist for Foreign Policy in Focus, "A Think Tank Without Walls," and an independent journalist. He oversaw the journalism program at the University of California, Santa Cruz for 23 years “How Trump Could Blunder Into War With China” accessed online 3/9/17 <u><strong>https://www.fairobserver.com/region/asia_pacific/china-news-donald-trump-chinese-world-news-35405/</p><p></u></strong>Rather than trying to assuage China’s paranoia, the US made things worse by adopting a military strategy to checkmate “Area Denial.” Called “Air/Sea Battle”—later renamed “Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons”—it envisions attacking China’s navy, air force, radar facilities and command centers with air and naval power. Missiles would be used to take out targets deep into Chinese territory. China’s recent seizure of a US underwater drone off the Philippines is part of an ongoing chess game in the region. The drone was almost certainly mapping sea floor bottoms and collecting data that would allow the US to track Chinese submarines, including those armed with nuclear missiles. While the heist was a provocative thing to do—it was seized right under the nose of an unarmed US Navy ship—it’s a reflection of how nervous the Chinese are about their vulnerability to Air/Sea Battle. China’s leaders “have good reason to worry about this emerging U.S. naval strategy [use of undersea drones] against China in East Asia,” Li Mingjiang, a China expert at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, told the Financial Times. “If this strategy becomes reality, it could be quite detrimental to China’s national security.” <u>Washington charges that the Chinese are playing the bully with small countries like Vietnam and the Philippines,</u> and there is some truth to that charge. China has been throwing its weight around with several nations in Southeast Asia. But it also true that the Chinese have a lot of evidence that the Americans are gunning for them. <u><mark>The US has some 400 military bases surrounding China and is deploying anti-ballistic missiles in South Korea and Japan</mark>, ostensibly to guard against North Korean nuclear weapons. But the interceptors could also down Chinese missiles</u>, <u><strong><mark>posing a threat to Beijing’s nuclear deterrence</u></strong></mark>. <u>While Air/Sea Battle does not envision using nuclear weapons, <strong>it <mark>could</mark> still <mark>lead to a nuclear war.</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>It would be very difficult to figure out whether missiles were targeting command centers or China’s nukes</mark>.</u> Under the stricture “use them or lose them,” <u>the Chinese might fear their missiles were endangered and launch them. The last thing one wants to do with a nuclear-armed power is make it guess.</u> Embed from Getty Images SUPERPOWER CONFLICT The Trump administration has opened a broad front on China, questioning the “One China” policy, accusing Beijing of being in cahoots with Islamic terrorists and threatening a trade war. The first would upend more than 30 years of diplomacy, the second is bizarre—if anything, China is overly aggressive in suppressing terrorism in its western Xinjiang Province—and the third makes no sense. China is America’s major trading partner and holds $1.24 trillion in US treasury bonds. While Trump charges that the Chinese have hollowed out the American economy by undermining its industrial base with cheap labor and goods, China didn’t force Apple or General Motors to pull up stakes and decamp elsewhere. Capital goes where wages are low and unions are weak. A trade war would hurt China, but it would also hurt the US and the global economy as well. When Trump says he wants to make America great again, what he really means is that he wants to go back to that post-World War II period when the US dominated much of the globe with a combination of economic strength and military power. But that era is gone, and dreams of a unipolar world run by Washington are a hallucination. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “by 2030 Asia will have surpassed North America and Europe combined in terms of global power based on GDP [gross domestic product], population size, military spending and technological investments.” By 2025, two-thirds of the world will live in Asia, 7% in Europe and 5% in the US. Those are the demographics of eclipse. If Trump starts a trade war, he will find little support among America’s allies. China is the number one trading partner for Japan, Australia, South Korea, Vietnam and India, and the third largest for Indonesia and the Philippines. Over the past year, a number of countries like Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines have also distanced themselves from Washington and moved closer to China. When President Barack Obama tried to get US allies not to sign on to China’s new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, they ignored him. But the <u><strong><mark>decline of US influence has a dangerous side</u></strong></mark>. <u>Washington may not be able to dictate the world’s economy, but it has immense military power</u>. Chinese military expert Yang Chengjun says “China does not stir up troubles, but we are not afraid of them when they come.” They should be. <u>For all its modernization, China is no match for the US. However, defeating China is far beyond Washington’s capacity</u>. The only wars the US has “won” since 1945 are Grenada and Panama. Nonetheless, <u><strong><mark>such a clash would be catastrophic</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>It would torpedo global trade, inflict trillions of dollars of damage on each side</mark>,</u> and <u><strong><mark>the odds are distressingly high that the war could go nuclear</mark>.</p></u></strong>
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1nc
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Off
| 32,206 | 115 | 101,811 |
./documents/ndtceda18/MissouriState/EvPi/Missouri%20State-Evans-Pieper-Neg-Wake%20Forest-Round1.docx
| 607,090 |
N
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Wake Forest
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1
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Emory CM
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Amar Adam
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1ac- Auer Deference
Growth
Modeling
1nc-
Court clog DA
Pres Powers DA
Agency flex DA
Farm Bill DA
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ndtceda18/MissouriState/EvPi/Missouri%20State-Evans-Pieper-Neg-Wake%20Forest-Round1.docx
| null | 51,483 |
EvPi
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Missouri State EvPi
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Ky.....
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El.....
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Pi.....
| 19,203 |
MissouriState
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Missouri State
| null | null | 1,008 |
ndtceda18
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NDT/CEDA 2018-19
| 2,018 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
3,846,225 |
Trump makes economic diversionary wars uniquely likely
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Foster 12/19
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Foster 12/19 (Dennis, professor of international studies and political science at the Virginia Military Institute, “Would President Trump go to war to divert attention from problems at home?” Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/12/19/yes-trump-might-well-go-to-war-to-divert-attention-from-problems-at-home/?utm_term=.43745ac4c66c)
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If the U.S. economy tanks, should we expect Trump to engage in a diversionary war? whether U.S. presidents engage in diversionary conflicts depends on their psychological traits I took data on Trump and plugged them into the statistical model that we developed to predict major uses of force by the U S the model would predict that a president with Trump’s numbers would respond to even a minor economic downturn with an increase in the use of force. were the misery index equal to about where it stood in October 2011 the model predicts a president with Trump’s psychological traits would initiate more than one major conflict per quarter
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If the U.S. economy tanks, should we expect Trump to engage in a diversionary war whether presidents engage in diversionary conflicts depends on psychological traits data on Trump would predict that Trump would respond to even a minor economic downturn with an increase in the use of force in 2011 a president with Trump’s traits would initiate more than one major conflict per quarter
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If the U.S. economy tanks, should we expect Donald Trump to engage in a diversionary war? Since the age of Machiavelli, analysts have expected world leaders to launch international conflicts to deflect popular attention away from problems at home. By stirring up feelings of patriotism, leaders might escape the political costs of scandal, unpopularity — or a poorly performing economy. One often-cited example of diversionary war in modern times is Argentina’s 1982 invasion of the Falklands, which several (though not all) political scientists attribute to the junta’s desire to divert the people’s attention from a disastrous economy. In a 2014 article, Jonathan Keller and I argued that whether U.S. presidents engage in diversionary conflicts depends in part on their psychological traits — how they frame the world, process information and develop plans of action. Certain traits predispose leaders to more belligerent behavior. Do words translate into foreign policy action? One way to identify these traits is content analyses of leaders’ rhetoric. The more leaders use certain types of verbal constructs, the more likely they are to possess traits that lead them to use military force. For one, conceptually simplistic leaders view the world in “black and white” terms; they develop unsophisticated solutions to problems and are largely insensitive to risks. Similarly, distrustful leaders tend to exaggerate threats and rely on aggression to deal with threats. Distrustful leaders typically favor military action and are confident in their ability to wield it effectively. Thus, when faced with politically damaging problems that are hard to solve — such as a faltering economy — leaders who are both distrustful and simplistic are less likely to put together complex, direct responses. Instead, they develop simplistic but risky “solutions” that divert popular attention from the problem, utilizing the tools with which they are most comfortable and confident (military force). Based on our analysis of the rhetoric of previous U.S. presidents, we found that presidents whose language appeared more simplistic and distrustful, such as Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower and George W. Bush, were more likely to use force abroad in times of rising inflation and unemployment. By contrast, John F. Kennedy and Bill Clinton, whose rhetoric pegged them as more complex and trusting, were less likely to do so. What about Donald Trump? Since Donald Trump’s election, many commentators have expressed concern about how he will react to new challenges and whether he might make quick recourse to military action. For example, the Guardian’s George Monbiot has argued that political realities will stymie Trump’s agenda, especially his promises regarding the economy. Then, rather than risk disappointing his base, Trump might try to rally public opinion to his side via military action. I sampled Trump’s campaign rhetoric, analyzing 71,446 words across 24 events from January 2015 to December 2016. Using a program for measuring leadership traits in rhetoric, I estimated what Trump’s words may tell us about his level of distrust and conceptual complexity. The graph below shows Trump’s level of distrust compared to previous presidents. These results are startling. Nearly 35 percent of Trump’s references to outside groups paint them as harmful to himself, his allies and friends, and causes that are important to him — a percentage almost twice the previous high. The data suggest that Americans have elected a leader who, if his campaign rhetoric is any indication, will be historically unparalleled among modern presidents in his active suspicion of those unlike himself and his inner circle, and those who disagree with his goals. As a candidate, Trump also scored second-lowest among presidents in conceptual complexity. Compared to earlier presidents, he used more words and phrases that indicate less willingness to see multiple dimensions or ambiguities in the decision-making environment. These include words and phrases like “absolutely,” “greatest” and “without a doubt.” A possible implication for military action I took these data on Trump and plugged them into the statistical model that we developed to predict major uses of force by the United States from 1953 to 2000. For a president of average distrust and conceptual complexity, an economic downturn only weakly predicts an increase in the use of force. But the model would predict that a president with Trump’s numbers would respond to even a minor economic downturn with an increase in the use of force. For example, were the misery index (aggregate inflation and unemployment) equal to 12 — about where it stood in October 2011 — the model predicts a president with Trump’s psychological traits would initiate more than one major conflict per quarter.
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<h4>Trump makes economic diversionary wars <u>uniquely likely</h4><p></u><strong>Foster 12/19</strong> (Dennis, professor of international studies and political science at the Virginia Military Institute, “Would President Trump go to war to divert attention from problems at home?” Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/12/19/yes-trump-might-well-go-to-war-to-divert-attention-from-problems-at-home/?utm_term=.43745ac4c66c)</p><p><u><mark>If the U.S. economy tanks, <strong>should we expect</u></strong></mark> Donald <u><strong><mark>Trump to engage in a diversionary war</mark>?</u></strong> Since the age of Machiavelli, analysts have expected world leaders to launch international conflicts to deflect popular attention away from problems at home. By stirring up feelings of patriotism, leaders might escape the political costs of scandal, unpopularity — or a poorly performing economy. One often-cited example of diversionary war in modern times is Argentina’s 1982 invasion of the Falklands, which several (though not all) political scientists attribute to the junta’s desire to divert the people’s attention from a disastrous economy. In a 2014 article, Jonathan Keller and I argued that <u><mark>whether</mark> U.S. <mark>presidents engage in diversionary conflicts depends</mark> </u>in part <u><mark>on</mark> their <strong><mark>psychological traits</u></strong></mark> — how they frame the world, process information and develop plans of action. Certain traits predispose leaders to more belligerent behavior. Do words translate into foreign policy action? One way to identify these traits is content analyses of leaders’ rhetoric. The more leaders use certain types of verbal constructs, the more likely they are to possess traits that lead them to use military force. For one, conceptually simplistic leaders view the world in “black and white” terms; they develop unsophisticated solutions to problems and are largely insensitive to risks. Similarly, distrustful leaders tend to exaggerate threats and rely on aggression to deal with threats. Distrustful leaders typically favor military action and are confident in their ability to wield it effectively. Thus, when faced with politically damaging problems that are hard to solve — such as a faltering economy — leaders who are both distrustful and simplistic are less likely to put together complex, direct responses. Instead, they develop simplistic but risky “solutions” that divert popular attention from the problem, utilizing the tools with which they are most comfortable and confident (military force). Based on our analysis of the rhetoric of previous U.S. presidents, we found that presidents whose language appeared more simplistic and distrustful, such as Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower and George W. Bush, were more likely to use force abroad in times of rising inflation and unemployment. By contrast, John F. Kennedy and Bill Clinton, whose rhetoric pegged them as more complex and trusting, were less likely to do so. What about Donald Trump? Since Donald Trump’s election, many commentators have expressed concern about how he will react to new challenges and whether he might make quick recourse to military action. For example, the Guardian’s George Monbiot has argued that political realities will stymie Trump’s agenda, especially his promises regarding the economy. Then, rather than risk disappointing his base, Trump might try to rally public opinion to his side via military action. I sampled Trump’s campaign rhetoric, analyzing 71,446 words across 24 events from January 2015 to December 2016. Using a program for measuring leadership traits in rhetoric, I estimated what Trump’s words may tell us about his level of distrust and conceptual complexity. The graph below shows Trump’s level of distrust compared to previous presidents. These results are startling. Nearly 35 percent of Trump’s references to outside groups paint them as harmful to himself, his allies and friends, and causes that are important to him — a percentage almost twice the previous high. The data suggest that Americans have elected a leader who, if his campaign rhetoric is any indication, will be historically unparalleled among modern presidents in his active suspicion of those unlike himself and his inner circle, and those who disagree with his goals. As a candidate, Trump also scored second-lowest among presidents in conceptual complexity. Compared to earlier presidents, he used more words and phrases that indicate less willingness to see multiple dimensions or ambiguities in the decision-making environment. These include words and phrases like “absolutely,” “greatest” and “without a doubt.” A possible implication for military action <u>I took</u> these <u><mark>data on Trump</mark> and plugged them into the statistical model that we developed to predict major uses of force by the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates from 1953 to 2000. For a president of average distrust and conceptual complexity, an economic downturn only weakly predicts an increase in the use of force. But <u>the model <mark>would predict that</mark> <strong>a president with <mark>Trump</mark>’s numbers <mark>would respond to even a minor economic downturn with an increase in the use of force</mark>. </u></strong>For example, <u>were the misery index</u> (aggregate inflation and unemployment) <u>equal to</u> 12 — <u>about where it stood <mark>in</mark> October <mark>2011</mark> </u>— <u>the model predicts <mark>a president with Trump’s</mark> psychological <mark>traits would initiate <strong>more than one major conflict per quarter</u></strong></mark>.</p>
|
Strath Haven PZ Aff – Round 1 – Penn
|
1AC
|
1AC – Manufacturing Advantage
| 35,819 | 711 | 127,855 |
./documents/hspolicy16/StrathHaven/PaZh/Strath%20Haven-Pak-Zhang-Aff-UPenn-Round1.docx
| 667,712 |
A
|
UPenn
|
1
|
Unionville KL
|
Gunther Clark
|
1AC - MES
1NC - Steel DA Steel QPQ CP Protectionism DA De-Dev Case
Block - Steel DA Steel QPQ CP De-Dev Case
2NR - Steel DA Steel QPQ CP Case
|
hspolicy16/StrathHaven/PaZh/Strath%20Haven-Pak-Zhang-Aff-UPenn-Round1.docx
| null | 56,569 |
PaZh
|
Strath Haven PaZh
| null |
An.....
|
Pa.....
|
Ly.....
|
Zh.....
| 20,304 |
StrathHaven
|
Strath Haven
| null | null | 1,015 |
hspolicy16
|
HS Policy 2016-17
| 2,016 |
cx
|
hs
| 2 |
3,021,826 |
Restrictions must prohibit
|
Schiedler-Brown 12
|
Jean Schiedler-Brown 12, Attorney, Jean Schiedler-Brown & Associates, Appellant Brief of Randall Kinchloe v. States Dept of Health, Washington, The Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, Division 1, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A01/686429%20Appellant%20Randall%20Kincheloe%27s.pdf
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The ordinary definition of restrictions does not include reporting and monitoring or supervising
Black's Law defines "restriction" as
A limitation imposed To prohibit from action
In contrast supervise" and "supervisor" are To have oversight or inspect
the definition of "restriction" is very different Kincheloe agreed to some supervision conditions did not restrict
|
The ordinary definition of "restrictions" does not include supervising terms and conditions that are included in the 2001 Stipulation.
Black's Law defines "restriction" as;
A limitation imposed To prohibit from action
|
3. The ordinary definition of the term "restrictions" also does not include the reporting and monitoring or supervising terms and conditions that are included in the 2001 Stipulation.
Black's Law Dictionary, 'fifth edition,(1979) defines "restriction" as;
A limitation often imposed in a deed or lease respecting the use to which the property may be put. The term "restrict' is also cross referenced with the term "restrain." Restrain is defined as; To limit, confine, abridge, narrow down, restrict, obstruct, impede, hinder, stay, destroy. To prohibit from action; to put compulsion on; to restrict; to hold or press back. To keep in check; to hold back from acting, proceeding, or advancing, either by physical or moral force, or by interposing obstacle, to repress or suppress, to curb.
In contrast, the terms "supervise" and "supervisor" are defined as; To have general oversight over, to superintend or to inspect. See Supervisor. A surveyor or overseer. . . In a broad sense, one having authority over others, to superintend and direct. The term "supervisor" means an individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but required the use of independent judgment.
Comparing the above definitions, it is clear that the definition of "restriction" is very different from the definition of "supervision"-very few of the same words are used to explain or define the different terms. In his 2001 stipulation, Mr. Kincheloe essentially agreed to some supervision conditions, but he did not agree to restrict his license.
| 1,864 |
<h4><strong>Restrictions must prohibit </h4><p></strong>Jean<strong> Schiedler-Brown 12</strong>,<strong> </strong>Attorney, Jean Schiedler-Brown & Associates, Appellant Brief of Randall Kinchloe v. States Dept of Health, Washington, The Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, Division 1, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A01/686429%20Appellant%20Randall%20Kincheloe%27s.pdf</p><p>3. <u><strong><mark>The ordinary definition of</u></strong></mark> the term <mark>"<u>restrictions</u>"</mark> also <u><mark>does not include</u> </mark>the <u><strong>reporting and monitoring or <mark>supervising</u></strong> terms and conditions that are included in the 2001 Stipulation. </p><p><u>Black's Law</u> </mark>Dictionary, 'fifth edition,(1979) <u><mark>defines "restriction" as</u>; </p><p><u>A limitation</u> </mark>often <u><mark>imposed</u> </mark>in a deed or lease respecting the use to which the property may be put. The term "restrict' is also cross referenced with the term "restrain." Restrain is defined as; To limit, confine, abridge, narrow down, restrict, obstruct, impede, hinder, stay, destroy. <u><strong><mark>To prohibit from action</u></strong></mark>; to put compulsion on; to restrict; to hold or press back. To keep in check; to hold back from acting, proceeding, or advancing, either by physical or moral force, or by interposing obstacle, to repress or suppress, to curb.</p><p><u>In contrast</u>, the terms "<u>supervise" and "supervisor" are</u> defined as; <u>To have</u> general <u>oversight</u> over, to superintend <u>or</u> to <u>inspect</u>. See Supervisor. A surveyor or overseer. . . In a broad sense, one having authority over others, to superintend and direct. The term "supervisor" means an individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but required the use of independent judgment. </p><p>Comparing the above definitions, it is clear that <u>the</u> <u><strong>definition of "restriction" is very different </u></strong>from the definition of "supervision"-very few of the same words are used to explain or define the different terms. In his 2001 stipulation, Mr. <u>Kincheloe</u> essentially <u>agreed to some <strong>supervision conditions</u></strong>, but he <u><strong>did not </u></strong>agree to<u><strong> restrict </u>his license.</p></strong>
|
1NC
|
Off
|
Off
| 101,995 | 501 | 99,132 |
./documents/ndtceda18/Emory/GaSh/Emory-Gazmararian-Shaikh-Neg-Gonzaga-Round7.docx
| 602,908 |
N
|
Gonzaga
|
7
|
MSU JS
|
Gramsinski
|
1AC - Rule of Two
Accidents Adv
Trump first strike bad adv
Congress adv
1NC -
T prohibit
Prolif DA
Deterrence DA
Midterms DA
Consult NATO CP
Executive CP
2NC -
T-Prohibit
Case
1NR -
Midterms
2NR - Midterms
|
ndtceda18/Emory/GaSh/Emory-Gazmararian-Shaikh-Neg-Gonzaga-Round7.docx
| null | 51,287 |
GaSh
|
Emory GaSh
| null |
Al.....
|
Ga.....
|
Za.....
|
Sh.....
| 19,176 |
Emory
|
Emory
| null | null | 1,008 |
ndtceda18
|
NDT/CEDA 2018-19
| 2,018 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
2,461,397 |
Believable NFU solves---prevents posture changes AND enables arms control dialogues.
|
Gerson 15
|
Michael S. Gerson 15. Gerson is an independent consultant in Atlanta, Georgia. He was previously a division lead, project director, and senior analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, where his research focused on nuclear and conventional deterrence, nuclear strategy, and arms control. 08/01/2015. “Getting to the Table: Prospects and Challenges for Arms Control with China.” The War That Must Never Be Fought: Dilemmas of Nuclear Deterrence, Hoover Press.
|
significant uncertainties and mistrust persist between Washington and Beijing—and perhaps nowhere is this greater than in the realm of military forces and capabilities China’s brought an expansive program to modernize nuclear forces (as well as its space and cyber capabilities) and develop new A2/AD systems that threaten the United States’ unfettered power projection in the region. These initiatives, in turn, have raised concerns in Washington and allied capitals about Beijing’s true intentions in the region and around the world At the same time, emerging US capabilities along with the “pivot” to Asia have generated trepidations in Beijing about Washington’s objectives and intentions The changing security environment in the Asia-Pacific region driven by the rise of China, and the US reaction to it, has important implications continued mistrust and mutual uncertainty regarding each other’s military capabilities and strategic intentions present a formidable challenge to deep meaningful engagement on nuclear issues While there are certainly some differences in definitions and concepts in Washington’s and Beijing’s nuclear lexicons, these disparities should not be overstated. China’s behavior demonstrates that it understands and abides by the core logic of nuclear weapons as developed in the West, even if the concepts and terms are somewhat different. At the most fundamental level, China views nuclear weapons not as militarily useful tools for aggression and coercion but rather as a means of preventing the threat or use of nuclear weapons against it Short of halting programs in America —the U S must find credible ways to assure China that these systems are not a threat can also encourage China’s participation in formal nuclear arms control and the abolition agenda by adopting a no-first-use nuclear policy repeatedly called for the U S and the other declared nuclear-weapon states under the N P T to adopt NFU, going so far as to introduce in January 1994 a draft “Treaty on Mutual No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons” and to propose that the nuclear-weapon states begin the first round of negotiations With renewed global interest in nuclear abolition, China has stated that it believes a critical first step in realizing the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world is for the other nuclear powers to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategies by foreswearing the option to use nuclear weapons first in conflict NFU, Chinese nuclear scholars argue, would enable further reductions because a nuclear posture designed for NFU can be much smaller than a posture that leaves open the option of first use For the United States, adopting NFU would not only meet one of China’s concrete recommendations for creating the conditions for a nuclear-free world and potentially pave the way for Chinese participation in arms control, but it could also enhance national security by reducing fears of a US first strike in a crisis or conflict if reducing nuclear dangers and laying the groundwork for nuclear abolition are to remain important long-term US policy objectives, adopting NFU could be a meaningful step forward
|
uncertainties and mistrust persist in military forces and capabilities China new systems have raised concerns the US reaction has important implications China’s behavior abides by the core logic of nuc s developed in the West At the most fundamental China views nuc s as a means of preventing use against it the U S must assure China that these systems are not a threat by adopting n f u China stated it believes a critical first step is to reduce the role of nuc s in security strategies by foreswearing the option to use first NFU would enable further reductions because a posture for NFU can be smaller the U S adopting NFU would not only meet China’s concrete recommendations and pave the way for arms control, but also enhance national security by reducing fears of a US first strike
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The climate change agreement is important not only because it addresses a pertinent global issue between two of the world’s largest polluters, but also because it presents a new opportunity for the kind of cooperation upon which sustained mutual trust, respect, and stability are built. But while the climate change announcement is a useful development in the continued effort to foster positive and productive US-China relations, significant uncertainties and mistrust persist between Washington and Beijing—and perhaps nowhere is this greater than in the realm of military forces and capabilities. China’s impressive economic growth has brought with it an expansive program to modernize its conventional and nuclear forces (as well as its space and cyber capabilities) and develop new anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems that threaten the United States’ unfettered power projection in the region. These initiatives, in turn, have raised concerns in Washington and allied capitals about Beijing’s true intentions in the region and around the world.[3] At the same time, emerging US capabilities such as ballistic missile defense and conventional prompt global strike, along with the US “pivot” to Asia and the strengthening of alliance relationships in the region, have generated trepidations in Beijing about Washington’s objectives and intentions with respect to China’s rise and its position in the Asia-Pacific region.[4] The changing security environment in the Asia-Pacific region driven by the rise of China, and the US reaction to it, has important implications for the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world. With China’s ascent to great power status and its significant expenditures associated with the expansion and modernization of its military capabilities, continued progress toward a nuclear weapons-free world requires bringing China into the process. Yet, continued mistrust and mutual uncertainty regarding each other’s military capabilities and strategic intentions present a formidable challenge to deep, meaningful engagement on nuclear issues. Washington and Beijing may be able to agree to cut their carbon emissions, but agreeing to cut or limit their nuclear arsenals is an entirely different matter. Absent a fundamental shift in international relations or a catastrophic event, such as the use of nuclear weapons in war, it is likely that the process leading to a nuclear weapons-free world will occur slowly and incrementally through a series of carefully crafted, verifiable arms control agreements. Such a process represents an important shift in the logic and objectives of arms control from the Cold War, where strategic stability—not abolition—was the central objective.[5] While strategic stability remains an important goal of arms control, modern proponents of nuclear abolition view arms control as a means through which to achieve eventual abolition, with strategic stability being an important and necessary interim product along the path to nuclear zero. If arms control is to be the means through which verifiable and permanent abolition will be achieved, then analyzing China’s commitment to nuclear zero requires first understanding China’s perspectives on nuclear arms control. This paper will identify and analyze how Chinese officials and scholars view arms control, and assess how these views might affect China’s willingness to engage in formal nuclear arms control and make serious moves toward nuclear zero. Any assessment of China’s historical and current view of arms control is necessarily speculative given the opaque nature of China’s government, especially concerning issues associated with nuclear weapons. There have been, of course, a handful of official public pronouncements and documents over the years discussing the Chinese leadership’s views on arms control. But, given China’s absence from previous rounds of formal negotiations to limit or reduce nuclear weapons, there is relatively little to provide precedent or serve as a guidepost. Consequently, this paper seeks to get at the question of how China thinks about nuclear arms control—and thus if and how China will make real strides toward nuclear abolition—by examining the debates about arms control among Chinese scholars and defense analysts in the belief that at least some of the key themes that emerge from this literature reflect the debates and concerns about arms control among China’s key decision-makers. China and Nuclear Arms Control: The Early Years At first glance, China would appear to be a “natural” for nuclear arms control. Immediately following its first nuclear test on October 16, 1964, China declared a no-first-use (NFU) policy and encouraged the other nuclear-armed states (the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France) to work toward the elimination of nuclear arms. Beijing’s declaratory policy on arms control and abolition has remained essentially unchanged since that time. China welcomed Obama’s April 2009 speech in Prague embracing the vision of a nuclear weapons-free world, proclaiming in August 2009 that it was ready to “make unremitting efforts to further promote the nuclear disarmament process and realize the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world at an early date.” The following month, President Hu Jintao told the UN General Assembly that China “has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons” and called on the international community “to take credible steps to push forward the nuclear disarmament process.”[6] Yet, despite its consistent rhetoric in favor of arms control and abolition, China has been reluctant to get down to the actual business of limitations and/or reductions in nuclear arms. To be sure, China has not eschewed any kind of restraint with regard to nuclear weapons. Despite the contention of a February 2012 editorial in the Washington Times that China “has never agreed to be part of any strategic nuclear framework,” China is, in fact, a signatory to several international agreements and is involved in multilateral fora associated with nuclear weapons.[7] China joined the Conference on Disarmament in 1980; joined the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1984; announced in 1986 that it would suspend atmospheric nuclear tests (although it has not signed the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty); signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992 and supported its indefinite extension in 1995; signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996 (though it has not yet ratified it); joined the Zangger Committee in 1997; and joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2004. Moreover, China acceded to both the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions and has been an active participant in multilateral discussion on a Treaty on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Nevertheless, China has been ambivalent and noncommittal at best—and outright belligerent at worst—when it comes to formal nuclear arms control with the United States or any other nuclear power. As early as the 1970s, Beijing called the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) between the United States and the Soviet Union “sham disarmament” and accused the superpowers of using arms control as a smokescreen for the continuation of the nuclear arms race.[8] At least part of this hostility toward early US-Soviet arms control was likely driven in part by Beijing’s fear of some kind of collaboration or alliance between Washington and Moscow against China. By the time of SALT I the alliance between Moscow and Beijing was completely broken, and the two countries had participated in a series of conflicts along their border on the Ussuri River that included veiled Soviet threats of an attack on China’s nuclear facilities.[9] US-China relations, while moving in a positive direction, were not yet solidified, and thus some in Beijing’s senior leadership almost certainly remained concerned about a threat from the United States. As such, the leadership in Beijing was more inclined to view SALT I as a strategic ploy rather than a genuine attempt to curb the arms race and reduce the danger of nuclear war. Another factor likely contributing to Beijing’s hostility toward nuclear arms control in the decade following its entrance into the nuclear club had to do with China’s domestic situation. The years immediately following China’s first test were chaotic. The Cultural Revolution that began in 1966 swept over the country, diverting manpower, money, and other resources away from the military and limiting attention and study to military matters, especially new and arcane topics like nuclear strategy and arms control. China did not establish an office or group within its military or political structures tasked with focusing on nuclear issues in the years immediately preceding its nuclear test. Rather, nuclear issues were treated with extreme secrecy and limited to a small group of the most senior military and political officials, thereby limiting opportunities for dialogue and debate. Consequently, while there was obviously sufficient technical expertise on nuclear weapons in China, in the 1960s and 1970s few had any real expertise on—and certainly no one had any experience with—nuclear arms control.[10] Over the next few decades, China appears to have gone through a learning period with respect to nuclear strategy and arms control.[11] Beginning in 1978 the Second Artillery, the military component of the People’s Liberation Army responsible for nuclear weapons, opened a research office, and through the 1980s the Second Artillery studied nuclear strategy and published operational documents. In addition, beginning in the 1980s a small community of arms control specialists emerged within Chinese think tanks and government-funded research institutes. Emblematic of the broader political reforms taking place in China, these experts had more leeway for open discussion and began publishing papers and attending international conferences on nuclear issues and arms control. The result was a more robust and sophisticated debate among Chinese nuclear specialists and, equally (if not more) important, the opportunity for dialogue with foreign arms control experts. As the importance of these topics grew, Beijing funded more research to build a cadre of arms control and nuclear strategy specialists. In 1988, for example, the Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics, a research component of the nuclear labs, created a program to train younger scientists about arms control. By 1997, China had created a specific department in its Foreign Ministry dedicated to arms control and disarmament.[12] China’s Changing Criteria and Evolving Concerns As China devoted more attention and study to nuclear issues, the leadership in Beijing softened its tone on arms control. By the late 1980s, China moved from skepticism and even antagonism toward arms control to indications of a willingness to participate in the process at some point in the future. In doing so, however, China placed some specific requirements that had to be met by the superpowers in order for it to consider engaging in arms control. And yet, as the United States came closer to meeting these stipulations, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Beijing has proceeded to modify these requirements to push the timeline for its participation further into the future. For example, in 1982 the Chinese leadership indicated that it would participate in arms control when the United States and the Soviet Union had cut their nuclear arsenals by 50 percent and ceased testing, manufacturing, and deploying their nuclear weapons. Then, in 1988, China modified its position and instead argued there must be “drastic reductions” in US and Soviet nuclear arsenals before it would join. This shift from a numerical requirement—a 50 percent reduction— to a vaguer and more subjective standard served to put Beijing in firm control of when it would participate, since China could easily argue that reductions were not “drastic” enough in its view rather than risk being held to the numerical standard that it had previously set for itself. Following the end of the Cold War, China’s leadership continued to modify the conditions necessary for its involvement in formal nuclear arms control. In 1995 Beijing said that it would not participate until the United States and Russia reduced their nuclear arsenals well below START II levels, gave up tactical nuclear weapons, halted ballistic missile defenses, and committed to no-first-use nuclear policies. In one of the highest-level declarations about China’s views on arms control, Chinese President Jiang Zemin argued at a meeting of the Conference on Disarmament in March 1999 that the United States and Russia must “substantially” reduce their nuclear forces in order for China to participate in a “multilateral nuclear disarmament process.”[13] As recently as 2010, China declared in its defense white paper, “When conditions are appropriate, other nuclear-weapon states should also join in multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament.”[14] Consistent with earlier claims, China did not define what would be required for the strategic situation to be “appropriate.” And, interestingly, China said only that “other nuclear-weapon states” should join in negotiations at an appropriate time, thus leaving it unclear as to whether China was even referring to itself as opposed to Britain and France. Consequently, while the rhetorical shift in China’s position on arms control is certainly a welcome development, actual movement toward China’s participation in a bilateral or multilateral process has been almost nonexistent. In examining recent official statements by Chinese leaders as well as the positions and debates among Chinese scholars, several key themes emerge that underpin China’s continued reticence to engage in formal nuclear arms control. Understanding these issues and concerns—and developing solutions to assuage them—is essential for bringing China into the process and, ultimately, for achieving a nuclear weapons-free world. In terms of declaratory policy, the Chinese leadership continues to argue that the countries with the largest nuclear arsenals, the United States and Russia, shoulder a “special and primary responsibility” for leading the charge for further arms control and eventual global abolition.[15] Whereas in many international arenas Beijing has seemingly been eager to play a leading role, when it comes to nuclear arms control China continues to be quite comfortable on the sidelines. Washington and Moscow, according to this view, must lead by example. Beyond this consistent policy position lie several deeper, more challenging issues that continue to complicate US efforts to bring China into an arms control process. The first is the lurking suspicion among some in China’s strategic community that the US effort to engage China in arms control is really a trick—a Trojan Horse of sorts—intended to lock in the United States’ superior power position over China. According to this view, the US interest in arms control with China is driven less by a desire to reduce nuclear danger and enhance stability and more by the realities of China’s rise and subsequent shift in the global balance of power. The United States, the argument goes, wants to engage in arms control negotiations in order to constrain China’s nuclear modernization and buildup and maintain its dominant position in the international order.[16] This skepticism about Washington’s true motives applies not only to arms control but also to the entire abolition agenda. Some in China contend that the objective driving the US-led push for global nuclear abolition is Washington’s desire for “absolute advantage” and “absolute security.”[17] If nuclear weapons serve not only to prevent nuclear coercion and deter nuclear attacks—the two stated purposes of China’s nuclear weapons—but also to deter conventional attacks by a superior opponent, then nuclear abolition would essentially give the United States a free hand to project power and attack any country it wished with its superior conventional forces. As one scholar argued, “The existence of nuclear weapons on the contrary weakens the conventional weapons advantages of the United States military. . . . Yet promoting global denuclearization is conducive to the maintenance of US conventional military resources to maximize the benefits of US national security.”[18] The second challenge relates to China’s views on transparency. According to classic nuclear theory developed during the Cold War, transparency is a core component of strategic stability and arms control. In terms of stability, the ability of nuclear-armed opponents (or, at least, countries not firmly allied with each other and with which there is some potential for conflict) to have insight into each other’s nuclear capabilities and force structure helps tamp down arms races, assuages the need to base force planning solely on “worst case” assumptions about the other’s forces, and helps alleviate concerns about a disarming first strike. Under this logic, transparency leads to predictability which, in turn, leads to stability. For arms control, transparency serves as a basic starting point for negotiations, since states cannot begin to find mutually agreeable limits unless they know what the other side possesses. Upon the completion and signing of an arms control accord, transparency serves as a central pillar of a verification regime to ensure that the parties are in compliance with their obligations. China, however, has a different perspective on transparency. Given its relatively small nuclear arsenal, China relies on secrecy and opacity as core components of its strategic deterrent.[19] Given the limited size of its nuclear arsenal, China believes that a lack of transparency contributes to deterrence by enhancing the survivability of its nuclear arsenal; after all, if an enemy doesn’t know where its nuclear weapons are or how many it has, they can’t accurately and reliably be targeted for destruction. Whereas Western nuclear theory posits that transparency underpins stability, China’s nuclear theory holds that a lack of transparency creates uncertainty which, in turn, encourages caution and restraint. For the United States, deterrence has rested on convincing an opponent of the certainty of unacceptable retaliation in response to a nuclear attack; for China, deterrence has traditionally rested on creating uncertainty in an opponent’s strategic calculations about its ability to successfully eliminate China’s minimal nuclear arsenal in a first strike.[20] Given the long-standing centrality of opacity in China’s strategic thinking, efforts to convince the leadership in Beijing to be more forthcoming about its strategic capabilities have been met with fierce resistance. Moreover, consistent with the view that the United States’ real interest in arms control and abolition is to restrain China and maintain a dominant power position, some in China contend that US efforts to convince Beijing to be more transparent about its nuclear capabilities are really designed to collect valuable targeting intelligence for US strategic war plans.[21] Consequently, on the issue of transparency the United States and China find themselves holding diametrically opposed positions. Whereas the United States views transparency as a necessary first step for arms control and strategic stability, China believes that transparency is the product or outcome of better overall strategic relations. In China’s view, Washington and Beijing must first establish “strategic trust” before there can be transparency and stability; in the United States’ view, transparency is one of the important mechanisms for creating strategic trust.[22] The Emergence of Non-Nuclear Concerns In addition to the concerns outlined above, two additional issues have proved to be major stumbling blocks in US and international efforts to bring China into the nuclear arms control process: US ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities and US plans to develop and deploy strategic conventional weapons such as conventional prompt global strike (CPGS). That these two capabilities are central irritants in US-China (as well as US-Russia) nuclear relations exemplifies the increasingly important—and potentially dangerous—interplay between nuclear and conventional forces in the modern era. BMD and CPGS are, of course, non-nuclear systems. But because of what Beijing—and Moscow —believe they are potentially capable of doing, they pose threats to the stability of the nuclear balance and risk causing an escalatory spiral in a conflict. Indeed, Beijing’s concerns about BMD and CPGS highlight a central tension in current US nuclear policy: in seeking to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy, the United States has subsequently elevated the role and importance of conventional systems like BMD and CPGS. Yet, BMD and CPGS are precisely the US capabilities that China is so deeply concerned about, and this concern helps drive Beijing’s resistance to greater transparency and encourages China’s leaders to increase the size and sophistication of their nuclear and conventional forces in order to offset these systems.[23] Paradoxically, then, the means by which the United States has sought to diminish the role of nuclear weapons to pave the way for further arms control and eventual abolition is one of the things that is making those objectives so difficult. While China’s initial response to the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was muted, its opposition has steadily grown over the past decade as US BMD plans and capabilities have evolved.[24] And despite repeated assurances that BMD is not designed for—and is, in fact, incapable of —defending against large-scale, sophisticated attacks like the kind that China could mount, many in Beijing remain unconvinced.[25] China contends that US BMD systems could undermine its strategic deterrent by potentially shielding the United States from retaliation in kind after a US first strike had eliminated the majority of China’s nuclear forces. The United States, Chinese policymakers argue, might be more willing to use nuclear weapons if it did not fear unacceptable retaliation. BMD not only might make US leaders more likely to use nuclear weapons against China, but it also might provide Washington with an incentive to engage in nuclear coercion or take greater risks in a crisis or conflict with China in the belief that its BMD capabilities effectively neutralize China’s deterrent.[26] With an effective (or at least a perceived effective) BMD system, deterrence in US-China relations would become decidedly one-sided. Whereas China worries that BMD threatens to destroy its missiles in flight, CPGS threatens to destroy its missiles before they are even launched. CPGS is intended to provide US decision-makers with a prompt, nonnuclear capability to strike targets anywhere in the world within a short time.[27] While US officials have posited a number of potential missions for CPGS—including striking highvalue terrorist targets, countering anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) attacks, and countering anti-access/area denial strikes—the nuclear-related missions have focused exclusively on North Korea and Iran.[28] But despite the US focus on so-called rogue states in discussing potential nuclear scenarios for CPGS, China views this capability as posing an equally dangerous threat to its nuclear deterrent. If CPGS can target North Korean or future Iranian nuclear forces, Beijing reasons, it can also target China’s nuclear arsenal. China worries that CPGS could give the United States a non-nuclear counterforce capability against China’s nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. In this situation, the United States could theoretically launch a disarming first strike without having to first cross the nuclear threshold.[29] This non-nuclear counterforce capability, whether real or merely perceived by Beijing, risks encouraging China to operate its forces in ways that could increase the chances of accidents, miscalculations, or nuclear escalation in a crisis or war.[30] While many in China believe that BMD and CPGS separately pose threats to its strategic deterrent, Chinese policymakers and defense analysts are even more concerned about them being used together. With effective conventional strike capabilities and missile defense, China worries that the United States could launch a non-nuclear counterforce first strike and then use its BMD to destroy any remaining nuclear-armed missiles launched in retaliation. In this scenario the United States would, in effect, engage in nuclear war without having to fire a nuclear shot.[31] Organizational and Bureaucratic Challenges The preceding discussion demonstrates that there are some important challenges and obstacles to convincing China to participate in meaningful nuclear arms control that might pave the way for eventual global abolition. And, if the challenges outlined above were not enough, it is likely that China must also contend with some organizational and bureaucratic hurdles that likely affect its willingness and ability to participate in arms control. As noted earlier, China was slow to develop formal governmental offices and expertise in nuclear weapons and deterrence, and its development of expertise specifically in arms control is likely to have been even slower. If US-Soviet/Russian arms control is any guide, the actual mechanics of arms control are complicated and esoteric, involving painstaking detail in definitions, counting roles, and verification procedures, to name only a few. Without direct experience in the business of negotiating and implementing a nuclear arms control agreement, some elements of China’s governmental apparatus may be reticent—and possibly even obstructionist—in participating in arms control even when the strategic situation is deemed “appropriate” by Chinese standards, whatever they may be. To be sure, China has been steadily developing academic expertise in nuclear weapons and arms control for several decades, and Chinese experts have participated in numerous unofficial Track II strategic dialogues, nuclear policy conferences, and technical meetings. In 2008 the U.S. National Academy of Sciences published the English-Chinese, Chinese-English Nuclear Security Glossary, a joint project by US and Chinese experts to create agreed-upon definitions of key nuclear terms. The issue, however, is whether this academic expertise, and some of the experts themselves, can filter up to China’s key decision-making circles and turn China’s learning in arms control theory into practice. The Way Ahead While none of the challenges outlined in this paper are insurmountable, China’s concerns are real and firmly held, thus necessitating careful and culturally sensitive solutions. As such, this paper concludes with some modest recommendations. A first step—and emphasizing the use of the word “modest” above—is to manage expectations about what is feasible and realistic in the near and medium term with respect to arms control with China. Given Beijing’s lack of experience with formal nuclear arms control and both recent and long-standing concerns about US strategic capabilities and its true intentions with respect to arms control with China, efforts to find a neat, all-encompassing solution or framework are likely to fail. The United States must sufficiently address each of China’s concerns about arms control, and some may be able to be dealt with together or on parallel tracks whereas others might need to be handled sequentially. US - policymakers—and, equally important, the US arms control community—should therefore expect a long and complicated process to get China to the negotiating table, one that will almost certainly be filled with frustrations, false starts, limited successes, and even occasional setbacks. This should not be met with criticism, frustration, and calls for speedier progress. Rather, it should be viewed as an important and necessary strategic challenge that requires patience, persistence, and fortitude. Managing expectations about what is realistic in the near and medium term is especially important because it may be the case that formal nuclear arms control negotiations with China might only be possible once China has “risen,” rather than during its rise. The uncertainties and mistrust that are hampering efforts to bring China into formal nuclear arms control are driven in part by the fact that China is still in ascendance and the full strategic consequences and implications of its rise are as yet unclear. The history of China’s rise, and the history of the US reaction to it, are still being written. It is possible that some of Beijing’s trepidations about engaging in formal arms control—particularly the concern about Washington using arms control as a means to contain China’s rise and lock in a superior power position—are driven at least in part by China’s perception of itself as a weaker state that is still emerging as major power, one that has in the past been bullied and taken advantage of by larger powers. Consequently, Beijing might be willing to consider engaging in formal negotiations on limitations or cuts only after its military modernization is completed and its emergence as a great power is solidified. Equally important, despite the desire among some in the US arms control community for significant limitations or cuts in the next round of arms control, US national security interests—and the broader abolition agenda—are better served by modest cuts over a series of agreements spanning several years, perhaps even decades. Not only is an initial proposal for substantial cuts likely to fail, thereby saddling the arms control record with a failure and setting back the arms control and abolition agendas, but calls for dramatic cuts might also scare off Beijing from participating in the first place. As a newcomer to arms control, it is likely that China would prefer quite modest cuts in its first round to become acquainted with the process and subsequent verification measures, and to ensure that it can still maintain security and protect its interests at lower levels. The second recommendation is to refrain from forcing US strategic concepts and definitions on China. There seems to have been a view over the last few decades among some in the US nuclear community that the United States must “teach” China about nuclear strategy and arms control. This belief stems from the fact that some Chinese nuclear concepts have differed from those in the West. One example is the traditional Chinese word for deterrence, weishe, which has a more offensive connotation—more akin to the US concept of compellence —than in the West.[32] Another more recent example involves the concept of strategic stability. The 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review’s call for maintaining and enhancing strategic stability with China was met with some confusion in Chinese strategic circles, as some in China view the concept of strategic stability as a relationship between relatively equal nuclear powers (such as the United States and Russia) and therefore not immediately applicable to US-China nuclear relations.[33] Importantly, the Nuclear Posture Review did not define strategic stability, perhaps deliberately so in order to create an opportunity for Washington and Beijing to jointly agree on a definition. Whatever the reason, however, Chinese officials and nuclear experts responded to the review’s call for strategic stability with China not by calling for bilateral work but by calling for the United States to provide a definition.[34] While there are certainly some important differences in definitions and concepts in Washington’s and Beijing’s nuclear lexicons, these disparities should not be overstated. China’s behavior over its nearly five-decade-long history with nuclear weapons demonstrates that it understands and abides by the core logic of nuclear weapons as developed in the West, even if the concepts and terms are somewhat different. At the most fundamental level, China views nuclear weapons not as militarily useful tools for aggression and coercion but rather as a means of preventing the threat or use of nuclear weapons against it. China’s ongoing nuclear modernization programs (including the deployment of landbased mobile missiles and the introduction of a new class of ballistic missile submarines) are driven in part by the need to increase the survivability of its forces—the central tenet of Western deterrence theory. As such, the United States should avoid trying to force precise definitions or concepts on China. These efforts are not only unnecessary but, equally important, are counterproductive, as Beijing almost certainly would interpret these actions as condescending and emblematic of Washington’s desire to maintain dominance over China. The United States should instead seek, through both formal and informal channels, to better understand China’s strategic concepts and work to ensure that China’s policymakers and nuclear analysts understand US concepts and terms. This approach is already occurring through Track II channels and is exemplified by the development and publication of the English-Chinese, Chinese-English Nuclear Security Glossary. Precision and specificity are extremely important in dialogue and negotiations between nuclear-armed powers. But the point is that as long as each side understands exactly what the other means when it uses a term, it does not matter if both countries are using the same lingo. In fact, in US-China nuclear relations it may well be worth dispensing with traditional Western buzzwords such as strategic stability given the Cold War baggage they carry and instead focus only on the core issues encompassed by the concept, perhaps even under the banner of a new term jointly coined by Washington and Beijing.[35] In terms of practical steps to assuage Chinese concerns about participating in arms control, the United States should consider how to involve China in some practical aspects of existing arms control agreements. Given China’s lack of experience in this arena, appropriate first-hand exposure could help familiarize Beijing with what arms control looks like in practice and help minimize the inherent trepidations involved in getting involved in something of this magnitude for the first time. As just one example, the United States could consider allowing China to observe a practice inspection of Russia’s strategic forces allowed under New START.[36] Perhaps the most important issues that need to be resolved in order to pave the way for China’s participation have to do with BMD and CPGS. Short of halting these programs—which would be politically unpalatable in America and unwise strategically given the myriad of threats to US security interests and its extended deterrence commitments—the United States must find credible ways to assure China that these systems are not a threat. Such efforts could include visits to US and Chinese missile defense sites, invitations to observe missile defense tests, joint technical assessments of BMD and CPGS capabilities, and joint threat assessments and scenario exercises analyzing the range of contingencies in which these capabilities might be used. Of course, all of these initiatives involve two critical elements of mutual trust: first, belief that these confidence-building efforts won’t be used solely as intelligence-gathering efforts designed to collect information that can then be used to counter the other side’s capabilities; and, second, faith that what each side is showing and communicating to the other about its capabilities and strategic thinking with regard to these weapons is, in fact, accurate. Finally, beyond alleviating concerns about US capabilities and intentions, the United States can also encourage China’s participation in formal nuclear arms control and the abolition agenda by adopting a no-first-use nuclear policy. China has repeatedly called for the United States and the other declared nuclear-weapon states under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to adopt NFU, going so far as to introduce in January 1994 a draft “Treaty on Mutual No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons” and to propose that the nuclear-weapon states begin the first round of negotiations on the treaty in Beijing. Russia, however, was the only state that took interest in the proposal. In September 1994, China and Russia issued a joint statement committing to a mutual no-first-use policy and the de-targeting of nuclear weapons against each other.[37] With renewed global interest in nuclear abolition, China has stated that it believes a critical first step in realizing the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world is for the other nuclear powers to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategies by foreswearing the option to use nuclear weapons first in conflict.[38] NFU, Chinese nuclear scholars argue, would enable further reductions because a nuclear posture designed for NFU can be much smaller than a posture that leaves open the option of first use.[39] For the United States, adopting NFU would not only meet one of China’s concrete recommendations for creating the conditions for a nuclear-free world and potentially pave the way for Chinese participation in arms control, but it could also enhance national security by reducing fears of a US first strike in a crisis or conflict.[40] Adopting NFU would not be easy, as Washington would have to credibly convince its allies that it can still meet its extended deterrence commitments and would have to work to mitigate domestic political fallout. But, if reducing nuclear dangers and laying the groundwork for nuclear abolition are to remain important long-term US policy objectives, adopting NFU could be a meaningful step forward.
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<h4>Believable NFU solves---prevents posture changes AND enables <u>arms control dialogues. </u> </h4><p>Michael S. <strong>Gerson 15</strong>. Gerson is an independent consultant in Atlanta, Georgia. He was previously a division lead, project director, and senior analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, where his research focused on nuclear and conventional deterrence, nuclear strategy, and arms control. 08/01/2015. “Getting to the Table: Prospects and Challenges for Arms Control with China.” The War That Must Never Be Fought: Dilemmas of Nuclear Deterrence, Hoover Press.</p><p>The climate change agreement is important not only because it addresses a pertinent global issue between two of the world’s largest polluters, but also because it presents a new opportunity for the kind of cooperation upon which sustained mutual trust, respect, and stability are built. But while the climate change announcement is a useful development in the continued effort to foster positive and productive US-China relations, <u>significant</u> <u><strong><mark>uncertainties</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>mistrust</u></strong> <u>persist</mark> between Washington and Beijing—and perhaps nowhere is this greater than <mark>in</mark> the realm of</u> <u><strong><mark>military forces and capabilities</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>China</mark>’s</u> impressive economic growth has <u>brought</u> with it <u>an</u> <u><strong>expansive program</u></strong> <u>to</u> <u><strong>modernize</u></strong> its conventional and <u><strong>nuclear forces</u></strong> <u>(as well as its space and cyber capabilities) and develop <mark>new</u></mark> anti-access/area denial (<u><strong>A2/AD</u></strong>) <u><mark>systems</mark> that threaten the United States’ unfettered power projection in the region. These initiatives, in turn, <mark>have raised concerns</mark> in</u> <u><strong>Washington</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>allied capitals</u></strong> <u>about Beijing’s true intentions in the region and around the world</u>.[3] <u>At the same time,</u> <u>emerging</u> <u><strong>US</u></strong> <u>capabilities</u> such as ballistic missile defense and conventional prompt global strike, <u>along with the</u> US <u><strong>“pivot” to Asia</u></strong> and the strengthening of alliance relationships in the region, <u>have generated trepidations in Beijing about Washington’s objectives and intentions</u> with respect to China’s rise and its position in the Asia-Pacific region.[4] <u>The changing security environment in the Asia-Pacific region driven by the rise of China, and <mark>the US reaction</mark> to it, <mark>has <strong>important implications</u></strong></mark> for the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world. With China’s ascent to great power status and its significant expenditures associated with the expansion and modernization of its military capabilities, continued progress toward a nuclear weapons-free world requires bringing China into the process. Yet, <u>continued</u> <u><strong>mistrust</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>mutual uncertainty</u></strong> <u>regarding each other’s military capabilities and strategic intentions present a <strong>formidable challenge</u></strong> <u>to</u> <u><strong>deep</u></strong>, <u><strong>meaningful engagement</u></strong> <u>on nuclear issues</u>. Washington and Beijing may be able to agree to cut their carbon emissions, but agreeing to cut or limit their nuclear arsenals is an entirely different matter. Absent a fundamental shift in international relations or a catastrophic event, such as the use of nuclear weapons in war, it is likely that the process leading to a nuclear weapons-free world will occur slowly and incrementally through a series of carefully crafted, verifiable arms control agreements. Such a process represents an important shift in the logic and objectives of arms control from the Cold War, where strategic stability—not abolition—was the central objective.[5] While strategic stability remains an important goal of arms control, modern proponents of nuclear abolition view arms control as a means through which to achieve eventual abolition, with strategic stability being an important and necessary interim product along the path to nuclear zero. If arms control is to be the means through which verifiable and permanent abolition will be achieved, then analyzing China’s commitment to nuclear zero requires first understanding China’s perspectives on nuclear arms control. This paper will identify and analyze how Chinese officials and scholars view arms control, and assess how these views might affect China’s willingness to engage in formal nuclear arms control and make serious moves toward nuclear zero. Any assessment of China’s historical and current view of arms control is necessarily speculative given the opaque nature of China’s government, especially concerning issues associated with nuclear weapons. There have been, of course, a handful of official public pronouncements and documents over the years discussing the Chinese leadership’s views on arms control. But, given China’s absence from previous rounds of formal negotiations to limit or reduce nuclear weapons, there is relatively little to provide precedent or serve as a guidepost. Consequently, this paper seeks to get at the question of how China thinks about nuclear arms control—and thus if and how China will make real strides toward nuclear abolition—by examining the debates about arms control among Chinese scholars and defense analysts in the belief that at least some of the key themes that emerge from this literature reflect the debates and concerns about arms control among China’s key decision-makers. China and Nuclear Arms Control: The Early Years At first glance, China would appear to be a “natural” for nuclear arms control. Immediately following its first nuclear test on October 16, 1964, China declared a no-first-use (NFU) policy and encouraged the other nuclear-armed states (the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France) to work toward the elimination of nuclear arms. Beijing’s declaratory policy on arms control and abolition has remained essentially unchanged since that time. China welcomed Obama’s April 2009 speech in Prague embracing the vision of a nuclear weapons-free world, proclaiming in August 2009 that it was ready to “make unremitting efforts to further promote the nuclear disarmament process and realize the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world at an early date.” The following month, President Hu Jintao told the UN General Assembly that China “has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons” and called on the international community “to take credible steps to push forward the nuclear disarmament process.”[6] Yet, despite its consistent rhetoric in favor of arms control and abolition, China has been reluctant to get down to the actual business of limitations and/or reductions in nuclear arms. To be sure, China has not eschewed any kind of restraint with regard to nuclear weapons. Despite the contention of a February 2012 editorial in the Washington Times that China “has never agreed to be part of any strategic nuclear framework,” China is, in fact, a signatory to several international agreements and is involved in multilateral fora associated with nuclear weapons.[7] China joined the Conference on Disarmament in 1980; joined the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1984; announced in 1986 that it would suspend atmospheric nuclear tests (although it has not signed the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty); signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992 and supported its indefinite extension in 1995; signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996 (though it has not yet ratified it); joined the Zangger Committee in 1997; and joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2004. Moreover, China acceded to both the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions and has been an active participant in multilateral discussion on a Treaty on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Nevertheless, China has been ambivalent and noncommittal at best—and outright belligerent at worst—when it comes to formal nuclear arms control with the United States or any other nuclear power. As early as the 1970s, Beijing called the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) between the United States and the Soviet Union “sham disarmament” and accused the superpowers of using arms control as a smokescreen for the continuation of the nuclear arms race.[8] At least part of this hostility toward early US-Soviet arms control was likely driven in part by Beijing’s fear of some kind of collaboration or alliance between Washington and Moscow against China. By the time of SALT I the alliance between Moscow and Beijing was completely broken, and the two countries had participated in a series of conflicts along their border on the Ussuri River that included veiled Soviet threats of an attack on China’s nuclear facilities.[9] US-China relations, while moving in a positive direction, were not yet solidified, and thus some in Beijing’s senior leadership almost certainly remained concerned about a threat from the United States. As such, the leadership in Beijing was more inclined to view SALT I as a strategic ploy rather than a genuine attempt to curb the arms race and reduce the danger of nuclear war. Another factor likely contributing to Beijing’s hostility toward nuclear arms control in the decade following its entrance into the nuclear club had to do with China’s domestic situation. The years immediately following China’s first test were chaotic. The Cultural Revolution that began in 1966 swept over the country, diverting manpower, money, and other resources away from the military and limiting attention and study to military matters, especially new and arcane topics like nuclear strategy and arms control. China did not establish an office or group within its military or political structures tasked with focusing on nuclear issues in the years immediately preceding its nuclear test. Rather, nuclear issues were treated with extreme secrecy and limited to a small group of the most senior military and political officials, thereby limiting opportunities for dialogue and debate. Consequently, while there was obviously sufficient technical expertise on nuclear weapons in China, in the 1960s and 1970s few had any real expertise on—and certainly no one had any experience with—nuclear arms control.[10] Over the next few decades, China appears to have gone through a learning period with respect to nuclear strategy and arms control.[11] Beginning in 1978 the Second Artillery, the military component of the People’s Liberation Army responsible for nuclear weapons, opened a research office, and through the 1980s the Second Artillery studied nuclear strategy and published operational documents. In addition, beginning in the 1980s a small community of arms control specialists emerged within Chinese think tanks and government-funded research institutes. Emblematic of the broader political reforms taking place in China, these experts had more leeway for open discussion and began publishing papers and attending international conferences on nuclear issues and arms control. The result was a more robust and sophisticated debate among Chinese nuclear specialists and, equally (if not more) important, the opportunity for dialogue with foreign arms control experts. As the importance of these topics grew, Beijing funded more research to build a cadre of arms control and nuclear strategy specialists. In 1988, for example, the Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics, a research component of the nuclear labs, created a program to train younger scientists about arms control. By 1997, China had created a specific department in its Foreign Ministry dedicated to arms control and disarmament.[12] China’s Changing Criteria and Evolving Concerns As China devoted more attention and study to nuclear issues, the leadership in Beijing softened its tone on arms control. By the late 1980s, China moved from skepticism and even antagonism toward arms control to indications of a willingness to participate in the process at some point in the future. In doing so, however, China placed some specific requirements that had to be met by the superpowers in order for it to consider engaging in arms control. And yet, as the United States came closer to meeting these stipulations, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Beijing has proceeded to modify these requirements to push the timeline for its participation further into the future. For example, in 1982 the Chinese leadership indicated that it would participate in arms control when the United States and the Soviet Union had cut their nuclear arsenals by 50 percent and ceased testing, manufacturing, and deploying their nuclear weapons. Then, in 1988, China modified its position and instead argued there must be “drastic reductions” in US and Soviet nuclear arsenals before it would join. This shift from a numerical requirement—a 50 percent reduction— to a vaguer and more subjective standard served to put Beijing in firm control of when it would participate, since China could easily argue that reductions were not “drastic” enough in its view rather than risk being held to the numerical standard that it had previously set for itself. Following the end of the Cold War, China’s leadership continued to modify the conditions necessary for its involvement in formal nuclear arms control. In 1995 Beijing said that it would not participate until the United States and Russia reduced their nuclear arsenals well below START II levels, gave up tactical nuclear weapons, halted ballistic missile defenses, and committed to no-first-use nuclear policies. In one of the highest-level declarations about China’s views on arms control, Chinese President Jiang Zemin argued at a meeting of the Conference on Disarmament in March 1999 that the United States and Russia must “substantially” reduce their nuclear forces in order for China to participate in a “multilateral nuclear disarmament process.”[13] As recently as 2010, China declared in its defense white paper, “When conditions are appropriate, other nuclear-weapon states should also join in multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament.”[14] Consistent with earlier claims, China did not define what would be required for the strategic situation to be “appropriate.” And, interestingly, China said only that “other nuclear-weapon states” should join in negotiations at an appropriate time, thus leaving it unclear as to whether China was even referring to itself as opposed to Britain and France. Consequently, while the rhetorical shift in China’s position on arms control is certainly a welcome development, actual movement toward China’s participation in a bilateral or multilateral process has been almost nonexistent. In examining recent official statements by Chinese leaders as well as the positions and debates among Chinese scholars, several key themes emerge that underpin China’s continued reticence to engage in formal nuclear arms control. Understanding these issues and concerns—and developing solutions to assuage them—is essential for bringing China into the process and, ultimately, for achieving a nuclear weapons-free world. In terms of declaratory policy, the Chinese leadership continues to argue that the countries with the largest nuclear arsenals, the United States and Russia, shoulder a “special and primary responsibility” for leading the charge for further arms control and eventual global abolition.[15] Whereas in many international arenas Beijing has seemingly been eager to play a leading role, when it comes to nuclear arms control China continues to be quite comfortable on the sidelines. Washington and Moscow, according to this view, must lead by example. Beyond this consistent policy position lie several deeper, more challenging issues that continue to complicate US efforts to bring China into an arms control process. The first is the lurking suspicion among some in China’s strategic community that the US effort to engage China in arms control is really a trick—a Trojan Horse of sorts—intended to lock in the United States’ superior power position over China. According to this view, the US interest in arms control with China is driven less by a desire to reduce nuclear danger and enhance stability and more by the realities of China’s rise and subsequent shift in the global balance of power. The United States, the argument goes, wants to engage in arms control negotiations in order to constrain China’s nuclear modernization and buildup and maintain its dominant position in the international order.[16] This skepticism about Washington’s true motives applies not only to arms control but also to the entire abolition agenda. Some in China contend that the objective driving the US-led push for global nuclear abolition is Washington’s desire for “absolute advantage” and “absolute security.”[17] If nuclear weapons serve not only to prevent nuclear coercion and deter nuclear attacks—the two stated purposes of China’s nuclear weapons—but also to deter conventional attacks by a superior opponent, then nuclear abolition would essentially give the United States a free hand to project power and attack any country it wished with its superior conventional forces. As one scholar argued, “The existence of nuclear weapons on the contrary weakens the conventional weapons advantages of the United States military. . . . Yet promoting global denuclearization is conducive to the maintenance of US conventional military resources to maximize the benefits of US national security.”[18] The second challenge relates to China’s views on transparency. According to classic nuclear theory developed during the Cold War, transparency is a core component of strategic stability and arms control. In terms of stability, the ability of nuclear-armed opponents (or, at least, countries not firmly allied with each other and with which there is some potential for conflict) to have insight into each other’s nuclear capabilities and force structure helps tamp down arms races, assuages the need to base force planning solely on “worst case” assumptions about the other’s forces, and helps alleviate concerns about a disarming first strike. Under this logic, transparency leads to predictability which, in turn, leads to stability. For arms control, transparency serves as a basic starting point for negotiations, since states cannot begin to find mutually agreeable limits unless they know what the other side possesses. Upon the completion and signing of an arms control accord, transparency serves as a central pillar of a verification regime to ensure that the parties are in compliance with their obligations. China, however, has a different perspective on transparency. Given its relatively small nuclear arsenal, China relies on secrecy and opacity as core components of its strategic deterrent.[19] Given the limited size of its nuclear arsenal, China believes that a lack of transparency contributes to deterrence by enhancing the survivability of its nuclear arsenal; after all, if an enemy doesn’t know where its nuclear weapons are or how many it has, they can’t accurately and reliably be targeted for destruction. Whereas Western nuclear theory posits that transparency underpins stability, China’s nuclear theory holds that a lack of transparency creates uncertainty which, in turn, encourages caution and restraint. For the United States, deterrence has rested on convincing an opponent of the certainty of unacceptable retaliation in response to a nuclear attack; for China, deterrence has traditionally rested on creating uncertainty in an opponent’s strategic calculations about its ability to successfully eliminate China’s minimal nuclear arsenal in a first strike.[20] Given the long-standing centrality of opacity in China’s strategic thinking, efforts to convince the leadership in Beijing to be more forthcoming about its strategic capabilities have been met with fierce resistance. Moreover, consistent with the view that the United States’ real interest in arms control and abolition is to restrain China and maintain a dominant power position, some in China contend that US efforts to convince Beijing to be more transparent about its nuclear capabilities are really designed to collect valuable targeting intelligence for US strategic war plans.[21] Consequently, on the issue of transparency the United States and China find themselves holding diametrically opposed positions. Whereas the United States views transparency as a necessary first step for arms control and strategic stability, China believes that transparency is the product or outcome of better overall strategic relations. In China’s view, Washington and Beijing must first establish “strategic trust” before there can be transparency and stability; in the United States’ view, transparency is one of the important mechanisms for creating strategic trust.[22] The Emergence of Non-Nuclear Concerns In addition to the concerns outlined above, two additional issues have proved to be major stumbling blocks in US and international efforts to bring China into the nuclear arms control process: US ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities and US plans to develop and deploy strategic conventional weapons such as conventional prompt global strike (CPGS). That these two capabilities are central irritants in US-China (as well as US-Russia) nuclear relations exemplifies the increasingly important—and potentially dangerous—interplay between nuclear and conventional forces in the modern era. BMD and CPGS are, of course, non-nuclear systems. But because of what Beijing—and Moscow —believe they are potentially capable of doing, they pose threats to the stability of the nuclear balance and risk causing an escalatory spiral in a conflict. Indeed, Beijing’s concerns about BMD and CPGS highlight a central tension in current US nuclear policy: in seeking to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy, the United States has subsequently elevated the role and importance of conventional systems like BMD and CPGS. Yet, BMD and CPGS are precisely the US capabilities that China is so deeply concerned about, and this concern helps drive Beijing’s resistance to greater transparency and encourages China’s leaders to increase the size and sophistication of their nuclear and conventional forces in order to offset these systems.[23] Paradoxically, then, the means by which the United States has sought to diminish the role of nuclear weapons to pave the way for further arms control and eventual abolition is one of the things that is making those objectives so difficult. While China’s initial response to the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was muted, its opposition has steadily grown over the past decade as US BMD plans and capabilities have evolved.[24] And despite repeated assurances that BMD is not designed for—and is, in fact, incapable of —defending against large-scale, sophisticated attacks like the kind that China could mount, many in Beijing remain unconvinced.[25] China contends that US BMD systems could undermine its strategic deterrent by potentially shielding the United States from retaliation in kind after a US first strike had eliminated the majority of China’s nuclear forces. The United States, Chinese policymakers argue, might be more willing to use nuclear weapons if it did not fear unacceptable retaliation. BMD not only might make US leaders more likely to use nuclear weapons against China, but it also might provide Washington with an incentive to engage in nuclear coercion or take greater risks in a crisis or conflict with China in the belief that its BMD capabilities effectively neutralize China’s deterrent.[26] With an effective (or at least a perceived effective) BMD system, deterrence in US-China relations would become decidedly one-sided. Whereas China worries that BMD threatens to destroy its missiles in flight, CPGS threatens to destroy its missiles before they are even launched. CPGS is intended to provide US decision-makers with a prompt, nonnuclear capability to strike targets anywhere in the world within a short time.[27] While US officials have posited a number of potential missions for CPGS—including striking highvalue terrorist targets, countering anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) attacks, and countering anti-access/area denial strikes—the nuclear-related missions have focused exclusively on North Korea and Iran.[28] But despite the US focus on so-called rogue states in discussing potential nuclear scenarios for CPGS, China views this capability as posing an equally dangerous threat to its nuclear deterrent. If CPGS can target North Korean or future Iranian nuclear forces, Beijing reasons, it can also target China’s nuclear arsenal. China worries that CPGS could give the United States a non-nuclear counterforce capability against China’s nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. In this situation, the United States could theoretically launch a disarming first strike without having to first cross the nuclear threshold.[29] This non-nuclear counterforce capability, whether real or merely perceived by Beijing, risks encouraging China to operate its forces in ways that could increase the chances of accidents, miscalculations, or nuclear escalation in a crisis or war.[30] While many in China believe that BMD and CPGS separately pose threats to its strategic deterrent, Chinese policymakers and defense analysts are even more concerned about them being used together. With effective conventional strike capabilities and missile defense, China worries that the United States could launch a non-nuclear counterforce first strike and then use its BMD to destroy any remaining nuclear-armed missiles launched in retaliation. In this scenario the United States would, in effect, engage in nuclear war without having to fire a nuclear shot.[31] Organizational and Bureaucratic Challenges The preceding discussion demonstrates that there are some important challenges and obstacles to convincing China to participate in meaningful nuclear arms control that might pave the way for eventual global abolition. And, if the challenges outlined above were not enough, it is likely that China must also contend with some organizational and bureaucratic hurdles that likely affect its willingness and ability to participate in arms control. As noted earlier, China was slow to develop formal governmental offices and expertise in nuclear weapons and deterrence, and its development of expertise specifically in arms control is likely to have been even slower. If US-Soviet/Russian arms control is any guide, the actual mechanics of arms control are complicated and esoteric, involving painstaking detail in definitions, counting roles, and verification procedures, to name only a few. Without direct experience in the business of negotiating and implementing a nuclear arms control agreement, some elements of China’s governmental apparatus may be reticent—and possibly even obstructionist—in participating in arms control even when the strategic situation is deemed “appropriate” by Chinese standards, whatever they may be. To be sure, China has been steadily developing academic expertise in nuclear weapons and arms control for several decades, and Chinese experts have participated in numerous unofficial Track II strategic dialogues, nuclear policy conferences, and technical meetings. In 2008 the U.S. National Academy of Sciences published the English-Chinese, Chinese-English Nuclear Security Glossary, a joint project by US and Chinese experts to create agreed-upon definitions of key nuclear terms. The issue, however, is whether this academic expertise, and some of the experts themselves, can filter up to China’s key decision-making circles and turn China’s learning in arms control theory into practice. The Way Ahead While none of the challenges outlined in this paper are insurmountable, China’s concerns are real and firmly held, thus necessitating careful and culturally sensitive solutions. As such, this paper concludes with some modest recommendations. A first step—and emphasizing the use of the word “modest” above—is to manage expectations about what is feasible and realistic in the near and medium term with respect to arms control with China. Given Beijing’s lack of experience with formal nuclear arms control and both recent and long-standing concerns about US strategic capabilities and its true intentions with respect to arms control with China, efforts to find a neat, all-encompassing solution or framework are likely to fail. The United States must sufficiently address each of China’s concerns about arms control, and some may be able to be dealt with together or on parallel tracks whereas others might need to be handled sequentially. US - policymakers—and, equally important, the US arms control community—should therefore expect a long and complicated process to get China to the negotiating table, one that will almost certainly be filled with frustrations, false starts, limited successes, and even occasional setbacks. This should not be met with criticism, frustration, and calls for speedier progress. Rather, it should be viewed as an important and necessary strategic challenge that requires patience, persistence, and fortitude. Managing expectations about what is realistic in the near and medium term is especially important because it may be the case that formal nuclear arms control negotiations with China might only be possible once China has “risen,” rather than during its rise. The uncertainties and mistrust that are hampering efforts to bring China into formal nuclear arms control are driven in part by the fact that China is still in ascendance and the full strategic consequences and implications of its rise are as yet unclear. The history of China’s rise, and the history of the US reaction to it, are still being written. It is possible that some of Beijing’s trepidations about engaging in formal arms control—particularly the concern about Washington using arms control as a means to contain China’s rise and lock in a superior power position—are driven at least in part by China’s perception of itself as a weaker state that is still emerging as major power, one that has in the past been bullied and taken advantage of by larger powers. Consequently, Beijing might be willing to consider engaging in formal negotiations on limitations or cuts only after its military modernization is completed and its emergence as a great power is solidified. Equally important, despite the desire among some in the US arms control community for significant limitations or cuts in the next round of arms control, US national security interests—and the broader abolition agenda—are better served by modest cuts over a series of agreements spanning several years, perhaps even decades. Not only is an initial proposal for substantial cuts likely to fail, thereby saddling the arms control record with a failure and setting back the arms control and abolition agendas, but calls for dramatic cuts might also scare off Beijing from participating in the first place. As a newcomer to arms control, it is likely that China would prefer quite modest cuts in its first round to become acquainted with the process and subsequent verification measures, and to ensure that it can still maintain security and protect its interests at lower levels. The second recommendation is to refrain from forcing US strategic concepts and definitions on China. There seems to have been a view over the last few decades among some in the US nuclear community that the United States must “teach” China about nuclear strategy and arms control. This belief stems from the fact that some Chinese nuclear concepts have differed from those in the West. One example is the traditional Chinese word for deterrence, weishe, which has a more offensive connotation—more akin to the US concept of compellence —than in the West.[32] Another more recent example involves the concept of strategic stability. The 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review’s call for maintaining and enhancing strategic stability with China was met with some confusion in Chinese strategic circles, as some in China view the concept of strategic stability as a relationship between relatively equal nuclear powers (such as the United States and Russia) and therefore not immediately applicable to US-China nuclear relations.[33] Importantly, the Nuclear Posture Review did not define strategic stability, perhaps deliberately so in order to create an opportunity for Washington and Beijing to jointly agree on a definition. Whatever the reason, however, Chinese officials and nuclear experts responded to the review’s call for strategic stability with China not by calling for bilateral work but by calling for the United States to provide a definition.[34] <u>While there are certainly <strong>some</u></strong> important <u>differences in definitions and concepts in Washington’s and Beijing’s nuclear lexicons, these disparities <strong>should not be overstated</strong>. <mark>China’s</u> <u><strong>behavior</u></strong></mark> over its nearly five-decade-long history with nuclear weapons <u>demonstrates that it understands and <mark>abides by the <strong>core logic</u></strong> <u>of <strong>nuc</strong></mark>lear weapon<strong><mark>s</strong></mark> as <mark>developed in the West</mark>, even if the concepts and terms are somewhat different. <mark>At the <strong>most fundamental</mark> level</strong>, <mark>China views <strong>nuc</strong></mark>lear weapon<strong><mark>s</strong></mark> <strong>not</strong> as</u> <u><strong>militarily useful tools</u></strong> <u>for</u> <u><strong>aggression</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>coercion</u></strong> <u>but rather <mark>as a means of</u> <u><strong>preventing</mark> the threat or <mark>use</mark> of nuclear weapons <mark>against it</u></strong></mark>. China’s ongoing nuclear modernization programs (including the deployment of landbased mobile missiles and the introduction of a new class of ballistic missile submarines) are driven in part by the need to increase the survivability of its forces—the central tenet of Western deterrence theory. As such, the United States should avoid trying to force precise definitions or concepts on China. These efforts are not only unnecessary but, equally important, are counterproductive, as Beijing almost certainly would interpret these actions as condescending and emblematic of Washington’s desire to maintain dominance over China. The United States should instead seek, through both formal and informal channels, to better understand China’s strategic concepts and work to ensure that China’s policymakers and nuclear analysts understand US concepts and terms. This approach is already occurring through Track II channels and is exemplified by the development and publication of the English-Chinese, Chinese-English Nuclear Security Glossary. Precision and specificity are extremely important in dialogue and negotiations between nuclear-armed powers. But the point is that as long as each side understands exactly what the other means when it uses a term, it does not matter if both countries are using the same lingo. In fact, in US-China nuclear relations it may well be worth dispensing with traditional Western buzzwords such as strategic stability given the Cold War baggage they carry and instead focus only on the core issues encompassed by the concept, perhaps even under the banner of a new term jointly coined by Washington and Beijing.[35] In terms of practical steps to assuage Chinese concerns about participating in arms control, the United States should consider how to involve China in some practical aspects of existing arms control agreements. Given China’s lack of experience in this arena, appropriate first-hand exposure could help familiarize Beijing with what arms control looks like in practice and help minimize the inherent trepidations involved in getting involved in something of this magnitude for the first time. As just one example, the United States could consider allowing China to observe a practice inspection of Russia’s strategic forces allowed under New START.[36] Perhaps the most important issues that need to be resolved in order to pave the way for China’s participation have to do with BMD and CPGS. <u>Short of</u> <u><strong>halting</u></strong> these <u>programs</u>—which would be politically unpalatable <u>in</u> <u><strong>America</u></strong> and unwise strategically given the myriad of threats to US security interests and its extended deterrence commitments<u>—<mark>the</u> <u><strong>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><mark>must</mark> find</u> <u><strong>credible ways</u></strong> <u>to</u> <u><strong><mark>assure China</u></strong> <u>that these systems are <strong>not a threat</u></strong></mark>. Such efforts could include visits to US and Chinese missile defense sites, invitations to observe missile defense tests, joint technical assessments of BMD and CPGS capabilities, and joint threat assessments and scenario exercises analyzing the range of contingencies in which these capabilities might be used. Of course, all of these initiatives involve two critical elements of mutual trust: first, belief that these confidence-building efforts won’t be used solely as intelligence-gathering efforts designed to collect information that can then be used to counter the other side’s capabilities; and, second, faith that what each side is showing and communicating to the other about its capabilities and strategic thinking with regard to these weapons is, in fact, accurate. Finally, beyond alleviating concerns about US capabilities and intentions, the United States <u>can also encourage China’s participation in formal nuclear arms control and the abolition agenda <mark>by adopting</mark> a</u> <u><strong><mark>n</mark>o-<mark>f</mark>irst-<mark>u</mark>se nuclear policy</u></strong>. China has <u><strong>repeatedly called</u></strong> <u>for the</u> <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u>and the other declared</u> <u>nuclear-weapon states under the</u> <u><strong>N</u></strong>on-<u><strong>P</u></strong>roliferation <u><strong>T</u></strong>reaty <u>to adopt NFU, going so far as to introduce in January 1994 a draft “Treaty on Mutual No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons” and to propose that the nuclear-weapon states begin the first round of negotiations</u> on the treaty in Beijing. Russia, however, was the only state that took interest in the proposal. In September 1994, China and Russia issued a joint statement committing to a mutual no-first-use policy and the de-targeting of nuclear weapons against each other.[37] <u>With renewed global interest in nuclear abolition, <mark>China</mark> has <strong><mark>stated</strong></mark> that <strong><mark>it believes</strong> a <strong>critical first step</u></strong></mark> <u>in realizing the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world <mark>is</mark> for the</u> <u><strong>other nuclear powers</u></strong> <u><mark>to</u> <u><strong>reduce the role of nuc</strong></mark>lear weapon<strong><mark>s in</mark> their national <mark>security strategies</u></strong> <u>by</u> <u><strong>foreswearing the option</u></strong> <u>to use</mark> nuclear weapons <mark>first</mark> in conflict</u>.[38] <u><mark>NFU</mark>, Chinese nuclear scholars argue, <mark>would <strong>enable further reductions</u></strong> <u>because a</mark> nuclear <mark>posture</mark> designed <mark>for NFU can be</mark> much <strong><mark>smaller</u></strong></mark> <u>than a posture that leaves open the <strong>option</strong> of first use</u>.[39] <u>For <mark>the <strong>U</strong></mark>nited <strong><mark>S</strong></mark>tates, <mark>adopting NFU would not only</u> <u><strong>meet</mark> one of <mark>China’s concrete recommendations</u></strong></mark> <u>for creating the conditions for a nuclear-free world <mark>and</mark> potentially <strong><mark>pave the way</u></strong> <u>for</mark> Chinese participation in <mark>arms control, but</mark> it could <mark>also <strong>enhance national security</u></strong> <u>by reducing</u> <u><strong>fears</u></strong> <u>of a US first strike</mark> in a</u> <u><strong>crisis</u></strong> <u>or</u> <u><strong>conflict</u></strong>.[40] Adopting NFU would not be easy, as Washington would have to credibly convince its allies that it can still meet its extended deterrence commitments and would have to work to mitigate domestic political fallout. But, <u>if reducing nuclear dangers and laying the groundwork for nuclear abolition are to remain important long-term US policy objectives, adopting NFU could be a</u> <u><strong>meaningful step forward</u></strong>.</p>
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Indiana
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4
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Michigan PS
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Cameron Dehmlow Dunne
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1AC
- Russia Joint Radar
1NC
- Unilat CP
- Advantage CP
- Russia Status DA
- Russia Sanctions DA
- EIA CP
- T-With
2NC
- T-With
- Advantage CP
- EIA CP
1NR
- Russia Status DA
2NR
- EIA CP
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Advances in genetic engineering make bioterror an existential threat that outweighs all impacts. Farmer 17
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Ben Farmer, Defence Correspondent, In Munich, 2/18/17, "Bioterrorism could kill more people than nuclear war, Bill Gates to warn world leaders," Telegraph, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/17/biological-terrorism-could-kill-people-nuclear-attacks-bill/ SP
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Ben Farmer, Defence Correspondent, In Munich, 2/18/17, "Bioterrorism could kill more people than nuclear war, Bill Gates to warn world leaders," Telegraph, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/17/biological-terrorism-could-kill-people-nuclear-attacks-bill/ SP
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Bioterrorists could one day kill hundreds of millions of people in an attack more deadly than nuclear war, Rapid advances in genetic engineering have opened the door for small terrorism groups to tailor biological viruses A resulting disease pandemic is currently one of the most deadly threats faced by the world, governments are concerned with the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons, they are overlooking the threat of biological warfare. Natural epidemics can be extremely large. Intentionally caused epidemics, bioterrorism, would be the largest of all. With nuclear weapons you would probably stop after killing 100million. Smallpox won’t stop Because the population is naïve, and there are no real preparations Biological warfare ambitions once limited to a handful of nation states are now open to small groups with limited resources and skills They make it much easier for a non-state perso The increasingly common use of gene editing technology would make it difficult to spot any potential terrorist conspiracy Technologies which have made it easy to read DNA sequences and tinker with them to rewrite or tweak genes have many legitimate uses. the potential death toll from a disease outbreak could be higher than other threats such as climate change or nuclear war. By tailoring the genes of a virus, it would be possible to manipulate its ability to spread and its ability to harm people It would be relatively easy to engineer a new flu strain combining qualities from varieties that spread like wildfire with varieties that were deadly. the 1918 Spanish Influenza kill more than 50 million people the number of people that look at bio-defence is worth increasing.” Whether naturally occurring, or deliberately started, it is almost certain that a highly lethal global pandemic will occur within our lifetimes,
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Bioterrorists could kill hundreds of millions genetic engineering have opened the door for bio viruses Intentionally caused epidemics would be the largest of all. “ Smallpox won’t stop. there are no real preparations Biological warfare are open to small groups with limited resources and skills the potential death toll could be higher than other threats such as climate change or nuclear war
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Bioterrorists could one day kill hundreds of millions of people in an attack more deadly than nuclear war, Bill Gates will warn world leaders. Rapid advances in genetic engineering have opened the door for small terrorism groups to tailor and easily turn biological viruses into weapons. A resulting disease pandemic is currently one of the most deadly threats faced by the world, he believes, yet governments are complacent about the scale of the risk. Speaking ahead of an address to the Munich Security Conference, the richest man in the world said that while governments are concerned with the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons, they are overlooking the threat of biological warfare. Because the population is naïve, there are no real preparations Bill Gates Mr Gates, whose charitable foundation is funding research into quickly spotting outbreaks and speeding up vaccine production, said the defence and security establishment “have not been following biology and I’m here to bring them a little bit of bad news”. Mr Gates will today (Saturday) tell an audience of international leaders and senior officers that the world’s next deadly pandemic “could originate on the computer screen of a terrorist”. He told the Telegraph: “Natural epidemics can be extremely large. Intentionally caused epidemics, bioterrorism, would be the largest of all. “With nuclear weapons, you’d think you would probably stop after killing 100million. Smallpox won’t stop. Because the population is naïve, and there are no real preparations. That, if it got out and spread, would be a larger number.” He said developments in genetic engineering were proceeding at a “mind-blowing rate”. Biological warfare ambitions once limited to a handful of nation states are now open to small groups with limited resources and skills. He said: “They make it much easier for a non-state person. It doesn’t take much biology expertise nowadays to assemble a smallpox virus. Biology is making it way easier to create these things.” The increasingly common use of gene editing technology would make it difficult to spot any potential terrorist conspiracy. Technologies which have made it easy to read DNA sequences and tinker with them to rewrite or tweak genes have many legitimate uses. He said: “It’s not like when someone says, ‘Hey I’d like some Plutonium’ and you start saying ‘Hmmm.. I wonder why he wants Plutonium?’” Mr Gates said the potential death toll from a disease outbreak could be higher than other threats such as climate change or nuclear war. He said: “This is like earthquakes, you should think in order of magnitudes. If you can kill 10 people that’s a one, 100 people that’s a two... Bioterrorism is the thing that can give you not just sixes, but sevens, eights and nines. “With nuclear war, once you have got a six, or a seven, or eight, you’d think it would probably stop. [With bioterrorism] it’s just unbounded if you are not there to stop the spread of it.” By tailoring the genes of a virus, it would be possible to manipulate its ability to spread and its ability to harm people. Mr Gates said one of the most potentially deadly outbreaks could involve the humble flu virus. It would be relatively easy to engineer a new flu strain combining qualities from varieties that spread like wildfire with varieties that were deadly. The last time that happened naturally was the 1918 Spanish Influenza pandemic, which went on to kill more than 50 million people – or nearly three times the death toll from the First World War. By comparison, the recent Ebola outbreak in West Africa which killed just over 11,000 was “a Richter Scale three, it’s a nothing,” he said. But despite the potential, the founder of Microsoft said that world leaders and their militaries could not see beyond the more recognised risks. He said: “Should the world be serious about this? It is somewhat serious about normal classic warfare and nuclear warfare, but today it is not very serious about bio-defence or natural epidemics.” He went on: “They do tend to say ‘How easy is it to get fissile material and how accurate are the plans out on the internet for dirty bombs, plutonium bombs and hydrogen bombs?’ “They have some people that do that. What I am suggesting is that the number of people that look at bio-defence is worth increasing.” Whether naturally occurring, or deliberately started, it is almost certain that a highly lethal global pandemic will occur within our lifetimes, he believes.
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<h4><strong>Advances in genetic engineering make bioterror an existential threat that outweighs all impacts. Farmer 17</h4><p>Ben Farmer, Defence Correspondent, In Munich, 2/18/17, "Bioterrorism could kill more people than nuclear war, Bill Gates to warn world leaders," Telegraph, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/17/biological-terrorism-could-kill-people-nuclear-attacks-bill/ SP</p><p><u></strong><mark>Bioterrorists could </mark>one day <mark>kill hundreds of millions </mark>of people in an attack more deadly than nuclear war,</u> Bill Gates will warn world leaders. <u>Rapid advances in <mark>genetic engineering</u> <u>have opened the door for </mark>small terrorism groups to tailor</u> and easily turn <u><mark>bio</mark>logical <mark>viruses</u> </mark>into weapons. <u>A resulting disease pandemic</u> <u>is currently one of the most deadly threats faced by the world,</u> he believes, yet governments are complacent about the scale of the risk. Speaking ahead of an address to the Munich Security Conference, the richest man in the world said that while <u>governments are concerned with the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons, they are overlooking the threat of biological warfare. </u>Because the population is naïve, there are no real preparations Bill Gates Mr Gates, whose charitable foundation is funding research into quickly spotting outbreaks and speeding up vaccine production, said the defence and security establishment “have not been following biology and I’m here to bring them a little bit of bad news”. Mr Gates will today (Saturday) tell an audience of international leaders and senior officers that the world’s next deadly pandemic “could originate on the computer screen of a terrorist”. He told the Telegraph: “<u>Natural epidemics can be extremely large. <mark>Intentionally caused epidemics</mark>, bioterrorism, <mark>would be the largest of all. </u>“<u></mark>With nuclear weapons</u>, you’d think <u>you would probably stop after killing 100million. <mark>Smallpox won’t stop</u>. <u></mark>Because the population is naïve, and <mark>there are no real preparations</u></mark>. That, if it got out and spread, would be a larger number.” He said developments in genetic engineering were proceeding at a “mind-blowing rate”. <u><mark>Biological warfare </mark>ambitions once limited to a handful of nation states <mark>are </mark>now <mark>open to small groups with limited resources and skills</u></mark>. He said: “<u>They make it much easier for a non-state perso</u>n. It doesn’t take much biology expertise nowadays to assemble a smallpox virus. Biology is making it way easier to create these things.” <u>The increasingly common use of gene editing technology would make it difficult to spot any potential terrorist conspiracy</u>. <u>Technologies which have made it easy to read DNA sequences and tinker with them to rewrite or tweak genes have many legitimate uses. </u>He said: “It’s not like when someone says, ‘Hey I’d like some Plutonium’ and you start saying ‘Hmmm.. I wonder why he wants Plutonium?’” Mr Gates said <u><mark>the potential death toll </mark>from a disease outbreak <mark>could be higher than other threats such as climate change or nuclear war</mark>. </u>He said: “This is like earthquakes, you should think in order of magnitudes. If you can kill 10 people that’s a one, 100 people that’s a two... Bioterrorism is the thing that can give you not just sixes, but sevens, eights and nines. “With nuclear war, once you have got a six, or a seven, or eight, you’d think it would probably stop. [With bioterrorism] it’s just unbounded if you are not there to stop the spread of it.” <u>By tailoring the genes of a virus, it would be possible to manipulate its ability to spread and its ability to harm people</u>. Mr Gates said one of the most potentially deadly outbreaks could involve the humble flu virus. <u>It would be relatively easy to engineer a new flu strain combining qualities from varieties that spread like wildfire with varieties that were deadly. </u>The last time that happened naturally was <u>the 1918 Spanish Influenza</u> pandemic, which went on to <u>kill more than 50 million people</u> – or nearly three times the death toll from the First World War. By comparison, the recent Ebola outbreak in West Africa which killed just over 11,000 was “a Richter Scale three, it’s a nothing,” he said. But despite the potential, the founder of Microsoft said that world leaders and their militaries could not see beyond the more recognised risks. He said: “Should the world be serious about this? It is somewhat serious about normal classic warfare and nuclear warfare, but today it is not very serious about bio-defence or natural epidemics.” He went on: “They do tend to say ‘How easy is it to get fissile material and how accurate are the plans out on the internet for dirty bombs, plutonium bombs and hydrogen bombs?’ “They have some people that do that. What I am suggesting is that <u>the number of people that look at bio-defence is worth increasing.” Whether naturally occurring, or deliberately started, it is almost certain that a highly lethal global pandemic will occur within our lifetimes,</u> he believes.</p>
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Terror DA
| null | 47,638 | 451 | 108,692 |
./documents/hsld18/HarvardWestlake/Go/Harvard%20Westlake-Gong-Neg-Loyola-Round1.docx
| 821,698 |
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1
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Eastside DH
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Ben Rosenthal
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1ac - structural violence
1nc - terror da base da
2nr - terror da
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Harvard Westlake AnGo
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1,594,042 |
Extinction.
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Starr 15 TG
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Starr 15 Steven “Nuclear War: An Unrecognized Mass Extinction Event Waiting To Happen.” Ratical. March 2015. https://ratical.org/radiation/NuclearExtinction/StevenStarr022815.html TG
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A war fought with 21st century nuclear weapons would be more than just a great catastrophe in human history. If we allow it to happen, such a war would be a mass extinction event that ends human history. There is a profound difference between extinction and “an unprecedented disaster,” or even “the end of civilization,” because even after such an immense catastrophe, human life would go on. extinction, by definition, is an event of utter finality, and a nuclear war that could cause human extinction should really be considered as the ultimate criminal act The world’s leading climatologists now tell us that nuclear war threatens our continued existence as a species studies predict that a large nuclear war, especially one fought with strategic nuclear weapons, would create a post-war environment in which for many years it would be too cold and dark to even grow food not only humans, but most large animals and many other forms of complex life would likely vanish forever in a nuclear darkness The environmental consequences of nuclear war would attack the ecological support systems of life at every level. Radioactive fallout produced not only by nuclear bombs, but also by the destruction of nuclear power plants and their spent fuel pools, would poison the biosphere. Millions of tons of smoke would act to destroy Earth’s protective ozone layer and block most sunlight from reaching Earth’s surface, creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last for decades. research predicts virtually any nuclear war, fought with even a fraction of the operational and deployed nuclear arsenals, will leave the Earth essentially uninhabitable.
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nuclear war would be extinction Radioactive fallout would poison the biosphere. smoke would destroy ozone and block sunlight creating Ice Age for decades
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A war fought with 21st century strategic nuclear weapons would be more than just a great catastrophe in human history. If we allow it to happen, such a war would be a mass extinction event that ends human history. There is a profound difference between extinction and “an unprecedented disaster,” or even “the end of civilization,” because even after such an immense catastrophe, human life would go on. But extinction, by definition, is an event of utter finality, and a nuclear war that could cause human extinction should really be considered as the ultimate criminal act. It certainly would be the crime to end all crimes. The world’s leading climatologists now tell us that nuclear war threatens our continued existence as a species. Their studies predict that a large nuclear war, especially one fought with strategic nuclear weapons, would create a post-war environment in which for many years it would be too cold and dark to even grow food. Their findings make it clear that not only humans, but most large animals and many other forms of complex life would likely vanish forever in a nuclear darkness of our own making. The environmental consequences of nuclear war would attack the ecological support systems of life at every level. Radioactive fallout produced not only by nuclear bombs, but also by the destruction of nuclear power plants and their spent fuel pools, would poison the biosphere. Millions of tons of smoke would act to destroy Earth’s protective ozone layer and block most sunlight from reaching Earth’s surface, creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last for decades. Yet the political and military leaders who control nuclear weapons strictly avoid any direct public discussion of the consequences of nuclear war. They do so by arguing that nuclear weapons are not intended to be used, but only to deter. Remarkably, the leaders of the Nuclear Weapon States have chosen to ignore the authoritative, long-standing scientific research done by the climatologists, research that predicts virtually any nuclear war, fought with even a fraction of the operational and deployed nuclear arsenals, will leave the Earth essentially uninhabitable.
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<h4><strong>Extinction.</h4><p>Starr 15</strong> Steven “Nuclear War: An Unrecognized Mass Extinction Event Waiting To Happen.” Ratical. March 2015. https://ratical.org/radiation/NuclearExtinction/StevenStarr022815.html<u><strong> TG</p><p></strong>A war fought with 21st century</u> strategic <u><strong><mark>nuclear</strong> </mark>weapons would be more than just a great catastrophe in human history. If we allow it to happen, such a <strong><mark>war would be</strong> </mark>a mass <strong><mark>extinction</strong> </mark>event that ends human history. There is a profound difference between extinction and “an unprecedented disaster,” or even “the end of civilization,” because even after such an immense catastrophe, human life would go on. </u>But <u>extinction, by definition, is an event of utter finality, and a nuclear war that could cause human extinction should really be considered as the ultimate criminal act</u>. It certainly would be the crime to end all crimes. <u>The world’s leading climatologists now tell us that nuclear war threatens our continued existence as a species</u>. Their <u>studies predict that a large nuclear war, especially one fought with strategic nuclear weapons, would create a post-war environment in which for many years it would be too cold and dark to even grow food</u>. Their findings make it clear that <u>not only humans, but most large animals and many other forms of complex life would likely vanish forever in a nuclear darkness </u>of our own making. <u>The environmental consequences of nuclear war would attack the ecological support systems of life at every level. <strong><mark>Radioactive fallout</strong></mark> produced not only by nuclear bombs, but also by the destruction of nuclear power plants and their spent fuel pools, <strong><mark>would poison the biosphere</strong>. </mark>Millions of tons of <strong><mark>smoke would</strong></mark> act to <strong><mark>destroy</strong></mark> Earth’s protective<strong> <mark>ozone</mark> </strong>layer <strong><mark>and block</strong></mark> most <strong><mark>sunlight</strong></mark> from reaching Earth’s surface, <strong><mark>creating Ice Age</strong></mark> weather conditions that would last <strong><mark>for decades</strong></mark>. </u>Yet the political and military leaders who control nuclear weapons strictly avoid any direct public discussion of the consequences of nuclear war. They do so by arguing that nuclear weapons are not intended to be used, but only to deter. Remarkably, the leaders of the Nuclear Weapon States have chosen to ignore the authoritative, long-standing scientific research done by the climatologists, <u>research</u> that <u><strong>predicts virtually any nuclear war, fought with even a fraction of the operational and deployed nuclear arsenals, will leave the Earth essentially uninhabitable.</p></u></strong>
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Blue Key
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Octas
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Park City NL
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Rohit Lakshman, Jeong-Wan Choi, Sabrina Callahan
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1AC - Alienation
1NC - Stock Market DA - Util NC - New Affs Bad - Case
1AR - Same
2NR - DA - NC - Case
2AR - Same
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That triggers missile radars.
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Hoots 15
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Hoots 15 (Felix; Fall 2015; Distinguished Engineer in the System Analysis and Simulation Subdivision, Ph.D. in Mathematics from Auburn University, M.S. in Mathematics from Tennessee Tech University; Crosslink, “Keeping Track: Space Surveillance for Operational Support,” https://aerospace.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/Crosslink%20Fall%202015%20V16N1%20.pdf)
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the Space Age marked the beginning of an intense race that brought a remarkable rate of rocket launches. In a very short time, the number of objects in orbit grew dramatically. This created a host of strategic challenges, including need for space surveillance the Air Force needed a way to prevent false alarms as satellites came within view of missile-warning radars, while the Navy needed to alert deployed units of reconnaissance overhead. These needs led to the establishment of a military mission to maintain a catalog of all orbiting objects along with information about trajectory and origin. Such a catalog could to filter normal orbital passages from potential incoming missiles and predict the passage of suspected spy satellites the missions is to detect, track, and identify all artificial objects in Earth orbit The models for predicting satellite motion are not perfect atmospheric variation caused by solar activity can cause the predicted position to stray from the true position This process of using observations to refine an orbit in an ongoing feedback loop is catalog maintenance if the satellite cannot be matched the information continues to age. If it reaches 30 days the satellite is placed on the lost list the most visible uses of the catalog is to warn about collision risks for active payloads. This function predicts close approaches in advance to allow avoidance maneuvers Unplanned maneuvers disturb normal operations and deplete resources for future maneuvers, so one would like high confidence in the collision predictions. The reliability depends directly on the accuracy which depends on the quality and quantity of the tracking data there are not enough tracking resources to achieve high-quality orbits for every object in the catalog smaller objects can only be tracked by the most sensitive radars, and this is infrequent. Most objects are considered debris, which can neither maneuver satellite operators depend exclusively on the catalog to know where their satellites are, and users depend on the catalog to know when satellites will be within view. This creates a challenging problem in balancing S S N to support the collision-warning task while providing highly accurate support to satellites The practical solution is collision risk assessment using a screening radius to ensure no approaches are missed When the danger has passed, the object reverts to a normal tracking level. Collisions and spontaneous breakups do happen residual fuel in an Ablestar body exploded, creating trackable debris there have been more than 200 satellite breakups, the most notable being the missile intercept which created 3300 trackable fragments Subsequent tracking improves orbit to the point that the object can be named numbered and moved into the catalog
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objects challenges surveillance to prevent false alarms as sat s came in missile radars a catalog could filter normal passages from missiles models are not perfect use is collision risks Unplanned maneuvers disturb op s reliability depends on quality and quantity of data there are not enough resources operators depend to know where sat s are This creates a challenging warning Collisions fuel exploded more than 200 breakups
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The launch of Sputnik on October 4, 1957, marked the beginning of the Space Age. It also marked the beginning of an intense space race that brought a remarkable rate of rocket launches. In a very short time, the number of objects in orbit grew dramatically. This created a host of strategic challenges, including the need for space surveillance. In particular, the Air Force needed a way to prevent false alarms as satellites came within view of missile-warning radars, while the Navy needed a way to alert deployed units of possible reconnaissance by satellites overhead. These needs led to the establishment of a military mission to maintain a catalog of all Earth-orbiting objects—active payloads, rocket bodies, and debris—along with detailed information about trajectory and point of origin. Such a catalog could be used to filter normal orbital passages from potential incoming missiles and predict the passage of suspected spy satellites. The first catalog was relatively small in comparison with today’s version, which lists more than 22,000 items (as of May 2015). Also, the current version supports much more than the original military mission—and Aerospace is helping to extend its utility even further. The Space Catalog The Space Catalog is maintained by the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) at Vandenberg Air Force Base, part of U.S. Strategic Command. One of the missions of JSpOC is to detect, track, and identify all artificial objects in Earth orbit. A key component of this mission is the Space Surveillance Network, a worldwide system of ground-based radars along with ground-based and orbital telescopes. The radars are used primarily for tracking near-Earth satellites with orbital period of 225 minutes or less, as well as some eccentric orbits that come down to near-Earth altitudes as they go towards their perigee. Ground-based telescopes are used for tracking more distant satellites, with orbital period greater than 225 minutes, and space-based sensors are used to track both near and distant satellites. The JSpOC tasks these sensors to track specific satellites and to record data such as time, azimuth, elevation, and range. This data is used to create orbital element sets or state vectors that represent the observed position of the satellite. The observed position can then be compared with the predicted position. The dynamic models used for predicting satellite motion are not perfect; factors such as atmospheric density variation caused by unmodeled solar activity can cause the predicted position to gradually stray from the true position. The observations are used to correct the predicted trajectory so the network can continue to track the satellite. This process of using observations to correct and refine an orbit in an ongoing feedback loop is called catalog maintenance, and it continues as long as the satellite remains in orbit. Ideally, the process is automatic, with manual inter vention only required when satellites maneuver or get near to reentry due to atmospheric drag. Sometimes, however, more effort is required. For example, a sensor may encounter a satellite trajectory that does not correspond well to anything in the catalog. Such observations are known as partially correlated observations if they are somewhat close to a known orbit or uncorrelated observations (or uncorrelated tracks) if they are far from any known orbit. Also, if a satellite is not tracked for five days, it is placed on an attention list for manual intervention. In that case, an analyst will attempt to match the wayward satellite to one of these partially correlated or uncorrelated tracks. If that effort succeeds, then the element sets are updated, and the object is returned to automatic catalog maintenance. On the other hand, if the satellite cannot be matched to a partially correlated or uncorrelated track, the satellite information continues to age. If it reaches 30 days without a match, the satellite is placed on the lost list. Risk Prediction One of the most visible uses of the catalog is to warn about collision risks for active payloads. This function predicts potential close approaches three to five days in advance to allow time to plan avoidance maneuvers, if necessary. Unplanned maneuvers may disturb normal operations and deplete resources for future maneuvers, so one would like to have high confidence in the collision-risk predictions. The reliability of the predictions depends directly on the accuracy of the orbit calculation, which in turn depends on the quality and quantity of the tracking data, which is limited by the capability of the Space Surveillance Network. Simply put, there are not enough tracking resources in the network to achieve high-quality orbits for every object in the catalog. Furthermore, many smaller objects can only be tracked by the most sensitive radars, and this tracking is infrequent. Most objects in the catalog are considered debris, which can neither maneuver nor broadcast telemetry. On the other hand, some satellite operators depend exclusively on the satellite catalog to know where their satellites are, and users of the satellite orbital data depend on the catalog to know when the satellites will be within view. This situation creates a challenging problem in balancing Space Surveillance Network resources to support the collision-warning task (tracking as many potential hazards as possible) while also providing highly accurate support to operational satellites (tracking the spacecraft as precisely as possible). The practical solution is to perform collision risk assessment using a large screening radius to ensure no close approaches are missed despite lower-quality predictions. Once an object is identified as having a potentially close approach, then the tasking level is raised, with the expectation that more tracking data will be obtained to refine the collision risk calculations. When the danger has passed, the object reverts to a normal tracking level. Collisions and spontaneous breakups do happen. The first satellite breakup occurred on June 29, 1961, when residual fuel in an Ablestar rocket body exploded, creating 296 trackable pieces of debris. Since that time, there have been more than 200 satellite breakups, the most notable being the missile intercept of the Fengyun-1C satellite, which created more than 3300 trackable fragments. In most cases, these breakups are first detected by the phased-array radars in the Space Surveillance Network. When multiple objects are observed where only one was expected, the downstream sensors are alerted, but no tasking is issued because specific debris orbits are not yet established. Tracks are taken and tagged as uncorrelated. Analysts at JSpOC then attempt to link uncorrelated tracks from different sensors to form a candidate orbit. Subsequent tracking improves the orbit to the point that the object can be named and numbered and moved into the catalog for automatic maintenance.
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<h4>That triggers <u>missile radars</u><strong>. </h4><p>Hoots 15 </strong>(Felix; Fall 2015; Distinguished Engineer in the System Analysis and Simulation Subdivision, Ph.D. in Mathematics from Auburn University, M.S. in Mathematics from Tennessee Tech University; Crosslink, “Keeping Track: Space Surveillance for Operational Support,” https://aerospace.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/Crosslink%20Fall%202015%20V16N1%20.pdf)</p><p>The launch of Sputnik on October 4, 1957, marked the beginning of <u><strong>the Space Age</u></strong>. It also <u><strong>marked the beginning of an intense</u></strong> space <u><strong>race that brought a remarkable rate of rocket launches. In a very short time, the number of <mark>objects</mark> in orbit grew dramatically. This created a host of strategic <mark>challenges</mark>, including</u></strong> the <u><strong>need for space <mark>surveillance</u></strong></mark>. In particular, <u><strong>the Air Force needed a way <mark>to prevent false alarms as sat</mark>ellite<mark>s came</mark> with<mark>in</mark> view of <mark>missile</mark>-warning <mark>radars</mark>, while the Navy needed</u></strong> a way <u><strong>to alert deployed units of</u></strong> possible <u><strong>reconnaissance</u></strong> by satellites <u><strong>overhead. These needs led to the establishment of a military mission to maintain a catalog of all</u></strong> Earth-<u><strong>orbiting objects</u></strong>—active payloads, rocket bodies, and debris—<u><strong>along with</u></strong> detailed <u><strong>information about trajectory and</u></strong> point of <u><strong>origin. Such <mark>a catalog could</u></strong></mark> be used <u><strong>to <mark>filter normal</mark> orbital <mark>passages from</mark> potential incoming <mark>missiles</mark> and predict the passage of suspected spy satellites</u></strong>. The first catalog was relatively small in comparison with today’s version, which lists more than 22,000 items (as of May 2015). Also, the current version supports much more than the original military mission—and Aerospace is helping to extend its utility even further. The Space Catalog The Space Catalog is maintained by the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) at Vandenberg Air Force Base, part of U.S. Strategic Command. One of <u><strong>the missions</u></strong> of JSpOC <u><strong>is to detect, track, and identify all artificial objects in Earth orbit</u></strong>. A key component of this mission is the Space Surveillance Network, a worldwide system of ground-based radars along with ground-based and orbital telescopes. The radars are used primarily for tracking near-Earth satellites with orbital period of 225 minutes or less, as well as some eccentric orbits that come down to near-Earth altitudes as they go towards their perigee. Ground-based telescopes are used for tracking more distant satellites, with orbital period greater than 225 minutes, and space-based sensors are used to track both near and distant satellites. The JSpOC tasks these sensors to track specific satellites and to record data such as time, azimuth, elevation, and range. This data is used to create orbital element sets or state vectors that represent the observed position of the satellite. The observed position can then be compared with the predicted position. <u><strong>The</u></strong> dynamic <u><strong><mark>models</u></strong></mark> used <u><strong>for predicting satellite motion <mark>are not perfect</u></strong></mark>; factors such as <u><strong>atmospheric</u></strong> density <u><strong>variation caused by</u></strong> unmodeled <u><strong>solar activity can cause the predicted position to</u></strong> gradually <u><strong>stray from the true position</u></strong>. The observations are used to correct the predicted trajectory so the network can continue to track the satellite. <u><strong>This process of using observations to</u></strong> correct and <u><strong>refine an orbit in an ongoing feedback loop is</u></strong> called <u><strong>catalog maintenance</u></strong>, and it continues as long as the satellite remains in orbit. Ideally, the process is automatic, with manual inter vention only required when satellites maneuver or get near to reentry due to atmospheric drag. Sometimes, however, more effort is required. For example, a sensor may encounter a satellite trajectory that does not correspond well to anything in the catalog. Such observations are known as partially correlated observations if they are somewhat close to a known orbit or uncorrelated observations (or uncorrelated tracks) if they are far from any known orbit. Also, if a satellite is not tracked for five days, it is placed on an attention list for manual intervention. In that case, an analyst will attempt to match the wayward satellite to one of these partially correlated or uncorrelated tracks. If that effort succeeds, then the element sets are updated, and the object is returned to automatic catalog maintenance. On the other hand, <u><strong>if the satellite cannot be matched</u></strong> to a partially correlated or uncorrelated track, <u><strong>the</u></strong> satellite <u><strong>information continues to age. If it reaches 30 days</u></strong> without a match, <u><strong>the satellite is placed on the lost list</u></strong>. Risk Prediction One of <u><strong>the most visible <mark>use</mark>s of the catalog <mark>is</mark> to warn about <mark>collision risks</mark> for active payloads. This function predicts</u></strong> potential <u><strong>close approaches</u></strong> three to five days <u><strong>in advance to allow</u></strong> time to plan <u><strong>avoidance maneuvers</u></strong>, if necessary. <u><strong><mark>Unplanned maneuvers</u></strong></mark> may <u><strong><mark>disturb</mark> normal <mark>op</mark>eration<mark>s</mark> and deplete resources for future maneuvers, so one would like</u></strong> to have <u><strong>high confidence in the collision</u></strong>-risk <u><strong>predictions. The <mark>reliability</u></strong></mark> of the predictions <u><strong>depends directly on the accuracy</u></strong> of the orbit calculation, <u><strong>which</u></strong> in turn <u><strong><mark>depends on</mark> the <mark>quality and quantity of</mark> the tracking <mark>data</u></strong></mark>, which is limited by the capability of the Space Surveillance Network. Simply put, <u><strong><mark>there are not enough</mark> tracking <mark>resources</u></strong></mark> in the network <u><strong>to achieve high-quality orbits for every object in the catalog</u></strong>. Furthermore, many <u><strong>smaller objects can only be tracked by the most sensitive radars, and this</u></strong> tracking <u><strong>is infrequent. Most objects</u></strong> in the catalog <u><strong>are considered debris, which can neither maneuver</u></strong> nor broadcast telemetry. On the other hand, some <u><strong>satellite <mark>operators depend</mark> exclusively on the</u></strong> satellite <u><strong>catalog <mark>to know where</mark> their <mark>sat</mark>ellite<mark>s are</mark>, and users</u></strong> of the satellite orbital data <u><strong>depend on the catalog to know when</u></strong> the <u><strong>satellites will be within view. <mark>This</u></strong></mark> situation <u><strong><mark>creates a challenging</mark> problem in balancing S</u></strong>pace <u><strong>S</u></strong>urveillance <u><strong>N</u></strong>etwork resources <u><strong>to support the collision-<mark>warning</mark> task</u></strong> (tracking as many potential hazards as possible) <u><strong>while</u></strong> also <u><strong>providing highly accurate support to</u></strong> operational <u><strong>satellites</u></strong> (tracking the spacecraft as precisely as possible). <u><strong>The practical solution is</u></strong> to perform <u><strong>collision risk assessment using a</u></strong> large <u><strong>screening radius to ensure no</u></strong> close <u><strong>approaches are missed</u></strong> despite lower-quality predictions. Once an object is identified as having a potentially close approach, then the tasking level is raised, with the expectation that more tracking data will be obtained to refine the collision risk calculations. <u><strong>When the danger has passed, the object reverts to a normal tracking level. <mark>Collisions</mark> and spontaneous breakups do happen</u></strong>. The first satellite breakup occurred on June 29, 1961, when <u><strong>residual <mark>fuel</mark> in an Ablestar</u></strong> rocket <u><strong>body <mark>exploded</mark>, creating</u></strong> 296 <u><strong>trackable</u></strong> pieces of <u><strong>debris</u></strong>. Since that time, <u><strong>there have been <mark>more than 200</mark> satellite <mark>breakups</mark>, the most notable being the missile intercept</u></strong> of the Fengyun-1C satellite, <u><strong>which created</u></strong> more than <u><strong>3300 trackable fragments</u></strong>. In most cases, these breakups are first detected by the phased-array radars in the Space Surveillance Network. When multiple objects are observed where only one was expected, the downstream sensors are alerted, but no tasking is issued because specific debris orbits are not yet established. Tracks are taken and tagged as uncorrelated. Analysts at JSpOC then attempt to link uncorrelated tracks from different sensors to form a candidate orbit. <u><strong>Subsequent tracking improves</u></strong> the <u><strong>orbit to the point that the object can be named</u></strong> and <u><strong>numbered and moved into the catalog</u></strong> for automatic maintenance.</p>
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1AC – Advantage
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CPS
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Immaculate Heart SP
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Rex Evans
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1ac - pragmatic commons
1nc - util nc innovation da case
1ar - tt nibs afc case innovation da
2nr - all
2ar - afc
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hsld21/BASISIndependentSiliconValley/Ka/BASIS%20Independent%20Silicon%20Valley-Kapavarapu-Aff-CPS-Round3.docx
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We control the largest explanation for dis-incentivizing great power conflict—err negative—even if they win HEG bad, that doesn’t answer unipolarity good—the world has no alternative.
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Drezner 13
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Drezner 13—Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University [Daniel, “Military Primacy Doesn’t Pay (Nearly As Much As You Think)” International Security, Vol. 38, No. 1, summer 2013, p. 52–79]
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unipolarity is the most stable and peaceful of all possible international systems Unipolarity favors the absence of war among the great powers and comparatively low levels of competition for prestige or security for two reasons: the leading state’s power advantage removes the problem of hegemonic rivalry from world politics and it reduces the salience and stakes of balance of power politics among the major states Wohlforth applying social identity theory to explain the durability and peaceful nature of unipolarity balancing against a rising power is one thing, but balancing against an existing hegemon is altogether different even realists have acknowledged that balancing is less common than realism predicts. Mearsheimer posits that this is because balancing is in and of itself a public good, and therefore buckpassing is more likely. Schweller attributes “underbalancing” to domestic political factors.80
Regardless of the causal mechanism, all of these international relations theories posit that once a military hegemon emerges, the world should be much more secure, peaceful, and prosperous. other states have less incentive to engage in arms races brinkmanship, or security rivalries Potential great power rivals do not see the utility of attempt to challenge the hegemon militarily Smaller states recognize that the benefits of bandwagoning outweigh efforts to balance militarized disputes and aggregate defense expenditures should be expected to decline thus allocating more resources for economic growth which creates a virtuous circle of greater growth and greater peace.
hegemonic eras are strongly correlated with lower trade barriers and greater levels of globalization
direct evidence exists that the exercise of military power to protect sea-lanes boosts global trade flows The presence of naval forces during times of militarized disputes has reduced market expectations of supply disruptions The presence of multinational naval patrols—including the U.S. Navy—in the most vulnerable sea-lanes has helped matters, but the improved private security on board the commercial tankers appears to have helped even more.8
global and regional systems with a sole superpower have lower levels of arms races and violent conflict The only polar structure that appears to influence conflict probability is unipolarity Examinations of pre-Westphalian regional systems also support this finding the East Asia region had a clear hegemon in China from the start of the Ming dynasty to the peak of the Manchu dynasty. The result was a period of remarkable political stability Except for moments of Chinese stagnation, war was extremely rare during this period
The post–Cold War era offers further evidence for reduced security rivalries and greater stability in a hegemonic world order violent conflict in the post-1945 period, and its data are incontrovertible there has been a marked and secular decline in interstate violence since the end of the Cold War and a further decline in other forms of violence, such as civil war and extrajudicial killings Consistent with the logic of unipolarity, global military expenditures have declined dramatically following the end of the Cold War despite the global war on terror defense expenditures as a percentage of global output have averaged only 2.5 percent The peace dividend from the shift to unipolarity has been significant
A growing body of work suggests that the post–Cold War decline is merely the continuation of a long-term secular trend toward less violence even scholars advancing this long-term argument acknowledge the role that U.S. military hegemony plays Goldstein attributes part of the decline in violent conflict to “the end of the cold war, and to a unipolar world order with a single superpower [A] unipolar world is inherently more peaceful than the bipolar one where two superpowers fueled rival armies around the world
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unipolarity is the most stable and peaceful of international systems Unipolarity favors the absence of war among great powers and low levels of competition for security the leading state’s power advantage removes hegemonic rivalry and reduces balance of power politics
Regardless of the causal mechanism once a hegemon emerges the world should be more secure, peaceful, and prosperous other states have less incentive to engage in arms races or rivalries great power rivals do attempt to challenge militarily Smaller states recognize that the benefits of bandwagoning outweigh efforts to balance militarized disputes and defense expenditures decline allocating more resources for growth which creates a virtuous circle of greater growth and peace.
systems with a sole superpower have lower levels of violent conflict The only structure that influence conflict probability is unipolarity Examinations of pre-Westphalian systems support this finding China from the Ming to Manchu dynasty was a period of political stability
post-1945 data are incontrovertible there has been a marked decline in interstate violence and in civil war and extrajudicial killings despite the war on terror peace has been significant
[A] unipolar world is inherently more peaceful than the bipolar one where two superpowers fueled rival armies around the world
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William Wohlforth has made the strongest theoretical argument for this position in the post–Cold War era. He argues, contrary to balance of power theorists, that unipolarity is the most stable and peaceful of all possible international systems: “Unipolarity favors the absence of war among the great powers and comparatively low levels of competition for prestige or security for two reasons: the leading state’s power advantage removes the problem of hegemonic rivalry from world politics, and it reduces the salience and stakes of balance of power politics among the major states.”77 Wohlforth has expanded on this argument in later work, applying social identity theory to explain the durability and peaceful nature of unipolarity.78 He and Stephen Brooks further point out that balancing against a rising power is one thing, but balancing against an existing hegemon is altogether different: “Balance-of power theory predicts that states will try to prevent the rise of a hegemon; it tells us nothing about what will happen once a country establishes such a position.”79 Indeed, even realists such as John Mearsheimer and Randall Schweller have acknowledged that balancing is less common than realism predicts. Mearsheimer posits that this is because balancing is in and of itself a public good, and therefore buckpassing is more likely. Schweller attributes “underbalancing” to domestic political factors.80
Regardless of the causal mechanism, all of these international relations theories posit that once a military hegemon emerges, the world should be much more secure, peaceful, and prosperous. With a preeminent military superpower, other states have less incentive to engage in arms races, brinkmanship, or security rivalries. Potential great power rivals do not see the utility of attempting to challenge the hegemon militarily. Smaller states recognize that the benefits of bandwagoning outweigh efforts to balance. As a result, both militarized disputes and aggregate defense expenditures should be expected to decline during eras of unipolarity, thus allocating more resources for economic growth, which in turn creates a virtuous circle of greater growth and greater peace.
The empirical evidence for this causal mechanism is stronger than for the mechanisms previously discussed in this article, although there are significant qualifiers. On one hand, the literature rejects the notion that hegemony is a necessary condition for an open global economy.81 Indeed, the existence of a liberal hegemon alone is not a sufficient condition; supporter states also play a crucial role in the spread of economic openness.82 Although the precise causal mechanisms remain disputed, hegemonic eras are nevertheless strongly correlated with lower trade barriers and greater levels of globalization.83
Furthermore, direct evidence exists that the exercise of military power to protect sea-lanes boosts global trade flows (though the magnitude of the effect is disputed). The presence of naval forces during times of militarized disputes has reduced market expectations of supply disruptions.84 It could be argued, however, that concerns about energy disruptions have been overstated; even in instances when U.S. military intervention was absent, world oil markets have rapidly adjusted to price spikes.85 A similar story can be told when analyzing the naval reaction to the post-2008 surge in Somali piracy. Attacks spiked after the financial crisis and peaked in 2011. Attacks remain at an elevated level after peaking in 2011, but their success rate has fallen markedly. Between 2011 and 2012, the number of successful global piracy attacks declined by 67 percent. The presence of multinational naval patrols—including the U.S. Navy—in the most vulnerable sea-lanes has helped matters, but the improved private security on board the commercial tankers appears to have helped even more.8
The historical evidence further suggests that global and regional systems with a sole superpower have lower levels of arms races and violent conflict. In one empirical review of the literature, Daniel Geller concluded, “The only polar structure that appears to influence conflict probability is unipolarity.”87 Examinations of pre-Westphalian regional systems also support this finding.88 For example, the East Asia region had a clear hegemon in China from the start of the Ming dynasty to the peak of the Manchu dynasty. The result was a period of remarkable political stability. Countries in the region refrained from attacking China and each other; Beijing refrained from converting its hegemony into an expanding empire.89 Except for moments of Chinese stagnation, war was extremely rare during this period; indeed, it was so rare that some Chinese international relations scholars now extol this tianxia era as a model for the future of global order.90
The post–Cold War era offers further evidence for reduced security rivalries and greater stability in a hegemonic world order. The Human Security Project has tracked violent conflict in the post-1945 period, and its data are incontrovertible: there has been a marked and secular decline in interstate violence since the end of the Cold War, and a further decline in other forms of violence, such as civil war and extrajudicial killings.91 Consistent with the logic of unipolarity, global military expenditures have declined dramatically following the end of the Cold War. Global expenditures on defense as a percentage of global output averaged 5.1 percent between 1972 and 1990. Over the last decade, despite the global war on terror, defense expenditures as a percentage of global output have averaged only 2.5 percent.92 The peace dividend from the shift to unipolarity has been significant.
Military primacy alone is not the sole cause of this decline. A growing body of work suggests that the post–Cold War decline is merely the continuation of a long-term secular trend toward less violence.93 Still, even scholars advancing this long-term argument acknowledge the role that U.S. military hegemony plays. Joshua Goldstein, for example, attributes part of the decline in violent conflict to “the end of the cold war, and to a unipolar world order with a single superpower to impose its will in places like Kuwait, Serbia, and Afghanistan.... [A] unipolar world is inherently more peaceful than the bipolar one where two superpowers fueled rival armies around the world.”9
| 6,425 |
<h4>We control the largest explanation for dis-incentivizing great power conflict—err negative—<u>even if</u> they win HEG bad, that doesn’t answer unipolarity good—the world has no alternative. </h4><p><strong>Drezner 13</strong>—Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University [Daniel, “Military Primacy Doesn’t Pay (Nearly As Much As You Think)” International Security, Vol. 38, No. 1, summer 2013, p. 52–79]</p><p>William Wohlforth has made the strongest theoretical argument for this position in the post–Cold War era. He argues, contrary to balance of power theorists, that <u><strong><mark>unipolarity is the most stable and peaceful of</mark> all possible <mark>international systems</u></strong></mark>: “<u><mark>Unipolarity favors the absence of war among</mark> the <mark>great powers and</mark> comparatively <mark>low levels of competition for</mark> prestige or <mark>security</mark> for two reasons: <mark>the leading state’s power advantage removes</mark> the problem of <mark>hegemonic rivalry</mark> from world politics</u>, <u><mark>and</mark> it <mark>reduces</mark> the salience and stakes of <mark>balance of power politics</mark> among</u> <u>the major states</u>.”77 <u>Wohlforth</u> has expanded on this argument in later work, <u>applying social identity theory to explain the durability and peaceful nature of unipolarity</u>.78 He and Stephen Brooks further point out that <u>balancing against a rising power is one thing, <strong>but balancing against an existing hegemon is altogether different</u></strong>: “Balance-of power theory predicts that states will try to prevent the rise of a hegemon; it tells us nothing about what will happen once a country establishes such a position.”79 Indeed, <u><strong>even realists </u></strong>such as John Mearsheimer and Randall Schweller <u>have acknowledged that balancing is less common than realism predicts. Mearsheimer posits that this is because balancing is in and of itself a public good, and therefore buckpassing is more likely. Schweller attributes “underbalancing” to domestic political factors.80</p><p><strong><mark>Regardless of the causal mechanism</strong></mark>, all of these international relations theories posit that <mark>once a</mark> military <mark>hegemon emerges</mark>, <strong><mark>the world should be </mark>much <mark>more secure, peaceful, and prosperous</mark>.</u></strong> With a preeminent military superpower, <u><mark>other states have <strong>less incentive to engage in arms races</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>brinkmanship, <mark>or</mark> security <mark>rivalries</u></strong></mark>. <u>Potential <mark>great power rivals do </mark>not see the utility of <mark>attempt</u></mark>ing <u><mark>to challenge</mark> the hegemon <mark>militarily</u></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Smaller states</strong> recognize that the</mark> <strong><mark>benefits of bandwagoning outweigh efforts to balance</u></strong></mark>. As a result, both <u><mark>militarized disputes <strong>and</mark> aggregate <mark>defense expenditures</strong></mark> should be expected to <mark>decline</u></mark> during eras of unipolarity, <u>thus <mark>allocating more resources for</mark> economic <mark>growth</u></mark>, <u><mark>which</u></mark> in turn <u><mark>creates a virtuous circle of <strong>greater growth and</mark> greater <mark>peace.</p><p></u></strong></mark>The empirical evidence for this causal mechanism is stronger than for the mechanisms previously discussed in this article, although there are significant qualifiers. On one hand, the literature rejects the notion that hegemony is a necessary condition for an open global economy.81 Indeed, the existence of a liberal hegemon alone is not a sufficient condition; supporter states also play a crucial role in the spread of economic openness.82 Although the precise causal mechanisms remain disputed, <u>hegemonic eras are </u>nevertheless<u> strongly correlated with lower trade barriers and greater levels of globalization</u>.83</p><p>Furthermore, <u>direct evidence exists that <strong>the exercise of military power to protect sea-lanes boosts global trade flows</u></strong> (though the magnitude of the effect is disputed). <u>The presence of naval forces during times of militarized disputes has reduced market expectations of supply disruptions</u>.84 It could be argued, however, that concerns about energy disruptions have been overstated; even in instances when U.S. military intervention was absent, world oil markets have rapidly adjusted to price spikes.85 A similar story can be told when analyzing the naval reaction to the post-2008 surge in Somali piracy. Attacks spiked after the financial crisis and peaked in 2011. Attacks remain at an elevated level after peaking in 2011, but their success rate has fallen markedly. Between 2011 and 2012, the number of successful global piracy attacks declined by 67 percent. <u>The presence of multinational naval patrols—including the U.S. Navy—in the most vulnerable sea-lanes has helped matters, but the improved private security on board the commercial tankers appears to have helped even more.8</p><p></u>The historical evidence further suggests that <u>global and regional <mark>systems with a <strong>sole superpower have lower levels of</mark> arms races and <mark>violent conflict</u></strong></mark>. In one empirical review of the literature, Daniel Geller concluded, “<u><strong><mark>The only</mark> polar <mark>structure that</mark> appears to <mark>influence conflict probability is unipolarity</u></strong></mark>.”87 <u><mark>Examinations of pre-Westphalian</mark> regional <mark>systems</mark> also <strong><mark>support this finding</u></strong></mark>.88 For example, <u>the East Asia region had a clear hegemon in <mark>China from the</mark> start of the <mark>Ming </mark>dynasty <mark>to</mark> the peak of the <mark>Manchu dynasty</mark>. The result <mark>was a period of</mark> remarkable <strong><mark>political stability</u></strong></mark>. Countries in the region refrained from attacking China and each other; Beijing refrained from converting its hegemony into an expanding empire.89 <u>Except for moments of Chinese stagnation, war was extremely rare during this period</u>; indeed, it was so rare that some Chinese international relations scholars now extol this tianxia era as a model for the future of global order.90</p><p><u>The post–Cold War era offers <strong>further evidence for reduced security rivalries and greater stability in a hegemonic world order</u></strong>. The Human Security Project has tracked <u>violent conflict in the <mark>post-1945 </mark>period, and its <strong><mark>data are incontrovertible</u></strong></mark>: <u><strong><mark>there has been a marked</mark> and secular <mark>decline in interstate violence</mark> since the end of the Cold War</u></strong>, <u><mark>and</mark> a further decline <mark>in</mark> other forms of violence, such as <mark>civil war and extrajudicial killings</u></mark>.91 <u>Consistent with the logic of unipolarity, global military expenditures</u> <u><strong>have declined dramatically following the end of the Cold War</u></strong>. Global expenditures on defense as a percentage of global output averaged 5.1 percent between 1972 and 1990. Over the last decade, <u><strong><mark>despite the</mark> global <mark>war on terror</u></strong></mark>, <u>defense expenditures as a percentage of global output have averaged only 2.5 percent</u>.92 <u><strong>The <mark>peace</mark> dividend from the shift to unipolarity <mark>has been significant</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>Military primacy alone is not the sole cause of this decline. <u>A growing body of work suggests that the post–Cold War decline is merely the continuation of a long-term secular trend toward less violence</u>.93 Still, <u>even scholars advancing this long-term argument acknowledge the role that U.S. military hegemony plays</u>. Joshua <u>Goldstein</u>, for example, <u>attributes part of the decline in violent conflict to “<strong>the end of the cold war, and to a unipolar world order with a single superpower</u></strong> to impose its will in places like Kuwait, Serbia, and Afghanistan.... <u><mark>[A] unipolar world is <strong>inherently more peaceful than the bipolar one where two superpowers fueled rival armies around the world</u></strong></mark>.”9</p>
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2ac
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K
| 88,462 | 177 | 82,427 |
./documents/ndtceda19/MichiganState/SeGr/Michigan%20State-Serrins-Grossman-Aff-harvard-Round7.docx
| 613,612 |
A
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harvard
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7
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michigan fh
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kilpatrick
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1ac - china ssa - fusion - synbio - hazards
2nr - kroker k
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ndtceda19/MichiganState/SeGr/Michigan%20State-Serrins-Grossman-Aff-harvard-Round7.docx
| null | 51,951 |
SeGr
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Michigan State SeGr
| null |
Ez.....
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Se.....
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Le.....
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Gr.....
| 19,271 |
MichiganState
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Michigan State
| null | null | 1,009 |
ndtceda19
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NDT/CEDA 2019-20
| 2,019 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
2,708,214 |
Making strategic concessions reveals the optimal way to deal with China
|
Yoder 18
|
Yoder 18 (Brandon Yoder is a Research fellow at the Centre on Asia and Globalisation, and was previously an Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Old Dominion University, 10/11/18, “Retrenchment as a Screening Mechanism: Power Shifts, Strategic Withdrawal, and Credible Signals,” American Journey of Political Science, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ajps.12395)SEM
|
optimists and pessimists regarding retrenchment have heretofore considered it a “last resort” strategy retrenchment early in a power shift can benefit a declining state for an entirely different reason: By removing constraints over a rising state's behavior in a particular region, retrenchment makes that behavior more informative as a signal of the riser's future intentions elsewhere. That information, in turn, allows the declining state to adopt a more optimal strategy toward the riser, increasing its degree of cooperation with benign rising states, while more effectively opposing the rise of hostile types. These findings have substantial implications for foreign policy, particularly regarding a rising China they identify conditions under which China's cooperative signals are more or less credible the U S has adopted a “hedging” strategy that imposes constraints over China's behavior by imposing high constraints over a rising China, the U S has increased China's incentives to misrepresent any hostile intentions, and thus reduced the credibility of China's cooperation as a signal of its long‐term intentions China's cooperation is more credible on issues where U.S. influence is low and China's behavior is relatively unconstrained how China shapes regional institutions under low constraints is more informative of its long‐term preferences for the broader, global international economic order than its previous cooperation within U.S.‐led institutions has been. given the ambiguity about the net costs and benefits of American retrenchment even relatively small informational incentives for retrenchment vis‐à‐vis China could potentially alter the U.S. calculus. This is particularly true regarding issues that are strong candidates for U.S. retrenchment, such as the status of Taiwan Each of these issues is significantly more valuable to China (which considers them “core national interests”) than to the U S which is when the informational benefits of retrenchment are greatest. Of course, Taiwan and the SCS still have significant strategic value to the United States, which may outweigh the net informational and material benefits of withdrawal. This is ultimately an empirical question. Answering it will require that the informational effects of retrenchment be included alongside noninformational variables in subsequent work on retrenchment in U.S. foreign policy.
|
retrenchment early in a power shift makes behavior informative as a signal of the riser's future intentions elsewhere. That info allows the declining state to adopt a more optimal strategy increasing cooperation with benign states, while opposing hostile types by imposing high constraints over China, the U S increased incentives to misrepresent intentions given ambiguity even small info incentives could alter the U.S. calculus Taiwan is significantly more valuable to China which is when the info benefits are greatest
|
Conclusion This article introduces a novel theoretical insight to the retrenchment debate. Both optimists and pessimists regarding the efficacy of retrenchment have heretofore considered it a “last resort” strategy for a declining state to reduce its foreign commitments after it has already lost the power to sustain them. Both sides in the debate agree about the content of the costs and benefits of retrenchment, and simply disagree about their relative magnitudes. In contrast, the retrenchment game suggests that retrenchment early in a power shift can benefit a declining state for an entirely different (though not mutually exclusive) reason: By removing constraints over a rising state's behavior in a particular region, retrenchment makes that behavior more informative as a signal of the riser's future intentions elsewhere. That information, in turn, allows the declining state to adopt a more optimal strategy toward the riser, increasing its degree of cooperation with benign rising states, while more effectively opposing the rise of hostile types. These findings have substantial implications for contemporary U.S. foreign policy, particularly regarding a rising China. First, they identify conditions under which China's cooperative signals are more or less credible. Over the course of China's rise, the United States has adopted a “hedging” strategy that imposes constraints over China's behavior through a combination of deterrent threats and positive inducements.32 This strategy has been quite effective in achieving its intended purpose of inducing China to cooperate under the rule of the U.S.‐led liberal order in the short term. However, the argument in this article implies that by imposing high constraints over a rising China, the United States has increased China's incentives to misrepresent any hostile intentions, and thus reduced the credibility of China's cooperation as a signal of its long‐term intentions. Although this effect has been recognized by some (e.g., Goldstein 2005), much of the academic and policy literature on U.S.–China relations has taken China's cooperative behavior under high constraints at face value.33 Conversely, this article suggests that China's cooperation is more credible on issues where U.S. influence is low and China's behavior is relatively unconstrained. This implies that there may be a previously unrecognized silver lining to two recent U.S. foreign policy choices that have been roundly derided by U.S.–China experts: failure to join the China‐led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or to prevent U.S. allies from doing so in 2015, and the recent U.S. withdrawal from its own initiative, the Trans‐Pacific Partnership. Although expert consensus is that these policy outcomes are clearly harmful to U.S. interests, they also open up space for China to assume a leadership role regarding regional economic governance in an institutional setting where U.S. power is not immediately present (e.g., Babones 2016; Parameswaran 2016). The argument here suggests that how China shapes regional institutions under relatively low constraints is more informative of its long‐term preferences for the broader, global international economic order than its previous cooperation within U.S.‐led institutions has been. Second, this article identifies informational benefits of retrenchment that are likely novel to policy makers, as evidenced by the absence of informational considerations in the academic or policy literature on retrenchment. The magnitude of this informational incentive for retrenchment in U.S.–China relations—like the magnitude of noninformational incentives—is difficult to measure and requires extensive empirical work. Yet given the ambiguity about the net costs and benefits of American retrenchment manifested in the current retrenchment debate, even relatively small informational incentives for retrenchment vis‐à‐vis China could potentially alter the U.S. calculus. This is particularly true regarding issues that both the model and the existing literature suggest are strong candidates for U.S. retrenchment, such as the maritime disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) and the status of Taiwan (e.g., Glaser 2015). Each of these issues is significantly more valuable to China (which considers them “core national interests”) than to the United States, which is when the informational benefits of retrenchment are greatest. Of course, Taiwan and the SCS still have significant strategic value to the United States, which may outweigh the net informational and material benefits of withdrawal. This is ultimately an empirical question. Answering it will require that the informational effects of retrenchment be included alongside noninformational variables in subsequent work on retrenchment in U.S. foreign policy.
| 4,805 |
<h4>Making strategic concessions reveals the <u>optimal wa</u>y to deal with China</h4><p><strong>Yoder 18</strong> (Brandon Yoder is a Research fellow at the Centre on Asia and Globalisation, and was previously an Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Old Dominion University, 10/11/18, “Retrenchment as a Screening Mechanism: Power Shifts, Strategic Withdrawal, and Credible Signals,” American Journey of Political Science, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ajps.12395)SEM</p><p>Conclusion This article introduces a novel theoretical insight to the retrenchment debate. Both <u>optimists and pessimists regarding</u> the efficacy of <u>retrenchment have heretofore considered it a “last resort” strategy</u> for a declining state to reduce its foreign commitments after it has already lost the power to sustain them. Both sides in the debate agree about the content of the costs and benefits of retrenchment, and simply disagree about their relative magnitudes. In contrast, the retrenchment game suggests that <u><mark>retrenchment <strong>early in a power shift</strong></mark> can benefit a declining state for an entirely different</u> (though not mutually exclusive) <u>reason: By removing constraints over a rising state's behavior in a particular region, retrenchment <strong><mark>makes</mark> that <mark>behavior</mark> more <mark>informative as a signal of the riser's future intentions elsewhere</strong>. That info</mark>rmation, in turn, <strong><mark>allows the declining state to adopt a more optimal strategy</strong></mark> toward the riser, <mark>increasing</mark> its degree of <mark>cooperation with benign</mark> rising <mark>states, while</mark> more effectively <mark>opposing</mark> the rise of <mark>hostile types</mark>. These findings have substantial implications for</u> contemporary U.S. <u>foreign policy, particularly regarding a rising China</u>. First, <u>they identify conditions under which China's cooperative signals are <strong>more or less credible</u></strong>. Over the course of China's rise, <u>the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>has adopted a “hedging” strategy that imposes constraints over China's behavior</u> through a combination of deterrent threats and positive inducements.32 This strategy has been quite effective in achieving its intended purpose of inducing China to cooperate under the rule of the U.S.‐led liberal order in the short term. However, the argument in this article implies that <u><mark>by imposing high constraints over</mark> a rising <mark>China, the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u>has <strong><mark>increased</mark> China's <mark>incentives to misrepresent</mark> any hostile <mark>intentions</strong></mark>, and thus reduced the credibility of China's cooperation as a signal of its long‐term intentions</u>. Although this effect has been recognized by some (e.g., Goldstein 2005), much of the academic and policy literature on U.S.–China relations has taken China's cooperative behavior under high constraints at face value.33 Conversely, this article suggests that <u>China's cooperation is more credible on issues where U.S. influence is low and China's behavior is relatively unconstrained</u>. This implies that there may be a previously unrecognized silver lining to two recent U.S. foreign policy choices that have been roundly derided by U.S.–China experts: failure to join the China‐led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or to prevent U.S. allies from doing so in 2015, and the recent U.S. withdrawal from its own initiative, the Trans‐Pacific Partnership. Although expert consensus is that these policy outcomes are clearly harmful to U.S. interests, they also open up space for China to assume a leadership role regarding regional economic governance in an institutional setting where U.S. power is not immediately present (e.g., Babones 2016; Parameswaran 2016). The argument here suggests that <u>how China shapes regional institutions under</u> relatively <u>low constraints is more informative of its long‐term preferences for the broader, global international economic order than its previous cooperation within U.S.‐led institutions has been. </u>Second, this article identifies informational benefits of retrenchment that are likely novel to policy makers, as evidenced by the absence of informational considerations in the academic or policy literature on retrenchment. The magnitude of this informational incentive for retrenchment in U.S.–China relations—like the magnitude of noninformational incentives—is difficult to measure and requires extensive empirical work. Yet <u><mark>given</mark> the <mark>ambiguity</mark> about the net costs and benefits of American retrenchment</u> manifested in the current retrenchment debate, <u><strong><mark>even</mark> relatively <mark>small info</mark>rmational <mark>incentives</strong></mark> for retrenchment vis‐à‐vis China <mark>could</mark> potentially <mark>alter the U.S. calculus</mark>. This is particularly true regarding issues that</u> both the model and the existing literature suggest <u>are strong candidates for U.S. retrenchment, such as</u> the maritime disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) and <u><strong>the status of <mark>Taiwan</u></strong></mark> (e.g., Glaser 2015). <u>Each of these issues <mark>is <strong>significantly more valuable to China</mark> (which considers them “core national interests”)</u></strong> <u>than to the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates, <u><strong><mark>which is when the info</mark>rmational <mark>benefits</mark> of retrenchment <mark>are greatest</strong></mark>. Of course, Taiwan and the SCS still have significant strategic value to the United States, which may outweigh the net informational and material benefits of withdrawal. This is ultimately an empirical question. Answering it will require that the informational effects of retrenchment be included alongside noninformational variables in subsequent work on retrenchment in U.S. foreign policy.</p></u>
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2AC Stanford R1
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Appeasement DA
|
1AC – Cooperation
| 786,212 | 114 | 86,237 |
./documents/hspolicy19/Interlake/ChFe/Interlake-Chen-Feng-Aff-Stanford-Round1.docx
| 712,962 |
A
|
Stanford
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1
|
Yerba Buena NN
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Courtney Schauer
|
1AC - Taiwan
1NC - Vagueness Incremental Sales CP Appeasement DA Prolif Good
2NR - Appeasement Prolif Good
|
hspolicy19/Interlake/ChFe/Interlake-Chen-Feng-Aff-Stanford-Round1.docx
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ChFe
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Interlake ChFe
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Br.....
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Ch.....
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Em.....
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Fe.....
| 21,240 |
Interlake
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Interlake
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WA
| null | 1,018 |
hspolicy19
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HS Policy 2019-20
| 2,019 |
cx
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hs
| 2 |
1,690,721 |
1. Specific adversaries, locations, types of conflicts or any other conditional demand would be topical
|
Shelton 10
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Shelton 10, MA (Allison Marie Shelton, Master’s Thesis, “Alliance risk tolerance and regime type: Determinants of alliance textual commitments” https://getd.libs.uga.edu/pdfs/shelton_allison_m_201005_ma.pdf)
|
conditions placed on an alliance may affect risk. Alliance include conditions for the alliance to be invoked, including limitations to a specific adversary or number of adversaries, location, conflict, certain demands, or a requirement for provocation. These conditions lower the risks of both entrapment and abandonment by specifying in greater detail the scope, or casus foederis, of the alliance
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Alliance conditions includ limitations to a specific adversary location, conflict, certain demands, or a requirement for provocation conditions specify the scope of the alliance
|
Third, the conditions placed on an alliance may be said to affect risk. Alliances often include many necessary conditions for the alliance to be invoked, including limitations to a specific adversary or number of adversaries, location, conflict, certain demands, or a requirement for provocation. These conditions lower the risks of both entrapment and abandonment by specifying in greater detail the scope, or casus foederis, of the alliance. By doing so, states may more effectively limit any unexpected or unforeseen risk to the alliance commitments. In a highly specified alliance, states will have very clearly agreed to the scope of the commitment, while in an unspecified alliance, states run the risk of unforeseen challenges to alliance success.
| 754 |
<h4>1. <u>Specific adversaries</u>, <u>locations</u>, <u>types of conflicts</u> or <u>any other</u> conditional demand would be topical</h4><p><strong>Shelton 10</strong>, MA (Allison Marie Shelton, Master’s Thesis, “Alliance risk tolerance and regime type: Determinants of alliance textual commitments” https://getd.libs.uga.edu/pdfs/shelton_allison_m_201005_ma.pdf)</p><p>Third, the <u>conditions placed on an alliance may</u> be said to <u>affect risk. <mark>Alliance</u></mark>s often <u>include</u> many necessary <u><strong><mark>conditions</strong></mark> for the alliance to be invoked, <mark>includ</mark>ing <strong><mark>limitations to a specific adversary </mark>or number of adversaries, <mark>location, conflict, certain demands, or a requirement for provocation</strong></mark>. These <mark>conditions </mark>lower the risks of both entrapment and abandonment by <strong><mark>specify</mark>ing in greater detail <mark>the scope</mark>, or casus foederis, <mark>of the alliance</u></strong></mark>. By doing so, states may more effectively limit any unexpected or unforeseen risk to the alliance commitments. In a highly specified alliance, states will have very clearly agreed to the scope of the commitment, while in an unspecified alliance, states run the risk of unforeseen challenges to alliance success.</p>
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2NC
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T
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2NC --- Limits DA
| 770,705 | 106 | 50,369 |
./documents/ndtceda20/JCCC/BaBa/JCCC-Babcock-Babcock-Neg-OLC-Round1.docx
| 618,638 |
N
|
OLC
|
1
|
Michigan State AM
|
Brett Bricker
|
1ac- extra peninsular soko
1nc- subset t its t ip qpq anc cp prolif da india da
2nr- anc cp
|
ndtceda20/JCCC/BaBa/JCCC-Babcock-Babcock-Neg-OLC-Round1.docx
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BaBa
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JCCC BaBa
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Ba.....
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Th.....
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Ba.....
| 19,327 |
JCCC
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JCCC
| null | null | 1,010 |
ndtceda20
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NDT/CEDA 2020-21
| 2,020 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
1,999,425 |
Criminal justice is the system of law enforcement, adjudication, and corrections
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Siegel 9
|
Siegel 9 – Professor Emeritus of Criminology & Justice Studies
Larry Siegel, Ph.D., Essentials of Criminal Justice, Cengage Learning, accessed via Google Books, 2009, pp. 4-5
|
Criminal justice may be defined as the system of law enforcement, adjudication, and correction that is directly involved in the apprehension, prosecution, and control of those charged with criminal offenses This collection of agencies is responsible for protecting the public, maintaining order, enforcing the law, identifying transgressors, bringing the guilty to justice, and treating criminal behavior This textbook serves as an introduction to the study of criminal justice This area of research and scholarship typically includes describing, analyzing, and explaining the behavior of those agencies, authorized by law and statute, to dispense justice—police departments courts and correctional agencies—and is designed to help these institutions identify effective and efficient methods of crime control criminal justice process: The decision making points from the initial investigation or arrest by police to the eventual release of the offender and his or her reentry into society various sequential criminal justice stages through which the offender passes.
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Criminal justice defined as system of law enforcement, adjudication, and correction directly involved in apprehension, prosecution, and control of those charged with criminal offenses This textbook study of criminal justice includes police departments, courts and correctional agencies— criminal justice process from the initial investigation or arrest to release and reentry
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Criminal justice may be viewed or defined as the system of law enforcement, adjudication, and correction that is directly involved in the apprehension, prosecution, and control of those charged with criminal offenses. This loosely organized collection of agencies is responsible for, among other matters, protecting the public, maintaining order, enforcing the law, identifying transgressors, bringing the guilty to justice, and treating criminal behavior. The public depends on this vast system not only to protect them from evil-doers and to bring justice to their lives but to maintain order and protect the fabric of society. This textbook serves as an introduction to the study of criminal justice. This area of research and scholarship typically includes describing, analyzing, and explaining the behavior of those agencies, authorized by law and statute, to dispense justice—police departments, courts, and correctional agencies—and is designed to help these institutions identify effective and efficient methods of crime control. This chapter introduces some basic issues, beginning with a discussion of the history of crime in America and the development of criminal justice. The major organizations and criminal justice processes of the criminal justice system are then introduced so that you can develop an overview of how the system functions. Because there is no single view of the underlying goals that help shape criminal justice, the varying perspectives on what criminal justice really is or should be are set out in some detail. [Insert from the page margin] criminal justice process: The decision making points, from the initial investigation or arrest by police to the eventual release of the offender and his or her reentry into society; the various sequential criminal justice stages through which the offender passes.
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<h4>Criminal justice is the system of law enforcement, adjudication, and corrections </h4><p><strong>Siegel 9</strong> – Professor Emeritus of Criminology & Justice Studies</p><p>Larry Siegel, Ph.D., Essentials of Criminal Justice<u>, Cengage Learning, accessed via Google Books, 2009, pp. 4-5</p><p><strong><mark>Criminal justice</u></strong></mark> <u>may be</u> viewed or <u><strong><mark>defined as</u></strong></mark> <u>the <strong><mark>system of law enforcement, adjudication, and correction</u></strong></mark> <u>that is <strong><mark>directly</strong></mark> <mark>involved</mark> <mark>in</mark> the <strong><mark>apprehension, prosecution, and control</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>of</mark> <mark>those <strong>charged</strong> with <strong>criminal</strong> offenses</u></mark>. <u>This</u> loosely organized <u>collection of agencies is responsible for</u>, among other matters, <u>protecting the public, maintaining order, enforcing the law, identifying transgressors, bringing the guilty to justice, and treating criminal behavior</u>. The public depends on this vast system not only to protect them from evil-doers and to bring justice to their lives but to maintain order and protect the fabric of society. <u><mark>This</mark> <strong><mark>textbook</strong></mark> serves as an introduction to the <strong><mark>study of criminal justice</u></strong></mark>. <u>This area of research and scholarship</u> <u>typically <mark>includes</mark> describing, analyzing, and explaining the behavior of those agencies, authorized by law and statute, to dispense justice—<strong><mark>police departments</u></strong>, <u><strong>courts</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>and <strong>correctional agencies</strong>—</mark>and is designed to help these institutions identify effective and efficient methods of crime control</u>. This chapter introduces some basic issues, beginning with a discussion of the history of crime in America and the development of criminal justice. The major organizations and criminal justice processes of the criminal justice system are then introduced so that you can develop an overview of how the system functions. Because there is no single view of the underlying goals that help shape criminal justice, the varying perspectives on what criminal justice really is or should be are set out in some detail. [Insert from the page margin] <u><strong><mark>criminal justice process</mark>:</u></strong> <u>The decision making points</u>, <u><mark>from the <strong>initial investigation</strong></mark> <mark>or <strong>arrest</mark> by police</u></strong> <u><mark>to</mark> the <strong>eventual <mark>release</strong></mark> of the offender <mark>and</mark> his or her <strong><mark>reentry</mark> into society</u></strong>; the <u>various <strong>sequential</strong> <strong>criminal justice stages</u></strong> <u>through which the offender passes.</p></u>
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1NC Round 3
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1NC – T
| 51,540 | 96 | 59,044 |
./documents/hspolicy20/Peninsula/RhWa/Peninsula-Rhoades-Wang-Neg-Mich%20RR-Round3.docx
| 737,652 |
N
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Mich RR
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3
|
Edina AA
|
Joseph Chicvak
|
1ac - queer performance
2nr - t
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hspolicy20/Peninsula/RhWa/Peninsula-Rhoades-Wang-Neg-Mich%20RR-Round3.docx
| null | 62,873 |
RhWa
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Peninsula RhWa
| null |
Lu.....
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Rh.....
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Na.....
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Wa.....
| 21,763 |
Peninsula
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Peninsula
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CA
| null | 1,019 |
hspolicy20
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HS Policy 2020-21
| 2,020 |
cx
|
hs
| 2 |
1,120,787 |
Expanding reproductive freedom slows overpopulation---extinction.
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Engelman ’11
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Engelman ’11 [Robert; May 2011; Vice President for Programs at the Worldwatch Institute, M.Sc. from Columbia University; Solutions, “An End to Population Growth: Why Family Planning Is Key to a Sustainable Future,” vol. 2]
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representatives of 58 national scientific academies concluded, “As human numbers increase, the potential for irreversible changes of far-reaching magnitude also increases humanity’s ability to deal successfully with its social, economic, and environmental problems will require the achievement of zero population growth within the lifetime of our children.
If world population peaked at close to 8 billion rather than 9 billion there would be a significant emissions savings
world population size might peak earlier and at a lower level if government policies aimed at individual reproductive freedom? Suppose such policies aimed to help all women and girls prevent unwanted pregnancies and conceive only when they want to bear a child? new data may appear counterintuitive: if, starting at any moment, all pregnancies in the world resulted from each woman’s intent to give birth, human population would immediately shift course away from growth toward decline within a few decades
when women have access to the information and means that allow them to choose the timing of pregnancy, the intervals between births lengthen, average family size shrinks, and teen births become less frequent. All of these improve maternal and child survival and slow population growth
Access to safe and reliable contraception has exploded since the mid-twentieth century As the use of birth control has spread, fertility has plummeted from a global average of five children per woman to barely more than 2.5 today
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scientific academies concluded, “As increase potential for irreversible changes of magnitude increases ability to deal economic, and environmental problems require zero growth
If world peaked at 8 billion there would be emissions savings
population might peak if policies aimed at reproductive freedom if all pregnancies resulted from intent population would immediately shift to decline within decades
when women access means to choose pregnancy intervals lengthen size shrinks, and become less frequent these slow growth
As birth control spread, fertility plummeted
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In a joint statement in 1993, representatives of 58 national scientific academies stressed the complexities of the population-environment relationship but nonetheless concluded, “As human numbers increase, the potential for irreversible changes of far-reaching magnitude also increases. … In our judgment, humanity’s ability to deal successfully with its social, economic, and environmental problems will require the achievement of zero population growth within the lifetime of our children.”3 In 2005, the United Nations’ Millennium Ecosystem Assessment identified population growth as a principal indirect driver of environmental change, along with economic growth and technological evolution.4
In October 2010, a group of US and European climate and demographic researchers published findings from an integrated assessment model calculating the impact of various population scenarios on fossil-fuel carbon dioxide emissions over the coming century. If world population peaked at close to 8 billion rather than 9 billion, along the lines described in a low-fertility demographic projection published by the UN Population Division, the model predicted there would be a significant emissions savings: about 5.1 billion tons of carbon dioxide by 2050 and 18.7 billion tons by century’s end.5
What if we could prove wrong the popular conviction that a future with 9 billion people and a growing population is inevitable? Suppose we could demonstrate that world population size might peak earlier and at a lower level if government policies aimed not at reproductive coercion but at individual reproductive freedom? Suppose such policies aimed to help all women and girls prevent unwanted pregnancies and conceive only when they want to bear a child? This article presents new data on births resulting from women’s active intentions to become pregnant. The hypothesis it probes may appear counterintuitive: if, starting at any moment, all pregnancies in the world resulted from each woman’s intent to give birth, human population would immediately shift course away from growth toward decline within a few decades.
An Ethical Basis for Action to Slow Population Growth
What can societies that value democracy, self-determination, human rights, personal autonomy, and privacy do to include demographic change among strategies for environmental sustainability? An important answer may lie in a relatively untested set of principles adopted by almost all the world’s nations at a 1994 UN conference held in Cairo. The third of three once-a-decade governmental conferences on population and development, it produced a program of action that abandoned the strategy of “population control” by governments in favor of a focus on the health, rights, and well-being of women.6 An operating assumption of this program is that when women have access to the information and means that allow them to choose the timing of pregnancy, the intervals between births lengthen, average family size shrinks, and teen births become less frequent. All of these improve maternal and child survival and slow population growth.7
Experts disagree on how reproductive autonomy compares with other strategies in slowing that growth. Some assume economic growth is the most effective means, although birthrates rose along with prosperity in many countries after World War II and remain relatively high in several wealthy oil-exporting nations in which women have fewer rights and lower status than men.8 Moreover, some analysts argue that the arrow of causation operates more in the other direction, with low fertility stoking economic growth.9
There is a more robust and demonstrable correlation between female educational attainment and fertility. Worldwide, women with no schooling have an average of 4.5 children, while those who have spent at least a year or more in primary school have just three. Women who complete at least a year or two of secondary school have 1.9 children—well below replacement fertility rates. With one or two years of advanced education for women, average childbearing rates fall even further, to 1.7.10 On this basis alone, those interested in depressing population growth rates might want to focus on improving women’s educational attainment.
Questions remain about whether education alone can bring about declines in fertility without other supporting conditions, especially easy, affordable access to a range of contraceptive options. Similar uncertainties cloud understanding of exactly how improved child survival and the empowerment of women affect fertility. Improving both factors certainly contributes to later births and smaller families and is valuable regardless of its demographic impacts. But without clear data on the magnitude of these influences, interventions related to schooling, child survival, and women’s empowerment are rarely seen as core aspects of governmental population policy.
This brings us to family planning. Access to safe and reliable contraception has exploded since the mid-twentieth century. An estimated 55 percent of all heterosexually active women worldwide now use modern contraceptive methods, while an additional seven percent use less reliable traditional methods.11 As the use of birth control has spread, fertility has plummeted from a global average of five children per woman in 1950 to barely more than 2.5 today.1
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<h4>Expanding reproductive freedom slows <u>overpopulation</u>---extinction. </h4><p><strong>Engelman ’11 </strong>[Robert; May 2011; Vice President for Programs at the Worldwatch Institute, M.Sc. from Columbia University; Solutions, “An End to Population Growth: Why Family Planning Is Key to a Sustainable Future,” vol. 2]</p><p>In a joint statement in 1993, <u>representatives of <strong>58 national <mark>scientific academies</u></strong></mark> stressed the complexities of the population-environment relationship but nonetheless <u><mark>concluded, “As</mark> <strong>human numbers <mark>increase</strong></mark>, the <mark>potential for <strong>irreversible changes</strong> of</mark> <strong>far-reaching <mark>magnitude</strong></mark> also <mark>increases</u></mark>. … In our judgment, <u>humanity’s <strong><mark>ability to deal</mark> successfully</strong> with its <strong>social</strong>, <strong><mark>economic</strong>, and <strong>environmental problems</strong></mark> will <strong><mark>require</mark> the achievement</strong> of <strong><mark>zero</mark> population <mark>growth</strong></mark> within the lifetime of our children.</u>”3 In 2005, the United Nations’ Millennium Ecosystem Assessment identified population growth as a principal indirect driver of environmental change, along with economic growth and technological evolution.4</p><p>In October 2010, a group of US and European climate and demographic researchers published findings from an integrated assessment model calculating the impact of various population scenarios on fossil-fuel carbon dioxide emissions over the coming century. <u><mark>If world</mark> population <strong><mark>peaked at</mark> close to <mark>8 billion</mark> rather than 9 billion</u></strong>, along the lines described in a low-fertility demographic projection published by the UN Population Division, the model predicted <u><mark>there would be</mark> a <strong>significant <mark>emissions savings</u></strong></mark>: about 5.1 billion tons of carbon dioxide by 2050 and 18.7 billion tons by century’s end.5</p><p>What if we could prove wrong the popular conviction that a future with 9 billion people and a growing population is inevitable? Suppose we could demonstrate that <u>world <mark>population</mark> size <strong><mark>might peak</mark> earlier</strong> and <strong>at a lower level</strong> <mark>if</mark> government <mark>policies aimed</mark> </u>not at reproductive coercion but <u><mark>at</mark> <strong>individual <mark>reproductive freedom</strong></mark>? Suppose such policies aimed to help all women and girls <strong>prevent unwanted pregnancies</strong> and conceive <strong>only when they want to bear a child</strong>?</u> This article presents <u><strong>new data</u></strong> on births resulting from women’s active intentions to become pregnant. The hypothesis it probes <u>may appear counterintuitive: <mark>if</mark>, starting at any moment, <strong><mark>all pregnancies</mark> in the world</strong> <mark>resulted from</mark> <strong>each woman’s <mark>intent</strong></mark> to give birth, human <mark>population would <strong>immediately shift</mark> course away from growth <mark>to</mark>ward <mark>decline within</mark> a few <mark>decades</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>An Ethical Basis for Action to Slow Population Growth</p><p>What can societies that value democracy, self-determination, human rights, personal autonomy, and privacy do to include demographic change among strategies for environmental sustainability? An important answer may lie in a relatively untested set of principles adopted by almost all the world’s nations at a 1994 UN conference held in Cairo. The third of three once-a-decade governmental conferences on population and development, it produced a program of action that abandoned the strategy of “population control” by governments in favor of a focus on the health, rights, and well-being of women.6 An operating assumption of this program is that <u><mark>when women</mark> <strong>have <mark>access</strong></mark> to the <strong>information</strong> and <strong><mark>means</strong></mark> that allow them <mark>to <strong>choose</mark> the timing of <mark>pregnancy</strong></mark>, the <strong><mark>intervals</mark> between births <mark>lengthen</strong></mark>, <strong>average family <mark>size shrinks</strong>, and</mark> teen births <strong><mark>become less frequent</strong></mark>. All of <mark>these</mark> <strong>improve maternal</strong> and <strong>child survival</strong> and <strong><mark>slow</mark> population <mark>growth</u></strong></mark>.7</p><p>Experts disagree on how reproductive autonomy compares with other strategies in slowing that growth. Some assume economic growth is the most effective means, although birthrates rose along with prosperity in many countries after World War II and remain relatively high in several wealthy oil-exporting nations in which women have fewer rights and lower status than men.8 Moreover, some analysts argue that the arrow of causation operates more in the other direction, with low fertility stoking economic growth.9</p><p>There is a more robust and demonstrable correlation between female educational attainment and fertility. Worldwide, women with no schooling have an average of 4.5 children, while those who have spent at least a year or more in primary school have just three. Women who complete at least a year or two of secondary school have 1.9 children—well below replacement fertility rates. With one or two years of advanced education for women, average childbearing rates fall even further, to 1.7.10 On this basis alone, those interested in depressing population growth rates might want to focus on improving women’s educational attainment.</p><p>Questions remain about whether education alone can bring about declines in fertility without other supporting conditions, especially easy, affordable access to a range of contraceptive options. Similar uncertainties cloud understanding of exactly how improved child survival and the empowerment of women affect fertility. Improving both factors certainly contributes to later births and smaller families and is valuable regardless of its demographic impacts. But without clear data on the magnitude of these influences, interventions related to schooling, child survival, and women’s empowerment are rarely seen as core aspects of governmental population policy.</p><p>This brings us to family planning. <u><strong>Access to safe</strong> and <strong>reliable contraception</strong> has <strong>exploded</strong> since the mid-twentieth century</u>. An estimated 55 percent of all heterosexually active women worldwide now use modern contraceptive methods, while an additional seven percent use less reliable traditional methods.11 <u><mark>As</mark> the <strong>use of <mark>birth control</mark> has <mark>spread</strong>, <strong>fertility</mark> has <mark>plummeted</strong></mark> from a global average of five children per woman</u> in 1950 <u>to barely more than 2.5 today</u>.1</p>
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1NC v Carrolton BC
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Off
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3
| 35,519 | 146 | 26,758 |
./documents/hspolicy21/GlenbrookSouth/KhKi/Glenbrook%20South-Khan-Kiefer-Neg-1%20-%20Greenhill-Round3.docx
| 746,968 |
N
|
1 - Greenhill
|
3
|
Carrollton BC
|
Matt Coleman
|
1ac - wotus
1nc - baudrillard judicial review cp states cp infra
2nr - states infra
|
hspolicy21/GlenbrookSouth/KhKi/Glenbrook%20South-Khan-Kiefer-Neg-1%20-%20Greenhill-Round3.docx
| null | 63,732 |
KhKi
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Glenbrook South KhKi
| null |
Hu.....
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Kh.....
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Co.....
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Ki.....
| 21,976 |
GlenbrookSouth
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Glenbrook South
|
IL
| null | 1,020 |
hspolicy21
|
HS Policy 2021-22
| 2,021 |
cx
|
hs
| 2 |
3,982,340 |
Protection crashes business confidence and the entire economy. Cycles go fast and assume the worst case.
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Barkin 19
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Tom Barkin 19, the president and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, where he is responsible for monetary policy, bank supervision, payment services and the Fed’s National IT organization, M.B.A. from Harvard University, 7/11/2019, “Confidence, Expectations and Implications for Monetary Policy,” https://www.richmondfed.org/press_room/speeches/thomas_i_barkin/2019/barkin_speech_20190711, Stras
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the business reaction function has gotten faster. Short-termism has increased as activism in the market for corporate control shifted companies’ focus firms’ resilience is down. They start with lower confidence
The speed of the reaction function may be exacerbated by higher leverage. Corporate debt as a percentage of GDP is at an all-time high. Levered companies—and their creditors—have a bias toward taking action on negative news. This can mean cutting costs, reducing staff or pricing for volume
all these factors lead to an asymmetry in which firms are much more cautious about the downside than they are optimistic about the upside
Firms’ fear of failure could prevent them from making investments even in the presence of reasonable returns
negative tilt, or asymmetry, continues today. Firms are frustrated with political polarization and uncertainty about trade and regulation
a drop in confidence lead to lower investment, lower output and eventually lower employment consumption won’t be far behind discount the idea that we could talk ourselves into a recession
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business reaction got fast Short-termism increased start with lower confidence
debt is high companies bias to negative news cutting costs
fear prevent investments even in reasonable returns
Firms are frustrated with uncertain about regulation
drop in confidence lower investment we could talk ourselves to a recession
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In addition, the business reaction function has gotten faster. Short-termism has increased as activism in the market for corporate control has shifted companies’ focus. Just as with consumers, I think firms’ resilience is down. They start with lower confidence—another “hangover” from the Great Recession. At the same time, businesspeople tell me the length of the current upturn makes them nervous that another recession might be right around the corner.
The speed of the reaction function may be exacerbated by higher leverage. Corporate debt as a percentage of GDP is at an all-time high. Levered companies—and their creditors—have a bias toward taking action on negative news. This can mean cutting costs, reducing staff or pricing for volume.
Taken together, all these factors lead to an asymmetry in which firms are much more cautious about the downside than they are optimistic about the upside.
Perhaps both consumers and businesses have a higher bar for spending decisions. It’s possible that some of the tepid recovery from the Great Recession was a self-fulfilling lack of belief in the strength of the economy. Firms’ fear of failure could have prevented them from making investments even in the presence of reasonable returns.
This negative tilt, or asymmetry, continues today. Firms are frustrated with political polarization and uncertainty about trade and regulation. This limits their pricing courage and caps the upside on their spending and investment decisions.
For these reasons, a drop in confidence could lead to lower investment, lower output and eventually lower employment. If employment is placed at risk, consumption won’t be far behind. And that would place us in more serious difficulty. Put another way, I don’t discount the idea that we could talk ourselves into a recession.
| 1,807 |
<h4>Protection <u>crashes</u> business confidence and the <u>entire</u> economy. Cycles go <u>fast</u> and assume the <u>worst case</u>.</h4><p>Tom <strong>Barkin 19</strong>, the president and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, where he is responsible for monetary policy, bank supervision, payment services and the Fed’s National IT organization, M.B.A. from Harvard University, 7/11/2019, “Confidence, Expectations and Implications for Monetary Policy,” https://www.richmondfed.org/press_room/speeches/thomas_i_barkin/2019/barkin_speech_20190711, Stras</p><p>In addition, <u><strong>the <mark>business reaction</mark> function</strong> has <mark>got</mark>ten <strong><mark>fast</mark>er</strong>. <mark>Short-termism</mark> has <strong><mark>increased</strong></mark> as <strong>activism</strong> in the market for <strong>corporate control</u></strong> has <u>shifted companies’ focus</u>. Just as with consumers, I think <u><strong>firms’ resilience</strong> is <strong>down</strong>. They <mark>start with <strong>lower confidence</u></strong></mark>—another “hangover” from the Great Recession. At the same time, businesspeople tell me the length of the current upturn makes them nervous that another recession might be right around the corner.</p><p><u>The speed of <strong>the reaction function</strong> may be exacerbated by <strong>higher leverage</strong>. Corporate <mark>debt</mark> as <strong>a percentage of GDP</strong> <mark>is</mark> at <strong>an all-time <mark>high</strong></mark>. Levered <mark>companies</mark>—and their creditors—have a <strong><mark>bias</strong> to</mark>ward taking action on <strong><mark>negative news</strong></mark>. This can mean <strong><mark>cutting costs</strong></mark>, <strong>reducing staff</strong> or <strong>pricing for volume</u></strong>.</p><p>Taken together, <u>all these factors lead to <strong>an asymmetry</strong> in which firms are <strong>much more cautious</strong> about the downside than they are optimistic about the upside</u>.</p><p>Perhaps both consumers and businesses have a higher bar for spending decisions. It’s possible that some of the tepid recovery from the Great Recession was a self-fulfilling lack of belief in the strength of the economy. <u>Firms’ <strong><mark>fear</mark> of failure</strong> could</u> have <u><strong><mark>prevent</u></strong></mark>ed <u>them from making <mark>investments <strong>even in</mark> the presence of <mark>reasonable returns</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>This <u><strong>negative tilt, or asymmetry</strong>, continues today. <mark>Firms are <strong>frustrated</strong> with</mark> <strong>political polarization</strong> and <strong><mark>uncertain</mark>ty</strong> <mark>about</mark> <strong>trade and <mark>regulation</u></strong></mark>. This limits their pricing courage and caps the upside on their spending and investment decisions.</p><p>For these reasons, <u>a <mark>drop in confidence</u></mark> could <u>lead to <strong><mark>lower investment</strong></mark>, <strong>lower output</strong> and <strong>eventually lower employment</u></strong>. If employment is placed at risk, <u>consumption <strong>won’t</strong> be far behind</u>. And that would place us in more serious difficulty. Put another way, I don’t <u><strong>discount the idea</strong> that <mark>we could <strong>talk ourselves</mark> in<mark>to a recession</u></mark>.</p></strong>
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1NC
|
OFF
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OFF---1NC
| 321,905 | 239 | 134,524 |
./documents/hspolicy21/MontgomeryBell/PaCl/Montgomery%20Bell-Pacconi-Climaco-Neg-TOC-Round1.docx
| 751,432 |
N
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TOC
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1
|
Niles North BG
|
Harry Aaronson
|
1AC - Water Courts
1NC - T Cessation CP Devolution CP Advantage CP Ban Special Masters DA BizCon DA Court Politics Turn Democracy Bad
2NR - Democracy Bad
|
hspolicy21/MontgomeryBell/PaCl/Montgomery%20Bell-Pacconi-Climaco-Neg-TOC-Round1.docx
| null | 64,101 |
PaCl
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Montgomery Bell PaCl
| null |
Ja.....
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Pa.....
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Ch.....
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Cl.....
| 22,058 |
MontgomeryBell
|
Montgomery Bell
|
TN
| null | 1,020 |
hspolicy21
|
HS Policy 2021-22
| 2,021 |
cx
|
hs
| 2 |
4,650,417 |
Their ev relies on an echo-chamber of activists that use flawed data—tons of recent studies negate.
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Richwine 22
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Richwine 22 [Jason; 6-27-22; PhD in Public Policy from Harvard University in 2009, completing the degree on a dissertation fellowship with the American Enterprise Institute. Before Harvard, he attended American University, where he received both a BS in Mathematics and a BA in Political Science. “A Compendium of Recent Academic Work Showing Negative Impacts of Immigration,” https://cis.org/Richwine/Abundance-New-Academic-Studies-Find-Negative-Impacts-Immigration] brett
|
Is there a scholarly consensus that immigration benefits all ? Listening to advocates and their allied media, one might assume so
The purpose of this compendium is to dispel such self-serving myths the costs and benefits of immigration are routinely measured, weighed, and debated in academic journals No fair reading of the literature could conclude that immigration has only benefits — or only costs, for that matter the labor market impact of immigration as well as broader effects.
The National Academies’ 2016 Review
Chapters 4 and 5 of the National Academies’ book-length report review the theoretical and empirical research on how immigration affects wages and employment immigration is costly to certain groups several major studies Notice the negative values in the “Wage Effect” column:
Table: Effect of Native Wages of an Inflow of Immigrants That Increases Labor Supply by 1%
The economist-activist Duflo once told a whopper about the National Academies’ report. According to her, the report “summarized maybe hundreds of studies, and they all come to the conclusion that the effect of low-skilled migration on low-skilled wages is zero.” assertions unmoored from reality fuel the impression of consensus about immigration’s benefits.
Recent Studies
Since 2016 academics have continued to produce papers finding costs associated with immigration authors are mainstream academics writing for mainstream outlets Borjas clearly has a lot of company authors usually stress that they have found both costs and benefits One-sided claims immigration are rarely true
Anthony Edo The Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market”, Journal of Economic Surveys July 2019
review paper takes a more international perspective considering over 50 studies of immigration in developed countries concludes immigration can create winners and losers among the native-born workers low-skill immigration tends to make low-skill natives the “losers” and high-skill natives the “winners”, rising inequality is a natural consequence stands in stark contrast to the advocates’ position that “there is no evidence that immigrants hurt any workers
Joseph Price Christian vom Lehn and Riley Wilson The Winners and Losers of Immigration: Evidence from Linked Historical Data NBER Working Paper No. 27156 May 2020
acknowledges the winner-loser framework right in its title genealogical data track millions between decennial censuses in the early 20th century , younger and less-skilled workers were the “losers” — they were more likely to move away and suffer income losses as a result of immigration
CIS emphasized strong disemployment effects on the youngest and least-skilled Americans of all: teenagers
David A. Jaeger Joakim Ruist and Jan Stuhler Shift-Share Instruments and the Impact of Immigration NBER Working Paper No. 24285 February 2018
studies try to isolate the impact of immigration on wages by comparing cities with different levels of immigration The problem immigrants do not choose destination cities randomly. If they choose cities that have rising wages, the negative impact may be obscured
shows that a common “instrumental variables” technique to deal with that problem still unintentionally captures more than just the initial impact of immigration When a local area experiences an influx of immigrants wage goes down for a time but then it rises back toward equilibrium as more businesses come in Since immigrants tend to go to the same places year after year, the instrumental-variables technique captures both the negative short-term wage effect and the positive "catch-up" wage effect from earlier waves of immigrants. As a result, all of the short-term wage effects estimated using this method appear less negative than they really are
The authors of this paper provide a long list of prior studies that underestimate negative wage effects . Giovanni Peri an economist famous for downplaying the negative impact of immigration, has 12 different papers on the list
Michael Amior and Alan Manning Monopsony and the Wage Effects of Migration CEP Discussion Paper No. 1690 May 2021
argue that various legal and cultural barriers prevent immigrants from moving between jobs as easily as natives do With less competition among employers to hire workers, immigration could reduce the ability of workers to demand a wage that reflects the full value of their labor both the surplus and the corresponding wage reductions would increase in magnitude
L. Jason Anastasopoulos George J. Borjas Gavin G. Cook and Michael Lachanski Job Vacancies and Immigration: Evidence from the Mariel Supply Shock Journal of Human Capital, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2021
Christian Dustmann Uta Schönberg and Jan Stuhler Labor Supply Shocks, Native Wages, and the Adjustment of Local Employment”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 132, No. 1., 2017
Maria Forthun Hoen, 2020
analyze immigration surges in different countries but come to similar conclusions a change in commuting policy led to a sudden increase in Czech workers in a border area of Germany result was lower wages and employment levels for natives, particularly for those who were older and had less attachment to the labor force an expansion of the EU labor market caused a surge of immigration to Norway. Wages for young workers fell in the most affected industries, and workers of all ages — especially older ones — experienced declines in employment and increases in disability enrollment
have important implications Expanding immigration in a tight labor market could short-circuit that employer outreach
Michael Amior The Contribution of Immigration to Local Labor Market Adjustment”, CEP Discussion Paper No. 1678 September 2021
Why don’t more Americans leave economically depressed places and move to the parts of the U.S. where more jobs are available? foreign immigration crowds them out immigrants tend to settle in high-employment areas, reducing the potential rewards for natives who move there
Javier Ortega and Gregory Verdugo Who Stays and Who Leaves? Immigration and the Selection of Natives Across Locations Journal of Economic Geography, Vol. 22, No. 2, March 2022
George J. Borjas and Anthony Edo Both of these papers show that immigration in France has imposed downward pressure on wages and encouraged natives to move away from high-immigration areas or leave the labor force entirely natives who exit tend to be less-skilled, the wage impact of immigration on a particular area may be understated if researchers do not take into account the new workforce composition
Joan Monras Local Adjustment to Immigrant-Driven Labor Supply Shocks”, Journal of Human Capital, Vol. 15, No 2021
demonstrates internal migration partially disguise longer-term labor market effects of immigration
Bin Xie The Effects of Immigration Quotas on Wages, the Great Black Migration, and Industrial Development IZA Discussion Paper No. 11214 December 2017.
studied results of restrictions on immigration are also instructive restrictive immigration laws in the 20s raised manufacturing wages and drew black migrants from the South into northern factories immigration deters natives from moving into emerging labor markets
Ran Abramitzky, Philipp Ager, Leah Boustan, Elior Cohen, and Casper W. Hansen The Effect of Immigration Restrictions on Local Labor Markets: Lessons from the 1920s Border Closure”, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
finds that 1920s immigration restrictions benefited rural Americans who migrated into cities to replace lost labor
Amy Wax and Jason Richwine, “Low-Skill Immigration: A Case for Restriction”, American Affairs, Winter 2017.
authors combine the “top-down” Census Bureau data on native job losses with “bottom-up” ethnographic research on employer preferences for immigrant labor make a strong qualitative case that businesses use immigrants to replace natives in their low-skill workforces
CIS published a follow-up report that focused on Equal Employment Opportunity Commission cases in which employers are accused of favoring immigrant workers over native workers cases are consistent with the claim that employers use immigration to depress wages and working conditions
Maria Hoen Simen Markussen and Knut Roed Immigration and Economic Mobility Journal of Population Economics 2021
Using data from Norway find that low-skill immigration has reduced social mobility, causing inequality to increase Opposition arises as a rational response to their weakened economic position
|
No fair reading of the lit could conclude immigration has only benefits
assertions unmoored from reality
review over 50 studies concludes low-skill immigration tends to rising inequality
genealogical data track millions younger workers were the “losers”
CIS emphasized effects on teenagers
instrumental variables captures more than initial impact effects appear less negative
prior studies underestimate negative wage effects
cultural barriers reduce ability to demand a wage
surges in the EU Wages fell and
short-circuit employer outreach
internal migration disguise longer-term market effects
employers use immigration to depress working conditions
reduced social mobility
|
Is there a scholarly consensus that immigration benefits all Americans? Listening to advocates and their allied media, one might assume so. Vox once ran this headline: “There's no evidence that immigrants hurt any American workers.” A writer for Forbes claimed that immigration restrictionists “are on the wrong side of history and the wrong side of social science”. Reason’s Shikha Dalmia has claimed that George Borjas is “literally the only economist of any repute who questions the economic benefits of immigration”.
The purpose of this compendium is to dispel such self-serving myths. The truth is that the costs and benefits of immigration are routinely measured, weighed, and debated in academic journals. No fair reading of the literature could conclude that immigration has only benefits — or only costs, for that matter. A 2016 review by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine demonstrated the mixed effects of immigration, as have dozens of studies appearing since that time. This compendium uses the National Academies as a starting point, then summarizes a sample of subsequently published papers that find costs associated with immigration. These papers address the labor market impact of immigration as well as broader effects.
The National Academies’ 2016 Review
Chapters 4 and 5 of the National Academies’ book-length report review the theoretical and empirical research on how immigration affects wages and employment. Anyone who takes the time to read this material will understand that immigration is costly to certain groups of Americans. For example, Table 5-2 from the report lists several major studies measuring immigration’s impact on wages. Notice the negative values in the “Wage Effect” column:
Table: Effect of Native Wages of an Inflow of Immigrants That Increases Labor Supply by 1%
Unfortunately, not everyone has done the reading. The economist-activist Esther Duflo once told a whopper about the National Academies’ report. According to her, the report “summarized maybe hundreds of studies, and they all come to the conclusion that the effect of low-skilled migration on low-skilled wages is zero.” It is these types of assertions, thoroughly unmoored from reality, that fuel the impression of consensus about immigration’s benefits.
Recent Studies
Since the National Academies’ report was published in 2016, academics have continued to produce papers finding costs associated with immigration. A curated list of these recent papers is provided below. Please note that the authors are mainstream academics writing for mainstream outlets. Harvard’s George Borjas, who was alleged to be “the only economist” to publish these types of studies, clearly has a lot of company. Like Borjas, these authors usually stress that they have found both costs and benefits. One-sided claims about immigration are rarely true.
In each of the following paper summaries, I focus on the immigration aspects of the paper, draw out policy implications, and link to related CIS research whenever helpful.
Wage and Employment Effects
Anthony Edo, “The Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market”, Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 33, No. 3, July 2019.
This review paper is similar in content to the National Academies’ chapters, but it takes a more international perspective. After considering over 50 studies of immigration in developed countries, the author concludes that “immigration can create winners and losers among the native-born workers.” Because low-skill immigration tends to make low-skill natives the “losers” and high-skill natives the “winners”, rising inequality is a natural consequence. This conclusion stands in stark contrast to the advocates’ position that “there is no evidence that immigrants hurt any American workers.” While some Americans gain from immigration, others certainly do lose.
Joseph Price, Christian vom Lehn, and Riley Wilson, “The Winners and Losers of Immigration: Evidence from Linked Historical Data”, NBER Working Paper No. 27156, May 2020.
This paper acknowledges the winner-loser framework right in its title. The authors use genealogical data to track millions of men between decennial censuses in the early 20th century. Following these individuals allows the authors to improve upon past research that focused only on community-level impacts of immigration. They find that older and higher-skilled workers were the “winners” — their incomes tended to go up when immigrants entered their local labor market. By contrast, younger and less-skilled workers were the “losers” — they were more likely to move away and suffer income losses as a result of immigration.
In the modern-day context, CIS has emphasized that immigration tends to have strong disemployment effects on the youngest and least-skilled Americans of all: teenagers.
David A. Jaeger, Joakim Ruist, and Jan Stuhler, “Shift-Share Instruments and the Impact of Immigration”, NBER Working Paper No. 24285, February 2018.
Several studies try to isolate the impact of immigration on wages by comparing cities with different levels of immigration. The problem is that immigrants do not choose destination cities randomly. If they choose cities that have rising wages, the negative impact of immigration may be obscured.
This paper shows that a common “instrumental variables” technique to deal with that problem still unintentionally captures more than just the initial impact of immigration. When a local area experiences an influx of immigrants, the wage goes down for a time, but then it rises back toward equilibrium as more businesses come in or other workers leave. Since immigrants tend to go to the same places year after year, the instrumental-variables technique captures both the negative short-term wage effect and the positive "catch-up" wage effect from earlier waves of immigrants. As a result, all of the short-term wage effects estimated using this method appear less negative than they really are.
The authors of this paper provide a long list of prior studies that underestimate negative wage effects because of this faulty method. Giovanni Peri, an economist famous for downplaying the negative impact of immigration, has 12 different papers on the list.
Michael Amior and Alan Manning, “Monopsony and the Wage Effects of Migration”, CEP Discussion Paper No. 1690, May 2021.
In the standard model first developed by George Borjas, immigrants produce small economic gains for natives (an “immigration surplus”) but do so by lowering the wages of competing workers. The model is built on the assumption of “perfect competition” in the labor market, meaning that employers compete for labor until the wage is bid up to equal the workers’ value added. But what happens if the assumption of perfect competition is relaxed?
The authors of this paper argue that various legal and cultural barriers prevent immigrants from moving between jobs as easily as natives do. With less competition among employers to hire workers, immigration could reduce the ability of workers to demand a wage that reflects the full value of their labor. If so, both the surplus and the corresponding wage reductions would increase in magnitude.
L. Jason Anastasopoulos, George J. Borjas, Gavin G. Cook, and Michael Lachanski, “Job Vacancies and Immigration: Evidence from the Mariel Supply Shock”, Journal of Human Capital, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2021.
It may seem that the Mariel Boatlift (summarized here by CIS) has been studied to death, but this is an innovative paper. It uses a database of historical job listings to establish that job vacancies for low-skill workers in Miami declined after a sudden wave of Cuban refugees arrived in the city in 1980. The implication is that the labor market was not able to immediately adjust to the influx of new workers.
Christian Dustmann, Uta Schönberg, and Jan Stuhler, “Labor Supply Shocks, Native Wages, and the Adjustment of Local Employment”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 132, No. 1., 2017.
Maria Forthun Hoen, “Immigration and the Tower of Babel: Using Language Barriers to Identify Individual Labor Market Effects of Immigration”, Labour Economics, Vol. 65, 2020.
These two papers analyze immigration surges in different countries but come to similar conclusions. In the first paper, a change in commuting policy led to a sudden increase in Czech workers in a border area of Germany. The result was lower wages and employment levels for natives, particularly for those who were older and had less attachment to the labor force. In the second paper, an expansion of the EU labor market caused a surge of immigration to Norway. Wages for young workers fell in the most affected industries, and workers of all ages — especially older ones — experienced declines in employment and increases in disability enrollment.
Although these two papers focus on Europe, they have important implications for U.S. policy. As CIS has argued, the tight labor market in the U.S. in 2019 led employers to recruit from marginalized groups such as high school dropouts and the disabled. Expanding immigration in a tight labor market could short-circuit that employer outreach.
Michael Amior, “The Contribution of Immigration to Local Labor Market Adjustment”, CEP Discussion Paper No. 1678, September 2021.
Why don’t more Americans leave economically depressed places and move to the parts of the U.S. where more jobs are available? One answer, according to this paper, is that foreign immigration crowds them out. New immigrants tend to settle in high-employment areas, reducing the potential rewards for natives who move there. This phenomenon again illustrates how immigration can limit the opportunities for down-and-out natives to benefit from economic growth.
Javier Ortega and Gregory Verdugo, “Who Stays and Who Leaves? Immigration and the Selection of Natives Across Locations”, Journal of Economic Geography, Vol. 22, No. 2, March 2022.
George J. Borjas and Anthony Edo, “Gender, Selection into Employment, and the Wage Impact of Immigration”, NBER Working Paper No. 28682, February 2022. Both of these papers show that immigration in France has imposed downward pressure on wages and encouraged natives to move away from high-immigration areas or leave the labor force entirely. Because the natives who exit tend to be less-skilled, the wage impact of immigration on a particular area may be understated if researchers do not take into account the new workforce composition.
Joan Monras, “Local Adjustment to Immigrant-Driven Labor Supply Shocks”, Journal of Human Capital, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2021.
This is another paper that demonstrates how internal migration can partially disguise longer-term labor market effects of immigration. After the Mariel boatlift initially caused wages to decline in Miami, the labor market returned to equilibrium. However, about half of the adaptation can be ascribed to low-skill workers moving away from (or declining to move to) Miami.
Bin Xie, “The Effects of Immigration Quotas on Wages, the Great Black Migration, and Industrial Development”, IZA Discussion Paper No. 11214, December 2017.
Just as economists have studied sudden surges in immigration to assess the labor market effects, the results of sudden restrictions on immigration are also instructive. According to this analysis, restrictive immigration laws in the 1920s raised manufacturing wages and drew black migrants from the South into northern factories. This result provides further support for the theory that immigration deters natives from moving into emerging labor markets.
Interestingly, immigration restriction also appears to have slowed the growth of electric-powered assembly lines, which illustrates how the relationship between skills and technology has changed over time. Low-skill workers were once needed to man the assembly lines that displaced skilled artisans. Today, technology generally advances with skilled workers — e.g., computer programmers in Silicon Valley. (See the Brunello et al. paper listed below for more on this point.)
Ran Abramitzky, Philipp Ager, Leah Boustan, Elior Cohen, and Casper W. Hansen, “The Effect of Immigration Restrictions on Local Labor Markets: Lessons from the 1920s Border Closure”, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, forthcoming.
This paper also finds that 1920s immigration restrictions benefited rural Americans who migrated into cities to replace lost labor. In contrast, farmers mechanized rather than attempting to recruit new workers.
Amy Wax and Jason Richwine, “Low-Skill Immigration: A Case for Restriction”, American Affairs, Winter 2017.
The authors combine the “top-down” Census Bureau data on native job losses with “bottom-up” ethnographic research on employer preferences for immigrant labor. They make a strong qualitative case that businesses use immigrants to replace natives in their low-skill workforces.
In 2019, CIS published a follow-up report that focused on Equal Employment Opportunity Commission cases in which employers are accused of favoring immigrant workers over native workers. The details of these cases are consistent with the claim that employers use immigration to depress wages and working conditions.
Maria Hoen, Simen Markussen, and Knut Roed, “Immigration and Economic Mobility”, Journal of Population Economics, 2021.
Using administrative data from Norway, the authors find that low-skill immigration has reduced social mobility, causing inequality to increase. Interestingly, they connect their findings to the politics of immigration. Opposition to immigration from lower classes in Norway arises not necessarily from “bigotry”, but as a rational response to their weakened economic position.
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<h4>Their ev relies on an <u>echo-chamber</u> of activists that use <u>flawed data</u>—tons of <u>recent</u> studies <u>negate</u>.</h4><p><strong>Richwine 22</strong> [Jason; 6-27-22; PhD in Public Policy from Harvard University in 2009, completing the degree on a dissertation fellowship with the American Enterprise Institute. Before Harvard, he attended American University, where he received both a BS in Mathematics and a BA in Political Science. “A Compendium of Recent Academic Work Showing Negative Impacts of Immigration,” https://cis.org/Richwine/Abundance-New-Academic-Studies-Find-Negative-Impacts-Immigration] brett</p><p><u>Is there a scholarly consensus that immigration benefits all</u> Americans<u>? Listening to advocates and their allied media, one might assume so</u>. Vox once ran this headline: “There's no evidence that immigrants hurt any American workers.” A writer for Forbes claimed that immigration restrictionists “are on the wrong side of history and the wrong side of social science”. Reason’s Shikha Dalmia has claimed that George Borjas is “literally the only economist of any repute who questions the economic benefits of immigration”.</p><p><u>The purpose of this compendium is to dispel such self-serving myths</u>. The truth is that <u>the costs and benefits of immigration are routinely measured, weighed, and debated in academic journals</u>. <u><mark>No fair reading of the</mark> <mark>lit</mark>erature <mark>could conclude</mark> that <mark>immigration has only benefits</mark> — or only costs, for that matter</u>. A 2016 review by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine demonstrated the mixed effects of immigration, as have dozens of studies appearing since that time. This compendium uses the National Academies as a starting point, then summarizes a sample of subsequently published papers that find costs associated with immigration. These papers address<u> the labor market impact of immigration as well as broader effects.</p><p>The National Academies’ 2016 Review</p><p>Chapters 4 and 5 of the National Academies’</u> <u>book-length report review</u> <u>the theoretical and empirical research</u> <u>on how immigration affects wages and employment</u>. Anyone who takes the time to read this material will understand that <u>immigration</u> <u>is costly to certain groups</u> of Americans. For example, Table 5-2 from the report lists <u>several major studies</u> measuring immigration’s impact on wages. <u>Notice the negative values in the “Wage Effect” column:</p><p>Table: Effect of Native Wages of an Inflow of Immigrants That Increases Labor Supply by 1%</p><p></u>Unfortunately, not everyone has done the reading. <u>The economist-activist</u> Esther <u>Duflo</u> <u>once told a whopper about the National Academies’ report. According to her, the report “summarized maybe hundreds of studies, and they all come to the conclusion that the effect of low-skilled migration on low-skilled wages is zero.”</u> It is these types of <u><mark>assertions</u></mark>, thoroughly <u><mark>unmoored from reality</u></mark>, that <u>fuel the impression of consensus about immigration’s benefits.</p><p>Recent Studies</p><p>Since</u> the National Academies’ report was published in <u>2016</u>, <u>academics have continued to produce papers finding costs associated with immigration</u>. A curated list of these recent papers is provided below. Please note that the <u>authors are mainstream academics writing for mainstream outlets</u>. Harvard’s George <u>Borjas</u>, who was alleged to be “the only economist” to publish these types of studies, <u>clearly has a lot of company</u>. Like Borjas, these <u>authors usually stress that they have found both costs and benefits</u>. <u>One-sided claims</u> about <u>immigration are rarely true</u>.</p><p>In each of the following paper summaries, I focus on the immigration aspects of the paper, draw out policy implications, and link to related CIS research whenever helpful.</p><p>Wage and Employment Effects</p><p><u>Anthony Edo</u>, “<u>The Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market”,</u> <u>Journal of Economic Surveys</u>, Vol. 33, No. 3, <u>July 2019</u>.</p><p>This <u><mark>review</mark> paper</u> is similar in content to the National Academies’ chapters, but it <u>takes a more international perspective</u>. After <u>considering <mark>over 50 studies</mark> of immigration in developed countries</u>, the author <u><mark>concludes</u></mark> that “<u>immigration can create winners and losers among the native-born workers</u>.” Because <u><mark>low-skill immigration</u></mark> <u><mark>tends to</mark> make low-skill natives the “losers” and high-skill natives the “winners”, <mark>rising inequality</mark> is a natural consequence</u>. This conclusion <u>stands in stark contrast to the advocates’ position that “there is no evidence that immigrants hurt any</u> American <u>workers</u>.” While some Americans gain from immigration, others certainly do lose.</p><p><u>Joseph Price</u>, <u>Christian vom Lehn</u>, <u>and</u> <u>Riley Wilson</u>, “<u>The Winners and Losers of Immigration: Evidence from Linked Historical Data</u>”, <u>NBER Working Paper No. 27156</u>, <u>May 2020</u>.</p><p>This paper <u>acknowledges the winner-loser framework right in its title</u>. The authors use <u><mark>genealogical data</u></mark> to <u><mark>track millions</u></mark> of men <u>between decennial censuses in the early 20th century</u>. Following these individuals allows the authors to improve upon past research that focused only on community-level impacts of immigration. They find that older and higher-skilled workers were the “winners” — their incomes tended to go up when immigrants entered their local labor market. By contrast<u>, <mark>younger</mark> and less-skilled <mark>workers were the “losers”</mark> — they were more likely to move away and suffer income losses as a result of immigration</u>.</p><p>In the modern-day context, <u><mark>CIS</u></mark> has <u><mark>emphasized</u></mark> that immigration tends to have <u>strong disemployment <mark>effects on</mark> the youngest and least-skilled Americans of all: <mark>teenagers</u></mark>.</p><p><u>David A. Jaeger</u>, <u>Joakim Ruist</u>, <u>and</u> <u>Jan Stuhler</u>, “<u>Shift-Share Instruments and the Impact of Immigration</u>”, <u>NBER Working Paper No. 24285</u>, <u>February 2018</u>.</p><p>Several <u>studies try to isolate the impact of immigration on wages by comparing cities with different levels of immigration</u>. <u>The problem</u> is that <u>immigrants do not choose destination cities randomly. If they choose cities that have rising wages, the negative impact</u> of immigration <u>may be obscured</u>.</p><p>This paper <u>shows that a common “<mark>instrumental variables</mark>” technique to deal with that problem still unintentionally <mark>captures more than</mark> just the <mark>initial impact</mark> of immigration</u>. <u>When a local area experiences an influx of immigrants</u>, the <u>wage goes down for a time</u>, <u>but then it rises back toward equilibrium as more businesses come in</u> or other workers leave. <u>Since immigrants tend to go to the same places year after year, the instrumental-variables technique captures both the negative short-term wage effect and the positive "catch-up"</u> <u>wage effect from earlier waves of immigrants. As a result, all of the short-term wage <mark>effects</mark> estimated using this method <mark>appear less negative</mark> than they really are</u>.</p><p><u>The authors of this paper provide a long list of <mark>prior studies</mark> that <mark>underestimate negative wage effects</u></mark> because of this faulty method<u>. Giovanni Peri</u>, <u>an economist famous for downplaying the negative impact of immigration, has 12 different papers on the list</u>.</p><p><u>Michael Amior and</u> <u>Alan Manning</u>, “<u>Monopsony and the Wage Effects of Migration</u>”, <u>CEP Discussion Paper No. 1690</u>, <u>May 2021</u>.</p><p>In the standard model first developed by George Borjas, immigrants produce small economic gains for natives (an “immigration surplus”) but do so by lowering the wages of competing workers. The model is built on the assumption of “perfect competition” in the labor market, meaning that employers compete for labor until the wage is bid up to equal the workers’ value added. But what happens if the assumption of perfect competition is relaxed?</p><p>The authors of this paper <u>argue that various legal and <mark>cultural barriers</mark> prevent immigrants from moving between jobs as easily as natives do</u>. <u>With less competition among employers to hire workers, immigration could <mark>reduce</mark> the <mark>ability</mark> of workers <mark>to demand a wage</mark> that reflects the full value of their labor</u>. If so, <u>both the surplus and the corresponding wage reductions would increase in magnitude</u>.</p><p><u>L. Jason Anastasopoulos</u>, <u>George J. Borjas</u>, <u>Gavin G. Cook</u>, <u>and</u> <u>Michael Lachanski</u>, “<u>Job Vacancies and Immigration: Evidence from the Mariel Supply Shock</u>”, <u>Journal of Human Capital, Vol. 15, No. 1,</u> <u>2021</u>.</p><p>It may seem that the Mariel Boatlift (summarized here by CIS) has been studied to death, but this is an innovative paper. It uses a database of historical job listings to establish that job vacancies for low-skill workers in Miami declined after a sudden wave of Cuban refugees arrived in the city in 1980. The implication is that the labor market was not able to immediately adjust to the influx of new workers.</p><p><u>Christian Dustmann</u>, <u>Uta Schönberg</u>, <u>and</u> <u>Jan Stuhler</u>, “<u>Labor Supply Shocks, Native Wages, and the Adjustment of Local Employment”,</u> <u>Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 132, No. 1.,</u> <u>2017</u>.</p><p><u>Maria Forthun Hoen,</u> “Immigration and the Tower of Babel: Using Language Barriers to Identify Individual Labor Market Effects of Immigration”, Labour Economics, Vol. 65, <u>2020</u>.</p><p>These two papers <u>analyze immigration <mark>surges in</mark> different countries but come to similar conclusions</u>. In the first paper, <u>a change in commuting policy led to a sudden increase in Czech workers in a border area of Germany</u>. The <u>result was lower wages and employment levels for natives, particularly for those who were older and had less attachment to the labor force</u>. In the second paper, <u>an expansion of <mark>the EU</mark> labor market caused a surge of immigration to Norway.</u> <u><mark>Wages</mark> for young workers <mark>fell</mark> in the most affected industries, <mark>and</mark> workers of all ages — especially older ones — experienced declines in employment and increases in disability enrollment</u>.</p><p>Although these two papers focus on Europe, they <u>have important implications</u> for U.S. policy. As CIS has argued, the tight labor market in the U.S. in 2019 led employers to recruit from marginalized groups such as high school dropouts and the disabled. <u>Expanding immigration in a tight labor market could <mark>short-circuit</mark> that <mark>employer outreach</u></mark>.</p><p><u>Michael Amior</u>, “<u>The Contribution of Immigration to Local Labor Market Adjustment”,</u> <u>CEP Discussion Paper No. 1678</u>, <u>September 2021</u>.</p><p><u>Why don’t more Americans leave economically depressed places and move to the parts of the U.S. where more jobs are available?</u> One answer, according to this paper, is that <u>foreign immigration crowds them out</u>. New <u>immigrants tend to settle in high-employment areas, reducing the potential rewards for natives who move there</u>. This phenomenon again illustrates how immigration can limit the opportunities for down-and-out natives to benefit from economic growth.</p><p><u>Javier Ortega</u> <u>and</u> <u>Gregory Verdugo</u>, “<u>Who Stays and Who Leaves? Immigration and the Selection of Natives Across Locations</u>”, <u>Journal of Economic Geography, Vol. 22, No. 2,</u> <u>March 2022</u>.</p><p><u>George J. Borjas</u> <u>and</u> <u>Anthony Edo</u>, “Gender, Selection into Employment, and the Wage Impact of Immigration”, NBER Working Paper No. 28682, February 2022. <u>Both of these papers show that immigration in France has imposed downward pressure on wages and encouraged natives to move away from high-immigration areas or leave the labor force entirely</u>. Because the <u>natives who exit tend to be less-skilled, the wage impact of immigration on a particular area may be understated if researchers do not take into account the new workforce composition</u>.</p><p><u>Joan Monras</u>, “<u>Local Adjustment to Immigrant-Driven Labor Supply Shocks”,</u> <u>Journal of Human Capital, Vol. 15, No</u>. 1, <u>2021</u>.</p><p>This is another paper that <u>demonstrates</u> how <u><mark>internal migration</u></mark> can <u>partially <mark>disguise longer-term</mark> labor <mark>market effects</mark> of immigration</u>. After the Mariel boatlift initially caused wages to decline in Miami, the labor market returned to equilibrium. However, about half of the adaptation can be ascribed to low-skill workers moving away from (or declining to move to) Miami.</p><p><u>Bin Xie</u>, “<u>The Effects of Immigration Quotas on Wages, the Great Black Migration, and Industrial Development</u>”, <u>IZA Discussion Paper No. 11214</u>, <u>December 2017.</p><p></u>Just as economists have <u>studied</u> sudden surges in immigration to assess the labor market effects, the <u>results of</u> sudden <u>restrictions on immigration are also instructive</u>. According to this analysis, <u>restrictive immigration laws</u> <u>in the</u> 19<u>20s</u> <u>raised manufacturing wages and drew black migrants from the South into northern factories</u>. This result provides further support for the theory that <u>immigration deters natives from moving into emerging labor markets</u>.</p><p>Interestingly, immigration restriction also appears to have slowed the growth of electric-powered assembly lines, which illustrates how the relationship between skills and technology has changed over time. Low-skill workers were once needed to man the assembly lines that displaced skilled artisans. Today, technology generally advances with skilled workers — e.g., computer programmers in Silicon Valley. (See the Brunello et al. paper listed below for more on this point.)</p><p><u>Ran Abramitzky, Philipp Ager, Leah Boustan, Elior Cohen, and Casper W. Hansen</u>, “<u>The Effect of Immigration Restrictions on Local Labor Markets: Lessons from the 1920s Border Closure”,</u> <u>American Economic Journal: Applied Economics</u>, forthcoming.</p><p>This paper also <u>finds that 1920s immigration restrictions benefited rural Americans who migrated into cities to replace lost labor</u>. In contrast, farmers mechanized rather than attempting to recruit new workers.</p><p><u>Amy Wax and Jason Richwine, “Low-Skill Immigration: A Case for Restriction”, American Affairs,</u> <u>Winter 2017.</p><p></u>The <u>authors combine the “top-down” Census Bureau data on native job losses with “bottom-up” ethnographic research on employer preferences for immigrant labor</u>. They <u>make a strong qualitative case that businesses use immigrants to replace natives in their low-skill workforces</u>.</p><p>In 2019, <u>CIS published a follow-up report</u> <u>that focused on Equal Employment Opportunity Commission cases in which employers are accused of favoring immigrant workers over native workers</u>. The details of these <u>cases are consistent with the claim that <mark>employers use immigration to</mark> <mark>depress</mark> wages and <mark>working conditions</u></mark>.</p><p><u>Maria Hoen</u>, <u>Simen Markussen</u>, <u>and</u> <u>Knut Roed</u>, “<u>Immigration and Economic Mobility</u>”, <u>Journal of Population Economics</u>, <u>2021</u>.</p><p><u>Using</u> administrative <u>data from Norway</u>, the authors <u>find that low-skill immigration has <mark>reduced</mark> <mark>social mobility</mark>, causing inequality to increase</u>. Interestingly, they connect their findings to the politics of immigration. <u>Opposition</u> to immigration from lower classes in Norway <u>arises</u> not necessarily from “bigotry”, but <u>as a rational response to their weakened economic position</u>.</p>
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Hey I'm Jason - contact at [email protected]
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Nuke war causes extinction, which outweighs.
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Todd 17
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Todd 17 [Ben has a 1st from Oxford in Physics and Philosophy, has published in Climate Physics, once kick-boxed for Oxford, and speaks Chinese, badly. "The case for reducing extinction risk." https://80000hours.org/articles/extinction-risk/] brett
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what should be our as a civilisation? our first priority should be to survive So long as civilisation continues to exist, we’ll have the chance to solve all our other problems, and have a far better future. But if we go extinct, that’s it progress have improved dramatically our descendants have vastly better lives It is possible to end poverty prevent climate change, alleviate suffering, and more Each new technology yields huge benefits the present generation lives in the most prosperous period in human history Even a “mild” nuclear winter cause mass starvation nuclear war to permanently end civilisation risks from nuclear weapons are greater than all the natural risks put together the stakes are millions of times A nuclear war imperils all of our descendants for as long as there will be humans. Even if the population remains static, with an average lifetime of the order of 100 years, over a typical time period for the biological evolution of a successful species we are talking about some 500 trillion people yet to come Improved wealth and tech makes us more resilient to natural risks If we could improve decision-making ability of people and institutions it would help to make society in general more resilient, and solve many other problems
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our first priority should be to survive we’ll have the chance to solve other problems if we go extinct, that’s it progress improved dramatically our descendants have vastly better lives Even “mild” nuclear winter permanently end civilisation risks are greater than all natural risks put together nuclear war imperils 500 trillion people
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In this new age, what should be our biggest priority as a civilisation? Improving technology? Helping the poor? Changing the political system? Here’s a suggestion that’s not so often discussed: our first priority should be to survive. So long as civilisation continues to exist, we’ll have the chance to solve all our other problems, and have a far better future. But if we go extinct, that’s it. Why isn’t this priority more discussed? Here’s one reason: many people don’t yet appreciate the change in situation, and so don’t think our future is at risk. Social science researcher Spencer Greenberg surveyed Americans on their estimate of the chances of human extinction within 50 years. The results found that many think the chances are extremely low, with over 30% guessing they’re under one in ten million.3 We used to think the risks were extremely low as well, but when we looked into it, we changed our minds. As we’ll see, researchers who study these issues think the risks are over one thousand times higher, and are probably increasing. These concerns have started a new movement working to safeguard civilisation, which has been joined by Stephen Hawking, Max Tegmark, and new institutes founded by researchers at Cambridge, MIT, Oxford, and elsewhere. In the rest of this article, we cover the greatest risks to civilisation, including some that might be bigger than nuclear war and climate change. We then make the case that reducing these risks could be the most important thing you do with your life, and explain exactly what you can do to help. If you would like to use your career to work on these issues, we can also give one-on-one support. Reading time: 25 minutes How likely are you to be killed by an asteroid? An overview of naturally occurring existential risks A one in ten million chance of extinction in the next 50 years — what many people think the risk is — must be an underestimate. Naturally occurring existential risks can be estimated pretty accurately from history, and are much higher. If Earth was hit by a 1km-wide asteroid, there’s a chance that civilisation would be destroyed. By looking at the historical record, and tracking the objects in the sky, astronomers can estimate the risk of an asteroid this size hitting Earth as about 1 in 5000 per century.4 That’s higher than most people’s chances of being in a plane crash (about one in five million per flight), and already about 1000-times higher than the one in ten million risk that some people estimated.5 Some argue that although a 1km-sized object would be a disaster, it wouldn’t be enough to cause extinction, so this is a high estimate of the risk. But on the other hand, there are other naturally occurring risks, such as supervolcanoes.6 All this said, natural risks are still quite small in absolute terms. An upcoming paper by Dr. Toby Ord estimated that if we sum all the natural risks together, they’re very unlikely to add up to more than a 1 in 300 chance of extinction per century.7 Unfortunately, as we’ll now show, the natural risks are dwarfed by the human-caused ones. And this is why the risk of extinction has become an especially urgent issue. A history of progress, leading to the start of the most dangerous epoch in human history If you look at history over millennia, the basic message is that for a long-time almost everyone was poor, and then in the 18th century, that changed.8 Large economic growth created the conditions in which now face anthropogenic existential risks This was caused by the industrial revolution — perhaps the most important event in history. It wasn’t just wealth that grew. The following chart shows that over the long-term, life expectancy, energy use and democracy have all grown rapidly, while the percentage living in poverty has dramatically decreased.9 Chart prepared by Luke Muehlhauser in 2017. Literacy and education levels have also dramatically increased: Image source. People also seem to become happier as they get wealthier. In The Better Angels of Our Nature, Steven Pinker argues that violence is going down.10 Individual freedom has increased, while racism, sexism and homophobia have decreased. Many people think the world is getting worse,11 and it’s true that modern civilisation does some terrible things, such as factory farming. But as you can see in the data, many important measures of progress have improved dramatically. More to the point, no matter what you think has happened in the past, if we look forward, improving technology, political organisation and freedom gives our descendants the potential to solve our current problems, and have vastly better lives.12 It is possible to end poverty, prevent climate change, alleviate suffering, and more. But also notice the purple line on the second chart: war-making capacity. It’s based on estimates of global military power by the historian Ian Morris, and it has also increased dramatically. Here’s the issue: improving technology holds the possibility of enormous gains, but also enormous risks. Each time we discover a new technology, most of the time it yields huge benefits. But there’s also a chance we discover a technology with more destructive power than we have the ability to wisely use. And so, although the present generation lives in the most prosperous period in human history, it’s plausibly also the most dangerous. The first destructive technology of this kind was nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons: a history of near-misses Today we all have North Korea’s nuclear programme on our minds, but current events are just one chapter in a long saga of near misses. We came near to nuclear war several times during the Cuban Missile crisis alone.13 In one incident, the Americans resolved that if one of their spy planes were shot down, they would immediately invade Cuba without a further War Council meeting. The next day, a spy plane was shot down. JFK called the council anyway, and decided against invading. An invasion of Cuba might well have triggered nuclear war; it later emerged that Castro was in favour of nuclear retaliation even if “it would’ve led to the complete annihilation of Cuba”. Some of the launch commanders in Cuba also had independent authority to target American forces with tactical nuclear weapons in the event of an invasion. In another incident, a Russian nuclear submarine was trying to smuggle materials into Cuba when they were discovered by the American fleet. The fleet began to drop dummy depth charges to force the submarine to surface. The Russian captain thought they were real depth charges and that, while out of radio communication, the third world war had started. He ordered a nuclear strike on the American fleet with one of their nuclear torpedoes. Fortunately, he needed the approval of other senior officers. One, Vasili Arkhipov, disagreed, preventing war. Thanks to Vasili Arkhipov, we narrowly averted a global catastrophic risk from nuclear weapons Thank you Vasili Arkhipov. Putting all these events together, JFK later estimated that the chances of nuclear war were “between one in three and even”.14 There have been plenty of other close calls with Russia, even after the Cold War, as listed on this nice Wikipedia page. And those are just the ones we know about. Nuclear experts today are just as concerned about tensions between India and Pakistan, which both possess nuclear weapons, as North Korea.15 The key problem is that several countries maintain large nuclear arsenals that are ready to be deployed in minutes. This means that a false alarm or accident can rapidly escalate into a full-blown nuclear war, especially in times of tense foreign relations. Would a nuclear war end civilisation? It was initially thought that a nuclear blast might be so hot that it would ignite the atmosphere and make the Earth uninhabitable. Scientists estimated this was sufficiently unlikely that the weapons could be “safely” tested, and we now know this won’t happen. In the 1980s, the concern was that ash from burning buildings would plunge the Earth into a long-term winter that would make it impossible to grow crops for decades.16 Modern climate models suggest that a nuclear winter severe enough to kill everyone is very unlikely, though it’s hard to be confident due to model uncertainty.17 Even a “mild” nuclear winter, however, could still cause mass starvation.18 For this and other reasons, a nuclear war would be extremely destabilising, and it’s unclear whether civilisation could recover. How likely is a nuclear war to permanently end civilisation? It’s very hard to estimate, but it seems hard to conclude that the chance of a civilisation-ending nuclear war in the next century isn’t over 0.3%. That would mean the risks from nuclear weapons are greater than all the natural risks put together. (Read more about nuclear risks.) This is why the 1950s marked the start of a new age for humanity. For the first time in history, it became possible for a small number of decision-makers to wreak havoc on the whole world. We now pose the greatest threat to our own survival — that makes today the most dangerous point in human history. And nuclear weapons aren’t the only way we could end civilisation. How big is the risk of run-away climate change? In 2015, President Obama said in his State of the Union address that:19 “No challenge poses a greater threat to future generations than climate change” Climate change is certainly a major risk to civilisation. The graph below shows estimates of climate sensitivity. Climate sensitivity is how much warming to expect in the long-term if CO2 concentrations double, which is roughly what’s expected within the century. Does climate change pose an existential risk? Wagner and Weitzman predict a greater than 10% chance of greater than 6 degrees celsius of warming. Image source The most likely outcome is 2-4 degrees of warming, which would be bad, but survivable. However, these estimates give a 10% chance of warming over 6 degrees, and perhaps a 1% chance of warming of 9 degrees. That would render large fractions of the Earth functionally uninhabitable, requiring at least a massive reorganisation of society. It would also probably increase conflict, and make us more vulnerable to other risks. (If you’re sceptical of climate models, then you should increase your uncertainty, which makes the situation more worrying.) So, it seems like the chance of a massive climate disaster created by CO2 is perhaps similar to the chance of a nuclear war. Researchers who study these issues think nuclear war seems more likely to result in outright extinction, due to the possibility of nuclear winter, which is why we think nuclear weapons pose an even greater risk than climate change. That said, climate change is certainly a major problem, which should raise our estimate of the risks even higher. (Read more about run-away climate change.) What new technologies might be as dangerous as nuclear weapons? The invention of nuclear weapons led to the anti-nuclear movement just a decade later in the 1960s, and the environmentalist movement soon adopted the cause of fighting climate change. What’s less appreciated is that new technologies will present further catastrophic risks. This is why we need a movement that is concerned with safeguarding civilisation in general. Predicting the future of technology is difficult, but because we only have one civilisation, we need to try our best. Here are some candidates for the next technology that’s as dangerous as nuclear weapons. In 1918-1919, over 3% of the world’s population died of the Spanish Flu.20 If such a pandemic arose today, it might be even harder to contain due to rapid global transport. What’s more concerning, though, is that it may soon be possible to genetically engineer a virus that’s as contagious as the Spanish Flu, but also deadlier, and which could spread for years undetected. That would be a weapon with the destructive power of nuclear weapons, but far harder to prevent from being used. Nuclear weapons require huge factories and rare materials to make, which makes them relatively easy to control. Designer viruses might be possible to create in a lab with a couple of biology PhDs. In fact, in 2006, The Guardian was able to receive segments of the extinct smallpox virus by mail order.21 Some terrorist groups have expressed interest in using indiscriminate weapons like these. (Read more about pandemic risks.) In fact, in 2006, The Guardian was able to receive segments of the extinct smallpox virus by mail order. Relevant experts suggest synthetic pathogens could potentially pose a global catastrophic risk. Who ordered the smallpox? Credit: The Guardian Another new technology with huge potential power is artificial intelligence. The reason that humans are in charge and not chimps is purely a matter of intelligence. Our large and powerful brains give us incredible control of the world, despite the fact that we are so much physically weaker than chimpanzees. So then what would happen if one day we created something much more intelligent than ourselves? In 2017, 350 researchers who have published peer-reviewed research into artificial intelligence at top conferences were polled about when they believe that we will develop computers with human-level intelligence: that is, a machine that is capable of carrying out all work tasks better than humans. The median estimate was that there is a 50% chance we will develop high-level machine intelligence in 45 years, and 75% by the end of the century.22 Graph of expert prediction from Grace et al: The median estimate was that there is a 50% chance we will develop high-level machine intelligence in 45 years These probabilities are hard to estimate, and the researchers gave very different figures depending on precisely how you ask the question.23 Nevertheless, it seems there is at least a reasonable chance that some kind of transformative machine intelligence is invented in the next century. Moreover, greater uncertainty means that it might come sooner than people think rather than later. What risks might this development pose? The original pioneers in computing, like Alan Turing and Marvin Minsky, raised concerns about the risks of powerful computer systems,24 and these risks are still around today. We’re not talking about computers “turning evil”. Rather, one concern is that a powerful AI system could be used by one group to gain control of the world, or otherwise be mis-used. If the USSR had developed nuclear weapons 10 years before the USA, the USSR might have become the dominant global power. Powerful computer technology might pose similar risks. Another concern is that deploying the system could have unintended consequences, since it would be difficult to predict what something smarter than us would do. A sufficiently powerful system might also be difficult to control, and so be hard to reverse once implemented. These concerns have been documented by Oxford Professor Nick Bostrom in Superintelligence and by AI pioneer Stuart Russell. Most experts think that better AI will be a hugely positive development, but they also agree there are risks. In the survey we just mentioned, AI experts estimated that the development of high-level machine intelligence has a 10% chance of a “bad outcome” and a 5% chance of an “extremely bad” outcome, such as human extinction.22 And we should probably expect this group to be positively biased, since, after all, they make their living from the technology. Putting the estimates together, if there’s a 75% chance that high-level machine intelligence is developed in the next century, then this means that the chance of a major AI disaster is 5% of 75%, which is about 4%. (Read more about risks from artificial intelligence.) People have raised concern about other new technologies, such as other forms of geo-engineering and atomic manufacturing, but they seem significantly less imminent, so are widely seen as less dangerous than the other technologies we’ve covered. You can see a longer list of existential risks here. What’s probably more concerning is the risks we haven’t thought of yet. If you had asked people in 1900 what the greatest risks to civilisation were, they probably wouldn’t have suggested nuclear weapons, genetic engineering or artificial intelligence, since none of these were yet invented. It’s possible we’re in the same situation looking forward to the next century. Future “unknown unknowns” might pose a greater risk than the risks we know today. Each time we discover a new technology, it’s a little like betting against a single number on a roulette wheel. Most of the time we win, and the technology is overall good. But each time there’s also a small chance the technology gives us more destructive power than we can handle, and we lose everything. Each new technology we develop has both unprecedented potential and perils. Image source. What’s the total risk of human extinction if we add everything together? Many experts who study these issues estimate that the total chance of human extinction in the next century is between 1 and 20%. For instance, an informal poll in 2008 at a conference on catastrophic risks found they believe it’s pretty likely we’ll face a catastrophe that kills over a billion people, and estimate a 19% chance of extinction before 2100.25 Risk At least 1 billion dead Human extinction Number killed by molecular nanotech weapons. 10% 5% Total killed by superintelligent AI. 5% 5% Total killed in all wars (including civil wars). 30% 4% Number killed in the single biggest engineered pandemic. 10% 2% Total killed in all nuclear wars. 10% 1% Number killed in the single biggest nanotech accident. 1% 0.5% Number killed in the single biggest natural pandemic. 5% 0.05% Total killed in all acts of nuclear terrorism. 1% 0.03% Overall risk of extinction prior to 2100 n/a 19% These figures are about one million times higher than what people normally think. In our podcast episode with Will MacAskill we discuss why he puts the risk of extinction this century at around 1%. In his his book The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity, Dr Toby Ord gives his guess at our total existential risk this century as 1 in 6 — a roll of the dice. Listen to our episode with Toby. What should we make of these estimates? Presumably, the researchers only work on these issues because they think they’re so important, so we should expect their estimates to be high (“selection bias”). But does that mean we can dismiss their concerns entirely? Given this, what’s our personal best guess? It’s very hard to say, but we find it hard to confidently ignore the risks. Overall, we guess the risk is likely over 3%. Why helping to safeguard the future could be the most important thing you can do with your life How much should we prioritise working to reduce these risks compared to other issues, like global poverty, ending cancer or political change? At 80,000 Hours, we do research to help people find careers with positive social impact. As part of this, we try to find the most urgent problems in the world to work on. We evaluate different global problems using our problem framework, which compares problems in terms of: Scale – how many are affected by the problem Neglectedness -how many people are working on it already Solvability – how easy it is to make progress If you apply this framework, we think that safeguarding the future comes out as the world’s biggest priority. And so, if you want to have a big positive impact with your career, this is the top area to focus on. In the next few sections, we’ll evaluate this issue on scale, neglectedness and solvability, drawing heavily on Existential Risk Prevention as a Global Priority by Nick Bostrom and unpublished work by Toby Ord, as well as our own research. First, let’s start with the scale of the issue. We’ve argued there’s likely over a 3% chance of extinction in the next century. How big an issue is this? One figure we can look at is how many people might die in such a catastrophe. The population of the Earth in the middle of the century will be about 10 billion, so a 3% chance of everyone dying means the expected number of deaths is about 300 million. This is probably more deaths than we can expect over the next century due to the diseases of poverty, like malaria.26 Many of the risks we’ve covered could also cause a “medium” catastrophe rather than one that ends civilisation, and this is presumably significantly more likely. The survey we covered earlier suggested over a 10% chance of a catastrophe that kills over 1 billion people in the next century, which would be at least another 100 million deaths in expectation, along with far more suffering among those who survive. So, even if we only focus on the impact on the present generation, these catastrophic risks are one of the most serious issues facing humanity. But this is a huge underestimate of the scale of the problem, because if civilisation ends, then we give up our entire future too. Most people want to leave a better world for their grandchildren, and most also think we should have some concern for future generations more broadly. There could be many more people having great lives in the future than there are people alive today, and we should have some concern for their interests. There’s a possibility that human civilization could last for millions of years, so when we consider the impact of the risks on future generations, the stakes are millions of times higher — for good or evil. As Carl Sagan wrote on the costs of nuclear war in Foreign Affairs: A nuclear war imperils all of our descendants, for as long as there will be humans. Even if the population remains static, with an average lifetime of the order of 100 years, over a typical time period for the biological evolution of a successful species (roughly ten million years), we are talking about some 500 trillion people yet to come. By this criterion, the stakes are one million times greater for extinction than for the more modest nuclear wars that kill “only” hundreds of millions of people. There are many other possible measures of the potential loss–including culture and science, the evolutionary history of the planet, and the significance of the lives of all of our ancestors who contributed to the future of their descendants. Extinction is the undoing of the human enterprise. We’re glad the Romans didn’t let humanity go extinct, since it means that all of modern civilisation has been able to exist. We think we owe a similar responsibility to the people who will come after us, assuming (as we believe) that they are likely to lead fulfilling lives. It would be reckless and unjust to endanger their existence just to make ourselves better off in the short-term. It’s not just that there might be more people in the future. As Sagan also pointed out, no matter what you think is of value, there is potentially a lot more of it in the future. Future civilisation could create a world without need or want, and make mindblowing intellectual and artistic achievements. We could build a far more just and virtuous society. And there’s no in-principle reason why civilisation couldn’t reach other planets, of which there are some 100 billion in our galaxy.27 If we let civilisation end, then none of this can ever happen. We’re unsure whether this great future will really happen, but that’s all the more reason to keep civilisation going so we have a chance to find out. Failing to pass on the torch to the next generation might be the worst thing we could ever do. So, a couple of percent risk that civilisation ends seems likely to be the biggest issue facing the world today. What’s also striking is just how neglected these risks are. Why these risks are some of the most neglected global issues Here is how much money per year goes into some important causes:28 Cause Annual targeted spending from all sources (highly approximate) Global R&D $1.5 trillion Luxury goods $1.3 trillion US social welfare $900 billion Climate change >$300 billion To the global poor >$250 billion Nuclear security $1-10 billion Extreme pandemic prevention $1 billion AI safety research $10 million As you can see, we spend a vast amount of resources on R&D to develop even more powerful technology. We also expend a lot in a (possibly misguided) attempt to improve our lives by buying luxury goods. Far less is spent mitigating catastrophic risks from climate change. Welfare spending in the US alone dwarfs global spending on climate change. But climate change still receives enormous amounts of money compared to some of these other risks we’ve covered. We roughly estimate that the prevention of extreme global pandemics receives under 300 times less, even though the size of the risk seems about the same. Research to avoid accidents from AI systems is the most neglected of all, perhaps receiving 100-times fewer resources again, at around only $10m per year. You’d find a similar picture if you looked at the number of people working on these risks rather than money spent, but it’s easier to get figures for money. If we look at scientific attention instead, we see a similar picture of neglect (though, some of the individual risks receive significant attention, such as climate change): Existential risk research receives less funding than dung beetle research. Credit: Nick Bostrom Our impression is that if you look at political attention, you’d find a similar picture to the funding figures. An overwhelming amount of political attention goes on concrete issues that help the present generation in the short-term, since that’s what gets votes. Catastrophic risks are far more neglected. Then, among the catastrophic risks, climate change gets the most attention, while issues like pandemics and AI are the most neglected. This neglect in resources, scientific study and political attention is exactly what you’d expect to happen from the underlying economics, and are why the area presents an opportunity for people who want to make the world a better place. First, these risks aren’t the responsibility of any single nation. Suppose the US invested heavily to prevent climate change. This benefits everyone in the world, but only about 5% of the world’s population lives in the US, so US citizens would only receive 5% of the benefits of this spending. This means the US will dramatically underinvest in these efforts compared to how much they’re worth to the world. And the same is true of every other country. This could be solved if we could all coordinate — if every nation agreed to contribute its fair share to reducing climate change, then all nations would benefit by avoiding its worst effects. Unfortunately, from the perspective of each individual nation, it’s better if every other country reduces their emissions, while leaving their own economy unhampered. So, there’s an incentive for each nation to defect from climate agreements, and this is why so little progress gets made (it’s a prisoner’s dilemma). And in fact, this dramatically understates the problem. The greatest beneficiaries of efforts to reduce catastrophic risks are future generations. They have no way to stand up for their interests, whether economically or politically. If future generations could vote in our elections, then they’d vote overwhelmingly in favour of safer policies. Likewise, if future generations could send money back in time, they’d be willing to pay us huge amounts of money to reduce these risks. (Technically, reducing these risks creates a trans-generational, global public good, which should make them among the most neglected ways to do good.) Our current system does a poor job of protecting future generations. We know people who have spoken to top government officials in the UK, and many want to do something about these risks, but they say the pressures of the news and election cycle make it hard to focus on them. In most countries, there is no government agency that naturally has mitigation of these risks in its remit. This is a depressing situation, but it’s also an opportunity. For people who do want to make the world a better place, this lack of attention means there are lots high-impact ways to help. What can be done about these risks? We’ve covered the scale and neglectedness of these issues, but what about the third element of our framework, solvability? It’s less certain that we can make progress on these issues than more conventional areas like global health. It’s much easier to measure our impact on health (at least in the short-run) and we have decades of evidence on what works. This means working to reduce catastrophic risks looks worse on solvability. However, there is still much we can do, and given the huge scale and neglectedness of these risks, they still seem like the most urgent issues. We’ll sketch out some ways to reduce these risks, divided into three broad categories: 1. Targeted efforts to reduce specific risks One approach is to address each risk directly. There are many concrete proposals for dealing with each, such as the following: Many experts agree that better disease surveillance would reduce the risk of pandemics. This could involve improved technology or better collection and aggregation of existing data, to help us spot new pandemics faster. And the faster you can spot a new pandemic, the easier it is to manage. There are many ways to reduce climate change, such as helping to develop better solar panels, or introducing a carbon tax. With AI, we can do research into the “control problem” within computer science, to reduce the chance of unintended damage from powerful AI systems. A recent paper, Concrete problems in AI safety, outlines some specific topics, but only about 20 people work full-time on similar research today. In nuclear security, many experts think that the deterrence benefits of nuclear weapons could be maintained with far smaller stockpiles. But, lower stockpiles would also reduce the risks of accidents, as well as the chance that a nuclear war, if it occurred, would end civilisation. We go into more depth on what you can do to tackle each risk within our problem profiles: AI safety Pandemic prevention Nuclear security Run-away climate change We don’t focus on naturally caused risks in this section, because they’re much less likely and we’re already doing a lot to deal with some of them. Improved wealth and technology makes us more resilient to natural risks, and a huge amount of effort already goes into getting more of these. 2. Broad efforts to reduce risks Rather than try to reduce each risk individually, we can try to make civilisation generally better at managing them. The “broad” efforts help to reduce all the threats at once, even those we haven’t thought of yet. For instance, there are key decision-makers, often in government, who will need to manage these risks as they arise. If we could improve the decision-making ability of these people and institutions, then it would help to make society in general more resilient, and solve many other problems. Recent research has uncovered lots of ways to improve decision-making, but most of it hasn’t yet been implemented. At the same time, few people are working on the issue. We go into more depth in our write-up of improving institutional decision-making. Another example is that we could try to make it easier for civilisation to rebound from a catastrophe. The Global Seed Vault is a frozen vault in the Arctic, which contains the seeds of many important crop varieties, reducing the chance we lose an important species. Melting water recently entered the tunnel leading to the vault due, ironically, to climate change, so could probably use more funding. There are lots of other projects like this we could do to preserve knowledge. Similarly, we could create better disaster shelters, which would reduce the chance of extinction from pandemics, nuclear winter and asteroids (though not AI), while also increasing the chance of a recovery after a disaster. Right now, these measures don’t seem as effective as reducing the risks in the first place, but they still help. A more neglected, and perhaps much cheaper option is to create alternative food sources, such as those that be produced without light, and could be quickly scaled up in a prolonged winter. Since broad efforts help even if we’re not sure about the details of the risks, they’re more attractive the more uncertain you are. As you get closer to the risks, you should gradually reallocate resources from broad to targeted efforts (read more). We expect there are many more promising broad interventions, but it’s an area where little research has been done. For instance, another approach could involve improving international coordination. Since these risks are caused by humanity, they can be prevented by humanity, but what stops us is the difficulty of coordination. For instance, Russia doesn’t want to disarm because it would put it at a disadvantage compared to the US, and vice versa, even though both countries would be better off if there were no possibility of nuclear war. However, it might be possible to improve our ability to coordinate as a civilisation, such as by improving foreign relations or developing better international institutions. We’re keen to see more research into these kinds of proposals. Mainstream efforts to do good like improving education and international development can also help to make society more resilient and wise, and so also contribute to reducing catastrophic risks. For instance, a better educated population would probably elect more enlightened leaders (cough), and richer countries are, all else equal, better able to prevent pandemics — it’s no accident that Ebola took hold in some of the poorest parts of West Africa. But, we don’t see education and health as the best areas to focus on for two reasons. First, these areas are far less neglected than the more unconventional approaches we’ve covered. In fact, improving education is perhaps the most popular cause for people who want to do good, and in the US alone, receives 800 billion dollars of government funding, and another trillion dollars of private funding. Second, these approaches have much more diffuse effects on reducing these risks — you’d have to improve education on a very large scale to have any noticeable effect. We prefer to focus on more targeted and neglected solutions.
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<h4>Nuke war causes <u>extinction</u>, which <u>outweighs</u>.</h4><p><strong>Todd 17</strong> [Ben has a 1st from Oxford in Physics and Philosophy, has published in Climate Physics, once kick-boxed for Oxford, and speaks Chinese, badly. "The case for reducing extinction risk." https://80000hours.org/articles/extinction-risk/] brett</p><p>In this new age, <u>what should be our </u>biggest priority<u> as a civilisation?</u> Improving technology? Helping the poor? Changing the political system? Here’s a suggestion that’s not so often discussed: <u><mark>our first priority should be to <strong>survive</u></strong></mark>. <u>So long as civilisation continues to exist, <mark>we’ll have the chance to solve</mark> all our <strong><mark>other problems</strong></mark>, and have a far better future. But <strong><mark>if we go extinct, that’s it</u></strong></mark>. Why isn’t this priority more discussed? Here’s one reason: many people don’t yet appreciate the change in situation, and so don’t think our future is at risk. Social science researcher Spencer Greenberg surveyed Americans on their estimate of the chances of human extinction within 50 years. The results found that many think the chances are extremely low, with over 30% guessing they’re under one in ten million.3 We used to think the risks were extremely low as well, but when we looked into it, we changed our minds. As we’ll see, researchers who study these issues think the risks are over one thousand times higher, and are probably increasing. These concerns have started a new movement working to safeguard civilisation, which has been joined by Stephen Hawking, Max Tegmark, and new institutes founded by researchers at Cambridge, MIT, Oxford, and elsewhere. In the rest of this article, we cover the greatest risks to civilisation, including some that might be bigger than nuclear war and climate change. We then make the case that reducing these risks could be the most important thing you do with your life, and explain exactly what you can do to help. If you would like to use your career to work on these issues, we can also give one-on-one support. Reading time: 25 minutes How likely are you to be killed by an asteroid? An overview of naturally occurring existential risks A one in ten million chance of extinction in the next 50 years — what many people think the risk is — must be an underestimate. Naturally occurring existential risks can be estimated pretty accurately from history, and are much higher. If Earth was hit by a 1km-wide asteroid, there’s a chance that civilisation would be destroyed. By looking at the historical record, and tracking the objects in the sky, astronomers can estimate the risk of an asteroid this size hitting Earth as about 1 in 5000 per century.4 That’s higher than most people’s chances of being in a plane crash (about one in five million per flight), and already about 1000-times higher than the one in ten million risk that some people estimated.5 Some argue that although a 1km-sized object would be a disaster, it wouldn’t be enough to cause extinction, so this is a high estimate of the risk. But on the other hand, there are other naturally occurring risks, such as supervolcanoes.6 All this said, natural risks are still quite small in absolute terms. An upcoming paper by Dr. Toby Ord estimated that if we sum all the natural risks together, they’re very unlikely to add up to more than a 1 in 300 chance of extinction per century.7 Unfortunately, as we’ll now show, the natural risks are dwarfed by the human-caused ones. And this is why the risk of extinction has become an especially urgent issue. A history of progress, leading to the start of the most dangerous epoch in human history If you look at history over millennia, the basic message is that for a long-time almost everyone was poor, and then in the 18th century, that changed.8 Large economic growth created the conditions in which now face anthropogenic existential risks This was caused by the industrial revolution — perhaps the most important event in history. It wasn’t just wealth that grew. The following chart shows that over the long-term, life expectancy, energy use and democracy have all grown rapidly, while the percentage living in poverty has dramatically decreased.9 Chart prepared by Luke Muehlhauser in 2017. Literacy and education levels have also dramatically increased: Image source. People also seem to become happier as they get wealthier. In The Better Angels of Our Nature, Steven Pinker argues that violence is going down.10 Individual freedom has increased, while racism, sexism and homophobia have decreased. Many people think the world is getting worse,11 and it’s true that modern civilisation does some terrible things, such as factory farming. But as you can see in the data, many important measures of <u><strong><mark>progress</mark> have <mark>improved dramatically</u></strong></mark>. More to the point, no matter what you think has happened in the past, if we look forward, improving technology, political organisation and freedom gives <u><mark>our descendants</u></mark> the potential to solve our current problems, and <u><mark>have <strong>vastly better lives</u></strong></mark>.12 <u>It is possible to end poverty</u>, <u>prevent climate change, alleviate suffering, and more</u>. But also notice the purple line on the second chart: war-making capacity. It’s based on estimates of global military power by the historian Ian Morris, and it has also increased dramatically. Here’s the issue: improving technology holds the possibility of enormous gains, but also enormous risks. <u>Each</u> time we discover a <u>new technology</u>, most of the time it <u>yields huge benefits</u>. But there’s also a chance we discover a technology with more destructive power than we have the ability to wisely use. And so, although <u>the present generation lives in the most prosperous period in human history</u>, it’s plausibly also the most dangerous. The first destructive technology of this kind was nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons: a history of near-misses Today we all have North Korea’s nuclear programme on our minds, but current events are just one chapter in a long saga of near misses. We came near to nuclear war several times during the Cuban Missile crisis alone.13 In one incident, the Americans resolved that if one of their spy planes were shot down, they would immediately invade Cuba without a further War Council meeting. The next day, a spy plane was shot down. JFK called the council anyway, and decided against invading. An invasion of Cuba might well have triggered nuclear war; it later emerged that Castro was in favour of nuclear retaliation even if “it would’ve led to the complete annihilation of Cuba”. Some of the launch commanders in Cuba also had independent authority to target American forces with tactical nuclear weapons in the event of an invasion. In another incident, a Russian nuclear submarine was trying to smuggle materials into Cuba when they were discovered by the American fleet. The fleet began to drop dummy depth charges to force the submarine to surface. The Russian captain thought they were real depth charges and that, while out of radio communication, the third world war had started. He ordered a nuclear strike on the American fleet with one of their nuclear torpedoes. Fortunately, he needed the approval of other senior officers. One, Vasili Arkhipov, disagreed, preventing war. Thanks to Vasili Arkhipov, we narrowly averted a global catastrophic risk from nuclear weapons Thank you Vasili Arkhipov. Putting all these events together, JFK later estimated that the chances of nuclear war were “between one in three and even”.14 There have been plenty of other close calls with Russia, even after the Cold War, as listed on this nice Wikipedia page. And those are just the ones we know about. Nuclear experts today are just as concerned about tensions between India and Pakistan, which both possess nuclear weapons, as North Korea.15 The key problem is that several countries maintain large nuclear arsenals that are ready to be deployed in minutes. This means that a false alarm or accident can rapidly escalate into a full-blown nuclear war, especially in times of tense foreign relations. Would a nuclear war end civilisation? It was initially thought that a nuclear blast might be so hot that it would ignite the atmosphere and make the Earth uninhabitable. Scientists estimated this was sufficiently unlikely that the weapons could be “safely” tested, and we now know this won’t happen. In the 1980s, the concern was that ash from burning buildings would plunge the Earth into a long-term winter that would make it impossible to grow crops for decades.16 Modern climate models suggest that a nuclear winter severe enough to kill everyone is very unlikely, though it’s hard to be confident due to model uncertainty.17 <u><mark>Even</mark> a <strong><mark>“mild”</strong></mark> <mark>nuclear winter</u></mark>, however, could still <u>cause mass starvation</u>.18 For this and other reasons, a nuclear war would be extremely destabilising, and it’s unclear whether civilisation could recover. How likely is a <u><strong>nuclear war to <mark>permanently end civilisation</u></strong></mark>? It’s very hard to estimate, but it seems hard to conclude that the chance of a civilisation-ending nuclear war in the next century isn’t over 0.3%. That would mean the <u><mark>risks</mark> from nuclear weapons <mark>are greater than all</mark> the <mark>natural risks <strong>put together</u></strong></mark>. (Read more about nuclear risks.) This is why the 1950s marked the start of a new age for humanity. For the first time in history, it became possible for a small number of decision-makers to wreak havoc on the whole world. We now pose the greatest threat to our own survival — that makes today the most dangerous point in human history. And nuclear weapons aren’t the only way we could end civilisation. How big is the risk of run-away climate change? In 2015, President Obama said in his State of the Union address that:19 “No challenge poses a greater threat to future generations than climate change” Climate change is certainly a major risk to civilisation. The graph below shows estimates of climate sensitivity. Climate sensitivity is how much warming to expect in the long-term if CO2 concentrations double, which is roughly what’s expected within the century. Does climate change pose an existential risk? Wagner and Weitzman predict a greater than 10% chance of greater than 6 degrees celsius of warming. Image source The most likely outcome is 2-4 degrees of warming, which would be bad, but survivable. However, these estimates give a 10% chance of warming over 6 degrees, and perhaps a 1% chance of warming of 9 degrees. That would render large fractions of the Earth functionally uninhabitable, requiring at least a massive reorganisation of society. It would also probably increase conflict, and make us more vulnerable to other risks. (If you’re sceptical of climate models, then you should increase your uncertainty, which makes the situation more worrying.) So, it seems like the chance of a massive climate disaster created by CO2 is perhaps similar to the chance of a nuclear war. Researchers who study these issues think nuclear war seems more likely to result in outright extinction, due to the possibility of nuclear winter, which is why we think nuclear weapons pose an even greater risk than climate change. That said, climate change is certainly a major problem, which should raise our estimate of the risks even higher. (Read more about run-away climate change.) What new technologies might be as dangerous as nuclear weapons? The invention of nuclear weapons led to the anti-nuclear movement just a decade later in the 1960s, and the environmentalist movement soon adopted the cause of fighting climate change. What’s less appreciated is that new technologies will present further catastrophic risks. This is why we need a movement that is concerned with safeguarding civilisation in general. Predicting the future of technology is difficult, but because we only have one civilisation, we need to try our best. Here are some candidates for the next technology that’s as dangerous as nuclear weapons. In 1918-1919, over 3% of the world’s population died of the Spanish Flu.20 If such a pandemic arose today, it might be even harder to contain due to rapid global transport. What’s more concerning, though, is that it may soon be possible to genetically engineer a virus that’s as contagious as the Spanish Flu, but also deadlier, and which could spread for years undetected. That would be a weapon with the destructive power of nuclear weapons, but far harder to prevent from being used. Nuclear weapons require huge factories and rare materials to make, which makes them relatively easy to control. Designer viruses might be possible to create in a lab with a couple of biology PhDs. In fact, in 2006, The Guardian was able to receive segments of the extinct smallpox virus by mail order.21 Some terrorist groups have expressed interest in using indiscriminate weapons like these. (Read more about pandemic risks.) In fact, in 2006, The Guardian was able to receive segments of the extinct smallpox virus by mail order. Relevant experts suggest synthetic pathogens could potentially pose a global catastrophic risk. Who ordered the smallpox? Credit: The Guardian Another new technology with huge potential power is artificial intelligence. The reason that humans are in charge and not chimps is purely a matter of intelligence. Our large and powerful brains give us incredible control of the world, despite the fact that we are so much physically weaker than chimpanzees. So then what would happen if one day we created something much more intelligent than ourselves? In 2017, 350 researchers who have published peer-reviewed research into artificial intelligence at top conferences were polled about when they believe that we will develop computers with human-level intelligence: that is, a machine that is capable of carrying out all work tasks better than humans. The median estimate was that there is a 50% chance we will develop high-level machine intelligence in 45 years, and 75% by the end of the century.22 Graph of expert prediction from Grace et al: The median estimate was that there is a 50% chance we will develop high-level machine intelligence in 45 years These probabilities are hard to estimate, and the researchers gave very different figures depending on precisely how you ask the question.23 Nevertheless, it seems there is at least a reasonable chance that some kind of transformative machine intelligence is invented in the next century. Moreover, greater uncertainty means that it might come sooner than people think rather than later. What risks might this development pose? The original pioneers in computing, like Alan Turing and Marvin Minsky, raised concerns about the risks of powerful computer systems,24 and these risks are still around today. We’re not talking about computers “turning evil”. Rather, one concern is that a powerful AI system could be used by one group to gain control of the world, or otherwise be mis-used. If the USSR had developed nuclear weapons 10 years before the USA, the USSR might have become the dominant global power. Powerful computer technology might pose similar risks. Another concern is that deploying the system could have unintended consequences, since it would be difficult to predict what something smarter than us would do. A sufficiently powerful system might also be difficult to control, and so be hard to reverse once implemented. These concerns have been documented by Oxford Professor Nick Bostrom in Superintelligence and by AI pioneer Stuart Russell. Most experts think that better AI will be a hugely positive development, but they also agree there are risks. In the survey we just mentioned, AI experts estimated that the development of high-level machine intelligence has a 10% chance of a “bad outcome” and a 5% chance of an “extremely bad” outcome, such as human extinction.22 And we should probably expect this group to be positively biased, since, after all, they make their living from the technology. Putting the estimates together, if there’s a 75% chance that high-level machine intelligence is developed in the next century, then this means that the chance of a major AI disaster is 5% of 75%, which is about 4%. (Read more about risks from artificial intelligence.) People have raised concern about other new technologies, such as other forms of geo-engineering and atomic manufacturing, but they seem significantly less imminent, so are widely seen as less dangerous than the other technologies we’ve covered. You can see a longer list of existential risks here. What’s probably more concerning is the risks we haven’t thought of yet. If you had asked people in 1900 what the greatest risks to civilisation were, they probably wouldn’t have suggested nuclear weapons, genetic engineering or artificial intelligence, since none of these were yet invented. It’s possible we’re in the same situation looking forward to the next century. Future “unknown unknowns” might pose a greater risk than the risks we know today. Each time we discover a new technology, it’s a little like betting against a single number on a roulette wheel. Most of the time we win, and the technology is overall good. But each time there’s also a small chance the technology gives us more destructive power than we can handle, and we lose everything. Each new technology we develop has both unprecedented potential and perils. Image source. What’s the total risk of human extinction if we add everything together? Many experts who study these issues estimate that the total chance of human extinction in the next century is between 1 and 20%. For instance, an informal poll in 2008 at a conference on catastrophic risks found they believe it’s pretty likely we’ll face a catastrophe that kills over a billion people, and estimate a 19% chance of extinction before 2100.25 Risk At least 1 billion dead Human extinction Number killed by molecular nanotech weapons. 10% 5% Total killed by superintelligent AI. 5% 5% Total killed in all wars (including civil wars). 30% 4% Number killed in the single biggest engineered pandemic. 10% 2% Total killed in all nuclear wars. 10% 1% Number killed in the single biggest nanotech accident. 1% 0.5% Number killed in the single biggest natural pandemic. 5% 0.05% Total killed in all acts of nuclear terrorism. 1% 0.03% Overall risk of extinction prior to 2100 n/a 19% These figures are about one million times higher than what people normally think. In our podcast episode with Will MacAskill we discuss why he puts the risk of extinction this century at around 1%. In his his book The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity, Dr Toby Ord gives his guess at our total existential risk this century as 1 in 6 — a roll of the dice. Listen to our episode with Toby. What should we make of these estimates? Presumably, the researchers only work on these issues because they think they’re so important, so we should expect their estimates to be high (“selection bias”). But does that mean we can dismiss their concerns entirely? Given this, what’s our personal best guess? It’s very hard to say, but we find it hard to confidently ignore the risks. Overall, we guess the risk is likely over 3%. Why helping to safeguard the future could be the most important thing you can do with your life How much should we prioritise working to reduce these risks compared to other issues, like global poverty, ending cancer or political change? At 80,000 Hours, we do research to help people find careers with positive social impact. As part of this, we try to find the most urgent problems in the world to work on. We evaluate different global problems using our problem framework, which compares problems in terms of: Scale – how many are affected by the problem Neglectedness -how many people are working on it already Solvability – how easy it is to make progress If you apply this framework, we think that safeguarding the future comes out as the world’s biggest priority. And so, if you want to have a big positive impact with your career, this is the top area to focus on. In the next few sections, we’ll evaluate this issue on scale, neglectedness and solvability, drawing heavily on Existential Risk Prevention as a Global Priority by Nick Bostrom and unpublished work by Toby Ord, as well as our own research. First, let’s start with the scale of the issue. We’ve argued there’s likely over a 3% chance of extinction in the next century. How big an issue is this? One figure we can look at is how many people might die in such a catastrophe. The population of the Earth in the middle of the century will be about 10 billion, so a 3% chance of everyone dying means the expected number of deaths is about 300 million. This is probably more deaths than we can expect over the next century due to the diseases of poverty, like malaria.26 Many of the risks we’ve covered could also cause a “medium” catastrophe rather than one that ends civilisation, and this is presumably significantly more likely. The survey we covered earlier suggested over a 10% chance of a catastrophe that kills over 1 billion people in the next century, which would be at least another 100 million deaths in expectation, along with far more suffering among those who survive. So, even if we only focus on the impact on the present generation, these catastrophic risks are one of the most serious issues facing humanity. But this is a huge underestimate of the scale of the problem, because if civilisation ends, then we give up our entire future too. Most people want to leave a better world for their grandchildren, and most also think we should have some concern for future generations more broadly. There could be many more people having great lives in the future than there are people alive today, and we should have some concern for their interests. There’s a possibility that human civilization could last for millions of years, so when we consider the impact of the risks on future generations, <u>the stakes are millions of times</u> higher — for good or evil. As Carl Sagan wrote on the costs of nuclear war in Foreign Affairs: <u><strong>A <mark>nuclear war imperils</mark> all of our descendants</u></strong>, <u>for as long as there will be humans. Even if the population remains static, with an average lifetime of the order of 100 years, over a typical time period for the biological evolution of a successful species</u> (roughly ten million years), <u>we are talking about some <strong><mark>500 trillion people</strong></mark> yet to come</u>. By this criterion, the stakes are one million times greater for extinction than for the more modest nuclear wars that kill “only” hundreds of millions of people. There are many other possible measures of the potential loss–including culture and science, the evolutionary history of the planet, and the significance of the lives of all of our ancestors who contributed to the future of their descendants. Extinction is the undoing of the human enterprise. We’re glad the Romans didn’t let humanity go extinct, since it means that all of modern civilisation has been able to exist. We think we owe a similar responsibility to the people who will come after us, assuming (as we believe) that they are likely to lead fulfilling lives. It would be reckless and unjust to endanger their existence just to make ourselves better off in the short-term. It’s not just that there might be more people in the future. As Sagan also pointed out, no matter what you think is of value, there is potentially a lot more of it in the future. Future civilisation could create a world without need or want, and make mindblowing intellectual and artistic achievements. We could build a far more just and virtuous society. And there’s no in-principle reason why civilisation couldn’t reach other planets, of which there are some 100 billion in our galaxy.27 If we let civilisation end, then none of this can ever happen. We’re unsure whether this great future will really happen, but that’s all the more reason to keep civilisation going so we have a chance to find out. Failing to pass on the torch to the next generation might be the worst thing we could ever do. So, a couple of percent risk that civilisation ends seems likely to be the biggest issue facing the world today. What’s also striking is just how neglected these risks are. Why these risks are some of the most neglected global issues Here is how much money per year goes into some important causes:28 Cause Annual targeted spending from all sources (highly approximate) Global R&D $1.5 trillion Luxury goods $1.3 trillion US social welfare $900 billion Climate change >$300 billion To the global poor >$250 billion Nuclear security $1-10 billion Extreme pandemic prevention $1 billion AI safety research $10 million As you can see, we spend a vast amount of resources on R&D to develop even more powerful technology. We also expend a lot in a (possibly misguided) attempt to improve our lives by buying luxury goods. Far less is spent mitigating catastrophic risks from climate change. Welfare spending in the US alone dwarfs global spending on climate change. But climate change still receives enormous amounts of money compared to some of these other risks we’ve covered. We roughly estimate that the prevention of extreme global pandemics receives under 300 times less, even though the size of the risk seems about the same. Research to avoid accidents from AI systems is the most neglected of all, perhaps receiving 100-times fewer resources again, at around only $10m per year. You’d find a similar picture if you looked at the number of people working on these risks rather than money spent, but it’s easier to get figures for money. If we look at scientific attention instead, we see a similar picture of neglect (though, some of the individual risks receive significant attention, such as climate change): Existential risk research receives less funding than dung beetle research. Credit: Nick Bostrom Our impression is that if you look at political attention, you’d find a similar picture to the funding figures. An overwhelming amount of political attention goes on concrete issues that help the present generation in the short-term, since that’s what gets votes. Catastrophic risks are far more neglected. Then, among the catastrophic risks, climate change gets the most attention, while issues like pandemics and AI are the most neglected. This neglect in resources, scientific study and political attention is exactly what you’d expect to happen from the underlying economics, and are why the area presents an opportunity for people who want to make the world a better place. First, these risks aren’t the responsibility of any single nation. Suppose the US invested heavily to prevent climate change. This benefits everyone in the world, but only about 5% of the world’s population lives in the US, so US citizens would only receive 5% of the benefits of this spending. This means the US will dramatically underinvest in these efforts compared to how much they’re worth to the world. And the same is true of every other country. This could be solved if we could all coordinate — if every nation agreed to contribute its fair share to reducing climate change, then all nations would benefit by avoiding its worst effects. Unfortunately, from the perspective of each individual nation, it’s better if every other country reduces their emissions, while leaving their own economy unhampered. So, there’s an incentive for each nation to defect from climate agreements, and this is why so little progress gets made (it’s a prisoner’s dilemma). And in fact, this dramatically understates the problem. The greatest beneficiaries of efforts to reduce catastrophic risks are future generations. They have no way to stand up for their interests, whether economically or politically. If future generations could vote in our elections, then they’d vote overwhelmingly in favour of safer policies. Likewise, if future generations could send money back in time, they’d be willing to pay us huge amounts of money to reduce these risks. (Technically, reducing these risks creates a trans-generational, global public good, which should make them among the most neglected ways to do good.) Our current system does a poor job of protecting future generations. We know people who have spoken to top government officials in the UK, and many want to do something about these risks, but they say the pressures of the news and election cycle make it hard to focus on them. In most countries, there is no government agency that naturally has mitigation of these risks in its remit. This is a depressing situation, but it’s also an opportunity. For people who do want to make the world a better place, this lack of attention means there are lots high-impact ways to help. What can be done about these risks? We’ve covered the scale and neglectedness of these issues, but what about the third element of our framework, solvability? It’s less certain that we can make progress on these issues than more conventional areas like global health. It’s much easier to measure our impact on health (at least in the short-run) and we have decades of evidence on what works. This means working to reduce catastrophic risks looks worse on solvability. However, there is still much we can do, and given the huge scale and neglectedness of these risks, they still seem like the most urgent issues. We’ll sketch out some ways to reduce these risks, divided into three broad categories: 1. Targeted efforts to reduce specific risks One approach is to address each risk directly. There are many concrete proposals for dealing with each, such as the following: Many experts agree that better disease surveillance would reduce the risk of pandemics. This could involve improved technology or better collection and aggregation of existing data, to help us spot new pandemics faster. And the faster you can spot a new pandemic, the easier it is to manage. There are many ways to reduce climate change, such as helping to develop better solar panels, or introducing a carbon tax. With AI, we can do research into the “control problem” within computer science, to reduce the chance of unintended damage from powerful AI systems. A recent paper, Concrete problems in AI safety, outlines some specific topics, but only about 20 people work full-time on similar research today. In nuclear security, many experts think that the deterrence benefits of nuclear weapons could be maintained with far smaller stockpiles. But, lower stockpiles would also reduce the risks of accidents, as well as the chance that a nuclear war, if it occurred, would end civilisation. We go into more depth on what you can do to tackle each risk within our problem profiles: AI safety Pandemic prevention Nuclear security Run-away climate change We don’t focus on naturally caused risks in this section, because they’re much less likely and we’re already doing a lot to deal with some of them. <u><strong>Improved wealth and tech</u></strong>nology <u>makes us</u> <u>more <strong>resilient</strong> to natural risks</u>, and a huge amount of effort already goes into getting more of these. 2. Broad efforts to reduce risks Rather than try to reduce each risk individually, we can try to make civilisation generally better at managing them. The “broad” efforts help to reduce all the threats at once, even those we haven’t thought of yet. For instance, there are key decision-makers, often in government, who will need to manage these risks as they arise. <u>If we could <strong>improve</u></strong> the <u><strong>decision-making</strong> ability of</u> these <u>people and institutions</u>, then <u>it would help to make society in general more resilient, and <strong>solve many other problems</u></strong>. Recent research has uncovered lots of ways to improve decision-making, but most of it hasn’t yet been implemented. At the same time, few people are working on the issue. We go into more depth in our write-up of improving institutional decision-making. Another example is that we could try to make it easier for civilisation to rebound from a catastrophe. The Global Seed Vault is a frozen vault in the Arctic, which contains the seeds of many important crop varieties, reducing the chance we lose an important species. Melting water recently entered the tunnel leading to the vault due, ironically, to climate change, so could probably use more funding. There are lots of other projects like this we could do to preserve knowledge. Similarly, we could create better disaster shelters, which would reduce the chance of extinction from pandemics, nuclear winter and asteroids (though not AI), while also increasing the chance of a recovery after a disaster. Right now, these measures don’t seem as effective as reducing the risks in the first place, but they still help. A more neglected, and perhaps much cheaper option is to create alternative food sources, such as those that be produced without light, and could be quickly scaled up in a prolonged winter. Since broad efforts help even if we’re not sure about the details of the risks, they’re more attractive the more uncertain you are. As you get closer to the risks, you should gradually reallocate resources from broad to targeted efforts (read more). We expect there are many more promising broad interventions, but it’s an area where little research has been done. For instance, another approach could involve improving international coordination. Since these risks are caused by humanity, they can be prevented by humanity, but what stops us is the difficulty of coordination. For instance, Russia doesn’t want to disarm because it would put it at a disadvantage compared to the US, and vice versa, even though both countries would be better off if there were no possibility of nuclear war. However, it might be possible to improve our ability to coordinate as a civilisation, such as by improving foreign relations or developing better international institutions. We’re keen to see more research into these kinds of proposals. Mainstream efforts to do good like improving education and international development can also help to make society more resilient and wise, and so also contribute to reducing catastrophic risks. For instance, a better educated population would probably elect more enlightened leaders (cough), and richer countries are, all else equal, better able to prevent pandemics — it’s no accident that Ebola took hold in some of the poorest parts of West Africa. But, we don’t see education and health as the best areas to focus on for two reasons. First, these areas are far less neglected than the more unconventional approaches we’ve covered. In fact, improving education is perhaps the most popular cause for people who want to do good, and in the US alone, receives 800 billion dollars of government funding, and another trillion dollars of private funding. Second, these approaches have much more diffuse effects on reducing these risks — you’d have to improve education on a very large scale to have any noticeable effect. We prefer to focus on more targeted and neglected solutions.</p>
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Please contact me for docs from other tournaments/rounds I may have forgotten to put on my wiki. Also, please contact me at least 30 minutes pre-round for any interps you want me to meet otherwise it's an automatic I-meet. Email is: [email protected]
**STATE- My rd1 and 2 os is freezing, but I have the round report up. If you need the doc, email me or go to one of my teammate's wiki's
https://docs.google.com/document/d/17aXHbX_Y7dEIuhjLWoIq_cTcne4mqsfog9JF97TDrko/edit?usp=sharing
Evidence of my wiki not letting me open source^^
**Note for Stanford and Colleyville- my rounds 1, 2, 4, and 5 for Stanford and round 2 & 4 for Colleyville keep freezing when I try to publish anything. Please email me if you need the docs from these rounds and I will get them to you immediately (aff docs for all these rounds were schengen)
**Cites- My cites are messed up and it won't let me fix them but if you need anything specific from them, lmk and I'll send them
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3,720,423 |
Even absent global adoption, the plan spurs clean tech—spills over globally, solves green energy cooperation
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Meltzer 14
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Joshua Meltzer, Fellow, Global Economy and Development, Brookings Institution and Adjunct Professor, School for Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, “A Carbon Tax as a Driver of Green Technology Innovation and the Implications for International Trade,” ENERGY LAW JOURNAL v. 35, 2014, p. 58.
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adoption by the U S of a carbon tax will create an incentive for both U.S. and overseas firms to innovate and develop green tech a carbon tax can induce innovation by incentivizing U.S. firms to innovate and produce green tech that reduce the impact of the tax. Not all firms will be innovators, and many will instead turn to the market to obtain the latest green techn This demand by the world's largest economy will also create a strong global incentive for the development of new green tech in other countries.
Increased global innovation in green technologies will also have a range of positive spillovers. As new sources of R&D and opportunities for scientific collaboration open up, greater resources become available to fund the innovation process and the knowledge and skills to assess the commercial viability increases the access to and reduces the costs of finance. These factors drive down the costs of innovation
a carbon tax, unlike a technology standard, creates an incentive to find multiple ways of reducing emissions. As a result, a carbon tax should lead to a broader range of innovations that could also be applicable in other countries.
increase in innovation that would follow a carbon tax should lead to new opportunities for international collaboration and cooperation. the U S has already forged these ties, such as with China Australia, Japan, and India, (APEC) is also working on energy issues, including promoting the development of energy efficiency technologies.
governments could make progress in promoting cooperation to develop green tech in services trade access to the skills of researchers, policymakers, or venture capitalists with expertise in green tech
|
a carbon tax will create incentive for U.S. and overseas firms to develop green tech carbon tax can induce innovation that reduce the impact of the tax many will turn to the market This demand will create a strong global incentive for development
Increased innovation will have positive spillovers new sources of R&D and opportunities for collaboration resources become available and skills to assess viability increases access and reduces costs
carbon tax, unlike a tech standard, creates an incentive to find multiple ways of reducing emissions. As a result should lead to innovations applicable in other countries
that lead to opportunities for international coop the U S has forged these ties with China Australia, Japan, and India (APEC) working on energy issues, promoting energy tech
governments could make progress in promoting coop in services trade access to researchers, policymakers, or venture capitalists with expertise in green tech
|
The adoption by the United States of a carbon tax will create an incentive for both U.S. and overseas firms to innovate and develop green technologies. As outlined above, a carbon tax can induce innovation by incentivizing U.S. firms to innovate and produce green technologies that reduce the impact of the tax. Not all firms will be innovators, and many will instead turn to the market to obtain the latest green technologies to reduce their CO<2> emissions. This demand for [*58] green technologies by the world's largest economy will also create a strong global incentive for the development of new green technologies in other countries.
Increased global innovation in green technologies will also have a range of positive spillovers. As new sources of R&D and opportunities for scientific collaboration open up, greater resources become available to fund the innovation process and the knowledge and skills to assess the commercial viability of green technologies increases the access to and reduces the costs of finance. These factors should drive down the costs of innovation and development of green technologies.
A carbon tax will also incentivize the development of green technologies that can be used to reduce CO<2> emissions in the country applying the tax as well as overseas. This is because a carbon tax, unlike a technology standard, creates an incentive to find multiple ways of reducing CO<2> emissions. As a result, a carbon tax should lead to a broader range of innovations that could also be applicable in other countries. n101
The increase in innovation that would follow the introduction by the United States of a carbon tax should lead to new opportunities for international collaboration and cooperation. In some areas, the United States has already forged these ties, such as with the U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center, and has clean energy partnerships with Australia, Japan, and India, to name a few countries in the Asia-Pacific region. n102 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is also working on energy issues, including promoting the development of energy efficiency technologies. n103
Additional areas where governments could make progress in promoting cooperation to develop green technologies should be in services trade. Indeed, access to the skills of researchers, policymakers, or venture capitalists with expertise in green technology will be as important for developing and commercializing it as will be access to the technologies themselves. For instance, countries could develop new and flexible visas aimed specifically at facilitating collaboration among people with green technology expertise. Expanding the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) mode 4 commitments for services delivered by the presence of the service suppliers from another WTO Member would also support this outcome.
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<h4><strong>Even absent global adoption, the plan spurs clean tech—spills over globally, solves green energy cooperation</h4><p></strong>Joshua <u><strong>Meltzer</u></strong>, Fellow, Global Economy and Development, Brookings Institution and Adjunct Professor, School for Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, “A Carbon Tax as a Driver of Green Technology Innovation and the Implications for International Trade,” ENERGY LAW JOURNAL v. 35, 20<u><strong>14</u></strong>, p. 58.</p><p>The <u>adoption by the</u> <u>U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>of <strong><mark>a carbon tax will create</strong></mark> an <strong><mark>incentive for </strong></mark>both <strong><mark>U.S. and overseas firms to</strong></mark> innovate and <strong><mark>develop green tech</u></strong></mark>nologies. As outlined above, <u>a <strong><mark>carbon tax can induce innovation</strong></mark> by incentivizing U.S. firms to innovate and produce green tech</u>nologies <u><strong><mark>that reduce the impact of the tax</strong></mark>. Not all firms will be innovators, and <strong><mark>many will</strong></mark> instead <strong><mark>turn to the market</strong></mark> to obtain the latest green techn</u>ologies to reduce their CO<2> emissions. <u><strong><mark>This demand</u></strong></mark> for [*58] green technologies <u>by the world's largest economy <strong><mark>will</strong></mark> also <strong><mark>create a strong global incentive for</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>development</strong></mark> of new green tech</u>nologies <u>in other countries.</p><p><strong><mark>Increased </strong></mark>global <strong><mark>innovation</strong></mark> in green technologies <strong><mark>will</strong></mark> also <strong><mark>have </strong></mark>a range of <strong><mark>positive spillovers</strong></mark>. As <strong><mark>new sources of R&D and opportunities for </strong></mark>scientific <strong><mark>collaboration </strong></mark>open up, greater <strong><mark>resources become available </strong></mark>to fund the innovation process <strong><mark>and</strong></mark> the knowledge and <strong><mark>skills to assess</strong></mark> the commercial <strong><mark>viability</u></strong></mark> of green technologies <u><strong><mark>increases</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>access</strong></mark> to <strong><mark>and reduces</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>costs</strong></mark> of finance. These factors</u> should <u>drive down the costs of innovation</u> and development of green technologies.</p><p>A carbon tax will also incentivize the development of green technologies that can be used to reduce CO<2> emissions in the country applying the tax as well as overseas. This is because <u>a <strong><mark>carbon tax, unlike a tech</strong></mark>nology <strong><mark>standard, creates an incentive to find multiple ways of reducing</u></strong></mark> CO<2> <u><strong><mark>emissions. As a result</strong></mark>, a carbon tax <strong><mark>should lead to</strong></mark> a broader range of <strong><mark>innovations</strong></mark> that could also be <strong><mark>applicable in other countries</strong></mark>.</u> n101</p><p>The <u>increase in innovation <strong><mark>that</strong></mark> would follow</u> the introduction by the United States of <u>a carbon tax should <strong><mark>lead to </strong></mark>new <strong><mark>opportunities for international </strong></mark>collaboration and <strong><mark>coop</strong></mark>eration.</u> In some areas, <u><strong><mark>the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>has </strong></mark>already <strong><mark>forged these ties</strong></mark>, such as <strong><mark>with</u></strong></mark> the U.S.-<u><strong><mark>China</u></strong></mark> Clean Energy Research Center, and has clean energy partnerships with <u><strong><mark>Australia, Japan, and India</strong></mark>,</u> to name a few countries in the Asia-Pacific region. n102 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation <u><strong><mark>(APEC) </strong></mark>is also <strong><mark>working on energy issues, </strong></mark>including <strong><mark>promoting</strong></mark> the development of <strong><mark>energy </strong></mark>efficiency <strong><mark>tech</strong></mark>nologies. </u>n103</p><p>Additional areas where <u><strong><mark>governments could make progress in promoting coop</strong></mark>eration to develop green tech</u>nologies should be <u><strong><mark>in services trade</u></strong></mark>. Indeed, <u><strong><mark>access to</strong></mark> the skills of <strong><mark>researchers, policymakers, or venture capitalists with expertise in green tech</u></mark>nology will be as important for developing and commercializing it as will be access to the technologies themselves. For instance, countries could develop new and flexible visas aimed specifically at facilitating collaboration among people with green technology expertise. Expanding the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) mode 4 commitments for services delivered by the presence of the service suppliers from another WTO Member would also support this outcome.</p></strong>
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Today the west operates on a consumption of images of pain – the affirmative only keeps putting quarters into our moral register making it hinge upon listening to the suffering of the others and feeling for them – absent the constant injection of new images of suffering, the west would collapse – the affirmative is sustaining a system in its death throes.
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Baudrillard 94.
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Baudrillard 94. Jean Baudrillard, dead French philosopher, former professor emeritus at the University de Paris X, The Illusion of The End, pg. 66-70
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We must today denounce the moral and sentimental exploitation of that poverty - charity cannibalism being worse than oppressive violence. The extraction and humanitarian reprocessing of a destitution which has become the equivalent of oil deposits and gold mines. The extortion of the spectacle of poverty and, at the same time, of our charitable condescension: a worldwide appreciated surplus of fine sentiments and bad conscience. material exploitation is only there to extract that spiritual raw material that is the misery of people which serves as psychological nourishment for our daily lives The West is whitewashed in the reprocessing of the rest of the world as waste and residue. And the white world repents and seeks absolution - it, too, the waste-product of its own history. The South is a natural producer of raw materials, the latest of which is catastrophe. The North, for its part, specializes in the reprocessing of raw materials and hence also in the reprocessing of catastrophe. Other people's destitution becomes our adventure playground our own efforts to alleviate it (which, in fact, merely function to secure the conditions of reproduction of the catastrophe market); there, at least, in the order of moral profits, the Marxist analysis is wholly applicable: we see to it that extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel essential to the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West Just as the economic crisis of the West will not be complete so long as it can still exploit the resources of the rest of the world, so the symbolic crisis will be complete only when it is no longer able to feed on the other half's human and natural catastrophes We need this drug, which serves us as an aphrodisiac and hallucinogen. And the poor countries are the best suppliers We provide them, through our media, with the means to exploit this paradoxical resource, just as we give them the means to exhaust their natural resources with our technologies. Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media, and carried forward in moral mode by our humanitarian aid, which is a way of encouraging it and ensuring its continuity, just as economic aid is a strategy for perpetuating under-development. Up to now, the financial sacrifice has been compensated a hundredfold by the moral gain. But when the catastrophe market itself reaches crisis point when we run out of disasters from elsewhere the West will be forced to produce its own catastrophe for itself, in order to meet its need for spectacle and that voracious appetite for symbols which characterizes it Latin America are really going flat out in the distress and catastrophe stakes, and thus in providing symbolic nourishment for the rich world. They might be said to be overdoing it: heaping earthquakes, floods, famines and ecological disasters one upon another, and finding the means to massacre each other most of the time. The 'disaster show' goes on without any let-up One day, the West will break down if we are not soon washed clean of this shame, if an international congress of the poor countries does not very quickly decide to share out this symbolic privilege of misery and catastrophe. It is of course normal, since we refuse to allow the spread of nuclear weapons, that they should refuse to allow the spread of the catastrophe weapon. But it is not right that they should exert that monopoly indefinitely. In any case, the under-developed are only so by comparison with the Western system and its presumed success. In the light of its assumed failure, they are not under-developed at all. They are only so in terms of a dominant evolutionism which has always been the worst of colonial ideologies. Thus, to encourage hope of evolution - albeit by revolution - among the poor and to doom them, in keeping with the objective illusion of progress, to technological salvation is a criminal absurdity.
|
We must denounce sentimental exploitation charity cannibalism being worse than violence. The extraction of destitution has become gold The extortion of bad conscience material exploitation is only to extract the misery of peoples, which serves as psychological nourishment for our daily lives Other people's destitution becomes our adventure playground our efforts to alleviate it secure the conditions of reproduction of catastrophe extreme poverty is a fuel essential to the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West Our whole culture lives off catastrophic cannibalism carried forward by humanitarian aid But when the market itself reaches crisis point when we run out of disasters from elsewhere the West will be forced to produce its own catastrophe to meet its need for spectacle the West will break down if we are not washed clean of this shame to encourage hope is criminal absurdity
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We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of the poverty of the 'other half of the world' ['autre monde]. We must today denounce the moral and sentimental exploitation of that poverty - charity cannibalism being worse than oppressive violence. The extraction and humanitarian reprocessing of a destitution which has become the equivalent of oil deposits and gold mines. The extortion of the spectacle of poverty and, at the same time, of our charitable condescension: a worldwide appreciated surplus of fine sentiments and bad conscience. We should, in fact, see this not as the extraction of raw materials, but as a waste-reprocessing enterprise. Their destitution and our bad conscience are, in effect, all part of the waste-products of history- the main thing is to recycle them to produce a new energy source. We have here an escalation in the psychological balance of terror. World capitalist oppression is now merely the vehicle and alibi for this other, much more ferocious, form of moral predation. One might almost say, contrary to the Marxist analysis, that material exploitation is only there to extract that spiritual raw material that is the misery of peoples, which serves as psychological nourishment for the rich countries and media nourishment for our daily lives. The 'Fourth World' (we are no longer dealing with a 'developing' Third World) is once again beleaguered, this time as a catastrophe-bearing stratum. The West is whitewashed in the reprocessing of the rest of the world as waste and residue. And the white world repents and seeks absolution - it, too, the waste-product of its own history. The South is a natural producer of raw materials, the latest of which is catastrophe. The North, for its part, specializes in the reprocessing of raw materials and hence also in the reprocessing of catastrophe. Bloodsucking protection, humanitarian interference, Medecins sans frontieres, international solidarity, etc. The last phase of colonialism: the New Sentimental Order is merely the latest form of the New World Order. Other people's destitution becomes our adventure playground. Thus, the humanitarian offensive aimed at the Kurds - a show of repentance on the part of the Western powers after allowing Saddam Hussein to crush them - is in reality merely the second phase of the war, a phase in which charitable intervention finishes off the work of extermination. We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, and of the moving spectacle of our own efforts to alleviate it (which, in fact, merely function to secure the conditions of reproduction of the catastrophe market); there, at least, in the order of moral profits, the Marxist analysis is wholly applicable: we see to it that extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel essential to the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West. In our defence, it might be said that this extreme poverty was largely of our own making and it is therefore normal that we should profit by it. There can be no finer proof that the distress of the rest of the world is at the root of Western power and that the spectacle of that distress is its crowning glory than the inauguration, on the roof of the Arche de la Defense, with a sumptuous buffet laid on by the Fondation des Droits de l'homme, of an exhibition of the finest photos of world poverty. Should we be surprised that spaces are set aside in the Arche d' Alliance. for universal suffering hallowed by caviar and champagne? Just as the economic crisis of the West will not be complete so long as it can still exploit the resources of the rest of the world, so the symbolic crisis will be complete only when it is no longer able to feed on the other half's human and natural catastrophes (Eastern Europe, the Gulf, the Kurds, Bangladesh, etc.). We need this drug, which serves us as an aphrodisiac and hallucinogen. And the poor countries are the best suppliers - as, indeed, they are of other drugs. We provide them, through our media, with the means to exploit this paradoxical resource, just as we give them the means to exhaust their natural resources with our technologies. Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media, and carried forward in moral mode by our humanitarian aid, which is a way of encouraging it and ensuring its continuity, just as economic aid is a strategy for perpetuating under-development. Up to now, the financial sacrifice has been compensated a hundredfold by the moral gain. But when the catastrophe market itself reaches crisis point, in accordance with the implacable logic of the market, when distress becomes scarce or the marginal returns on it fall from overexploitation, when we run out of disasters from elsewhere or when they can no longer be traded like coffee or other commodities, the West will be forced to produce its own catastrophe for itself, in order to meet its need for spectacle and that voracious appetite for symbols which characterizes it even more than its voracious appetite for food. It will reach the point where it devours itself. When we have finished sucking out the destiny of others, we shall have to invent one for ourselves. The Great Crash, the symbolic crash, will come in the end from us Westerners, but only when we are no longer able to feed on the hallucinogenic misery which comes to us from the other half of the world. Yet they do not seem keen to give up their monopoly. The Middle East, Bangladesh, black Africa and Latin America are really going flat out in the distress and catastrophe stakes, and thus in providing symbolic nourishment for the rich world. They might be said to be overdoing it: heaping earthquakes, floods, famines and ecological disasters one upon another, and finding the means to massacre each other most of the time. The 'disaster show' goes on without any let-up and our sacrificial debt to them far exceeds their economic debt. The misery with which they generously overwhelm us is something we shall never be able to repay. The sacrifices we offer in return are laughable (a tornado or two, a few tiny holocausts on the roads, the odd financial sacrifice) and, moreover, by some infernal logic, these work out as much greater gains for us, whereas our kindnesses have merely added to the natural catastrophes another one immeasurably worse: the demographic catastrophe, a veritable epidemic which we deplore each day in pictures. In short, there is such distortion between North and South, to the symbolic advantage of the South (a hundred thousand Iraqi dead against casualties numbered in tens on our side: in every case we are the losers), that one day everything will break down. One day, the West will break down if we are not soon washed clean of this shame, if an international congress of the poor countries does not very quickly decide to share out this symbolic privilege of misery and catastrophe. It is of course normal, since we refuse to allow the spread of nuclear weapons, that they should refuse to allow the spread of the catastrophe weapon. But it is not right that they should exert that monopoly indefinitely. In any case, the under-developed are only so by comparison with the Western system and its presumed success. In the light of its assumed failure, they are not under-developed at all. They are only so in terms of a dominant evolutionism which has always been the worst of colonial ideologies. The argument here is that there is a line of objective progress and everyone is supposed to pass through its various stages (we find the same eyewash with regard to the evolution of species and in that evolutionism which unilaterally sanctions the superiority of the human race). In the light of current upheavals, which put an end to any idea of history as a linear process, there are no longer either developed or under-developed peoples. Thus, to encourage hope of evolution - albeit by revolution - among the poor and to doom them, in keeping with the objective illusion of progress, to technological salvation is a criminal absurdity. In actual fact, it is their good fortune to be able to escape from evolution just at the point when we no longer know where it is leading. In any case, a majority of these peoples, including those of Eastern Europe, do not seem keen to enter this evolutionist modernity, and their weight in the balance is certainly no small factor in the West's repudiation of its own history, of its own utopias and its own modernity. It might be said that the routes of violence, historical or otherwise, are being turned around and that the viruses now pass from South to North, there being every chance that, five hundred years after America was conquered, 1992 and the end of the century will mark the comeback of the defeated and the sudden reversal of that modernity. The sense of pride is no longer on the side of wealth but of poverty, of those who - fortunately for them - have nothing to repent, and may indeed glory in being privileged in terms of catastrophes. Admittedly, this is a privilege they could hardly renounce, even if they wished to, but natural disasters merely reinforce the sense of guilt felt towards them by the wealthy – by those whom God visibly scorns since he no longer even strikes them down. One day it will be the Whites themselves who will give up their whiteness. It is a good bet that repentance will reach its highest pitch with the five-hundredth anniversary of the conquest of the Americas. We are going to have to lift the curse of the defeated - but symbolically victorious - peoples, which is insinuating itself five hundred years later, by way of repentance, into the heart of the white race.
| 9,756 |
<h4>Today the west operates on a consumption of <u>images of pain</u> – the affirmative only keeps putting <u>quarters</u> into our <u>moral register</u> making it hinge upon listening to the <u>suffering of the others</u> and <u>feeling for them</u> – absent the <u>constant injection</u> of new images of suffering, the <u>west would collapse</u> – the affirmative is sustaining a system in its death throes.</h4><p><strong>Baudrillard 94.</strong> Jean Baudrillard, dead French philosopher, former professor emeritus at the University de Paris X, The Illusion of The End, pg. 66-70</p><p>We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of the poverty of the 'other half of the world' ['autre monde]. <u><strong><mark>We must</u></strong></mark> <u>today <strong><mark>denounce </mark>the</strong> moral and <strong><mark>sentimental exploitation </mark>of</strong> that poverty - <strong><mark>charity cannibalism being worse than </mark>oppressive <mark>violence</strong>. The extraction</mark> and humanitarian reprocessing <mark>of</mark> a <mark>destitution</mark> which <mark>has become </mark>the equivalent of oil deposits and <mark>gold </mark>mines. <mark>The</mark> <mark>extortion</mark> of the spectacle of poverty and, at the same time, of our charitable condescension: a worldwide appreciated surplus <mark>of</mark> fine sentiments and <mark>bad conscience</mark>.</u> We should, in fact, see this not as the extraction of raw materials, but as a waste-reprocessing enterprise. Their destitution and our bad conscience are, in effect, all part of the waste-products of history- the main thing is to recycle them to produce a new energy source. We have here an escalation in the psychological balance of terror. World capitalist oppression is now merely the vehicle and alibi for this other, much more ferocious, form of moral predation. One might almost say, contrary to the Marxist analysis, that <u><strong><mark>material exploitation is only </mark>there <mark>to extract </mark>that spiritual raw material that is <mark>the misery of people</u></strong>s, <u><strong>which serves as psychological nourishment for</u></strong></mark> the rich countries and media nourishment for <u><strong><mark>our daily lives</u></strong></mark>. The 'Fourth World' (we are no longer dealing with a 'developing' Third World) is once again beleaguered, this time as a catastrophe-bearing stratum. <u>The West is whitewashed in the reprocessing of the rest of the world as waste and residue. And the white world repents and seeks absolution - it, too, the waste-product of its own history. The South is a natural producer of raw materials, the latest of which is catastrophe. The North, for its part, specializes in the reprocessing of raw materials and hence also in the reprocessing of catastrophe.</u> Bloodsucking protection, humanitarian interference, Medecins sans frontieres, international solidarity, etc. The last phase of colonialism: the New Sentimental Order is merely the latest form of the New World Order. <u><strong><mark>Other people's destitution becomes our adventure playground</u></strong></mark>. Thus, the humanitarian offensive aimed at the Kurds - a show of repentance on the part of the Western powers after allowing Saddam Hussein to crush them - is in reality merely the second phase of the war, a phase in which charitable intervention finishes off the work of extermination. We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, and of the moving spectacle of <u><strong><mark>our</strong></mark> own <strong><mark>efforts to alleviate it</strong></mark> (which, in fact, merely <strong>function to <mark>secure the conditions of reproduction of </mark>the <mark>catastrophe </mark>market</strong>); there, at least, in the order of moral profits, the Marxist analysis is wholly applicable: we see to it that <mark>extreme poverty is</mark> reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as <mark>a fuel <strong>essential to the moral</strong> and sentimental <strong>equilibrium of the West</u></strong></mark>. In our defence, it might be said that this extreme poverty was largely of our own making and it is therefore normal that we should profit by it. There can be no finer proof that the distress of the rest of the world is at the root of Western power and that the spectacle of that distress is its crowning glory than the inauguration, on the roof of the Arche de la Defense, with a sumptuous buffet laid on by the Fondation des Droits de l'homme, of an exhibition of the finest photos of world poverty. Should we be surprised that spaces are set aside in the Arche d' Alliance. for universal suffering hallowed by caviar and champagne? <u>Just as the economic crisis of the West will not be complete so long as it can still exploit the resources of the rest of the world, so the symbolic crisis will be complete only when it is no longer able to feed on the other half's human and natural catastrophes</u> (Eastern Europe, the Gulf, the Kurds, Bangladesh, etc.). <u>We need this drug, which serves us as an aphrodisiac and hallucinogen. And the poor countries are the best suppliers </u>- as, indeed, they are of other drugs. <u>We provide them, through our media, with the means to exploit this paradoxical resource, just as we give them the means to exhaust their natural resources with our technologies.</u> <u><mark>Our whole culture lives off </mark>this <mark>catastrophic cannibalism</mark>, relayed in cynical mode by the news media, and <mark>carried forward</mark> in moral mode <mark>by</mark> our <mark>humanitarian aid</mark>, which is a way of encouraging it and ensuring its continuity, just as economic aid is a strategy for perpetuating under-development. Up to now, the financial sacrifice has been compensated a hundredfold by the moral gain. <strong><mark>But when the </mark>catastrophe <mark>market itself reaches crisis point</u></strong></mark>, in accordance with the implacable logic of the market, when distress becomes scarce or the marginal returns on it fall from overexploitation, <u><strong><mark>when we run out of disasters from elsewhere</u></strong></mark> or when they can no longer be traded like coffee or other commodities, <u><strong><mark>the West will be forced to produce its own catastrophe </mark>for itself, in order <mark>to meet its need for spectacle </mark>and that voracious appetite for symbols which characterizes it</u></strong> even more than its voracious appetite for food. It will reach the point where it devours itself. When we have finished sucking out the destiny of others, we shall have to invent one for ourselves. The Great Crash, the symbolic crash, will come in the end from us Westerners, but only when we are no longer able to feed on the hallucinogenic misery which comes to us from the other half of the world. Yet they do not seem keen to give up their monopoly. The Middle East, Bangladesh, black Africa and <u>Latin America are really going flat out in the distress and catastrophe stakes, and thus in providing symbolic nourishment for the rich world. They might be said to be overdoing it: heaping earthquakes, floods, famines and ecological disasters one upon another, and finding the means to massacre each other most of the time. The <strong>'disaster show' goes on without any let-up</u></strong> and our sacrificial debt to them far exceeds their economic debt. The misery with which they generously overwhelm us is something we shall never be able to repay. The sacrifices we offer in return are laughable (a tornado or two, a few tiny holocausts on the roads, the odd financial sacrifice) and, moreover, by some infernal logic, these work out as much greater gains for us, whereas our kindnesses have merely added to the natural catastrophes another one immeasurably worse: the demographic catastrophe, a veritable epidemic which we deplore each day in pictures. In short, there is such distortion between North and South, to the symbolic advantage of the South (a hundred thousand Iraqi dead against casualties numbered in tens on our side: in every case we are the losers), that one day everything will break down. <u>One day, <mark>the West will break down if we are not</mark> soon <mark>washed clean of this shame</mark>, if an international congress of the poor countries does not very quickly decide to share out this symbolic privilege of misery and catastrophe. It is of course normal, since we refuse to allow the spread of nuclear weapons, that they should refuse to allow the spread of the catastrophe weapon. But it is not right that they should exert that monopoly indefinitely. In any case, the under-developed are only so by comparison with the Western system and its presumed success. In the light of its assumed failure, they are not under-developed at all. They are only so in terms of a dominant evolutionism which has always been the worst of colonial ideologies. </u>The argument here is that there is a line of objective progress and everyone is supposed to pass through its various stages (we find the same eyewash with regard to the evolution of species and in that evolutionism which unilaterally sanctions the superiority of the human race). In the light of current upheavals, which put an end to any idea of history as a linear process, there are no longer either developed or under-developed peoples. <u>Thus, <mark>to encourage hope</mark> of evolution - albeit by revolution - among the poor and to doom them, in keeping with the objective illusion of progress, to technological salvation <mark>is </mark>a <mark>criminal absurdity</mark>.</u> In actual fact, it is their good fortune to be able to escape from evolution just at the point when we no longer know where it is leading. In any case, a majority of these peoples, including those of Eastern Europe, do not seem keen to enter this evolutionist modernity, and their weight in the balance is certainly no small factor in the West's repudiation of its own history, of its own utopias and its own modernity. It might be said that the routes of violence, historical or otherwise, are being turned around and that the viruses now pass from South to North, there being every chance that, five hundred years after America was conquered, 1992 and the end of the century will mark the comeback of the defeated and the sudden reversal of that modernity. The sense of pride is no longer on the side of wealth but of poverty, of those who - fortunately for them - have nothing to repent, and may indeed glory in being privileged in terms of catastrophes. Admittedly, this is a privilege they could hardly renounce, even if they wished to, but natural disasters merely reinforce the sense of guilt felt towards them by the wealthy – by those whom God visibly scorns since he no longer even strikes them down. One day it will be the Whites themselves who will give up their whiteness. It is a good bet that repentance will reach its highest pitch with the five-hundredth anniversary of the conquest of the Americas. We are going to have to lift the curse of the defeated - but symbolically victorious - peoples, which is insinuating itself five hundred years later, by way of repentance, into the heart of the white race. </p>
| null |
1nc
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Advantage
| 1,240,486 | 453 | 87,372 |
./documents/hspolicy19/Mamaroneck/SuSu/Mamaroneck-Suben-Suben-Neg-Georgetown%20Day-Round2.docx
| 716,270 |
N
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Georgetown Day
|
2
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DuVal AR
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Kelly Anderson
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1ac- mexico small arms
1nc- aspec psychoanalysis k gender terrorism k charity cannibalism turn duffield turn schlag turn
2nr- gender terrorism aspec
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hspolicy19/Mamaroneck/SuSu/Mamaroneck-Suben-Suben-Neg-Georgetown%20Day-Round2.docx
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SuSu
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Mamaroneck SuSu
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Mamaroneck
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NY
| null | 1,018 |
hspolicy19
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HS Policy 2019-20
| 2,019 |
cx
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hs
| 2 |
3,492,637 |
Ending the demand for Opioids is reverse causal and decreases the strength of cartels
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Kim, 8-28
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Kim, 8-28 — Major Jacob J. Kim, U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer Specializing in the Latin American and Northeast Asian Regions, M.A. in Latin American Studies from the University of California Los Angeles, Dissertation on Mexican Drug Cartel Influence in Government, Society, and Culture in 2014, 8-28-2017, Accessed: 10-4-2017, "Solving the Opioid National Security Crisis" Real Clear Defense, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/08/28/solving_the_opioid_national_security_crisis_112158.html
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Opioid addiction in the United States has quickly become a complex crisis with enormous implications. The greatest culprits and beneficiaries of this epidemic are Mexico’s drug cartels, which provide more than 90 percent and rake in billions in profit. As long as demand for the drug in the U.S. remains high, Mexico’s cartels will continue to flourish. America’s addiction is the Mexican drug cartels’ primary source of income. It has been this way, but the drug of choice has changed. Trafficking of opioids such as fentanyl and heroin is now more profitable than marijuana and cartels have ramped up local production of opioids significantly since 2013 The profitability of opioids has become so high that gangs of rival drug cartels in Mexico are going to war to control poppy fields In the U.S., the demand for opioids shows no sign of abating, as addicts in all 50 states abuse everything from overprescribed OxyContin to more lethal opioids such as fentanyl and heroin. If the demand for opioids in the U.S. were to decrease, Mexican drug cartels would likely lose money and power.
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Opioid addiction beneficiaries are Mexico’s cartels, which provide 90 percent and rake in billions As long as demand remains high cartels will continue to flourish. addiction is cartels’ primary source opioids is more profitable than marijuana The profitability has become so high rival cartels in Mexico are going to war If demand were to decrease cartels would lose money and power.
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Opioid addiction in the United States has quickly become a complex crisis with enormous implications. Overdose deaths involving opioids nearly tripled from 1999 to 2014, and they currently claim the lives of approximately 142 people every day.[1], [2] Experts say opioid related deaths could kill nearly 500,000 Americans in the next decade.[3] The greatest culprits and beneficiaries of this epidemic are Mexico’s drug cartels, which provide more than 90 percent of America’s heroin and rake in billions in profit.[4] As long as demand for the drug in the U.S. remains high, Mexico’s drug traffickers and cartels will continue to flourish. Significantly decreasing demand for illicit opioids in the U.S. is the most effective way to reduce the power of these cartels, and this can only be done through a combination of education, legalization, and effective medical treatment. One Problem Fuels the Other America’s addiction to illicit drugs is the Mexican drug cartels’ primary source of income. It has always been this way, but the drug of choice has changed. Trafficking of opioids such as fentanyl and heroin is now more profitable than marijuana and cocaine, and cartels have ramped up local production of opioids significantly since 2013.[5] The profitability of opioids has become so high that gangs of rival drug cartels in Mexico are going to war to control poppy fields, which the federal government struggles to find and destroy.[6] In the U.S., the demand for opioids shows no sign of abating, as addicts in all 50 states abuse everything from overprescribed OxyContin to more lethal opioids such as fentanyl and heroin. If the demand for opioids in the U.S. were to decrease, Mexican drug cartels would likely lose a proportional amount of money and power.
| 1,770 |
<h4>Ending the <u>demand</u> for Opioids is <u>reverse</u> causal and decreases the <u>strength</u> of cartels</h4><p><u><strong>Kim, 8-28</u></strong> — Major Jacob J. Kim, U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer Specializing in the Latin American and Northeast Asian Regions, M.A. in Latin American Studies from the University of California Los Angeles, Dissertation on Mexican Drug Cartel Influence in Government, Society, and Culture in 2014, 8-28-2017, Accessed: 10-4-2017, "Solving the Opioid National Security Crisis" Real Clear Defense, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/08/28/solving_the_opioid_national_security_crisis_112158.html</p><p><u><strong><mark>Opioid addiction</mark> in the United States has quickly become a complex crisis with enormous implications.</u></strong> Overdose deaths involving opioids nearly tripled from 1999 to 2014, and they currently claim the lives of approximately 142 people every day.[1], [2] Experts say opioid related deaths could kill nearly 500,000 Americans in the next decade.[3] <u><strong>The greatest culprits and <mark>beneficiaries</mark> of this epidemic <mark>are Mexico’s</mark> drug <mark>cartels, which provide</mark> more than <mark>90 percent</u></strong></mark> of America’s heroin <u><strong><mark>and rake in billions</mark> in profit.</u></strong>[4] <u><strong><mark>As long as demand</mark> for the drug in the U.S. <mark>remains high</mark>, Mexico’s</u></strong> drug traffickers and <u><strong><mark>cartels will continue to flourish.</u></strong></mark> Significantly decreasing demand for illicit opioids in the U.S. is the most effective way to reduce the power of these cartels, and this can only be done through a combination of education, legalization, and effective medical treatment. One Problem Fuels the Other <u><strong>America’s <mark>addiction</u></strong></mark> to illicit drugs <u><strong><mark>is</mark> the Mexican drug <mark>cartels’ primary source</mark> of income. It has</u></strong> always <u><strong>been this way, but the drug of choice</u></strong> <u><strong>has changed. Trafficking of <mark>opioids</mark> such as fentanyl and heroin <mark>is</mark> now <mark>more profitable than marijuana</u></strong></mark> and cocaine, <u><strong>and cartels have ramped up local production of opioids significantly since 2013</u></strong>.[5] <u><strong><mark>The profitability</mark> of opioids <mark>has become so high</mark> that gangs of <mark>rival</mark> drug <mark>cartels in Mexico are going to war</mark> to control poppy fields</u></strong>, which the federal government struggles to find and destroy.[6] <u><strong>In the U.S., the demand for opioids shows no sign of abating, as addicts in all 50 states abuse everything from overprescribed OxyContin to more lethal opioids such as fentanyl and heroin.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>If</mark> the <mark>demand</mark> for opioids in the U.S. <mark>were to decrease</mark>, Mexican drug <mark>cartels would</mark> likely <mark>lose</u></strong></mark> a proportional amount of <u><strong><mark>money and power.</p></u></strong></mark>
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1AC
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1AC – New
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4
| 45,274 | 177 | 116,135 |
./documents/ndtceda17/Minnesota/AsLe/Minnesota-Asirvatham-Leburu-Aff-Jesuit-Octas.docx
| 598,886 |
A
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Jesuit
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Octas
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Kentucky Adam-Noparstak
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Buntin, Karthikeyan, Wunderlich
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1AC - Single Payer - Disease Cost Cartels
2NR - Markets CP Immigration DA Case
|
ndtceda17/Minnesota/AsLe/Minnesota-Asirvatham-Leburu-Aff-Jesuit-Octas.docx
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AsLe
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Minnesota AsLe
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Ro.....
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As.....
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Te.....
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Le.....
| 19,128 |
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Minnesota
| null | null | 1,007 |
ndtceda17
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NDT/CEDA 2017-18
| 2,017 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
2,177,569 |
[Anderson] Util is unintuitive and justifies repugnant action.
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Anderson: .
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Anderson: Anderson, Kerby. [National Director of Probe Ministries International] “Utilitarianism: The Greatest Good for the Greatest Number.” Probe, 2004. RP
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One problem with util is its ‘end justifies the means’ mentality. If any end can justify the means a ethical foundation is lost. then Hitler could justify the Holocaust because the end was to purify the human race. A particular act cannot be judged as good simply because it may lead to a good consequence. The means must be judged by some consistent standard of morality. Second, util cannot protect rights of minorities if the goal is the greatest good for the greatest number. Americans in the eighteenth century could justify slavery it provided a good consequence for a majority of Americans. Util provides no objective and consistent foundation to judge results because results are the mechanism used to judge the action itself. Inviolability is intrinsically valuable.
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util is end justifies the means a ethical foundation is lost then Hitler could justify the Holocaust because the end was to purify the human race. The means must be judged by some consistent standard util cannot protect minorities Americans in the eighteenth century could justify slavery it provided a good consequence for a majority of Americans Inviolability is intrinsically valuable.
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One problem with utilitarianism is that its leads to an ‘end justifies the means’ mentality. If any worthwhile end can justify the means to attain it, a true ethical foundation is lost. But we all know that the end does not justify the means. If that were so, then Hitler could justify the Holocaust because the end was to purify the human race. Stalin could justify his slaughter of millions because he was trying to achieve a communist utopia. The end never justifies the means. The means must justify themselves. A particular act cannot be judged as good simply because it may lead to a good consequence. The means must be judged by some objective and consistent standard of morality. Second, utilitarianism cannot protect the rights of minorities if the goal is the greatest good for the greatest number. Americans in the eighteenth century could justify slavery on the basis that it provided a good consequence for a majority of Americans. Certainly the majority benefited from cheap slave labor even though the lives of black slaves were much worse. A third problem with utilitarianism is predicting the consequences. If morality is based on results, then we would have to have omniscience in order to accurately predict the consequence of any action. But at best we can only guess at the future, and often these educated guesses are wrong. A fourth problem with utilitarianism is that consequences themselves must be judged. When results occur, we must still ask whether they are good or bad results. Utilitarianism provides no objective and consistent foundation to judge results because results are the mechanism used to judge the action itself. Inviolability is intrinsically valuable.
| 1,695 |
<h4>[Anderson] Util is unintuitive and justifies repugnant action.</h4><p><u><strong>Anderson</u>: </strong>Anderson, Kerby. [National Director of Probe Ministries International] “Utilitarianism: The Greatest Good for the Greatest Number.” Probe, 2004<strong>. <u></strong>RP</p><p><strong>One problem with <mark>util</u></mark>i</strong>tarianism<strong> <u><mark>is</u></mark> </strong>that<strong> <u>its</u></strong> leads to an<strong> <u>‘<mark>end justifies the means</mark>’ mentality. If any</u></strong> worthwhile <u><strong>end can justify the means</u></strong> to attain it, <u><strong><mark>a</u></strong></mark> true<u><strong> <mark>ethical foundation is lost</mark>.</u></strong> But we all know that the end does not justify the means. If that were so,<strong> <u><mark>then Hitler could justify the Holocaust because the end was to purify the human race.</mark> </u></strong>Stalin could justify his slaughter of millions because he was trying to achieve a communist utopia. The end never justifies the means. The means must justify themselves. <u><strong>A particular act cannot be judged as good simply because it may lead to a good consequence. <mark>The means must be judged by some</u></mark> </strong>objective and<strong> <u><mark>consistent standard</mark> of morality. Second, <mark>util</u></strong></mark>itarianism<strong> <u><mark>cannot protect</u></mark> the <u>rights of <mark>minorities</mark> if the goal is the greatest good for the greatest number. <mark>Americans in the eighteenth century could justify slavery</u></strong></mark> on the basis that<strong> <u><mark>it provided a good consequence for a majority of Americans</mark>.</u> </strong>Certainly the majority benefited from cheap slave labor even though the lives of black slaves were much worse. A third problem with utilitarianism is predicting the consequences.<strong> </strong>If morality is based on results, then we would have to have omniscience in order to accurately predict the consequence of any action. But at best we can only guess at the future, and often these educated guesses are wrong. A fourth problem with utilitarianism is that consequences themselves must be judged. When results occur, we must still ask whether they are good or bad results<strong>. <u>Util</u>i</strong>tarianism <u><strong>provides no objective and consistent foundation to judge results because results are the mechanism used to judge the action itself. <mark>Inviolability is intrinsically valuable.</p></u></strong></mark>
| null |
Pleasure
|
Actor Specificity
| 74,198 | 116 | 66,562 |
./documents/hsld20/Harrison/Ah/Harrison-Ahmad-Neg-Apple%20Valley-Semis.docx
| 860,934 |
N
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Apple Valley
|
Semis
|
Loyola BM
|
Panel
|
AC - Degrowth
NC - Set Col
1AR - Case and Set Col K
2NR - Case
2AR - Case
|
hsld20/Harrison/Ah/Harrison-Ahmad-Neg-Apple%20Valley-Semis.docx
| null | 73,111 |
AlAh
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Harrison AlAh
| null |
Al.....
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Ah.....
| null | null | 24,536 |
Harrison
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Harrison
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NY
| null | 1,028 |
hsld20
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HS LD 2020-21
| 2,020 |
ld
|
hs
| 1 |
4,626,966 |
2] No North Korean war or draw-in---all sides have huge incentives to limit conflict
|
Horowitz 18
|
Michael C. Horowitz 18, professor of political science and the associate director of Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania; and Elizabeth N. Saunders, associate professor of political science at George Washington University, 1/3/18, “Analysis: Why nuclear war with North Korea is less likely than you think,” https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/analysis-why-nuclear-war-with-north-korea-is-less-likely-than-you-think/ar-BBHPJfL
|
commentary on risk of war focuses on Trump and Kim in this case, other factors, including geography and military capabilities matter more than tweets And these reduce the likelihood of war leaders are constrained by material and situational constraints. No U.S. or North Korean leader can change these One constraint stems from the two sides’ formidable military capabilities, which mean that a general war with North Korea would be devastating second is geography, which may make war less likely. North Korean artillery points directly at Seoul South Korea could influence U.S. behavior China faces geographic reality China does not want refugees All sides know war would be a huge and difficult military and political problem there are strong incentives to deter the other side, rather than escalate leaders have reason to make war even less likely Trump and Kim have strong incentives to reduce the prospect of war Kim’s pursuit of nuclear weapons was rational. He wants to stay in power war would spell the end of the regime U.S. decision-makers know how costly a war might be. Knowledge of these costs makes war less likely
|
commentary focuses on Trump and Kim other factors matter more than tweets And reduce likelihood of war leaders are constrained formidable capabilities mean war would be devastating geography make war less likely South Korea could influence U.S. behavior China does not want refugees All sides know war would be difficult there are strong incentives to deter rather than escalate Trump and Kim have strong incentives to reduce prospect of war Kim’s rational. He wants power war would end the regime U.S. decision-makers Knowledge of costs makes war less likely
|
Last night, in response to Kim Jong Un’s claim to have a nuclear button on his desk, President Trump tweeted, “I too have a Nuclear Button, but it is a much bigger & more powerful one than his, and my Button works!” This is not the first time that things have gotten personal in the U.S.-North Korea standoff. Much of the rhetoric between the two leaders and media commentary on the risk of war focuses on the leadership of Trump and Kim — or “Little Rocket Man,” as Trump has called the North Korean leader. But how much could these two singular leaders really propel us to a nuclear war? Trump’s tweets and other actions certainly can increase the risk of conflict — consistent with our research on how the decisions of individual leaders affect military conflict. However, in this case, other factors, including geography and military capabilities, will matter more than tweets or the characteristics of leaders. And these factors reduce the likelihood of war. Leaders can be important for international conflict For the past few generations, political scientists who write about the outbreak of conflict mainly argued that leaders were irrelevant, focusing instead on international factors such as great power relations or domestic political factors such as whether the two countries involved had democratic institutions. But more and more scholarship suggest that leaders make a large difference in determining whether and how countries go to war. And it’s not just in dictatorships such as North Korea; even more constrained leaders, such as U.S. presidents, matter. Leaders’ beliefs and experiences before coming into office can be critical in determining whether a country goes to war and what military strategy will be used in the event of war. But structural forces are strong in this case Even if leaders have discretion, they are constrained by material and situational constraints. No U.S. or North Korean leader can realistically change or avoid some of these constraints. One constraint stems from the two sides’ formidable military capabilities, which mean that a general war with North Korea would be devastating, as Barry Posen argued last year. Even before it acquired a nuclear capability, North Korea’s artillery put tremendous pressure on South Korea. Add to that its missile arsenal — which, as nuclear experts have chronicled, can now probably deliver an intercontinental ballistic missile armed with a nuclear warhead against the United States. A second unavoidable constraint is geography, which may make war less likely. North Korean artillery points directly at Seoul, just 35 miles from the demilitarized zone (DMZ). South Korea may oppose a war, which could influence U.S. behavior. North Korea also borders China, a powerful country whose economic support keeps North Korea afloat. But China faces its own geographic reality with respect to North Korea, and China is increasingly frustrated with North Korea’s behavior. In the event of war, China does not want refugees flooding across the border into China. Yet China also does not want a unified Korean Peninsula with U.S. troops on its border. Indeed, in the Korean War, the United States tested geographic constraints by pushing beyond the prewar dividing line, the 38th parallel, in an attempt to unify Korea. China intervened to prevent such an outcome, and the conflict stopped where it started. All sides know that a war would be a huge and difficult military and political problem. So there are strong incentives to try to deter the other side, rather than escalate. U.S. and North Korean leaders have reason to make war even less likely Although the focus on Trump and Kim almost always suggests that their behavior increases the risk of war, they actually have strong incentives to reduce the prospect of war. Despite rhetoric about North Korea’s irrationality, Kim’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and long range missiles was rational. He wants to stay in power, and nuclear weapons constitute invasion insurance. But a war would probably spell the end of the regime, giving North Korea little reason to start a war. On the U.S. side, few wars have probably been war-gamed more than a conflict on the Korean Peninsula. U.S. decision-makers know how costly a war might be. Knowledge of these costs makes war less likely.
| 4,308 |
<h4><strong>2] No North Korean war or draw-in---all sides have huge incentives to limit conflict </h4><p></strong>Michael C. <strong>Horowitz 18</strong>, professor of political science and the associate director of Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania; and Elizabeth N. Saunders, associate professor of political science at George Washington University, 1/3/18, “Analysis: Why nuclear war with North Korea is less likely than you think,” https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/analysis-why-nuclear-war-with-north-korea-is-less-likely-than-you-think/ar-BBHPJfL</p><p>Last night, in response to Kim Jong Un’s claim to have a nuclear button on his desk, President Trump tweeted, “I too have a Nuclear Button, but it is a much bigger & more powerful one than his, and my Button works!” This is not the first time that things have gotten personal in the U.S.-North Korea standoff. Much of the rhetoric between the two leaders and media <u><strong><mark>commentary</mark> on</u></strong> the <u><strong>risk of war <mark>focuses on</u></strong></mark> the leadership of <u><strong><mark>Trump and Kim</u></strong></mark> — or “Little Rocket Man,” as Trump has called the North Korean leader. But how much could these two singular leaders really propel us to a nuclear war? Trump’s tweets and other actions certainly can increase the risk of conflict — consistent with our research on how the decisions of individual leaders affect military conflict. However, <u><strong>in this case, <mark>other factors</mark>, including geography and military capabilities</u></strong>, will <u><strong><mark>matter more than tweets</u></strong></mark> or the characteristics of leaders. <u><strong><mark>And</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>these</u></strong> factors <u><strong><mark>reduce</mark> the <mark>likelihood of war</u></strong></mark>. Leaders can be important for international conflict For the past few generations, political scientists who write about the outbreak of conflict mainly argued that leaders were irrelevant, focusing instead on international factors such as great power relations or domestic political factors such as whether the two countries involved had democratic institutions. But more and more scholarship suggest that leaders make a large difference in determining whether and how countries go to war. And it’s not just in dictatorships such as North Korea; even more constrained leaders, such as U.S. presidents, matter. Leaders’ beliefs and experiences before coming into office can be critical in determining whether a country goes to war and what military strategy will be used in the event of war. But structural forces are strong in this case Even if <u><strong><mark>leaders</u></strong></mark> have discretion, they <u><strong><mark>are constrained</mark> by material and situational constraints. No U.S. or North Korean leader can</u></strong> realistically <u><strong>change</u></strong> or avoid some of <u><strong>these</u></strong> constraints. <u><strong>One constraint stems from the two sides’ <mark>formidable</mark> military <mark>capabilities</mark>, which <mark>mean</mark> that a general <mark>war</mark> with North Korea <mark>would be devastating</u></strong></mark>, as Barry Posen argued last year. Even before it acquired a nuclear capability, North Korea’s artillery put tremendous pressure on South Korea. Add to that its missile arsenal — which, as nuclear experts have chronicled, can now probably deliver an intercontinental ballistic missile armed with a nuclear warhead against the United States. A <u><strong>second</u></strong> unavoidable constraint <u><strong>is <mark>geography</mark>, which may <mark>make war less likely</mark>. North Korean artillery points directly at Seoul</u></strong>, just 35 miles from the demilitarized zone (DMZ). <u><strong><mark>South Korea</u></strong></mark> may oppose a war, which <u><strong><mark>could influence U.S. behavior</u></strong></mark>. North Korea also borders China, a powerful country whose economic support keeps North Korea afloat. But <u><strong>China faces</u></strong> its own <u><strong>geographic reality</u></strong> with respect to North Korea, and China is increasingly frustrated with North Korea’s behavior. In the event of war, <u><strong><mark>China does not want refugees</u></strong></mark> flooding across the border into China. Yet China also does not want a unified Korean Peninsula with U.S. troops on its border. Indeed, in the Korean War, the United States tested geographic constraints by pushing beyond the prewar dividing line, the 38th parallel, in an attempt to unify Korea. China intervened to prevent such an outcome, and the conflict stopped where it started. <u><strong><mark>All sides know</u></strong></mark> that a <u><strong><mark>war would be</mark> a huge and <mark>difficult</mark> military and political problem</u></strong>. So <u><strong><mark>there are strong incentives to</u></strong></mark> try to <u><strong><mark>deter</mark> the other side, <mark>rather than escalate</u></strong></mark>. U.S. and North Korean <u><strong>leaders have reason to make war even less likely</u></strong> Although the focus on <u><strong><mark>Trump and Kim</u></strong></mark> almost always suggests that their behavior increases the risk of war, they actually <u><strong><mark>have strong incentives to reduce</mark> the <mark>prospect of war</u></strong></mark>. Despite rhetoric about North Korea’s irrationality, <u><strong><mark>Kim’s</mark> pursuit of nuclear weapons</u></strong> and long range missiles <u><strong>was <mark>rational. He wants</mark> to stay in <mark>power</u></strong></mark>, and nuclear weapons constitute invasion insurance. But a <u><strong><mark>war would</u></strong></mark> probably <u><strong>spell the <mark>end</mark> of <mark>the regime</u></strong></mark>, giving North Korea little reason to start a war. On the U.S. side, few wars have probably been war-gamed more than a conflict on the Korean Peninsula. <u><strong><mark>U.S. decision-makers</mark> know how costly a war might be. <mark>Knowledge of</mark> these <mark>costs makes war less likely</u></strong></mark>. </p>
| null |
3
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Advantages
| 21,617 | 273 | 153,696 |
./documents/hsld22/Westwood/AkPi/Westwood-AkPi-Neg-Churchill-Classic-Round-3.docx
| 960,015 |
N
|
Churchill Classic
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3
|
LC Anderson LS
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Okunlola
|
1AC - Korea
1NC - Vaccines PIC, Moen Reps, Populism DA, Case
1AR - All
2NR - Moen Reps
2AR - All
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hsld22/Westwood/AkPi/Westwood-AkPi-Neg-Churchill-Classic-Round-3.docx
|
2023-01-07 15:57:28
| 79,598 |
AkPi
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Westwood AkPi
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Hello my name is Akhilesh (he/him)
Pre-Round Information:
Email: [email protected]
phone number: 7378086063
(use email for disclosure)
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Ak.....
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Pi.....
| null | null | 26,697 |
Westwood
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Westwood
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TX
| 10,966 | 2,003 |
hsld22
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HS LD 2022-23
| 2,022 |
ld
|
hs
| 1 |
3,048,470 |
Capitalism makes extinction inevitable through escalating ecological catastrophes and creates violence across racial and gendered lines—confronting it requires a reclamation of the state, not a rejection of it.
|
Parr 15 , Volume 62, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2015.03.012)
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Parr 15 (Adrian - Professor and Director of The Charles Phelps Taft Research Center at the University of Cincinnati, “The Wrath of Capital: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics – Reflections,” 4/20/15, Geoforum, Volume 62, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2015.03.012)
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our politics must start from the point that after 2050 it may all be over.’ A future world of rising oceans, extreme weather events, species extinction, pollution, and increasing inequity is not inevitable. If the human race continues on its current course, then the earth could very well become an inhospitable place for a great many species, people included. Using a neoliberal framework to craft solutions to climate change produces a vicious circle that reinstates the selfsame social organization and broader sociocultural and economic structures that have led to global climate change. Rigorous thinking and broadening our understanding of flourishing and emancipatory politics are important resources we can use to counter the narrow-minded view that the free market will solve the challenges climate change poses. the neoliberal framework of climate change politics has turned it into a moralizing discourse. he discourse exposes a racist, sexist, privileged political subject who points the finger of blame in the direction of underdeveloped countries overpopulating the earth, the Chinese polluting the atmosphere, ‘primitive societies’ in need of ‘modernizing’ their economies and governments, and an inefficient and ineffectual public sphere that should hand the ownership and management of common pool resources over to the private sector. All are moralizing arguments presented under the umbrella of climate change solutions. It is therefore important we recognize these are not political arguments. Arguments of this kind do not view the ‘opportunity’ in question as a platform for transforming otherwise oppressive, exploitative, and coercive power relations. scientific consensus is human activities are changing global climate. If this situation continues predictions for the future of all life on earth are far from good, and by some accounts these are quite simply catastrophic. Using the logic of neoliberalism to ‘solve’ the crisis climate change poses is not a solution it is a displacement activity. this displacement activity is an act of violence that conceals a deeper structural violence, or the ‘objective violence’, of global capitalism such that the political weight of the problem is no longer felt. Critically engaging with this structure of objective violence is a necessary first step in creating emancipatory solutions and engaging new political subjectivities. we need to first recognize that individualism as expressed through consumption is just one kind of investment human energies and affects can take. The observation has concrete political consequences for it means energies and affects can be re-directed away from individual consumption and find investment in more emancipatory outcomes. Consumerist individualism is therefore not inevitable; it can be countered, but only if we first grasp how it works. I suggest a more collaborative and equitable governance structure might emerge from a transversal operation, whereby the horizontal and vertical dialectically engage each other. Solving the climate change puzzle cannot be achieved under the rubric of neoliberalism because this occurs at the expense of an emancipatory project. Life will never be sustainable if the structural violence of capital accumulation continues unchecked. I do end with a desperate plea announcing all roads currently lead us through the gates of capitalist heaven. However, this is only true if our politics ignores the emancipatory promise of political change and continues on its current neoliberal trajectory. I maintain this is only inevitable as long as the neoliberal inscription of all spaces for all times remain closed to critique.
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it may all be over rising oceans species extinction, pollution, and increasing inequity the earth could become inhospitable the neoliberal framework exposes a racist, sexist, privileged political subject If this situation continues predictions for the future of life on earth are catastrophic. displacement is an act of violence that conceals a deeper structural violence of global capitalism Critically engaging is a necessary first step in creating emancipatory solutions and engaging new political subjectivities. energies and affects can be re-directed away from consumption and find investment in emancipatory outcomes. a more collaborative and equitable governance structure might emerge from a transversal operation all roads currently lead through the gates of capitalist heaven. this is only true if our politics ignores the emancipatory promise of political change this is only inevitable as long as the neoliberal inscription of all spaces for all times remain closed to critique.
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In retrospect I wonder if I should have opened The Wrath of Capital with my closing remarks: ‘I close with the following proposition, which I mean in the most optimistic sense possible: our politics must start from the point that after 2050 it may all be over.’ (Parr, 2013: 147). The emphasis here is on maybe. A future world of rising oceans, extreme weather events, species extinction, pollution, and increasing inequity is not inevitable. If the human race continues on its current course, then the earth could very well become an inhospitable place for a great many species, people included. To change course though, humanity needs to begin with a healthy dose of critical realism and an optimistic understanding of the political opportunities climate change presents. Using a neoliberal framework to craft solutions to climate change produces a vicious circle that reinstates the selfsame social organization and broader sociocultural and economic structures that have led to global climate change. The Wrath of Capital shows that climate change is not just an economic, cultural, or technological challenge. It is a political dilemma. Rigorous thinking and broadening our understanding of flourishing and emancipatory politics are important resources we can use to counter the narrow-minded view that the free market will solve the challenges climate change poses. The central focus of The Wrath of Capital is how ‘opportunity’ is put to work in climate change politics. Is it a moralizing or political operation? The conclusion I draw is that thus far the neoliberal framework of climate change politics has turned it into a moralizing discourse. For as I show the discourse exposes a racist, sexist, privileged political subject who points the finger of blame in the direction of underdeveloped countries overpopulating the earth, the Chinese polluting the atmosphere, ‘primitive societies’ in need of ‘modernizing’ their economies and governments, and an inefficient and ineffectual public sphere that should hand the ownership and management of common pool resources over to the private sector. All are moralizing arguments presented under the umbrella of climate change solutions. It is therefore important we recognize these are not political arguments. Arguments of this kind do not view the ‘opportunity’ in question as a platform for transforming otherwise oppressive, exploitative, and coercive power relations. To briefly restate the argument I develop. I start with a now well known and oft cited fact that the scientific consensus is human activities are changing global climate. If this situation continues predictions for the future of all life on earth are far from good, and by some accounts these are quite simply catastrophic. Obviously we need to change course but the lingering question is how to do this? Unsurprisingly, given the prevailing economic and political influence neoliberalism currently has, solutions to the question of what to do about climate change have used a neoliberal point of reference. The principles of the free market, privatization, individualism, consumerism, and competition all shape the current direction of climate change politics. In the book I describe how the logic of the free market has resulted in a new brand of capitalism – climate capitalism – that has led to the creation of a market in pollution (cap and trade, or emissions trading) which has placed the limits climate change poses for capitalism back in the service of capital accumulation. Vast tracts of land have accordingly been turned into green energy farms (solar panels or wind farms), which in theory is a fabulous idea, but when practiced unchecked leads to land grabbing. Another form of land appropriation taking place under the guise of climate change solutions is the greening of cities. Green urbanism, as it is commonly called, refers to modifying cities so as to make them more environmentally friendly. This involves the creation of bike paths, green roofs, public transportation, green spaces, pedestrian friendly cities, efficient land use policies, and energy efficient buildings; all fabulous initiatives that potentially could improve the lives of all city dwellers. I show how green urbanism trumps equitable urbanism. Green urbanism in Chicago has also been used to justify demolishing public housing in a city where land values are growing and the poor are turned out on to the rental market with vouchers in hand designed to offset the higher rental costs. David Harvey fittingly calls this ‘accumulation by dispossession’, when public wealth is privatized and the poor are displaced (Harvey, 2003). The global population is expected to peak at just over 9 billion people in 2050. The argument is that more people will place the ecological balance of life on earth under serious strain, and along with more people comes more greenhouse gas emissions. Focusing on population numbers means that the population debate, as it figures within climate change political discourse, fails to acknowledge qualitative differences. For instance, not everyone impacts the climate equally. Not everyone has a dangerously high ecological footprint. The more well to do citizens of the world produce the greatest ecological burdens. Similarly the fear over China’s growing national emissions typically points to a growing Chinese middle class of eager consumers. However, comparing national greenhouse gas emissions does not honestly represent national emissions. One can easily be fooled into thinking China poses the greatest threat to achieving a global reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. However, if we consider how much dirty manufacturing high-income nations outsource to China then we come to realize that high-income nations are in large part responsible for China’s growing emissions. In addition, there are serious theoretical shortcomings to how per capita emissions statistics figure within climate change discourse. Rates of consumption rely upon the individual subject being the primary unit of analysis, at the expense of analyses that produce a nuanced examination of how different collective scenarios, such as household size and whether a person is an urban or rural dweller, also impact patterns of consumption. More importantly the per capita analysis of reproduction does not account for how inequity works within the larger discourse of reproductive rights. I ask: ‘Are the poor women from low-and middle-income countries having fewer babies so that the affluent can continue to consume a steady line of cheap commodities that are made by the cheap labor of these selfsame women?’ (Parr, 2013: 50). I use the example of women working at the plastic-recycling center in the Dharavi slum in Mumbai to explain that women being ‘liberated’ from the reproductive role traditionally assigned to them does not necessarily lead to emancipation. Indeed the women I met were working around the clock in filthy conditions with no workers rights returning to a tiny shack and a long list of domestic chores that had them working well into the night and rising before the sun came up. In this context the population debate fails to tackle the feminist problem of how women’s bodies are coded, and the location of female bodies in a matrix of power that is oppressive and exploitative. Tangentially related to the population debate is the growing concern over the diminishing quality and quantity of potable water. For example, the United Nations ‘predicts that by 2025 two out of three people will be living in conditions of water stress, and 1.8 billion people will be living in regions of absolute water scarcity’ (Parr, 2013: 53). If we also consider how climate change is changing the hydrologic cycle it is unsurprising that competition over water resources is mounting. This situation has spurred on a burgeoning water market, resulting in the privatization of water resources and unlikely marriages between the public and private sector to form. Water scarcity, when combined with extreme weather events and changing seasonal patterns also impacts food production. The solution to this has been the widespread industrialization of food production which I explain has led to a growing market in patenting indigenous ecological knowledge, seeds, and the violent exploitation of animal reproductive systems and immigrant labor. Using the logic of neoliberalism to ‘solve’ the crisis climate change poses is not a solution it is a displacement activity. And as the final chapter argues, this displacement activity is an act of violence that conceals a deeper structural violence, or what Zizek would call the ‘objective violence’, of global capitalism (Zizek, 2010) such that the political weight of the problem is no longer felt. Critically engaging with this structure of objective violence is a necessary first step in creating emancipatory solutions and engaging new political subjectivities. Some reviewers have disputed the book for lacking concrete solutions (Stoekl, 2013; Pearse, 2014). Others regard my conclusions as pessimistic (Cuomo and Schueneman, 2013: 699), stating the message I leave a reader with is one of general futility (Miller, 2013: 1). I understand the criticism but I would disagree adding that I tackle the nihilistic condition of climate change politics describing how it empties the political promise of futurity out of climate change discourse. What is nihilistic, in my view, is presenting a neoliberal worldview as a universal instead of appreciating it is merely a construction and as such it is refutable. Recognizing this, describing how it works, and understanding its contingent character is for me a political strategy. Allan Stoekl asks ‘If we are to do away with consumerist individualism’ then, ‘what, in practice, will replace it?’ (Stoekl, 2013: 4). I am coming at this issue from a slightly different vantage point. Instead of hoping to eliminate consumerist individualism, I am more interested in the machinic problem of how consumerist individualism works. This point is indebted to Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of desire as social. As I see it, we need to first recognize that individualism as expressed through consumption is just one kind of investment human energies and affects can take. This point is at the core of my analysis of sustainability culture in Hijacking Sustainability (Parr, 2009). The observation has concrete political consequences for it means energies and affects can be re-directed away from individual consumption and find investment in more emancipatory outcomes. Consumerist individualism is therefore not inevitable; it can be countered, but only if we first grasp how it works. Stoekl goes on to inquire what kind of government, ‘elected by whom, and with what (and whose) money’ could successfully realize a sustainable project (Stoekl, 2013: 4). His query echoes a similar question raised by Rebecca Pearse who writes, ‘How to turn a sense of humanity’s complicity with violence of capital into political practice is less clear.’ (Pearse, 2014: 133). Likewise Ryder W. Miller recognizes the book’s call to ‘carry on’, yet without presenting ‘many new options or ideas’ (Miller (2013): 1). I do outline an alternative approach to governance, recognizing that often this issue is presented as having either a vertical orientation (State or corporate governance) or one that is constituted as a horizontal mass movement (grassroots organization, local initiatives). I suggest a more collaborative and equitable governance structure might emerge from a transversal operation, whereby the horizontal and vertical dialectically engage each other. Whilst I acknowledge the importance of presenting concrete solutions that governments, people, and entrepreneurs can A. Parr / Geoforum 62 (2015) 70–72 71 implement, the point I make is that if politics remains at the level of neoliberal outcomes this presumes solutions to the problems climate change poses are properly the province of capital accumulation. In my view, this is not a solution it is an act of bad faith. Under such circumstances climate change politics is neutralized and is even reduced to a mere banality, because it is stripped of its transformative potential. Solving the climate change puzzle cannot be achieved under the rubric of neoliberalism because this occurs at the expense of an emancipatory project. Life will never be sustainable if the structural violence of capital accumulation continues unchecked. This distinction is ultimately an intellectual problem concerning understanding. What I set out to do is expand the reader’s understanding of how neoliberalism has become the standard against which all social, economic, cultural, and political responses to climate change are measured. Solutions are constructions and currently these primarily take place within a neoliberal frame. In my view this is lazy thinking and it has produced a narrow, even ignorant view of what opportunity consists of. The opportunity climate change presents is primarily valued as an instrument of privatization, individualism, consumption, commodification, and capital accumulation. The Wrath of Capital critiques this kind of reductive thinking explaining it arises when the practices of climate change politics are disaggregated from gender, racism, class relations, speciesism, and sexuality. If we widen the lens of climate change analysis to include the forces of exploitation, oppression, and inequity then we allow deeper ontological problems to surface. Thinking about these issues within the context of climate change discourse is a political strategy because it shifts the priorities away from capital accumulation and onto advancing the social good. All in all The Wrath of Capital identifies the myriad ways in which climate change politics has gained traction, however, I go on to consider how the logic of neoliberalism infects the potential political opportunity climate change presents. As neoliberalism enters the arenas of climate change discourse, policy, debate, and solutions – economic growth, population growth, food and water scarcity, spectacle – the transformative political opportunity is hollowed out. So yes, I do end with a desperate plea announcing all roads currently lead us through the gates of capitalist heaven. However, this is only true if our politics ignores the emancipatory promise of political change and continues on its current neoliberal trajectory. Under this schema the opportunity in question merely constructs passive subjectivities that are circumscribed by the inevitability of a neoliberal future. I maintain this is only inevitable as long as the neoliberal inscription of all spaces for all times remain closed to critique.
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<h4>Capitalism makes extinction inevitable through escalating ecological catastrophes and creates violence across racial and gendered lines—confronting it requires a reclamation of the state, not a rejection of it. </h4><p><strong>Parr 15</strong> (Adrian - Professor and Director of The Charles Phelps Taft Research Center at the University of Cincinnati, “The Wrath of Capital: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics – Reflections,” 4/20/15, Geoforum<u><strong><mark>, Volume 62, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2015.03.012)</p><p></u></strong></mark>In retrospect I wonder if I should have opened The Wrath of Capital with my closing remarks: ‘I close with the following proposition, which I mean in the most optimistic sense possible: <u>our politics must start from the point that after 2050 <mark>it may all be over</mark>.’</u> (Parr, 2013: 147). The emphasis here is on maybe. <u>A future world of <strong><mark>rising oceans</mark>, extreme weather events, <mark>species extinction, pollution, and increasing inequity</strong></mark> is <strong>not inevitable.</u></strong> <u>If the human race continues on its current course, then <mark>the earth could</mark> very well <mark>become</mark> an <strong><mark>inhospitable</mark> place</strong> for a great many species, people included.</u> To change course though, humanity needs to begin with a healthy dose of critical realism and an optimistic understanding of the political opportunities climate change presents. <u>Using a neoliberal framework to craft solutions to climate change produces a vicious circle that reinstates the selfsame social organization and broader sociocultural and economic structures that have led to global climate change.</u> The Wrath of Capital shows that climate change is not just an economic, cultural, or technological challenge. It is a political dilemma. <u>Rigorous thinking and broadening our understanding of flourishing and emancipatory politics are important resources we can use to counter the narrow-minded view that the free market will solve the challenges climate change poses. </u>The central focus of The Wrath of Capital is how ‘opportunity’ is put to work in climate change politics. Is it a moralizing or political operation? The conclusion I draw is that thus far <u><mark>the <strong>neoliberal framework</strong></mark> of climate change politics has turned it into a <strong>moralizing discourse.</u></strong> For as I show t<u>he discourse <mark>exposes a racist, sexist, privileged political subject</mark> who points the finger of blame in the direction of underdeveloped countries overpopulating the earth, the Chinese polluting the atmosphere, ‘primitive societies’ in need of ‘modernizing’ their economies and governments, and an inefficient and ineffectual public sphere that should hand the ownership and management of common pool resources over to the private sector. All are moralizing arguments presented under the umbrella of climate change solutions. It is therefore important we recognize <strong>these are not political arguments.</strong> Arguments of this kind do not view the ‘opportunity’ in question as a platform for transforming otherwise oppressive, exploitative, and coercive power relations. </u>To briefly restate the argument I develop. I start with a now well known and oft cited fact that the <u>scientific consensus is human activities are changing global climate. <mark>If this situation continues predictions for the future of</mark> all <mark>life on earth are</mark> far from good, and by some accounts these are quite simply <strong><mark>catastrophic.</strong></mark> </u>Obviously we need to change course but the lingering question is how to do this? Unsurprisingly, given the prevailing economic and political influence neoliberalism currently has, solutions to the question of what to do about climate change have used a neoliberal point of reference. The principles of the free market, privatization, individualism, consumerism, and competition all shape the current direction of climate change politics. In the book I describe how the logic of the free market has resulted in a new brand of capitalism – climate capitalism – that has led to the creation of a market in pollution (cap and trade, or emissions trading) which has placed the limits climate change poses for capitalism back in the service of capital accumulation. Vast tracts of land have accordingly been turned into green energy farms (solar panels or wind farms), which in theory is a fabulous idea, but when practiced unchecked leads to land grabbing. Another form of land appropriation taking place under the guise of climate change solutions is the greening of cities. Green urbanism, as it is commonly called, refers to modifying cities so as to make them more environmentally friendly. This involves the creation of bike paths, green roofs, public transportation, green spaces, pedestrian friendly cities, efficient land use policies, and energy efficient buildings; all fabulous initiatives that potentially could improve the lives of all city dwellers. I show how green urbanism trumps equitable urbanism. Green urbanism in Chicago has also been used to justify demolishing public housing in a city where land values are growing and the poor are turned out on to the rental market with vouchers in hand designed to offset the higher rental costs. David Harvey fittingly calls this ‘accumulation by dispossession’, when public wealth is privatized and the poor are displaced (Harvey, 2003). The global population is expected to peak at just over 9 billion people in 2050. The argument is that more people will place the ecological balance of life on earth under serious strain, and along with more people comes more greenhouse gas emissions. Focusing on population numbers means that the population debate, as it figures within climate change political discourse, fails to acknowledge qualitative differences. For instance, not everyone impacts the climate equally. Not everyone has a dangerously high ecological footprint. The more well to do citizens of the world produce the greatest ecological burdens. Similarly the fear over China’s growing national emissions typically points to a growing Chinese middle class of eager consumers. However, comparing national greenhouse gas emissions does not honestly represent national emissions. One can easily be fooled into thinking China poses the greatest threat to achieving a global reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. However, if we consider how much dirty manufacturing high-income nations outsource to China then we come to realize that high-income nations are in large part responsible for China’s growing emissions. In addition, there are serious theoretical shortcomings to how per capita emissions statistics figure within climate change discourse. Rates of consumption rely upon the individual subject being the primary unit of analysis, at the expense of analyses that produce a nuanced examination of how different collective scenarios, such as household size and whether a person is an urban or rural dweller, also impact patterns of consumption. More importantly the per capita analysis of reproduction does not account for how inequity works within the larger discourse of reproductive rights. I ask: ‘Are the poor women from low-and middle-income countries having fewer babies so that the affluent can continue to consume a steady line of cheap commodities that are made by the cheap labor of these selfsame women?’ (Parr, 2013: 50). I use the example of women working at the plastic-recycling center in the Dharavi slum in Mumbai to explain that women being ‘liberated’ from the reproductive role traditionally assigned to them does not necessarily lead to emancipation. Indeed the women I met were working around the clock in filthy conditions with no workers rights returning to a tiny shack and a long list of domestic chores that had them working well into the night and rising before the sun came up. In this context the population debate fails to tackle the feminist problem of how women’s bodies are coded, and the location of female bodies in a matrix of power that is oppressive and exploitative. Tangentially related to the population debate is the growing concern over the diminishing quality and quantity of potable water. For example, the United Nations ‘predicts that by 2025 two out of three people will be living in conditions of water stress, and 1.8 billion people will be living in regions of absolute water scarcity’ (Parr, 2013: 53). If we also consider how climate change is changing the hydrologic cycle it is unsurprising that competition over water resources is mounting. This situation has spurred on a burgeoning water market, resulting in the privatization of water resources and unlikely marriages between the public and private sector to form. Water scarcity, when combined with extreme weather events and changing seasonal patterns also impacts food production. The solution to this has been the widespread industrialization of food production which I explain has led to a growing market in patenting indigenous ecological knowledge, seeds, and the violent exploitation of animal reproductive systems and immigrant labor. <u>Using the logic of neoliberalism to ‘solve’ the crisis climate change poses is not a solution it is a displacement activity.</u> And as the final chapter argues, <u>this <mark>displacement</mark> activity <mark>is an act of violence that conceals a <strong>deeper structural violence</strong></mark>, or </u>what Zizek would call <u>the ‘objective violence’, <mark>of <strong>global capitalism</u></strong></mark> (Zizek, 2010) <u>such that the political weight of the problem is no longer felt. <mark>Critically engaging </mark>with this structure of objective violence <mark>is a necessary first step in creating emancipatory solutions and <strong>engaging new political subjectivities.</strong></mark> </u>Some reviewers have disputed the book for lacking concrete solutions (Stoekl, 2013; Pearse, 2014). Others regard my conclusions as pessimistic (Cuomo and Schueneman, 2013: 699), stating the message I leave a reader with is one of general futility (Miller, 2013: 1). I understand the criticism but I would disagree adding that I tackle the nihilistic condition of climate change politics describing how it empties the political promise of futurity out of climate change discourse. What is nihilistic, in my view, is presenting a neoliberal worldview as a universal instead of appreciating it is merely a construction and as such it is refutable. Recognizing this, describing how it works, and understanding its contingent character is for me a political strategy. Allan Stoekl asks ‘If we are to do away with consumerist individualism’ then, ‘what, in practice, will replace it?’ (Stoekl, 2013: 4). I am coming at this issue from a slightly different vantage point. Instead of hoping to eliminate consumerist individualism, I am more interested in the machinic problem of how consumerist individualism works. This point is indebted to Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of desire as social. As I see it, <u>we need to first recognize that individualism as expressed through consumption is just one kind of investment human energies and affects can take. </u>This point is at the core of my analysis of sustainability culture in Hijacking Sustainability (Parr, 2009). <u>The observation has concrete political consequences for it means <mark>energies and affects can be re-directed away from</mark> individual <mark>consumption and find investment in</mark> more <mark>emancipatory outcomes.</u></mark> <u>Consumerist individualism is therefore <strong>not inevitable</strong>; it can be countered, but only if we first grasp how it works.</u> Stoekl goes on to inquire what kind of government, ‘elected by whom, and with what (and whose) money’ could successfully realize a sustainable project (Stoekl, 2013: 4). His query echoes a similar question raised by Rebecca Pearse who writes, ‘How to turn a sense of humanity’s complicity with violence of capital into political practice is less clear.’ (Pearse, 2014: 133). Likewise Ryder W. Miller recognizes the book’s call to ‘carry on’, yet without presenting ‘many new options or ideas’ (Miller (2013): 1). I do outline an alternative approach to governance, recognizing that often this issue is presented as having either a vertical orientation (State or corporate governance) or one that is constituted as a horizontal mass movement (grassroots organization, local initiatives). <u>I suggest <mark>a more collaborative and equitable governance structure might emerge from a transversal operation</mark>, whereby the horizontal and vertical dialectically engage each other.</u> Whilst I acknowledge the importance of presenting concrete solutions that governments, people, and entrepreneurs can A. Parr / Geoforum 62 (2015) 70–72 71 implement, the point I make is that if politics remains at the level of neoliberal outcomes this presumes solutions to the problems climate change poses are properly the province of capital accumulation. In my view, this is not a solution it is an act of bad faith. Under such circumstances climate change politics is neutralized and is even reduced to a mere banality, because it is stripped of its transformative potential. <u>Solving the climate change puzzle cannot be achieved under the rubric of neoliberalism because this occurs at the expense of an emancipatory project. <strong>Life will never be sustainable if the structural violence of capital accumulation continues unchecked.</u></strong> This distinction is ultimately an intellectual problem concerning understanding. What I set out to do is expand the reader’s understanding of how neoliberalism has become the standard against which all social, economic, cultural, and political responses to climate change are measured. Solutions are constructions and currently these primarily take place within a neoliberal frame. In my view this is lazy thinking and it has produced a narrow, even ignorant view of what opportunity consists of. The opportunity climate change presents is primarily valued as an instrument of privatization, individualism, consumption, commodification, and capital accumulation. The Wrath of Capital critiques this kind of reductive thinking explaining it arises when the practices of climate change politics are disaggregated from gender, racism, class relations, speciesism, and sexuality. If we widen the lens of climate change analysis to include the forces of exploitation, oppression, and inequity then we allow deeper ontological problems to surface. Thinking about these issues within the context of climate change discourse is a political strategy because it shifts the priorities away from capital accumulation and onto advancing the social good. All in all The Wrath of Capital identifies the myriad ways in which climate change politics has gained traction, however, I go on to consider how the logic of neoliberalism infects the potential political opportunity climate change presents. As neoliberalism enters the arenas of climate change discourse, policy, debate, and solutions – economic growth, population growth, food and water scarcity, spectacle – the transformative political opportunity is hollowed out. So yes, <u>I do end with a desperate plea announcing <mark>all roads currently lead</mark> us <mark>through the gates of capitalist heaven.</mark> However,<mark> <strong>this is only true if our politics ignores the emancipatory promise of political change</mark> and continues on its current neoliberal trajectory.</u></strong> Under this schema the opportunity in question merely constructs passive subjectivities that are circumscribed by the inevitability of a neoliberal future. <u>I maintain <mark>this is <strong>only inevitable as long as the neoliberal inscription of all spaces for all times remain closed to critique.</p></u></strong></mark>
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Third, terrorism – major retaliatory strikes, hardline nationalism, and Pakistan’s inability to counter the Indian army make nuclear escalation inevitable
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Ayoob 18
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Ayoob 18 [Mohammed Ayoob is senior fellow at the Center for Global Policy in Washington, DC, and University Distinguished Professor Emeritus of International Relations at Michigan State University.] “India and Pakistan: Inching Toward Their Final War?” National Interest. March 14, 2018. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/india-pakistan-inching-toward-their-final-war-24902?page=0%2C1 TG
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the logic of this deterrence is fast eroding. Attacks have provided justification for India’s hard-line Hindu nationalists to heighten anti-Pakistan rhetoric, and putting pressure on the Indian government to intensify its military response. In the past few months, Indian retaliatory attacks have targeted not only terrorist bases but also Pakistani military facilities, causing significant casualties among Pakistani forces.
The escalation in the last two years in terror attacks, especially by Jaish-e-Muhammad, with the obvious connivance of the Pakistan army, on Indian military targets in Kashmir and surrounding Indian states has made the situation very perilous several such major attacks, causing significant loss of life among Indian security forces.
A major terrorist attack on the Uri camp in Jammu and Kashmir in September 2016, which left seventeen military personnel dead, motivated the Indian government to reassess its strategy On September 29, 2016, India launched its first publicly acknowledged “surgical strike” against terrorist bases in Pakistan New Delhi was ready to launch major retaliatory attacks against targets in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.
in February 2018, Jaish terrorists attacked an Indian military camp in Jammu; five army personnel and four militants were killed. In retaliation, the Indian army destroyed a Pakistani army post with the help of rocket launchers, killing, according to Indian sources, twenty-two Pakistani personnel. This tit-for-tat exchange is reaching dangerous proportions.
the Pakistani military has downplayed Indian incursions and retaliatory attacks and refused to recognize their seriousness, because it does not want to appear weak However, the Pakistani military cannot continue to downplay Indian attacks, especially in light of the increasing fatalities. There is the danger that at some point, either by miscalculation or by design, an Indian surgical strike in Pakistani territory will push the Pakistani military—which controls the nuclear weapons—to retaliate in force.
If a full-scale war erupts, at some point Pakistan, unable to counter superior Indian conventional forces, could resort to battlefield nuclear weapons, as its doctrine proclaims India has made it abundantly clear that it will massively retaliate against any use of battlefield nuclear weapons by Pakistan without making a distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons
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Attacks provided justification for India’s nationalists to put pressure on the Indian military response Indian retaliatory attacks targeted not only terrorist bases but also Pakistani military facilities
escalation in terror attacks made the situation perilous
Delhi was ready to launch major retaliatory attacks against targets in Pakistan
Jaish terrorists attacked an Indian military camp the Indian army destroyed a Pakistani army post tit-for-tat is reaching dangerous proportions
the Pakistani military cannot continue to downplay Indian attacks an Indian strike will push the Pakistani military to retaliate in force
Pakistan, unable to counter superior Indian conventional forces, could resort to battlefield nuclear weapons India will massively retaliate
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However, it seems that the logic of this deterrence is fast eroding. Attacks such as the one in Mumbai, and subsequent assaults on Indian military installations in Kashmir and elsewhere, have also provided justification for India’s hard-line Hindu nationalists to heighten anti-Pakistan rhetoric, and putting pressure on the Indian government to intensify its military response. In the past few months, Indian retaliatory attacks have targeted not only terrorist bases but also Pakistani military facilities, causing significant casualties among Pakistani forces.
The escalation in the last two years in terror attacks, especially by Jaish-e-Muhammad, with the obvious connivance of the Pakistan army, on Indian military targets in Kashmir and surrounding Indian states has made the situation very perilous. In the past several months, terrorist groups operating from Pakistan have undertaken several such major attacks, causing significant loss of life among Indian security forces.
A major terrorist attack on the Uri camp in Jammu and Kashmir in September 2016, which left seventeen military personnel dead, motivated the Indian government to reassess its strategy for responding to such attacks. On September 29, 2016, India launched its first publicly acknowledged “surgical strike” against terrorist bases in Pakistan. Although there had been speculation that India had conducted such strikes earlier as well, this was the first admission by New Delhi that it was ready to launch major retaliatory attacks against targets in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.
In the latest incident, in February 2018, Jaish terrorists attacked an Indian military camp in Jammu; five army personnel and four militants were killed. In retaliation, the Indian army destroyed a Pakistani army post with the help of rocket launchers, killing, according to Indian sources, twenty-two Pakistani personnel. This tit-for-tat exchange is reaching dangerous proportions.
So far, the Pakistani military has downplayed Indian incursions and retaliatory attacks and refused to recognize their seriousness, because it does not want to appear weak in the eyes of the Pakistani public, which is then likely to clamor for revenge. However, the Pakistani military cannot continue to downplay Indian attacks, especially in light of the increasing fatalities. There is the danger that at some point, either by miscalculation or by design, an Indian surgical strike in Pakistani territory will push the Pakistani military—which controls the nuclear weapons—to retaliate in force.
If a full-scale war erupts, at some point Pakistan, unable to counter superior Indian conventional forces, could resort to battlefield nuclear weapons, as its doctrine proclaims. While India subscribes to a no-first-use doctrine, it has made it abundantly clear that it will massively retaliate against any use of battlefield nuclear weapons by Pakistan without making a distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. This strategy, as enunciated in a statement issued by the government of India on January 4, 2003, is designed to inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy.
| 3,138 |
<h4>Third, <u>terrorism</u> – major retaliatory strikes, hardline nationalism, and Pakistan’s inability to counter the Indian army make nuclear escalation inevitable</h4><p><u><strong>Ayoob 18</u></strong> [Mohammed Ayoob is senior fellow at the Center for Global Policy in Washington, DC, and University Distinguished Professor Emeritus of International Relations at Michigan State University.] “India and Pakistan: Inching Toward Their Final War?” National Interest. March 14, 2018. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/india-pakistan-inching-toward-their-final-war-24902?page=0%2C1<u> TG</p><p></u>However, it seems that <u>the logic of this deterrence is fast eroding. <mark>Attacks</u></mark> such as the one in Mumbai, and subsequent assaults on Indian military installations in Kashmir and elsewhere, <u>have</u> also <u><mark>provided justification for India’s</mark> hard-line Hindu <mark>nationalists to</mark> heighten anti-Pakistan rhetoric, and <mark>put</mark>ting <mark>pressure on the Indian</mark> government to intensify its <mark>military response</mark>. In the past few months, <mark>Indian retaliatory attacks</mark> have <mark>targeted not only terrorist bases but also Pakistani military facilities</mark>,<mark> </mark>causing significant casualties among Pakistani forces.</p><p>The <mark>escalation in </mark>the last two years in <mark>terror attacks</mark>, especially by Jaish-e-Muhammad, with the obvious connivance of the Pakistan army, on Indian military targets in Kashmir and surrounding Indian states has <mark>made the situation </mark>very <mark>perilous</u></mark>. In the past several months, terrorist groups operating from Pakistan have undertaken<u> several such major attacks, causing significant loss of life among Indian security forces.</p><p>A major terrorist attack on the Uri camp in Jammu and Kashmir in September 2016, which left seventeen military personnel dead, motivated the Indian government to reassess its strategy</u> for responding to such attacks. <u>On September 29, 2016, India launched its first publicly acknowledged “surgical strike” against terrorist bases in Pakistan</u>. Although there had been speculation that India had conducted such strikes earlier as well, this was the first admission by <u>New <mark>Delhi</u></mark> that it <u><mark>was ready to launch major retaliatory attacks against targets in Pakistan</mark> and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.</p><p></u>In the latest incident, <u>in February 2018, <mark>Jaish terrorists attacked an Indian military camp</mark> in Jammu; five army personnel and four militants were killed. In retaliation, <mark>the Indian army destroyed a Pakistani army post</mark> with the help of rocket launchers, killing, according to Indian sources, twenty-two Pakistani personnel. This <mark>tit-for-tat</mark> exchange <mark>is reaching dangerous proportions</mark>.</p><p></u>So far, <u>the Pakistani military has downplayed Indian incursions and retaliatory attacks and refused to recognize their seriousness, because it does not want to appear weak</u> in the eyes of the Pakistani public, which is then likely to clamor for revenge. <u>However, <mark>the Pakistani military cannot continue to downplay Indian attacks</mark>, especially in light of the increasing fatalities. There is the danger that at some point, either by miscalculation or by design, <mark>an Indian</mark> surgical <mark>strike</mark> in Pakistani territory <mark>will push the Pakistani military</mark>—which controls the nuclear weapons—<mark>to retaliate in force</mark>.</p><p>If a full-scale war erupts, at some point <mark>Pakistan, unable to counter superior Indian conventional forces, could resort to battlefield nuclear weapons</mark>, as its doctrine proclaims</u>. While <u><mark>India</u></mark> subscribes to a no-first-use doctrine, it <u>has made it abundantly clear that it <mark>will massively retaliate</mark> against any use of battlefield nuclear weapons by Pakistan without making a distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons</u>. This strategy, as enunciated in a statement issued by the government of India on January 4, 2003, is designed to inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy.</p>
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Adv – IndoPak War – Long
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Cal
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4
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Dougherty Valley KK
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Sean Fahey
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1AC IndoPak
1NC Nebel T - Second Strike CP - China Aggression DA - Deterrence DA - Bioweapons DA - Case
1AR Condo Bad - All
2NR Condo - Deterrence DA - Case
2AR Case - Deterrence DA
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hsld19/CrescentaValley/To/Crescenta%20Valley-Towner-Aff-Cal-Round4.docx
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Crescenta Valley AsTo
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hsld19
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HS LD 2019-20
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4,580,360 |
Util is intrinsic to us we can’t avoid that maximizing well being is the most moral action
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Nagel 86:
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Nagel 86: Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere, HUP, 1986: 156-168.
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sensory pleasure is good and pain bad just sensory experiences we feel involuntary desire . [E]veryone takes the avoidance of {their} own pain and promotion of own pleasure as reasons for action in a fairly simple way; not back[ed] up by any further reasons.
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sensory pleasure is good and pain bad just sensory experiences we feel involuntary desire [E]veryone takes the avoidance of their} own pain and promotion of own pleasure as reasons for action in a fairly simple way not back[ed] up by any further reasons.
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I shall defend the unsurprising claim that sensory pleasure is good and pain bad, no matter whose they are. The point of the exercise is to see how the pressures of objectification operate in a simple case. Physical pleasure and pain do not usually depend on activities or desires which themselves raise questions of justification and value. They are just sensory experiences in relation to which we are fairly passive, but toward which we feel involuntary desire or aversion. Almost [E]veryone takes the avoidance of his {their} own pain and the promotion of his own pleasure as subjective reasons for action in a fairly simple way; they are not back[ed] up by any further reasons.
| 682 |
<h4>Util is intrinsic to us we can’t avoid that maximizing well being is the most moral action </h4><p><u><strong>Nagel 86</u>: </strong>Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere, HUP, 1986: 156-168.</p><p>I shall defend the unsurprising claim that <u><mark>sensory pleasure is good and pain bad</u></mark>, no matter whose they are. The point of the exercise is to see how the pressures of objectification operate in a simple case. Physical pleasure and pain do not usually depend on activities or desires which themselves raise questions of justification and value. They are<u> <mark>just sensory experiences</u></mark> in relation to which we are fairly passive, but toward which<u> <mark>we feel involuntary desire</mark> </u>or aversion<u>.</u> Almost <u><mark>[E]veryone takes the avoidance of</mark> </u>his<u> {<mark>their} own pain and</mark> </u>the<u> <mark>promotion of</mark> </u>his<u> <mark>own pleasure as</mark> </u>subjective<u> <mark>reasons for action in a fairly</mark> <mark>simple way</mark>; </u>they are<u> <mark>not back[ed] up by any further reasons.</p></u></mark>
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1AC-Russia AFF
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Framing & method
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./documents/hsld22/NewmanSmith/SuJa/NewmanSmith-SuJa-Aff-arizona-state-Octas.docx
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arizona state
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Octas
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basis independent silicon valley sk
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kyle hietala, rhys moon, zach tom
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1ac--draft evaders v01
1nc--new affs bad, t leslie, t hypothetical action, vax pic, econ da, temporary residence cp, icj cp, case
1ar- all
2nr- econ da, temporary residence cp
2ar- all
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hsld22/NewmanSmith/SuJa/NewmanSmith-SuJa-Aff-arizona-state-Octas.docx
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2023-01-17 21:15:52
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SuJa
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Newman Smith SuJa
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hi!
**berkeley note--my email is not working**
contact info: [email protected] or 9723583863
*do not message me on facebook*
disclosure: happy to reformat docs for accessibility or make other accommodations, please let me know at least 15 minutes before round so that i have time to make the necessary changes! contact me for any interps you want me to meet or treat this as an instant I-meet
pdfs: i don't read many paywalled articles, but if you want a full pdf of one that i do read, please email and i will give it to you (or if i can't, i'll give you a screenshot of the pages i read)
round recording: if you plan to record our round, please ask for consent first AND please share a copy with me as soon as possible
pronouns: any
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And – US-China data sharing now – lunar landing
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Huang 19
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Huang 19 [Echo Huang is a reporter based in Hong Kong, where she covers China's technology and business.1-15-2019 https://qz.com/1523812/nasa-and-china-cooperated-in-recent-landing-on-far-side-of-the-moon/]
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NASA still cooperates with China’s space program despite a ban
the two countries had shared data on its exploration of the far side of the Moon Cooperation is the joint will of scientists,” said Yanhua deputy director of China’s National Space Agency both organizations have met “frequently.”
China discussed NASA using its Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO), to observe the landing of the Chang’e-4 spacecraft on the lunar far side. Wu said that China had told NASA the exact landing time and position of the spacecraft, but the LRO wasn’t in the right position to do so as it wasn’t able to adjust its orbit with what little fuel it had left. Before the touchdown on Jan. 3, the LRO managed to capture pictures of the landing site.
NASA confirmed those discussions the orbiter has been collecting data since Chang’e-4’s arrived on the far side The agencies have agreed to share data NASA’s cooperation with China is transparent reciprocal and mutually beneficial,” the US space agency said.
NASA’s administrator Bridenstine said the agency can share data with China. when we do a mission we can share data with them science is in the interest of all humanity. It’s not something any one country should retain
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NASA still cooperates China’s program despite a ban
the two shared data on exploration of the Moon organizations have met “frequently.”
The agencies have agreed to share data
Bridenstine said the agency can share data with China when we do a mission we share science is not something any one country should retain
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The small ways NASA still cooperates with China’s space program, despite a ban
In its recent landing on the far side of the Moon, China had help from scientists from a handful of countries, while more and more institutes around the world are cooperating with China in space exploration. NASA, however, is left out, thanks to restrictions imposed by the US government since 2011.
The US banned the space agency from working with China and its state-owned companies out of concerns regarding national security and technology transfers. As a result, China was locked out of the International Space Station because NASA is one of the participating bodies. More recently, scientists from other countries such as Germany and Sweden who were helping China with its exploration of the far side of the Moon were cautious of not falling afoul of US export controls on sensitive technology.
China’s space agency, however, announced that the two countries had shared data on its exploration of the far side of the Moon. “Cooperation is the joint will of scientists,” said Wu Yanhua, deputy director of China’s National Space Agency in a press conference yesterday (Jan. 14). He also noted that both organizations have met “frequently.”
According to Wu, China had discussed the possibility of NASA using its Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO), which orbits the Moon, to observe the landing of the Chang’e-4 spacecraft on the lunar far side. Wu said that China had told NASA the exact landing time and position of the spacecraft, but the LRO wasn’t in the right position to do so as it wasn’t able to adjust its orbit with what little fuel it had left. Before the touchdown on Jan. 3, the LRO managed to capture pictures of the landing site.
In a statement last week, NASA confirmed those discussions, and said that “for a number of reasons” the LRO wasn’t able to be at the optimal location for the landing. But it added that the orbiter has been collecting data since Chang’e-4’s arrived on the far side, and will take photos of the landing site on Jan. 31. The agencies have agreed to share data on significant findings, if any, at a meeting of a subcommittee of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to be held next month. “NASA’s cooperation with China is transparent, reciprocal and mutually beneficial,” the US space agency said.
NASA’s administrator, James Bridenstine, in an earlier interview with Quartz (paywall), had also said that the agency can share data with China. “When they do a science mission to the Moon, we’re hopeful they will be able to share with us the data they receive, and when we do a mission to the moon, we can share data with them,” Bridenstine told Quartz. “Understanding and characterizing the Moon and doing that kind of science is in the interest of all humanity. It’s not something any one country should try to retain for itself.”
| 2,871 |
<h4>And – US-China data sharing now – lunar landing</h4><p><strong>Huang 19<u></strong> [Echo Huang is a reporter based in Hong Kong, where she covers China's technology and business.1-15-2019 https://qz.com/1523812/nasa-and-china-cooperated-in-recent-landing-on-far-side-of-the-moon/]</p><p></u>The small ways <u><mark>NASA still cooperates</mark> with <mark>China’s</mark> space <mark>program</u></mark>, <u><mark>despite</mark> <mark>a ban</p><p></u></mark>In its recent landing on the far side of the Moon, China had help from scientists from a handful of countries, while more and more institutes around the world are cooperating with China in space exploration. NASA, however, is left out, thanks to restrictions imposed by the US government since 2011.</p><p>The US banned the space agency from working with China and its state-owned companies out of concerns regarding national security and technology transfers. As a result, China was locked out of the International Space Station because NASA is one of the participating bodies. More recently, scientists from other countries such as Germany and Sweden who were helping China with its exploration of the far side of the Moon were cautious of not falling afoul of US export controls on sensitive technology.</p><p>China’s space agency, however, announced that <u><mark>the two</mark> countries had <strong><mark>shared data</strong></mark> <mark>on</mark> its <mark>exploration of the</mark> far side of the <mark>Moon</u></mark>. “<u>Cooperation is the joint will of scientists,” said</u> Wu <u>Yanhua</u>, <u>deputy director of China’s National Space Agency</u> in a press conference yesterday (Jan. 14). He also noted that <u>both <mark>organizations have met “frequently.”</p><p></u></mark>According to Wu, <u>China</u> had <u>discussed</u> the possibility of <u>NASA using its Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO),</u> which orbits the Moon, <u>to</u> <u>observe the landing of the Chang’e-4 spacecraft on the lunar far side. Wu said that China had told NASA the exact landing time and position of the spacecraft, but the LRO wasn’t in the right position to do so as it wasn’t able to adjust its orbit with what little fuel it had left. Before the touchdown on Jan. 3, the LRO managed to capture pictures of the landing site.</p><p></u>In a statement last week, <u>NASA confirmed those discussions</u>, and said that “for a number of reasons” the LRO wasn’t able to be at the optimal location for the landing. But it added that <u>the orbiter has been collecting data since Chang’e-4’s arrived on the far side</u>, and will take photos of the landing site on Jan. 31. <u><mark>The agencies have</u> <u><strong>agreed to</mark> <mark>share data</u></strong></mark> on significant findings, if any, at a meeting of a subcommittee of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to be held next month. “<u>NASA’s cooperation with China is transparent</u>, <u>reciprocal and mutually beneficial,” the US space agency said.</p><p>NASA’s administrator</u>, James <u><mark>Bridenstine</u></mark>, in an earlier interview with Quartz (paywall), had also <u><mark>said</u></mark> that <u><strong><mark>the agency can share data with China</mark>.</u></strong> “When they do a science mission to the Moon, we’re hopeful they will be able to share with us the data they receive, and <u><mark>when we do a</u> <u>mission</u></mark> to the moon, <u><mark>we</mark> can <mark>share</mark> data with them</u>,” Bridenstine told Quartz. “Understanding and characterizing the Moon and doing that kind of <u><mark>science</mark> <mark>is</mark> in the interest of all humanity. It’s <mark>not something</mark> <mark>any one country</mark> <mark>should</u></mark> try to <u><mark>retain</u></mark> for itself.”</p>
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Space Engagement – 1AC
| 1,094,762 | 92 | 82,429 |
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ky
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5
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dart vl
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perkins
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1ac - china ssa - collisions - engagement
2nr - asats da - adv cp
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Michigan State SeGr
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Ez.....
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Michigan State
| null | null | 1,009 |
ndtceda19
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NDT/CEDA 2019-20
| 2,019 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
1,123,127 |
No war internal link
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Vestby 18
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Vestby et al 18 [Jonas Vestby, Doctoral Researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo, Ida Rudolfsen, doctoral researcher at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and PRIO, and Halvard Buhaug, Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO); Professor of Political Science at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU); and Associate Editor of the Journal of Peace Research and Political Geography, “Does hunger cause conflict?”, 5/18/18, https://blogs.prio.org/ClimateAndConflict/2018/05/does-hunger-cause-conflict/]
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there is little scholarly merit in the notion that a short-term reduction in access to food increases the probability that conflict will break out. to start or participate in violent conflict requires people to have both the means and the will. Most people on the brink of starvation are not in the position to resort to violence, whether against the government or other social groups the urban middle classes tend to be the most likely to protest against rises in food prices, since they often have the best opportunities, the most energy, and the best skills to coordinate and participate in protests.
there is a widespread misapprehension that social unrest in periods of high food prices relates primarily to food shortages sources of discontent are considerably more complex – linked to political structures, land ownership, corruption, the desire for democratic reforms and general economic problems – where the price of food is seen in the context of general increases in the cost of living
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little scholarly merit in notion that a reduction in access to food increases probability that conflict will break out. start or participate in violent conflict requires the means and the will people on the brink of starvation are not in the position to resort to violence
widespread misapprehension that social unrest in periods of high food prices relates to shortages sources of discontent are more complex political structures, land , corruption democratic reforms and economic problems
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It is perhaps surprising, then, that there is little scholarly merit in the notion that a short-term reduction in access to food increases the probability that conflict will break out. This is because to start or participate in violent conflict requires people to have both the means and the will. Most people on the brink of starvation are not in the position to resort to violence, whether against the government or other social groups. In fact, the urban middle classes tend to be the most likely to protest against rises in food prices, since they often have the best opportunities, the most energy, and the best skills to coordinate and participate in protests.
Accordingly, there is a widespread misapprehension that social unrest in periods of high food prices relates primarily to food shortages. In reality, the sources of discontent are considerably more complex – linked to political structures, land ownership, corruption, the desire for democratic reforms and general economic problems – where the price of food is seen in the context of general increases in the cost of living. Research has shown that while the international media have a tendency to seek simple resource-related explanations – such as drought or famine – for conflicts in the Global South, debates in the local media are permeated by more complex political relationships.
| 1,353 |
<h4>No war internal link</h4><p><strong>Vestby </strong>et al<strong> 18<u></strong> [Jonas Vestby, Doctoral Researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo, Ida Rudolfsen, doctoral researcher at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and PRIO, and Halvard Buhaug, Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO); Professor of Political Science at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU); and Associate Editor of the Journal of Peace Research and Political Geography, “Does hunger cause conflict?”, 5/18/18, https://blogs.prio.org/ClimateAndConflict/2018/05/does-hunger-cause-conflict/]</p><p></u>It is perhaps surprising, then, that <u>there is <strong><mark>little scholarly merit</strong> in</mark> the <mark>notion that a</mark> short-term <mark>reduction in access to <strong>food increases</mark> the <mark>probability that conflict</strong> will break out.</u></mark> This is because <u>to <mark>start or participate in violent conflict requires</mark> people to have both <mark>the means and the will</mark>. Most <mark>people on the brink <strong>of starvation are not in the position to resort to violence</strong></mark>, whether against the government or other social groups</u>. In fact, <u>the urban middle classes tend to be the most likely to protest against rises in food prices, since they often have the best opportunities, the most energy, and the best skills to coordinate and participate in protests.</p><p></u>Accordingly, <u>there is a <mark>widespread misapprehension that social unrest in periods of high food prices relates</mark> primarily <mark>to</mark> food <mark>shortages</u></mark>. In reality, the <u><mark>sources of discontent are</mark> considerably <mark>more complex</mark> – linked to <mark>political structures, land</mark> ownership<mark>, corruption</mark>, the desire for <mark>democratic reforms and</mark> general <mark>economic problems</mark> – where the price of food is seen in the context of general increases in the cost of living</u>. Research has shown that while the international media have a tendency to seek simple resource-related explanations – such as drought or famine – for conflicts in the Global South, debates in the local media are permeated by more complex political relationships.</p>
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1NC New Trier r3
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Case
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Adv2
| 6,854 | 1,148 | 26,907 |
./documents/hspolicy21/Lexington/HeVe/Lexington-He-Venkatesh-Neg-Trevian-Round3.docx
| 749,517 |
N
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Trevian
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3
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Kent Denver AH
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Joshua Gonzalez
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1AC - Ag Subsidies
2NR - DA Infrastructure
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hspolicy21/Lexington/HeVe/Lexington-He-Venkatesh-Neg-Trevian-Round3.docx
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HS Policy 2021-22
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1,697,230 |
The alternative is to endorse pragmatic demands upon the state towards an anti-capitalist project — that opens space for radicalism; their strategy cedes political potential to violent forces
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Harvey 15
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Harvey 15 — David Harvey (Distinguished Professor of anthropology and geography at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York), “Consolidating Power,” Roar, Issue #0, p. 16, Fall 2015, https://roarmag.org/magazine/david-harvey-consolidating-power/)
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there is a clear self-limitation in it, The self-limitation is the reluctance to take power at some point the problem is their denial of the significance of power and their inability to take it it is the refusal to see the state as a possible partner to radical transformation There is a tendency to regard the state as being the enemy No question: the capitalist state has to be fought, but without dominating state power and without taking it on you quickly get into the story of what happened for example in 1936 and 1937 in Barcelona and then all over Spain By refusing to take the state at a moment where they had the power to do it, the revolutionaries in Spain allowed the state to fall back into the hands of the bourgeoisie wing the state got reorganized and smashed the resistance the left is not very good at answering the question of how we build massive infrastructures How will the left build the Brooklyn bridge, for example? Any society relies on big infrastructures, infrastructures for a whole city — like the water supply, electricity and so on there is a big reluctance among the left to recognize that therefore we need some different forms of organization There are wings of the state apparatus, even of the neoliberal state apparatus, which are terribly important — the center of disease control How do we respond to global epidemics such as Ebola and the like? You can’t do it in the anarchist way of DIY-organization There are many instances where you need some state-like forms of infrastructure We can’t confront global warming through decentralized forms of confrontations and activities despite its problems the Montreal Protocol to phase out the use of chlorofluorocarbon in refrigerators to limit the depletion of the ozone layer It was successfully enforced but it needed some kind of organization that is very different to the one coming out of assembly-based politics there will always be some kind of hierarchies and we will always face problems like accountability or the right of recourse There will be complicated relationships between people dealing with global warming from the standpoint of the world as a whole and from the standpoint of a group on the ground that wonders: ‘why should we listen to what they are saying?’
So you believe this would require some form of authority?
No, there will be authority structures anyway there will always be I have never been in an anarchist meeting where there was no secret authority structure There is always this fantasy of everything being horizontal, but I sit there and watch and think: ‘oh god, there is a whole hierarchical structure in here — but it’s covert.’ we have to create organizations which are able to assemble and enforce social change on a broader scale , will Podemos in Spain be able to do that? In a chaotic situation like the economic crisis it is important for the left to act. If the left doesn’t make it, then the right-wing is the next option the left has to be more pragmatic in relation to the dynamics going on right now
More pragmatic in what sense?
Very narrow demands open up space for much more revolutionary outcomes, and even when there isn’t any possibility for any revolutionary outcomes, we have to look for compromise solutions which nevertheless roll back the neoliberal austerity and open the space where new forms of organizing can take place.
This goes back to the question of consolidating power: you have to find ways to do so, because without it the bourgeoisie and corporate capitalism are going to find ways to reassert it and take the power back there has to be an anti-capitalist agenda, so that when the group works with people everybody knows that it is not only about helping them to cope but that there is an organized intent to politically change the system in its entirety This means having a very clear political project, which is problematic with decentralized, non-homogenous types of movements where somebody works one way, others work differently and there is no collective or common project there is no coordination of what the political objectives are the danger is that you just help people cope and there will be no politics coming out of it Looking at the anti-capitalist struggle, do you think “winning” is still an option? Definitely There is a healthy growth of recognition that we need to be much broader concerning politics among all these initiatives The Marxist left tends to be a little bit dismissive and I think they are wrong Here we talk about nothing less than a state So the left will have to rethink its theoretical and tactical apparatus
|
the problem is denial of power and inability to take it the refusal to see the state as a partner to radical transformation By refusing to take the state the revolutionaries in Spain allowed the state to fall back into the hands of the bourgeoisie the state reorganized and smashed the resistance the left is not good at answering the question of how we build massive infrastructures society relies on the water supply, electricity there is reluctance to recognize that we need some organization There are state apparatus which are important the c d c How do we respond to global epidemics such as Ebola You can’t do it DIY-organization We can’t confront warming through decentralized confrontations to limit the depletion of the ozone It needed organization that is different to assembly- politics
If the left doesn’t make it, then the right-wing is the next option the left has to be pragmatic
narrow demands open up space for revolutionary outcomes, and when there isn’t possibility for revolutionary outcomes, we have to look for compromise which roll back neoliberal austerity and open the space where new forms of organizing take place
without it the bourgeoisie and capitalism are going to find ways to take power back there has to be an anti-capitalist agenda, to change the system This means having a political project, which is problematic with decentralized movements where there is no collective project the danger is that you help people cope and there will be no politics out of it
|
So, looking at examples from southern Europe — solidarity networks in Greece, self-organization in Spain or Turkey — these seem to be very crucial for building social movements around everyday life and basic needs these days. Do you see this as a promising approach? I think it is very promising, but there is a clear self-limitation in it, which is a problem for me. The self-limitation is the reluctance to take power at some point. Bookchin, in his last book, says that the problem with the anarchists is their denial of the significance of power and their inability to take it. Bookchin doesn’t go this far, but I think it is the refusal to see the state as a possible partner to radical transformation. There is a tendency to regard the state as being the enemy, the 100 percent enemy. And there are plenty of examples of repressive states out of public control where this is the case. No question: the capitalist state has to be fought, but without dominating state power and without taking it on you quickly get into the story of what happened for example in 1936 and 1937 in Barcelona and then all over Spain. By refusing to take the state at a moment where they had the power to do it, the revolutionaries in Spain allowed the state to fall back into the hands of the bourgeoisie and the Stalinist wing of the Communist movement — and the state got reorganized and smashed the resistance. That might be true for the Spanish state in the 1930s, but if we look at the contemporary neoliberal state and the retreat of the welfare state, what is left of the state to be conquered, to be seized? To begin with, the left is not very good at answering the question of how we build massive infrastructures. How will the left build the Brooklyn bridge, for example? Any society relies on big infrastructures, infrastructures for a whole city — like the water supply, electricity and so on. I think that there is a big reluctance among the left to recognize that therefore we need some different forms of organization. There are wings of the state apparatus, even of the neoliberal state apparatus, which are therefore terribly important — the center of disease control, for example. How do we respond to global epidemics such as Ebola and the like? You can’t do it in the anarchist way of DIY-organization. There are many instances where you need some state-like forms of infrastructure. We can’t confront the problem of global warming through decentralized forms of confrontations and activities alone. One example that is often mentioned, despite its many problems, is the Montreal Protocol to phase out the use of chlorofluorocarbon in refrigerators to limit the depletion of the ozone layer. It was successfully enforced in the 1990s but it needed some kind of organization that is very different to the one coming out of assembly-based politics. From an anarchist perspective, I would say that it is possible to replace even supra-national institutions like the WHO with confederal organizations which are built from the bottom up and which eventually arrive at worldwide decision-making. Maybe to a certain degree, but we have to be aware that there will always be some kind of hierarchies and we will always face problems like accountability or the right of recourse. There will be complicated relationships between, for example, people dealing with the problem of global warming from the standpoint of the world as a whole and from the standpoint of a group that is on the ground, let’s say in Hanover or somewhere, and that wonders: ‘why should we listen to what they are saying?’
So you believe this would require some form of authority?
No, there will be authority structures anyway — there will always be. I have never been in an anarchist meeting where there was no secret authority structure. There is always this fantasy of everything being horizontal, but I sit there and watch and think: ‘oh god, there is a whole hierarchical structure in here — but it’s covert.’ Coming back to the recent protests around the Mediterranean: many movements have focused on local struggles. What is the next step to take towards social transformation? At some point we have to create organizations which are able to assemble and enforce social change on a broader scale. For example, will Podemos in Spain be able to do that? In a chaotic situation like the economic crisis of the last years, it is important for the left to act. If the left doesn’t make it, then the right-wing is the next option. I think — and I hate to say this — but I think the left has to be more pragmatic in relation to the dynamics going on right now.
More pragmatic in what sense?
Well, why did I support SYRIZA even though it is not a revolutionary party? Because it opened a space in which something different could happen and therefore it was a progressive move for me. It is a bit like Marx saying: the first step to freedom is the limitation of the length of the working day. Very narrow demands open up space for much more revolutionary outcomes, and even when there isn’t any possibility for any revolutionary outcomes, we have to look for compromise solutions which nevertheless roll back the neoliberal austerity nonsense and open the space where new forms of organizing can take place.
For example, it would be interesting if Podemos looked towards organizing forms of democratic confederalism — because in some ways Podemos originated with lots of assembly-type meetings taking place all over Spain, so they are very experienced with the assembly structure. The question is how they connect the assembly-form to some permanent forms of organization concerning their upcoming position as a strong party in Parliament. This also goes back to the question of consolidating power: you have to find ways to do so, because without it the bourgeoisie and corporate capitalism are going to find ways to reassert it and take the power back. What do you think about the dilemma of solidarity networks filling the void after the retreat of the welfare state and indirectly becoming a partner of neoliberalism in this way? There are two ways of organizing. One is a vast growth of the NGO sector, but a lot of that is externally funded, not grassroots, and doesn’t tackle the question of the big donors who set the agenda — which won’t be a radical agenda. Here we touch upon the privatization of the welfare state. This seems to me to be very different politically from grassroots organizations where people are on their own, saying: ‘OK, the state doesn’t take care of anything, so we are going to have to take care of it by ourselves.’ That seems to me to be leading to forms of grassroots organization with a very different political status. But how to avoid filling that gap by helping, for example, unemployed people not to get squeezed out by neoliberal state? Well there has to be an anti-capitalist agenda, so that when the group works with people everybody knows that it is not only about helping them to cope but that there is an organized intent to politically change the system in its entirety. This means having a very clear political project, which is problematic with decentralized, non-homogenous types of movements where somebody works one way, others work differently and there is no collective or common project. This connects to the very first question you raised: there is no coordination of what the political objectives are. And the danger is that you just help people cope and there will be no politics coming out of it. For example, Occupy Sandy helped people get back to their houses and they did terrific work, but in the end they did what the Red Cross and federal emergency services should have done. The end of history seems to have passed already. Looking at the actual conditions and concrete examples of anti-capitalist struggle, do you think “winning” is still an option? Definitely, and moreover, you have occupied factories in Greece, solidarity economies across production chains being forged, radical democratic institutions in Spain and many beautiful things happening in many other places. There is a healthy growth of recognition that we need to be much broader concerning politics among all these initiatives. The Marxist left tends to be a little bit dismissive of some of this stuff and I think they are wrong. But at the same time I don’t think that any of this is big enough on its own to actually deal with the fundamental structures of power that need to be challenged. Here we talk about nothing less than a state. So the left will have to rethink its theoretical and tactical apparatus.
| 8,613 |
<h4>The alternative is to <u>endorse pragmatic demands</u> upon the state <u>towards an anti-capitalist project</u> — that <u>opens space</u> for radicalism; their strategy <u>cedes political potential</u> to violent forces</h4><p><strong>Harvey 15</strong> — David Harvey (Distinguished Professor of anthropology and geography at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York), “Consolidating Power,” Roar, Issue #0, p. 16, Fall 2015, https://roarmag.org/magazine/david-harvey-consolidating-power/)</p><p>So, looking at examples from southern Europe — solidarity networks in Greece, self-organization in Spain or Turkey — these seem to be very crucial for building social movements around everyday life and basic needs these days. Do you see this as a promising approach? I think it is very promising, but <u>there is a clear self-limitation in it,</u> which is a problem for me. <u>The self-limitation is the reluctance to take power at some point</u>. Bookchin, in his last book, says that <u><strong><mark>the problem</u></strong></mark> with the anarchists <u><strong><mark>is</mark> their <mark>denial of</mark> the significance of <mark>power and</mark> their <mark>inability to take it</u></strong></mark>. Bookchin doesn’t go this far, but I think <u><strong>it is <mark>the refusal to see the state as a</mark> possible <mark>partner to radical transformation</u></strong></mark>. <u>There is a tendency to regard the state as being the enemy</u>, the 100 percent enemy. And there are plenty of examples of repressive states out of public control where this is the case. <u>No question: the capitalist state has to be fought, but without dominating state power and without taking it on you quickly get into the story of what happened for example in 1936 and 1937 in Barcelona and then all over Spain</u>. <u><strong><mark>By refusing to take the state</mark> at a moment where they had the power to do it</strong>, <mark>the revolutionaries in Spain allowed the state to fall back into the hands of the bourgeoisie</u></mark> and the Stalinist <u>wing</u> of the Communist movement — and <u><strong><mark>the state</mark> got <mark>reorganized and smashed the resistance</u></strong></mark>. That might be true for the Spanish state in the 1930s, but if we look at the contemporary neoliberal state and the retreat of the welfare state, what is left of the state to be conquered, to be seized? To begin with, <u><mark>the left is not</mark> very <mark>good at answering the question of how we build massive infrastructures</u></mark>. <u>How will the left build the Brooklyn bridge, for example?</u> <u>Any <mark>society relies on</mark> big infrastructures, infrastructures for a whole city — like <mark>the water supply, electricity</mark> and so on</u>. I think that <u><mark>there is</mark> a big <mark>reluctance</mark> among the left <mark>to recognize that</mark> therefore <strong><mark>we need some</mark> different forms of <mark>organization</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>There are</mark> wings of the <mark>state apparatus</mark>, even of the neoliberal state apparatus, <mark>which are</u></mark> therefore <u><strong>terribly <mark>important</strong></mark> — <mark>the</mark> <strong><mark>c</strong></mark>enter of <strong><mark>d</strong></mark>isease <strong><mark>c</strong></mark>ontrol</u>, for example. <u><mark>How do we respond to global epidemics such as Ebola</mark> and the like?</u> <u><strong><mark>You can’t do it</strong></mark> in the anarchist way of <strong><mark>DIY-organization</u></strong></mark>. <u>There are many instances where you need some state-like forms of infrastructure</u>. <u><strong><mark>We can’t confront</u></strong></mark> the problem of <u><strong>global <mark>warming through decentralized</mark> forms of <mark>confrontations </mark>and activities</u></strong> alone. One example that is often mentioned, <u>despite its</u> many <u>problems</u>, is <u>the Montreal Protocol to phase out the use of chlorofluorocarbon in refrigerators <mark>to limit the depletion of the ozone</mark> layer</u>. <u><mark>It</mark> was successfully enforced</u> in the 1990s <u>but <strong>it <mark>needed</mark> some kind of <mark>organization</strong> that is <strong></mark>very <mark>different</strong> to</mark> the one coming out of <strong><mark>assembly-</mark>based <mark>politics</u></strong></mark>. From an anarchist perspective, I would say that it is possible to replace even supra-national institutions like the WHO with confederal organizations which are built from the bottom up and which eventually arrive at worldwide decision-making. Maybe to a certain degree, but we have to be aware that <u>there will always be some kind of hierarchies and we will always face problems like accountability or the right of recourse</u>. <u>There will be complicated relationships between</u>, for example, <u>people dealing with</u> the problem of <u>global warming from the standpoint of the world as a whole and from the standpoint of a group </u>that is <u>on the ground</u>, let’s say in Hanover or somewhere, and <u>that wonders: ‘why should we listen to what they are saying?’</p><p>So you believe this would require some form of authority?</p><p>No, there will be authority structures anyway</u> — <u>there will always be</u>. <u>I have never been in an anarchist meeting where there was no secret authority structure</u>. <u>There is always this fantasy of everything being horizontal, but I sit there and watch and think: ‘oh god, <strong>there is a whole hierarchical structure in here — but it’s covert.’ </u></strong>Coming back to the recent protests around the Mediterranean: many movements have focused on local struggles. What is the next step to take towards social transformation? At some point <u>we have to create organizations which are able to assemble and enforce social change on a broader scale</u>. For example<u>, will Podemos in Spain be able to do that?</u> <u>In a chaotic situation like the economic crisis</u> of the last years, <u><strong>it is important for the left to act</strong>. <mark>If the left doesn’t make it, <strong>then the right-wing is the next option</u></strong></mark>. I think — and I hate to say this — but I think <u><strong><mark>the left has to be</mark> more <mark>pragmatic</strong></mark> in relation to the dynamics going on right now</u>.</p><p><u>More pragmatic in what sense?</p><p></u>Well, why did I support SYRIZA even though it is not a revolutionary party? Because it opened a space in which something different could happen and therefore it was a progressive move for me. It is a bit like Marx saying: the first step to freedom is the limitation of the length of the working day. <u><strong>Very <mark>narrow demands</strong> open up space for</mark> much more <mark>revolutionary outcomes, and</mark> even <mark>when there isn’t</mark> any <mark>possibility for</mark> any <mark>revolutionary outcomes, we have to look for compromise</mark> solutions <mark>which <strong></mark>nevertheless <mark>roll back</mark> the <mark>neoliberal austerity</u></strong></mark> nonsense <u><mark>and <strong>open the space where new forms of organizing </mark>can <mark>take place</mark>.</p><p></u></strong> For example, it would be interesting if Podemos looked towards organizing forms of democratic confederalism — because in some ways Podemos originated with lots of assembly-type meetings taking place all over Spain, so they are very experienced with the assembly structure. The question is how they connect the assembly-form to some permanent forms of organization concerning their upcoming position as a strong party in Parliament. <u>This</u> also <u>goes back to the question of consolidating power: you have to find ways to do so, because <mark>without it the bourgeoisie and </mark>corporate <mark>capitalism are going to find ways to</mark> reassert it and <strong><mark>take </mark>the <mark>power back</u></strong></mark>. What do you think about the dilemma of solidarity networks filling the void after the retreat of the welfare state and indirectly becoming a partner of neoliberalism in this way? There are two ways of organizing. One is a vast growth of the NGO sector, but a lot of that is externally funded, not grassroots, and doesn’t tackle the question of the big donors who set the agenda — which won’t be a radical agenda. Here we touch upon the privatization of the welfare state. This seems to me to be very different politically from grassroots organizations where people are on their own, saying: ‘OK, the state doesn’t take care of anything, so we are going to have to take care of it by ourselves.’ That seems to me to be leading to forms of grassroots organization with a very different political status. But how to avoid filling that gap by helping, for example, unemployed people not to get squeezed out by neoliberal state? Well <u><strong><mark>there has to be an anti-capitalist agenda</strong>, </mark>so that when the group works with people everybody knows that it is not only about helping them to cope but that there is an organized intent <mark>to </mark>politically <mark>change the system</mark> in its entirety</u>. <u><mark>This means <strong>having a </mark>very clear <mark>political project</strong>, which is problematic with decentralized</mark>, non-homogenous types of <mark>movements where </mark>somebody works one way, others work differently and <mark>there is <strong>no collective</mark> or common <mark>project</u></strong></mark>. This connects to the very first question you raised: <u>there is no coordination of what the political objectives are</u>. And <u><mark>the danger is that <strong>you </mark>just <mark>help people cope and there will be no politics </mark>coming <mark>out of it</u></strong></mark>. For example, Occupy Sandy helped people get back to their houses and they did terrific work, but in the end they did what the Red Cross and federal emergency services should have done. The end of history seems to have passed already. <u>Looking at the</u> actual conditions and concrete examples of <u>anti-capitalist struggle, do you think “winning” is still an option? <strong>Definitely</u></strong>, and moreover, you have occupied factories in Greece, solidarity economies across production chains being forged, radical democratic institutions in Spain and many beautiful things happening in many other places. <u>There is a healthy growth of recognition that we need to be much broader concerning politics among all these initiatives</u>. <u>The Marxist left tends to be a little bit dismissive</u> of some of this stuff <u>and I think they are wrong</u>. But at the same time I don’t think that any of this is big enough on its own to actually deal with the fundamental structures of power that need to be challenged. <u>Here we talk about nothing less than a state</u>. <u>So the left will have to rethink its theoretical and tactical apparatus</u>.</p>
|
1NC
|
Off-Case
|
1NC---K
| 51,710 | 349 | 50,536 |
./documents/ndtceda20/Kansas/PeSe/Kansas-Peter-Semrick-Neg-Gonzaga-Round2.docx
| 618,904 |
N
|
Gonzaga
|
2
|
Harvard OY
|
Anthony Joseph
|
1AC - Harvard Garden
1NC - T USFG K Cap
|
ndtceda20/Kansas/PeSe/Kansas-Peter-Semrick-Neg-Gonzaga-Round2.docx
| null | 52,324 |
PeSe
|
Kansas PeSe
| null |
Ra.....
|
Pe.....
|
Je.....
|
Se.....
| 19,328 |
Kansas
|
Kansas
| null | null | 1,010 |
ndtceda20
|
NDT/CEDA 2020-21
| 2,020 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
582,077 |
Banning is worse for miscalc and the tech benefits outweigh risks – more steps in the escalation ladder are more opportunities to deescalate.
|
Rabkin and Yoo '17
|
Rabkin and Yoo '17 [Jeremy and John; 9/1/17; Professor of Law at the Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University; Professor of Law at the University of California Berkeley; Striking Power: How Cyber, Robots, and Space Weapons Change the Rules of War, Chapter 2]//GJ
Reducing the number and types of targets and limiting the means to pursue them would increase the odds of war. Imperfect information can lead rational states to miscalculate. If there are further steps to convey reliable information, nations will have more accurate information on the expected values of war. That information will allow them to consider settlements before making the fateful decision for war. The more steps up an escalatory ladder, the more opportunity nations have to jump off before they reach the stage of armed conflict. On the other hand, limiting the ability of nations to communicate will reduce their ability to reach settlements of their differences. If nations have less opportunity to credibly signal information to each other, the chances of miscalculation and war will increase.
|
The twenty-first century has brought new types of security challenges Where the last century saw worldwide war today the threats to peace come from regional powers, rogue nations, terrorist groups, and civil wars. The West should maintain international peace and stability by employing the full spectrum of force made available by technological progress. It should also use force to prevent looming threats posed by terrorism or the internal breakdown of states broadening the use of force will not lead to more war. It should allow the international system to reduce the number of more harmful conflicts by allowing nations to communicate their intentions more clearly
|
today threats come from regional powers, rogue nations, terrorist groups, and civil wars maintain stability by employing full spectrum of force available by tech progress broadening use of force will not lead to more war. It should reduce harmful conflicts by allowing nations to communicate intentions clearly
|
The twenty-first century has brought new types of security challenges to the United States and its allies. Where the last century saw worldwide war between continent-spanning alliances, today the threats to peace come from regional powers, rogue nations, terrorist groups, and civil wars. The West should maintain international peace and stability by employing the full spectrum of force made available by technological progress. It should also use force to prevent looming threats posed by terrorism or the internal breakdown of states from maturing into catastrophes. Contrary to the concerns of some, broadening the use of force will not lead to more war. It should allow the international system to reduce the number of more harmful conflicts by allowing nations to communicate their intentions more clearly, which should produce more settlement of disputes without resorting to war.
| 887 |
<h4>Banning is worse for miscalc and the tech benefits outweigh risks – more steps in the escalation ladder are more opportunities to deescalate. </h4><p><strong>Rabkin and Yoo '17 </strong>[Jeremy and John; 9/1/17; Professor of Law at the Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University; Professor of Law at the University of California Berkeley; Striking Power: How Cyber, Robots, and Space Weapons Change the Rules of War, Chapter 2]//GJ</p><p><u>Reducing the number and types of targets and <mark>limiting</mark> the <mark>means</mark> to pursue them <mark>would <strong>increase</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>odds of war</strong>. Imperfect info</mark>rmation <mark>can lead</mark> <strong>rational <mark>states</strong> to <strong>miscalculate</strong></mark>. If there are further steps to convey reliable information, nations will have <strong>more accurate information</strong> on the expected values of war. That information will allow them to <strong>consider settlements</strong> before making the <strong>fateful decision</strong> for war. <mark>The <strong>more steps</strong> up an <strong>escalatory ladder</strong></mark>, the <mark>more opportunity</mark> nations have <mark>to jump off before</mark> they reach the stage of <mark>armed conflict</u></mark>. On the other hand, limiting the ability of nations to communicate will reduce their ability to reach settlements of their differences. <u><mark>If nations have <strong>less opportunity</strong> to</mark> <strong>credibly <mark>signal</strong></mark> information <mark>to each other</mark>, the <mark>chances of <strong>miscalculation</strong> and <strong>war</strong></mark> will <strong><mark>increase</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u>The twenty-first century has brought new types of <strong>security challenges</u></strong> to the United States and its allies. <u>Where the last century saw worldwide war</u> between continent-spanning alliances, <u><mark>today</mark> the <mark>threats</mark> to peace <mark>come from <strong>regional powers</strong>, <strong>rogue nations</strong>, <strong>terrorist groups</strong>, and <strong>civil wars</strong></mark>. The West should <mark>maintain</mark> <strong>international peace</strong> and <strong><mark>stability</strong> by <strong>employing</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>full spectrum</strong> of force</mark> made <mark>available by <strong>tech</mark>nological <mark>progress</strong></mark>. It should also <strong>use force to prevent looming threats</strong> posed by terrorism or the internal breakdown of states</u> from maturing into catastrophes. Contrary to the concerns of some, <u><mark>broadening</mark> the <mark>use of force will not lead to more war. It should</mark> allow the international system to <strong><mark>reduce</strong></mark> the number of more <strong><mark>harmful conflicts</strong> by allowing nations to <strong>communicate</mark> their <mark>intentions</strong></mark> more <mark>clearly</u></mark>, which should produce more settlement of disputes without resorting to war.</p>
| null |
Case
|
NC – AT: Crisis Stability – Top
| 350,776 | 120 | 9,409 |
./documents/hsld20/Harker/Vi/Harker-Vinod-Neg-Stanford-Round3.docx
| 859,765 |
N
|
Stanford
|
3
|
Dublin YC
|
Grigsby, Gerard
|
1AC Whole Res
1N Green Financing DA Borders DA Terror DA Exclude US CP Case
2N Borders DA
|
hsld20/Harker/Vi/Harker-Vinod-Neg-Stanford-Round3.docx
| null | 73,081 |
AdVi
|
Harker AdVi
| null |
Ad.....
|
Vi.....
| null | null | 24,534 |
Harker
|
Harker
|
CA
| null | 1,028 |
hsld20
|
HS LD 2020-21
| 2,020 |
ld
|
hs
| 1 |
1,832,161 |
---30 NATO member states
|
NATO 20
|
NATO 20 (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/nato_countries.htm)
|
NATO is an Alliance that consists of 30 independent member countries. Country by country, this page offers an overview of the links to national information servers and to the website of national delegations to NATO.
|
NATO consists of 30 member countries
|
NATO is an Alliance that consists of 30 independent member countries. Country by country, this page offers an overview of the links to national information servers and to the website of national delegations to NATO.
| 215 |
<h4>---30 NATO member states</h4><p><strong>NATO 20</strong> (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/nato_countries.htm)</p><p><u><mark>NATO</mark> is an Alliance that <mark>consists of 30</mark> independent <mark>member countries</mark>. Country by country, this page offers an overview of the links to national information servers and to the website of national delegations to NATO.</p></u>
|
2NC/1NR
|
T
| null | 771,206 | 108 | 53,693 |
./documents/ndtceda20/Wyoming/KrDa/Wyoming-Kramer-Datel-Neg-Indiana-Round5.docx
| 622,806 |
N
|
Indiana
|
5
|
Missouri State EP
|
Cameron Dehmlow Dunne
|
1AC - Arctic
1NC - Russia Adventurism DA T-Subs Threaten CP Lashout DA President Elect CP
2NR - T
|
ndtceda20/Wyoming/KrDa/Wyoming-Kramer-Datel-Neg-Indiana-Round5.docx
| null | 52,573 |
KrDa
|
Wyoming KrDa
| null |
Ma.....
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Kr.....
|
Am.....
|
Da.....
| 19,364 |
Wyoming
|
Wyoming
| null | null | 1,010 |
ndtceda20
|
NDT/CEDA 2020-21
| 2,020 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
1,964,848 |
They’re restricted now, especially on foreign affairs---that blocks agreements critical to leadership and innovation
|
Weatherholtz 18
|
Tiffany Weatherholtz 18, Executive Articles Editor at the Emory International Law Review, J.D. Candidate at Emory University School of Law and B.A., Magna Cum Laude from the University of Georgia, “Separating Controversy and Climate Change: How The United States Could Lead Climate Change And Energy Reform With The Growth Of Renewable Energy Sources Globally”, Emory International Law Review, 32 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 581, Lexis
|
states will push uncooperative federalism when … states implementing federal environmental law use power to push federal authorities to take a new position states use power as federal servants to challenge federal policy uncooperative federalism would push the Court to tolerate a degree of conflict between laws and federal counterparts Therefore, although the Court has not yet approved this theory, uncooperative federalism provides a way for states to continue to push the proposed solution to increase renewable energy sources
a treaty after an interstate agreement would effectuate climate change reform with the U S as a leader the Commerce Clause imposes restrictions federalism limits states' attempts to legislate respecting foreign affairs
The question becomes how to reconcile
each level of government will contribute to reducing climate change The state will perform the cost-benefit analysis Thus, the U S will continue as a leader of innovation
allocating risks to states that want the U S to participate in international climate change reform could pave the way for the U S to be a leader in climate change reform instead of continually displaying reluctance to address climate change individual states that understand the importance and urgency behind addressing the effects of climate change commit to individualized standards this will allow for better international relations since the U S will contribute to climate change reform, meeting other countries' expectations.
|
states push uncoop to push fed to a new position uncoop push the Court to tolerate conflict a way to increase renewable sources
Commerce Clause restrict s states' attempts to legislate foreign affairs
Thus U S will lead innovation
allocating to states could pave the way for U S to lead instead of displaying reluctance this allow better relations since U S will contribute meeting countries' expectations
|
Otherwise, without authorization, to conform with the proposed solution, states will push uncooperative federalism. "Uncooperative federalism occurs [*607] when … states implementing federal environmental law use that power to push federal authorities to take a new position" and generally, in practice, when "states use their power as federal servants to resist, challenge, and even dissent from federal policy." Although the Supreme Court consistently condemns commandeering and favors preemption, proponents of uncooperative federalism insist that the Court is wrong and "would push the Court to tolerate a degree of conflict between such laws and their federal counterparts" along with "greater federal-state integration." Therefore, although the Supreme Court has not yet approved this theory, uncooperative federalism provides a way for states to continue to push the proposed solution to increase renewable energy sources.
B. The United States and a Treaty
As discussed in Part I(E), a treaty after an interstate agreement would effectuate climate change reform with the United States as a leader. For the treaty, the dormant foreign Commerce Clause imposes restrictions on states' ability to interfere in foreign commerce. The federal government regulates foreign trade by speaking with "one voice." So, federalism limits states' attempts to legislate respecting foreign affairs, and most commentators agree that the United States should speak with one voice for foreign affairs with the President as the sole organ or representative to foreign nations. While wide powers are given to the President to enter into international treaties, the President must have the consent of two-thirds majority of the Senate. [*608] Although treaties are, in principal, self-executing by virtue of Article VI, the American Restatement of Law states that a treaty envisioning future conduct will not be self-executing, and senatorial consent is needed for such a treaty.
While a treaty becomes equivalent to federal law and different states will have different obligations under this proposal, because the agreement last in date is the ruling law, Congress could promulgate law to bind states to certain standards after signing a treaty. The order of the process would first be an interstate agreement, a treaty, and then an agreement showing that the treaty will enforce the interstate agreement. However, much like the TOGAs and uncooperative federalism discussed supra Part II(A)(4), if a treaty becomes impossible, then the states will use the examples of other interstate agreements set forth in Part I(C) and international agreements set forth in Part I(D) to continue involvement in an agreement with other countries.
III. Solution
A. Proposal
The question thus becomes how to best reconcile the need for manageable negotiations with the need for holistic thinking. The relevant science is complex … and the costs and benefits of various strategies to address climate change have proved highly contentious.
To address climate change and energy independence through agreements on renewable energy production, both a regional and a holistic solution are necessary. By first making an interstate agreement more specific to each state, each state's department of the environment or public health determines the [*609] feasibility of renewable energy production from a cost-benefit analysis, comparing the costs of climate change in the future and the benefit of producing renewable energy for energy independence. The states that choose to participate with more stringent emissions standards and high production of renewable energy sources will be hubs for climate change reform in the United States. Once each state determines the amount of renewable energy the state can produce, the state will choose how to commit resources along with the other states that also choose to create an interstate agreement, with the intent of creating a treaty in the future. This proposal calls for congressional approval to hold the states accountable to each other and to the United States. However, if congressional approval is not obtained, the states will employ theories such as TOGAs and uncooperative federalism. Either with Congress's approval or TOGAs and uncooperative federalism, the interstate agreement's accountability and enforceability framework for each state will be one of the following methods: tax subsidies, regulatory approaches, or cap-and-trade programs.
After the interstate agreement has been formed, this Comment proposes that the United States will be able to enter into treaties on climate change as a nation while allocating the risk to each state internally based on each state's commitment under the interstate agreement. For the United States to enter into a binding, enforceable treaty with foreign countries, senatorial consent is required before the President may ratify the treaty. A binding and enforceable treaty, similar to the Kyoto Protocol but with enforcement [*610] mechanisms more like the WTO, prevents unrealistic expectations and provides a practical, working solution instead of unmet pledges. While this treaty will bind the United States, each state that participates in the interstate agreement will be bound to both other states and the United States. Under this proposal, states will enter an agreement to indemnify the United States if the targets not met in the interstate agreement cause the United States to breach a binding, enforceable treaty.
Therefore, among the states that agree to this proposal, each level of government will contribute to reducing the contribution to climate change. The local government will provide information to determine how the state will contribute. The state will perform the cost-benefit analysis of entering into an interstate agreement and treaty. The United States will take the responsibility of uniting the states to enter into agreements with other nations. Thus, the United States will continue as a leader of innovation and escape any liability previously discussed from not participating in climate change reform.
B. Remaining Challenges
Because many environmental problems are of a global nature, it may be necessary to prevent a free rider problem where "one … receives the benefit of a good without contributing to its costs."
The proposal this Comment suggests is not a perfect plan but a creative solution for the United States to participate in global climate agreements and [*611] promote less controversy within Congress. As such, this proposal faces two main challenges. First, voluntary assent is necessary for states to comply with an interstate agreement and for the United States to join an enforceable, binding treaty. Second, for states, the capacity for renewable energy may not correlate with state officials or state legislatures' policies on energy.
First, because states consent to join the interstate agreement and the Senate and the President consent to a treaty, economic concerns may hinder consent. Appropriate consent may depend on Pareto efficiency rather than Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. Leakage - when a state may have other priorities and not enough resources to deal with the problem so that the externality being avoided is not offset - leads to nonparticipation which makes the state less likely over time to participate while enjoying the benefits of other states and participating as a free-rider. The beneficiaries pay for the benefits of restricting activity rather than forcing payment for the external costs of activities, which will only continue if the marginal payment yields more in benefits from controlling externalities.
[*612]
As Professor [Robert] Dorfman puts it, the crucial "complication" of international environmental problems is that "the world is divided into entities called "sovereign nations,' each of which is entitled to use, or misuse, the transnational commons in whatever way it considers advantageous, unless it agrees voluntarily to forgo some or all of these rights." If the status quo represents a property rule to emit, then the victim (the "beneficiary") must negotiate to purchase the entitlement at a price high enough to cover the source's cost of abatement.
Therefore, assuming economic concerns predominantly drive states to act rather than a sense of moral obligation, individual states and the United States collectively consenting to this proposal along with the expenses for participation may prove to be a daunting impediment.
Second, a state's renewable energy production does not necessarily correlate with the state's renewable energy policies or incentives. For example, California is a leader in renewable energy but still produces a smaller percentage of renewable energy out of all energy production than some other states. Because the proposal suggests an increase in renewable energy sources, the willingness of leaders and legislatures of state governments to act in accordance with the proposed solution may be more of a benefit to the state than the ability of the state to produce renewable energy. Divided states or states where the population approves of the interstate agreement but the state officials or legislature choose not to act in accordance with the [*613] proposal could pose an impediment to the interstate agreement. Even if this happens, if some states commit that are not regionally connected, such as California and New York, then the United States will still have a greater voice in international affairs regarding renewable energy sources and climate change.
Conclusion
While climate change remains a political debate in the United States, allocating risks to states that want the United States to participate in international climate change reform could pave the way for the United States to be a leader in climate change reform instead of continually displaying reluctance to address climate change. Under this proposal, the individual states in the United States that understand the importance and urgency behind addressing the effects of climate change commit to individualized standards through an interstate agreement. The United States will then use the interstate agreement to determine the United States' capacity to enter enforceable, binding treaties in the future. If an individual state does not comply with the commitment, the state will be held accountable to other states and the United States for a breach, although the United States will still be held accountable to other countries. The United States' willingness to enter into treaties from this allocation of risk will allow for better international relations since the United States will contribute to climate change reform, meeting other countries' expectations.
| 10,740 |
<h4>They’re <u>restricted</u> now, especially on <u>foreign affairs</u>---that <u>blocks</u> agreements <u>critical</u> to leadership and innovation</h4><p>Tiffany <strong>Weatherholtz 18</strong>, Executive Articles Editor at the Emory International Law Review, J.D. Candidate at Emory University School of Law and B.A., Magna Cum Laude from the University of Georgia, “Separating Controversy and Climate Change: How The United States Could Lead Climate Change And Energy Reform With The Growth Of Renewable Energy Sources Globally”, Emory International Law Review, 32 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 581, Lexis</p><p>Otherwise, without authorization, to conform with the proposed solution, <u><mark>states</mark> will <mark>push <strong>uncoop</mark>erative</strong> federalism</u>. "Uncooperative federalism occurs [*607] <u>when … states implementing federal environmental law use</u> that <u>power <mark>to <strong>push fed</mark>eral authorities</strong> <mark>to</mark> take <mark>a <strong>new position</u></strong></mark>" and generally, in practice, when "<u>states use</u> their <u>power as federal servants to</u> resist, <u>challenge</u>, and even dissent from <u>federal policy</u>." Although the Supreme Court consistently condemns commandeering and favors preemption, proponents of <u><strong><mark>uncoop</strong></mark>erative federalism</u> insist that the Court is wrong and "<u>would <strong><mark>push the Court</strong> to <strong>tolerate</strong></mark> a degree of <mark>conflict</mark> between</u> such <u>laws and</u> their <u>federal counterparts</u>" along with "greater federal-state integration." <u>Therefore, although the</u> Supreme <u>Court has not yet approved this theory, uncooperative federalism provides <mark>a way</mark> for states to continue to push the proposed solution <mark>to <strong>increase renewable</mark> energy <mark>sources</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>B. The United States and a Treaty</p><p>As discussed in Part I(E), <u>a treaty after an interstate agreement would effectuate climate change reform with the <strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u>as a <strong>leader</u></strong>. For the treaty, <u>the</u> dormant foreign <u><mark>Commerce Clause</mark> imposes <strong><mark>restrict</mark>ion<mark>s</u></strong></mark> on states' ability to interfere in foreign commerce. The federal government regulates foreign trade by speaking with "one voice." So, <u>federalism limits <mark>states' attempts to legislate</mark> respecting <strong><mark>foreign affairs</u></strong></mark>, and most commentators agree that the United States should speak with one voice for foreign affairs with the President as the sole organ or representative to foreign nations. While wide powers are given to the President to enter into international treaties, the President must have the consent of two-thirds majority of the Senate. [*608] Although treaties are, in principal, self-executing by virtue of Article VI, the American Restatement of Law states that a treaty envisioning future conduct will not be self-executing, and senatorial consent is needed for such a treaty.</p><p>While a treaty becomes equivalent to federal law and different states will have different obligations under this proposal, because the agreement last in date is the ruling law, Congress could promulgate law to bind states to certain standards after signing a treaty. The order of the process would first be an interstate agreement, a treaty, and then an agreement showing that the treaty will enforce the interstate agreement. However, much like the TOGAs and uncooperative federalism discussed supra Part II(A)(4), if a treaty becomes impossible, then the states will use the examples of other interstate agreements set forth in Part I(C) and international agreements set forth in Part I(D) to continue involvement in an agreement with other countries.</p><p>III. Solution</p><p>A. Proposal</p><p><u>The question</u> thus <u>becomes how to</u> best <u>reconcile</u> the need for manageable negotiations with the need for holistic thinking. The relevant science is complex … and the costs and benefits of various strategies to address climate change have proved highly contentious.</p><p>To address climate change and energy independence through agreements on renewable energy production, both a regional and a holistic solution are necessary. By first making an interstate agreement more specific to each state, each state's department of the environment or public health determines the [*609] feasibility of renewable energy production from a cost-benefit analysis, comparing the costs of climate change in the future and the benefit of producing renewable energy for energy independence. The states that choose to participate with more stringent emissions standards and high production of renewable energy sources will be hubs for climate change reform in the United States. Once each state determines the amount of renewable energy the state can produce, the state will choose how to commit resources along with the other states that also choose to create an interstate agreement, with the intent of creating a treaty in the future. This proposal calls for congressional approval to hold the states accountable to each other and to the United States. However, if congressional approval is not obtained, the states will employ theories such as TOGAs and uncooperative federalism. Either with Congress's approval or TOGAs and uncooperative federalism, the interstate agreement's accountability and enforceability framework for each state will be one of the following methods: tax subsidies, regulatory approaches, or cap-and-trade programs.</p><p>After the interstate agreement has been formed, this Comment proposes that the United States will be able to enter into treaties on climate change as a nation while allocating the risk to each state internally based on each state's commitment under the interstate agreement. For the United States to enter into a binding, enforceable treaty with foreign countries, senatorial consent is required before the President may ratify the treaty. A binding and enforceable treaty, similar to the Kyoto Protocol but with enforcement [*610] mechanisms more like the WTO, prevents unrealistic expectations and provides a practical, working solution instead of unmet pledges. While this treaty will bind the United States, each state that participates in the interstate agreement will be bound to both other states and the United States. Under this proposal, states will enter an agreement to indemnify the United States if the targets not met in the interstate agreement cause the United States to breach a binding, enforceable treaty.</p><p>Therefore, among the states that agree to this proposal, <u>each level of government will contribute to reducing</u> the contribution to <u>climate change</u>. The local government will provide information to determine how the state will contribute. <u>The state will perform the cost-benefit analysis</u> of entering into an interstate agreement and treaty. The United States will take the responsibility of uniting the states to enter into agreements with other nations. <u><mark>Thus</mark>, the <strong><mark>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><mark>will</mark> continue as a <strong><mark>lead</mark>er of <mark>innovation</u></strong></mark> and escape any liability previously discussed from not participating in climate change reform.</p><p>B. Remaining Challenges</p><p>Because many environmental problems are of a global nature, it may be necessary to prevent a free rider problem where "one … receives the benefit of a good without contributing to its costs."</p><p>The proposal this Comment suggests is not a perfect plan but a creative solution for the United States to participate in global climate agreements and [*611] promote less controversy within Congress. As such, this proposal faces two main challenges. First, voluntary assent is necessary for states to comply with an interstate agreement and for the United States to join an enforceable, binding treaty. Second, for states, the capacity for renewable energy may not correlate with state officials or state legislatures' policies on energy.</p><p>First, because states consent to join the interstate agreement and the Senate and the President consent to a treaty, economic concerns may hinder consent. Appropriate consent may depend on Pareto efficiency rather than Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. Leakage - when a state may have other priorities and not enough resources to deal with the problem so that the externality being avoided is not offset - leads to nonparticipation which makes the state less likely over time to participate while enjoying the benefits of other states and participating as a free-rider. The beneficiaries pay for the benefits of restricting activity rather than forcing payment for the external costs of activities, which will only continue if the marginal payment yields more in benefits from controlling externalities.</p><p> [*612] </p><p>As Professor [Robert] Dorfman puts it, the crucial "complication" of international environmental problems is that "the world is divided into entities called "sovereign nations,' each of which is entitled to use, or misuse, the transnational commons in whatever way it considers advantageous, unless it agrees voluntarily to forgo some or all of these rights." If the status quo represents a property rule to emit, then the victim (the "beneficiary") must negotiate to purchase the entitlement at a price high enough to cover the source's cost of abatement.</p><p>Therefore, assuming economic concerns predominantly drive states to act rather than a sense of moral obligation, individual states and the United States collectively consenting to this proposal along with the expenses for participation may prove to be a daunting impediment.</p><p>Second, a state's renewable energy production does not necessarily correlate with the state's renewable energy policies or incentives. For example, California is a leader in renewable energy but still produces a smaller percentage of renewable energy out of all energy production than some other states. Because the proposal suggests an increase in renewable energy sources, the willingness of leaders and legislatures of state governments to act in accordance with the proposed solution may be more of a benefit to the state than the ability of the state to produce renewable energy. Divided states or states where the population approves of the interstate agreement but the state officials or legislature choose not to act in accordance with the [*613] proposal could pose an impediment to the interstate agreement. Even if this happens, if some states commit that are not regionally connected, such as California and New York, then the United States will still have a greater voice in international affairs regarding renewable energy sources and climate change.</p><p>Conclusion</p><p>While climate change remains a political debate in the United States, <u><mark>allocating</mark> risks <mark>to states</mark> that want the <strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u>to participate in international climate change reform <mark>could <strong>pave the way</strong> for</mark> the <strong><mark>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><mark>to</mark> be a <strong><mark>lead</strong></mark>er in climate change reform <mark>instead of</mark> continually <mark>displaying <strong>reluctance</strong></mark> to address climate change</u>. Under this proposal, the <u>individual states</u> in the United States <u>that understand the <strong>importance</strong> and <strong>urgency</strong> behind addressing the effects of climate change commit to individualized standards</u> through an interstate agreement. The United States will then use the interstate agreement to determine the United States' capacity to enter enforceable, binding treaties in the future. If an individual state does not comply with the commitment, the state will be held accountable to other states and the United States for a breach, although the United States will still be held accountable to other countries. The United States' willingness to enter into treaties from <u><mark>this</u></mark> allocation of risk <u>will <mark>allow</mark> for <mark>better</mark> international <mark>relations since</mark> the <strong><mark>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><mark>will contribute</mark> to climate change reform, <strong><mark>meeting</mark> other <mark>countries' expectations</strong></mark>.</p></u>
|
2NC
|
Uncooperative Federalism CP
|
Warming---Uncooperative Federalism Key---2NC
| 501,700 | 112 | 58,009 |
./documents/hspolicy20/MontgomeryBell/GrYo/Montgomery%20Bell-Green-Young-Neg-Meadows-Round5.docx
| 735,244 |
N
|
Meadows
|
5
|
Ghill GR
|
Cade Cottrell
|
1AC
- Risk Assessments
1NC
- A coherent strategy
2NR
- T-enact
|
hspolicy20/MontgomeryBell/GrYo/Montgomery%20Bell-Green-Young-Neg-Meadows-Round5.docx
| null | 62,697 |
GrYo
|
Montgomery Bell GrYo
| null |
Ma.....
|
Gr.....
|
Ja.....
|
Yo.....
| 21,723 |
MontgomeryBell
|
Montgomery Bell
|
TN
| null | 1,019 |
hspolicy20
|
HS Policy 2020-21
| 2,020 |
cx
|
hs
| 2 |
1,991,553 |
CJR must REDUCE the incarceration rate
|
Laliberte 19
|
Laliberte 19 --- Vail Vail Laliberte, author for European Training Foundation, a European Union agency that helps transition and developing countries harness the potential of their human capital through the reform of education, training and labour market systems, “Lessons About Criminal Justice Reform”, Sept 2019, https://connections.etf.europa.eu/blogs/EntrepreneurialInsights/entry/Lessons_About_Criminal_Justice_Reform?lang=en_gb (BJN)
|
The word “reform” has different meanings when it comes to criminal justice, but one definition that everyone agree on is reform when used in this context should be the reduction of the number of incarcerated people
|
“reform” when it comes to criminal justice everyone agree in this context should be the reduction of the number of incarcerated people
|
The word “reform” has different meanings to a lot of people when it comes to criminal justice, but there is one definition that everyone seems to agree on. That meaning is reform when used in this context should be the reduction of the number of incarcerated people. This reduction though, shouldn’t mean putting public safety in jeopardy.
| 339 |
<h4>CJR must REDUCE the incarceration rate</h4><p><strong>Laliberte 19</strong> --- Vail Vail Laliberte, author for European Training Foundation, a European Union agency that helps transition and developing countries harness the potential of their human capital through the reform of education, training and labour market systems, “Lessons About Criminal Justice Reform”, Sept 2019, https://connections.etf.europa.eu/blogs/EntrepreneurialInsights/entry/Lessons_About_Criminal_Justice_Reform?lang=en_gb (BJN)</p><p><u>The word <mark>“reform” </mark>has different meanings</u> to a lot of people <u><mark>when it comes to criminal justice</mark>, but</u> there is <u>one definition that <mark>everyone</u></mark> seems to <u><mark>agree</mark> on</u>. That meaning <u>is reform</u> <u>when used <mark>in this context</mark> <mark>should be</u> <u>the reduction of the number of incarcerated people</u></mark>. This reduction though, shouldn’t mean putting public safety in jeopardy.</p>
| null |
OFF
|
1
| 64,651 | 110 | 58,716 |
./documents/hspolicy20/OakParkRiverForest/BlKa/Oak%20Park%20River%20Forest-Blasi-KahanHarth-Neg-Iowa%20Caucus-Round5.docx
| 737,301 |
N
|
Iowa Caucus
|
5
|
West HS SLC PS
|
Henry Wright
|
1NC
- ESR CP
- CIL CP
- T Bidirectional
- Security K
- Contested Elections
- CO2 Ag (on case)
2NR CO2 Ag
|
hspolicy20/OakParkRiverForest/BlKa/Oak%20Park%20River%20Forest-Blasi-KahanHarth-Neg-Iowa%20Caucus-Round5.docx
| null | 62,818 |
BlKa
|
Oak Park River Forest BlKa
| null |
Ch.....
|
Bl.....
|
Sa.....
|
Ka.....
| 21,748 |
OakParkRiverForest
|
Oak Park River Forest
|
IL
| null | 1,019 |
hspolicy20
|
HS Policy 2020-21
| 2,020 |
cx
|
hs
| 2 |
1,262,839 |
Biodiversity loss entombs the planet
|
Torres 16
|
Phil Torres 16, founder of the X-Risks Institute and an affiliate scholar at the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, “Biodiversity loss: An existential risk comparable to climate change,” http://thebulletin.org/biodiversity-loss-existential-risk-comparable-climate-change9329
|
repercussions of biodiversity loss are as severe as nuclear conflict according to a 2015 study the best available evidence reveals an exceptionally rapid loss of biodiversity over the last few centuries indicating that a sixth mass extinction is already under way This conclusion holds even on the most optimistic assumptions about the background rate of species losses and the current rate of vertebrate extinctions. The group classified as “vertebrates” includes mammals, birds, reptiles, fish, and all other creatures with a backbone.
using conservative figures the average loss of vertebrate species was 100 times higher in the past century relative to the background rate of extinction The evidence is incontrovertible that recent extinction rates are unprecedented in human history the last of which wiped out the dinosaurs 66 million years ago.
biodiversity refers to the size of different populations of species multiple studies around the world are dwindling
The report also found that the population of farmland birds in Europe has dropped by 50 percent since 1980; bird populations in the grasslands of North America declined by almost 40 percent between 1968 and 2003; and the population of birds in North American arid lands has fallen by almost 30 percent since the 1960s. Similarly, 42 percent of all amphibian species (a type of vertebrate that is sometimes called an “ecological indicator”) are undergoing population declines, and 23 percent of all plant species “are estimated to be threatened with extinction.” Other studies have found that some 20 percent of all reptile species, 48 percent of the world’s primates, and 50 percent of freshwater turtles are threatened. Underwater, about 10 percent of all coral reefs are now dead, and another 60 percent are in danger of dying.
the 2014 Living Planet Report projects past trends of marine biodiversity loss into the 21st century, concluding that, unless significant changes are made to patterns of human activity, there will be virtually no more wild-caught seafood by 2048.
The consequences of this rapid pruning extend beyond the obvious There could be surprising effects that scientists are unable to fully anticipate in advance prior research has shown localized ecosystems can undergo abrupt and irreversible shifts when they reach a tipping point. According to a 2012 paper we may be approaching a tipping point of this sort in the global ecosystem, beyond which the consequences could be catastrophic for civilization.
a planetary-scale transition could precipitate substantial losses of ecosystem services required to sustain the human population such as food production and crop pollination If the global ecosystem were to cross a tipping point the results could be “widespread social unrest, economic instability, and loss of human life this could occur in a matter of decades far more quickly than most of the consequences of climate change
Biodiversity loss is a “threat multiplier that by pushing societies to the brink of collapse, will exacerbate existing conflicts and introduce entirely new struggles between state and non-state actors it could even fuel the rise of terrorism climate change has been linked to the emergence of ISIS
we are entering the sixth mass extinction the impact of this event could be felt by civilization “in as little as three human lifetimes widespread decline of biological populations could plausibly initiate a dramatic transformation of the global ecosystem on an even faster timescale: perhaps a single human lifetime.
biodiversity loss constitutes an existential threat in its own right it ought to be considered alongside climate change and nuclear weapons as one of the most significant contemporary risks to human prosperity and survival.
|
biod loss are as severe as nuclear conflict extinction is under way
rates are unprecedented
unless changes are made
ecosystems undergo abrupt irreversible shifts reach a tipping point
a planetary transition could precipitate losses required to sustain food production and pollination the results could occur in decades
loss is a “threat multiplier that will exacerbate conflicts and fuel terrorism
loss constitutes an existential threat
|
The repercussions of biodiversity loss are potentially as severe as those anticipated from climate change, or even a nuclear conflict. For example, according to a 2015 study published in Science Advances, the best available evidence reveals “an exceptionally rapid loss of biodiversity over the last few centuries, indicating that a sixth mass extinction is already under way.” This conclusion holds, even on the most optimistic assumptions about the background rate of species losses and the current rate of vertebrate extinctions. The group classified as “vertebrates” includes mammals, birds, reptiles, fish, and all other creatures with a backbone.
The article argues that, using its conservative figures, the average loss of vertebrate species was 100 times higher in the past century relative to the background rate of extinction. (Other scientists have suggested that the current extinction rate could be as much as 10,000 times higher than normal.) As the authors write, “The evidence is incontrovertible that recent extinction rates are unprecedented in human history and highly unusual in Earth’s history.” Perhaps the term “Big Six” should enter the popular lexicon—to add the current extinction to the previous “Big Five,” the last of which wiped out the dinosaurs 66 million years ago.
But the concept of biodiversity encompasses more than just the total number of species on the planet. It also refers to the size of different populations of species. With respect to this phenomenon, multiple studies have confirmed that wild populations around the world are dwindling and disappearing at an alarming rate. For example, the 2010 Global Biodiversity Outlook report found that the population of wild vertebrates living in the tropics dropped by 59 percent between 1970 and 2006.
The report also found that the population of farmland birds in Europe has dropped by 50 percent since 1980; bird populations in the grasslands of North America declined by almost 40 percent between 1968 and 2003; and the population of birds in North American arid lands has fallen by almost 30 percent since the 1960s. Similarly, 42 percent of all amphibian species (a type of vertebrate that is sometimes called an “ecological indicator”) are undergoing population declines, and 23 percent of all plant species “are estimated to be threatened with extinction.” Other studies have found that some 20 percent of all reptile species, 48 percent of the world’s primates, and 50 percent of freshwater turtles are threatened. Underwater, about 10 percent of all coral reefs are now dead, and another 60 percent are in danger of dying.
Consistent with these data, the 2014 Living Planet Report shows that the global population of wild vertebrates dropped by 52 percent in only four decades—from 1970 to 2010. While biologists often avoid projecting historical trends into the future because of the complexity of ecological systems, it’s tempting to extrapolate this figure to, say, the year 2050, which is four decades from 2010. As it happens, a 2006 study published in Science does precisely this: It projects past trends of marine biodiversity loss into the 21st century, concluding that, unless significant changes are made to patterns of human activity, there will be virtually no more wild-caught seafood by 2048.
Catastrophic consequences for civilization. The consequences of this rapid pruning of the evolutionary tree of life extend beyond the obvious. There could be surprising effects of biodiversity loss that scientists are unable to fully anticipate in advance. For example, prior research has shown that localized ecosystems can undergo abrupt and irreversible shifts when they reach a tipping point. According to a 2012 paper published in Nature, there are reasons for thinking that we may be approaching a tipping point of this sort in the global ecosystem, beyond which the consequences could be catastrophic for civilization.
As the authors write, a planetary-scale transition could precipitate “substantial losses of ecosystem services required to sustain the human population.” An ecosystem service is any ecological process that benefits humanity, such as food production and crop pollination. If the global ecosystem were to cross a tipping point and substantial ecosystem services were lost, the results could be “widespread social unrest, economic instability, and loss of human life.” According to Missouri Botanical Garden ecologist Adam Smith, one of the paper’s co-authors, this could occur in a matter of decades—far more quickly than most of the expected consequences of climate change, yet equally destructive.
Biodiversity loss is a “threat multiplier” that, by pushing societies to the brink of collapse, will exacerbate existing conflicts and introduce entirely new struggles between state and non-state actors. Indeed, it could even fuel the rise of terrorism. (After all, climate change has been linked to the emergence of ISIS in Syria, and multiple high-ranking US officials, such as former US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and CIA director John Brennan, have affirmed that climate change and terrorism are connected.)
The reality is that we are entering the sixth mass extinction in the 3.8-billion-year history of life on Earth, and the impact of this event could be felt by civilization “in as little as three human lifetimes,” as the aforementioned 2012 Nature paper notes. Furthermore, the widespread decline of biological populations could plausibly initiate a dramatic transformation of the global ecosystem on an even faster timescale: perhaps a single human lifetime.
The unavoidable conclusion is that biodiversity loss constitutes an existential threat in its own right. As such, it ought to be considered alongside climate change and nuclear weapons as one of the most significant contemporary risks to human prosperity and survival.
| 5,870 |
<h4>Biodiversity loss <u>entombs</u> the planet</h4><p>Phil <strong>Torres 16</strong>, founder of the X-Risks Institute and an affiliate scholar at the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, “Biodiversity loss: An existential risk comparable to climate change,” http://thebulletin.org/biodiversity-loss-existential-risk-comparable-climate-change9329</p><p>The <u>repercussions of <strong><mark>biod</mark>iversity <mark>loss</strong> are</u></mark> potentially <u><mark>as severe as</u></mark> those anticipated from climate change, or even a <u><strong><mark>nuclear conflict</u></strong></mark>. For example, <u>according to a 2015 study</u> published in Science Advances, <u>the best available evidence reveals</u> “<u>an <strong>exceptionally rapid loss of biod</strong>iversity over the last few centuries</u>, <u>indicating that a sixth <strong>mass <mark>extinction</strong> is</mark> <strong>already <mark>under way</u></strong></mark>.” <u>This conclusion holds</u>, <u><strong>even on the most optimistic assumptions</strong> about the background rate of species losses and the current rate of vertebrate extinctions. The group classified as “vertebrates” includes mammals, birds, reptiles, fish, and all other creatures with a backbone.</p><p></u>The article argues that, <u>using</u> its <u>conservative figures</u>, <u>the average loss</u> <u>of vertebrate species was 100 times higher in the past century relative to the background rate of extinction</u>. (Other scientists have suggested that the current extinction rate could be as much as 10,000 times higher than normal.) As the authors write, “<u>The evidence is incontrovertible that <strong>recent extinction <mark>rates</strong> are unprecedented</mark> in human</u> <u>history</u> and highly unusual in Earth’s history.” Perhaps the term “Big Six” should enter the popular lexicon—to add the current extinction to the previous “Big Five,” <u>the last of which <strong>wiped out the dinosaurs</strong> 66 million years ago.</p><p></u>But the concept of <u>biodiversity</u> encompasses more than just the total number of species on the planet. It also <u>refers to the size of different populations of species</u>. With respect to this phenomenon, <u>multiple studies</u> have confirmed that wild populations<u> around the world are dwindling</u> and disappearing at an alarming rate. For example, the 2010 Global Biodiversity Outlook report found that the population of wild vertebrates living in the tropics dropped by 59 percent between 1970 and 2006.</p><p><u><strong>The report also found that the population of farmland birds in Europe has dropped by 50 percent since 1980; bird populations in the grasslands of North America declined by almost 40 percent between 1968 and 2003; and the population of birds in North American arid lands has fallen by almost 30 percent since the 1960s. Similarly, 42 percent of all amphibian species (a type of vertebrate that is sometimes called an “ecological indicator”) are undergoing population declines, and 23 percent of all plant species “are estimated to be threatened with extinction.” Other studies have found that some 20 percent of all reptile species, 48 percent of the world’s primates, and 50 percent of freshwater turtles are threatened. Underwater, about 10 percent of all coral reefs are now dead, and another 60 percent are in danger of dying.</p><p></u></strong>Consistent with these data, <u>the 2014 Living Planet Report </u>shows that the global population of wild vertebrates dropped by 52 percent in only four decades—from 1970 to 2010. While biologists often avoid projecting historical trends into the future because of the complexity of ecological systems, it’s tempting to extrapolate this figure to, say, the year 2050, which is four decades from 2010. As it happens, a 2006 study published in Science does precisely this: It <u>projects past trends of marine biodiversity loss into the 21st century, concluding that, <mark>unless</mark> significant <mark>changes are made</mark> to patterns of human activity, there will be virtually <strong>no more</strong> wild-caught <strong>seafood by 2048</strong>.</p><p></u>Catastrophic consequences for civilization. <u>The consequences of this rapid pruning</u> of the evolutionary tree of life <u>extend beyond the obvious</u>. <u>There could be <strong>surprising effects</u></strong> of biodiversity loss <u>that scientists are unable to fully anticipate in advance</u>. For example, <u>prior research has shown</u> that <u>localized <mark>ecosystems</mark> can <mark>undergo</u> <u><strong>abrupt</mark> and <mark>irreversible shifts</u></strong></mark> <u>when they <mark>reach <strong>a tipping point</strong></mark>.</u> <u>According to a 2012 paper</u> published in Nature, there are reasons for thinking that <u>we may be approaching a tipping point of this sort in <strong>the global ecosystem</strong>, beyond which the consequences could be <strong>catastrophic</strong> for civilization.</p><p></u>As the authors write, <u><mark>a <strong>planetary</mark>-scale <mark>transition</strong> could precipitate</u></mark> “<u>substantial <strong><mark>losses</mark> of ecosystem</strong> services <strong><mark>required</strong> to sustain</mark> <strong>the human population</u></strong>.” An ecosystem service is any ecological process that benefits humanity, <u>such as <strong><mark>food production</strong> and <strong></mark>crop <mark>pollination</u></strong></mark>. <u>If the global ecosystem were to cross a tipping point</u> and substantial ecosystem services were lost, <u><strong><mark>the results</strong> </mark>could be “widespread <strong>social unrest</strong>, <strong>economic instability</strong>, and <strong>loss of human life</u></strong>.” According to Missouri Botanical Garden ecologist Adam Smith, one of the paper’s co-authors, <u>this <mark>could occur <strong>in</mark> a matter of <mark>decades</u></strong></mark>—<u>far more quickly than most of the</u> expected <u>consequences of climate change</u>, yet equally destructive.</p><p><u><strong>Biodiversity <mark>loss</strong> is a “<strong>threat multiplier</u></strong></mark>” <u><mark>that</u></mark>, <u>by pushing societies to <strong>the brink of collapse</strong>, <mark>will <strong>exacerbate</mark> existing <mark>conflicts</strong> and</mark> introduce entirely <strong>new struggles</strong> between state and non-state actors</u>. Indeed, <u>it could even <strong><mark>fuel</mark> the rise of <mark>terrorism</u></strong></mark>. (After all, <u>climate change has been linked to the emergence of ISIS</u> in Syria, and multiple high-ranking US officials, such as former US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and CIA director John Brennan, have affirmed that climate change and terrorism are connected.)</p><p>The reality is that<u> <strong>we are entering the sixth mass extinction</u></strong> in the 3.8-billion-year history of life on Earth, and <u>the impact of this event could be felt by civilization “in as little as three human lifetimes</u>,” as the aforementioned 2012 Nature paper notes. Furthermore, the <u>widespread decline of biological populations could plausibly initiate a dramatic transformation of the global ecosystem <strong>on an even faster timescale</strong>: perhaps a single human lifetime.</p><p></u>The unavoidable conclusion is that <u><strong>biodiversity <mark>loss</strong> constitutes an <strong>existential threat</strong></mark> in its own right</u>. As such, <u>it ought to be considered alongside climate change and <strong>nuclear weapons</strong> as one of the most significant contemporary risks to human prosperity and survival.</p></u>
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1AC – Line 5 – WC BS
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1AC – Environment
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./documents/hspolicy21/WinstonChurchill/BlSt/Winston%20Churchill-Blanton-Stone-Aff-Grapevine-Round2.docx
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Greenhill MS
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Arnav Kashyap
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1AC- Line 5
1NC- Reg Neg CP Infra DA T Regulation Michigan CP Set col K
2NR- Reg Neg CP
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hspolicy21/WinstonChurchill/BlSt/Winston%20Churchill-Blanton-Stone-Aff-Grapevine-Round2.docx
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2] Extinction is the only coherent and egalitarian framework – prefer it
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Khan 18
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Khan 18 (Risalat, activist and entrepreneur from Bangladesh passionate about addressing climate change, biodiversity loss, and other existential challenges. He was featured by The Guardian as one of the “young climate campaigners to watch” (2015). As a campaigner with the global civic movement Avaaz (2014-17), Risalat was part of a small core team that spearheaded the largest climate marches in history with a turnout of over 800,000 across 2,000 cities. After fighting for the Paris Agreement, Risalat led a campaign joined by over a million people to stop the Rampal coal plant in Bangladesh to protect the Sundarbans World Heritage forest, and elicited criticism of the plant from Crédit Agricolé through targeted advocacy. Currently, Risalat is pursuing an MPA in Environmental Science and Policy at Columbia University as a SIPA Environmental Fellow, “5 reasons why we need to start talking about existential risks,” https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/5-reasons-start-talking-existential-risks-extinction-moriori/)
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Infinite possibilities human culture is far from immutable we can master them and rise to unprecedented challenges even this does not make us masters of our own destiny. We can make visionary choices, but the future can still surprise us. faced with an uncertain future, the only wise thing we can do is prepare the possibilities seem endless. They range from abundance to the end of humanity Among the infinite future possibilities, only one outcome is truly irreversible: extinction Concerns are dismissed as apocalyptic alarmism repeating that mankind is still here after 70 years of existential warning about nuclear warfare is a straw man argument. The fact that a 1000-year flood has not happened does not negate its possibility there have been far too many nuclear near-misses to rest easy. Davos discusses five reasons why the possibility of existential risks should raise the stakes of conversation: Extinction is the rule, not the exception 99.9% of all the species that ever existed are gone Deep time is unfathomable if one cares to take a tour of the billions of years of life’s history, we find a litany of forgotten species. 99.9% of all human cultures that have ever existed are extinct. It is only in the very recent past that we became a truly global civilization 15,000 scientists just issued a ‘warning to humanity’ Diamond charts the history of past societies overpopulation and resource use beyond the carrying capacity have often been important, of collapse. we must achieve tremendous changes in our response to several major environmental crises. Bostrom cites a survey of industry experts that projected a 50% chance of the development of artificial superintelligence by 2050 and a 90% chance by 2075 Visionaries warned of the existential risks from artificial superintelligence. Throughout history, we have rallied against the ‘other’ Tribes overpowered tribes, empires have conquered rivals our fiercest displays of unity typically happen at wartime. We we 21st-century citizens find ourselves on an increasingly unstable island. We may have a violent past, but we have no more dangerous enemy than ourselves Our task is to find Our own shared contract, based on equity, would help us navigate safely. would ensure a future that unleashes the full potential of our still-budding human civilization, in all its diversity. We cannot do this unless we are humbly grounded in the possibility of our own destruction Survival is life’s primal instinct In the absence of a common enemy, we must find common cause in survival. Our future may depend on whether we realize this.
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Infinite possibilities faced with an uncertain future, the only thing we can do is prepare one outcome is truly irreversible: extinction there have been too many nuclear near-misses to rest easy Extinction is the rule, not the exception 99.9% of all the species that ever existed are gone 15,000 scientists just issued a ‘warning to humanity’ experts projected the development of a i 90% chance by 2075 Visionaries warned of the existential risks from artificial superintelligence Survival is life’s primal instinct we must find common cause in survival.
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Infinite future possibilities I find the story of the Moriori profound. It teaches me two lessons. Firstly, that human culture is far from immutable. That we can struggle against our baser instincts. That we can master them and rise to unprecedented challenges. Secondly, that even this does not make us masters of our own destiny. We can make visionary choices, but the future can still surprise us. This is a humbling realization. Because faced with an uncertain future, the only wise thing we can do is prepare for possibilities. Standing at the launch pad of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, the possibilities seem endless. They range from an era of abundance to the end of humanity, and everything in between. How do we navigate such a wide and divergent spectrum? I am an optimist. From my bubble of privilege, life feels like a rollercoaster ride full of ever more impressive wonders, even as I try to fight the many social injustices that still blight us. However, the accelerating pace of change amid uncertainty elicits one fundamental observation. Among the infinite future possibilities, only one outcome is truly irreversible: extinction. Concerns about extinction are often dismissed as apocalyptic alarmism. Sometimes, they are. But repeating that mankind is still here after 70 years of existential warning about nuclear warfare is a straw man argument. The fact that a 1000-year flood has not happened does not negate its possibility. And there have been far too many nuclear near-misses to rest easy. As the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting in Davos discusses how to create a shared future in a fractured world, here are five reasons why the possibility of existential risks should raise the stakes of conversation: 1. Extinction is the rule, not the exception More than 99.9% of all the species that ever existed are gone. Deep time is unfathomable to the human brain. But if one cares to take a tour of the billions of years of life’s history, we find a litany of forgotten species. And we have only discovered a mere fraction of the extinct species that once roamed the planet. In the speck of time since the first humans evolved, more than 99.9% of all the distinct human cultures that have ever existed are extinct. Each hunter-gatherer tribe had its own mythologies, traditions and norms. They wiped each other out, or coalesced into larger formations following the agricultural revolution. However, as major civilizations emerged, even those that reached incredible heights, such as the Egyptians and the Romans, eventually collapsed. It is only in the very recent past that we became a truly global civilization. Our interconnectedness continues to grow rapidly. “Stand or fall, we are the last civilization”, as Ricken Patel, the founder of the global civic movement Avaaz, put it. 2. Environmental pressures can drive extinction More than 15,000 scientists just issued a ‘warning to humanity’. They called on us to reduce our impact on the biosphere, 25 years after their first such appeal. The warning notes that we are far outstripping the capacity of our planet in all but one measure of ozone depletion, including emissions, biodiversity, freshwater availability and more. The scientists, not a crowd known to overstate facts, conclude: “soon it will be too late to shift course away from our failing trajectory, and time is running out”. In his 2005 book Collapse, Jared Diamond charts the history of past societies. He makes the case that overpopulation and resource use beyond the carrying capacity have often been important, if not the only, drivers of collapse. Even though we are making important incremental progress in battles such as climate change, we must still achieve tremendous step changes in our response to several major environmental crises. We must do this even while the world’s population continues to grow. These pressures are bound to exert great stress on our global civilization. 3. Superintelligence: unplanned obsolescence? Imagine a monkey society that foresaw the ascendance of humans. Fearing a loss of status and power, it decided to kill the proverbial Adam and Eve. It crafted the most ingenious plan it could: starve the humans by taking away all their bananas. Foolproof plan, right? This story describes the fundamental difficulty with superintelligence. A superintelligent being may always do something entirely different from what we, with our mere mortal intelligence, can foresee. In his 2014 book Superintelligence, Swedish philosopher Nick Bostrom presents the challenge in thought-provoking detail, and advises caution. Bostrom cites a survey of industry experts that projected a 50% chance of the development of artificial superintelligence by 2050, and a 90% chance by 2075. The latter date is within the life expectancy of many alive today. Visionaries like Stephen Hawking and Elon Musk have warned of the existential risks from artificial superintelligence. Their opposite camp includes Larry Page and Mark Zuckerberg. But on an issue that concerns the future of humanity, is it really wise to ignore the guy who explained the nature of space to us and another guy who just put a reusable rocket in it? 4. Technology: known knowns and unknown unknowns Many fundamentally disruptive technologies are coming of age, from bioengineering to quantum computing, 3-D printing, robotics, nanotechnology and more. Lord Martin Rees describes potential existential challenges from some of these technologies, such as a bioengineered pandemic, in his book Our Final Century. Imagine if North Korea, feeling secure in its isolation, could release a virulent strain of Ebola, engineered to be airborne. Would it do it? Would ISIS? Projecting decades forward, we will likely develop capabilities that are unthinkable even now. The unknown unknowns of our technological path are profoundly humbling. 5. 'The Trump Factor' Despite our scientific ingenuity, we are still a confused and confusing species. Think back to two years ago, and how you thought the world worked then. Has that not been upended by the election of Donald Trump as US President, and everything that has happened since? The mix of billions of messy humans will forever be unpredictable. When the combustible forces described above are added to this melee, we find ourselves on a tightrope. What choices must we now make now to create a shared future, in which we are not at perpetual risk of destroying ourselves? Common enemy to common cause Throughout history, we have rallied against the ‘other’. Tribes have overpowered tribes, empires have conquered rivals. Even today, our fiercest displays of unity typically happen at wartime. We give our lives for our motherland and defend nationalistic pride like a wounded lion. But like the early Morioris, we 21st-century citizens find ourselves on an increasingly unstable island. We may have a violent past, but we have no more dangerous enemy than ourselves. Our task is to find our own Nunuku’s Law. Our own shared contract, based on equity, would help us navigate safely. It would ensure a future that unleashes the full potential of our still-budding human civilization, in all its diversity. We cannot do this unless we are humbly grounded in the possibility of our own destruction. Survival is life’s primal instinct. In the absence of a common enemy, we must find common cause in survival. Our future may depend on whether we realize this.
| 7,435 |
<h4><strong>2] Extinction is the only coherent and egalitarian framework – prefer it </h4><p>Khan 18 <u></strong>(Risalat, activist and entrepreneur from Bangladesh passionate about addressing climate change, biodiversity loss, and other existential challenges. He was featured by The Guardian as one of the “young climate campaigners to watch” (2015). As a campaigner with the global civic movement Avaaz (2014-17), Risalat was part of a small core team that spearheaded the largest climate marches in history with a turnout of over 800,000 across 2,000 cities. After fighting for the Paris Agreement, Risalat led a campaign joined by over a million people to stop the Rampal coal plant in Bangladesh to protect the Sundarbans World Heritage forest, and elicited criticism of the plant from Crédit Agricolé through targeted advocacy. Currently, Risalat is pursuing an MPA in Environmental Science and Policy at Columbia University as a SIPA Environmental Fellow, “5 reasons why we need to start talking about existential risks,” https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/5-reasons-start-talking-existential-risks-extinction-moriori/)</p><p><strong><mark>Infinite</u></strong></mark> future <u><strong><mark>possibilities</u></strong></mark> I find the story of the Moriori profound. It teaches me two lessons. Firstly, that <u>human culture is <strong>far from immutable</u></strong>. That we can struggle against our baser instincts. That <u><strong>we can master them and rise to unprecedented challenges</u></strong>. Secondly, that <u>even this does not make us masters of our own destiny. We can make visionary choices, but the future can still surprise us. </u>This is a humbling realization. Because <u><strong><mark>faced with an uncertain future, the only</mark> wise <mark>thing we can do is prepare</u></strong> </mark>for possibilities. Standing at the launch pad of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, <u>the possibilities seem endless. They range from</u> an era of <u>abundance to the end of humanity</u>, and everything in between. How do we navigate such a wide and divergent spectrum? I am an optimist. From my bubble of privilege, life feels like a rollercoaster ride full of ever more impressive wonders, even as I try to fight the many social injustices that still blight us. However, the accelerating pace of change amid uncertainty elicits one fundamental observation. <u>Among the infinite future possibilities<strong>, only <mark>one outcome is truly irreversible: extinction</u></strong></mark>. <u>Concerns</u> about extinction <u>are</u> often <u>dismissed as <strong>apocalyptic alarmism</u></strong>. Sometimes, they are. But <u>repeating that mankind is still here after 70 years of existential warning about nuclear warfare is a <strong>straw man argument</strong>.</u> <u><strong>The fact that a 1000-year flood has not happened does not negate its possibility</u></strong>. And <u><mark>there have been <strong></mark>far <mark>too many nuclear near-misses to rest easy</mark>. </u></strong>As the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting in <u>Davos discusses</u> how to create a shared future in a fractured world, here are <u>five reasons why the possibility of existential risks should raise the stakes of conversation: </u>1. <u><strong><mark>Extinction is the rule, not the exception</u></strong></mark> More than <u><mark>99.9% of all the species that ever existed are gone</u></mark>. <u><strong>Deep time is unfathomable</u></strong> to the human brain. But <u>if one cares to take a tour of the billions of years of life’s history, we find a litany of forgotten species. </u>And we have only discovered a mere fraction of the extinct species that once roamed the planet. In the speck of time since the first humans evolved, more than <u>99.9% of all</u> the distinct <u>human cultures that have ever existed are extinct.</u> Each hunter-gatherer tribe had its own mythologies, traditions and norms. They wiped each other out, or coalesced into larger formations following the agricultural revolution. However, as major civilizations emerged, even those that reached incredible heights, such as the Egyptians and the Romans, eventually collapsed. <u>It is only in the very recent past that we became a truly global civilization</u>. Our interconnectedness continues to grow rapidly. “Stand or fall, we are the last civilization”, as Ricken Patel, the founder of the global civic movement Avaaz, put it. 2. Environmental pressures can drive extinction More than <u><mark>15,000 scientists just issued a ‘warning to humanity’</u></mark>. They called on us to reduce our impact on the biosphere, 25 years after their first such appeal. The warning notes that we are far outstripping the capacity of our planet in all but one measure of ozone depletion, including emissions, biodiversity, freshwater availability and more. The scientists, not a crowd known to overstate facts, conclude: “soon it will be too late to shift course away from our failing trajectory, and time is running out”. In his 2005 book Collapse, Jared <u>Diamond charts the history of past societies</u>. He makes the case that <u>overpopulation and resource use beyond the carrying capacity have often been important, </u>if not the only, drivers <u>of collapse. </u>Even though we are making important incremental progress in battles such as climate change, <u>we must</u> still <u>achieve tremendous </u>step <u>changes in our response to several major environmental crises.</u> We must do this even while the world’s population continues to grow. These pressures are bound to exert great stress on our global civilization. 3. Superintelligence: unplanned obsolescence? Imagine a monkey society that foresaw the ascendance of humans. Fearing a loss of status and power, it decided to kill the proverbial Adam and Eve. It crafted the most ingenious plan it could: starve the humans by taking away all their bananas. Foolproof plan, right? This story describes the fundamental difficulty with superintelligence. A superintelligent being may always do something entirely different from what we, with our mere mortal intelligence, can foresee. In his 2014 book Superintelligence, Swedish philosopher Nick Bostrom presents the challenge in thought-provoking detail, and advises caution. <u><strong>Bostrom cites a survey of industry <mark>experts</mark> that <mark>projected </mark>a 50% chance of <mark>the development of a</mark>rtificial super<mark>i</mark>ntelligence by 2050</u></strong>, <u><strong>and a <mark>90% chance by 2075</u></strong></mark>. The latter date is within the life expectancy of many alive today. <u><mark>Visionaries</u></mark> like Stephen Hawking and Elon Musk have <u><mark>warned of the existential risks from artificial superintelligence</mark>. </u>Their opposite camp includes Larry Page and Mark Zuckerberg. But on an issue that concerns the future of humanity, is it really wise to ignore the guy who explained the nature of space to us and another guy who just put a reusable rocket in it? 4. Technology: known knowns and unknown unknowns Many fundamentally disruptive technologies are coming of age, from bioengineering to quantum computing, 3-D printing, robotics, nanotechnology and more. Lord Martin Rees describes potential existential challenges from some of these technologies, such as a bioengineered pandemic, in his book Our Final Century. Imagine if North Korea, feeling secure in its isolation, could release a virulent strain of Ebola, engineered to be airborne. Would it do it? Would ISIS? Projecting decades forward, we will likely develop capabilities that are unthinkable even now. The unknown unknowns of our technological path are profoundly humbling. 5. 'The Trump Factor' Despite our scientific ingenuity, we are still a confused and confusing species. Think back to two years ago, and how you thought the world worked then. Has that not been upended by the election of Donald Trump as US President, and everything that has happened since? The mix of billions of messy humans will forever be unpredictable. When the combustible forces described above are added to this melee, we find ourselves on a tightrope. What choices must we now make now to create a shared future, in which we are not at perpetual risk of destroying ourselves? Common enemy to common cause <u>Throughout history, we have rallied against the ‘other’</u>. <u>Tribes</u> have <u>overpowered tribes,</u> <u>empires have conquered rivals</u>. Even today, <u>our fiercest displays of unity typically happen at wartime. We</u> give our lives for our motherland and defend nationalistic pride like a wounded lion. But like the early Morioris, <u>we 21st-century citizens find ourselves on an <strong>increasingly unstable island</strong>.</u> <u>We may have a violent past, but <strong>we have no more dangerous enemy than ourselves</u></strong>. <u>Our task is to find</u> our own Nunuku’s Law. <u>Our own shared contract, based on equity, would help us navigate safely.</u> It <u>would ensure a future that unleashes the full potential of our still-budding human civilization, in all its diversity. We cannot do this unless we are <strong>humbly grounded in the possibility of our own destruction</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Survival is life’s primal instinct</u></strong></mark>. <u>In the absence of a common enemy, <mark>we must find common cause in survival. <strong></mark>Our future may depend on whether we realize this.</p></u></strong>
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1AC
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Judgement day
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./documents/hsld20/HarvardWestlake/Ch/Harvard%20Westlake-Chen-Aff-Stanford-Round2.docx
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Stanford
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Saratoga AG
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Gonzalez, Gabriela
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1AC nuclear LAWs
1NC T CP Security K Deterrence
2NR Security
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hsld20/HarvardWestlake/Ch/Harvard%20Westlake-Chen-Aff-Stanford-Round2.docx
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HS LD 2020-21
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Weakened antitrust enforcement emboldens firms to follow Qualcomm’s lead, which collapses FRAND integrity.
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Hovenkamp 20
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Hovenkamp 20, *Herbert J. Hovenkamp is James G. Dinan University Professor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania; (2020, “FRAND and Antitrust”, https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3095&context=faculty_scholarship)
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the FRAND process is also fragile Firms are tempted to make commitments but renege on them later when they can profit private FRAND enforcement had not worked very well Qualcomm had been able to violate FRAND commitments in order to exclude rivals and obtain higher royalties than FRAND would permit largely with impunity Other firms will very likely follow Qualcomm’s lead If that happens the FRAND system will fall apart doing irreparable injury to the modern wireless telecommunications network or diminishing the leadership role of the United States in preserving effective network competition
As private actors those involved in standard setting or compliance are fully subject to the federal antitrust laws
This Article addresses one question: when is an SSO participant’s violation of a FRAND commitment an antitrust violation, and if it is, of what kind and what are the implications for remedies? It warns against two extremes. One is thinking that any violation of a FRAND commitment is an antitrust violation as well. In the first instance FRAND obligations are contractual, and most breaches of contract do not violate any antitrust law. The other extreme is thinking that, because a FRAND violation is a breach of contract, it cannot also be an antitrust violation. The question of an antitrust violation does not de-pend on whether the conduct breached a particular agreement but rather on whether it caused competitive harm. This can happen because the conduct restrained trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act, was unreasonably exclusionary under section 2 of the Sherman Act, or amounted to an anticompetitive condition or understanding as defined by section 3 of the Clay-ton Act.10 The end goal is to identify practices that harm com-petition, thereby injuring consumers.
The Ninth Circuit’s Qualcomm decision will make antitrust violations in the context of FRAND licensing much more difficult to prove even in cases where anticompetitive behavior and consumer harm seem clear If this decision stands FRAND obligations will to a larger extent have to be settled through private litigation and the federal antitrust enforcement agencies will have a diminished role Anticompetitive behavior by one firm that is not effectively disciplined will lead others to do the same thing.
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FRAND is fragile. Firms are tempted to renege when they can profit Qualcomm had been able to violate FRAND commitments with impunity. Other firms will follow Qualcomm’s lead FRAND will fall apart, doing irreparable injury to the modern telecommunications network or diminishing the leadership of the U S in preserving network competition
The Ninth Circuit’s decision make antitrust violations difficult to prove, even where anticompetitive behavior seem clear If this decision stands, antitrust enforcement will have a diminished role behavior not effectively disciplined lead others to do the same thing
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While the FRAND process has been highly productive, it is also fragile. Firms are tempted to make commitments at the beginning when the incentive to join is large, but renege on them later when they can profit by doing so. At least in this particular case, private FRAND enforcement had not worked very well. Qualcomm had been able to violate FRAND commitments in order to exclude rivals and obtain higher royalties than FRAND would permit, largely with impunity. Other firms will very likely follow Qualcomm’s lead. If that happens the FRAND system will fall apart, doing irreparable injury to the modern wireless telecommunications network or, at the very least, diminishing the leadership role of the United States in preserving effective network competition.
While governments can be heavily involved in standard set-ting,9 the implementation of technical standards in information technologies is largely the work of private actors. Government involvement is limited mainly to enforcement of contract, intellectual property, or antitrust law. As private actors, those involved in standard setting or compliance are fully subject to the federal antitrust laws.
This Article addresses one question: when is an SSO participant’s violation of a FRAND commitment an antitrust violation, and if it is, of what kind and what are the implications for remedies? It warns against two extremes. One is thinking that any violation of a FRAND commitment is an antitrust violation as well. In the first instance FRAND obligations are contractual, and most breaches of contract do not violate any antitrust law. The other extreme is thinking that, because a FRAND violation is a breach of contract, it cannot also be an antitrust violation. The question of an antitrust violation does not de-pend on whether the conduct breached a particular agreement but rather on whether it caused competitive harm. This can happen because the conduct restrained trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act, was unreasonably exclusionary under section 2 of the Sherman Act, or amounted to an anticompetitive condition or understanding as defined by section 3 of the Clay-ton Act.10 The end goal is to identify practices that harm com-petition, thereby injuring consumers.
The Ninth Circuit’s Qualcomm decision will make antitrust violations in the context of FRAND licensing much more difficult to prove, even in cases where anticompetitive behavior and consumer harm seem clear.11 Indeed, in this case the court itself acknowledged the harm to consumers but appeared to think that they were not entitled to protection.12 If this decision stands, FRAND obligations will to a larger extent have to be settled through private litigation and the federal antitrust enforcement agencies will have a diminished role. Anticompetitive behavior by one firm that is not effectively disciplined will lead others to do the same thing.
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<h4>Weakened antitrust enforcement <u>emboldens firms</u> to follow Qualcomm’s lead, which collapses FRAND integrity.</h4><p><strong>Hovenkamp 20</strong>, *Herbert J. Hovenkamp is James G. Dinan University Professor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania; (2020, “FRAND and Antitrust”, https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3095&context=faculty_scholarship)</p><p>While <u>the <mark>FRAND</mark> process</u> has been highly productive, it <u><mark>is </mark>also <strong><mark>fragile</u></strong>. <u>Firms are tempted to</mark> make commitments</u> at the beginning when the incentive to join is large, <u>but <strong><mark>renege</strong></mark> on them <strong>later</strong> <mark>when they can profit</u></mark> by doing so. At least in this particular case, <u>private FRAND enforcement <strong>had not worked</strong> very well</u>. <u><mark>Qualcomm had been able to violate FRAND commitments</mark> in order to <strong>exclude rivals</strong> and obtain <strong>higher royalties</strong> than FRAND would permit</u>, <u>largely <mark>with <strong>impunity</u></strong>. <u>Other firms will</mark> very likely <strong><mark>follow Qualcomm’s lead</u></strong></mark>. <u>If that happens the <strong><mark>FRAND</mark> system</strong> <mark>will <strong>fall apart</u></strong>, <u>doing <strong>irreparable injury</strong> to the modern</mark> wireless <mark>telecommunications network or</u></mark>, at the very least, <u><strong><mark>diminishing</strong> the <strong>leadership</mark> role</strong> <mark>of the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>in preserving</mark> effective <strong><mark>network competition</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>While governments can be heavily involved in standard set-ting,9 the implementation of technical standards in information technologies is largely the work of private actors. Government involvement is limited mainly to enforcement of contract, intellectual property, or antitrust law. <u>As private actors</u>, <u>those involved in standard setting or compliance are fully subject to the federal antitrust laws</u>.</p><p><u>This Article addresses one question: when is an SSO participant’s violation of a FRAND commitment an antitrust violation, and if it is, of what kind and what are the implications for remedies? It warns against two extremes. One is thinking that any violation of a FRAND commitment is an antitrust violation as well. In the first instance FRAND obligations are contractual, and most breaches of contract do not violate any antitrust law. The other extreme is thinking that, because a FRAND violation is a breach of contract, it cannot also be an antitrust violation. The question of an antitrust violation does not de-pend on whether the conduct breached a particular agreement but rather on whether it caused competitive harm. This can happen because the conduct restrained trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act, was unreasonably exclusionary under section 2 of the Sherman Act, or amounted to an anticompetitive condition or understanding as defined by section 3 of the Clay-ton Act.10 The end goal is to identify practices that harm com-petition, thereby injuring consumers.</p><p><mark>The Ninth Circuit’s</mark> Qualcomm <mark>decision </mark>will <mark>make antitrust violations</mark> in the context of FRAND licensing much more <strong><mark>difficult to prove</u></strong>, <u>even </mark>in cases <mark>where <strong>anticompetitive behavior</strong></mark> and consumer harm <strong><mark>seem clear</u></strong></mark>.11 Indeed, in this case the court itself acknowledged the harm to consumers but appeared to think that they were not entitled to protection.12 <u><mark>If this decision stands</u>,</mark> <u>FRAND obligations will to a <strong>larger extent</strong> have to be settled through private litigation and the federal <mark>antitrust enforcement</mark> agencies <mark>will have a <strong>diminished role</u></strong></mark>. <u>Anticompetitive <mark>behavior</mark> by one firm that is <strong><mark>not effectively disciplined</strong> </mark>will <mark>lead <strong>others</strong> to do the <strong>same thing</strong></mark>.</p></u>
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Only the plan can solve covid access – inequalities heighten the risk of mutations and uneven development – neg objections miss the boat.
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Kumar 21
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Kumar 21 [Rajeesh; Associate Fellow at the Institute, currently working on a project titled “Emerging Powers and the Future of Global Governance: India and International Institutions.” He has PhD in International Organization from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Prior to joining MP-IDSA in 2016, he taught at JamiaMilliaIslamia, New Delhi (2010-11& 2015-16) and University of Calicut, Kerala (2007-08). His areas of research interest are International Organizations, India and Multilateralism, Global Governance, and International Humanitarian Law. He is the co-editor of two books;Eurozone Crisis and the Future of Europe: Political Economy of Further Integration and Governance (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); and Islam, Islamist Movements and Democracy in the Middle East: Challenges, Opportunities and Responses (Delhi: Global Vision Publishing, 2013); “WTO TRIPS Waiver and COVID-19 Vaccine Equity,” IDSA Issue Briefs; https://idsa.in/issuebrief/wto-trips-waiver-covid-vaccine-rkumar-120721] Justin
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rich nations representing just 14 per cent of the world population have bought up to 53 per cent of the most promising vaccines so far high-income countries (HICs) purchased more than half (6.16 billion) vaccine doses sold globally the low-income countries (LICs) received only 0.3 per cent of the vaccines produced. The low and middle-income countries (LMICs), which account for 81 per cent of the global adult population, purchased 33 per cent there is a significant disparity between HICs and LICs in vaccine administration as well. As of 8 July 2021, 3.32 billion vaccine doses had been administered globally only one per cent of people in LICs have been given at least one dose. While in HICs almost one in four people have received the vaccine In Sub-Saharan Africa, vaccine rollout remains the slowest in the world. According to the International Monetary Fund massive global inequity will continue to exist, with Africa still experiencing meagre vaccination rates while other parts of the world move much closer to complete vaccination.14 This vaccine inequity is not only morally indefensible but also clinically counter-productive. If this situation prevails, LICs could be waiting until 2025 for vaccinating half of their people. Allowing most of the world’s population to go unvaccinated will also spawn new virus mutations, more contagious viruses leading to a steep rise in COVID-19 cases TRIPS: Barrier to Equitable Health Care Access The opponents of the waiver proposal argue that IPR are not a significant barrier to equitable access to health care, and existing TRIPS flexibilities are sufficient to address the COVID-19 pandemic history suggests the contrary nearly 40 of world’s largest and influential pharma companies took the South African government to court over the violation of TRIPS The Big Pharma also lobbied developed countries, particularly the US, to put bilateral trade sanctions against South Africa when Indian company Cipla decided to provide generic antiretrovirals (ARVs) to the African market at a lower cost, Big Pharma retaliated through patent litigations in Indian and international trade courts and branded Indian drug companies as thieves IP hinders manufacturing and supply of diagnostics, medical equipment, treatments and vaccines during the COVID-19 pandemic opponents of the TRIPS waiver also argue that IP is the incentive for innovation and if it is undermined, future innovation will suffer. However, most of the COVID-19 medical innovations, particularly vaccines, are developed with public financing assistance Another argument against the proposed TRIPS waiver is that a waiver would not increase the manufacturing of COVID-19 vaccines one of the significant factors contributing to vaccine inequity is the lack of manufacturing capacity a waiver would be the first but essential step to increase manufacturing capacity worldwide to export COVID-19 vaccine-related products, countries need to ensure that there are no IP restrictions at both ends market for vaccine materials includes consumables, single-use reactors bags, filters, culture media, and vaccine ingredients. Export blockages harm the overall output of the vaccine supply chain. If there is no TRIPS restriction governments and companies will invest in repurposing their facilities. the arguments such as that no other manufacturers can carry out the complex manufacturing process of COVID-19 vaccines and generic manufacturing as that would jeopardise quality, have also been proven wrong in the past Shantha Biotechnics developed its own vaccine at $1 per dose, and the UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund) mass inoculation programme uses this vaccine against Hepatitis B. In 2009, Shantha sold over 120 million doses of vaccines globally. India also produces high-quality generic drugs for HIV/AIDS and cancer treatment and markets them across the globe Indian companies are in the last stage of producing mRNA vaccines Bangladesh and Indonesia claimed that they could manufacture millions of COVID-19 vaccine doses a year if pharmaceutical companies share the know-how Vietnam also said that the country could satisfy COVID-19 vaccine production requirements once it obtains vaccine patents COVID-19 vaccine IPR runs across the entire value chain What is more important here is to share the technical know-how and information such as trade secrets. Therefore, the existing TRIPS flexibilities, such as compulsory and voluntary licensing, are insufficient to address this crisis
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rich nations bought 53 per cent of vaccines low-income countries received 0.3 per cent significant disparity only one per cent in LICs given one dose vaccine rollout slowest massive global inequity exist, with Africa experiencing meagre vaccination LICs waiting until 2025 for vaccinating unvaccinated spawn new mutations, more contagious viruses TRIPS: Barrier IP hinders manufacturing supply of equipment significant factors to vaccine inequity is lack of manufacturing waiver increase capacity to export vaccine-related products no TRIPS governments invest in repurposing facilities arguments manufacturers jeopardise quality wrong Biotechnics developed own vaccine India produces high-quality generic producing mRNA Bangladesh and Indonesia manufacture millions Vietnam could satisfy production share know-how and information compulsory licensing insufficient
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According to Duke Global Health Innovation Center, which monitors COVID-19 vaccine purchases, rich nations representing just 14 per cent of the world population have bought up to 53 per cent of the most promising vaccines so far. As of 4 July 2021, the high-income countries (HICs) purchased more than half (6.16 billion) vaccine doses sold globally. At the same time, the low-income countries (LICs) received only 0.3 per cent of the vaccines produced. The low and middle-income countries (LMICs), which account for 81 per cent of the global adult population, purchased 33 per cent, and COVAX (COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access) has received 13 per cent.10 Many HICs bought enough doses to vaccinate their populations several times over. For instance, Canada procured 10.45 doses per person, while the UK, EU and the US procured 8.18, 6.89, and 4.60 doses per inhabitant, respectively.11 Consequently, there is a significant disparity between HICs and LICs in vaccine administration as well. As of 8 July 2021, 3.32 billion vaccine doses had been administered globally.12 Nonetheless, only one per cent of people in LICs have been given at least one dose. While in HICs almost one in four people have received the vaccine, in LICs, it is one in more than 500. The World Health Organization (WHO) notes that about 90 per cent of African countries will miss the September target to vaccinate at least 10 per cent of their populations as a third wave looms on the continent.13 South Africa, the most affected African country, for instance, has vaccinated less than two per cent of its population of about 59 million. This is in contrast with the US where almost 47.5 per cent of the population of more than 330 million has been fully vaccinated. In Sub-Saharan Africa, vaccine rollout remains the slowest in the world. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), at current rates, by the end of 2021, a massive global inequity will continue to exist, with Africa still experiencing meagre vaccination rates while other parts of the world move much closer to complete vaccination.14 This vaccine inequity is not only morally indefensible but also clinically counter-productive. If this situation prevails, LICs could be waiting until 2025 for vaccinating half of their people. Allowing most of the world’s population to go unvaccinated will also spawn new virus mutations, more contagious viruses leading to a steep rise in COVID-19 cases. Such a scenario could cause twice as many deaths as against distributing them globally, on a priority basis. Preventing this humanitarian catastrophe requires removing all barriers to the production and distribution of vaccines. TRIPS is one such barrier that prevents vaccine production in LMICs and hence its equitable distribution. TRIPS: Barrier to Equitable Health Care Access The opponents of the waiver proposal argue that IPR are not a significant barrier to equitable access to health care, and existing TRIPS flexibilities are sufficient to address the COVID-19 pandemic. However, history suggests the contrary. For instance, when South Africa passed the Medicines and Related Substances Act of 1997 to address the HIV/AIDS public health crisis, nearly 40 of world’s largest and influential pharma companies took the South African government to court over the violation of TRIPS. The Act, which invoked the compulsory licensing provision, allowed South Africa to produce affordable generic drugs.15 The Big Pharma also lobbied developed countries, particularly the US, to put bilateral trade sanctions against South Africa.16 Similarly, when Indian company Cipla decided to provide generic antiretrovirals (ARVs) to the African market at a lower cost, Big Pharma retaliated through patent litigations in Indian and international trade courts and branded Indian drug companies as thieves.17 Another instance was when Swiss company Roche initiated patent infringement proceedings against Cipla’s decision to launch a generic version of cancer drug, “erlotinib”. Though the Delhi High Court initially dismissed Roche's appeal by citing “public interest” and “affordability of medicines,” the continued to pressure the generic pharma companies over IPR. 18 Likewise, Pfizer’s aggressive patenting strategy prevented South Korea in developing pneumonia vaccines for children.19 A recent document by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), or Doctors Without Borders, highlights various instances of how IP hinders manufacturing and supply of diagnostics, medical equipment, treatments and vaccines during the COVID-19 pandemic. For instance, during the peak of the COVID-19 first wave in Europe, Roche rejected a request from the Netherlands to release the recipe of key chemical reagents needed to increase the production of diagnostic kits. Another example was patent holders threatening producers of 3D printing ventilators with patent infringement lawsuits in Italy.20 The MSF also found that patents pose a severe threat to access to affordable versions of newer vaccines.21 The opponents of the TRIPS waiver also argue that IP is the incentive for innovation and if it is undermined, future innovation will suffer. However, most of the COVID-19 medical innovations, particularly vaccines, are developed with public financing assistance. Governments spent billions of dollars for COVID-19 vaccine research. Notably, out of $6.1 billion in investment tracked up to July 2021, 98.12 per cent was public funding.22 The US and Germany are the largest investors in vaccine R&D with $2.2 billion and $1.5 billion funding. Private companies received 94.6 per cent of this funding; Moderna received the highest $956.3 million and Janssen $910.6 million. Moreover, governments also invested $50.9 billion for advance purchase agreements (APAs) as an incentive for vaccine development. A recent IMF working paper also notes that public research institutions were a key driver of the COVID-19 R&D effort—accounting for 70 per cent of all COVID-19 clinical trials globally.23 The argument is that vaccines are developed with the support of substantial public financing, hence there is a public right to the scientific achievements. Moreover, private companies reaped billions in profits from COVID-19 vaccines. One could argue that since the US, Germany and other HICs are spending money, their citizens are entitled to get vaccines first, hence vaccine nationalism is morally defensible. Nonetheless, it is not the case. The TRIPS Agreement includes several provisions which mandates promotion of technology transfer from developed countries to LDCs. For instance, Article 7 states that "the protection and enforcement of IP rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technical knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations."24 Similarly, Article 66.2 also mandates the developed countries to transfer technologies to LDCs to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base. The LMICs opened their markets and amended domestic patent laws favouring developing countries’ products against this promise of technology transfer. Another argument against the proposed TRIPS waiver is that a waiver would not increase the manufacturing of COVID-19 vaccines. Indeed, one of the significant factors contributing to vaccine inequity is the lack of manufacturing capacity in the global south. Further, a TRIPS waiver will not automatically translate into improved manufacturing capacity. However, a waiver would be the first but essential step to increase manufacturing capacity worldwide. For instance, to export COVID-19 vaccine-related products, countries need to ensure that there are no IP restrictions at both ends – exporting and importing. The market for vaccine materials includes consumables, single-use reactors bags, filters, culture media, and vaccine ingredients. Export blockages on raw materials, equipment and finished products harm the overall output of the vaccine supply chain. If there is no TRIPS restriction, more governments and companies will invest in repurposing their facilities. Similarly, the arguments such as that no other manufacturers can carry out the complex manufacturing process of COVID-19 vaccines and generic manufacturing as that would jeopardise quality, have also been proven wrong in the past. For instance, in the early 1990s, when Indian company Shantha Biotechnics approached a Western firm for a technology transfer of Hepatitis B vaccine, the firm responded that “India cannot afford such high technology vaccines… And even if you can afford to buy the technology, your scientists cannot understand recombinant technology in the least.”25 Later, Shantha Biotechnics developed its own vaccine at $1 per dose, and the UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund) mass inoculation programme uses this vaccine against Hepatitis B. In 2009, Shantha sold over 120 million doses of vaccines globally. India also produces high-quality generic drugs for HIV/AIDS and cancer treatment and markets them across the globe. Now, a couple of Indian companies are in the last stage of producing mRNA (Messenger RNA) vaccines.26 Similarly, Bangladesh and Indonesia claimed that they could manufacture millions of COVID-19 vaccine doses a year if pharmaceutical companies share the know-how.27 Recently, Vietnam also said that the country could satisfy COVID-19 vaccine production requirements once it obtains vaccine patents.28 Countries like the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, Cuba, Brazil, Argentina and South Korea have the capacity to produce high-quality vaccines but lack technologies and know-how. However, Africa, Egypt, Morocco, Senegal, South Africa and Tunisia have limited manufacturing capacities, which could also produce COVID-19 vaccines after repurposing. Moreover, COVID-19 vaccine IPR runs across the entire value chain – vaccine development, production, use, etc. A mere patent waiver may not be enough to address the issues related to its production and distribution. What is more important here is to share the technical know-how and information such as trade secrets. Therefore, the existing TRIPS flexibilities, such as compulsory and voluntary licensing, are insufficient to address this crisis. Further, compulsory licensing and the domestic legal procedures it requires is cumbersome and not expedient in a public health crisis like the COVID-19 pandemic. India’s Role in Ensuring Vaccine Equity India's response to COVID-19 at the global level was primarily two-fold. First, its proactive engagements in the regional and international platforms. Second, its policies and programmes to provide therapeutics and vaccines to the world. Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, India has been advocating international cooperation and policy coordination in fighting it. For instance, in April 2020, India co-sponsored a UN resolution that called for fair and equitable access to essential medical supplies and future vaccines to COVID-19. Later, in October 2020, India also put pressure on developed countries with a joint WTO proposal for TRIPS waiver. India’s Vaccine Maitri initiative also aims vaccine equity. As of 29 May 2021, India has supplied 663.698 lakh doses of COVID-19 vaccines to 95 countries. It includes 107.15 lakh doses as a gift to more than 45 countries, 357.92 lakh doses by commercial sales, and 198.628 lakh doses to the COVAX facility.29 The COVAX initiative aims to ensure rapid and equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines for all countries, regardless of their income level. India has decided to supply 10 million doses of the vaccine to Africa and one million to the UN health workers under the COVAX facility. India has also removed the IPR of Covaxin that would help platforms like C-TAP once WHO and developed countries’ regulatory bodies approve the vaccine. If agreed, the waiver would benefit India in many ways. First, more vaccines will help the country to control the pandemic and its recurring waves. Second, it will be a boost to India's pharma industry, particularly the generic medicine industry. According to the Biotechnology Innovation Organization, 834 unique active compounds are involved in the current R&D of COVID-19 therapeutics, vaccines, and diagnostics. It means that thousands of new patents are awaited, and that will hinder India's ability to produce COVID-19 related medical products. Only through a waiver, this challenge can be addressed. Similarly, scientists note that mRNA is the future of vaccine technology. However, manufacturing mRNA vaccines involves complex processes and procedures. Only a very few Indian manufacturers have access to this technology; however, that too is limited. Once Indian companies have access to mRNA technology, it will help country’s generic medicine industry and boost India’s economy. Therefore, even if the WTO agrees on a waiver for a period shorter than proposed, India should accept it. In addition, mRNA vaccines can be produced in lesser time compared to the traditional vaccines. While traditional vaccines’ production takes four to five months, mRNA needs only six to eight weeks. Access to this technology will be vital for India in expediting the fight against COVID-19 and future pandemics. Finally, a waiver may strengthen India's diplomatic soft power. At present, what hinders India's Vaccine Maitri initiative is the scarcity of vaccines at home. On the other hand, China is increasing its standing in Africa, South America and the Pacific through vaccine diplomacy. The WHO approval of the Chinese vaccines and lack of access to vaccines by most developing countries, opens up huge space for China to do its vaccine diplomacy. Here, India should convince its Quad partners, particularly Australia and Japan, who oppose the waiver that vaccine production in developing countries through TRIPS waiver will enable the grouping to deliver its pledged billion doses of COVID-19 vaccine in the Indo-Pacific region. In short, the proposed waiver, if agreed, will help India in addressing the public health crisis by producing more vaccines and distributing them at home; economically, by boosting its generic pharmaceutical industry, and diplomatically, providing vaccines to the developing and least-developed countries. Therefore, India should use all available means and methods, from trade-offs to pressurising, to make the waiver happen.
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<h4>Only the plan can solve <u>covid access</u> – inequalities <u>heighten</u> the risk of <u>mutations</u> and <u>uneven development</u> – neg objections <u>miss the boat</u>.</h4><p><strong>Kumar 21</strong> [Rajeesh; Associate Fellow at the Institute, currently working on a project titled “Emerging Powers and the Future of Global Governance: India and International Institutions.” He has PhD in International Organization from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Prior to joining MP-IDSA in 2016, he taught at JamiaMilliaIslamia, New Delhi (2010-11& 2015-16) and University of Calicut, Kerala (2007-08). His areas of research interest are International Organizations, India and Multilateralism, Global Governance, and International Humanitarian Law. He is the co-editor of two books;Eurozone Crisis and the Future of Europe: Political Economy of Further Integration and Governance (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); and Islam, Islamist Movements and Democracy in the Middle East: Challenges, Opportunities and Responses (Delhi: Global Vision Publishing, 2013); “WTO TRIPS Waiver and COVID-19 Vaccine Equity,” IDSA Issue Briefs; https://idsa.in/issuebrief/wto-trips-waiver-covid-vaccine-rkumar-120721] Justin</p><p>According to Duke Global Health Innovation Center, which monitors COVID-19 vaccine purchases, <u><strong><mark>rich nations</mark> representing</strong> just 14 per cent of the world population have <mark>bought</mark> up to <strong><mark>53 per cent of</mark> the most promising <mark>vaccines</strong></mark> so far</u>. As of 4 July 2021, the <u><strong>high-income countries</strong> (HICs) purchased more than half (6.16 billion) vaccine doses sold globally</u>. At the same time, <u>the <mark>low-income countries</mark> (<strong>LICs</strong>) <mark>received</mark> only <mark>0.3 per cent</mark> of the vaccines produced. The low and middle-income countries (LMICs), which account for <strong>81 per cent of the global adult population</strong>, purchased <strong>33 per cent</u></strong>, and COVAX (COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access) has received 13 per cent.10 Many HICs bought enough doses to vaccinate their populations several times over. For instance, Canada procured 10.45 doses per person, while the UK, EU and the US procured 8.18, 6.89, and 4.60 doses per inhabitant, respectively.11 Consequently, <u>there is a <strong><mark>significant disparity</mark> between HICs and LICs</strong> in vaccine administration as well. As of 8 July 2021, <strong>3.32 billion vaccine doses had been administered globally</u></strong>.12 Nonetheless, <u><mark>only <strong>one per cent</strong></mark> of people <mark>in LICs</mark> have been <mark>given</mark> at least <strong><mark>one dose</strong></mark>. While in HICs almost one in four people have received the vaccine</u>, in LICs, it is one in more than 500. The World Health Organization (WHO) notes that about 90 per cent of African countries will miss the September target to vaccinate at least 10 per cent of their populations as a third wave looms on the continent.13 South Africa, the most affected African country, for instance, has vaccinated less than two per cent of its population of about 59 million. This is in contrast with the US where almost 47.5 per cent of the population of more than 330 million has been fully vaccinated. <u>In Sub-Saharan Africa, <strong><mark>vaccine rollout</mark> remains the <mark>slowest</mark> in the world</strong>. According to the International Monetary Fund</u> (IMF), at current rates, by the end of 2021, a <u><mark>massive <strong>global inequity</strong></mark> will continue to <mark>exist, with Africa</mark> still <strong><mark>experiencing meagre vaccination</strong></mark> rates while other parts of the world move much closer to complete vaccination.14 This vaccine inequity is not only <strong>morally indefensible</strong> but also <strong>clinically counter-productive</strong>. If this situation prevails, <mark>LICs</mark> could be <strong><mark>waiting until 2025 for vaccinating</strong></mark> half of their people. Allowing most of the world’s population to go <mark>unvaccinated</mark> will also <mark>spawn <strong>new</mark> virus <mark>mutations</strong>, more <strong>contagious viruses</strong></mark> leading to a steep rise in COVID-19 cases</u>. Such a scenario could cause twice as many deaths as against distributing them globally, on a priority basis. Preventing this humanitarian catastrophe requires removing all barriers to the production and distribution of vaccines. TRIPS is one such barrier that prevents vaccine production in LMICs and hence its equitable distribution. <u><mark>TRIPS: <strong>Barrier</mark> to Equitable Health Care Access</strong> The opponents of the waiver proposal argue that IPR are not a significant barrier to equitable access to health care, and existing TRIPS flexibilities are sufficient to address the COVID-19 pandemic</u>. However, <u><strong>history suggests the contrary</u></strong>. For instance, when South Africa passed the Medicines and Related Substances Act of 1997 to address the HIV/AIDS public health crisis, <u>nearly <strong>40 of world’s largest and influential pharma companies took the South African government to court over the violation of TRIPS</u></strong>. The Act, which invoked the compulsory licensing provision, allowed South Africa to produce affordable generic drugs.15 <u>The Big Pharma also lobbied developed countries, particularly the US, to put bilateral <strong>trade sanctions against South Africa</u></strong>.16 Similarly, <u>when Indian company Cipla decided to provide generic antiretrovirals (ARVs) to the African market at a lower cost, Big Pharma retaliated through <strong>patent litigations in Indian and international trade courts and branded Indian drug companies as thieves</u></strong>.17 Another instance was when Swiss company Roche initiated patent infringement proceedings against Cipla’s decision to launch a generic version of cancer drug, “erlotinib”. Though the Delhi High Court initially dismissed Roche's appeal by citing “public interest” and “affordability of medicines,” the continued to pressure the generic pharma companies over IPR. 18 Likewise, Pfizer’s aggressive patenting strategy prevented South Korea in developing pneumonia vaccines for children.19 A recent document by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), or Doctors Without Borders, highlights various instances of how <u><mark>IP <strong>hinders manufacturing</mark> and <mark>supply of</mark> diagnostics, medical <mark>equipment</strong></mark>, <strong>treatments</strong> and <strong>vaccines</strong> during the COVID-19 pandemic</u>. For instance, during the peak of the COVID-19 first wave in Europe, Roche rejected a request from the Netherlands to release the recipe of key chemical reagents needed to increase the production of diagnostic kits. Another example was patent holders threatening producers of 3D printing ventilators with patent infringement lawsuits in Italy.20 The MSF also found that patents pose a severe threat to access to affordable versions of newer vaccines.21 The <u>opponents of the TRIPS waiver also argue that IP is the <strong>incentive for innovation and if it is undermined</strong>, future innovation will <strong>suffer</strong>. However, most of the COVID-19 <strong>medical innovations</strong>, particularly vaccines, are developed with <strong>public financing assistance</u></strong>. Governments spent billions of dollars for COVID-19 vaccine research. Notably, out of $6.1 billion in investment tracked up to July 2021, 98.12 per cent was public funding.22 The US and Germany are the largest investors in vaccine R&D with $2.2 billion and $1.5 billion funding. Private companies received 94.6 per cent of this funding; Moderna received the highest $956.3 million and Janssen $910.6 million. Moreover, governments also invested $50.9 billion for advance purchase agreements (APAs) as an incentive for vaccine development. A recent IMF working paper also notes that public research institutions were a key driver of the COVID-19 R&D effort—accounting for 70 per cent of all COVID-19 clinical trials globally.23 The argument is that vaccines are developed with the support of substantial public financing, hence there is a public right to the scientific achievements. Moreover, private companies reaped billions in profits from COVID-19 vaccines. One could argue that since the US, Germany and other HICs are spending money, their citizens are entitled to get vaccines first, hence vaccine nationalism is morally defensible. Nonetheless, it is not the case. The TRIPS Agreement includes several provisions which mandates promotion of technology transfer from developed countries to LDCs. For instance, Article 7 states that "the protection and enforcement of IP rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technical knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations."24 Similarly, Article 66.2 also mandates the developed countries to transfer technologies to LDCs to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base. The LMICs opened their markets and amended domestic patent laws favouring developing countries’ products against this promise of technology transfer. <u>Another argument against the proposed TRIPS waiver is that a waiver would not increase the manufacturing of COVID-19 vaccines</u>. Indeed, <u>one of the <strong><mark>significant factors</mark> contributing <mark>to vaccine inequity</strong> is </mark>the <strong><mark>lack of manufacturing</mark> capacity</u></strong> in the global south. Further, a TRIPS waiver will not automatically translate into improved manufacturing capacity. However, <u>a <mark>waiver</mark> would be the first but essential step to <strong><mark>increase</mark> manufacturing <mark>capacity</strong></mark> worldwide</u>. For instance, <u><mark>to <strong>export</mark> COVID-19 <mark>vaccine-related products</strong></mark>, countries need to ensure that there are no IP restrictions at both ends</u> – exporting and importing. The <u>market for vaccine materials includes consumables, single-use reactors bags, filters, culture media, and vaccine ingredients. Export blockages</u> on raw materials, equipment and finished products <u>harm the overall output of the vaccine supply chain. If there is <mark>no TRIPS</mark> restriction</u>, more <u><mark>governments</mark> and companies will <mark>invest in <strong>repurposing</mark> their <mark>facilities</mark>. </u></strong>Similarly, <u>the <mark>arguments</mark> such as that <strong>no other <mark>manufacturers</mark> can carry out the complex manufacturing</strong> <strong>process</strong> of COVID-19 vaccines and generic manufacturing as that would <mark>jeopardise quality</mark>, have also been proven <strong><mark>wrong</strong></mark> in the past</u>. For instance, in the early 1990s, when Indian company Shantha Biotechnics approached a Western firm for a technology transfer of Hepatitis B vaccine, the firm responded that “India cannot afford such high technology vaccines… And even if you can afford to buy the technology, your scientists cannot understand recombinant technology in the least.”25 Later, <u>Shantha <mark>Biotechnics <strong>developed</mark> its <mark>own vaccine</mark> at $1 per dose</strong>, and the UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund) mass inoculation programme uses this vaccine against Hepatitis B. In 2009, Shantha sold over 120 million doses of vaccines globally. <mark>India</mark> also <mark>produces <strong>high-quality generic</mark> drugs for HIV/AIDS and cancer treatment</strong> and markets them across the globe</u>. Now, a couple of <u>Indian companies are in the <strong>last stage of <mark>producing mRNA</u></strong></mark> (Messenger RNA) <u>vaccines</u>.26 Similarly, <u><mark>Bangladesh and Indonesia</mark> claimed that they could <strong><mark>manufacture millions</mark> of COVID-19 vaccine doses a year</strong> if pharmaceutical companies share the know-how</u>.27 Recently, <u><mark>Vietnam</mark> also said that the country <mark>could <strong>satisfy</mark> COVID-19 vaccine <mark>production</strong></mark> requirements once it obtains vaccine patents</u>.28 Countries like the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, Cuba, Brazil, Argentina and South Korea have the capacity to produce high-quality vaccines but lack technologies and know-how. However, Africa, Egypt, Morocco, Senegal, South Africa and Tunisia have limited manufacturing capacities, which could also produce COVID-19 vaccines after repurposing. Moreover, <u>COVID-19 vaccine IPR runs <strong>across the entire value chain</u></strong> – vaccine development, production, use, etc. A mere patent waiver may not be enough to address the issues related to its production and distribution. <u>What is more important here is to <mark>share</mark> the technical <strong><mark>know-how and information</strong></mark> such as trade secrets. Therefore, the existing TRIPS flexibilities, such as <strong><mark>compulsory</mark> and voluntary <mark>licensing</mark>, are <mark>insufficient</strong></mark> to address this crisis</u>. Further, compulsory licensing and the domestic legal procedures it requires is cumbersome and not expedient in a public health crisis like the COVID-19 pandemic. India’s Role in Ensuring Vaccine Equity India's response to COVID-19 at the global level was primarily two-fold. First, its proactive engagements in the regional and international platforms. Second, its policies and programmes to provide therapeutics and vaccines to the world. Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, India has been advocating international cooperation and policy coordination in fighting it. For instance, in April 2020, India co-sponsored a UN resolution that called for fair and equitable access to essential medical supplies and future vaccines to COVID-19. Later, in October 2020, India also put pressure on developed countries with a joint WTO proposal for TRIPS waiver. India’s Vaccine Maitri initiative also aims vaccine equity. As of 29 May 2021, India has supplied 663.698 lakh doses of COVID-19 vaccines to 95 countries. It includes 107.15 lakh doses as a gift to more than 45 countries, 357.92 lakh doses by commercial sales, and 198.628 lakh doses to the COVAX facility.29 The COVAX initiative aims to ensure rapid and equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines for all countries, regardless of their income level. India has decided to supply 10 million doses of the vaccine to Africa and one million to the UN health workers under the COVAX facility. India has also removed the IPR of Covaxin that would help platforms like C-TAP once WHO and developed countries’ regulatory bodies approve the vaccine. If agreed, the waiver would benefit India in many ways. First, more vaccines will help the country to control the pandemic and its recurring waves. Second, it will be a boost to India's pharma industry, particularly the generic medicine industry. According to the Biotechnology Innovation Organization, 834 unique active compounds are involved in the current R&D of COVID-19 therapeutics, vaccines, and diagnostics. It means that thousands of new patents are awaited, and that will hinder India's ability to produce COVID-19 related medical products. Only through a waiver, this challenge can be addressed. Similarly, scientists note that mRNA is the future of vaccine technology. However, manufacturing mRNA vaccines involves complex processes and procedures. Only a very few Indian manufacturers have access to this technology; however, that too is limited. Once Indian companies have access to mRNA technology, it will help country’s generic medicine industry and boost India’s economy. Therefore, even if the WTO agrees on a waiver for a period shorter than proposed, India should accept it. In addition, mRNA vaccines can be produced in lesser time compared to the traditional vaccines. While traditional vaccines’ production takes four to five months, mRNA needs only six to eight weeks. Access to this technology will be vital for India in expediting the fight against COVID-19 and future pandemics. Finally, a waiver may strengthen India's diplomatic soft power. At present, what hinders India's Vaccine Maitri initiative is the scarcity of vaccines at home. On the other hand, China is increasing its standing in Africa, South America and the Pacific through vaccine diplomacy. The WHO approval of the Chinese vaccines and lack of access to vaccines by most developing countries, opens up huge space for China to do its vaccine diplomacy. Here, India should convince its Quad partners, particularly Australia and Japan, who oppose the waiver that vaccine production in developing countries through TRIPS waiver will enable the grouping to deliver its pledged billion doses of COVID-19 vaccine in the Indo-Pacific region. In short, the proposed waiver, if agreed, will help India in addressing the public health crisis by producing more vaccines and distributing them at home; economically, by boosting its generic pharmaceutical industry, and diplomatically, providing vaccines to the developing and least-developed countries. Therefore, India should use all available means and methods, from trade-offs to pressurising, to make the waiver happen.</p>
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Advantage
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./documents/hsld21/StrakeJesuit/St/Strake%20Jesuit-Stuckert-Aff-Loyola%20Invitational-Round3.docx
| 900,585 |
A
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Loyola Invitational
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3
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Harvard-Westlake IC
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Tej Gedela
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1AC - Ripstein
1N - Anti-ethics
1AR - All
2NR - All
2AR - All
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hsld21/StrakeJesuit/St/Strake%20Jesuit-Stuckert-Aff-Loyola%20Invitational-Round3.docx
| null | 75,375 |
MiSt
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Strake Jesuit MiSt
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Mi.....
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St.....
| null | null | 25,176 |
StrakeJesuit
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Strake Jesuit
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TX
| null | 1,029 |
hsld21
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HS LD 2021-22
| 2,021 |
ld
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hs
| 1 |
3,865,993 |
‘Prohibiting’ a practice requires per se illegality.
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Mendelsohn 6
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Lee Mendelsohn 6, Director at Edward Nathan, “KIPA Conduct Amounts to Price Fixing”, Business Day (South Africa), 6/12/2006, Lexis
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The first step in competition law analysis is to define
The prohibition is one of "per se" prohibition is automatic and absolute and the fixing cannot be justified on the basis of any technological, efficiency or other procompetitive gains that could outweigh the potential anticompetitive effect of the fixing of the price or trading condition
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first step in competition law define
prohibition is "per se" automatic absolute and not justified on gains that outweigh anticompetitive effect
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The first step in any competition law analysis is to define the relevant market. There are two components to an analysis of the relevant market, namely the relevant product market and the geographic market.
The relevant product market consists of those products and services that operate as a competitive constraint on the behaviour of the suppliers of those products and/or services.
The relevant product market is determined by ascertaining whether a small but significant non-transient increase in pricing of the product in question would cause buyers to substitute the product with another product or would cause suppliers of other products to begin producing the product in question.
The relevant geographic market is determined by ascertaining whether a small but significant non-transient increase in pricing of the product in question would cause buyers to purchase the product from other geographic areas, alternatively suppliers of the product in other geographic areas to supply those products into the area in question.
For the purposes of this case study, we are instructed to accept that each medical speciality constitutes a relevant product market and that the relevant geographic market for each of them is Kleindorpie.
The Competition Act provides that "an agreement between, or concerted practice by, firms, or a decision by an association of firms, is prohibited if it is between parties in a horizontal relationship and if … it involves … directly or indirectly fixing a purchase or selling price or any other trading condition".
An "agreement" is defined as including a contract, arrangement or understanding, whether or not legally enforceable. The term agreement is very widely defined. A "horizontal relationship" is defined as a "relationship between competitors".
The prohibition on the fixing of a purchase or selling price or any other trading condition is one of the so-called "per se" prohibitions which are included in our Competition Act. The prohibition is automatic and absolute and the fixing of prices or other trading condition cannot be justified on the basis of any technological, efficiency or other procompetitive gains that could outweigh the potential anticompetitive effect of the fixing of the price or trading condition. If the capitation plan of KIPA falls within the restrictive horizontal practice prohibiting price fixing and the fixing of other trading conditions, such practice will be a contravention of the act.
| 2,466 |
<h4>‘Prohibiting’ a practice requires <u>per se</u> illegality.</h4><p>Lee <strong>Mendelsohn 6</strong>, Director at Edward Nathan, “KIPA Conduct Amounts to Price Fixing”, Business Day (South Africa), 6/12/2006, Lexis</p><p><u><strong>The <mark>first step in</u></strong></mark> any <u><strong><mark>competition law</mark> analysis is to <mark>define</u></strong></mark> the relevant market. There are two components to an analysis of the relevant market, namely the relevant product market and the geographic market.</p><p>The relevant product market consists of those products and services that operate as a competitive constraint on the behaviour of the suppliers of those products and/or services.</p><p>The relevant product market is determined by ascertaining whether a small but significant non-transient increase in pricing of the product in question would cause buyers to substitute the product with another product or would cause suppliers of other products to begin producing the product in question.</p><p>The relevant geographic market is determined by ascertaining whether a small but significant non-transient increase in pricing of the product in question would cause buyers to purchase the product from other geographic areas, alternatively suppliers of the product in other geographic areas to supply those products into the area in question.</p><p>For the purposes of this case study, we are instructed to accept that each medical speciality constitutes a relevant product market and that the relevant geographic market for each of them is Kleindorpie.</p><p>The Competition Act provides that "an agreement between, or concerted practice by, firms, or a decision by an association of firms, is prohibited if it is between parties in a horizontal relationship and if … it involves … directly or indirectly fixing a purchase or selling price or any other trading condition".</p><p>An "agreement" is defined as including a contract, arrangement or understanding, whether or not legally enforceable. The term agreement is very widely defined. A "horizontal relationship" is defined as a "relationship between competitors".</p><p><u><strong>The <mark>prohibition</u></strong></mark> on the fixing of a purchase or selling price or any other trading condition <u><strong><mark>is</mark> one of</u></strong> the so-called <u><strong><mark>"per se"</u></strong></mark> prohibitions which are included in our Competition Act. The <u><strong>prohibition is <mark>automatic</mark> and <mark>absolute and</mark> the fixing</u></strong> of prices or other trading condition <u><strong>can<mark>not</mark> be <mark>justified on </mark>the basis of any technological, efficiency or other procompetitive <mark>gains that</mark> could <mark>outweigh</mark> the potential <mark>anticompetitive effect</mark> of the fixing of the price or trading condition</u></strong>. If the capitation plan of KIPA falls within the restrictive horizontal practice prohibiting price fixing and the fixing of other trading conditions, such practice will be a contravention of the act.</p>
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1NC
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1NC OFF
| 482,912 | 91 | 128,862 |
./documents/ndtceda21/Georgia/MrVa/Georgia-Mruz-Vale-Neg-National%20Debate%20Tournament-Round4.docx
| 624,078 |
N
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National Debate Tournament
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4
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Georgetown GL
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dill, shaikh, smelko
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1AC - Innovation
1NC - T per Se T Scope Cap K CP new agency CP policy memorandum China Bill DA Clog DA ConCon DA DOJ DA
2NC -
1NR -
2NR -
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ndtceda21/Georgia/MrVa/Georgia-Mruz-Vale-Neg-National%20Debate%20Tournament-Round4.docx
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MrVa
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Georgia MrVa
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Ja.....
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Mr.....
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Va.....
| 19,382 |
Georgia
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Georgia
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ndtceda21
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NDT/CEDA 2021-22
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cx
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college
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1,187,691 |
Mismanagement spills up---border water is a unique sticking point.
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Schlanger 18
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Zoë Schlanger 18, environmental reporter at Quartz, “There’s a time bomb for US-Mexico relations ticking underground,” 8/20/18, https://qz.com/1353839/theres-a-time-bomb-for-us-mexico-relations-ticking-underground/
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more than a dozen underground aquifers crisscross the national boundaries. They might be the only sources of water the region will have left when the Rio Grande, hit by a one-two punch of climate change and a booming population, inevitably dries up. And yet there is no binational agreement for all this shared groundwater.
Meanwhile, the US and Mexico barely even know about their shared groundwater. The two nations only officially recognize four cross-border aquifers (pdf). But Rosario Sanchez, a Texas A&M University hydrologist who has spent her academic life seeking out transboundary aquifers that aren’t yet on maps, has identified 36. Of those, 15 are shared between Texas and Mexico.
We don’t notice them until something goes wrong. This is how it goes for groundwater. We stick our straw in and drink up until it runs out, or the land sinks beneath our feet, and we can no longer pretend the source of our water is magically unlimited and reliable.
It’s a crisis that has, by now, been unfolding in the background groundwater management ranks low among the priorities of both federal governments groundwater resources are being overexploited as populations and industries pump with little regard for sustainability or transboundary consequences the viability of the region’s communities, natural environment, and economic growth are threatened with stagnation and may falter. And no one, at least on the federal level, is doing anything about it.
Groundwater depletion will threaten communities new border residents will need a lot more water, just when the river starts truly struggling to meet demand. That will likely spark a run on groundwater. the neglected resource will become a major geopolitical issue in the region.
What Mexico chose to do with its border groundwater would change the amount of water available in South Texas—and without a treaty, that could get diplomatically messy, fast.
could become a matter of international security
if a Texas city blamed Mexico for depleting an aquifer, it would raise questions neither government is prepared to answer.
federal agencies are supposed to give us something by law—they give us the absolute minimum
In Mexico, groundwater is a very sensitive topic. It’s kind of an unexplainable fear.
At a recent water conference, she struck up a conversation with representatives from a Mexico-based company currently using a lot of water from the Allende-Piedras Negras. She walked away with data for “nine or 10 wells,” she says. “We were lucky.” Companies using water in the desert have come under fire in Mexico lately, and so Sanchez told this story on the condition that the company remain anonymous. Getting the company to share its well data was hard enough.
touchiness has to do with the history between the US and Mexico US farmers have accused Mexican officials of not releasing the water from the Rio Grande they believe they are owed under the 1944 treaty. The same antagonism over groundwater could easily arise if the governments of the US and Mexico determine that the water on either side of the border actually comes from shared aquifers.
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aquifers crisscross the boundaries yet there is no binational agreement for this
It’s a crisis in the background groundwater ranks low among priorities
when the river starts struggling to meet demand. That will spark a run on groundwater
change the water available in Texas without a treaty could get diplomatically messy
a matter of international security
agencies are supposed to give us something they give us the minimum.”
groundwater is very sensitive
touchiness has to do with the history US accused Mexican officials of not releasing water they are owed antagonism over groundwater could arise
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All along the 1,250 miles of border between Texas and Mexico, hidden under hundreds of feet of soil and rock, lie more than a dozen underground aquifers—areas of permeable earth that hold water—that crisscross the national boundaries. They might be the only sources of water the region will have left when the Rio Grande, hit by a one-two punch of climate change and a booming population, inevitably dries up. And yet there is no binational agreement for all this shared groundwater.
Texas and Mexico have elaborate sharing agreements for every acre-foot of water that flows through the Rio Grande, which makes sense, especially since the river is dwindling. Making sure both sides are upholding those agreements while the region rides through its regular whiplash of droughts and floods takes up most of the bandwidth of water officials on both sides.
Meanwhile, the US and Mexico barely even know about their shared groundwater. The two nations only officially recognize four cross-border aquifers (pdf). But Rosario Sanchez, a Texas A&M University hydrologist who has spent her academic life seeking out transboundary aquifers that aren’t yet on maps, has identified 36. Of those, 15 are shared between Texas and Mexico.
This is how it goes with humans and the invisible forces that enable—or disable—our lives. We don’t notice them until something goes wrong. This is how it goes for groundwater. We stick our straw in and drink up until it runs out, or the land sinks beneath our feet, and we can no longer pretend the source of our water is magically unlimited and reliable.
It’s a crisis that has, by now, been unfolding in the background for a while. “[C]ompared to the issues of illegal immigration, drug violence, economic trade, and other border and non-border issues, groundwater management ranks relatively low among the priorities of both federal governments,” wrote Gabriel Eckstein, a water-law scholar at Texas A&M School of Law, in a 2012 paper (pdf). “As a result, the [Rio Grande Valley region’s] groundwater resources are being overexploited on both frontiers as populations and industries pump with little regard for sustainability or transboundary consequences…. Ultimately, the viability of the region’s communities, natural environment, and economic growth are threatened with stagnation and may falter. And no one, at least on the federal level, is doing anything about it.”
Groundwater depletion will threaten communities on both sides before long, says Sanchez. Temperatures in the Rio Grande Valley are rising, and droughts are expected to become (pdf) more frequent. Surface water—the water from streams, lakes, and other above-ground sources—in the region is vanishing. In 15 or 20 years, Sanchez says, the Rio Grande will be a pitiful stream. Meanwhile, the population in the Rio Grande Valley is projected to more than double by 2060 (pdf). All those new border residents will need a lot more water, just when the river starts truly struggling to meet demand. That will likely spark a run on groundwater. Sanchez predicts the neglected resource will become a major geopolitical issue in the region.
Sanchez is from Saltillo, the capital of Coahuila, an enormous Mexican border state that kisses the Texas frontier from Big Bend in West Texas down to Laredo, more than 300 miles to the southeast. She moved to the US in 2000 while working for the Mexican foreign service, and to Texas in 2006, to begin her PhD at Texas A&M. At 41, she’s spent almost half her life in the US. She understands this is an issue for both sides. “Very few people have been able to acknowledge how risky it is not to know what is going on with groundwater on the border,” she says. “Nobody actually pays attention to it.”
As far back as 1973, the International Boundary and Water Commission, a joint US-Mexico body that governs border water, added a clause to their water-sharing agreement that acknowledged a need for groundwater rules that both countries could abide. But that’s where the negotiating stopped. The US government has known since at least 2013 the lower Rio Grande basin is on track to run out of water in the coming decades, but no binational agreement governing groundwater has ever materialized.
Aquifer maps on both sides “end” at the border. Academics in the water world call this “blank map syndrome.” (Even if you tried to put maps used by the US and Mexico together, the aquifers would look like mismatched puzzle pieces; they don’t line up, probably due to a lack of data about where, exactly, they are.) Everyone knows the groundwater is shared by both nations, but neither side wants to put the aquifers on a unified map for both sides to sign off on. Doing so would trigger hard conversations about who they belong to, who is using more than their share, and how to split the water up. It would certainly mean changing laws, or, at least, their enforcement, on both sides.
On the Mexican side, water is controlled by the federal government, and “they have all kinds of good regulations on the books, but they’re not enforced,” Eckstein says. Within Texas, the “rule of capture”—if you can pump it, it’s yours—is a powerful concept. Imposing strict limits on the rule of capture would almost certainly trigger legal action. “In Texas, if you change the game, you are taking private property away from citizens, which invokes the Takings Clause, both in the Texas Constitution and the US Constitution,” Eckstein says. “It’s going to get litigated like heck. It’s going to be a mess.”
Transboundary aquifers are the “lifeblood of nearly every border village and population,” as Eckstein puts it, and yet the people in charge of border policies often pretend they don’t exist. As the region heats up and fills up, nothing could be a more short-sighted approach.
Approaching College Station from the west, the Texas A&M campus appears suddenly, rising out of an otherwise flat plane like it came into view in a video game. The buildings look new in an unsullied-office-park way: tan structures sprinkled among freshly-painted parking lots, garnished by evenly-spaced saplings throughout, and an athletic facility off to one side.
In the back of the Texas A&M agricultural sciences building, a windowless office serves as the headquarters for the only research project with a chance at convincing the US and Mexico to recognize just how many aquifers they really share. On an afternoon in March, Rosario Sanchez, in a red sweater, sat at one desk in the small room, going over a graduate student’s research project. Beside her, Laura Rodriguez was hand-digitizing old oil-well maps, the best shot we have at locating the groundwater systems underneath the US-Mexico border.
Drilling into the earth to find the borders of an aquifer would be astronomically expensive, and impractical—the hydrogeological equivalent of finding a needle in a haystack. In a previous life, Rodriguez worked in the oil industry, on teams using sensors to determine how close to aquifers her employers could drill for oil without damaging the local water supply. Now, she relies on those oil well-maps to pinpoint groundwater.
When petroleum engineers search for potential pockets of underground oil, they stick electric probes down a borehole. Each geologic formation has its own unique response to the electric charge, a “signature” that helps engineers decipher and translate the data into a vertical map indicating rock formations and whether oil, gas, or water lie between them.
Oil prospectors are only interested in the water inasmuch as they need to know how to avoid it. But Rodriguez wants to know about the water itself. That afternoon, her desktop computer displayed a PDF scan of an aging piece of paper, bisected vertically by a jagged line, like a readout from an EKG machine. It was an electric-probe map from 1962, taken just outside the Texas border town of Eagle Pass, in Maverick County, about 140 miles southwest of San Antonio. Along the jagged line were pencil marks designating different geologic formations the probe had passed through.
Deciphering the meaning of the esoteric marks found on these old oil-well maps is a perpetual project for Rodriguez. The maps date back to the 1940s, so marks are faded, and some geologists had bad handwriting. The acronyms they jotted down are gibberish—unless you’re already versed in the names of Texas geological formations. “AC, this means Austin Chalk. Austin Chalk is a clay. DR—DR is for the Davis River formation,” Rodriguez said as she pointed to notations on the map. Each type of rock tells her something about where aquifers begin and end. By piecing together dozens of these maps side by side, she’s able to coax out a picture of a hidden aquifer.
In another electric-probe map from Maverick County, Rodriguez found a slice of the Allende-Piedras Negras aquifer. It’s well-known in northern Mexico—some 100,000 acre-feet of water a year are pumped out of it to support vast areas of agriculture and the lives of 300,000 people in the Mexican state of Coahuila. But in Texas, it’s virtually unknown. The aquifer creeps into Maverick and Kinney counties, but, according to Sanchez, people with water wells in those regions tend to presume they’re just tapping into small, local supplies, pockets of groundwater that are too small even to have a formal name, or to appear on an aquifer map. And yet here was the Allende-Piedras Negras, in the probe maps, making an appearance in Texas. Sanchez and Rodriguez recently published a paper showing that the Allende-Piedras Negras aquifer extends into Texas, underlying several South Texas counties. Another border-crossing aquifer. It was like finding an oasis hidden in plain sight.
What would happen if the Allende-Piedras Negras aquifer was recognized as transboundary? For starters, a major water-thirsty project like the Mexican government’s plans for hydraulic fracturing in Coahuila—which news reports say will use millions of gallons of water pumped from the aquifer—could become an international story, rather than a domestic one. What Mexico chose to do with its border groundwater would change the amount of water available in South Texas—and without a treaty, that could get diplomatically messy, fast.
In that same vein, beer brewing could become a matter of international security. In 2016, Constellation Brands, the US-owned beer, wine and spirits giant that makes Corona, Modelo, Pacifico, and Victoria beers in Nava, Coahuila, for export to the US, was the center of a controversy over extraction from the Allende-Piedras Negras aquifer. The nearby town of Zaragoza was in the grips of a water shortage so dire that household taps were running dry, and Zaragoza’s mayor accused the brewery of exacerbating the crisis. “We’re worried because we’re already being impacted by this extraction of 1,200 liters of water per second” by the brewery, the mayor told the Guardian at the time. “It’s contradictory that while Constellation Brands has industrial amounts of water to make beer, the municipality of Zaragoza doesn’t have 100 liters [per second] of water to give people to drink or use in their homes.”
Constellation Brands refutes the claim that they were at fault for the shortages, saying their business amounts to only 1% of the water taken each year from the aquifer. “This situation has been misrepresented in the media, and it is very important for people to understand,” says Constellation spokesperson Alicia Nestle. “If you look at subsequent coverage of the issue in Zaragoza, you will see that the governor of Coahuila actually came out in support of our company, clarifying that the issue had nothing to do with our brewery operations.”
In any case, the story is a case study of the sort of scenario that could present intractable geopolitical challenges in the coming years. The brewery sits less than 30 miles south of Eagle Pass, Texas. Right now, Eagle Pass, in Maverick County, draws most of its water from the Rio Grande. But if the Rio Grande dries out, as climate scientists and water planners predict, the town will have to turn to groundwater. Already, the Texas State Water Plan calls for investment in new groundwater infrastructure to keep Maverick County afloat in the coming decades.
In the future, if a Texas city blamed Mexico for depleting an aquifer, it would raise questions neither government is prepared to answer.
The first step toward avoiding conflict is basic science. Where does groundwater exist, how much is there, and how much is being pumped already? Once Rodriguez finds the structural formation using the oil maps, Sanchez starts negotiating for data. She identifies existing water wells, determines if the water is salty or fresh, and calculates how much people are pumping—all clues to the health of the aquifer. In Texas, in most cases, she can simply ask the local irrigation districts for that data. On the other side of the border, it’s not so easy. Everything is centralized in the federal government. “In Mexico,” she says, “the federal agencies are supposed to give us something by law—they give us the absolute minimum.”
So instead she knocks on doors. “I cannot say it’s safe. I don’t go out after 7pm.” Shootings and kidnappings are common in the region, and in many areas, drug cartels control local police and government officials. Sanchez never knows who actually owns the land she’s on. “There could be wells belonging to—I’ll say, organizations beyond the law.”
“I don’t feel at risk,” she says. “It’s easier for me, because I’m from the region.” But she’s still doing something she wouldn’t ask of anyone else.
Even when safety is less of a concern, data negotiation is a subtle sport. “I can’t tell you how it’s done, because there’s not a ‘how.’ It’s complicated. Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn’t,” Sanchez says.
She’s learned that there’s something ineffable about sharing water-well data that provokes anxiety in people. “In Mexico, groundwater is a very sensitive topic. Particularly data. Particularly on the border,” she says. “Nobody has been able to explain to me why it is so sensitive. It’s kind of an unexplainable fear.” She tries her best to make well owners feel safe, whether they’re individuals, a big corporation, or the Mexican government.
At a recent water conference, she struck up a conversation with representatives from a Mexico-based company currently using a lot of water from the Allende-Piedras Negras. She walked away with data for “nine or 10 wells,” she says. “We were lucky.” Companies using water in the desert have come under fire in Mexico lately, and so Sanchez told this story on the condition that the company remain anonymous. Getting the company to share its well data was hard enough.
If she had to guess, she says, the touchiness “probably has to do with the history between the US and Mexico.” For decades, US farmers have accused Mexican officials of not releasing the water from the Rio Grande they believe they are owed under the 1944 treaty. The same antagonism over groundwater could easily arise if the governments of the US and Mexico determine that the water on either side of the border actually comes from shared aquifers.
| 15,192 |
<h4>Mismanagement spills up---border water is a <u>unique</u> sticking point.</h4><p>Zoë <strong>Schlanger 18</strong>, environmental reporter at Quartz, “There’s a time bomb for US-Mexico relations ticking underground,” 8/20/18, https://qz.com/1353839/theres-a-time-bomb-for-us-mexico-relations-ticking-underground/</p><p>All along the 1,250 miles of border between Texas and Mexico, hidden under hundreds of feet of soil and rock, lie <u>more than a dozen underground <mark>aquifers</u></mark>—areas of permeable earth that hold water—that <u><mark>crisscross the</mark> national <mark>boundaries</mark>. They might be the only sources of water the region will have left when the Rio Grande, hit by a one-two punch of climate change and a booming population, inevitably dries up. And <mark>yet there is <strong>no binational agreement</strong> for</mark> all <mark>this</mark> shared groundwater.</p><p></u>Texas and Mexico have elaborate sharing agreements for every acre-foot of water that flows through the Rio Grande, which makes sense, especially since the river is dwindling. Making sure both sides are upholding those agreements while the region rides through its regular whiplash of droughts and floods takes up most of the bandwidth of water officials on both sides.</p><p><u>Meanwhile, the US and Mexico barely even know about their shared groundwater. The two nations only officially recognize four cross-border aquifers (pdf). But Rosario Sanchez, a Texas A&M University hydrologist who has spent her academic life seeking out transboundary aquifers that aren’t yet on maps, has identified 36. Of those, 15 are shared between Texas and Mexico.</p><p></u>This is how it goes with humans and the invisible forces that enable—or disable—our lives. <u>We don’t notice them until something goes wrong. This is how it goes for groundwater. We stick our straw in and drink up until it runs out, or the land sinks beneath our feet, and we can no longer pretend the source of our water is magically unlimited and reliable.</p><p><strong><mark>It’s a crisis </mark>that has, by now, been unfolding <mark>in the background</u></strong></mark> for a while. “[C]ompared to the issues of illegal immigration, drug violence, economic trade, and other border and non-border issues, <u><mark>groundwater</mark> management <mark>ranks</u></mark> relatively <u><strong><mark>low among</mark> the <mark>priorities</mark> of both federal governments</u></strong>,” wrote Gabriel Eckstein, a water-law scholar at Texas A&M School of Law, in a 2012 paper (pdf). “As a result, the [Rio Grande Valley region’s] <u>groundwater resources are being overexploited</u> on both frontiers <u>as populations and industries pump with little regard for sustainability or transboundary consequences</u>…. Ultimately, <u>the viability of the region’s communities, natural <strong>environment</strong>, and <strong>economic growth</strong> are threatened with stagnation and may falter. And <strong>no one, at least on the federal level, is doing anything about it</strong>.</u>”</p><p><u>Groundwater depletion will threaten communities</u> on both sides before long, says Sanchez. Temperatures in the Rio Grande Valley are rising, and droughts are expected to become (pdf) more frequent. Surface water—the water from streams, lakes, and other above-ground sources—in the region is vanishing. In 15 or 20 years, Sanchez says, the Rio Grande will be a pitiful stream. Meanwhile, the population in the Rio Grande Valley is projected to more than double by 2060 (pdf). All those <u>new border residents will need a lot more water, just <mark>when the river starts</mark> truly <strong><mark>struggling to meet demand</strong>. That will</mark> likely <strong><mark>spark a run on groundwater</strong></mark>.</u> Sanchez predicts <u><strong>the neglected resource will become a major geopolitical issue</strong> in the region.</p><p></u>Sanchez is from Saltillo, the capital of Coahuila, an enormous Mexican border state that kisses the Texas frontier from Big Bend in West Texas down to Laredo, more than 300 miles to the southeast. She moved to the US in 2000 while working for the Mexican foreign service, and to Texas in 2006, to begin her PhD at Texas A&M. At 41, she’s spent almost half her life in the US. She understands this is an issue for both sides. “Very few people have been able to acknowledge how risky it is not to know what is going on with groundwater on the border,” she says. “Nobody actually pays attention to it.”</p><p>As far back as 1973, the International Boundary and Water Commission, a joint US-Mexico body that governs border water, added a clause to their water-sharing agreement that acknowledged a need for groundwater rules that both countries could abide. But that’s where the negotiating stopped. The US government has known since at least 2013 the lower Rio Grande basin is on track to run out of water in the coming decades, but no binational agreement governing groundwater has ever materialized.</p><p>Aquifer maps on both sides “end” at the border. Academics in the water world call this “blank map syndrome.” (Even if you tried to put maps used by the US and Mexico together, the aquifers would look like mismatched puzzle pieces; they don’t line up, probably due to a lack of data about where, exactly, they are.) Everyone knows the groundwater is shared by both nations, but neither side wants to put the aquifers on a unified map for both sides to sign off on. Doing so would trigger hard conversations about who they belong to, who is using more than their share, and how to split the water up. It would certainly mean changing laws, or, at least, their enforcement, on both sides.</p><p>On the Mexican side, water is controlled by the federal government, and “they have all kinds of good regulations on the books, but they’re not enforced,” Eckstein says. Within Texas, the “rule of capture”—if you can pump it, it’s yours—is a powerful concept. Imposing strict limits on the rule of capture would almost certainly trigger legal action. “In Texas, if you change the game, you are taking private property away from citizens, which invokes the Takings Clause, both in the Texas Constitution and the US Constitution,” Eckstein says. “It’s going to get litigated like heck. It’s going to be a mess.”</p><p>Transboundary aquifers are the “lifeblood of nearly every border village and population,” as Eckstein puts it, and yet the people in charge of border policies often pretend they don’t exist. As the region heats up and fills up, nothing could be a more short-sighted approach.</p><p>Approaching College Station from the west, the Texas A&M campus appears suddenly, rising out of an otherwise flat plane like it came into view in a video game. The buildings look new in an unsullied-office-park way: tan structures sprinkled among freshly-painted parking lots, garnished by evenly-spaced saplings throughout, and an athletic facility off to one side.</p><p>In the back of the Texas A&M agricultural sciences building, a windowless office serves as the headquarters for the only research project with a chance at convincing the US and Mexico to recognize just how many aquifers they really share. On an afternoon in March, Rosario Sanchez, in a red sweater, sat at one desk in the small room, going over a graduate student’s research project. Beside her, Laura Rodriguez was hand-digitizing old oil-well maps, the best shot we have at locating the groundwater systems underneath the US-Mexico border.</p><p>Drilling into the earth to find the borders of an aquifer would be astronomically expensive, and impractical—the hydrogeological equivalent of finding a needle in a haystack. In a previous life, Rodriguez worked in the oil industry, on teams using sensors to determine how close to aquifers her employers could drill for oil without damaging the local water supply. Now, she relies on those oil well-maps to pinpoint groundwater.</p><p>When petroleum engineers search for potential pockets of underground oil, they stick electric probes down a borehole. Each geologic formation has its own unique response to the electric charge, a “signature” that helps engineers decipher and translate the data into a vertical map indicating rock formations and whether oil, gas, or water lie between them.</p><p>Oil prospectors are only interested in the water inasmuch as they need to know how to avoid it. But Rodriguez wants to know about the water itself. That afternoon, her desktop computer displayed a PDF scan of an aging piece of paper, bisected vertically by a jagged line, like a readout from an EKG machine. It was an electric-probe map from 1962, taken just outside the Texas border town of Eagle Pass, in Maverick County, about 140 miles southwest of San Antonio. Along the jagged line were pencil marks designating different geologic formations the probe had passed through.</p><p>Deciphering the meaning of the esoteric marks found on these old oil-well maps is a perpetual project for Rodriguez. The maps date back to the 1940s, so marks are faded, and some geologists had bad handwriting. The acronyms they jotted down are gibberish—unless you’re already versed in the names of Texas geological formations. “AC, this means Austin Chalk. Austin Chalk is a clay. DR—DR is for the Davis River formation,” Rodriguez said as she pointed to notations on the map. Each type of rock tells her something about where aquifers begin and end. By piecing together dozens of these maps side by side, she’s able to coax out a picture of a hidden aquifer.</p><p>In another electric-probe map from Maverick County, Rodriguez found a slice of the Allende-Piedras Negras aquifer. It’s well-known in northern Mexico—some 100,000 acre-feet of water a year are pumped out of it to support vast areas of agriculture and the lives of 300,000 people in the Mexican state of Coahuila. But in Texas, it’s virtually unknown. The aquifer creeps into Maverick and Kinney counties, but, according to Sanchez, people with water wells in those regions tend to presume they’re just tapping into small, local supplies, pockets of groundwater that are too small even to have a formal name, or to appear on an aquifer map. And yet here was the Allende-Piedras Negras, in the probe maps, making an appearance in Texas. Sanchez and Rodriguez recently published a paper showing that the Allende-Piedras Negras aquifer extends into Texas, underlying several South Texas counties. Another border-crossing aquifer. It was like finding an oasis hidden in plain sight.</p><p>What would happen if the Allende-Piedras Negras aquifer was recognized as transboundary? For starters, a major water-thirsty project like the Mexican government’s plans for hydraulic fracturing in Coahuila—which news reports say will use millions of gallons of water pumped from the aquifer—could become an international story, rather than a domestic one. <u>What Mexico chose to do with its border groundwater would <mark>change the</mark> amount of <mark>water available in</mark> South <mark>Texas</mark>—and <mark>without a treaty</mark>, that <strong><mark>could get diplomatically messy</mark>, fast</strong>.</p><p></u>In that same vein, beer brewing <u>could become <mark>a matter of <strong>international security</u></strong></mark>. In 2016, Constellation Brands, the US-owned beer, wine and spirits giant that makes Corona, Modelo, Pacifico, and Victoria beers in Nava, Coahuila, for export to the US, was the center of a controversy over extraction from the Allende-Piedras Negras aquifer. The nearby town of Zaragoza was in the grips of a water shortage so dire that household taps were running dry, and Zaragoza’s mayor accused the brewery of exacerbating the crisis. “We’re worried because we’re already being impacted by this extraction of 1,200 liters of water per second” by the brewery, the mayor told the Guardian at the time. “It’s contradictory that while Constellation Brands has industrial amounts of water to make beer, the municipality of Zaragoza doesn’t have 100 liters [per second] of water to give people to drink or use in their homes.”</p><p>Constellation Brands refutes the claim that they were at fault for the shortages, saying their business amounts to only 1% of the water taken each year from the aquifer. “This situation has been misrepresented in the media, and it is very important for people to understand,” says Constellation spokesperson Alicia Nestle. “If you look at subsequent coverage of the issue in Zaragoza, you will see that the governor of Coahuila actually came out in support of our company, clarifying that the issue had nothing to do with our brewery operations.”</p><p>In any case, the story is a case study of the sort of scenario that could present intractable geopolitical challenges in the coming years. The brewery sits less than 30 miles south of Eagle Pass, Texas. Right now, Eagle Pass, in Maverick County, draws most of its water from the Rio Grande. But if the Rio Grande dries out, as climate scientists and water planners predict, the town will have to turn to groundwater. Already, the Texas State Water Plan calls for investment in new groundwater infrastructure to keep Maverick County afloat in the coming decades.</p><p>In the future, <u>if a Texas city blamed Mexico for depleting an aquifer, it would raise questions neither government is prepared to answer.</p><p></u>The first step toward avoiding conflict is basic science. Where does groundwater exist, how much is there, and how much is being pumped already? Once Rodriguez finds the structural formation using the oil maps, Sanchez starts negotiating for data. She identifies existing water wells, determines if the water is salty or fresh, and calculates how much people are pumping—all clues to the health of the aquifer. In Texas, in most cases, she can simply ask the local irrigation districts for that data. On the other side of the border, it’s not so easy. Everything is centralized in the federal government. “In Mexico,” she says, “the <u><strong>federal <mark>agencies are supposed to give us something</mark> by law</strong>—<mark>they give us the </mark>absolute <mark>minimum</u>.”</p><p></mark>So instead she knocks on doors. “I cannot say it’s safe. I don’t go out after 7pm.” Shootings and kidnappings are common in the region, and in many areas, drug cartels control local police and government officials. Sanchez never knows who actually owns the land she’s on. “There could be wells belonging to—I’ll say, organizations beyond the law.”</p><p>“I don’t feel at risk,” she says. “It’s easier for me, because I’m from the region.” But she’s still doing something she wouldn’t ask of anyone else.</p><p>Even when safety is less of a concern, data negotiation is a subtle sport. “I can’t tell you how it’s done, because there’s not a ‘how.’ It’s complicated. Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn’t,” Sanchez says.</p><p>She’s learned that there’s something ineffable about sharing water-well data that provokes anxiety in people. “<u>In Mexico, <mark>groundwater is</mark> a <mark>very sensitive </mark>topic.</u> Particularly data. Particularly on the border,” she says. “Nobody has been able to explain to me why it is so sensitive. <u>It’s kind of an unexplainable fear.</u>” She tries her best to make well owners feel safe, whether they’re individuals, a big corporation, or the Mexican government.</p><p><u>At a recent water conference, she struck up a conversation with representatives from a Mexico-based company currently using a lot of water from the Allende-Piedras Negras. She walked away with data for “nine or 10 wells,” she says. “We were lucky.” Companies using water in the desert have come under fire in Mexico lately, and so Sanchez told this story on the condition that the company remain anonymous. Getting the company to share its well data was hard enough.</p><p></u>If she had to guess, she says, the <u><strong><mark>touchiness</u></strong></mark> “probably <u><mark>has to do with the history</mark> between the US and Mexico</u>.” For decades, <u><mark>US</mark> farmers have <mark>accused</mark> <mark>Mexican officials of not releasing</mark> the <mark>water</mark> from the Rio Grande they believe <mark>they are owed</mark> under the 1944 treaty. The same <strong><mark>antagonism</strong> over groundwater could</mark> easily <mark>arise</mark> if the governments of the US and Mexico determine that the water on either side of the border actually comes from shared aquifers.</p></u>
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1AC---Management ADV
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./documents/hspolicy21/MontgomeryBell/HoMa/Montgomery%20Bell-Howard-Maxwell-Aff-Glenbrooks-Round1.docx
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Glenbrooks
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Garfield PS
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William Soper
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1AC- Water Transfer Rule
2NR- Brand X CP Biz Con DA
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hspolicy21/MontgomeryBell/HoMa/Montgomery%20Bell-Howard-Maxwell-Aff-Glenbrooks-Round1.docx
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HS Policy 2021-22
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1,208,389 |
US ag and food security stabilize the globe – collapse greenlights great power wars and terrorism.
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Castellaw 17
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Castellaw 17 – Lieutenant General, former President of the non-profit Crockett Policy Institute (John; Published: May 1, 2017; “Opinion: Food Security Strategy Is Essential to Our National Security,” Agri-pulse; https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/9203-opinion-food-security-strategy-is-essential-to-our-national-security)//CYang
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United States faces threats to National Security include ISIS rogue state North Korea or nuclear power Iran. economic and diplomatic competition with Russia and surging China spiral out of control we face threats to future security posed by famine which create incubators for extremist and anti-American factions. Our response cannot be one dimensional but instead must be a nuanced and comprehensive National Security Strategy combining all elements of National Power including a Food Security Strategy.
Food Security is an imperative factor in reducing the multiple threats impacting National wellbeing. Recent history shown reliable food supplies produce stable and secure countries food insecurity lead to instability, unrest, and violence.
Food insecurity drives mass migration destabilizing neighboring populations, generating conflicts, and threatening security by disrupting our economic, military, and diplomatic relationships. Food system shocks correlated with protests and riots history taught us strong agricultural sector unquestionable requirement for sustainable growth, development progress, and long-term stability
situations deteriorate into shooting wars requiring deployment of our military forces
Actions taken now to increase agricultural sector jobs can provide economic opportunity and stability for those unemployed youths while helping to feed people. A recent report by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs identifies agriculture development as the core essential for providing greater food security, economic growth, and population well-being.
food security stabilize key regions over 60 years robust food security strategy can mitigate growth of terrorism, build important relationships, and support continued American economic and prosperity while contributing to world’s security
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threats to Security include ISIS No Ko or nuclear Iran competition with Russia and China spiral famine incubators for extremist and anti-American factions
Food Security imperative in reducing threats food insecurity lead to instability and violence
Food insecurity threaten economic, military, and diplomatic relationships strong ag unquestionable requirement for long-term stability
robust food security mitigate terrorism, build relationships, and support prosperity while contributing to security
|
The United States faces many threats to our National Security. These threats include continuing wars with extremist elements such as ISIS and potential wars with rogue state North Korea or regional nuclear power Iran. The heated economic and diplomatic competition with Russia and a surging China could spiral out of control. Concurrently, we face threats to our future security posed by growing civil strife, famine, and refugee and migration challenges which create incubators for extremist and anti-American government factions. Our response cannot be one dimensional but instead must be a nuanced and comprehensive National Security Strategy combining all elements of National Power including a Food Security Strategy.
An American Food Security Strategy is an imperative factor in reducing the multiple threats impacting our National wellbeing. Recent history has shown that reliable food supplies and stable prices produce more stable and secure countries. Conversely, food insecurity, particularly in poorer countries, can lead to instability, unrest, and violence.
Food insecurity drives mass migration around the world from the Middle East, to Africa, to Southeast Asia, destabilizing neighboring populations, generating conflicts, and threatening our own security by disrupting our economic, military, and diplomatic relationships. Food system shocks from extreme food-price volatility can be correlated with protests and riots. Food price related protests toppled governments in Haiti and Madagascar in 2007 and 2008. In 2010 and in 2011, food prices and grievances related to food policy were one of the major drivers of the Arab Spring uprisings. Repeatedly, history has taught us that a strong agricultural sector is an unquestionable requirement for inclusive and sustainable growth, broad-based development progress, and long-term stability.
The impact can be remarkable and far reaching. Rising income, in addition to reducing the opportunities for an upsurge in extremism, leads to changes in diet, producing demand for more diverse and nutritious foods provided, in many cases, from American farmers and ranchers. Emerging markets currently purchase 20 percent of U.S. agriculture exports and that figure is expected to grow as populations boom.
Moving early to ensure stability in strategically significant regions requires long term planning and a disciplined, thoughtful strategy. To combat current threats and work to prevent future ones, our national leadership must employ the entire spectrum of our power including diplomatic, economic, and cultural elements. The best means to prevent future chaos and the resulting instability is positive engagement addressing the causes of instability before it occurs.
This is not rocket science. We know where the instability is most likely to occur. The world population will grow by 2.5 billion people by 2050. Unfortunately, this massive population boom is projected to occur primarily in the most fragile and food insecure countries. This alarming math is not just about total numbers. Projections show that the greatest increase is in the age groups most vulnerable to extremism. There are currently 200 million people in Africa between the ages of 15 and 24, with that number expected to double in the next 30 years. Already, 60% of the unemployed in Africa are young people.
Too often these situations deteriorate into shooting wars requiring the deployment of our military forces. We should be continually mindful that the price we pay for committing military forces is measured in our most precious national resource, the blood of those who serve. For those who live in rural America, this has a disproportionate impact. Fully 40% of those who serve in our military come from the farms, ranches, and non-urban communities that make up only 16% of our population.
Actions taken now to increase agricultural sector jobs can provide economic opportunity and stability for those unemployed youths while helping to feed people. A recent report by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs identifies agriculture development as the core essential for providing greater food security, economic growth, and population well-being.
Our active support for food security, including agriculture development, has helped stabilize key regions over the past 60 years. A robust food security strategy, as a part of our overall security strategy, can mitigate the growth of terrorism, build important relationships, and support continued American economic and agricultural prosperity while materially contributing to our Nation’s and the world’s security.
| 4,606 |
<h4>US ag and food security <u>stabilize</u> the globe – collapse greenlights <u>great power wars </u>and <u>terrorism</u>.</h4><p><strong>Castellaw 17</strong> – Lieutenant General, former President of the non-profit Crockett Policy Institute (John; Published: May 1, 2017; “Opinion: Food Security Strategy Is Essential to Our National Security,” Agri-pulse; https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/9203-opinion-food-security-strategy-is-essential-to-our-national-security)//CYang</p><p>The <u>United States faces</u> many <u><mark>threats to</u></mark> our <u>National <mark>Security</u></mark>. These threats <u><mark>include</u></mark> continuing wars with extremist elements such as <u><mark>ISIS</u></mark> and potential wars with <u><strong>rogue state <mark>No</mark>rth <mark>Ko</mark>rea</strong> <mark>or</u></mark> regional <u><strong><mark>nuclear</mark> power <mark>Iran</strong></mark>.</u> The heated <u>economic and diplomatic <mark>competition with Russia and</u></mark> a <u>surging <mark>China</u></mark> could <u><mark>spiral</mark> out of control</u>. Concurrently, <u>we face threats to</u> our <u><strong>future security</strong> posed by</u> growing civil strife, <u><mark>famine</u></mark>, and refugee and migration challenges <u>which create <mark>incubators for <strong>extremist and anti-American</u></strong></mark> government <u><mark>factions</mark>. Our response cannot be one dimensional but instead must be a nuanced and comprehensive National Security Strategy combining all elements of National Power including a Food Security Strategy.</p><p></u>An American <u><mark>Food Security</u></mark> Strategy <u>is an <strong><mark>imperative</mark> factor</strong> <mark>in reducing</mark> the <strong>multiple <mark>threats</strong></mark> impacting</u> our <u>National wellbeing. Recent history</u> has <u>shown</u> that <u><strong>reliable food supplies</u></strong> and stable prices <u>produce</u> more <u>stable and secure countries</u>. Conversely, <u><mark>food insecurity</u></mark>, particularly in poorer countries, can <u><mark>lead to <strong>instability</strong></mark>, <strong>unrest</strong>, <mark>and</mark> <strong><mark>violence</strong></mark>.</p><p><mark>Food insecurity</mark> drives mass migration</u> around the world from the Middle East, to Africa, to Southeast Asia, <u>destabilizing neighboring populations, <strong>generating conflicts</strong>, and <mark>threaten</mark>ing</u> our own <u>security by disrupting our <mark>economic, military, and diplomatic relationships</mark>. Food system shocks</u> from extreme food-price volatility can be <u>correlated with protests and riots</u>. Food price related protests toppled governments in Haiti and Madagascar in 2007 and 2008. In 2010 and in 2011, food prices and grievances related to food policy were one of the major drivers of the Arab Spring uprisings. Repeatedly, <u>history</u> has <u>taught us</u> that a <u><mark>strong ag</mark>ricultural sector</u> is an <u><strong><mark>unquestionable requirement</strong> for</u></mark> inclusive and <u><strong>sustainable growth</strong>,</u> broad-based <u><strong>development progress</strong>, and <strong><mark>long-term stability</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>The impact can be remarkable and far reaching. Rising income, in addition to reducing the opportunities for an upsurge in extremism, leads to changes in diet, producing demand for more diverse and nutritious foods provided, in many cases, from American farmers and ranchers. Emerging markets currently purchase 20 percent of U.S. agriculture exports and that figure is expected to grow as populations boom.</p><p>Moving early to ensure stability in strategically significant regions requires long term planning and a disciplined, thoughtful strategy. To combat current threats and work to prevent future ones, our national leadership must employ the entire spectrum of our power including diplomatic, economic, and cultural elements. The best means to prevent future chaos and the resulting instability is positive engagement addressing the causes of instability before it occurs.</p><p>This is not rocket science. We know where the instability is most likely to occur. The world population will grow by 2.5 billion people by 2050. Unfortunately, this massive population boom is projected to occur primarily in the most fragile and food insecure countries. This alarming math is not just about total numbers. Projections show that the greatest increase is in the age groups most vulnerable to extremism. There are currently 200 million people in Africa between the ages of 15 and 24, with that number expected to double in the next 30 years. Already, 60% of the unemployed in Africa are young people. </p><p>Too often these <u>situations deteriorate into <strong>shooting wars</strong> requiring</u> the <u>deployment of our military forces</u>. We should be continually mindful that the price we pay for committing military forces is measured in our most precious national resource, the blood of those who serve. For those who live in rural America, this has a disproportionate impact. Fully 40% of those who serve in our military come from the farms, ranches, and non-urban communities that make up only 16% of our population. </p><p><u>Actions taken now to increase agricultural sector jobs can provide economic opportunity and stability for those unemployed youths while helping to feed people. A recent report by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs identifies agriculture development as the core essential for providing greater food security, economic growth, and population well-being.</p><p></u>Our active support for <u>food security</u>, including agriculture development, has helped <u>stabilize key regions over</u> the past <u>60 years</u>. A <u><strong><mark>robust food security</strong></mark> strategy</u>, as a part of our overall security strategy, <u>can <mark>mitigate</u></mark> the <u><strong>growth of <mark>terrorism</strong>, build</mark> <strong>important <mark>relationships</strong>, and support</mark> continued American economic and</u> agricultural <u><mark>prosperity while</u></mark> materially <u><mark>contributing to</u></mark> our Nation’s and the <u>world’s <mark>security</u></mark>.</p>
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Open Source – UK R1
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1AC – Water Markets V1
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1AC – Shortages
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./documents/hspolicy21/Peninsula/QiSr/Peninsula-Qin-Sridevan-Aff-University%20of%20Kentucky-Round1.docx
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University of Kentucky
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1
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Edina HM
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Zack Lim
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1AC -- Water Markets V1
1NC -- T Cessation ConCon CP Uncooperative Federalism CP States CP Federalism DA Business Confidence DA
2NC -- Uncooperative Federalism CP
1NR -- Business Confidence DA
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hspolicy21/Peninsula/QiSr/Peninsula-Qin-Sridevan-Aff-University%20of%20Kentucky-Round1.docx
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HS Policy 2021-22
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Drug profits get funneled into insurgents in Northeast India
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Singh 20
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Singh 20 [Waikhom Bobichand Singh Lovely Professional University. “INSURGENCY AND VOLATILITY IN THE NORTH EASTERN INDIA: A CASE OF DRUGS, ARMS AND CONFLICT.” Journal of Interdisciplinary Cycle Research. Volume XII, Issue XI, November/2020. ISSN NO: 0022-1945//AM]
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pervasive criminal crime dominating the Northeastern region, also affected by the insurgency, is drug trafficking The drug use and trafficking problem and the arms-drug connection in the region took on considerable significance and came to the fore just after independence, such as the Indo-Myanmar frontier, marijuana and poppy are grown commonly for commercial purposes city has undergone prolonged cocaine trafficking and drug violence over the past few years. . the insurgent groups' use of this sector to finance themselves. Latest studies show the bulk of organised conflict and militancy are mostly confined to locations close to international borders; much drug trade happens along with border zones. the second-largest drug-producing country in the world, known as the Golden Triangle, the Northeastern region is a frontier area composed of Laos, Myanmar and Thailand. Myanmar is also one of the largest producers of heroin in the world and heroin is one of the nation's most valuable export goods. the Shan state of Myanmar has in fact become the hub of opium production and conversion. flourishing international drug trade and the connection between insurgency and drug trafficking have literally impacted India's Northeast Northeast India's insurgent groups depend on Southeast Asia's black markets to supply weaponry if these rebel groups did not resort to smuggling and drug dealing, they would not necessarily have mobilised money to acquire weapons to sustain their cadres while other groups, such as the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), have actually taken up drug trafficking Myanmar's cocaine trade is a major source of revenue for the NSCN (IM), and both the NSCN (IM) and NSCN(K) groups operate parallel tax (extortion) schemes in the regions they control. many of them have actually systematically taxed and acquired money from smugglers while providing the latter with protection for drug trafficking struggle to control drug trafficking and smuggling through Moreh, the border town of Manipur, led to strong competition between the Kuki National Army (KNA) and NSCN(IM) Transnational narco-networks, now supported by armed militants, make it particularly difficult to push narco-trafficking or anti-narco-production given the topographical and geographical circumstances in which the rebels and smugglers work, it is now much more important to conclude that the military or coercive options arranged nationwide might not be the proper way to get rid of the challenge of narcoterrorism Guns in the hands of both smugglers and rebels, end up jeopardizing the situation of law and order in the region the cash earned from taxing and purchasing narco-traffickers goes to purchasing small, often expensive, weapons for the insurgency. the drug cartel has absorbed various government figures, bureaucrats, and even authorities from the armed forces in order to continue their illicit trade trend challenges the spirits of Indian security forces unless safely inspected India 's Northeast, ethnic separatists need the protection of drug mafias as a swift way to collect funds. Burmese opium lords are also promoting poppy planting for tribal farmers he growth gains expected from India's Act East strategy in the Northeastern States may be adversely affected Trafficking is regulated by trans-border groups, who are generally difficult to negotiate with or control.
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crime dominating the Northeastern region drug trafficking the Indo-Myanmar frontier marijuana and poppy are grown commonly undergone trafficking and drug violence insurgent groups' use this sector to finance themselves studies show organised conflict and militancy drug trade along with border zones the Golden Triangle international drug trade and connection between insurgency and drug trafficking impacted India's Northeast Northeast India's insurgent groups depend on Southeast Asia's black markets to supply weaponry if groups did not resort to smuggling and drug dealing, they would not sustain their cadres
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Another pervasive criminal crime dominating the Northeastern region, also affected by the insurgency, is drug trafficking. The opioid dilemma is as old as history itself. Drugs are typically cultivated for local use in Northeast India. But with some supervision and regulation, the British colonial government did not prohibit such production and use and, as a result, the problem was limited to addiction during those days. The laws enacted in 1893 as part of the imperial drug policies led to a major revenue increase, and ganja served as the main source of revenue from pot products. The drug use and trafficking problem and the arms-drug connection in the region took on considerable significance and came to the fore just after independence, particularly in the previous three decades. Currently, in the most distant areas of the country, such as the Indo-Myanmar frontier, marijuana and poppy are grown commonly for commercial purposes. The city has undergone prolonged cocaine trafficking and drug violence over the past few years. In general, the occurrence of drug trafficking in the region is related to open boundaries, closeness to the Golden Triangle, continuing ethnic strife, hardship, insecurity, and transport to the world market. Compounded with this is the insurgent groups' use of this sector to finance themselves. Latest studies show that in many regions of the world, the bulk of organised conflict and militancy are mostly confined to locations close to international borders; much drug trade happens along with border zones. . Near the second-largest drug-producing country in the world, known as the Golden Triangle, the Northeastern region is a frontier area composed of Laos, Myanmar and Thailand. With the expansion of this drug-producing location to the boundaries of Vietnam — Cambodia, and Nagaland — Manipur (Chin, 2011), the Golden Triangle has recently been considered the Golden Pentagon (Chin, 2011). Myanmar is also one of the largest producers of heroin in the world and heroin is one of the nation's most valuable export goods. Despite the military junta 's statements that they are aggressively battling opioid cultivation and circulation, the Shan state of Myanmar has in fact become the hub of opium production and conversion. This flourishing international drug trade and the connection between insurgency and drug trafficking have literally impacted India's Northeast (Chandran, 1998). Since their establishment, major insurgents in the region have relied on China and Pakistan for their training and supply of weapons. Pakistan was too distant for any direct assistance with the independence of Bangladesh (East Pakistan) in 1971; the rapprochement of Sino-India relations during the Rajiv Gandhi era, due to the mid-1980s, slowly stopped the Chinese support of these rebel groups. Northeast India's insurgent groups depend on Southeast Asia's black markets to supply weaponry. It is suspected that if these rebel groups did not resort to smuggling and drug dealing, they would not necessarily have mobilised money to acquire weapons to sustain their cadres. Some Manipur rebel movements continue to fight drug trafficking and addiction, such as the Unified National Freedom Front and the Peoples' Freedom Army, while other groups, such as the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), have actually taken up drug trafficking (Goswami, 2008). Myanmar's cocaine trade is a major source of revenue for the NSCN (IM), and both the NSCN (IM) and NSCN(K) groups operate parallel tax (extortion) schemes in the regions they control. It is clear that while rebel groups do not participate in narco-production or narco-trafficking, it has actually been discovered, though, that many of them have actually systematically taxed and acquired money from smugglers while providing the latter with protection for drug trafficking. The bitter struggle to control drug trafficking and smuggling through Moreh, the border town of Manipur, led to strong competition between the Kuki National Army (KNA) and NSCN(IM) in 1992, which resulted in strong competition between the Kuki National Army (KNA) and NSCN(IM) in 1992 (Chin & Zhang, 2015). CONCLUSION Transnational narco-networks, now supported by armed militants, make it particularly difficult to push narco-trafficking or anti-narco-production. And given the topographical and geographical circumstances in which the rebels and smugglers work, it is now much more important to conclude that the military or coercive options arranged nationwide might not be the proper way to get rid of the challenge of narcoterrorism. Guns, especially small weapons in the hands of both smugglers and rebels, end up becoming more common, to the point of jeopardizing the situation of law and order in the region. Most of the cash earned from taxing and purchasing narco-traffickers goes to purchasing small, often expensive, weapons for the insurgency. In fact, smuggling through the northeast has contributed to a rise in local consumption. Most addicts use intravenous needles to administer medications and wind up becoming HIV positive. Numerous armies and patients. Indeed, the drug cartel has absorbed various government figures, bureaucrats, and even authorities from the armed forces in order to continue their illicit trade. This trend challenges the spirits of Indian security forces unless safely inspected. In India 's Northeast, ethnic separatists need the protection of drug mafias as a swift way to collect funds. The Burmese opium lords are also promoting poppy planting for tribal farmers. Until these brand new plantations are rapidly demolished and alternate farming solutions given to farmers are feasible, the border between India and Burma will soon be dotted with poppy fields feeding the manufacturing plants in western Burma. If the problem of narcotics, HIV / AIDS, and prostitution in the region is not initially decreased, the growth gains expected from India's Act East strategy in the Northeastern States may be adversely affected. If the trajectory of progress is not to be challenged, the problem must really be fought on a war footing. For a long-term order, the trans-border essence of this problem involves local cooperation. Trafficking is regulated by trans-border groups, who are generally difficult to negotiate with or control. While today 's policy needs to rely on a cooperative alternative, with other state governments on the one side, it should also involve sharing of information not only with states, but also with regional and subregional organisations, scholars, scientists, and civil society.
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<h4>Drug profits get funneled into insurgents in Northeast India</h4><p><strong>Singh 20 </strong>[Waikhom Bobichand Singh Lovely Professional University. “INSURGENCY AND VOLATILITY IN THE NORTH EASTERN INDIA: A CASE OF DRUGS, ARMS AND CONFLICT.” Journal of Interdisciplinary Cycle Research. Volume XII, Issue XI, November/2020. ISSN NO: 0022-1945//AM]</p><p>Another <u>pervasive criminal <mark>crime dominating the Northeastern region</mark>, also affected by the insurgency, is <mark>drug trafficking</u></mark>. The opioid dilemma is as old as history itself. Drugs are typically cultivated for local use in Northeast India. But with some supervision and regulation, the British colonial government did not prohibit such production and use and, as a result, the problem was limited to addiction during those days. The laws enacted in 1893 as part of the imperial drug policies led to a major revenue increase, and ganja served as the main source of revenue from pot products. <u>The drug use and trafficking problem and the arms-drug connection in the region took on considerable significance and came to the fore just after independence,</u> particularly in the previous three decades. Currently, in the most distant areas of the country, <u>such as <mark>the Indo-Myanmar frontier</mark>, <mark>marijuana and poppy are grown commonly</mark> for commercial purposes</u>. The <u>city has <mark>undergone</mark> prolonged cocaine <mark>trafficking and drug violence</mark> over the past few years.</u> In general, the occurrence of drug trafficking in the region is related to open boundaries, closeness to the Golden Triangle, continuing ethnic strife, hardship, insecurity, and transport to the world market<u>.</u> Compounded with this is <u>the <mark>insurgent groups' use</mark> of <mark>this sector to finance themselves</mark>.</u> <u>Latest <mark>studies show</u></mark> that in many regions of the world, <u>the bulk of <mark>organised conflict and militancy </mark>are mostly confined to locations close to international borders; much <mark>drug trade</mark> happens <mark>along with border zones</mark>.</u> . Near <u>the second-largest drug-producing country in the world, known as <mark>the Golden Triangle</mark>, the Northeastern region is a frontier area composed of Laos, Myanmar and Thailand.</u> With the expansion of this drug-producing location to the boundaries of Vietnam — Cambodia, and Nagaland — Manipur (Chin, 2011), the Golden Triangle has recently been considered the Golden Pentagon (Chin, 2011). <u>Myanmar is also one of the largest producers of heroin in the world and heroin is one of the nation's most valuable export goods.</u> Despite the military junta 's statements that they are aggressively battling opioid cultivation and circulation, <u>the Shan state of Myanmar has in fact become the hub of opium production and conversion.</u> This <u>flourishing <mark>international drug trade and</mark> the <mark>connection between insurgency and drug trafficking</mark> have literally <mark>impacted India's Northeast</mark> </u>(Chandran, 1998). Since their establishment, major insurgents in the region have relied on China and Pakistan for their training and supply of weapons. Pakistan was too distant for any direct assistance with the independence of Bangladesh (East Pakistan) in 1971; the rapprochement of Sino-India relations during the Rajiv Gandhi era, due to the mid-1980s, slowly stopped the Chinese support of these rebel groups. <u><mark>Northeast India's insurgent groups depend on Southeast Asia's black markets to supply weaponry</u></mark>. It is suspected that <u><mark>if</mark> these rebel <mark>groups did not resort to smuggling and drug dealing, they would not</mark> necessarily have mobilised money to acquire weapons to <mark>sustain their cadres</u></mark>. Some Manipur rebel movements continue to fight drug trafficking and addiction, such as the Unified National Freedom Front and the Peoples' Freedom Army, <u>while other groups, such as the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), have actually taken up drug trafficking</u> (Goswami, 2008). <u>Myanmar's cocaine trade is a major source of revenue for the NSCN (IM), and both the NSCN (IM) and NSCN(K) groups operate parallel tax (extortion) schemes in the regions they control.</u> It is clear that while rebel groups do not participate in narco-production or narco-trafficking, it has actually been discovered, though, that <u>many of them have actually systematically taxed and acquired money from smugglers while providing the latter with protection for drug trafficking</u>. The bitter <u>struggle to control drug trafficking and smuggling through Moreh, the border town of Manipur, led to strong competition between the Kuki National Army (KNA) and NSCN(IM)</u> in 1992, which resulted in strong competition between the Kuki National Army (KNA) and NSCN(IM) in 1992 (Chin & Zhang, 2015). CONCLUSION <u>Transnational narco-networks, now supported by armed militants, make it particularly difficult to push narco-trafficking or anti-narco-production</u>. And <u>given the topographical and geographical circumstances in which the rebels and smugglers work, it is now much more important to conclude that the military or coercive options arranged nationwide might not be the proper way to get rid of the challenge of narcoterrorism</u>. <u>Guns</u>, especially small weapons <u>in the hands of both smugglers and rebels, end up </u>becoming more common, to the point of <u>jeopardizing the situation of law and order in the region</u>. Most of <u>the cash earned from taxing and purchasing narco-traffickers goes to purchasing small, often expensive, weapons for the insurgency.</u> In fact, smuggling through the northeast has contributed to a rise in local consumption. Most addicts use intravenous needles to administer medications and wind up becoming HIV positive. Numerous armies and patients. Indeed, <u>the drug cartel has absorbed various government figures, bureaucrats, and even authorities from the armed forces in order to continue their illicit trade</u>. This <u>trend challenges the spirits of Indian security forces unless safely inspected</u>. In <u>India 's Northeast,</u> <u>ethnic separatists need the protection of drug mafias as a swift way to collect funds.</u> The <u>Burmese opium lords are also promoting poppy planting for tribal farmers</u>. Until these brand new plantations are rapidly demolished and alternate farming solutions given to farmers are feasible, the border between India and Burma will soon be dotted with poppy fields feeding the manufacturing plants in western Burma. If the problem of narcotics, HIV / AIDS, and prostitution in the region is not initially decreased, t<u>he growth gains expected from India's Act East strategy in the Northeastern States may be adversely affected</u>. If the trajectory of progress is not to be challenged, the problem must really be fought on a war footing. For a long-term order, the trans-border essence of this problem involves local cooperation. <u>Trafficking is regulated by trans-border groups, who are generally difficult to negotiate with or control.</u> While today 's policy needs to rely on a cooperative alternative, with other state governments on the one side, it should also involve sharing of information not only with states, but also with regional and subregional organisations, scholars, scientists, and civil society.</p>
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1AC – ASEAN
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1AC: Irregular Migration
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./documents/hsld22/JamesCaldwell/RiZh/JamesCaldwell-RiZh-Aff-37th-Annual-Stanford-Invitational-Round-3.docx
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A
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37th Annual Stanford Invitational
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3
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Bellingham AH
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Asenat Pantoja
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1ac - asean v2
1nc - trans k, cap k, nebel t
1ar - all + policy rotb
2nr - trans k, cap k
2ar - util fw, policy rotb, centrality adv
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hsld22/JamesCaldwell/RiZh/JamesCaldwell-RiZh-Aff-37th-Annual-Stanford-Invitational-Round-3.docx
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2023-02-11 22:25:03
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James Caldwell RiZh
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We can describe this condition as cruel optimism, an attachment to a possibility that is ultimately impossible or harmful. The affirmative comes at the cost of the detached apathy that explains how easily Harrison packs up and reads the 1AC all over again next round. This repetition is the basis for capitalism – the assigning of trauma to an object that is to be consumed AND commodified by subjects endlessly.
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Berlant 11
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Berlant 11 [Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, Cruel Optimism, Routledge: Duke University Press, 2011, p. 33-6]
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When we talk about an object of desire, we are really talking about a cluster of promises we want someone or something to make to us and make possible for us. This could be embedded in a person, a thing, an institution, a text a good idea - whatever proximity to the object means proximity to the cluster of things that the object promises In other words, all attachments are optimistic. That does not mean that they feel optimistic But the surrender to the return to the scene where the object hovers in its potentialities is the operation of optimism as an affective form the subject leans toward promises contained within the encounter with their object.' 'Cruel optimism' names a relation of attachment to compromised conditions of possibility whose realisation is discovered either to be impossible or toxic. What's cruel is that the subjects who have x in their lives might not well endure the loss of their object or scene of desire, even though its presence threatens their well-being, because whatever the content of the attachment is, the continuity of the form of it provides something of the continuity of the subject's sense of what it means to keep on living on and to look forward to being in the world Cruel optimism is the condition of maintaining an attachment to a problematic object the cruelty of an optimistic attachment is something an analyst observes about someone's attachment since usually that attachment , seems to lighten the load for someone if the cruelty of an attachment is experienced by someone the fear is that the loss of the object will defeat the capacity to have any hope about anything some scenes of optimism are clearly crueller than others: where cruel optimism operates, the very vitalising potency of an object of desire contributes to the attrition of the very thriving that is supposed to be made possible in the work of attachment in the first place One makes affective bargains about the costliness of one's attachments, usually unconscious ones, most of which keep one in proximity to the scene of desire To understand cruel optimism one must embark on a way of thinking about the strange temporalities of projection into an enabling object that is also disabling in a performance of fantasmatic intersubjectivity, the writer gains superhuman observational authority, enabling a performance of being made possible by the proximity of the object. Because this object is something like what I am describing in the optimism of attachment, I'll describe a bit the shape of my transference with her thought the condition of projected possibility creates a fake present moment of intersubjectivity in which, nonetheless, a performance of address can take place. The present moment is made possible by the fantasy laden with the qualities I can project it is actually a turning back, an animating of a receiver on behalf of the desire to make something happen now that realises something in the speaker the illusion is thus an indirect, unstable, physically impossible but phenomenologically vitalising movement of rhetorical animation that permits subjects to suspend themselves in the optimism of a potential occupation of the same psychic space of others, the objects of desire who make you possible the conditions of the lush submerging of one consciousness into another require a double negation: of the speaker's boundaries and of the spoken of, who is a placeholder providing an opportunity for the speaker's imagination psychoanalytically speaking all intersubjectivity is impossible. It is a desire that marks the indeterminate relation between a feeling of recognition and misrecognition a transaction that affirms you without, necessarily feeling good it might affirm your monstrosity Johnson's work on projection is about the optimism of attachment Political depression persists in affective judgments of the world's intractability modes of what might be called detachment that are really not detached at all but constitute ongoing relations of sociality.'" The politically depressed position is manifested in the problem of the difficulty of detaching from life-building modalities that can no longer be said to be doing their work, and which indeed make obstacles to the desires that animate them; Cruel optimism is an analytic lever to track the attachment to what we call 'the good life,' which is for so many a bad life that wears out the subjects who nonetheless , find their conditions of possibility within it the conditions of ordinary life are conditions of the wearing out of the subject Cruel optimism is a concept pointing toward a mode of lived imminence the reasons people choose to ride the wave of the system of attachment that they are used to, to syncopate with it, or to be held in a relation of reciprocity, reconciliation, or resignation that does not mean defeat by it and misrecognise that as an achievement these exuberant attachments keep ticking not like the time bomb they might be but like a white noise machine that provides assurance that what seems like static really is, after all, a rhythm people can enter into while they're dithering, tottering, bargaining, testing, or otherwise being worn out
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When we talk about an object of desire, we are really talking about promises we want someone to make to us proximity to the object means proximity to promises, In other words, all attachments are optimistic. That does not mean they feel optimistic But , the subject leans toward promises contained within the object 'Cruel optimism' names attachment to conditions of possibility whose realisation is impossible or toxic What's cruel is subjects might not well endure the loss of their object its presence threatens their well-being Cruel optimism is maintaining attachment that attachment seems to lighten the load for someone the condition of projected possibility creates a fake moment of intersubjectivity made possible by the fantasy the illusion, is an impossible movement that permits subjects to suspend themselves optimism of occupation of the same psychic space of others submerging one consciousness into another require a double negation: of the speaker's boundaries and of the spoken of, who is providing opportunity for the speaker's imagination psychoanalytically speaking all intersubjectivity is impossible. It is a transaction that affirms you without, , necessarily feeling good it might affirm monstrosity . Political depression persists in affective judgments of intractability - modes of detachment that are really not detached at all but constitute ongoing relations of sociality.'" Cruel optimism is, an analytic lever to track attachment to 'the good life,' which is for so many a bad life that wears out the subjects who nonetheless find their conditions of possibility within it Cruel optimism is to ride the wave of the system and misrecognise that as achievement
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When we talk about an object of desire, we are really talking about a cluster of promises we want someone or something to make to us and make possible for us. This cluster of promises could be embedded in a person, a thing, an institution, a text, a norm, a bunch of cells, smells, a good idea - whatever. To phrase 'the object of desire' as a cluster of promises is to allow us to encounter what's incoherent or enigmatic in our attachments, not as confirmation of our irrationality but as an explanation for our sense of our endurance in the object, insofar as proximity to the object means proximity to the cluster of things that the object promises, some of which may be clear to us while others not so much. In other words, all attachments are optimistic. That does not mean that they all feel optimistic: one might dread, for example, returning to a scene of hunger or longing or the slapstick reiteration of a lover or parent's typical misrecognition. But the surrender to the return to the scene where the object hovers in its potentialities is the operation of optimism as an affective form. In optimism, the subject leans toward promises contained within the present moment of the encounter with their object.' 'Cruel optimism' names a relation of attachment to compromised conditions of possibility whose realisation is discovered either to be impossible, sheer fantasy, or too possible, and toxic. What's cruel about these attachments, and not merely inconvenient or tragic, is that the subjects who have x in their lives might not well endure the loss of their object or scene of desire, even though its presence threatens their well-being, because whatever the content of the attachment is, the continuity of the form of it provides something of the continuity of the subject's sense of what it means to keep on living on and to look forward to being in the world. This phrase points to a condition different than that of melancholia, which is enacted in the subject's desire to temporise an experience of the loss of an object/scene with which she has identified her ego continuity. Cruel optimism is the condition of maintaining an attachment to a problematic object. One more thing: the cruelty of an optimistic attachment is, I think, usually something an analyst observes about someone's or some group's attachment to x, since usually that attachment exists without being an event, or even better, seems to lighten the load for someone/some group.^ But if the cruelty of an attachment is experienced by someone/some group, even in disavowed fashion, the fear is that the loss of the object/scene of promising itself will defeat the capacity to have any hope about anything. Often this fear of loss of a scene of optimism as such is unstated and only experienced in a sudden incapacity to manage startling situations, as we will see below. One might point out that all objects/scenes of desire are problematic, in that investments in them and projections onto them are less about them than about what cluster of desires and affects we can manage to keep magnetised to them. I have indeed wondered whether all optimism is cruel, because the experience of loss of the conditions of its reproduction can be so breathtakingly bad, just as the threat of the loss of x in the scope of one's attachment drives can feel like a threat to living on itself. But some scenes of optimism are clearly crueller than others: where cruel optimism operates, the very vitalising or animating potency of an object/ scene of desire contributes to the attrition of the very thriving that is supposed to be made possible in the work of attachment in the first place. This might point to something as banal as a scouring love, but it also opens out to obsessive appetites, working for a living, patriotism, all kinds of things. One makes affective bargains about the costliness of one's attachments, usually unconscious ones, most of which keep one in proximity to the scene of desire/attrition. This means that a poetics of attachment always involves some splitting off of the story I can tell about wanting to be near x (as though x has autonomous qualities) from the activity of the emotional habitus I have constructed by having x in my life in order to be able to project out my endurance as proximity to the complex of what x seems to offer and proffer. To understand cruel optimism, therefore, one must embark on an analysis of rhetorical indirection, as a way of thinking about the strange temporalities of projection into an enabling object that is also disabling. I learned how to do this from reading Barbara Johnson's work on apostrophe and free indirect discourse. In her poetics of indirection, each of these rhetorical modes is shaped by the ways a writing subjectivity conjures other ones so that, in a performance of fantasmatic intersubjectivity, the writer gains superhuman observational authority, enabling a performance of being made possible by the proximity of the object. Because this object is something like what I am describing in the optimism of attachment, I'll describe a bit the shape of my transference with her thought. In 'Apostrophe, Animation, and Abortion,' which will be my key referent bere, Johnson tracks the political consequences of apostrophe for what has become foetal personhood: a silent, affectively present but physically displaced interlocutor (a lover, a foetus) is animated in speech as distant enough for a conversation but close enough to be imaginable by the speaker in whose head the entire scene is happening.' But the condition of projected possibility, of a hearing that cannot take place in the terms of its enunciation ('you' are not here, 'you' are eternally belated to the conversation with you that I am imagining) creates a fake present moment of intersubjectivity in which, nonetheless, a performance of address can take place. The present moment is made possible by the fantasy of you, laden with the x qualities I can project onto you, given your convenient absence. Apostrophe therefore appears to be a reaching out to a you, a direct movement from place x to y, but it is actually a turning back, an animating of a receiver on behalf of the desire to make something happen now that realises something in the speaker, makes the speaker more or differently possible, because she has admitted, in a sense, the importance of speaking for, as, and to, two: but only under the condition, and illusion, that the two is really (in) one. Apostrophe is thus an indirect, unstable, physically impossible but phenomenologically vitalising movement of rhetorical animation that permits subjects to suspend themselves in the optimism of a potential occupation of the same psychic space of others, the objects of desire who make you possible (by having some promising qualities, but also by not being there).'' Later work, such as on 'Muteness Envy,' elaborates Johnson's description of the gendered rhetorical politics of this projection of voluble intersubjectivity.'^ The paradox remains that the conditions of the lush submerging of one consciousness into another require a double negation: of the speaker's boundaries, so s/he can grow bigger in rhetorical proximity to the object of desire; and of the spoken of, who is more or less a powerful mute placeholder providing an opportunity for the speaker's imagination of her/his/their flourishing. Of course psychoanalytically speaking all intersubjectivity is impossible. It is a wish, a desire, and a demand for an enduring sense of being with and in x, and is related to that big knot that marks the indeterminate relation between a feeling of recognition and misrecognition - recognition is the misrecognition you can bear, a transaction that affirms you without, again, necessarily feeling good or accurate (it might idealise, it might affirm your monstrosity, it might mirror your desire to be nothing enough to live under the radar, it might feel just right, and so on).'' Johnson's work on projection shows that scenes of impossible identity, rhetorically rendered, open up meaning and knowledge by mining the negative - projective, boundary dissolving - spaces of attachment to the object of address who must be absent in order for the desiring subject of intersubjectivity to get some traction, to stabilise her proximity to the object/scene of promise. In free indirect discourse, a cognate kind of suspension, the circulation of this kind of merged and submerged observational subjectivity, has less pernicious outcomes, at least when Johnson reads Zora Neale Hurston's practice of it.' In a narrator's part-merging with a character's consciousness, say, free indirect discourse performs the impossibility of locating an observational intelligence in one or any body, and therefore forces the reader to transact a different, more open relation of unfolding to what she is reading, judging, being, and thinking she understands. In Jobnson's work such a transformative transaction through reading/speaking 'unfolds' the subject in a good way, despite whatever desires they may have not to become significantly different." In short, Johnson's work on projection is about the optimism of attachment, and is often itself optimistic about the negations and extensions of personhood that forms of suspended intersubjectivity demand from the reader. What follows is not so buoyant: this is an essay politicising Freud's observation that 'people never willingly abandon a libidinal position, not even, indeed, when a substitute is already beckoning to them'.^ It comes from a longer project about the politics, aesthetics, and projections of political depression. Political depression persists in affective judgments of the world's intractability - evidenced in affectlessness, apathy, coolness, cynicism, and so on - modes of what might be called detachment that are really not detached at all but constitute ongoing relations of sociality.'" The politically depressed position is manifested in the problem of the difficulty of detaching from life-building modalities that can no longer be said to be doing their work, and which indeed make obstacles to the desires that animate them; my archive tracks practices of self-interruption, self-suspension, and self-abeyance that indicate people's struggles to change, but not traumatically, the terms of value in which their life-making activity has been cast." Cruel optimism is, then, like all phases, a deictic, a phrase that points to a proximate location: as an analytic lever it is an incitement to inhabit and to track the affective attachment to what we call 'the good life,' which is for so many a bad life that wears out the subjects who nonetheless, and at the same time, find their conditions of possibility within it. My assumption is that the conditions of ordinary life in the contemporary world even of relative wealth, as in the US, are conditions of the attrition or the wearing out of the subject, and that the irony - that the labour of reproducing life in the contemporary world is also the activity of being worn out by it - has specific implications for thinking about the ordinariness of suffering, the violence of normativity, and the 'technologies of patience' or lag that enable a concept of the later to suspend questions of the cruelty of the now.'^ Cruel optimism is in this sense a concept pointing toward a mode of lived imminence, one that grows from a perception about the reasons people are not Bartlehy, do not prefer to interfere with varieties of immiseration, but choose to ride the wave of the system of attachment that they are used to, to syncopate with it, or to be held in a relation of reciprocity, reconciliation, or resignation that does not mean defeat by it. Or perhaps they move to normative form to get numb with the consensual promise, and to misrecognise that promise as an achievement. This essay traverses three episodes of suspension - from John Ashhery, Charles Johnson, and Ceoff Ryman - of the reproduction of habituated or normative life. These suspensions open up revelations about the promises that had clustered as people's objects of desire, stage moments of exuberance in the impasse near the normal, and provide tools for suggesting why these exuberant attachments keep ticking not like the time bomb they might be but like a white noise machine that provides assurance that what seems like static really is, after all, a rhythm people can enter into while they're dithering, tottering, bargaining, testing, or otherwise being worn out by the promises that they have attached to in this world.
| 12,612 |
<h4><strong>We can describe this condition as cruel optimism, an attachment to a possibility that is ultimately impossible or harmful. The affirmative comes at the cost of the detached apathy that explains how easily Harrison packs up and reads the 1AC all over again next round. This repetition is the basis for capitalism – the assigning of trauma to an object that is to be consumed AND commodified by subjects endlessly.</h4><p>Berlant 11</strong> [Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, Cruel Optimism, Routledge: Duke University Press, 2011, p. 33-6]</p><p><u><strong><mark>When we talk about an object of desire, we are really talking about</mark> a cluster of <mark>promises we want someone</mark> or something <mark>to make to us</mark> and make possible for us. This</u></strong> cluster of promises <u><strong>could be embedded in a person, a thing, an institution, a text</u></strong>, a norm, a bunch of cells, smells, <u><strong>a good idea - whatever</u></strong>. To phrase 'the object of desire' as a cluster of promises is to allow us to encounter what's incoherent or enigmatic in our attachments, not as confirmation of our irrationality but as an explanation for our sense of our endurance in the object, insofar as <u><strong><mark>proximity to the object means proximity to </mark>the cluster of things that the object <mark>promises</u></strong>,</mark> some of which may be clear to us while others not so much. <u><strong><mark>In other words, all attachments are optimistic. That does not mean</mark> that <mark>they</u></strong> </mark>all <u><strong><mark>feel optimistic</u></strong></mark>: one might dread, for example, returning to a scene of hunger or longing or the slapstick reiteration of a lover or parent's typical misrecognition. <u><strong><mark>But</mark> the surrender to the return to the scene where the object hovers in its potentialities is the operation of optimism as an affective form</u></strong>. In optimism<mark>, <u><strong>the subject leans toward promises contained within the </u></strong></mark>present moment of the <u><strong>encounter with their <mark>object</mark>.' <mark>'Cruel optimism' names</mark> a relation of <mark>attachment to</mark> compromised <mark>conditions of possibility</mark> <mark>whose realisation is</mark> discovered either to be <mark>impossible</u></strong></mark>, sheer fantasy, <u><strong><mark>or</u></strong></mark> too possible, and <u><strong><mark>toxic</strong></mark>. <mark>What's cruel</u></mark> about these attachments, and not merely inconvenient or tragic, <u><strong><mark>is</mark> that the <mark>subjects</mark> who have x in their lives <mark>might not well endure the loss of their object</mark> or scene of desire, even though <mark>its presence threatens their well-being</mark>, because whatever the content of the attachment is, the continuity of the form of it provides something of the continuity of the subject's sense of</strong> what it means to keep on living on and to look forward to being in the world</u>. This phrase points to a condition different than that of melancholia, which is enacted in the subject's desire to temporise an experience of the loss of an object/scene with which she has identified her ego continuity. <u><strong><mark>Cruel optimism is </mark>the condition of <mark>maintaining </mark>an<mark> attachment </mark>to a problematic object</u></strong>. One more thing: <u><strong>the cruelty of an optimistic attachment is</u></strong>, I think, usually <u><strong>something an analyst observes about someone's</u></strong> or some group's <u><strong>attachment</u></strong> to x, <u><strong>since usually <mark>that attachment</u></strong></mark> exists without being an event, or even better<u><strong>, <mark>seems to</mark> <mark>lighten the load for someone</u></strong></mark>/some group.^ But <u><strong>if the cruelty of an attachment is experienced by someone</u></strong>/some group, even in disavowed fashion, <u><strong>the fear is that the loss of the object</u></strong>/scene of promising itself <u><strong>will defeat the capacity to have any hope about anything</u></strong>. Often this fear of loss of a scene of optimism as such is unstated and only experienced in a sudden incapacity to manage startling situations, as we will see below. One might point out that all objects/scenes of desire are problematic, in that investments in them and projections onto them are less about them than about what cluster of desires and affects we can manage to keep magnetised to them. I have indeed wondered whether all optimism is cruel, because the experience of loss of the conditions of its reproduction can be so breathtakingly bad, just as the threat of the loss of x in the scope of one's attachment drives can feel like a threat to living on itself. But <u><strong>some scenes of optimism are clearly crueller than others: where cruel optimism operates, the very vitalising</u></strong> or animating <u><strong>potency of an object</u></strong>/ scene <u><strong>of desire contributes to the attrition of the very thriving that is supposed to be made possible in the work of attachment in the first place</u></strong>. This might point to something as banal as a scouring love, but it also opens out to obsessive appetites, working for a living, patriotism, all kinds of things. <u><strong>One makes affective bargains about the costliness of one's attachments, usually unconscious ones, most of which keep one in proximity to the scene of desire</u></strong>/attrition. This means that a poetics of attachment always involves some splitting off of the story I can tell about wanting to be near x (as though x has autonomous qualities) from the activity of the emotional habitus I have constructed by having x in my life in order to be able to project out my endurance as proximity to the complex of what x seems to offer and proffer. <u><strong>To understand cruel optimism</u></strong>, therefore, <u><strong>one must embark on</u></strong> an analysis of rhetorical indirection, as <u><strong>a way of thinking about the strange temporalities of projection into an</strong> <strong>enabling object that is also disabling</u></strong>. I learned how to do this from reading Barbara Johnson's work on apostrophe and free indirect discourse. In her poetics of indirection, each of these rhetorical modes is shaped by the ways a writing subjectivity conjures other ones so that, <u><strong>in a performance of fantasmatic intersubjectivity, the writer gains superhuman observational authority, enabling a performance of being made possible by the proximity of the object. Because this object is something like what I am describing in the optimism of attachment, I'll describe a bit the shape of my transference with her thought</u></strong>. In 'Apostrophe, Animation, and Abortion,' which will be my key referent bere, Johnson tracks the political consequences of apostrophe for what has become foetal personhood: a silent, affectively present but physically displaced interlocutor (a lover, a foetus) is animated in speech as distant enough for a conversation but close enough to be imaginable by the speaker in whose head the entire scene is happening.' But <u><strong><mark>the condition of projected possibility</u></strong></mark>, of a hearing that cannot take place in the terms of its enunciation ('you' are not here, 'you' are eternally belated to the conversation with you that I am imagining) <u><strong><mark>creates a fake</mark> present <mark>moment of intersubjectivity</mark> in which, nonetheless, a performance of address can take place. The present moment is <mark>made possible by the fantasy</u></strong> </mark>of you, <u><strong>laden with the</u></strong> x <u><strong>qualities I can project</u></strong> onto you, given your convenient absence. Apostrophe therefore appears to be a reaching out to a you, a direct movement from place x to y, but <u><strong>it is actually a turning back, an animating of a receiver on behalf of the desire to make something happen now that realises something in the speaker</u></strong>, makes the speaker more or differently possible, because she has admitted, in a sense, the importance of speaking for, as, and to, two: but only under <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong> </mark>condition, and <u><strong><mark>illusion</u></strong>,</mark> that the two is really (in) one. Apostrophe <u><strong><mark>is</mark> thus <mark>an</mark> indirect, unstable, physically <mark>impossible </mark>but phenomenologically vitalising <mark>movement </mark>of rhetorical animation <mark>that permits subjects to suspend themselves </mark>in the <mark>optimism of</mark> a potential <mark>occupation of the same psychic space of others</mark>, the objects of desire who make you possible</u></strong> (by having some promising qualities, but also by not being there).'' Later work, such as on 'Muteness Envy,' elaborates Johnson's description of the gendered rhetorical politics of this projection of voluble intersubjectivity.'^ The paradox remains that <u><strong>the conditions of the lush <mark>submerging </mark>of <mark>one consciousness into another require a double negation: of the speaker's boundaries</u></strong></mark>, so s/he can grow bigger in rhetorical proximity to the object of desire; <u><strong><mark>and of the spoken of, who is</u></strong></mark> more or less <u><strong>a</u></strong> powerful mute <u><strong>placeholder <mark>providing</mark> an <mark>opportunity for the speaker's imagination</u></strong></mark> of her/his/their flourishing. Of course <u><strong><mark>psychoanalytically speaking all intersubjectivity is impossible. It is</mark> a</u></strong> wish, a <u><strong>desire</u></strong>, and a demand for an enduring sense of being with and in x, and is related to that big knot <u><strong>that marks the indeterminate relation between a feeling of recognition and misrecognition</u></strong> - recognition is the misrecognition you can bear, <u><strong><mark>a transaction that affirms you without,</u></strong> </mark>again<mark>, <u><strong>necessarily feeling good</u></strong></mark> or accurate (it might idealise, <u><strong><mark>it might affirm</mark> your <mark>monstrosity</u></strong></mark>, it might mirror your desire to be nothing enough to live under the radar, it might feel just right, and so on).'' Johnson's work on projection shows that scenes of impossible identity, rhetorically rendered, open up meaning and knowledge by mining the negative - projective, boundary dissolving - spaces of attachment to the object of address who must be absent in order for the desiring subject of intersubjectivity to get some traction, to stabilise her proximity to the object/scene of promise. In free indirect discourse, a cognate kind of suspension, the circulation of this kind of merged and submerged observational subjectivity, has less pernicious outcomes, at least when Johnson reads Zora Neale Hurston's practice of it.' In a narrator's part-merging with a character's consciousness, say, free indirect discourse performs the impossibility of locating an observational intelligence in one or any body, and therefore forces the reader to transact a different, more open relation of unfolding to what she is reading, judging, being, and thinking she understands. In Jobnson's work such a transformative transaction through reading/speaking 'unfolds' the subject in a good way, despite whatever desires they may have not to become significantly different." In short, <u><strong>Johnson's work on projection is about the optimism of attachment</u></strong>, and is often itself optimistic about the negations and extensions of personhood that forms of suspended intersubjectivity demand from the reader. What follows is not so buoyant: this is an essay politicising Freud's observation that 'people never willingly abandon a libidinal position, not even, indeed, when a substitute is already beckoning to them'.^ It comes from a longer project about the politics, aesthetics, and projections of political depression<mark>. <u><strong>Political depression persists in affective judgments of</mark> the world's <mark>intractability</u></strong></mark> - evidenced in affectlessness, apathy, coolness, cynicism, and so on <mark>- <u><strong>modes of</mark> what might be called <mark>detachment that are really not detached at all but constitute ongoing relations of sociality.'" </mark>The politically depressed position is manifested in the problem of the difficulty of detaching from life-building modalities that can no longer be said to be doing their work, and which indeed make obstacles to the desires that animate them;</u></strong> my archive tracks practices of self-interruption, self-suspension, and self-abeyance that indicate people's struggles to change, but not traumatically, the terms of value in which their life-making activity has been cast." <u><strong><mark>Cruel optimism is</u></strong>,</mark> then, like all phases, a deictic, a phrase that points to a proximate location: as <u><strong><mark>an analytic lever</u></strong></mark> it is an incitement to inhabit and <u><strong><mark>to track</mark> the</u></strong> affective <u><strong><mark>attachment to</mark> what we call <mark>'the good life,' which is for so many a bad life that wears out the subjects who nonetheless</u></strong></mark>, and at the same time<u><strong>, <mark>find their conditions of possibility within it</u></mark>.</strong> My assumption is that <u><strong>the conditions of ordinary life</u></strong> in the contemporary world even of relative wealth, as in the US, <u><strong>are conditions of the</u></strong> attrition or the <u><strong>wearing out of the subject</u></strong>, and that the irony - that the labour of reproducing life in the contemporary world is also the activity of being worn out by it - has specific implications for thinking about the ordinariness of suffering, the violence of normativity, and the 'technologies of patience' or lag that enable a concept of the later to suspend questions of the cruelty of the now.'^ <u><strong><mark>Cruel optimism is</u></strong></mark> in this sense <u><strong>a concept pointing toward a mode of lived imminence</u></strong>, one that grows from a perception about <u><strong>the reasons people</u></strong> are not Bartlehy, do not prefer to interfere with varieties of immiseration, but <u><strong>choose <mark>to ride the wave of the system</mark> of attachment that they are used to, to syncopate with it, or to be held in a relation of reciprocity, reconciliation, or resignation that does not mean defeat by it</u></strong>. Or perhaps they move to normative form to get numb with the consensual promise, <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong></mark> to <u><strong><mark>misrecognise that</u></strong></mark> promise <u><strong><mark>as</mark> an <mark>achievement</u></strong></mark>. This essay traverses three episodes of suspension - from John Ashhery, Charles Johnson, and Ceoff Ryman - of the reproduction of habituated or normative life. These suspensions open up revelations about the promises that had clustered as people's objects of desire, stage moments of exuberance in the impasse near the normal, and provide tools for suggesting why <u>these exuberant attachments keep ticking not like the time bomb they might be but like a white noise machine that provides assurance that what seems like static really is, after all, a rhythm people can enter into while they're dithering, tottering, bargaining, testing, or otherwise being worn out </u><strong>by the promises that they have attached to in this world.</p></strong>
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1NC – Samantha
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1NC---OFF
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K – Psycho Cap
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./documents/hsld22/GreenhillSchool/AdKe/GreenhillSchool-AdKe-Neg-NDCA-Round-2.docx
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2
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Harrison SR
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Flores
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1AC - Fem
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hsld22/GreenhillSchool/AdKe/GreenhillSchool-AdKe-Neg-NDCA-Round-2.docx
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2023-03-25 20:23:33
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Greenhill School AdKe
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TX
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Biodiversity is resilient and inevitable
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Sagoff 8
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Sagoff 8 (Mark, Senior Research Scholar @ Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy @ School of Public Policy @ U. Maryland, Environmental Values, “On the Economic Value of Ecosystem Services”, 17:2, 239-257, EBSCO)
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Biodiversity represents nature's greatest excess species appear nearly as numerous as the stars scientists have a better understanding of how many stars there are in the galaxy than how many species there arc on Earth the variety of biodiversity is effectively infinite the myriad species of plants and animals, not to mention microbes exceed our ability to count or identify them The "next" or "incremental" thousand species taken at random would not fetch a market price because another thousand are immediately available and another thousand after that.
We do not know how many [plant] species are needed to keep the planet green and healthy, but it seems very unlikely to be anywhere near the more than quarter of a million we have now what biologist is willing to find a value for all 600,000-plus species of beetles?7*
The disappearance in the wild even of agriculturally useful species appears to have no effect on production The last wild aurochs, the progenitor of dairy and beef cattle, went extinct in Poland in 1742, yet no one believes the beef industry is threatened genetic material is contained in tens of thousands of landraces and does not depend on the persistence of wild ancestral types Genetic engineering can introduce DNA from virtually any species into virtually any other which allows for unlimited creation of biodiversity.
Biodiversity has no value "at the margin" because nature provides far more of it than anyone could possibly administer. If one kind of moth flies off, you can easily attract hundreds of others.
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Biodiversity represents nature's excess biodiversity is effectively infinite species exceed our ability to count
species needed to keep the planet healthy seem unlikely to be anywhere near the quarter million we have now
disappearance even of useful species have no effect genetic material is in landraces engineering can introduce DNA from any species into an other - which allows for unlimited biodiversity
Biodiversity has no value because nature provides far more than anyone could possibly administer.
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What about the economic value of biodiversity? Biodiversity represents nature's greatest largess or excess since species appear nearly as numerous as the stars the Drifters admired, except that "scientists have a better understanding of how many stars there are in the galaxy than how many species there arc on Earth."70 Worldwide the variety of biodiversity is effectively infinite; the myriad species of plants and animals, not to mention microbes that arc probably more important, apparently exceed our ability to count or identify them. The "next" or "incremental" thousand species taken at random would not fetch a market price because another thousand are immediately available, and another thousand after that. No one has suggested an economic application, moreover, for any of the thousand species listed as threatened in the United States.77 To defend these species - or the next thousand or the thousand after that - on economic grounds is to trade convincing spiritual, aesthetic, and ethical arguments for bogus, pretextual, and disingenuous economic ones.78 As David Ehrenfeld has written,
We do not know how many [plant] species are needed to keep the planet green and healthy, but it seems very unlikely to be anywhere near the more than quarter of a million we have now. Even a mighty dominant like the American chestnut, extending over half a continent, all but disappeared without bring¬ing the eastern deciduous forest down with it. And if we turn to the invertebrates, the source of nearly all biological diversity, what biologist is willing to find a value - conventional or ecological - for all 600,000-plus species of beetles?7*
The disappearance in the wild even of agriculturally useful species appears to have no effect on production. The last wild aurochs, the progenitor of dairy and beef cattle, went extinct in Poland in 1742, yet no one believes the beef industry is threatened. The genetic material of crop species is contained in tens of thousands of landraces and cultivars in use - rice is an example - and does not depend on the persistence of wild ancestral types. Genetic engineering can introduce DNA from virtually any species into virtually any other - which allows for the unlimited creation of biodiversity.
A neighbor of mine has collected about 4,000 different species of insects on his two-acre property in Silver Spring, Maryland. These include 500 kinds of Lepidoptera (mostly moths) - half the number another entomologist found at his residence.80 When you factor in plants and animals, the amount of "backyard biodiversity" in suburbs is astounding and far greater than you can imagine.8' Biodiversity has no value "at the margin" because nature provides far more of it than anyone could possibly administer. If one kind of moth flies off, you can easily attract hundreds of others.
| 2,832 |
<h4>Biodiversity is resilient and inevitable </h4><p><strong>Sagoff 8</strong> (Mark, Senior Research Scholar @ Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy @ School of Public Policy @ U. Maryland, Environmental Values, “On the Economic Value of Ecosystem Services”, 17:2, 239-257, EBSCO)</p><p>What about the economic value of biodiversity? <u><mark>Biodiversity represents nature's </mark>greatest</u> largess or <u><mark>excess</u></mark> since <u>species appear nearly as numerous as the stars</u> the Drifters admired, except that "<u>scientists have a better understanding of how many stars there are in the galaxy than how many species there arc on Earth</u>."70 Worldwide <u>the variety of <mark>biodiversity is <strong>effectively infinite</u></strong></mark>; <u>the myriad <mark>species</mark> of plants and animals, not to mention microbes</u> that arc probably more important, apparently <u><mark>exceed our ability to count</mark> or identify them</u>. <u>The "next" or "incremental" thousand species taken at random would not fetch a market price because another thousand are immediately available</u>, <u>and another thousand after that.</u> No one has suggested an economic application, moreover, for any of the thousand species listed as threatened in the United States.77 To defend these species - or the next thousand or the thousand after that - on economic grounds is to trade convincing spiritual, aesthetic, and ethical arguments for bogus, pretextual, and disingenuous economic ones.78 As David Ehrenfeld has written,</p><p><u>We do not know how many [plant] <mark>species</mark> are <mark>needed to keep the planet</mark> green and <mark>healthy</mark>, but it <mark>seem</mark>s very <mark>unlikely to be anywhere near the</mark> more than <mark>quarter</mark> of a <mark>million we have now</u></mark>. Even a mighty dominant like the American chestnut, extending over half a continent, all but disappeared without bring¬ing the eastern deciduous forest down with it. And if we turn to the invertebrates, the source of nearly all biological diversity, <u>what biologist is willing to find a value</u> - conventional or ecological - <u>for all 600,000-plus species of beetles?7<strong>*</p><p></strong>The <mark>disappearance</mark> in the wild <mark>even of </mark>agriculturally <mark>useful species </mark>appears to <mark>have <strong>no effect</strong></mark> on production</u>. <u>The last wild aurochs, the progenitor of dairy and beef cattle, went extinct in Poland in 1742, yet no one believes the beef industry is threatened</u>. The <u><mark>genetic material</u></mark> of crop species <u><mark>is</mark> contained <mark>in</mark> tens of thousands of <mark>landraces</u></mark> and cultivars in use - rice is an example - <u>and does not depend on the persistence of wild ancestral types</u>. <u>Genetic <mark>engineering can introduce DNA from</mark> virtually <strong><mark>any species into</mark> virtually <mark>an</mark>y<mark> other</u></strong> - <u>which allows for</u></mark> the <u><strong><mark>unlimited</mark> creation of <mark>biodiversity</mark>.</p><p></u></strong>A neighbor of mine has collected about 4,000 different species of insects on his two-acre property in Silver Spring, Maryland. These include 500 kinds of Lepidoptera (mostly moths) - half the number another entomologist found at his residence.80 When you factor in plants and animals, the amount of "backyard biodiversity" in suburbs is astounding and far greater than you can imagine.8' <u><mark>Biodiversity has <strong>no value</strong></mark> "at the margin" <mark>because nature provides far more</mark> of it <mark>than anyone could possibly administer.</mark> If one kind of moth flies off, you can easily attract hundreds of others.</p></u>
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2NC---NU R3
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FTC
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2NC---AT: Food Wars !
| 23,070 | 138 | 22,901 |
./documents/ndtceda21/MichiganStateUniversity/MeMi/Michigan%20State%20University-Meloche-Miklovis-Neg-Northwestern%20Season%20Opener-Round3.docx
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Northwestern Season Opener
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3
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Samford GT
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Gabriel Morbeck
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1AC - Crossborder MMAs
1NC -
- Plan flaw
- DA - FTC
- CP - Section 5
- NB - FTC Independence
- DA - Debt Ceiling PTX
- CP - Advantage
Block -
- CP - Section 5
- DA - Debt Ceiling PTX
2NR -
- CP - Section 5
- DA - Debt Ceiling PTX
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Michigan State University
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NDT/CEDA 2021-22
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college
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681,155 |
Action now is sufficient to solve
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Stern 15
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Stern 15 (Stern studied the Mathematical Tripos and was awarded a is Bachelor of Arts degree in mathematics at Peterhouse, Cambridge, and his DPhilEcon in economics at Nuffield College, Oxford with thesis on the rate of economic development and the theory of optimum planning in 1971 supervised by James Mirrlees, “Why Are We Waiting?: The Logic, Urgency, and Promise of Tackling Climate Change”, MIT Press, Apr 17, 2015)
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The scale of the problem and the risks we face if we fail to act are potentially immense It is possible to reduce these risks discussion has focused on the scale of action required to limit temperature increases to less than 2°C This is a widely accepted target in international discussion At temperature increases above 2°C, the probabilities of nonlinearities and tipping points are believed to increase greatly a higher probability of success would be preferable
It will be broadly necessary to hold concentrations of GHGs to below 500 ppm and reduce from there to give a reasonable chance of staying below 2°C A plausible emissions path would see global emissions fall from around 50 billion tonnes of CO2 to under 35 billion tonnes in 2030 We are likely to have to go well under 20 billion tonnes by 2050.
the emissions trend needs to change significantly and rapidly it could be very costly to catch up if we postpone actions.
think of there being only a certain allowance of total cumulative emissions a limited "carbon space" if we are to keep warming to only 2° the IPCC estimates the remaining “space” consistent with 2°C trajectories as being in the region of 1-1.5 trillion tonnes of CO2 Given that emissions rising, that space would be exhausted well before 40 years without strong action
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It is possible to reduce risks At above 2°C, the probabilities of nonlinearities and tipping points increase .
It will be necessary to hold concentrations of GHGs to below 500 ppm and reduce from there to give a reasonable chance of staying below 2°
the emissions trend needs to change
a limited "carbon space" that space would be exhausted before 40 years without strong action.
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The scale of the problem and the risks we face if we fail to act are potentially immense. It is possible to reduce these risks. Much discussion over recent years has focused on the scale of action required to limit temperature increases to less than 2°C from levels in the mid-nineteenth century. This is a widely accepted target in international discussion as a temperature beyond which climate change is "dangerous," and it is embodied in international agreements such as that of the UNFCCC in Cancun in December 2010. At temperature increases above 2°C, the probabilities of nonlinearities and tipping points are believed to increase greatly. Clearly, a higher probability of success would be preferable (for instance offering us at least a 66% chance of limiting the increase to 2°C). The target is sometimes expressed in terms of 66% but more often in terms of a 50-50 chance of a 2°C increase. We have to use such a formulation because outcomes are not defined with certainty and there is a probability distribution around any central estimate. Indeed, a 50% chance of going above "dangerous" levels is itself worrying, but this has been a standard benchmark.
It will be broadly necessary to hold concentrations of GHGs to below 500 ppm CO2e, and reduce from there, to give a reasonable (50%) chance of staying below 2°C. A plausible emissions path would see global emissions fall from around 50 billion tonnes of CO2e in 2013' to under 35 billion tonnes in 2030, and under 20 billion tonnes in 2050. We are actually likely to have to go well under 20 billion tonnes by 2050. We can do less now and more later. For example, with strong assumptions about the ability to go to zero or negative emissions in the second half of the century, the 35 billion tonnes in 2030 might be raised to 42.
Figure 1.2 illustrates the range of feasible paths we could follow that are consistent with at least a 50-50 chance of holding temperature increase to 2°C. The message is the same in all: for that objective, the emissions trend needs to change significantly and rapidly. While we can in principle do more earlier and less later, or vice versa, the shape of plausible paths will be similar, and it could be very costly to catch up if we postpone actions.
An alternative way of expressing future possible paths is to think of there being only a certain allowance of total cumulative emissions, remaining—a limited "carbon space"—if we are to keep warming to only 2°C. While figure 1.2 shows several emissions trajectories, the area und each curve is similar,' and it is this area that must fit into the "carbon space" remaining. New important reports such as from the IPCC estimates the remaining “space” consistent with 2°C trajectories as being in the region of 1-1.5 trillion tonnes of CO2 emissions. 29 To a rough approximation, 30 this is equivalent at the very most to current annual world CO2 emissions over a 40-year period. Given that emissions rising, that space would be exhausted well before 40 years without strong action.
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<h4>Action now is sufficient to solve</h4><p><strong>Stern 15 </strong>(Stern studied the Mathematical Tripos and was awarded a is Bachelor of Arts degree in mathematics at Peterhouse, Cambridge, and his DPhilEcon in economics at Nuffield College, Oxford with thesis on the rate of economic development and the theory of optimum planning in 1971 supervised by James Mirrlees, “Why Are We Waiting?: The Logic, Urgency, and Promise of Tackling Climate Change”, MIT Press, Apr 17, 2015)</p><p><u>The scale of the problem and the risks we face if we fail to act are potentially immense</u>. <u><strong><mark>It is possible to reduce</mark> these <mark>risks</u></strong></mark>. Much <u>discussion</u> over recent years <u>has focused on the scale of action required to limit temperature increases to less than 2°C</u> from levels in the mid-nineteenth century. <u>This is a widely accepted target in international discussion</u> as a temperature beyond which climate change is "dangerous," and it is embodied in international agreements such as that of the UNFCCC in Cancun in December 2010. <u><mark>At</mark> temperature increases <mark>above 2°C, <strong>the probabilities of nonlinearities and tipping points </mark>are believed to <mark>increase </mark>greatly</u></strong><mark>.</mark> Clearly, <u>a higher probability of success would be preferable</u> (for instance offering us at least a 66% chance of limiting the increase to 2°C). The target is sometimes expressed in terms of 66% but more often in terms of a 50-50 chance of a 2°C increase. We have to use such a formulation because outcomes are not defined with certainty and there is a probability distribution around any central estimate. Indeed, a 50% chance of going above "dangerous" levels is itself worrying, but this has been a standard benchmark.</p><p><u><strong><mark>It will be</mark> broadly <mark>necessary to hold concentrations of GHGs to below 500 ppm</u></strong></mark> CO2e, <u><mark>and reduce from there</u></mark>, <u><mark>to give a reasonable</u></mark> (50%) <u><mark>chance of staying below 2°</mark>C</u>. <u>A plausible emissions path would see global emissions fall from around 50 billion tonnes</u> <u>of CO2</u>e in 2013' <u>to under 35 billion tonnes in 2030</u>, and under 20 billion tonnes in 2050. <u>We are</u> actually <u>likely to have to go well under 20 billion tonnes by 2050.</u> We can do less now and more later. For example, with strong assumptions about the ability to go to zero or negative emissions in the second half of the century, the 35 billion tonnes in 2030 might be raised to 42. </p><p>Figure 1.2 illustrates the range of feasible paths we could follow that are consistent with at least a 50-50 chance of holding temperature increase to 2°C. The message is the same in all: for that objective, <u><strong><mark>the emissions trend needs to change </mark>significantly and rapidly</u></strong>. While we can in principle do more earlier and less later, or vice versa, the shape of plausible paths will be similar, and <u>it could be very costly to catch up if we postpone actions. </p><p></u>An alternative way of expressing future possible paths is to <u>think of there being only a certain allowance of total cumulative emissions</u>, remaining—<u><strong><mark>a limited "carbon space"</u></strong></mark>—<u>if we are to keep warming to only 2°</u>C. While figure 1.2 shows several emissions trajectories, the area und each curve is similar,' and it is this area that must fit into the "carbon space" remaining. New important reports such as from <u>the IPCC estimates the remaining “space” consistent with 2°C trajectories as being in the region of 1-1.5 trillion tonnes of CO2</u> emissions. 29 To a rough approximation, 30 this is equivalent at the very most to current annual world CO2 emissions over a 40-year period. <u><strong>Given that emissions rising, <mark>that space would be exhausted</mark> well <mark>before 40 years without strong action</u></strong>.</mark> </p>
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Jordon Newton
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1AC - Carbon Tax
1NC - CT Spec T Restriction Multilat CP GIP CP Elections Trade turn
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1NR - Trade Turn
2NR - Trade Turn
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Extinction
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Danielpour 14
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Danielpour 14 (Steven Danielpour, AIA, CSI, CCS, LEED AP BD+C, director of firmwide specifications at HOK, member of the corporate BuildingSmart, BIM, and Project Delivery boards, “Sustainable Coatings: Shifting the Paradigm,” D+D, April 2014, http://www.cristalactiv.com/uploads/press/2014-04%20Sustainable%20Coatings_Danielpour%20D+D%20April%202014.pdf)
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New technologies and processes will help deliver the innovations needed to respond to greatest challenges Continuing to build the way we have built, using the materials we have used for centuries, is no longer viable in light of diminishing energy, water and other resources. Key megatrends, including population growth, climate change and a proliferation of information, make sustainable coatings all the more critical to see the industry responding with advanced technologies that are healthier for building occupants and the environment, while achieving high performance and durability cutting-edge technologies, along with processes that reduce waste, reuse byproducts and allow reformulation into new products, promise game-changing improvements for coatings The logic is simple: If we continue to consume natural resources faster than they can be replenished, and if we produce wastes for future generations to deal with, we’ll have a harder and harder time maintaining life on Earth Scientific research on species extinction makes it clear that human survival depends on maintaining our ecological cycle, as well as those of other species and their habitats. Yet we’re barreling like a runaway train toward depleting some key resources Petrochemicals Water Resources Forests Statistics show that the annual rate of global deforestation is critical, because the remainder may be unable to sustain the environment needed for survival Waste Energy The numbers are grim, but designers and suppliers have real options for countering these trends Beyond the challenges we face in conserving scarce resources, a few key megatrends underscore the importance of sustainable coatings Population Growth Climate Change increasingly will affect industrialized farming and dense urban populations see more pressure to produce materials, products and assemblies that can withstand extreme variances in weather designing disaster-mitigation plans and hardening essential facilities and infrastructure Greater emphasis will be placed on energy efficiency and energy recovery, as well as water-resource management and conservation Information Explosion These health concerns are driving changes that have tremendous implications for New Regulations Technology Explosion The last 20 years of mergers and acquisitions led to large chemical plants manufacturing single resins. The future lies in small batch processing of custom chemicals and new processing technologies. These include nano-technology, micron-level changes to alter product performance; phase-changing materials, capable of storing and releasing large amounts of energy; and regenerative chemicals that respond to environmental changes for the chemical industry Alchemizing Toxic Chemicals: The storage of large quantities of toxic chemicals at various waste sites necessitates that we incorporate toxic chemicals in ways that alchemize them, creating non-toxic, stable, safe products that can be reused and recycled, without toxicity use of fly ash, the byproduct of coal manufacturing, as cement replacement in concrete production This activity will decrease chemical reservoirs of fly ash so that they no longer pose a health hazard The industry will produce healthier, environmentally sustainable chemicals and products that mitigate problems while maintaining performance and long life This effort will depend on greater cooperation among design professionals, chemical companies, manufacturers and fabricators The challenges and stakes we face are unprecedented in human history, but so are the opportunities
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New tech will deliver innovations needed to respond to diminishing energy, water and population growth, climate change Scientific research makes clear human survival depends on maintaining ecological cycle Yet we’re depleting key resources Petrochemicals Water global deforestation unable to sustain survival see pressure to design disaster-mitigation plans and harden essential infrastructure The future lies in custom chemicals and new processing tech for the chemical industry Alchemizing Chemicals will decrease reservoirs of fly ash health hazard The industry will produce healthier, environmentally sustainable chemicals that mitigate problems
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New technologies and processes will help deliver the innovations needed to respond to mankind’s greatest challenges, says HOK’s firmwide director of specifications. Whether you’re an architect or facility owner interested in ensuring healthy buildings and communities, a contractor navigating the many shades of “green” coatings or a supplier responding to market demand for these coatings, sustainability matters. But what makes a coating “sustainable” in the built environment, and why should we care? Wikipedia defines sustainability as “a characteristic of a process or state that can be maintained at a certain level indefinitely.” Production, distribution and application of sustainable coatings must meet current needs without compromising our ecosystems’ ability to sustain future populations. Continuing to build the way we have built, using the materials we have used for centuries, is no longer viable in light of diminishing energy, water and other resources. Key megatrends, including population growth, climate change and a proliferation of information, make sustainable coatings all the more critical. So it’s exciting to see the industry responding with advanced technologies that are healthier for building occupants and the environment, while achieving high performance and durability. We see it in such innovations as the newest generation of PVDF (polyvinylidene fluoride) coatings, polysiloxane coating systems, advanced anti-microbials and more. And just ahead we can expect to see phase-changing coatings that will respond chemically to cooler or warmer conditions, for instance, to improve energy efficiency in the building envelope. We may see roofing materials that reflect and absorb heat as appropriate, using phase-changing materials and nanotechnology. Such cutting-edge technologies, along with processes that reduce waste, reuse byproducts and allow reformulation into new products, promise game-changing improvements for coatings. Let’s take a closer look at the drivers that will make sustainable coatings increasingly important, and the processes and technologies on the horizon. Responding to Dwindling Resources The logic is simple: If we continue to consume natural resources faster than they can be replenished, and if we produce wastes for future generations to deal with, we’ll have a harder and harder time maintaining life on Earth as we know it. Scientific research on species extinction makes it clear that human survival depends on maintaining our ecological cycle, as well as those of other species and their habitats. Yet we’re barreling like a runaway train toward depleting some key resources. Petroleum: Petrochemicals, a necessary feedstock for high-performance coatings, derive from fossil fuels that took millions of years to create; they are not readily replenished. Sustainable resource management requires that we conserve irreplaceable resources through closed-loop manufacturing, reusing manufacturing byproducts and recycling waste into new products. Water Resources: Only 3 percent of the Earth’s water is potable, and most of this supply is locked in the polar ice cap. Just 0.003 percent of the world’s water is readily available for human consumption, and 16 percent of that is used to manufacture building materials and construct buildings. Worse yet, due to pollution, 40 percent of streams, 45 percent of lakes and 50 percent of estuaries in the United States were deemed not clean enough to support fishing and swimming in a 2000 Environmental Protection Agency study. The Index of Watershed Indicators reports that only 15 percent of our watershed has relatively good water quality. Forests: Rain forests play an important role in maintaining Earth’s air quality, absorbing carbon dioxide emissions and VOCs (volatile organic compounds), while replenishing the air with oxygen. Statistics show that the annual rate of global deforestation is equal to an area the size of the state of Georgia. This is critical, because it has been estimated that when more than 70 percent of an ecosystem is lost, the remainder may be unable to sustain the environment needed for survival. Waste: The United States generates enough garbage daily to fill 63,000 garbage trucks, which, lined up, would stretch 400 miles from Los Angeles to San Francisco. The building industry accounts for 20 percent of this waste stream. Energy: The U.S. Department of Energy estimates that improvements in U.S. building energy efficiency using existing technology could save $20 billion. Forty percent of the world’s energy is used to construct and operate buildings. The numbers are grim, but designers and suppliers have real options for countering these trends. We can employ what I like to call the Seven Principles of Sustainable Design: Use Low-Impact Materials: Select non-toxic, sustainably produced or recycled materials that require little energy to process. Promote Energy efficiency: Use less energy to manufacture more efficient products. Select for Quality and Durability: Use durable, longer-lasting and better-functioning products to minimize replacement frequency. Design for Reuse and Recycling: Design products, processes and systems for performance in a commercial “afterlife.” Employ Bio-Mimicry: Use scientific data to redesign industrial systems along biological lines, enabling the constant reuse of materials in continuous closed cycles. Substitute for High-Use Service: Shift modes of consumption from single ownership to public/shared ownership (e.g., private automobile to car-sharing service). Promote minimal resource use per unit of consumption. Choose Renewable Sources: Use materials extracted from nearby (local or bioregional), sustainably managed renewable sources that can be composted (or fed to livestock) when usefulness has been exhausted. Responding to a Changing Society Beyond the challenges we face in conserving scarce resources, a few key megatrends underscore the importance of sustainable coatings. Population Growth: World population doubled from 2.5 billion in 1950 to 5 billion in 1990; it is projected to reach 9.8 billion in 2050. The population is also shifting from rural areas to major metropolitan areas, with people migrating for better employment, commerce and quality of life. New construction will be required to support growth and urbanization. We’ll need to replace, upgrade, repurpose and conserve existing structures and infrastructures. Climate Change: Once mislabeled “global warming,” the significant, lasting change from relatively mild, predictable weather patterns to more unpredictable patterns increasingly will affect industrialized farming and dense urban populations. We’ll see more pressure to produce materials, products and assemblies that can withstand extreme variances in weather. Basic code-compliant solutions that are “good enough” today will no longer be acceptable. We’re now designing disaster-mitigation plans and hardening essential facilities and infrastructure, as new codes require mitigation of rising water levels and storms we once saw every 100 years. We can expect to see carbon dioxide emissions regulated, promoting net-zero buildings whose every feature is designed to reduce energy use and associated carbon emissions. Greater emphasis will be placed on energy efficiency and energy recovery, as well as water-resource management and conservation. Information Explosion: Information is growing exponentially, and a corollary increase in access to this information through the Internet means that people are more informed than ever about optimum human health and the risks associated with exposure to chemicals. We pore over studies seeking to define the “tipping point” for toxemia in terms of parts per billion of key compounds. We worry about information that links exposure to changes of DNA affecting future generations. These health concerns are driving changes that have tremendous implications for building materials. • New Regulations: States increasingly introduce regulations designed to control exposure and assure public health. The International Green Construction Code is now used for baseline sustainability in regular building codes. • VOC Limits: VOCs are regulated on the West Coast via the South Coast Air Quality Management District, and on the East Coast via the Ozone Transport Commission. Recent changes in California have lowered VOC limits to a maximum of 50 grams per liter in coatings. • New Organizations: The Living Building Challenge introduced a chemical “Red List” banning hazardous chemicals from use on projects. • More Transparency: As a result of requirements in LEED v4 for product transparency, manufacturers of products used on LEED projects must detail the chemical content of the products in HPDs (health product declarations) and EPDs (environmental protection declarations). • New Social Contract: Major petroleum chemical companies are forced to address the population’s desire to shift from oil and coal to natural gas and to renewable energy and biomass materials. Technology Explosion: The last 20 years of mergers and acquisitions led to large chemical plants manufacturing single resins. The future lies in small batch processing of custom chemicals and new processing technologies. These include nano-technology, micron-level changes to alter product performance; phase-changing materials, capable of storing and releasing large amounts of energy; and regenerative chemicals that respond to environmental changes. What do these megatrends mean for the chemical industry? They portend a shift in processes, standardization and approach. Closed-Loop Processes: Manufacturing closed loops are economically advantageous, reduce/ eliminate waste, reuse byproducts and allow reformulation into new products without downcycling. Shaw Carpet is one success story, creating nylon 6 fibers that can be recycled 100 percent into new carpet. Shaw’s activity resulted in record profits, as producing carpet with nylon 6 requires no new petrochemicals. Tightening of Standards/LCA: Life-cycle costing is the true measure of value instead of traditional first-cost thinking. That is important where better products require less maintenance. Tightening standards will help designers maintain quality through specifications. In fact, as coatings technologies advance, our reliance on standards increases. Standards organizations whose certifications for sustainable offerings fail to keep up with national programs, or whose certifications don’t perform as intended, will be bypassed. For coatings specific standard groups to survive, they must align with national standards and address high performance and durability. Stricter Guidelines: In the healthcare and science laboratory industries, stricter guidelines will be required to combat hospital-acquired infections and address the harsh chemicals/disinfectants necessary to stem infections. Alchemizing Toxic Chemicals: The storage of large quantities of toxic chemicals at various waste sites necessitates that we incorporate toxic chemicals in ways that alchemize them, creating non-toxic, stable, safe products that can be reused and recycled, without toxicity. For example, LEED supports the use of fly ash, the byproduct of coal manufacturing, as cement replacement in concrete production. This activity will decrease chemical reservoirs of fly ash so that they no longer pose a health hazard. Creating Coatings for the Future Coatings technology has evolved as manufacturers respond to market needs and awareness. Getting the Lead Out: For decades lead was added to paints and coatings to improve durability and color retention. Research into the hazards of lead paint, and lead dust, made the industry move from lead to safer alkyd formulations. Recent awareness of the high VOC content has led manufacturers to replace alkyds with lower-VOC acrylic latex systems. Where initial productions met market skepticism regarding performance and durability, formulation improvements now offer paint coatings with low VOCs and better performance, durability, color retention and color-hiding capability than older technologies. Improving Corrosion-Resistant Coatings: Corrosion-resistant coatings for architecturally exposed structural steel have been three-coat systems consisting of organic or inorganic zincrich primers, epoxy intermediate and aliphatic polyurethane topcoats as the most durable high-performance coatings. Advances in the last 20 years have led to two-coat polysiloxane coating systems that, for mild to moderate atmospheric exposure, provide excellent corrosion resistance along with color and gloss retention said to surpass that of polyurethanes. Improving Coatings to Protect Aluminum: Coatings to protect aluminum required chromate pretreatment for surface preparation and bonding of PVDF resin coatings. Awareness of the toxicity of hexavalent chromate prewashes led to development of coatings that do not need chromate prewashes but offer the same service life and durability. In addition, the EPA introduced a significant new use rule (SNUR) last September to limit/eliminate perfluorinated compounds (PFCs) in PVDF coatings in response to overwhelming evidence that these chemicals are persistent bioaccumulative toxicants. PFCs were used as surfactants to improve the bond between coatings and metals. Producers of PVDF coatings altered the chemistry to remove perfluorooctanoic acids. Combining PVDF coatings with acrylics, coatings companies created low-VOC, water-based PVDF coatings with the same performance as the solvent-based PVDFs and that can be applied in the field, making initial application and long-term maintenance easy. Other chemical companies altered the chemistry of PVDF coatings further, developing powder coatings that can be applied in the field or in the shop with the same performance as 20-year warrantable fluid-applied systems. Advancing Anti-Microbials: In high-performance interior coatings for laboratories and hospital facilities, epoxy paints and coatings recently have been replaced with two-component waterborne polyurethane systems based on advancements in polyurea technology. These systems provide high-durability coatings that can contain anti-microbial additives. They have great color retention and durability, while reducing dry time in shop preparations. Controlling Moisture in Buildings: Rain screen design and energy regulations led to improvement in the building energy envelope through creation of air barrier systems. Controlling the movement of moisture through the building envelope increases the durability and life of the thermal envelope. Fluid-applied air barriers face new challenges as IBC 2012 adopts NFPA 285, mandating assembly fire testing of the exterior envelope. Companies must alter formulations to respond to new requirements for fire test performance. Overcoming Issues of Fire-Resistant Chemicals: In the last year, fire-resistant coatings came under attack due to studies linking halogenated products to human health issues. Early formulations migrated, leaching chemicals in the environment. Independent research studies showed fire-retardant coatings to be carcinogenic and endocrine disruptors. Recent formulations provide more durability and intimate bond chemicals in chemical composition of insulation products to prevent leaching and the related hazards. However, the public damage sustained as a result of published reports has led makers of children’s clothing, bedding and toys to remove fire-resistant chemicals from their products. Some design professionals are pushing for building code legislation to remove the requirement that building insulation be fire resistant. So what developments can we expect in architectural coatings technology? Phase-Changing Technology: Phase-changing materials will become more mainstream to address changes in environmental conditions. Coatings will change chemistry in response to environmental changes. These coatings will improve the energy efficiency of the building envelope, while minimizing unwanted effects. Cool Roofing: Some debate surrounds cool roof technology. Reflective roof coatings help reduce energy demand during cooling cycles by reflecting heat from solar radiation. LEED points are available for use of cool roof coatings that help limit the heat island effect in urban environments. Recent research indicates that cool roofs are most effective in reducing the building energy use where the number of cooling days exceeds the number of heating days. Darker roofs may provide better energy performance in colder regions. However, water runoff from black roofs increases the temperature of water in rain and water runoff, and may be harmful to downstream biomes. Cool roof systems not only reduce the heat island effect locally, but also minimize this damage to ecosystems miles away. Titanium Dioxide Coatings: TiO2 coatings clean surfaces through photocatalytic action, using UV light to activate coatings to bond with carbon dioxide. They produce hydrocarbon runoff and oxygen and clean the environment. Here are some examples. • As a concrete additive, titanium dioxide maintains white concrete surfaces, minimizing maintenance, by de-bonding with carbon and dirt. It cleans the air by cycling and capturing carbon particles and VOCs. • In healthcare environments, TiO2 coatings may stimulate antimicrobial action. Operating rooms can “self-clean,” eliminating bacteria between operations by activating enzymatic action through exposure to UV, infrared or other spectral light. • In another application of TiO2 used as a photocatalyst, the technology is used to coat “self-cleaning glass.” While relatively expensive, such technologies may be valuable in polluted areas like China, where rains pose a durability threat to building materials that self-cleaning chemicals can mitigate. • Data reveal that indoor air quality is 10 times more toxic than exterior air. Tightening the building envelope has exacerbated this issue. Manufacturers have produced TiO2- based surface treatments that are activated by UV light to actively purify air when applied to interior and exterior surfaces. Reenvisioning What’s Possible These are exciting developments, but they’re just the beginning. Here are but a few innovations to look for in coming years. Regenerative Coatings. Such coatings alter their chemistry to respond to the environment in ways that are regenerative. For example, cool roof coatings will be developed to respond to hot days by reflecting light and to cold days by absorbing heat. This technology will be available through integration of phase-changing materials and nanotechnology. Better Insulation. Thinner, lighter, more efficient insulations will come down in price, become more mainstream and be adopted by building codes to increase thermal control of the interior environment. Inherently Fire-Resistant Coatings. These coatings will use nano-technology to produce products that are inherently flame and fire resistant, so fire retardants are not necessary. More broadly, we can expect the product transparency requirements in LEED v4 and chemical bans from groups like the Living Building Challenge to fundamentally change our approach to materials development and selection. The industry will produce healthier, environmentally sustainable chemicals and products that mitigate problems while maintaining performance and long life. This effort will depend on greater cooperation among design professionals, chemical companies, manufacturers and fabricators. It will take communication on individual projects, as well as collaboration through cross-industry channels. The challenges and stakes we face are unprecedented in human history, but so are the opportunities.
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<h4>Extinction</h4><p><strong>Danielpour 14</strong> (Steven Danielpour, AIA, CSI, CCS, LEED AP BD+C, director of firmwide specifications at HOK, member of the corporate BuildingSmart, BIM, and Project Delivery boards, “Sustainable Coatings: Shifting the Paradigm,” D+D, April 2014, http://www.cristalactiv.com/uploads/press/2014-04%20Sustainable%20Coatings_Danielpour%20D+D%20April%202014.pdf)</p><p><u><mark>New tech</mark>nologies and processes <mark>will</mark> help <mark>deliver</mark> the <strong><mark>innovations needed</strong> to respond to</u></mark> mankind’s <u>greatest challenges</u>, says HOK’s firmwide director of specifications. Whether you’re an architect or facility owner interested in ensuring healthy buildings and communities, a contractor navigating the many shades of “green” coatings or a supplier responding to market demand for these coatings, sustainability matters. But what makes a coating “sustainable” in the built environment, and why should we care? Wikipedia defines sustainability as “a characteristic of a process or state that can be maintained at a certain level indefinitely.” Production, distribution and application of sustainable coatings must meet current needs without compromising our ecosystems’ ability to sustain future populations. <u>Continuing to build the way we have built, using the materials we have used for centuries, is no longer viable in light of <mark>diminishing <strong>energy</strong>, <strong>water</strong> and</mark> other <strong>resources</strong>. Key megatrends, including <strong><mark>population growth</strong>, <strong>climate change</strong></mark> and a proliferation of information, make sustainable coatings all the more critical</u>. So it’s exciting <u>to see the industry responding with advanced technologies that are healthier for building occupants and the environment, while achieving high performance and durability</u>. We see it in such innovations as the newest generation of PVDF (polyvinylidene fluoride) coatings, polysiloxane coating systems, advanced anti-microbials and more. And just ahead we can expect to see phase-changing coatings that will respond chemically to cooler or warmer conditions, for instance, to improve energy efficiency in the building envelope. We may see roofing materials that reflect and absorb heat as appropriate, using phase-changing materials and nanotechnology. Such <u>cutting-edge technologies, along with processes that reduce waste, reuse byproducts and allow reformulation into new products, promise game-changing improvements for coatings</u>. Let’s take a closer look at the drivers that will make sustainable coatings increasingly important, and the processes and technologies on the horizon. Responding to Dwindling Resources <u>The logic is simple: If we continue to consume natural resources faster than they can be replenished, and if we produce wastes for future generations to deal with, we’ll have a harder and harder time <strong>maintaining life on Earth</u></strong> as we know it. <u><strong><mark>Scientific research</strong></mark> on species extinction <mark>makes</mark> it <mark>clear</mark> that <strong><mark>human survival</strong> depends on maintaining</mark> our <mark>ecological cycle</mark>, as well as those of other species and their habitats. <mark>Yet we’re</mark> barreling like a runaway train toward <mark>depleting</mark> some <mark>key resources</u></mark>. Petroleum: <u><strong><mark>Petrochemicals</u></strong></mark>, a necessary feedstock for high-performance coatings, derive from fossil fuels that took millions of years to create; they are not readily replenished. Sustainable resource management requires that we conserve irreplaceable resources through closed-loop manufacturing, reusing manufacturing byproducts and recycling waste into new products. <u><strong><mark>Water</mark> Resources</u></strong>: Only 3 percent of the Earth’s water is potable, and most of this supply is locked in the polar ice cap. Just 0.003 percent of the world’s water is readily available for human consumption, and 16 percent of that is used to manufacture building materials and construct buildings. Worse yet, due to pollution, 40 percent of streams, 45 percent of lakes and 50 percent of estuaries in the United States were deemed not clean enough to support fishing and swimming in a 2000 Environmental Protection Agency study. The Index of Watershed Indicators reports that only 15 percent of our watershed has relatively good water quality. <u>Forests</u>: Rain forests play an important role in maintaining Earth’s air quality, absorbing carbon dioxide emissions and VOCs (volatile organic compounds), while replenishing the air with oxygen. <u>Statistics show that the annual rate of <strong><mark>global deforestation</u></strong></mark> is equal to an area the size of the state of Georgia. This <u>is critical, because</u> it has been estimated that when more than 70 percent of an ecosystem is lost, <u>the remainder may be <strong><mark>unable to sustain</strong></mark> the environment <strong>needed for <mark>survival</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Waste</u></strong>: The United States generates enough garbage daily to fill 63,000 garbage trucks, which, lined up, would stretch 400 miles from Los Angeles to San Francisco. The building industry accounts for 20 percent of this waste stream. <u><strong>Energy</u></strong>: The U.S. Department of Energy estimates that improvements in U.S. building energy efficiency using existing technology could save $20 billion. Forty percent of the world’s energy is used to construct and operate buildings. <u>The numbers are grim, but designers and suppliers have real options for countering these trends</u>. We can employ what I like to call the Seven Principles of Sustainable Design: Use Low-Impact Materials: Select non-toxic, sustainably produced or recycled materials that require little energy to process. Promote Energy efficiency: Use less energy to manufacture more efficient products. Select for Quality and Durability: Use durable, longer-lasting and better-functioning products to minimize replacement frequency. Design for Reuse and Recycling: Design products, processes and systems for performance in a commercial “afterlife.” Employ Bio-Mimicry: Use scientific data to redesign industrial systems along biological lines, enabling the constant reuse of materials in continuous closed cycles. Substitute for High-Use Service: Shift modes of consumption from single ownership to public/shared ownership (e.g., private automobile to car-sharing service). Promote minimal resource use per unit of consumption. Choose Renewable Sources: Use materials extracted from nearby (local or bioregional), sustainably managed renewable sources that can be composted (or fed to livestock) when usefulness has been exhausted. Responding to a Changing Society <u>Beyond the challenges we face in conserving scarce resources, a few key megatrends underscore the importance of sustainable coatings</u>. <u><strong>Population Growth</u></strong>: World population doubled from 2.5 billion in 1950 to 5 billion in 1990; it is projected to reach 9.8 billion in 2050. The population is also shifting from rural areas to major metropolitan areas, with people migrating for better employment, commerce and quality of life. New construction will be required to support growth and urbanization. We’ll need to replace, upgrade, repurpose and conserve existing structures and infrastructures. <u><strong>Climate Change</u></strong>: Once mislabeled “global warming,” the significant, lasting change from relatively mild, predictable weather patterns to more unpredictable patterns <u>increasingly will affect industrialized farming and dense urban populations</u>. We’ll <u><mark>see</mark> more <mark>pressure to</mark> produce materials, products and assemblies that can withstand extreme variances in weather</u>. Basic code-compliant solutions that are “good enough” today will no longer be acceptable. We’re now <u><mark>design</mark>ing <strong><mark>disaster-mitigation</strong> plans and <strong>harden</strong></mark>ing <strong><mark>essential</strong></mark> facilities and <strong><mark>infrastructure</u></strong></mark>, as new codes require mitigation of rising water levels and storms we once saw every 100 years. We can expect to see carbon dioxide emissions regulated, promoting net-zero buildings whose every feature is designed to reduce energy use and associated carbon emissions. <u>Greater emphasis will be placed on energy efficiency and energy recovery, as well as water-resource management and conservation</u>. <u><strong>Information Explosion</u></strong>: Information is growing exponentially, and a corollary increase in access to this information through the Internet means that people are more informed than ever about optimum human health and the risks associated with exposure to chemicals. We pore over studies seeking to define the “tipping point” for toxemia in terms of parts per billion of key compounds. We worry about information that links exposure to changes of DNA affecting future generations. <u>These health concerns are driving changes that have tremendous implications for</u> building materials. • <u>New Regulations</u>: States increasingly introduce regulations designed to control exposure and assure public health. The International Green Construction Code is now used for baseline sustainability in regular building codes. • VOC Limits: VOCs are regulated on the West Coast via the South Coast Air Quality Management District, and on the East Coast via the Ozone Transport Commission. Recent changes in California have lowered VOC limits to a maximum of 50 grams per liter in coatings. • New Organizations: The Living Building Challenge introduced a chemical “Red List” banning hazardous chemicals from use on projects. • More Transparency: As a result of requirements in LEED v4 for product transparency, manufacturers of products used on LEED projects must detail the chemical content of the products in HPDs (health product declarations) and EPDs (environmental protection declarations). • New Social Contract: Major petroleum chemical companies are forced to address the population’s desire to shift from oil and coal to natural gas and to renewable energy and biomass materials. <u><strong>Technology Explosion</u></strong>: <u>The last 20 years of mergers and acquisitions led to large chemical plants manufacturing single resins. <mark>The future lies in</mark> small batch processing of <strong><mark>custom chemicals</strong> and <strong>new processing tech</mark>nologies</strong>. These include nano-technology, micron-level changes to alter product performance; phase-changing materials, capable of storing and releasing large amounts of energy; and regenerative chemicals that respond to environmental changes</u>. What do these megatrends mean <u><mark>for the <strong>chemical industry</u></strong></mark>? They portend a shift in processes, standardization and approach. Closed-Loop Processes: Manufacturing closed loops are economically advantageous, reduce/ eliminate waste, reuse byproducts and allow reformulation into new products without downcycling. Shaw Carpet is one success story, creating nylon 6 fibers that can be recycled 100 percent into new carpet. Shaw’s activity resulted in record profits, as producing carpet with nylon 6 requires no new petrochemicals. Tightening of Standards/LCA: Life-cycle costing is the true measure of value instead of traditional first-cost thinking. That is important where better products require less maintenance. Tightening standards will help designers maintain quality through specifications. In fact, as coatings technologies advance, our reliance on standards increases. Standards organizations whose certifications for sustainable offerings fail to keep up with national programs, or whose certifications don’t perform as intended, will be bypassed. For coatings specific standard groups to survive, they must align with national standards and address high performance and durability. Stricter Guidelines: In the healthcare and science laboratory industries, stricter guidelines will be required to combat hospital-acquired infections and address the harsh chemicals/disinfectants necessary to stem infections. <u><mark>Alchemizing</mark> Toxic <mark>Chemicals</mark>: The storage of large quantities of <strong>toxic chemicals</strong> at various waste sites necessitates that we incorporate toxic chemicals in ways that alchemize them, creating non-toxic, stable, safe products that can be reused and recycled, without toxicity</u>. For example, LEED supports the <u>use of fly ash, the byproduct of coal manufacturing, as cement replacement in concrete production</u>. <u>This activity <mark>will decrease</mark> chemical <mark>reservoirs of <strong>fly ash</strong></mark> so that they no longer pose a <mark>health hazard</u></mark>. Creating Coatings for the Future Coatings technology has evolved as manufacturers respond to market needs and awareness. Getting the Lead Out: For decades lead was added to paints and coatings to improve durability and color retention. Research into the hazards of lead paint, and lead dust, made the industry move from lead to safer alkyd formulations. Recent awareness of the high VOC content has led manufacturers to replace alkyds with lower-VOC acrylic latex systems. Where initial productions met market skepticism regarding performance and durability, formulation improvements now offer paint coatings with low VOCs and better performance, durability, color retention and color-hiding capability than older technologies. Improving Corrosion-Resistant Coatings: Corrosion-resistant coatings for architecturally exposed structural steel have been three-coat systems consisting of organic or inorganic zincrich primers, epoxy intermediate and aliphatic polyurethane topcoats as the most durable high-performance coatings. Advances in the last 20 years have led to two-coat polysiloxane coating systems that, for mild to moderate atmospheric exposure, provide excellent corrosion resistance along with color and gloss retention said to surpass that of polyurethanes. Improving Coatings to Protect Aluminum: Coatings to protect aluminum required chromate pretreatment for surface preparation and bonding of PVDF resin coatings. Awareness of the toxicity of hexavalent chromate prewashes led to development of coatings that do not need chromate prewashes but offer the same service life and durability. In addition, the EPA introduced a significant new use rule (SNUR) last September to limit/eliminate perfluorinated compounds (PFCs) in PVDF coatings in response to overwhelming evidence that these chemicals are persistent bioaccumulative toxicants. PFCs were used as surfactants to improve the bond between coatings and metals. Producers of PVDF coatings altered the chemistry to remove perfluorooctanoic acids. Combining PVDF coatings with acrylics, coatings companies created low-VOC, water-based PVDF coatings with the same performance as the solvent-based PVDFs and that can be applied in the field, making initial application and long-term maintenance easy. Other chemical companies altered the chemistry of PVDF coatings further, developing powder coatings that can be applied in the field or in the shop with the same performance as 20-year warrantable fluid-applied systems. Advancing Anti-Microbials: In high-performance interior coatings for laboratories and hospital facilities, epoxy paints and coatings recently have been replaced with two-component waterborne polyurethane systems based on advancements in polyurea technology. These systems provide high-durability coatings that can contain anti-microbial additives. They have great color retention and durability, while reducing dry time in shop preparations. Controlling Moisture in Buildings: Rain screen design and energy regulations led to improvement in the building energy envelope through creation of air barrier systems. Controlling the movement of moisture through the building envelope increases the durability and life of the thermal envelope. Fluid-applied air barriers face new challenges as IBC 2012 adopts NFPA 285, mandating assembly fire testing of the exterior envelope. Companies must alter formulations to respond to new requirements for fire test performance. Overcoming Issues of Fire-Resistant Chemicals: In the last year, fire-resistant coatings came under attack due to studies linking halogenated products to human health issues. Early formulations migrated, leaching chemicals in the environment. Independent research studies showed fire-retardant coatings to be carcinogenic and endocrine disruptors. Recent formulations provide more durability and intimate bond chemicals in chemical composition of insulation products to prevent leaching and the related hazards. However, the public damage sustained as a result of published reports has led makers of children’s clothing, bedding and toys to remove fire-resistant chemicals from their products. Some design professionals are pushing for building code legislation to remove the requirement that building insulation be fire resistant. So what developments can we expect in architectural coatings technology? Phase-Changing Technology: Phase-changing materials will become more mainstream to address changes in environmental conditions. Coatings will change chemistry in response to environmental changes. These coatings will improve the energy efficiency of the building envelope, while minimizing unwanted effects. Cool Roofing: Some debate surrounds cool roof technology. Reflective roof coatings help reduce energy demand during cooling cycles by reflecting heat from solar radiation. LEED points are available for use of cool roof coatings that help limit the heat island effect in urban environments. Recent research indicates that cool roofs are most effective in reducing the building energy use where the number of cooling days exceeds the number of heating days. Darker roofs may provide better energy performance in colder regions. However, water runoff from black roofs increases the temperature of water in rain and water runoff, and may be harmful to downstream biomes. Cool roof systems not only reduce the heat island effect locally, but also minimize this damage to ecosystems miles away. Titanium Dioxide Coatings: TiO2 coatings clean surfaces through photocatalytic action, using UV light to activate coatings to bond with carbon dioxide. They produce hydrocarbon runoff and oxygen and clean the environment. Here are some examples. • As a concrete additive, titanium dioxide maintains white concrete surfaces, minimizing maintenance, by de-bonding with carbon and dirt. It cleans the air by cycling and capturing carbon particles and VOCs. • In healthcare environments, TiO2 coatings may stimulate antimicrobial action. Operating rooms can “self-clean,” eliminating bacteria between operations by activating enzymatic action through exposure to UV, infrared or other spectral light. • In another application of TiO2 used as a photocatalyst, the technology is used to coat “self-cleaning glass.” While relatively expensive, such technologies may be valuable in polluted areas like China, where rains pose a durability threat to building materials that self-cleaning chemicals can mitigate. • Data reveal that indoor air quality is 10 times more toxic than exterior air. Tightening the building envelope has exacerbated this issue. Manufacturers have produced TiO2- based surface treatments that are activated by UV light to actively purify air when applied to interior and exterior surfaces. Reenvisioning What’s Possible These are exciting developments, but they’re just the beginning. Here are but a few innovations to look for in coming years. Regenerative Coatings. Such coatings alter their chemistry to respond to the environment in ways that are regenerative. For example, cool roof coatings will be developed to respond to hot days by reflecting light and to cold days by absorbing heat. This technology will be available through integration of phase-changing materials and nanotechnology. Better Insulation. Thinner, lighter, more efficient insulations will come down in price, become more mainstream and be adopted by building codes to increase thermal control of the interior environment. Inherently Fire-Resistant Coatings. These coatings will use nano-technology to produce products that are inherently flame and fire resistant, so fire retardants are not necessary. More broadly, we can expect the product transparency requirements in LEED v4 and chemical bans from groups like the Living Building Challenge to fundamentally change our approach to materials development and selection. <u><mark>The <strong>industry</strong> will produce <strong>healthier, environmentally sustainable chemicals</strong></mark> and products <mark>that <strong>mitigate problems</strong></mark> while maintaining performance and long life</u>. <u>This effort will depend on greater cooperation among design professionals, chemical companies, manufacturers and fabricators</u>. It will take communication on individual projects, as well as collaboration through cross-industry channels. <u>The challenges and stakes we face are unprecedented in human history, but so are the opportunities</u>. </p>
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Growth sustainable---technology removes dependence on nature and solves resource scarcity
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Adjaye 15
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John Asafu-Adjaye 15, associate professor of economics at the University of Queensland, et al., April 2015, “An Ecomodernist Manifesto,” http://www.ecomodernism.org/s/An-Ecomodernist-Manifesto.pdf
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human flourishing has taken a serious toll on natural, nonhuman environments and wildlife Humans use half of the planet’s ice-free land, mostly for pasture, crops, and production forestry. Of the land once covered by forests, 20 percent has been converted to human use. how is it possible that people are doing so much damage to natural systems without doing more harm to themselves? The role that technology plays in reducing humanity’s dependence on nature explains this paradox Human technologies, have made humans less reliant upon the many ecosystems that once provided their only sustenance, even as those same ecosystems have often been left deeply damaged.¶ Despite frequent assertions of fundamental “limits to growth,” there is still remarkably little evidence that human population and economic expansion will outstrip the capacity to grow food or procure critical material resources To the degree to which there are fixed physical boundaries to human consumption, they are so theoretical as to be functionally irrelevant With proper management, humans are at no risk of lacking sufficient agricultural land for food substitutes for other material inputs to human well-being can easily be found if those inputs become scarce or expensive There remain serious long-term environmental threats such as anthropogenic climate change ozone depletion, and ocean acidification. While these risks are difficult to quantify they could cause significant risk of catastrophic impacts on societies and ecosystems Much of the world’s population still suffers from more-immediate local environmental health risks air pollution continue to bring premature death and illness to millions annually Water pollution and water-borne illness due to pollution and degradation of watersheds cause similar suffering.¶ Even as human environmental impacts continue to grow in the aggregate, a range of long-term trends are today driving significant decoupling of human well-being from environmental impacts.¶ Decoupling occurs in relative and absolute terms. Relative decoupling means that human environmental impacts rise at a slower rate than overall economic growth for each unit of economic output, less environmental impact results Absolute decoupling occurs when total environmental impacts peak and begin to decline, even as the economy continues to grow.¶ Decoupling can be driven by both technological and demographic trends The growth rate of the human population has already peaked.
Today’s population growth rate is one percent per year, down from its high point in the 1970s. Fertility rates in countries containing more than half of the global population are now below replacement level. Population growth today is primarily driven by longer life spans and lower infant mortality it is very possible that the size of the human population will peak this century and then start to decline.¶ Trends in population are inextricably linked to other demographic and economic dynamics Cities are characterized by both dense populations and low fertility rates.¶ Cities occupy just one to three percent of the Earth’s surface and yet are home to nearly four billion people cities both drive and symbolize the decoupling of humanity from nature, performing better than rural economies in providing efficiently for material needs while reducing environmental impacts As agriculture has become more land and labor efficient, rural populations have left the countryside for the cities. Roughly half the US population worked the land in 1880. Today, less than 2 percent does.¶ As human lives have been liberated from hard agricultural labor, enormous human resources have been freed up for other endeavors Thanks to technological improvements in agriculture, during the half-century starting in the mid-1960s, the amount of land required for growing crops and animal feed for the average person declined by one-half.¶ Agricultural intensification, along with the move away from the use of wood as fuel, has allowed many parts of the world to experience net reforestation Human use of many other resources is similarly peaking. The amount of water needed for the average diet has declined by nearly 25 percent over the past half-century. in contradiction to the often-expressed fear of infinite growth colliding with a finite planet, demand for many material goods may be saturating as societies grow wealthier As demand for material goods is met, developed economies see higher levels of spending directed to materially less-intensive service and knowledge sectors, which account for an increasing share of economic activity. This dynamic might be even more pronounced in today’s developing economies, which may benefit from being late adopters of resource-efficient technologies.¶ these trends mean that the total human impact on the environment, including land-use change, overexploitation, and pollution, can peak and decline this century humans have the opportunity to re-wild and re-green the Earth even as developing countries achieve modern living standards, and material poverty ends.
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there is little evidence human population and economic expansion will outstrip resources boundaries to consumption are so theoretical as to be irrelevant humans are at no risk of lacking land substitutes for inputs can easily be found Even as environmental impacts grow long-term trends are driving decoupling environmental impacts rise slower than economic growth The growth rate of the population has peaked
cities drive decoupling performing better than rural economies in reducing environmental impacts Agricultural intensification has allowed net reforestation Human use of other resources is peaking water need for the average diet has declined resource-efficient tech trends mean the total impact on the environment can peak and decline this century
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At the same time, human flourishing has taken a serious toll on natural, nonhuman environments and wildlife. Humans use about half of the planet’s ice-free land, mostly for pasture, crops, and production forestry. Of the land once covered by forests, 20 percent has been converted to human use. Populations of many mammals, amphibians, and birds have declined by more than 50 percent in the past 40 years alone. More than 100 species from those groups went extinct in the 20th century, and about 785 since 1500. As we write, only four northern white rhinos are confirmed to exist.¶ Given that humans are completely dependent on the living biosphere, how is it possible that people are doing so much damage to natural systems without doing more harm to themselves?¶ The role that technology plays in reducing humanity’s dependence on nature explains this paradox. Human technologies, from those that first enabled agriculture to replace hunting and gathering, to those that drive today’s globalized economy, have made humans less reliant upon the many ecosystems that once provided their only sustenance, even as those same ecosystems have often been left deeply damaged.¶ Despite frequent assertions starting in the 1970s of fundamental “limits to growth,” there is still remarkably little evidence that human population and economic expansion will outstrip the capacity to grow food or procure critical material resources in the foreseeable future.¶ To the degree to which there are fixed physical boundaries to human consumption, they are so theoretical as to be functionally irrelevant. The amount of solar radiation that hits the Earth, for instance, is ultimately finite but represents no meaningful constraint upon human endeavors. Human civilization can flourish for centuries and millennia on energy delivered from a closed uranium or thorium fuel cycle, or from hydrogen-deuterium fusion. With proper management, humans are at no risk of lacking sufficient agricultural land for food. Given plentiful land and unlimited energy, substitutes for other material inputs to human well-being can easily be found if those inputs become scarce or expensive.¶ There remain, however, serious long-term environmental threats to human well-being, such as anthropogenic climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion, and ocean acidification. While these risks are difficult to quantify, the evidence is clear today that they could cause significant risk of catastrophic impacts on societies and ecosystems. Even gradual, non-catastrophic outcomes associated with these threats are likely to result in significant human and economic costs as well as rising ecological losses.¶ Much of the world’s population still suffers from more-immediate local environmental health risks. Indoor and outdoor air pollution continue to bring premature death and illness to millions annually. Water pollution and water-borne illness due to pollution and degradation of watersheds cause similar suffering.¶ 2¶ Even as human environmental impacts continue to grow in the aggregate, a range of long-term trends are today driving significant decoupling of human well-being from environmental impacts.¶ Decoupling occurs in both relative and absolute terms. Relative decoupling means that human environmental impacts rise at a slower rate than overall economic growth. Thus, for each unit of economic output, less environmental impact (e.g., deforestation, defaunation, pollution) results. Overall impacts may still increase, just at a slower rate than would otherwise be the case. Absolute decoupling occurs when total environmental impacts — impacts in the aggregate — peak and begin to decline, even as the economy continues to grow.¶ Decoupling can be driven by both technological and demographic trends and usually results from a combination of the two.¶ The growth rate of the human population has already peaked.
Today’s population growth rate is one percent per year, down from its high point of 2.1 percent in the 1970s. Fertility rates in countries containing more than half of the global population are now below replacement level. Population growth today is primarily driven by longer life spans and lower infant mortality, not by rising fertility rates. Given current trends, it is very possible that the size of the human population will peak this century and then start to decline.¶ Trends in population are inextricably linked to other demographic and economic dynamics. For the first time in human history, over half the global population lives in cities. By 2050, 70 percent are expected to dwell in cities, a number that could rise to 80 percent or more by the century’s end. Cities are characterized by both dense populations and low fertility rates.¶ Cities occupy just one to three percent of the Earth’s surface and yet are home to nearly four billion people. As such, cities both drive and symbolize the decoupling of humanity from nature, performing far better than rural economies in providing efficiently for material needs while reducing environmental impacts.¶ The growth of cities along with the economic and ecological benefits that come with them are inseparable from improvements in agricultural productivity. As agriculture has become more land and labor efficient, rural populations have left the countryside for the cities. Roughly half the US population worked the land in 1880. Today, less than 2 percent does.¶ As human lives have been liberated from hard agricultural labor, enormous human resources have been freed up for other endeavors. Cities, as people know them today, could not exist without radical changes in farming. In contrast, modernization is not possible in a subsistence agrarian economy.¶ These improvements have resulted not only in lower labor requirements per unit of agricultural output but also in lower land requirements. This is not a new trend: rising harvest yields have for millennia reduced the amount of land required to feed the average person. The average per-capita use of land today is vastly lower than it was 5,000 years ago, despite the fact that modern people enjoy a far richer diet. Thanks to technological improvements in agriculture, during the half-century starting in the mid-1960s, the amount of land required for growing crops and animal feed for the average person declined by one-half.¶ Agricultural intensification, along with the move away from the use of wood as fuel, has allowed many parts of the world to experience net reforestation. About 80 percent of New England is today forested, compared with about 50 percent at the end of the 19th century. Over the past 20 years, the amount of land dedicated to production forest worldwide declined by 50 million hectares, an area the size of France. the “forest transition” from net deforestation to net reforestation seems to be as resilient a feature of development as the demographic transition that reduces human birth rates as poverty declines.¶ Human use of many other resources is similarly peaking. The amount of water needed for the average diet has declined by nearly 25 percent over the past half-century. Nitrogen pollution continues to cause eutrophication and large dead zones in places like the Gulf of Mexico. While the total amount of nitrogen pollution is rising, the amount used per unit of production has declined significantly in developed nations.¶ Indeed, in contradiction to the often-expressed fear of infinite growth colliding with a finite planet, demand for many material goods may be saturating as societies grow wealthier. Meat consumption, for instance, has peaked in many wealthy nations and has shifted away from beef toward protein sources that are less land intensive.¶ As demand for material goods is met, developed economies see higher levels of spending directed to materially less-intensive service and knowledge sectors, which account for an increasing share of economic activity. This dynamic might be even more pronounced in today’s developing economies, which may benefit from being late adopters of resource-efficient technologies.¶ Taken together, these trends mean that the total human impact on the environment, including land-use change, overexploitation, and pollution, can peak and decline this century. By understanding and promoting these emergent processes, humans have the opportunity to re-wild and re-green the Earth — even as developing countries achieve modern living standards, and material poverty ends.
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<h4>Growth sustainable---technology removes dependence on nature and solves resource scarcity </h4><p>John Asafu-<strong>Adjaye 15</strong>, associate professor of economics at the University of Queensland, et al., April 2015, “An Ecomodernist Manifesto,” http://www.ecomodernism.org/s/An-Ecomodernist-Manifesto.pdf</p><p>At the same time, <u>human flourishing has taken a serious toll on natural, nonhuman environments and wildlife</u>. <u>Humans use</u> about <u>half of the planet’s ice-free land, mostly for pasture, crops, and production forestry. Of the land once covered by forests, 20 percent has been converted to human use. </u>Populations of many mammals, amphibians, and birds have declined by more than 50 percent in the past 40 years alone. More than 100 species from those groups went extinct in the 20th century, and about 785 since 1500. As we write, only four northern white rhinos are confirmed to exist.¶ Given that humans are completely dependent on the living biosphere, <u>how is it possible that people are doing so much damage to natural systems without doing more harm to themselves?</u>¶ <u>The role that technology plays in reducing humanity’s dependence on nature explains this paradox</u>. <u>Human technologies,</u> from those that first enabled agriculture to replace hunting and gathering, to those that drive today’s globalized economy, <u>have made humans <strong>less reliant</strong> upon the many ecosystems that once provided their only sustenance, even as those same ecosystems have often been left deeply damaged.¶ Despite frequent assertions</u> starting in the 1970s <u>of fundamental “limits to growth,” <mark>there is </mark>still remarkably <strong><mark>little evidence</strong></mark> that <mark>human population and economic expansion will outstrip</mark> the capacity to grow food or procure critical material <mark>resources</u></mark> in the foreseeable future.¶ <u>To the degree to which there are fixed physical <mark>boundaries to </mark>human <mark>consumption</mark>, they <mark>are so theoretical as to be</mark> <strong>functionally <mark>irrelevant</u></strong></mark>. The amount of solar radiation that hits the Earth, for instance, is ultimately finite but represents no meaningful constraint upon human endeavors. Human civilization can flourish for centuries and millennia on energy delivered from a closed uranium or thorium fuel cycle, or from hydrogen-deuterium fusion. <u>With proper management, <mark>humans are at <strong>no risk</strong> of lacking </mark>sufficient agricultural <mark>land</mark> for food</u>. Given plentiful land and unlimited energy, <u><mark>substitutes for</mark> other material <mark>inputs</mark> to human well-being <mark>can easily be found</mark> if those inputs become scarce or expensive</u>.¶ <u>There remain</u>, however, <u>serious long-term environmental threats</u> to human well-being, <u>such as anthropogenic climate change</u>, stratospheric <u>ozone depletion, and ocean acidification. While these risks are difficult to quantify</u>, the evidence is clear today that <u>they could cause significant risk of catastrophic impacts on societies and ecosystems</u>. Even gradual, non-catastrophic outcomes associated with these threats are likely to result in significant human and economic costs as well as rising ecological losses.¶ <u>Much of the world’s population still suffers from more-immediate local environmental health risks</u>. Indoor and outdoor <u>air pollution continue to bring premature death and illness to millions annually</u>. <u>Water pollution and water-borne illness due to pollution and degradation of watersheds cause similar suffering.¶ </u>2¶ <u><mark>Even as</mark> human <mark>environmental impacts</mark> continue to <mark>grow</mark> in the aggregate, a range of <mark>long-term trends are </mark>today <mark>driving</mark> significant <mark>decoupling</mark> of human well-being from environmental impacts.¶ Decoupling occurs in</u> both <u>relative and absolute terms. Relative decoupling means that human <mark>environmental impacts rise</mark> at a <mark>slower</mark> rate <mark>than</mark> overall <mark>economic growth</u></mark>. Thus, <u>for each unit of economic output, less environmental impact</u> (e.g., deforestation, defaunation, pollution) <u>results</u>. Overall impacts may still increase, just at a slower rate than would otherwise be the case. <u>Absolute decoupling occurs when total environmental impacts</u> — impacts in the aggregate — <u>peak and begin to decline, even as the economy continues to grow.¶ Decoupling can be driven by both technological and demographic trends</u> and usually results from a combination of the two.¶ <u><strong><mark>The growth rate of the</mark> human <mark>population has </mark>already <mark>peaked</strong></mark>. </p><p>Today’s population growth rate is one percent per year, down from its high point</u> of 2.1 percent <u>in the 1970s. Fertility rates in countries containing more than half of the global population are now below replacement level. Population growth today is primarily driven by longer life spans and lower infant mortality</u>, not by rising fertility rates. Given current trends, <u>it is very possible that the size of the human population will peak this century and then start to decline.¶ Trends in population are inextricably linked to other demographic and economic dynamics</u>. For the first time in human history, over half the global population lives in cities. By 2050, 70 percent are expected to dwell in cities, a number that could rise to 80 percent or more by the century’s end. <u>Cities are characterized by both dense populations and low fertility rates.¶ Cities occupy just one to three percent of the Earth’s surface and yet are home to nearly four billion people</u>. As such, <u><mark>cities</mark> both <mark>drive</mark> and symbolize the <mark>decoupling</mark> of humanity from nature, <mark>performing</u></mark> far <u><mark>better than rural economies in</mark> providing efficiently for material needs while <mark>reducing environmental impacts</u></mark>.¶ The growth of cities along with the economic and ecological benefits that come with them are inseparable from improvements in agricultural productivity.<u> As agriculture has become more land and labor efficient, rural populations have left the countryside for the cities. Roughly half the US population worked the land in 1880. Today, less than 2 percent does.¶ As human lives have been liberated from hard agricultural labor, enormous human resources have been freed up for other endeavors</u>. Cities, as people know them today, could not exist without radical changes in farming. In contrast, modernization is not possible in a subsistence agrarian economy.¶ These improvements have resulted not only in lower labor requirements per unit of agricultural output but also in lower land requirements. This is not a new trend: rising harvest yields have for millennia reduced the amount of land required to feed the average person. The average per-capita use of land today is vastly lower than it was 5,000 years ago, despite the fact that modern people enjoy a far richer diet. <u>Thanks to <strong>technological improvements</strong> in agriculture, during the half-century starting in the mid-1960s, the amount of land required for growing crops and animal feed for the average person declined by one-half.¶ <mark>Agricultural intensification</mark>, along with the move away from the use of wood as fuel, <mark>has allowed</mark> many parts of the world to experience <strong><mark>net reforestation</u></strong></mark>. About 80 percent of New England is today forested, compared with about 50 percent at the end of the 19th century. Over the past 20 years, the amount of land dedicated to production forest worldwide declined by 50 million hectares, an area the size of France. the “forest transition” from net deforestation to net reforestation seems to be as resilient a feature of development as the demographic transition that reduces human birth rates as poverty declines.¶ <u><mark>Human use of </mark>many <mark>other resources is </mark>similarly <mark>peaking</mark>. The amount of <strong><mark>water</strong> need</mark>ed<mark> for the average diet has declined</mark> by nearly 25 percent over the past half-century.</u> Nitrogen pollution continues to cause eutrophication and large dead zones in places like the Gulf of Mexico. While the total amount of nitrogen pollution is rising, the amount used per unit of production has declined significantly in developed nations.¶ Indeed, <u>in contradiction to the often-expressed fear of infinite growth colliding with a finite planet, demand for many material goods may be saturating as societies grow wealthier</u>. Meat consumption, for instance, has peaked in many wealthy nations and has shifted away from beef toward protein sources that are less land intensive.¶ <u>As demand for material goods is met, developed economies see higher levels of spending directed to materially less-intensive service and knowledge sectors, which account for an increasing share of economic activity. This dynamic might be even more pronounced in today’s developing economies, which may benefit from being late adopters of <mark>resource-efficient tech</mark>nologies.¶ </u>Taken together, <u>these <mark>trends mean</mark> that <mark>the total </mark>human <mark>impact on the environment</mark>, including land-use change, overexploitation, and pollution, <strong><mark>can peak and decline this century</u></strong></mark>. By understanding and promoting these emergent processes, <u>humans have the opportunity to re-wild and re-green the Earth</u> — <u>even as developing countries achieve modern living standards, and material poverty ends.</p></u>
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| 14,533 | 506 | 114,284 |
./documents/ndtceda17/Georgia/HoHa/Georgia-Hoover-Haskins-Aff-00%20NDT-Round1.docx
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Harvard AM
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Najor, Hagney, Lepp
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1ac- single payer econ and pandemics advs
1nc-Stiegler k disease interventions turn on pandemics adv pandemics defense financial crises inevitable on econ econ d
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ndtceda17/Georgia/HoHa/Georgia-Hoover-Haskins-Aff-00%20NDT-Round1.docx
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2. Admin costs. Micro-costing studies prove solving them is both necessary AND sufficient for growth. Single payer is key---the best case multi-payer reforms are nine times less efficient. Our estimates are conservative.
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Jiwani et al. 14
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Jiwani et al. 14. Super Models for Global Health; City University School of Public Health @ Hunter College; Philip R. Lee Institute for Health Policy Studies @ UCSF. 11/13/2014. “Billing and Insurance-Related Administrative Costs in United States’ Health Care: Synthesis of Micro-Costing Evidence.” BMC Health Services Research, vol. 14. PubMed Central, doi:10.1186/s12913-014-0556-7.
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In a well-functioning sound administration is required In the U S however, the complex structure of health financing has led to a large and growing administrative burden In 1993, administrative personnel accounted for 27% of the health care workforce costs as a percentage of total spending more than doubled between 1980 and 2010 Private insurers’ overhead costs have also increased sharply rising 117 percent between 2001 to 2010 In the U.S. multi-payer system, insurers’ coverage, billing and eligibility requirements often vary greatly requiring providers to incur added administrative effort and cost These payment-related activities can be termed “billing and insurance-related” (BIR) BIR activities include functions related to interacting with payers including filing claims obtaining prior authorizations and managed care administration On the payer side, most administrative functions are billing related Insurers’ [and] profits also contribute to BIR costs. Several studies have used micro-costing methods to quantify the portion of administrative costs attributable to BIR activities the specific analytical methods and components included in the analyses vary, rendering estimates mostly non-comparable Thus, results cannot be easily combined into a system-wide estimate. To address this problem, we synthesized available micro-costing data on BIR costs We use an explicit, consistent, and comprehensive definition of BIR to calculate BIR costs in well-studied sectors; estimate the portion of BIR spending in other provider sectors; and present a system-wide estimate of total BIR costs in the U.S. health care system in 2012 We also calculate potential savings from a system with simplified financing by comparing measured BIR in US health care sectors to lower levels observed with different financing mechanisms
We defined added BIR as the costs of BIR activities that exceed those in systems with simplified BIR requirements For physicians, hospitals and other providers, we used Canada’s single-payer system for comparison. For private and public insurers, we used U.S. Medicare as a comparator. We calculated added BIR costs for physicians, hospitals and other health services/supplies as: Added BIR = Total BIR in U.S. sector ×(BIR in U.S. sector – BIR in Canadian sector)/BIR in U.S. sector For private and public insurers, we calculated added BIR costs as: Added insurer BIR = Total insurer BIR × (Insurer overhead – U.S. Medicare overhead)/Insurer overhead
analysis findings based on using Canada’s Medicare as a comparison system for calculating added BIR among U.S. insurers
we varied our baseline estimate of 27% by 5 percentage points in either direction
About $375 billion 80% of annual BIR costs constitutes additional spending compared to a simplified financing system This 80% reflects 73% savings among provider sectors and 93% savings in the private insurance sector
Varying the BIR cost ratios for the hospital and non-physician health service and supplies sectors as described above, and using the lower and upper bound estimates of total BIR in each sector, we obtained a plausible range for overall added BIR costs in the U.S. of $254 - $507 billion
If BIR costs were pared to that of benchmark systems, system-wide savings would exceed $350 billion per year. Total BIR costs currently represent about 18% of U.S. health care expenditures Non-BIR administrative activities represent an additional 9.4% leaving less than 73% for clinical care Added BIR costs of $375 billion translate to 14.7% of U.S. health care expenditures in 2012, or 2.4% of GDP
Woolhandler et al. estimated total administrative spending in the U.S. health care system in 1999 at $294.3 billion, with added spending of $209 billion when compared to Canada Adjusting their estimates to 2012 health spending yields estimated added costs of $448 billion, an estimate that falls within the upper bound of our sensitivity analysis The earlier study assessed total administrative costs, not just BIR spending a simplified payment system that blunts entrepreneurial incentives as in Canada might reduce non-BIR administrative costs for such items as marketing and internal cost accounting. our estimate of total and added BIR is likely conservative on three accounts First, we assume no BIR spending outside of the direct health sector Since employment-based coverage is pervasive in the U.S., documentation of BIR costs of employers might well augment the estimates Second, for providers, we assume that costs such as public relations and marketing are incurred for non-BIR reasons. This assumption might underestimate added costs, since such non-BIR administrative costs might also be lower in a simplified financing system. Finally, new evidence comparing total hospital administrative costs in the U.S. to Canada and other OECD countries suggests that added BIR for hospitals may be substantially higher than our base case estimate Since these added costs are a function of the structure of the U.S. multi-payer system, some might characterize these costs as excess in that that they provide little to no added value any unmeasured benefit would have to be large to offset added BIR costs at least one study has found that higher administrative costs are associated with lower quality Hence, reducing BIR costs by adopting a simplified financing system would provide substantial recurring savings and produce an unequivocal benefit controls might be employed in single payer systems while maintaining lower BIR costs. Eliminating added BIR costs of $375 billion per year would provide resources to extend and improve insurance coverage within current expenditure levels Since uninsured individuals have utilization of about 50% of insured individuals the current 15% uninsured could be covered with roughly half of the $375 billion Remaining savings could be applied to improved coverage for those already insured. Full financial analyses of single payer insurance reform formalize and extend these analyses recent reforms incorporated in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) are unlikely to substantially reduce BIR costs and administrative burden Moreover, greater use of deductibles under the ACA will likely further increase administrative costs, since each claim will require processing and value adjustment before determining whether the deductible has been met. Thus, the new system will incur some new BIR costs for both the insured and uninsured portion of care. While it was hoped that incentives for adoption of health information technology would reduce costs, partly by streamlining billing and administration savings have not materialized Indeed, it appears that HIT will impose hefty implementation and training costs and may require ongoing expenditures for IT upgrades and maintenance Moreover, the ACA’s emphasis on financial incentives such as pay-for-performance may well increase administrative complexity and hence costs simplifying administrative activities within the existing multi-payer system by implementing a range of standardization, automation and enrollment stabilization reforms could save $40 billion annually While these savings are significant the annual administrative savings under a single-payer system would be nearly nine-fold higher Though some argue that shifting to a single payer system could propagate unintended financial hazards overutilization and inefficiencies utilization controls can be employed in simplified financing systems while also keeping BIR costs down evidence from the U.S. Medicare program and the systems of several other countries [1] demonstrates that large, unified payers can achieve significantly greater efficiencies than multi-payer systems Unified payment schemes enjoy economies of scale, sharply reduce the burdens of claims processing, and obviate the need for marketing, advertising and underwriting expenses. Implementation of a simplified financing system offers the potential for substantial administrative savings, on the order of $375 billion annually
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In the U S complex financing led to a growing admin burden insurers’ requirements vary greatly requiring added effort and cost in functions related to filing claims obtaining authorizations managed care billing [and] profits
About $375 billion 80% constitutes additional spending This reflects 93% savings in private insurance
a range for overall added costs of $507 billion
If costs were pared system-wide savings would exceed 2.4% of GDP
a simplified system that blunts entrepreneurial incentives (as in Canada) might reduce costs for marketing and internal accounting our estimate is conservative new evidence suggests added BIR may be substantially higher these costs provide no added value Eliminating costs would extend and improve coverage, within current expenditure current uninsured could be covered with half Remaining savings could improve coverage deductibles increase costs, since each claim will require processing simplifying multi-payer could save $40 billion While significant annual admin savings under single-payer would be nine-fold higher unified payers achieve significantly greater efficiencies enjoy economies of scale, sharply reduce claims and obviate marketing, advertising and underwriting
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***BIR = billing and insurance-related costs, a subset of administrative costs
Background In a well-functioning health care system, sound administration is required to ensure efficient operations and quality outcomes. In the United States however, the complex structure of health care financing has led to a large and growing administrative burden [1]. In 1993, administrative personnel accounted for 27% of the health care workforce, a 40% increase over 1968 [2]. Similarly, administrative costs as a percentage of total health care spending more than doubled between 1980 and 2010 [3]. Private insurers’ overhead costs have also increased sharply, rising 117 percent between 2001 to 2010 [4]. In the U.S. multi-payer system, insurers’ coverage, billing and eligibility requirements often vary greatly, requiring providers to incur added administrative effort and cost [5]. These payment-related activities can be termed “billing and insurance-related” (BIR) [6]. On the provider side, BIR activities include functions related to interacting with payers, including filing claims, obtaining prior authorizations, and managed care administration. On the payer side, most administrative functions are billing related, with only a small portion spent on care-related issues [7]. Insurers’ [and] profits also contribute to BIR costs. Several studies have used micro-costing methods — cost estimates constructed from detailed classification of resource use or expenditures — to quantify the portion of administrative costs attributable to BIR activities in physician and hospital sectors. Though the specific set of methods used to estimate this cost varies by study, the general approach has been to identify the administrative functions related to BIR activities and use clinician interviews and/or surveys to determine the proportion of work time spent on these activities. In some studies, this process has been supplemented with additional interviews with non-clinical staff [8,9] and observations of work flows [9]. In California in 2001, the BIR component of administrative costs was as high as 61% for physicians (constituting 14% of revenue) and 51% for hospitals (6.6-10.8% of revenue) [7], with predominantly non-BIR activities such as scheduling and medical records management forming the rest of administrative spending. When adjusted to a standard definition of BIR, two other studies attributed 10-13% of revenue in physicians’ offices to BIR costs [9,10]. Though studies have documented BIR costs in physician and hospital sectors, the specific analytical methods and components included in the analyses vary, rendering estimates mostly non-comparable. Thus, results cannot be easily combined into a system-wide estimate. To address this problem, we synthesized available micro-costing data on BIR costs. We use an explicit, consistent, and comprehensive definition of BIR to calculate BIR costs in well-studied sectors; estimate the portion of BIR spending in other provider sectors; and present a system-wide estimate of total BIR costs in the U.S. health care system in 2012. We also calculate potential savings from a system with simplified financing, by comparing measured BIR in US health care sectors to lower levels observed with different financing mechanisms. This paper updates preliminary information developed for an Institute of Medicine roundtable on Value and Science-Driven Health Care [6]. It is intended to facilitate policy discussions about reducing the BIR component of administrative costs. Methods Overview Drawing on U.S. National Health Expenditures (NHE), existing research and publicly reported data, we estimated total and added BIR costs in the U.S. health care system in 2012. Our estimates included the following sectors: physician practices, hospitals, private insurers, public insurers and “other health services and supplies.” We assembled micro-costing estimates of total and added BIR costs from various studies [5,8], as well as the percentage of revenue spent on BIR [5,7,9,10]. We reconciled differences in methods and findings by adjusting estimates to include the same BIR activities, payers and cost categories (detailed below). We calculated total BIR costs for each sector as the product of the 2012 U.S. NHE for that sector and the proportion of that sector’s revenue used for BIR. To calculate added BIR costs, we adjusted our total estimates using benchmarks from simplified financing systems (detailed below). To assess the effect of input uncertainty, we performed multiple sensitivity analyses. Health system sectors We defined the sectors using categories designated as “personal health care” in the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ (CMS) accounting of NHEs, and in the case of payers, from the categories designated as “health insurance” [11] (Additional file 1: Table S1). Examples of categories included under “other health services and supplies” sector were nursing care, home health care, prescription drugs, and other medical products. Total BIR We calculated total BIR costs for each sector as: Total BIR costs = 2012 NHE × % revenue for BIR For example, 2012 projected NHE for physician and clinical services was $542.9 billion [11] and estimated average BIR costs for physicians as a percent of their gross revenues was 13% [5,7,9]. Thus, we calculated total BIR costs for physician practices in 2012 as $70.6 billion. Existing micro-costing estimates of BIR costs in physician practices vary substantially due to differences in analytic methods and BIR functional areas included in the analyses [5,7-9,12]. Rather than select only the estimates that were obtained based on the same BIR definition and analytic method, we undertook a systematic process to make evidence more directly comparable. To do this, we classified BIR into sub-components by type of cost (e.g. contracting, insurance verification, service coding, billing, information technology, overhead) and payer (e.g., private, public). We adjusted each cost study as necessary to include all costs (e.g., overhead) and payers (e.g. public payers), based on data from other cost studies and from the NHE. For example, our estimate of 13% revenue for BIR costs for physician practices is based on a synthesis of three published studies [5,7,9]. It includes BIR costs at multi-specialty, single-specialty primary care, and single-specialty surgical practices. Each study was adjusted for missing information. In the study by Morra and colleagues, the reported estimate of BIR costs at 8.5% of revenue accounted for both public and private payers, but did not include the full range of BIR functional areas in physician practices [5]. Thus, we adjusted the Morra estimate to include information technology, time for insurance verification, a portion of clinician coding of services, and overhead attributed to BIR administration. This translated to a total BIR of approximately 13.3% of revenue, or 12.2% of revenue if clinician coding is omitted. See Additional file 1: Table S2, for details of the synthesis transformations. We estimated that 8.5% of hospital revenue goes towards BIR activities, based on the mid-point value for hospitals found by Kahn and colleagues [7]. For public insurers, we estimated 3.1% of revenue for BIR, which is the blended mean overhead for Medicare and Medicaid [13]. Since the majority of administrative functions for private insurers are BIR, we assumed the full value of private insurer overhead, including profits, as the percentage of revenue for BIR. We estimated this at 18%, which we calculated as the total enrollment-weighted mean overhead for the 19 largest for-profit, publicly-traded insurers based on market capitalization [14], using 2010 data filed with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). Our estimate of private insurer BIR costs includes the administrative costs of private insurers for their administration of Medicare Advantage, Medicare Part D and Medicaid managed care. We added these costs from the 2011 historical NHE to the total estimate of BIR for private insurers. Recent data on BIR costs for categories within the “other health services and supplies” sector is absent from the literature, though some earlier data on total administrative costs is available. An analysis of 1999 data from a sample of nursing homes in California and home health agencies across the U.S. found administrative expenditures of approximately 19% and 35% of total expenditures, respectively [15]. We conservatively assumed that 10% of revenue for our other health services and supplies sector categories goes to BIR activities, which is the mean percentage from physician practices and hospitals. We vary these assumptions in sensitivity analyses. Table 1 shows the NHE and percent of revenue attributed to BIR for each sector.
[[TABLE 1 OMITTED]]
2012 U.S. National Health Expenditures, percent billing and insurance-related (BIR), and BIR proportion considered “added” Added BIR We defined added BIR as the costs of BIR activities that exceed those in systems with simplified BIR requirements. For physicians, hospitals and other providers, we used Canada’s single-payer system for comparison. For private and public insurers, we used U.S. Medicare as a comparator. We calculated added BIR costs for physicians, hospitals and other health services/supplies as: Added BIR = Total BIR in U.S. sector ×(BIR in U.S. sector – BIR in Canadian sector)/BIR in U.S. sector Morra and colleagues estimated annual BIR costs in physicians’ practices at $82,975 per physician in the U.S. versus $22,205 in Ontario, Canada [5], i.e., 73% lower. While data on BIR costs in U.S. hospitals exists [7], we found no comparable data on Canadian hospitals or Canadian or U.S. non-physician health service or supply sectors. We assumed an added proportion of 73% for these sectors. We varied these assumptions in sensitivity analyses. For private and public insurers, we calculated added BIR costs as: Added insurer BIR = Total insurer BIR × (Insurer overhead – U.S. Medicare overhead)/Insurer overhead Table 1 summarizes the proportion considered as the added BIR costs of the U.S. multi-payer system for each health care sector. Sensitivity analyses Excluding clinician coding of services BIR obligations likely require additional coding by clinicians, beyond that needed for clinical documentation, consuming up to 2.3% of physician revenue [9]. In our base case estimate of BIR costs in physician practices, we included 50% of the cost of coding. If we exclude clinician coding of services as a BIR function, we calculate a revised estimate of 12% for the percentage of physician revenue spent on BIR, based on the average of three studies [5,7,9]. Canadian medicare In the base case analysis, we use U.S. Medicare as a comparison system against which to estimate the added BIR costs of private and public insurers. Due to differing estimates of U.S. Medicare overhead (i.e. excluding versus including private insurer administration of medical plans) [16], we explored the effect of using Canada’s Medicare as an alternative comparator to calculate the excess BIR costs of U.S. insurers. We used an overhead estimate for Canada’s Medicare of 1.8% (2011 forecast) [17] (Additional file 1: Table S3).
***BEGIN TABLE S3---FROM SUPPLEMENTARY FILE***
Table S3: Sensitivity analysis findings based on using Canada’s Medicare as a comparison system for calculating added BIR among U.S. insurers
Sector
Total BIR costs
Added* BIR costs
Physicians
$70 billion
$49 billion
Hospitals
$74 billion
$54 billion
Other health services and supplies
$94 billion
$69 billion
Private insurers
$198 billion
$182 billion**
Public insurers
$35 billion
$15 billion***
TOTAL
$471 billion
$369 billion
* "Added" is defined as spending above the indicated benchmark comparison.
**Based on an “added” proportion of 0.90
***Based on an “added” proportion of 0.42
***END TABLE S3---FROM SUPPLEMENTARY FILE***
Total BIR Due to uncertainty in some sector-specific inputs, we varied the percentage of revenue for BIR for each sector to obtain a plausible range of total BIR costs. Where available, we used lower and upper bound estimates from the literature; where unavailable, we varied the estimates by up to ten percentage points, using wider variations when data was least certain, e.g., for the “other health services and supplies” sector. Varying the estimates in tandem, we obtained upper and lower bound estimates of total BIR costs across the U.S. health care system in 2012 (Additional file 1: Table S4). Added BIR For the “other health service and supplies” sector, we varied our baseline estimate of 27% (Canadian: U.S. BIR costs) by 5 percentage points in either direction. For the hospital sector, we calculated a new ratio of 8.1% (Canadian: U.S. BIR costs) based on published data on total (not just BIR) hospital administrative spending in the U.S. and Canada [15] (text on added costs, Additional file 1). Ethics statement This research did not involve human subjects and thus did not require ethics committee review. Total BIR Our base case calculation is that BIR costs in the U.S. totaled $471 billion in 2012. Physicians’ practices spent $70 billion on BIR activities, hospitals spent $74 billion, and the “other health service and supplies” sector spent an estimated $94 billion (Figure 1). Private insurers contributed the largest share of BIR costs, $198 billion; public insurers contributed $35 billion.
Total and added BIR costs (billions) by health care sector. Blue = total BIR; Orange = added BIR. Added defined as spending above indicated benchmark comparison. Physicians: synthesis range = $68-71 billion ... Added BIR About $375 billion (80%) of annual BIR costs constitutes additional spending compared to a simplified financing system. This 80% reflects 73% savings among provider sectors [5] and 93% savings in the private insurance sector. When compared to Canada’s single payer system, added BIR costs in U.S. physicians’ practices totaled $49 billion annually (Figure 1; Additional file 1: Table S3). In U.S. hospitals and “other health service and supplies” sectors, added BIR costs were $54 billion and $69 billion, respectively. When compared to BIR costs in U.S. Medicare, additional annual spending on BIR for private and public insurers totaled $185 billion and $18 billion, respectively (Figure 1). Figure 2 shows each health care sector’s share of total added BIR costs. Private insurers contributed much of added BIR spending at 49%, though providers collectively represented nearly half of the total.
[[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]]
Percentage of total U.S. added BIR costs by health care sector. Percentages indicate contribution towards total added BIR in the U.S. ($375 billion). Added is defined as spending above indicated benchmark comparison (Canada’s single payer system ... Sensitivity analysis Excluding clinician coding If clinician coding of services is excluded as a BIR activity, total and added BIR costs in physicians’ practices are reduced minimally to $65 billion and $48 billion, respectively. Canadian medicare Using Canada’s Medicare overhead (1.8%) [17] instead of U.S. Medicare’s (1.5%) [13] for comparison reduces added BIR costs for private and public insurers to $182 billion and $15 billion, respectively, yielding a revised estimate of $369 billion in overall added BIR costs (Additional file 1: Table S3). Total BIR Varying in tandem each of the sector-specific estimates of the percentage of revenue spent for BIR yields a plausible range for total 2012 BIR costs of $330 billion - $597 billion (Additional file 1: Table S4). Added BIR Varying the BIR cost ratios for the hospital and non-physician health service and supplies sectors as described above, and using the lower and upper bound estimates of total BIR in each sector, we obtained a plausible range for overall added BIR costs in the U.S. of $254 - $507 billion in 2012 (see Table 2).
[[TABLE 2 OMITTED]]
Lower and upper bound estimates of added billing and insurance-related (BIR) costs in the U.S. health care system a Discussion While published data exist on BIR costs for certain health care sectors, these isolated estimates do not provide the comprehensive portrayal needed to understand the overall costs of BIR in the U.S. health care system. First, studies of similar sectors have examined a varying set of BIR activities and costs, complicating straightforward comparisons and simple aggregation of existing component BIR costs. Akin to the tale of the blind men and the elephant [18], knowing bits of information about a few isolated pieces cannot construct an accurate picture of the whole. Second, and equally important, evidence on BIR costs in provider sectors other than physicians’ practices and hospitals is lacking from the published literature. Taken together, these realities have made it difficult for policymakers to grasp the total magnitude of health care administrative costs due to BIR activities. Our analyses, which synthesize available micro-costing data on BIR costs using a consistent definition of BIR and extrapolate data to sectors lacking estimates, present the first system-wide estimate of total BIR costs across the U.S. health care system. Synthesizing data from existing studies, our analyses indicate that BIR costs totaled $471 billion annually in the U.S in 2012; 80% of this represents additional costs when compared to a simplified financing system. If BIR costs were pared to that of benchmark systems, system-wide savings would exceed $350 billion per year. Total BIR costs currently represent about 18% of U.S. health care expenditures (excluding government public health activities). Non-BIR administrative activities represent an additional 9.4% [7], leaving less than 73% of spending for clinical care (Figure 3; details of estimation of non-BIR administrative costs in Additional file 1). Added BIR costs of $375 billion translate to 14.7% of U.S. health care expenditures in 2012, or 2.4% of GDP [19].
[[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]]
Allocation of spending for clinical care and administration in the U.S. health care system. Values represent share of 2012 U.S. Health Consumption Expenditures (minus government public health activities; i.e., ~$2.6 trillion). BIR = billing ... Our findings update and expand on previous estimates. Woolhandler et al. estimated total administrative spending in the U.S. health care system in 1999 at $294.3 billion, with added spending of $209 billion when compared to Canada [15]. Adjusting their estimates to 2012 health spending yields estimated added costs of approximately $448 billion, an estimate that falls within the upper bound of our sensitivity analysis. The earlier study assessed total administrative costs, not just BIR spending, and hence is not directly comparable to this study. However, a simplified payment system that blunts entrepreneurial incentives (as in Canada) might also reduce non-BIR administrative costs for such items as marketing and internal cost accounting. Our estimates of BIR costs in physicians’ practices are higher than previous studies, due to the more complete set of BIR activities, payers, and costs quantified in our analysis. Morra et al. estimated total BIR costs per U.S. physician of $82,975, translating to total and added BIR costs of $38 billion and $28 billion, respectively [5]. However, their analysis involved just a subset of BIR activities, as detailed above. Similarly, Heffernan et al’s [8,12] analysis, which was limited to private payers, estimated added BIR costs of $26 billion. After adjustment to encompass the entire scope of BIR activities, payers, and overhead costs, these earlier estimates are consistent with ours (Methods and Additional file 1: Table S2). Remaining differences are small – less than 5% of total BIR costs – and most likely explained by nuances in the questions used to obtain BIR costs. We present synthesis mid-point estimates of this small variation for all relevant analyses (Additional file 1: Table S2). Several caveats apply to our estimates. First, BIR estimates in the published literature are most robust for physicians’ practices, with limited information available for hospitals and almost no data for categories within the sector defined as “other health service and supplies.” Hence, we explored the effect of uncertainty in our estimates in sensitivity analyses. Second, our analyses assume that BIR can be distinguished from other administrative functions. This seems a fair assumption, given that consistent findings were obtained for similar activities using varied methods. Qualitative claims by physicians of the burden of BIR lend further support to this assumption [10]. Finally, our estimate of total and added BIR is likely conservative on three accounts. First, we assume no BIR spending outside of the direct health sector, e.g., by employers or patients. Since employment-based coverage is pervasive in the U.S., documentation of BIR costs of employers might well augment the estimates presented here. Second, for providers, we assume that costs such as public relations and marketing are incurred for non-BIR reasons. This assumption might underestimate added BIR costs, since such non-BIR administrative costs might also be lower in a simplified financing system. Finally, new evidence comparing total hospital administrative costs in the U.S. to Canada and other OECD countries suggests that added BIR for hospitals may be substantially higher than our base case estimate [20]. Since these added costs are a function of the structure of the U.S. multi-payer system, some might characterize these costs as excess, in that that they provide little to no added value to the health care system. If BIR functions produce secondary benefits, such as enhanced quality or utilization management, the high BIR costs in the U.S. might be justified. Some research suggests, for example, that prior authorization can reduce over-utilization of brand-name medications without reducing patient satisfaction [21]. It is also possible that BIR functions provide benefits that have not yet been quantified. Nonetheless, any unmeasured benefit would have to be large to offset added BIR costs. Moreover, at least one study has found that higher administrative costs are associated with lower quality [22]. Hence, reducing BIR costs by adopting a simplified financing system would provide substantial recurring savings and produce an unequivocal benefit from a societal perspective. It is worth noting also that a simplified financing system does not preclude utilization controls, and that such controls might be employed in single payer systems while maintaining lower BIR costs. Eliminating added BIR costs of $375 billion per year (14.7% of US health care spending) would provide resources to extend and improve insurance coverage, within current expenditure levels. Since uninsured individuals have utilization of about 50% of insured individuals [23], the current 15% uninsured could be covered with roughly half of the $375 billion. Remaining savings could be applied to improved coverage for those already insured. Full financial analyses of single payer insurance reform formalize and extend these analyses [24]. Unfortunately, recent reforms incorporated in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) are unlikely to substantially reduce BIR costs and administrative burden. Data on the BIR portion of administrative costs is not yet available in the published literature. Using the BIR cost percentages identified in this analysis as a starting point, we projected BIR costs under the ACA in 2014 and 2018. Our projections were based on estimated increases in the insured population in each health sector (i.e., 7 million more people covered by private insurance and 8 million more by Medicaid in 2014; 13 and 12 million more, respectively, in 2018) [25]. Assuming parallel increases in healthcare utilization, stable administrative complexity, and an initial cost of $5.8 million to operate the exchanges [26,27], we estimate that implementing the ACA will increase system-wide BIR costs by 5 − 7% ($24 − $34 billion) in 2014 and 9 − 11% ($45 − $55 billion) in 2018 (in 2014 USD). Moreover, greater use of deductibles under the ACA will likely further increase administrative costs, since each claim will require processing and value adjustment before determining whether the deductible has been met. Thus, the new system will incur some new BIR costs for both the insured and uninsured portion of care. Empirical evidence from similar reform in Massachusetts is not encouraging: exchanges added 4% to health plan costs [28], and the reform sharply increased administrative staffing compared with other states [29]. While it was hoped that the ARRA’s incentives for adoption of health information technology (HIT) would reduce costs, partly by streamlining billing and administration [30], savings have not materialized [31,32]. Indeed, it appears that HIT will impose hefty implementation and training costs [33], and may require ongoing expenditures for IT upgrades and maintenance [4]. Moreover, the ACA’s emphasis on financial incentives such as pay-for-performance may well increase administrative complexity, and hence costs [34]. A recent estimate suggests that simplifying administrative activities within the existing multi-payer system by implementing a range of standardization, automation and enrollment stabilization reforms could save $40 billion annually [35]. While these savings are significant, we estimate that the annual administrative savings under a single-payer system would be nearly nine-fold higher. Though some argue that shifting to a single payer system could propagate unintended financial hazards (i.e., overutilization) and inefficiencies, as discussed previously, utilization controls can be employed in simplified financing systems while also keeping BIR costs down. Moreover, evidence from the U.S. Medicare program and the systems of several other countries [1] demonstrates that large, unified payers can achieve significantly greater efficiencies than multi-payer systems. Unified payment schemes enjoy economies of scale, sharply reduce the burdens of claims processing, and obviate the need for marketing, advertising and underwriting expenses. Conclusions While the estimates presented here should continue to be refined through additional sector-specific research on BIR costs, the cost burden of BIR activities in the existing U.S. multi-payer health care system is clear. Implementation of a simplified financing system offers the potential for substantial administrative savings, on the order of $375 billion annually, which could cover all of the uninsured [36] and upgrade coverage for the tens of millions who are under-insured. Further research into the costs of BIR activities to employers and in areas such as home health care, nursing home care, and prescription drugs would augment the findings from this analysis. Data on BIR costs since implementation of the ACA is also needed to further illuminate the administrative effects of recent health reforms and provide additional tangible information for policy decision-making.
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<h4><strong>2. <u>Admin costs</u>. <u>Micro-costing studies</u> prove solving them is both <u>necessary</u> AND <u>sufficient</u> for growth. Single payer is key---the <u>best case</u> multi-payer reforms are <u>nine times less efficient</u>. Our estimates are <u>conservative</u>.</h4><p>Jiwani et al. 14</strong>. Super Models for Global Health; City University School of Public Health @ Hunter College; Philip R. Lee Institute for Health Policy Studies @ UCSF. 11/13/2014. “Billing and Insurance-Related Administrative Costs in United States’ Health Care: Synthesis of Micro-Costing Evidence.” BMC Health Services Research, vol. 14. PubMed Central, doi:10.1186/s12913-014-0556-7.</p><p>***BIR = billing and insurance-related costs, a <u>subset</u> of administrative costs</p><p>Background <u>In a well-functioning</u> health care system, <u>sound administration is required</u> to ensure efficient operations and quality outcomes. <u><mark>In the</u> <u><strong>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u>however, the</u> <u><strong><mark>complex</mark> structure</u></strong> <u>of health</u> care <u><mark>financing</mark> has <mark>led to a</u></mark> <u><strong>large and <mark>growing admin</mark>istrative <mark>burden</u></strong></mark> [1]. <u>In 1993, administrative personnel accounted for <strong>27%</u></strong> <u>of the health care workforce</u>, a 40% increase over 1968 [2]. Similarly, administrative <u>costs as a percentage of total</u> health care <u>spending <strong>more than doubled</u></strong> <u>between 1980 and 2010</u> [3]. <u><strong>Private insurers’ overhead costs</u></strong> <u>have also</u> <u><strong>increased sharply</u></strong>, <u>rising</u> <u><strong>117 percent</u></strong> <u>between 2001 to 2010</u> [4]. <u>In the U.S. multi-payer system, <mark>insurers’</mark> <strong>coverage, billing and eligibility <mark>requirements</strong></mark> often <strong><mark>vary greatly</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>requiring</mark> providers to incur <mark>added</mark> administrative <mark>effort and cost</u></mark> [5]. <u>These payment-related activities can be termed “billing and insurance-related” (BIR)</u> [6]. On the provider side, <u>BIR activities <mark>in</mark>clude</u> <u><mark>functions related to</u></mark> <u><strong>interacting with payers</u></strong>, <u>including</u> <u><strong><mark>filing claims</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>obtaining</mark> <strong>prior <mark>authorizations</u></strong></mark>, <u>and</u> <u><strong><mark>managed care</mark> administration</u></strong>. <u>On the payer side, most administrative functions are <strong><mark>billing</mark> related</u></strong>, with only a small portion spent on care-related issues [7]. <u>Insurers’ <mark>[and] <strong>profits</strong></mark> also contribute to BIR costs.</u> <u>Several studies have used micro-costing methods</u> — cost estimates constructed from detailed classification of resource use or expenditures — <u>to quantify the portion of administrative costs attributable to BIR activities</u> in physician and hospital sectors. Though the specific set of methods used to estimate this cost varies by study, the general approach has been to identify the administrative functions related to BIR activities and use clinician interviews and/or surveys to determine the proportion of work time spent on these activities. In some studies, this process has been supplemented with additional interviews with non-clinical staff [8,9] and observations of work flows [9]. In California in 2001, the BIR component of administrative costs was as high as 61% for physicians (constituting 14% of revenue) and 51% for hospitals (6.6-10.8% of revenue) [7], with predominantly non-BIR activities such as scheduling and medical records management forming the rest of administrative spending. When adjusted to a standard definition of BIR, two other studies attributed 10-13% of revenue in physicians’ offices to BIR costs [9,10]. Though studies have documented BIR costs in physician and hospital sectors, <u>the specific analytical methods and components included in the analyses vary, rendering estimates mostly</u> <u><strong>non-comparable</u></strong>. <u>Thus, results cannot be easily combined into a <strong>system-wide estimate</strong>.</u> <u>To address this problem, we <strong>synthesized available micro-costing data on BIR costs</u></strong>. <u>We use an explicit, consistent, and comprehensive definition of BIR to calculate BIR costs in well-studied sectors; estimate the portion of BIR spending in other provider sectors; and present a system-wide estimate of total BIR costs in the U.S. health care system in 2012</u>. <u>We also calculate potential <strong>savings from a system with simplified financing</u></strong>, <u>by comparing measured BIR in US health care sectors to</u> <u><strong>lower levels observed with different financing mechanisms</u></strong>. This paper updates preliminary information developed for an Institute of Medicine roundtable on Value and Science-Driven Health Care [6]. It is intended to facilitate policy discussions about reducing the BIR component of administrative costs. Methods Overview Drawing on U.S. National Health Expenditures (NHE), existing research and publicly reported data, we estimated total and added BIR costs in the U.S. health care system in 2012. Our estimates included the following sectors: physician practices, hospitals, private insurers, public insurers and “other health services and supplies.” We assembled micro-costing estimates of total and added BIR costs from various studies [5,8], as well as the percentage of revenue spent on BIR [5,7,9,10]. We reconciled differences in methods and findings by adjusting estimates to include the same BIR activities, payers and cost categories (detailed below). We calculated total BIR costs for each sector as the product of the 2012 U.S. NHE for that sector and the proportion of that sector’s revenue used for BIR. To calculate added BIR costs, we adjusted our total estimates using benchmarks from simplified financing systems (detailed below). To assess the effect of input uncertainty, we performed multiple sensitivity analyses. Health system sectors We defined the sectors using categories designated as “personal health care” in the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ (CMS) accounting of NHEs, and in the case of payers, from the categories designated as “health insurance” [11] (Additional file 1: Table S1). Examples of categories included under “other health services and supplies” sector were nursing care, home health care, prescription drugs, and other medical products. Total BIR We calculated total BIR costs for each sector as: Total BIR costs = 2012 NHE × % revenue for BIR For example, 2012 projected NHE for physician and clinical services was $542.9 billion [11] and estimated average BIR costs for physicians as a percent of their gross revenues was 13% [5,7,9]. Thus, we calculated total BIR costs for physician practices in 2012 as $70.6 billion. Existing micro-costing estimates of BIR costs in physician practices vary substantially due to differences in analytic methods and BIR functional areas included in the analyses [5,7-9,12]. Rather than select only the estimates that were obtained based on the same BIR definition and analytic method, we undertook a systematic process to make evidence more directly comparable. To do this, we classified BIR into sub-components by type of cost (e.g. contracting, insurance verification, service coding, billing, information technology, overhead) and payer (e.g., private, public). We adjusted each cost study as necessary to include all costs (e.g., overhead) and payers (e.g. public payers), based on data from other cost studies and from the NHE. For example, our estimate of 13% revenue for BIR costs for physician practices is based on a synthesis of three published studies [5,7,9]. It includes BIR costs at multi-specialty, single-specialty primary care, and single-specialty surgical practices. Each study was adjusted for missing information. In the study by Morra and colleagues, the reported estimate of BIR costs at 8.5% of revenue accounted for both public and private payers, but did not include the full range of BIR functional areas in physician practices [5]. Thus, we adjusted the Morra estimate to include information technology, time for insurance verification, a portion of clinician coding of services, and overhead attributed to BIR administration. This translated to a total BIR of approximately 13.3% of revenue, or 12.2% of revenue if clinician coding is omitted. See Additional file 1: Table S2, for details of the synthesis transformations. We estimated that 8.5% of hospital revenue goes towards BIR activities, based on the mid-point value for hospitals found by Kahn and colleagues [7]. For public insurers, we estimated 3.1% of revenue for BIR, which is the blended mean overhead for Medicare and Medicaid [13]. Since the majority of administrative functions for private insurers are BIR, we assumed the full value of private insurer overhead, including profits, as the percentage of revenue for BIR. We estimated this at 18%, which we calculated as the total enrollment-weighted mean overhead for the 19 largest for-profit, publicly-traded insurers based on market capitalization [14], using 2010 data filed with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). Our estimate of private insurer BIR costs includes the administrative costs of private insurers for their administration of Medicare Advantage, Medicare Part D and Medicaid managed care. We added these costs from the 2011 historical NHE to the total estimate of BIR for private insurers. Recent data on BIR costs for categories within the “other health services and supplies” sector is absent from the literature, though some earlier data on total administrative costs is available. An analysis of 1999 data from a sample of nursing homes in California and home health agencies across the U.S. found administrative expenditures of approximately 19% and 35% of total expenditures, respectively [15]. We conservatively assumed that 10% of revenue for our other health services and supplies sector categories goes to BIR activities, which is the mean percentage from physician practices and hospitals. We vary these assumptions in sensitivity analyses. Table 1 shows the NHE and percent of revenue attributed to BIR for each sector.</p><p>[[TABLE 1 OMITTED]]</p><p>2012 U.S. National Health Expenditures, percent billing and insurance-related (BIR), and BIR proportion considered “added” Added BIR <u>We defined added BIR as the costs of BIR activities that</u> <u><strong>exceed those in systems with simplified BIR requirements</u></strong>. <u>For physicians, hospitals and other providers, we used</u> <u><strong>Canada’s single-payer system</u></strong> <u>for comparison. For private and public insurers, we used <strong>U.S. Medicare</strong> as a comparator. We calculated added BIR costs for physicians, hospitals and other health services/supplies as: Added BIR = Total BIR in U.S. sector ×(BIR in U.S. sector – BIR in Canadian sector)/BIR in U.S. sector </u>Morra and colleagues estimated annual BIR costs in physicians’ practices at $82,975 per physician in the U.S. versus $22,205 in Ontario, Canada [5], i.e., 73% lower. While data on BIR costs in U.S. hospitals exists [7], we found no comparable data on Canadian hospitals or Canadian or U.S. non-physician health service or supply sectors. We assumed an added proportion of 73% for these sectors. We varied these assumptions in sensitivity analyses. <u>For private and public insurers, we calculated added BIR costs as: Added insurer BIR = Total insurer BIR × (Insurer overhead – U.S. Medicare overhead)/Insurer overhead </u>Table 1 summarizes the proportion considered as the added BIR costs of the U.S. multi-payer system for each health care sector. Sensitivity analyses Excluding clinician coding of services BIR obligations likely require additional coding by clinicians, beyond that needed for clinical documentation, consuming up to 2.3% of physician revenue [9]. In our base case estimate of BIR costs in physician practices, we included 50% of the cost of coding. If we exclude clinician coding of services as a BIR function, we calculate a revised estimate of 12% for the percentage of physician revenue spent on BIR, based on the average of three studies [5,7,9]. Canadian medicare In the base case analysis, we use U.S. Medicare as a comparison system against which to estimate the added BIR costs of private and public insurers. Due to differing estimates of U.S. Medicare overhead (i.e. excluding versus including private insurer administration of medical plans) [16], we explored the effect of using Canada’s Medicare as an alternative comparator to calculate the excess BIR costs of U.S. insurers. We used an overhead estimate for Canada’s Medicare of 1.8% (2011 forecast) [17] (Additional file 1: Table S3).</p><p>***BEGIN TABLE S3---FROM SUPPLEMENTARY FILE***</p><p>Table S3: Sensitivity <u><strong>analysis findings</u></strong> <u>based on using Canada’s Medicare as a comparison system for calculating <strong>added BIR among U.S. insurers</p><p></u>Sector</p><p>Total BIR costs</p><p>Added* BIR costs</p><p></strong>Physicians</p><p>$70 billion</p><p>$49 billion</p><p>Hospitals</p><p>$74 billion</p><p>$54 billion</p><p>Other health services and supplies</p><p>$94 billion</p><p>$69 billion</p><p>Private insurers</p><p>$198 billion </p><p>$182 billion**</p><p>Public insurers</p><p>$35 billion</p><p><strong>$15 billion***</p><p>TOTAL</p><p>$471 billion</p><p>$369 billion</p><p></strong>* "Added" is defined as spending above the indicated benchmark comparison. </p><p>**Based on an “added” proportion of 0.90</p><p>***Based on an “added” proportion of 0.42</p><p>***END TABLE S3---FROM SUPPLEMENTARY FILE***</p><p>Total BIR Due to uncertainty in some sector-specific inputs, we varied the percentage of revenue for BIR for each sector to obtain a plausible range of total BIR costs. Where available, we used lower and upper bound estimates from the literature; where unavailable, we varied the estimates by up to ten percentage points, using wider variations when data was least certain, e.g., for the “other health services and supplies” sector. Varying the estimates in tandem, we obtained upper and lower bound estimates of total BIR costs across the U.S. health care system in 2012 (Additional file 1: Table S4). Added BIR For the “other health service and supplies” sector, <u>we varied our baseline estimate of <strong>27%</u></strong> (Canadian: U.S. BIR costs) <u>by</u> <u><strong>5 percentage points in either direction</u></strong>. For the hospital sector, we calculated a new ratio of 8.1% (Canadian: U.S. BIR costs) based on published data on total (not just BIR) hospital administrative spending in the U.S. and Canada [15] (text on added costs, Additional file 1). Ethics statement This research did not involve human subjects and thus did not require ethics committee review. Total BIR Our base case calculation is that BIR costs in the U.S. totaled $471 billion in 2012. Physicians’ practices spent $70 billion on BIR activities, hospitals spent $74 billion, and the “other health service and supplies” sector spent an estimated $94 billion (Figure 1). Private insurers contributed the largest share of BIR costs, $198 billion; public insurers contributed $35 billion. </p><p>Total and added BIR costs (billions) by health care sector. Blue = total BIR; Orange = added BIR. Added defined as spending above indicated benchmark comparison. Physicians: synthesis range = $68-71 billion ... Added BIR <u><mark>About</u> <u><strong>$375 billion</u></strong></mark> (<u><strong><mark>80%</u></strong></mark>) <u>of annual BIR costs <mark>constitutes <strong>additional spending</mark> compared to a simplified financing system</u></strong>. <u><mark>This</mark> 80% <mark>reflects</u></mark> <u><strong>73% savings among provider sectors</u></strong> [5] <u>and</u> <u><strong><mark>93% savings in</mark> the <mark>private insurance</mark> sector</u></strong>. When compared to Canada’s single payer system, added BIR costs in U.S. physicians’ practices totaled $49 billion annually (Figure 1; Additional file 1: Table S3). In U.S. hospitals and “other health service and supplies” sectors, added BIR costs were $54 billion and $69 billion, respectively. When compared to BIR costs in U.S. Medicare, additional annual spending on BIR for private and public insurers totaled $185 billion and $18 billion, respectively (Figure 1). Figure 2 shows each health care sector’s share of total added BIR costs. Private insurers contributed much of added BIR spending at 49%, though providers collectively represented nearly half of the total.</p><p>[[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]]</p><p>Percentage of total U.S. added BIR costs by health care sector. Percentages indicate contribution towards total added BIR in the U.S. ($375 billion). Added is defined as spending above indicated benchmark comparison (Canada’s single payer system ... Sensitivity analysis Excluding clinician coding If clinician coding of services is excluded as a BIR activity, total and added BIR costs in physicians’ practices are reduced minimally to $65 billion and $48 billion, respectively. Canadian medicare Using Canada’s Medicare overhead (1.8%) [17] instead of U.S. Medicare’s (1.5%) [13] for comparison reduces added BIR costs for private and public insurers to $182 billion and $15 billion, respectively, yielding a revised estimate of $369 billion in overall added BIR costs (Additional file 1: Table S3). Total BIR Varying in tandem each of the sector-specific estimates of the percentage of revenue spent for BIR yields a plausible range for total 2012 BIR costs of $330 billion - $597 billion (Additional file 1: Table S4). Added BIR <u>Varying the BIR cost ratios for the hospital and non-physician health service and supplies sectors as described above, and using the lower and upper bound estimates of total BIR in each sector, we obtained <mark>a</mark> plausible <mark>range for overall added</mark> BIR <mark>costs</mark> in the U.S. <mark>of</u></mark> <u><strong>$254 - <mark>$507 billion</u></strong></mark> in 2012 (see Table 2).</p><p>[[TABLE 2 OMITTED]]</p><p>Lower and upper bound estimates of added billing and insurance-related (BIR) costs in the U.S. health care system a Discussion While published data exist on BIR costs for certain health care sectors, these isolated estimates do not provide the comprehensive portrayal needed to understand the overall costs of BIR in the U.S. health care system. First, studies of similar sectors have examined a varying set of BIR activities and costs, complicating straightforward comparisons and simple aggregation of existing component BIR costs. Akin to the tale of the blind men and the elephant [18], knowing bits of information about a few isolated pieces cannot construct an accurate picture of the whole. Second, and equally important, evidence on BIR costs in provider sectors other than physicians’ practices and hospitals is lacking from the published literature. Taken together, these realities have made it difficult for policymakers to grasp the total magnitude of health care administrative costs due to BIR activities. Our analyses, which synthesize available micro-costing data on BIR costs using a consistent definition of BIR and extrapolate data to sectors lacking estimates, present the first system-wide estimate of total BIR costs across the U.S. health care system. Synthesizing data from existing studies, our analyses indicate that BIR costs totaled $471 billion annually in the U.S in 2012; 80% of this represents additional costs when compared to a simplified financing system. <u><mark>If</mark> BIR <mark>costs were pared </mark>to that of benchmark systems, <mark>system-wide savings would <strong>exceed</mark> $350 billion per year. </strong>Total BIR costs currently represent about</u> <u><strong>18% of U.S. health care expenditures</u></strong> (excluding government public health activities). <u>Non-BIR administrative activities represent an <strong>additional 9.4%</u></strong> [7], <u>leaving <strong>less than 73%</u></strong> of spending <u><strong>for clinical care</u></strong> (Figure 3; details of estimation of non-BIR administrative costs in Additional file 1). <u><strong>Added BIR costs of $375 billion translate to 14.7% of U.S. health care expenditures in 2012, or <mark>2.4% of GDP</u></strong></mark> [19].</p><p>[[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]]</p><p>Allocation of spending for clinical care and administration in the U.S. health care system. Values represent share of 2012 U.S. Health Consumption Expenditures (minus government public health activities; i.e., ~$2.6 trillion). BIR = billing ... Our findings update and expand on previous estimates. <u>Woolhandler et al. estimated total administrative spending in the U.S. health care system in 1999 at $294.3 billion, with added spending of $209 billion when compared to Canada</u> [15]. <u>Adjusting <strong>their estimates</u></strong> <u>to</u> <u><strong>2012 health spending yields</u></strong> <u>estimated added costs of</u> approximately <u><strong>$448 billion</strong>, an estimate that falls <strong>within the upper bound of our sensitivity analysis</u></strong>. <u>The earlier study assessed <strong>total administrative costs</strong>, not <strong>just BIR spending</u></strong>, and hence is not directly comparable to this study. However, <u><mark>a simplified </mark>payment <mark>system that <strong>blunts entrepreneurial incentives</u></strong> (<u>as in <strong>Canada</u></strong>) <u>might</u></mark> also <u><mark>reduce</u> <u><strong></mark>non-BIR administrative <mark>costs for</mark> such items as <mark>marketing and</mark> <mark>internal</mark> cost <mark>accounting</mark>. </u></strong>Our estimates of BIR costs in physicians’ practices are higher than previous studies, due to the more complete set of BIR activities, payers, and costs quantified in our analysis. Morra et al. estimated total BIR costs per U.S. physician of $82,975, translating to total and added BIR costs of $38 billion and $28 billion, respectively [5]. However, their analysis involved just a subset of BIR activities, as detailed above. Similarly, Heffernan et al’s [8,12] analysis, which was limited to private payers, estimated added BIR costs of $26 billion. After adjustment to encompass the entire scope of BIR activities, payers, and overhead costs, these earlier estimates are consistent with ours (Methods and Additional file 1: Table S2). Remaining differences are small – less than 5% of total BIR costs – and most likely explained by nuances in the questions used to obtain BIR costs. We present synthesis mid-point estimates of this small variation for all relevant analyses (Additional file 1: Table S2). Several caveats apply to our estimates. First, BIR estimates in the published literature are most robust for physicians’ practices, with limited information available for hospitals and almost no data for categories within the sector defined as “other health service and supplies.” Hence, we explored the effect of uncertainty in our estimates in sensitivity analyses. Second, our analyses assume that BIR can be distinguished from other administrative functions. This seems a fair assumption, given that consistent findings were obtained for similar activities using varied methods. Qualitative claims by physicians of the burden of BIR lend further support to this assumption [10]. Finally, <u><mark>our estimate</mark> of total and added BIR <mark>is</mark> likely</u> <u><strong><mark>conservative</mark> on three accounts</u></strong>. <u>First, we assume <strong>no BIR spending outside of the direct health sector</u></strong>, e.g., by employers or patients. <u>Since employment-based coverage is pervasive in the U.S., documentation of BIR costs of employers might well <strong>augment the estimates</u></strong> presented here. <u>Second, for providers, we assume that costs such as <strong>p</strong>ublic <strong>r</strong>elations and marketing are incurred for <strong>non-BIR reasons</strong>. This assumption might <strong>underestimate added</u></strong> BIR <u><strong>costs</strong>, since such non-BIR administrative costs might also be lower in a simplified financing system. Finally, <mark>new evidence</mark> comparing total hospital administrative costs in the U.S. to Canada and other OECD countries <mark>suggests</mark> that <strong><mark>added BIR</strong></mark> for hospitals <mark>may be <strong>substantially higher</mark> than our base case estimate</u></strong> [20]. <u>Since these added costs are a function of the structure of the</u> <u><strong>U.S. multi-payer system</strong>, some might characterize <mark>these costs</u></mark> <u>as</u> <u><strong>excess</u></strong>, <u>in that that they <mark>provide</u></mark> <u><strong>little to <mark>no added value</u></strong></mark> to the health care system. If BIR functions produce secondary benefits, such as enhanced quality or utilization management, the high BIR costs in the U.S. might be justified. Some research suggests, for example, that prior authorization can reduce over-utilization of brand-name medications without reducing patient satisfaction [21]. It is also possible that BIR functions provide benefits that have not yet been quantified. Nonetheless, <u>any unmeasured benefit would have to be large to offset added BIR costs</u>. Moreover, <u>at least one study has found that higher administrative costs are</u> <u><strong>associated with lower quality</u></strong> [22]. <u>Hence, reducing BIR costs by adopting a simplified financing system would provide <strong>substantial recurring savings</u></strong> <u>and produce an <strong>unequivocal benefit</u></strong> from a societal perspective. It is worth noting also that a simplified financing system does not preclude utilization controls, and that such <u>controls might be employed in</u> <u><strong>single payer systems</u></strong> <u>while maintaining lower BIR costs. <mark>Eliminating</u> <u></mark>added BIR <mark>costs</mark> of</u> <u><strong>$375 billion per year</u></strong> (14.7% of US health care spending) <u><mark>would</u></mark> <u>provide resources to <strong><mark>extend and improve</mark> insurance <mark>coverage</u></strong>, <u>within</u> <u><strong>current expenditure</mark> levels</u></strong>. <u>Since uninsured individuals have utilization of about 50% of insured individuals</u> [23], <u>the <mark>current</mark> 15% <mark>uninsured could be covered with</mark> <strong>roughly <mark>half</mark> of the $375 billion</u></strong>. <u><mark>Remaining savings could</mark> be applied to</u> <u><strong><mark>improve</mark>d <mark>coverage</mark> for those already insured</strong>. Full financial analyses of single payer insurance reform <strong>formalize</strong> and extend these analyses</u> [24]. Unfortunately, <u>recent reforms incorporated in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) are unlikely to substantially reduce BIR costs and administrative burden</u>. Data on the BIR portion of administrative costs is not yet available in the published literature. Using the BIR cost percentages identified in this analysis as a starting point, we projected BIR costs under the ACA in 2014 and 2018. Our projections were based on estimated increases in the insured population in each health sector (i.e., 7 million more people covered by private insurance and 8 million more by Medicaid in 2014; 13 and 12 million more, respectively, in 2018) [25]. Assuming parallel increases in healthcare utilization, stable administrative complexity, and an initial cost of $5.8 million to operate the exchanges [26,27], we estimate that implementing the ACA will increase system-wide BIR costs by 5 − 7% ($24 − $34 billion) in 2014 and 9 − 11% ($45 − $55 billion) in 2018 (in 2014 USD). <u>Moreover, greater use of</u> <u><strong><mark>deductibles</u></strong></mark> <u>under the ACA will likely <strong>further <mark>increase</mark> administrative <mark>costs</strong>, since each claim will require processing</mark> and value adjustment before determining whether the deductible has been met. Thus, the new system will incur some new BIR costs for both the insured and uninsured portion of care.</u> Empirical evidence from similar reform in Massachusetts is not encouraging: exchanges added 4% to health plan costs [28], and the reform sharply increased administrative staffing compared with other states [29]. <u>While it was hoped that</u> the ARRA’s <u>incentives for adoption of</u> <u><strong>health information technology</u></strong> (HIT) <u>would reduce costs, partly by streamlining billing and administration</u> [30], <u><strong>savings have not materialized</u></strong> [31,32]. <u>Indeed, it appears that HIT will impose hefty</u> <u><strong>implementation and training costs</u></strong> [33], <u>and may require ongoing expenditures for <strong>IT upgrades and maintenance</u></strong> [4]. <u>Moreover, the ACA’s emphasis on financial incentives such as pay-for-performance may well</u> <u><strong>increase administrative complexity</u></strong>, <u>and hence</u> <u><strong>costs</u></strong> [34]. A recent estimate suggests that <u><mark>simplifying</mark> administrative activities within the existing <mark>multi-payer</mark> system by implementing a range of standardization, automation and enrollment stabilization reforms <mark>could save $40 billion</mark> annually</u> [35]. <u><strong><mark>While</mark> these savings are <mark>significant</u></strong></mark>, we estimate that <u>the <mark>annual admin</mark>istrative <mark>savings under</mark> a</u> <u><strong><mark>single-payer</mark> system</u></strong> <u><mark>would be</mark> <strong>nearly <mark>nine-fold higher</u></strong></mark>. <u>Though some argue that shifting to a single payer system could propagate unintended financial hazards</u> (i.e., <u><strong>overutilization</u></strong>) <u>and inefficiencies</u>, as discussed previously, <u><strong>utilization controls</strong> can be employed in simplified financing systems while <strong>also keeping BIR costs down</u></strong>. Moreover, <u>evidence from the U.S. Medicare program and the systems of several other countries [1] demonstrates that large, <mark>unified payers</mark> can <mark>achieve <strong>significantly greater efficiencies</mark> than multi-payer systems</u></strong>. <u>Unified payment schemes <mark>enjoy <strong>economies of scale, sharply reduce</mark> the burdens of <mark>claims</mark> processing, <mark>and obviate</mark> the need for <mark>marketing, advertising and underwriting</mark> expenses</strong>. </u>Conclusions While the estimates presented here should continue to be refined through additional sector-specific research on BIR costs, the cost burden of BIR activities in the existing U.S. multi-payer health care system is clear. <u>Implementation of a simplified financing system offers the potential for <strong>substantial administrative savings</strong>, on the order of</u> <u><strong>$375 billion annually</u></strong>, which could cover all of the uninsured [36] and upgrade coverage for the tens of millions who are under-insured. Further research into the costs of BIR activities to employers and in areas such as home health care, nursing home care, and prescription drugs would augment the findings from this analysis. Data on BIR costs since implementation of the ACA is also needed to further illuminate the administrative effects of recent health reforms and provide additional tangible information for policy decision-making. </p>
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Policy 1AC v2
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1ac – Econ
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./documents/ndtceda17/Kentucky/HaRi/Kentucky-Hackman-Rivas-Aff-Wsuziggy-Round2.docx
| 597,601 |
A
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Wsuziggy
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2
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Michigan State Pepper-Brown
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Fifelski
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1AC - sing payer trust econ
1NC - hastert da 2020 states cp market cp medicare opt in cp econ ton case
2NC - states cp econ t
1NR - hastert da
2NR - states hastert
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ndtceda17/Kentucky/HaRi/Kentucky-Hackman-Rivas-Aff-Wsuziggy-Round2.docx
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ndtceda17
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NDT/CEDA 2017-18
| 2,017 |
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college
| 2 |
2,843,919 |
Suffering comes first
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Paterson 03
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Paterson 03 – Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island (Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, http://sce.sagepub.com)
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death is the objective evil not because it deprives us of a future It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is evil because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate metaphysical lightening strike independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Death is destructive of the type of entity that we are. What is crucially at stake here, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process any rejection of life cannot be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject the destruction of the present person a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh against the travails of life
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death is evil not because it deprives us of a future Rather, death in itself is evil because it ontologically destroys the subject independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Death is destructive of the type of entity that we are any rejection of life cannot be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject
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Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alter- native of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81 In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82
| 2,171 |
<h4>Suffering comes first</h4><p><strong>Paterson 03</strong> – Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island (Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, http://sce.sagepub.com)</p><p>Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is <u><mark>death </u></mark>per se that <u><mark>is </u></mark>really <u>the objective <mark>evil </u></mark>for us,<u> <mark>not because it deprives us of a </u></mark>prospective <u><mark>future </u></mark>of overall good judged better than the alter- native of non-being. <u>It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. <mark>Rather, death in itself is </u></mark>an <u><mark>evil </u></mark>to us <u><mark>because it ontologically destroys the </mark>current existent <mark>subject </mark>— it is the ultimate </u>in <u>metaphysical lightening strike</u>s.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, <u><mark>independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. </u></mark>Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. <u><mark>Death is </u></mark>an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is <u><mark>destructive of the type of entity that we</mark> </u>essentially <u><mark>are</mark>. </u>Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. <u>What is crucially at stake here, </u>and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, <u>is that death is a radical interference with the current life process </u>of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81 In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that<u> <mark>any </u></mark>intentional<u> <mark>rejection of </u></mark>human<u> <mark>life </u></mark>itself<u> <mark>cannot </u></mark>therefore<u> <mark>be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject</u></mark>, namely,<u> the destruction of the present person</u>;<u> a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh </u>objectively<u> against the travails of life </u>in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82 </p>
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1
| 32,578 | 1,478 | 90,114 |
./documents/hsld19/AppletonEast/Ma/Appleton%20East-Mast-Neg-TOC-Round3.docx
| 833,148 |
N
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TOC
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3
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Strake Jesuit JG
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Lawrence Zhou
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1ac - korsgaard
1nc - util cbw
1ar - neg advocacy text one route to ballot tricks death good
2nc - cbw case turn
2ar - indexicles death good
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hsld19/AppletonEast/Ma/Appleton%20East-Mast-Neg-TOC-Round3.docx
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Appleton East SoMa
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So.....
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Ma.....
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Appleton East
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WI
| null | 1,027 |
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HS LD 2019-20
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2,612,809 |
No risk of Russia war---neither side will escalate
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Tsygankov 16
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Andrei Tsygankov 16, Professor at the Departments of Political Science and International Relations at San Francisco State University, PhD from USC, “5 reasons why the threat of a global war involving Russia is overstated,” Feb 19 2016, http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/5-reasons-why-threat-great-power-war-involving-russia-overstated
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whatever the rhetoric, major powers are not inclined towards risky behavior when their core interests are at stake. This concerns not only the nuclear superpowers, but also countries such as Turkey
NATO has been careful to not be drawn into highly provocative actions, whether it is by responding to Russia seizing the Pristina Airport getting involved on Georgia’s side in 2008 or by providing lethal military assistance and support for Ukraine
Russia remains a defensive power aware of its responsibility for maintaining international stability. Moscow wants to work with major powers
the U.S. military and diplomatic resources are sufficient to restrain key regional players in any part of the world proxy wars are possible and are happening, but they are unlikely to escalate
the contemporary world has no rigid alliance structure The world remains a space in which international coalitions overlap and are mostly formed on an ad hoc basis
there is no fundamental conflict of values and ideologies. Despite the efforts to present as incompatible the so-called “traditional” and “Western” values by Russia or “democracy” to “autocracy” by the U S and Europe, the world majority does not think that this cultural divide is worth fighting for
the world contains a number of important checks on great powers’ militarism threat talk coming from politicians is often deceiving. Such talk may be a way to pressure the opponent into various political and military concessions rather than to signal real intentions. When such pressures do not bring expected results, the rhetoric of war and isolation subsides
Then a dialogue begins
|
major powers are not inclined towards risky behavior when core interests are at stake
NATO has been careful to not be drawn into provocative actions whether the Pristina Airport Georgia or Ukraine
Russia remains a defensive power aware of its responsibility for maintaining stability Moscow wants to work with major powers
U.S. military and diplomatic resources restrain key players proxy wars are unlikely to escalate
the majority does not think this is worth fighting for
the world contains checks on militarism threat talk is deceiving When pressures do not bring results rhetoric of war subsides
|
First, whatever the rhetoric, major powers are not inclined towards risky behavior when their core interests are at stake. This concerns not only the nuclear superpowers, but also countries such as Turkey. The prospect of confronting Russia's overwhelmingly superior military should give pause even to someone as hot-tempered as Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan. Even if Erdogan wanted to pit Russia against NATO, it wouldn’t work.
So far, NATO has been careful to not be drawn into highly provocative actions, whether it is by responding to Russia seizing the Pristina International Airport in June 1999, getting involved on Georgia’s side during the military conflict in August 2008 or by providing lethal military assistance and support for Ukraine. Unless Russia is the clear and proven aggressor, NATO is unlikely to support Turkey and begin World War III.
Second, Russia remains a defensive power aware of its responsibility for maintaining international stability. Moscow wants to work with major powers, not against them. Its insistence on Western recognition of Russia’s interests must not be construed as a drive to destroy the foundations of the international order, such as sovereignty, multilateralism, and arms control.
Third, the United States has important interests to prevent regional conflicts from escalating or becoming trans-regional. Although its relative military capabilities are not where they were ten years ago, the U.S. military and diplomatic resources are sufficient to restrain key regional players in any part of the world. Given the power rivalry across several regions, proxy wars are possible and indeed are happening, but they are unlikely to escalate.
Fourth, unlike the Cold War era, the contemporary world has no rigid alliance structure. The so-called Russia-China-Iran axis is hardly more than a figment of the imagination by American neoconservatives and some Russia conspiracy-minded thinkers. The world remains a space in which international coalitions overlap and are mostly formed on an ad hoc basis.
Fifth, with the exception of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Greater Syria (ISIS), there is no fundamental conflict of values and ideologies. Despite the efforts to present as incompatible the so-called “traditional” and “Western” values by Russia or “democracy” to “autocracy” by the United States and Europe, the world majority does not think that this cultural divide is worth fighting for.
Despite the dangers of the world we live in, it contains a number of important, even underappreciated, checks on great powers’ militarism. The threat talk coming from politicians is often deceiving. Such talk may be a way to pressure the opponent into various political and military concessions rather than to signal real intentions. When such pressures do not bring expected results, the rhetoric of war and isolation subsides.
Then a dialogue begins. Perhaps, the increasing frequency of exchanges between Obama and Putin since December 2015 - including their recent phone conversation following the Munich conference - suggest a growing recognition that the record of pressuring Russia has been mixed at best.
| 3,156 |
<h4><strong>No risk of Russia war---neither side will escalate</h4><p></strong>Andrei <strong>Tsygankov 16</strong>, Professor at the Departments of Political Science and International Relations at San Francisco State University, PhD from USC, “5 reasons why the threat of a global war involving Russia is overstated,” Feb 19 2016, http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/5-reasons-why-threat-great-power-war-involving-russia-overstated</p><p>First, <u>whatever the rhetoric, <mark>major powers are <strong>not inclined towards risky behavior</strong> when</mark> their <strong><mark>core interests</strong> are at stake</mark>. This concerns not only the nuclear superpowers, but also countries such as Turkey</u>. The prospect of confronting Russia's overwhelmingly superior military should give pause even to someone as hot-tempered as Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan. Even if Erdogan wanted to pit Russia against NATO, it wouldn’t work.</p><p>So far, <u><mark>NATO has been careful <strong>to not be drawn into</strong></mark> highly <mark>provocative actions</mark>, <mark>whether</mark> it is by responding to Russia seizing <mark>the Pristina</u></mark> International <u><mark>Airport</u></mark> in June 1999, <u>getting involved on <mark>Georgia</mark>’s side</u> during the military conflict <u>in</u> August <u>2008 <mark>or</mark> by providing lethal military assistance and support for <mark>Ukraine</u></mark>. Unless Russia is the clear and proven aggressor, NATO is unlikely to support Turkey and begin World War III.</p><p>Second, <u><mark>Russia remains a <strong>defensive power</strong> aware of its responsibility for <strong>maintaining</strong></mark> international <strong><mark>stability</strong></mark>. <mark>Moscow wants to <strong>work with</strong> major powers</u></mark>, not against them. Its insistence on Western recognition of Russia’s interests must not be construed as a drive to destroy the foundations of the international order, such as sovereignty, multilateralism, and arms control.</p><p>Third, the United States has important interests to prevent regional conflicts from escalating or becoming trans-regional. Although its relative military capabilities are not where they were ten years ago, <u>the <mark>U.S. military and diplomatic resources</mark> are sufficient to <strong><mark>restrain</strong></mark> <mark>key</mark> regional <mark>players</mark> in any part of the world</u>. Given the power rivalry across several regions, <u><mark>proxy wars</mark> are possible and</u> indeed <u>are happening, but they <mark>are <strong>unlikely to escalate</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>Fourth, unlike the Cold War era, <u>the contemporary world has no rigid alliance structure</u>. The so-called Russia-China-Iran axis is hardly more than a figment of the imagination by American neoconservatives and some Russia conspiracy-minded thinkers. <u>The world remains a space in which international coalitions overlap and are mostly formed on an ad hoc basis</u>.</p><p>Fifth, with the exception of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Greater Syria (ISIS), <u>there is <strong>no</strong> fundamental conflict of values and ideologies. Despite the efforts to present as incompatible the so-called “traditional” and “Western” values by Russia or “democracy” to “autocracy” by the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and Europe, <mark>the</mark> world <strong><mark>majority</strong> <strong>does not</strong> think</mark> that <mark>this</mark> cultural divide <mark>is worth fighting for</u></mark>.</p><p>Despite the dangers of <u><mark>the world</u></mark> we live in, it <u><mark>contains</mark> a number of important</u>, even underappreciated, <u><strong><mark>checks on</strong></mark> great powers’ <strong><mark>militarism</u></strong></mark>. The <u><strong><mark>threat talk</mark> coming from politicians <mark>is</mark> often <mark>deceiving</strong></mark>. Such talk may be a way to pressure the opponent into various political and military concessions rather than to signal real intentions. <mark>When</mark> such <mark>pressures</mark> <mark>do not bring</mark> expected <mark>results</mark>, the <mark>rhetoric of war</mark> and isolation <strong><mark>subsides</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u>Then a dialogue begins</u>. Perhaps, the increasing frequency of exchanges between Obama and Putin since December 2015 - including their recent phone conversation following the Munich conference - suggest a growing recognition that the record of pressuring Russia has been mixed at best.</p>
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1NC
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Refugees Advantage
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No Russia War---1NC
| 12,970 | 589 | 105,495 |
./documents/hspolicy18/NilesNorth/IvLo/Niles%20North-Ivackovic-Lorenz-Neg-St%20Marks-Doubles.docx
| 698,528 |
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St Marks
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Doubles
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Carrollton AD
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Jensen, William - Roark, Collin - Fry, Chris
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1AC - Refugees
1NC - T Refugees Vagueness ASPEC Courts CP States CP Parole CP Buddhism K Base DA Horsetrading DA Midterms DA Trump Shun DA DeDev
2NC - Parole CP DeDev
1NR - Midterms DA Horsetrading DA Base DA
2NR - Midterms DA Case
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HS Policy 2018-19
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Can’t Solve either advantage—foreign counterparts want to deal with Congress—will defer to their declaratory policy.
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Soufan 17
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Ali Soufan 17. Chief Executive Officer of The Soufan Group. Mr. Soufan is a former FBI Supervisory Special Agent. Mr. Soufan is an Honors graduate from Mansfield University of Pennsylvania where he received undergraduate degrees in International Studies and Political Science. He is a Magna Cum Laude graduate of Villanova University where he received a Master of Arts in International Relations. 7-14-2017 http://www.soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-congress-asserts-its-foreign-policy-authority/
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As foreign policy of Trump maintains chaotic trajectory the Congress constitutionally-mandated power maintain consistency and credibility the Legislative Branch has used tools to exert constitutional authority over foreign policy. Congress clarify U.S. positions on a range of foreign policy matters After Trump’s failure to clearly and vocally endorse the Senate’s vote demonstrates a strong majority The erratic Executive Branch has added impetus to Congressional efforts While the role of Congress is limited the conduct of ‘the people’s branch’ reliant on consensus and considered a more direct reflection of constituents’ views carries a degree of gravitas. As allies attempt to decipher contradictory messages coming out of the Trump administration, Congress will likely play an increasingly important role in foreign policy
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foreign policy of Trump maintains chaotic trajectory Congress maintain consistency and credibility clarify positions After Trump’s failure The erratic Exec added impetus While Congress is limited the branch’ reliant on consensus and considered a more direct reflection of views carries a degree of gravitas As allies decipher contradictory messages out of Trump Congress play an important role
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As the foreign policy of the Trump administration maintains its distinctly chaotic trajectory, the U.S. Congress is increasingly attempting to use the full breadth of its constitutionally-mandated power to maintain a degree of consistency and credibility in U.S. foreign policy. Since the President took office on January 20, the Legislative Branch has used a variety of tools—often in a bipartisan manner—to exert its albeit limited constitutional authority over a wide range of issues related to foreign policy. On the issue of foreign aid—a key tool for bolstering the security and stability of U.S. allies and partners—Congress has largely rejected the deep cuts proposed by the Trump administration. As the FY2018 budget is currently being hashed out in Congress, proposed cuts to military and economic aid to fledgling U.S. allies in the Middle East like Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia, have either been scaled back or completely rejected in a largely bipartisan manner. Congress has likewise vowed to resist draconian cuts to the U.S. State Department in general, making clear that they do not share the president’s tendency to view foreign policy as a primarily economic enterprise. As the Trump administration raises doubts over its commitment to long-standing allies and policies, Congress has also used its power to clarify U.S. positions—often in contradiction to the Trump administration—on a range of foreign policy matters. After President Trump’s failure to clearly and vocally endorse the mutual defense clause in the founding treaty of NATO, Congress passed a resolution reaffirming the U.S. commitment to its NATO allies and to the clause itself. As concerns grow over the Trump administration’s relationship with Russia, the Senate’s recent 98-2 vote to impose new sanctions on Moscow—with restrictions on the President’s ability to lift those sanctions—demonstrates that a strong majority continues to view Russia as a hostile adversary. In response to U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia that challenge America’s historic commitment to human rights—especially as the civilian death toll from Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen continues to mount—a bipartisan group of Senators introduced legislation that would restrict the provision of arms to Riyadh over human rights concerns. While that legislation narrowly failed in the Senate, it achieved a surprising level of bipartisan support, serving as a warning to the Trump administration that Congress is in a position to exercise its oversight authorities where issues of human rights are concerned. The combination of an erratic Executive Branch and growing instability on a variety of national security fronts has added impetus to Congressional efforts to craft a new Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF). Long before the election of President Trump, a growing consensus emerged among members of Congress, as well as the public at large, regarding the need for a new AUMF. There is now a large degree of bipartisan agreement that the continued use of the original 2001 AUMF—passed in the aftermath of the 9-11 attacks—as the ongoing legal basis for waging war against a host of terrorist groups presents an unreasonable de facto expansion of the President’s war making powers, possibly beyond those prescribed in article two of the U.S. constitution. The U.S. has now been waging war for 16 years without an official declaration to that effect, yet the AUMF has been used as the legal basis for military operations in fourteen countries, against groups ranging from al-Shabaab in Somalia to the Taliban in Afghanistan. Many in Congress have argued that the apparent ‘blank check’ of the 2001 AUMF is evidence that the Legislative Branch has failed to exercise its foreign policy role as mandated in article one of the constitution, which explicitly grants Congress the responsibility to declare war. A recently revised bipartisan draft of new AUMF legislation proposed by Senators Kaine (D-VA) and Flake (R-AZ) would provide new legislative checks on the President’s ability to unilaterally expand the scope and nature of the fight against terrorist groups. The law would repeal the original AUMF and replace it with another that would specify three terrorist groups against which the President could use military force: al-Qaeda, the so-called Islamic State, and the Taliban. It would also give Congress greater say over how the President targets potential offshoots or allies of these groups, as well as the countries in which the President may order the use of military force in certain circumstances. While the role of Congress in conducting foreign affairs is relatively limited compared to the Executive Branch, the conduct of ‘the people’s branch’—reliant on consensus and considered a more direct reflection of constituents’ views—carries a degree of gravitas. As U.S. allies attempt to decipher the often contradictory messages coming out of the Trump administration, Congress will likely play an increasingly important role in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.
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<h4>Can’t Solve either advantage—foreign counterparts want to deal with Congress—will defer to their declaratory policy. </h4><p>Ali <strong>Soufan 17</strong>. Chief Executive Officer of The Soufan Group. Mr. Soufan is a former FBI Supervisory Special Agent. Mr. Soufan is an Honors graduate from Mansfield University of Pennsylvania where he received undergraduate degrees in International Studies and Political Science. He is a Magna Cum Laude graduate of Villanova University where he received a Master of Arts in International Relations. 7-14-2017 http://www.soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-congress-asserts-its-foreign-policy-authority/</p><p><u>As</u> the <u><mark>foreign policy of</mark> </u>the <u><mark>Trump</u></mark> administration <u><mark>maintains</u></mark> its distinctly <u><strong><mark>chaotic trajectory</u></strong></mark>, <u>the</u> U.S. <u><mark>Congress</u></mark> is increasingly attempting to use the full breadth of its <u>constitutionally-mandated power</u> to <u><mark>maintain</u></mark> a degree of <u><strong><mark>consistency and credibility</u></strong></mark> in U.S. foreign policy. Since the President took office on January 20, <u>the Legislative Branch has used</u> a variety of <u>tools</u>—often in a bipartisan manner—<u>to exert</u> its albeit limited <u>constitutional authority over</u> a wide range of issues related to <u>foreign policy. </u>On the issue of foreign aid—a key tool for bolstering the security and stability of U.S. allies and partners—Congress has largely rejected the deep cuts proposed by the Trump administration. As the FY2018 budget is currently being hashed out in Congress, proposed cuts to military and economic aid to fledgling U.S. allies in the Middle East like Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia, have either been scaled back or completely rejected in a largely bipartisan manner. Congress has likewise vowed to resist draconian cuts to the U.S. State Department in general, making clear that they do not share the president’s tendency to view foreign policy as a primarily economic enterprise. As the Trump administration raises doubts over its commitment to long-standing allies and policies, <u>Congress</u> has also used its power to <u><mark>clarify</mark> U.S. <mark>positions</u></mark>—often in contradiction to the Trump administration—<u>on a range of foreign policy matters</u>. <u><mark>After</u></mark> President <u><mark>Trump’s</u> <u>failure</mark> to</u> <u>clearly</u> <u>and vocally endorse</u> the mutual defense clause in the founding treaty of NATO, Congress passed a resolution reaffirming the U.S. commitment to its NATO allies and to the clause itself. As concerns grow over the Trump administration’s relationship with Russia, <u>the Senate’s</u> recent 98-2 <u><strong>vote</u></strong> to impose new sanctions on Moscow—with restrictions on the President’s ability to lift those sanctions—<u>demonstrates</u> that <u>a strong majority</u> continues to view Russia as a hostile adversary. In response to U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia that challenge America’s historic commitment to human rights—especially as the civilian death toll from Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen continues to mount—a bipartisan group of Senators introduced legislation that would restrict the provision of arms to Riyadh over human rights concerns. While that legislation narrowly failed in the Senate, it achieved a surprising level of bipartisan support, serving as a warning to the Trump administration that Congress is in a position to exercise its oversight authorities where issues of human rights are concerned. <u><mark>The</u></mark> combination of an <u><strong><mark>erratic Exec</mark>utive Branch</u></strong> and growing instability on a variety of national security fronts <u>has <mark>added</u> <u>impetus</u></mark> <u>to Congressional efforts</u> to craft a new Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF). Long before the election of President Trump, a growing consensus emerged among members of Congress, as well as the public at large, regarding the need for a new AUMF. There is now a large degree of bipartisan agreement that the continued use of the original 2001 AUMF—passed in the aftermath of the 9-11 attacks—as the ongoing legal basis for waging war against a host of terrorist groups presents an unreasonable de facto expansion of the President’s war making powers, possibly beyond those prescribed in article two of the U.S. constitution. The U.S. has now been waging war for 16 years without an official declaration to that effect, yet the AUMF has been used as the legal basis for military operations in fourteen countries, against groups ranging from al-Shabaab in Somalia to the Taliban in Afghanistan. Many in Congress have argued that the apparent ‘blank check’ of the 2001 AUMF is evidence that the Legislative Branch has failed to exercise its foreign policy role as mandated in article one of the constitution, which explicitly grants Congress the responsibility to declare war. A recently revised bipartisan draft of new AUMF legislation proposed by Senators Kaine (D-VA) and Flake (R-AZ) would provide new legislative checks on the President’s ability to unilaterally expand the scope and nature of the fight against terrorist groups. The law would repeal the original AUMF and replace it with another that would specify three terrorist groups against which the President could use military force: al-Qaeda, the so-called Islamic State, and the Taliban. It would also give Congress greater say over how the President targets potential offshoots or allies of these groups, as well as the countries in which the President may order the use of military force in certain circumstances. <u><mark>While</mark> the role of <mark>Congress</u></mark> in conducting foreign affairs <u><mark>is</u></mark> relatively <u><mark>limited</u></mark> compared to the Executive Branch, <u><mark>the</mark> conduct of ‘the people’s <mark>branch’</u></mark>—<u><mark>reliant on</u> <u><strong>consensus</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>and considered a</u></mark> <u><mark>more</u> <u><strong>direct reflection of</mark> constituents’ <mark>views</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong><mark>carries a degree of gravitas</mark>.</u></strong> <u><mark>As</u></mark> U.S. <u><mark>allies</u></mark> <u>attempt to <mark>decipher</u></mark> the often <u><mark>contradictory</mark> <mark>messages</mark> coming <mark>out of</mark> the <mark>Trump</mark> administration,</u> <u><strong><mark>Congress</mark> will</strong> likely <strong><mark>play an</strong></mark> increasingly <strong><mark>important role</u></strong></mark> <u>in</u> the conduct of U.S. <u>foreign policy</u>.</p>
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2AC vs Trinity GG
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Executive Self-Restraint Counterplan
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2AC—Executive Self-Restraint
| 84,222 | 137 | 102,652 |
./documents/ndtceda18/Pittsburgh/LeKa/Pittsburgh-Lee-Katz-Aff-Shirley-Round1.docx
| 607,740 |
A
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Shirley
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1
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Trinity Glancy-Grimsley
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Cody Crunkilton
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1AC INF Withdraw (INF Stability and MTCR)
1NC New Affs Bad - T-Subsets - T-Increase - T-Restrictions - Farm Bill PTX DA - Populism DA - Courts CP - ESR CP - Flex DA
2NR ESR CP - Farm Bill PTX DA
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ndtceda18/Pittsburgh/LeKa/Pittsburgh-Lee-Katz-Aff-Shirley-Round1.docx
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LeKa
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Pittsburgh LeKa
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Ja.....
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Le.....
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Ry.....
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Ka.....
| 19,210 |
Pittsburgh
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Pittsburgh
| null | null | 1,008 |
ndtceda18
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NDT/CEDA 2018-19
| 2,018 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
3,239,856 |
Anti-immigrant sentiment currently drives support for Trump---it’s the single most important issue for his base
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Enten & Bacon 17
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Enten & Bacon 17 - * senior political writer and analyst for FiveThirtyEight AND ** senior writer for FiveThirtyEight (Harry and Perry Jr., “Trump’s Hardline Immigration Stance Got Him To The White House,” FiveThirtyEight, 07/12/17, Accessed Online at: https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-polls-showing-daca-as-popular-even-among-republicans-dont-tell-the-whole-story/, Accessed Online on 08/09/18, SI)
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Trump’s decision to end DACA seems like a political loser. Polling shows that most Americans support the program
A DACA-like bill could be approved by Congress. But there’s a big force in the way: Anti-immigration sentiment in the Republican Party. DACA may be popular, even among some Republicans, but hardline immigration policy has been growing as an animating force in GOP politics for years. It helped put Trump in the White House.
immigration tends to be an issue that is more important to Republicans than Democrats. The 2016 national exit poll found that Trump beat Hillary Clinton by 31 percentage points among voters who said immigration was the most important issue facing the country. 73 percent of Trump voters said immigration was of “very high importance” to them
So even though DACA is popular, Republicans would be unlikely to face a backlash among their voters — even their more centrist ones — should they refuse to pass a replacement.
In recent elections, a hardline stance on immigration has proved to be a winner in Republican primaries. It has been highly correlated with how well GOP senators have done against primary challenges — senators with more hardline positions have done better against primary challengers; those with more moderate views have done worse.
In 2016, moreover, immigration may have been the issue most responsible for Trump’s winning the Republican nomination. In every state with a caucus or primary exit poll, he did best among voters who said immigration was their top issue.1
Vocal conservative activists such as Ann Coulter and the Federation for American Immigration Reform are against any kind of broad protection Breitbart, has been casting any kind of formalization of DACA policy as “amnesty
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there’s a big force in the way: Anti-immigration sentiment in the Republican Party hardline immigration policy has been growing as an animating force in GOP politics for years
73 percent of Trump voters said immigration was of “very high importance” to them
a hardline stance on immigration has proved to be a winner in Republican primaries — senators with more hardline positions have done better against primary challengers
immigration may have been the issue most responsible for Trump’s winning the Republican nomination
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President Trump’s decision to end the Obama administration’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program (better known as DACA) seems like a political loser. Polling shows that most Americans support the program, which protects undocumented immigrants who were brought to the United States as children from deportation, and don’t want participants removed. This includes, in some polls, a plurality of Republicans. That may be why some congressional Republicans have lined up behind a bill that essentially reinstates DACA.
A DACA-like bill could be approved by Congress. But there’s a big force in the way: Anti-immigration sentiment in the Republican Party. DACA may be popular, even among some Republicans, but hardline immigration policy has been growing as an animating force in GOP politics for years. It helped put Trump in the White House.
So looking only at the polling on DACA can be misleading if you’re trying to gauge the chances that the Republican-controlled Congress will replace the program. During policy debates, we sometimes become too focused on individual questions instead of looking at the broader public view. On the issue of gun control, for example, Democrats have liked to point out that background checks have near universal support. Yet, Congress has repeatedly failed to pass a background check bill. Part of the reason: Background checks may poll well, but gun control as a general concept is less popular. Similarly, Republicans tend to poll evenly with Democrats on which party “would do a better job of dealing with” gun policy. In other words, gun policy divides voters along normal partisan lines, making it unlikely that Republicans would be punished for sticking to their position on a specific policy question within that issue.
Immigration is similar to guns in that the Democratic position on many specific immigration policy questions is more popular than the Republican position, but Republicans hold their own on immigration more generally. Much of Trump’s immigration agenda doesn’t poll well: For instance, there isn’t broad support for building a border wall with Mexico, limiting legal immigration or ending DACA. However, recent surveys from George Washington University and Morning Consult found that Democrats and Republicans tend to poll evenly when it comes to which party is trusted more to handle immigration.
Additionally, immigration tends to be an issue that is more important to Republicans than Democrats. The 2016 national exit poll found that Trump beat Hillary Clinton by 31 percentage points among voters who said immigration was the most important issue facing the country. The 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study found that 73 percent of Trump voters said immigration was of “very high importance” to them, compared with 24 percent of Clinton voters. And despite Trump’s rhetoric on immigration and Latinos during the 2016 campaign, he probably did no worse among them than Mitt Romney did in 2012. (And he may have done slightly better.)
So even though DACA is popular, Republicans would be unlikely to face a backlash among their voters — even their more centrist ones — should they refuse to pass a replacement.
Indeed, Republican members of Congress could face a backlash if they pass one — in the form of primary challenges. In recent elections, a hardline stance on immigration has proved to be a winner in Republican primaries. It has been highly correlated with how well GOP senators have done against primary challenges — senators with more hardline positions have done better against primary challengers; those with more moderate views have done worse.
In 2016, moreover, immigration may have been the issue most responsible for Trump’s winning the Republican nomination. In every state with a caucus or primary exit poll, he did best among voters who said immigration was their top issue.1
That’s the GOP’s conundrum on immigration and DACA: The politics of “immigration” would suggest that Republicans let DACA lapse, leaving some of the 800,000 recipients subject to deportation; the politics of DACA more narrowly would argue for passing a bill that grants some of its protections. And lawmakers will probably get pressure from both sides.
Vocal conservative activists such as Ann Coulter and the Federation for American Immigration Reform are against any kind of broad protection from deportation like DACA. Breitbart, the website run in part by former Trump chief strategist Steve Bannon, has been casting any kind of formalization of DACA policy as “amnesty,” a word that conservatives often invoke to drive up opposition to more liberal immigration proposals among party activists. Conservative activists could still declare that a vote for a DACA replacement both rewards illegal behavior and, in effect, gives Obama a policy win. If that kind of argument takes hold among party activists, it will be hard for congressional Republicans to support this legislation.
| 4,963 |
<h4>Anti-immigrant sentiment currently drives support for Trump---it’s the single most important issue for his base</h4><p><strong>Enten & Bacon 17</strong> - * senior political writer and analyst for FiveThirtyEight AND ** senior writer for FiveThirtyEight (Harry and Perry Jr., “Trump’s Hardline Immigration Stance Got Him To The White House,” FiveThirtyEight, 07/12/17, Accessed Online at: https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-polls-showing-daca-as-popular-even-among-republicans-dont-tell-the-whole-story/, Accessed Online on 08/09/18, SI)</p><p>President <u>Trump’s decision to end</u> the Obama administration’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program (better known as <u>DACA</u>)<u> seems like a political loser. Polling shows that most Americans support the program</u>, which protects undocumented immigrants who were brought to the United States as children from deportation, and don’t want participants removed. This includes, in some polls, a plurality of Republicans. That may be why some congressional Republicans have lined up behind a bill that essentially reinstates DACA.</p><p><u>A DACA-like bill could be approved by Congress<strong>. But <mark>there’s a big force in the way: Anti-immigration sentiment in the Republican Party</mark>. </strong>DACA may be popular, even among some Republicans, but<strong> <mark>hardline immigration policy has been growing as an animating force in GOP politics for years</mark>. It helped put Trump in the White House.</p><p></u></strong>So looking only at the polling on DACA can be misleading if you’re trying to gauge the chances that the Republican-controlled Congress will replace the program. During policy debates, we sometimes become too focused on individual questions instead of looking at the broader public view. On the issue of gun control, for example, Democrats have liked to point out that background checks have near universal support. Yet, Congress has repeatedly failed to pass a background check bill. Part of the reason: Background checks may poll well, but gun control as a general concept is less popular. Similarly, Republicans tend to poll evenly with Democrats on which party “would do a better job of dealing with” gun policy. In other words, gun policy divides voters along normal partisan lines, making it unlikely that Republicans would be punished for sticking to their position on a specific policy question within that issue.</p><p>Immigration is similar to guns in that the Democratic position on many specific immigration policy questions is more popular than the Republican position, but Republicans hold their own on immigration more generally. Much of Trump’s immigration agenda doesn’t poll well: For instance, there isn’t broad support for building a border wall with Mexico, limiting legal immigration or ending DACA. However, recent surveys from George Washington University and Morning Consult found that Democrats and Republicans tend to poll evenly when it comes to which party is trusted more to handle immigration.</p><p>Additionally, <u>immigration tends to be an issue that is more important to Republicans than Democrats. The 2016 national exit poll found that Trump beat Hillary Clinton by 31 percentage points among voters who said immigration was the most important issue facing the country.</u> The 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study found that <u><strong><mark>73 percent of Trump voters said immigration was of “very high importance” to them</u></strong></mark>, compared with 24 percent of Clinton voters. And despite Trump’s rhetoric on immigration and Latinos during the 2016 campaign, he probably did no worse among them than Mitt Romney did in 2012. (And he may have done slightly better.)</p><p><u>So even though DACA is popular, Republicans would be unlikely to face a backlash among their voters — even their more centrist ones — should they refuse to pass a replacement.</p><p></u>Indeed, Republican members of Congress could face a backlash if they pass one — in the form of primary challenges. <u><strong>In recent elections, <mark>a hardline stance on immigration has proved to be a winner in Republican primaries</mark>. </strong>It has been highly correlated with how well GOP senators have done against primary challenges <mark>— senators with more hardline positions have done better against primary challengers</mark>; those with more moderate views have done worse.</p><p><strong>In 2016, moreover, <mark>immigration may have been the issue most responsible for Trump’s winning the Republican nomination</mark>.</u></strong> <u>In every state with a caucus or primary exit poll, he did best among voters who said immigration was their top issue.1 </p><p></u>That’s the GOP’s conundrum on immigration and DACA: The politics of “immigration” would suggest that Republicans let DACA lapse, leaving some of the 800,000 recipients subject to deportation; the politics of DACA more narrowly would argue for passing a bill that grants some of its protections. And lawmakers will probably get pressure from both sides.</p><p><u>Vocal conservative activists such as Ann Coulter and the Federation for American Immigration Reform are against any kind of broad protection </u>from deportation like DACA. <u><strong>Breitbart,</u></strong> the website run in part by former Trump chief strategist Steve Bannon, <u><strong>has been casting any kind of formalization of DACA policy as “amnesty</u></strong>,” a word that conservatives often invoke to drive up opposition to more liberal immigration proposals among party activists. Conservative activists could still declare that a vote for a DACA replacement both rewards illegal behavior and, in effect, gives Obama a policy win. If that kind of argument takes hold among party activists, it will be hard for congressional Republicans to support this legislation.</p>
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1nc
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Base
| null | 96,017 | 138 | 104,870 |
./documents/hspolicy18/LiberalArtsAndScience/FoSu/Liberal%20Arts%20And%20Science-Fox-Sudarsan-Neg-Cedar%20Ridge-Round2.docx
| 696,361 |
N
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Cedar Ridge
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2
|
Westwood NY
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Elmer Yang
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1AC EB visas
1NC Cap K Base DA Auctions CP
2AC PerfCon theory
2NR Cap K
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hspolicy18/LiberalArtsAndScience/FoSu/Liberal%20Arts%20And%20Science-Fox-Sudarsan-Neg-Cedar%20Ridge-Round2.docx
| null | 59,191 |
FoSu
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Liberal Arts And Science FoSu
| null |
Ga.....
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Fo.....
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Sa.....
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Su.....
| 20,879 |
LiberalArtsAndScience
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Liberal Arts And Science
| null | null | 1,017 |
hspolicy18
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HS Policy 2018-19
| 2,018 |
cx
|
hs
| 2 |
1,039,999 |
1) Self-questioning – the process of researching, thinking about, and reflecting on a topic prior to debating it changes minds. Without a predictable, limited resolution teams will resort to gut reactions that entrench biases.
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Goodin & Niemeyer ‘3
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Goodin & Niemeyer ‘3 (Robert; Simon; 2003; Australian National University; “When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy”; Political Studies; Vol. 50; p. 627-649)
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in any particular case Exaggerated claims and counter-claims become entrenched, and unreflective public opinion polarized around them the effect of deliberative processes was to brush away those highly polarized attitudes, dispel the myths and symbolic posturing on both sides that had come to dominate the debate, and liberate people to act upon their attitudes The key point is that happened before the formal discussions Talking among themselves did very little Suppose that we have at the outset mass ignorance or mass apathy people’s engaging with the issue acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would occur earlier in the deliberative process There is much literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change Before deliberation, individuals may not give the issue much thought or bothered to engage an extensive process of reflection In such cases, positions may be arrived via cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even following the lead of others Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on incomplete information processing ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve more deliberate effort in a way akin to internal-reflective deliberative ideal we lead our ordinary lives on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without thought When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we retrieve what we think but we cannot retrieve the reasons why That fully reasoned assessment internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons rather than just consulting our summary judgments’ what prompts that shift from online to more deeply reflective deliberation is fixing one’s attention on a topic in the context of a group discussion, this shift is likely to occur earlier rather than later before the formal discussion ever begins elements of the pre-discursive process are crucial to shaping and reshaping people’s attitudes The processes of focusing attention on a topic, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard is likely to alter not just the information people have but also the way people process that information and think about the issue people shift into this internal-reflective mode they may be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds Our claim is that the earliest steps in the process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will matter more than a more discursive stripe the pre-discursive phases will have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue informal, pre-group deliberation will do much of the work that deliberative democrats want to attribute to formal discursive processes What are the preconditions for that happening? A citizens’ jury concentrates people’s minds on a single issue Ordinary politics involve many issues at once A citizens’ jury is supplied a background briefing that has been agreed by all stakeholders In ordinary politics, there is rarely common ground on which debates are conducted Participating in a ‘citizens’ jury’ evokes very particular norms: norms concerning impartiality’ norms concerning the ‘common good’ citizens’ juries are ‘special’ in those ways if being special makes for a better – more ‘reflective’, more ‘deliberative’ – political process those are design features we ought to mimic in ordinary politics as well There are various ways that might be done Issues might be sequenced for debate and resolution, to avoid too much competition for people’s time and attention those features need to be replicated in real-world politics in order to achieve that goal
weigh better debating resolutional question should not burdened with rejoinder untopical affirmatives
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deliberative processes brush away polarized attitudes, dispel myths and liberate people to act The key happened before discussions people’s engaging with the issue acquiring information thinking hard about it occur earlier Before deliberation there may be inconsistencies in logic based on incomplete information processing That fully reasoned assessment reflective deliberation requires us to call reasons rather than just consulting judgments’ focusing attention on a topic and inviting people to think hard alter the way people process that information and think about the issue they may be open to argument with talk actually changing minds pre-discursive phases have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue Issues might be sequenced for debate and resolution, to avoid competition for attention
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What happened in this particular case, as in any particular case, was in some respects peculiar unto itself. The problem of the Bloomfield Track had been well known and much discussed in the local community for a long time. Exaggerated claims and counter-claims had become entrenched, and unreflective public opinion polarized around them. In this circumstance, the effect of the information phase of deliberative processes was to brush away those highly polarized attitudes, dispel the myths and symbolic posturing on both sides that had come to dominate the debate, and liberate people to act upon their attitudes toward the protection of rainforest itself. The key point, from the perspective of ‘democratic deliberation within’, is that that happened in the earlier stages of deliberation – before the formal discussions (‘deliberations’, in the discursive sense) of the jury process ever began. The simple process of jurors seeing the site for themselves, focusing their minds on the issues and listening to what experts had to say did virtually all the work in changing jurors’ attitudes. Talking among themselves, as a jury, did very little of it. However, the same might happen in cases very different from this one. Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people’s engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and pro cedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from online to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing one’s attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘online’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people’s attitudes in a citizens’ jury-style process. The initial processes of focusing attention on a topic, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard about it is likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think about the issue. What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earliest steps in the jury process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue. From Citizens’ Juries to Ordinary Mass Politics? In a citizens’ jury sort of setting, then, it seems that informal, pre-group deliberation – ‘deliberation within’ – will inevitably do much of the work that deliberative democrats ordinarily want to attribute to the more formal discursive processes. What are the preconditions for that happening? To what extent, in that sense, can findings about citizens’ juries be extended to other larger or less well-ordered deliberative settings? Even in citizens’ juries, deliberation will work only if people are attentive, open and willing to change their minds as appropriate. So, too, in mass politics. In citizens’ juries the need to participate (or the anticipation of participating) in formally organized group discussions might be the ‘prompt’ that evokes those attributes. But there might be many other possible ‘prompts’ that can be found in less formally structured mass-political settings. Here are a few ways citizens’ juries (and all cognate micro-deliberative processes)37 might be different from mass politics, and in which lessons drawn from that experience might not therefore carry over to ordinary politics: • A citizens’ jury concentrates people’s minds on a single issue. Ordinary politics involve many issues at once. • A citizens’ jury is often supplied a background briefing that has been agreed by all stakeholders (Smith and Wales, 2000, p. 58). In ordinary mass politics, there is rarely any equivalent common ground on which debates are conducted. • A citizens’ jury separates the process of acquiring information from that of discussing the issues. In ordinary mass politics, those processes are invariably intertwined. • A citizens’ jury is provided with a set of experts. They can be questioned, debated or discounted. But there is a strictly limited set of ‘competing experts’ on the same subject. In ordinary mass politics, claims and sources of expertise often seem virtually limitless, allowing for much greater ‘selective perception’. • Participating in something called a ‘citizens’ jury’ evokes certain very particular norms: norms concerning the ‘impartiality’ appropriate to jurors; norms concerning the ‘common good’ orientation appropriate to people in their capacity as citizens.38 There is a very different ethos at work in ordinary mass politics, which are typically driven by flagrantly partisan appeals to sectional interest (or utter disinterest and voter apathy). • In a citizens’ jury, we think and listen in anticipation of the discussion phase, knowing that we soon will have to defend our views in a discursive setting where they will be probed intensively.39 In ordinary mass-political settings, there is no such incentive for paying attention. It is perfectly true that citizens’ juries are ‘special’ in all those ways. But if being special in all those ways makes for a better – more ‘reflective’, more ‘deliberative’ – political process, then those are design features that we ought try to mimic as best we can in ordinary mass politics as well. There are various ways that that might be done. Briefing books might be prepared by sponsors of American presidential debates (the League of Women Voters, and such like) in consultation with the stakeholders involved. Agreed panels of experts might be questioned on prime-time television. Issues might be sequenced for debate and resolution, to avoid too much competition for people’s time and attention. Variations on the Ackerman and Fishkin (2002) proposal for a ‘deliberation day’ before every election might be generalized, with a day every few months being given over to small meetings in local schools to discuss public issues. All that is pretty visionary, perhaps. And (although it is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper to explore them in depth) there are doubtless many other more-or-less visionary ways of introducing into real-world politics analogues of the elements that induce citizens’ jurors to practice ‘democratic deliberation within’, even before the jury discussion gets underway. Here, we have to content ourselves with identifying those features that need to be replicated in real-world politics in order to achieve that goal – and with the ‘possibility theorem’ that is established by the fact that (as sketched immediately above) there is at least one possible way of doing that for each of those key features.
2) Fairness – debate is a game and we’re both here to win – this means that procedural questions like T come first.
Don’t weigh the affirmative. The role of the ballot is to vote for the team that does the better debating over the resolutional question. The negative should not be burdened with rejoinder against untopical affirmatives.
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<h4>1) Self-questioning – the process of researching, thinking about, and reflecting on a topic prior to debating it <u>changes minds</u>. Without a predictable, limited resolution teams will resort to gut reactions that <u>entrench biases</u>. </h4><p><strong>Goodin & Niemeyer ‘3 </strong>(Robert; Simon; 2003; Australian National University; “When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy”; Political Studies; Vol. 50; p. 627-649)</p><p>What happened <u>in</u> this particular case, as in <u>any particular case</u>, was in some respects peculiar unto itself. The problem of the Bloomfield Track had been well known and much discussed in the local community for a long time. <u>Exaggerated claims and counter-claims</u> had <u><strong>become</strong> entrenched, and unreflective public opinion <strong>polarized</strong> around them</u>. In this circumstance, <u>the effect</u> of the information phase <u>of <mark>deliberative processes</mark> was to <strong><mark>brush away</strong></mark> those highly <mark>polarized attitudes, <strong>dispel</strong></mark> the <mark>myths</mark> and symbolic posturing on both sides that had come to dominate the debate, <mark>and <strong>liberate</strong> people to act</mark> upon their attitudes</u> toward the protection of rainforest itself. <u><mark>The key</mark> point</u>, from the perspective of ‘democratic deliberation within’, <u>is</u> that <u>that <mark>happened</u></mark> in the earlier stages of deliberation – <u><strong><mark>before</mark> the formal <mark>discussions</u></strong></mark> (‘deliberations’, in the discursive sense) of the jury process ever began. The simple process of jurors seeing the site for themselves, focusing their minds on the issues and listening to what experts had to say did virtually all the work in changing jurors’ attitudes. <u><strong>Talking among themselves</u></strong>, as a jury, <u><strong>did very little</u></strong> of it. However, the same might happen in cases very different from this one. <u>Suppose that</u> instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what <u>we have at the outset</u> is <u>mass ignorance or mass apathy</u> or non-attitudes. There again, <u><mark>people’s <strong>engaging</strong> with the issue</u></mark> – focusing on it, <u><strong><mark>acquiring information</strong></mark> about it, <strong><mark>thinking hard</strong> about it</mark> – would</u> be something that is likely to <u><mark>occur earlier</u></mark> rather than later <u>in the deliberative process</u>. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. <u>There is much</u> in the large <u>literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change</u> to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. <u><mark>Before deliberation</mark>, individuals may not</u> have <u>give</u>n <u>the issue much thought or bothered to engage</u> in <u>an extensive process of reflection</u>.32 <u>In such cases, positions may be arrived</u> at <u>via</u> peripheral routes, taking <u><strong>cognitive shortcuts</strong> or arriving at <strong>‘top of the head’ conclusions</strong> or even</u> simply <u><strong>following the lead</strong> <strong>of others</u></strong> believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. <u>Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, <mark>there may be <strong>inconsistencies</strong> in logic</mark> and the formation of positions, <mark>based on</u></mark> partial information or <u><strong><mark>incomplete information processing</u></strong></mark>. In contrast, <u>‘central’ routes to</u> <u>the development of attitudes involve</u> the application of <u>more deliberate effort</u> to the matter at hand, <u>in a way</u> that is more <u>akin to</u> the <u>internal-reflective deliberative ideal</u>. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that <u>we lead our ordinary lives</u> largely <u>on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without</u> much <u>thought</u> or reflection. <u>When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines</u> – our ‘running’ beliefs and pro cedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, <u>when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we</u> easily <u>retrieve what we think but we cannot</u> so easily <u>retrieve the reasons why</u>. <u><mark>That</u></mark> more <u><strong><mark>fully reasoned assessment</u></strong></mark> – the sort of thing we have been calling <u><strong>internal-<mark>reflective deliberation</strong></mark> – <mark>requires us to call</mark> up <mark>reasons</u></mark> from stored memory <u><mark>rather than just consulting</mark> our</u> running on-line ‘<u>summary <mark>judgments’</u></mark>. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, <u>what prompts that shift from online to more <strong>deeply reflective deliberation</strong> is</u> not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for <u><strong>fixing one’s attention on a topic</u></strong>, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even <u>in the context of a group discussion, this shift</u> from ‘online’ to ‘memory-based’ processing <u>is likely to occur earlier rather than later</u> in the process, often <u>before the formal discussion ever begins</u>. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that <u>elements of the pre-discursive process are</u> likely to prove <u>crucial to</u> the <u><strong>shaping and reshaping</u></strong> of <u>people’s attitudes</u> in a citizens’ jury-style process. <u>The</u> initial <u>processes of <strong><mark>focusing attention on a topic</strong></mark>, providing information about it <mark>and inviting people to <strong>think hard</u></strong></mark> about it <u>is likely to</u> provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, <u><mark>alter</u></mark>ing <u>not just the information people have</u> about the issue <u>but also <mark>the way people<strong> process that information</strong> and</u></mark> hence (perhaps) what they <u><strong><mark>think about the issue</u></strong></mark>. What happens once <u>people</u> have <u>shift</u>ed <u>into this</u> more <u><strong>internal-reflective mode</u></strong> is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and <u><mark>they</u></mark> then <u><mark>may</u></mark> (or may not) <u><mark>be <strong>open</strong> to argument</mark> and counter-argument, <mark>with talk <strong>actually changing minds</u></strong></mark>. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 <u>Our claim is</u> instead merely <u>that the earliest steps in the</u> jury <u>process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue</u> at hand <u>and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will</u> invariably <u><strong>matter more</strong> than</u> deliberative democrats of <u>a more discursive stripe</u> would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, <u>the <mark>pre-discursive phases</u></mark> of the jury process <u>will</u> invariably <u><mark>have a <strong>considerable impact</strong> on changing the way jurors approach an issue</u></mark>. From Citizens’ Juries to Ordinary Mass Politics? In a citizens’ jury sort of setting, then, it seems that <u>informal, pre-group deliberation</u> – ‘deliberation within’ – <u>will</u> inevitably <u>do much of the work that deliberative democrats</u> ordinarily <u>want to attribute to</u> the more <u>formal discursive processes</u>. <u>What are the preconditions for that happening?</u> To what extent, in that sense, can findings about citizens’ juries be extended to other larger or less well-ordered deliberative settings? Even in citizens’ juries, deliberation will work only if people are attentive, open and willing to change their minds as appropriate. So, too, in mass politics. In citizens’ juries the need to participate (or the anticipation of participating) in formally organized group discussions might be the ‘prompt’ that evokes those attributes. But there might be many other possible ‘prompts’ that can be found in less formally structured mass-political settings. Here are a few ways citizens’ juries (and all cognate micro-deliberative processes)37 might be different from mass politics, and in which lessons drawn from that experience might not therefore carry over to ordinary politics: • <u>A citizens’ jury concentrates people’s minds on a single issue</u>. <u>Ordinary politics involve many issues at once</u>. • <u>A citizens’ jury is</u> often <u>supplied a background briefing that has been agreed by all stakeholders</u> (Smith and Wales, 2000, p. 58). <u>In ordinary</u> mass <u>politics, there is rarely</u> any equivalent <u><strong>common ground</strong> on which debates are conducted</u>. • A citizens’ jury separates the process of acquiring information from that of discussing the issues. In ordinary mass politics, those processes are invariably intertwined. • A citizens’ jury is provided with a set of experts. They can be questioned, debated or discounted. But there is a strictly limited set of ‘competing experts’ on the same subject. In ordinary mass politics, claims and sources of expertise often seem virtually limitless, allowing for much greater ‘selective perception’. • <u>Participating in</u> something called <u>a ‘citizens’ jury’ evokes</u> certain <u>very particular norms: norms concerning</u> the ‘<u>impartiality’</u> appropriate to jurors; <u>norms concerning the ‘common good’</u> orientation appropriate to people in their capacity as citizens.38 There is a very different ethos at work in ordinary mass politics, which are typically driven by flagrantly partisan appeals to sectional interest (or utter disinterest and voter apathy). • In a citizens’ jury, we think and listen in anticipation of the discussion phase, knowing that we soon will have to defend our views in a discursive setting where they will be probed intensively.39 In ordinary mass-political settings, there is no such incentive for paying attention. It is perfectly true that <u>citizens’ juries are ‘special’ in</u> all <u>those ways</u>. But <u>if being special</u> in all those ways <u>makes for a better – more ‘reflective’, more ‘deliberative’ – political process</u>, then <u>those are design features</u> that <u>we ought</u> try <u>to mimic</u> as best we can <u>in ordinary</u> mass <u>politics as well</u>. <u>There are various ways that</u> that <u>might be done</u>. Briefing books might be prepared by sponsors of American presidential debates (the League of Women Voters, and such like) in consultation with the stakeholders involved. Agreed panels of experts might be questioned on prime-time television. <u><mark>Issues might be sequenced for <strong>debate</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>resolution</strong>, to avoid</mark> too much <mark>competition for</mark> people’s time and <mark>attention</u></mark>. Variations on the Ackerman and Fishkin (2002) proposal for a ‘deliberation day’ before every election might be generalized, with a day every few months being given over to small meetings in local schools to discuss public issues. All that is pretty visionary, perhaps. And (although it is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper to explore them in depth) there are doubtless many other more-or-less visionary ways of introducing into real-world politics analogues of the elements that induce citizens’ jurors to practice ‘democratic deliberation within’, even before the jury discussion gets underway. Here, we have to content ourselves with identifying <u>those features</u> that <u>need to be replicated in <strong>real-world politics</strong> in order to achieve that goal</u> – and with the ‘possibility theorem’ that is established by the fact that (as sketched immediately above) there is at least one possible way of doing that for each of those key features.</p><p>2) Fairness – debate is a game and we’re both here to win – this means that procedural questions like T come first. </p><p>Don’t <u>weigh</u> the affirmative. The role of the ballot is to vote for the team that does the <u>better debating</u> over the <u>resolutional question</u>. The negative <u>should not </u>be <u>burdened with rejoinder</u> against <u>untopical affirmatives</u>.</p>
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Russia wants to cooperate with the US on debris.
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Byers 19
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Michael Byers 19. Professor & Canada Research Chair, Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia. “Cold, dark, and dangerous: international cooperation in the arctic and space.” Polar Record 55 (1): 32-47.
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Russia and Western states continued to cooperate in Space after Crimea ISS has been functioning normally, with astronauts travelling in Soyuz spacecraft All three of the commercial launch services based on Russian–Western cooperation continued to operate after Crimea 12 commercial launches for Western customers have taken place on Protons, 3 on Rockots, and 18 on Soyuz STs Russia and the U S continue to share some information on Space debris Trump’s plans for Space Force are refraining from testing anti-satellite weapons in ways that might create Space debris As Hyten stated the one limiting factor is no debris Whatever you do, don’t create debris Russia and Western states are cooperating with regards to natural hazards in-and-from Space, including through the International Asteroid Warning Network, created in 2013 to facilitate cooperation Russia is similarly working with Western states in the Space Mission Planning Advisory Group to ‘prepare for an international response to a NEO threat through the exchange of information, development of options for collaborative research and mission opportunities, and to conduct NEO threat mitigation planning activities’ the U S and Russia are still cooperating in Space and appear intent on continued cooperation Putin said Thank God, this field of activity is not being influenced by problems in politics I hope that everything will develop, since it is in the interests of everyone, in the interests of all humankind This is a sphere of activity that unites people remoteness and extreme conditions makes almost any activity very expensive These high expenses create an incentive for cooperation and burden-sharing states which contribute their satellites and ground stations all obtain much greater coverage and therefore faster notification of distress signals States have a shared interest in cooperation as an antidote against conflict especially in remote and extreme environments where military preparations and activities can be punishingly expensive. The OSCE’s 1992 Treaty on Open Skies enabled the verification of arms control agreements. The Arctic Council was created, in large part, to foster communication, build confidence, reduce tensions, and thus help to prevent conflict in the post-Cold War period (English, 2013). The greatest accomplishment of the Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement may have been to regularise contact, and therefore confidence-building, among the militaries and coastguards of the eight Arctic states (Exner-Pirot, 2012). The creation of the Arctic Coast Guard Forum has carried this development further. In Space, one of the motivations for the Cospas-Sarsat Programme was to continue the cooperation and confidence-building that had developed—during the Cold War—as a result of the Apollo–Soyuz Project (Jamgotch, Knappet, & Carpio, 1988). In the 1990s, the same motivation led to Russia being invited to participate in the ISS as a full partner, despite the United States shouldering most of the cost. The recent inclusion of Russia as the United States’ primary partner in the Lunar Gateway is a continuation of this policy—taking collaborative, confidence-building steps that reduce tensions and thus help to prevent conflict.
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Russia and Western states continued to cooperate in Space after Crimea Russia and the U S share information on Space debris cooperating with regards to natural hazards in Space U S and Russia appear intent on continued cooperation this field of activity is not influenced by politics remoteness and extreme conditions makes activity very expensive. create an incentive for cooperation and burden-sharing
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Russia and Western states continued to cooperate in Space after the annexation of Crimea. The ISS has been functioning normally, with Western astronauts travelling there in Soyuz spacecraft. Indeed, since the annexation in March 2014, NASA has booked an additional seven seats on Soyuz and taken out options on three more (Grush, 2016; O’Kane, 2017). The Cospas-Sarsat Programme is functioning normally and Russian-made RD-180 engines are still being used to launch US intelligence and military satellites. Although plans to replace the RD-180 with a US-made engine gained impetus from the annexation of Crimea (Ferster, 2014), the replacement engine is still years away. In 2016, the US Congress approved the purchase of an additional 18 RD-180 engines: enough to last until 2022 (King & Troyan, 2016). All three of the commercial launch services based on Russian–Western cooperation continued to operate after the annexation of Crimea. Since March 2014, 12 commercial launches for Western customers have taken place on Protons, 3 on Rockots, and 18 on Soyuz STs (Space Launch Report, n.d.). Russia and the United States continue to share some information on Space debris, with the US military remaining at the centre of this international cooperation (Henry, 2018). The two countries also continue to observe the ban on the deployment of nuclear weapons in Space and, notwithstanding President Donald Trump’s plans for creating a US Space Force, are refraining from testing anti-satellite weapons in ways that might create Space debris. As General John Hyten, the current head of US Strategic Command, stated in 2015: Kinetic [anti-satellite weaponry] is horrible for the world … And to me, the one limiting factor is no debris. Whatever you do, don’t create debris. (Billings, 2015) In 2017, Trump redirected NASA’s plans for human Space travel towards the Moon rather than Mars. NASA responded by proposing the Lunar Gateway, a Space station in cis-lunar orbit that would serve as a staging point for access to the Moon’s surface as well for deep Space missions (NASA, 2017). Later that year, NASA and Roscosmos issued a joint statement on cooperation in pursuit of this objective (Weitering, 2017). Russia and Western states are also cooperating with regards to natural hazards in-and-from Space, including through the International Asteroid Warning Network, created in 2013 to facilitate cooperation between observatories and Space institutions in discovering, monitoring, and characterising potentially hazardous near-Earth objects (NEOs) (International Asteroid Warning Network, n.d.). Russia is similarly working with Western states in the Space Mission Planning Advisory Group, an association of national Space agencies that was established in 2014 to ‘prepare for an international response to a NEO threat through the exchange of information, development of options for collaborative research and mission opportunities, and to conduct NEO threat mitigation planning activities’ (European Space Agency, n.d.). Last but not least, Space weather (that is solar storms) has become another subject of Russian–Western cooperation through the recent establishment of expert and working groups within the United Nations system as part of the Space 2030 Agenda and UNISPACE+50 exercise (St. Pierre, 2017). In short, both the United States and Russia are still cooperating in Space, and appear intent on continued cooperation. In April 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin said: Thank God, this field of activity is not being influenced by problems in politics. Therefore, I hope that everything will develop, since it is in the interests of everyone, in the interests of all humankind. … This is a sphere of activity that unites people. (President of Russia, 2018) Reasons for Continued Cooperation There are a number of reasons for continued Russian–Western cooperation in the Arctic and Space; reasons that overlap with each other. These reasons are not of equal importance; nor must they all be present for cooperation to occur. The Arctic and Space are remote and extreme environments The first reason for continued cooperation concerns the ‘cold, dark, and dangerous’ characters of the Arctic and Space. In every region of the world, natural factors such as geography, climate, and the presence or absence of resources play a role in national interests and policy preferences. In the Arctic and Space, a combination of remoteness and extreme conditions makes almost any activity very expensive. These high expenses, in turn, create an incentive for cooperation and burden-sharing. As Vladimir Putin said in 2010: If you stand alone, you can’t survive in the Arctic. Nature makes people and states to help each other. (Harding, 2010) Examples of how states cooperate to overcome remoteness, extreme conditions, and high expenses abound in the Arctic and Space. For instance, the states which contribute their satellites and ground stations to the Cospas-Sarsat Programme all obtain much greater coverage and therefore faster notification of distress signals than they could ever obtain on their own, given the high costs of building, insuring, and launching satellites. This then saves them money by taking the ‘search’ out of search and rescue—a matter of no small importance for the Soviet Union/Russia, the United States, Canada, and France, which created the Cospas-Sarsat Programme and have some of the world’s largest maritime zones. Similarly, all the states involved in the ISS benefit scientifically and commercially from having a laboratory in micro-gravity (Rai et al., 2016). Yet the cost of building and operating such a large, multi-functional, and long-lasting Space station would be prohibitive for any single state, including the United States (Zimmerman, 2003). States also have a shared interest in cooperation as an antidote against conflict, especially in remote and extreme environments where military preparations and activities can be punishingly expensive. The OSCE’s 1992 Treaty on Open Skies enabled the verification of arms control agreements. The Arctic Council was created, in large part, to foster communication, build confidence, reduce tensions, and thus help to prevent conflict in the post-Cold War period (English, 2013). The greatest accomplishment of the Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement may have been to regularise contact, and therefore confidence-building, among the militaries and coastguards of the eight Arctic states (Exner-Pirot, 2012). The creation of the Arctic Coast Guard Forum has carried this development further. In Space, one of the motivations for the Cospas-Sarsat Programme was to continue the cooperation and confidence-building that had developed—during the Cold War—as a result of the Apollo–Soyuz Project (Jamgotch, Knappet, & Carpio, 1988). In the 1990s, the same motivation led to Russia being invited to participate in the ISS as a full partner, despite the United States shouldering most of the cost. The recent inclusion of Russia as the United States’ primary partner in the Lunar Gateway is a continuation of this policy—taking collaborative, confidence-building steps that reduce tensions and thus help to prevent conflict.
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<h4>Russia wants to cooperate with the US on debris. </h4><p>Michael <strong>Byers 19</strong>. Professor & Canada Research Chair, Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia. “Cold, dark, and dangerous: international cooperation in the arctic and space.” Polar Record 55 (1): 32-47. </p><p><u><mark>Russia and Western states <strong>continued to cooperate in Space</u></strong> <u>after</u></mark> the annexation of <u><mark>Crimea</u></mark>. The <u><strong>ISS</u></strong> <u>has been functioning normally, with</u> Western <u>astronauts travelling</u> there <u>in Soyuz spacecraft</u>. Indeed, since the annexation in March 2014, NASA has booked an additional seven seats on Soyuz and taken out options on three more (Grush, 2016; O’Kane, 2017). The Cospas-Sarsat Programme is functioning normally and Russian-made RD-180 engines are still being used to launch US intelligence and military satellites. Although plans to replace the RD-180 with a US-made engine gained impetus from the annexation of Crimea (Ferster, 2014), the replacement engine is still years away. In 2016, the US Congress approved the purchase of an additional 18 RD-180 engines: enough to last until 2022 (King & Troyan, 2016). <u>All three of the commercial launch services based on Russian–Western cooperation continued to operate after</u> the annexation of <u>Crimea</u>. Since March 2014, <u>12 commercial launches for Western customers have taken place on Protons, 3 on Rockots, and 18 on Soyuz STs</u> (Space Launch Report, n.d.). <u><strong><mark>Russia</strong> and the</u> <u><strong>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u>continue to <mark>share</mark> <strong>some</strong> <mark>information on <strong>Space debris</u></strong></mark>, with the US military remaining at the centre of this international cooperation (Henry, 2018). The two countries also continue to observe the ban on the deployment of nuclear weapons in Space and, notwithstanding President Donald <u>Trump’s plans for</u> creating a US <u>Space Force</u>, <u>are refraining</u> <u><strong>from</u></strong> <u>testing anti-satellite weapons in ways that might</u> <u><strong>create Space debris</u></strong>. <u>As</u> General John <u>Hyten</u>, the current head of US Strategic Command, <u>stated</u> in 2015: Kinetic [anti-satellite weaponry] is horrible for the world … And to me, <u>the one limiting factor</u> <u>is <strong>no debris</u></strong>. <u><strong>Whatever you do, don’t create debris</u></strong>. (Billings, 2015) In 2017, Trump redirected NASA’s plans for human Space travel towards the Moon rather than Mars. NASA responded by proposing the Lunar Gateway, a Space station in cis-lunar orbit that would serve as a staging point for access to the Moon’s surface as well for deep Space missions (NASA, 2017). Later that year, NASA and Roscosmos issued a joint statement on cooperation in pursuit of this objective (Weitering, 2017). <u>Russia and Western states are</u> also <u><mark>cooperating with regards to <strong>natural hazards</u></strong> <u>in</mark>-and-from <mark>Space</mark>, including through the International Asteroid Warning Network, created in 2013 to facilitate cooperation</u> between observatories and Space institutions in discovering, monitoring, and characterising potentially hazardous near-Earth objects (NEOs) (International Asteroid Warning Network, n.d.). <u>Russia is similarly working with Western states in the Space Mission Planning Advisory Group</u>, an association of national Space agencies that was established in 2014 <u>to ‘prepare for an international response to a NEO threat through the exchange of information, development of options for collaborative research and mission opportunities, and to conduct NEO threat mitigation planning activities’</u> (European Space Agency, n.d.). Last but not least, Space weather (that is solar storms) has become another subject of Russian–Western cooperation through the recent establishment of expert and working groups within the United Nations system as part of the Space 2030 Agenda and UNISPACE+50 exercise (St. Pierre, 2017). In short, both <u>the</u> <u><strong><mark>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><mark>and <strong>Russia</strong></mark> are still <strong>cooperating in Space</u></strong>, <u>and <mark>appear <strong>intent on continued cooperation</u></strong></mark>. In April 2018, Russian President Vladimir <u>Putin said</u>: <u>Thank God, <mark>this field of activity is not</mark> being <mark>influenced by</mark> problems in <mark>politics</u></mark>. Therefore, <u>I hope that everything will develop, since it is in the interests of everyone, in the interests of all humankind</u>. … <u>This is a sphere of activity that <strong>unites people</u></strong>. (President of Russia, 2018) Reasons for Continued Cooperation There are a number of reasons for continued Russian–Western cooperation in the Arctic and Space; reasons that overlap with each other. These reasons are not of equal importance; nor must they all be present for cooperation to occur. The Arctic and Space are remote and extreme environments The first reason for continued cooperation concerns the ‘cold, dark, and dangerous’ characters of the Arctic and Space. In every region of the world, natural factors such as geography, climate, and the presence or absence of resources play a role in national interests and policy preferences. In the Arctic and Space, a combination of <u><strong><mark>remoteness</u></strong> <u>and <strong>extreme conditions</u></strong> <u>makes</mark> almost any <mark>activity <strong>very expensive</u></strong>.</mark> <u>These high expenses</u>, in turn, <u><strong><mark>create an incentive</u></strong> <u>for <strong>cooperation</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>burden-sharing</u></strong></mark>. As Vladimir Putin said in 2010: If you stand alone, you can’t survive in the Arctic. Nature makes people and states to help each other. (Harding, 2010) Examples of how states cooperate to overcome remoteness, extreme conditions, and high expenses abound in the Arctic and Space. For instance, the <u>states which contribute their satellites and ground stations</u> to the Cospas-Sarsat Programme <u>all obtain much greater coverage and therefore faster notification of distress signals</u> than they could ever obtain on their own, given the high costs of building, insuring, and launching satellites. This then saves them money by taking the ‘search’ out of search and rescue—a matter of no small importance for the Soviet Union/Russia, the United States, Canada, and France, which created the Cospas-Sarsat Programme and have some of the world’s largest maritime zones. Similarly, all the states involved in the ISS benefit scientifically and commercially from having a laboratory in micro-gravity (Rai et al., 2016). Yet the cost of building and operating such a large, multi-functional, and long-lasting Space station would be prohibitive for any single state, including the United States (Zimmerman, 2003). <u>States</u> also <u>have a <strong>shared interest</u></strong> <u>in cooperation as an <strong>antidote against conflict</u></strong>, <u>especially in remote and extreme environments where military preparations and activities can be <strong>punishingly expensive</strong>. The OSCE’s 1992 Treaty on Open Skies enabled the verification of arms control agreements. The Arctic Council was created, in large part, to foster communication, build confidence, reduce tensions, and thus help to prevent conflict in the post-Cold War period (English, 2013). The greatest accomplishment of the Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement may have been to regularise contact, and therefore confidence-building, among the militaries and coastguards of the eight Arctic states (Exner-Pirot, 2012). The creation of the Arctic Coast Guard Forum has carried this development further. In Space, one of the motivations for the Cospas-Sarsat Programme was to continue the cooperation and confidence-building that had developed—during the Cold War—as a result of the Apollo–Soyuz Project (Jamgotch, Knappet, & Carpio, 1988). In the 1990s, the same motivation led to Russia being invited to participate in the ISS as a full partner, despite the United States shouldering most of the cost. The recent inclusion of Russia as the United States’ primary partner in the Lunar Gateway is a continuation of this policy—taking collaborative, confidence-building steps that reduce tensions and thus help to prevent conflict. </p></u>
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1AC – Solvency
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./documents/ndtceda19/Dartmouth/HeHe/Dartmouth-He-He-Aff-Navy-Round4.docx
| 610,741 |
A
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Navy
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4
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Texas SW
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Matt Harkins
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1ac - share liability (debris africa)
1nc - cosmo liberalism K tech K
2nr - liberalism K
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ndtceda19/Dartmouth/HeHe/Dartmouth-He-He-Aff-Navy-Round4.docx
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HeHe
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Dartmouth HeHe
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So.....
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Er.....
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He.....
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Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
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ndtceda19
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NDT/CEDA 2019-20
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cx
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college
| 2 |
2,461,847 |
The world is too complex for local politics – multipolar global politics, economic instability, and climate change necessitates a collective response that changes the structural conditions of power rather than tinkering around at the margins.
|
SRNICEK AND WILLIAMS 15
|
Nick SRNICEK AND Alex WILLIAMS 15. **Lecturer at City University London and a PhD from the London School of Economics. **Lecturer at City University London. Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work. Verso Books. 34-40.
|
folk political tendencies are so seductive and appealing to movements politics as a response to the problem of how to interpret and act within an ever more complex world
Increasingly, multipolar global politics, economic instability, and climate change outpace the narratives we use to structure and make sense of our lives. Each these is an example a complex system, which features nonlinear dynamics, where marginally different inputs can cause dramatically divergent outputs, intricate sets of causes feedback on one another in unexpected ways, and which operates on scales of space and time that go far beyond any individual’s unaided perception Globalisation, international politics, and climate change: each shapes our world, but their effects are so extensive and complicated that it is difficult to place our own experience within them the economy is not an object amenable to direct perception; it is distributed across time and space (you will never meet ‘the economy’ in person); it incorporates a wide array of elements, from property laws to biological needs, natural resources to technological infrastructures, market stalls and supercomputers; and it involves an enormous and intricately interacting set of feedback loops, all of which produce emergent effects that are irreducible to its individual components the interaction of an economy’s parts produces effects that cannot be understood just by knowing how those parts work in isolation – it is only in grasping the relations between them that the economy can be made sense of we will never be able to experience it directly
we lack a ‘cognitive map’ of our socioeconomic system: a mental picture of how individual and collective human action can be situated within the unimaginable vastness of the global economy
This separation between everyday experience and the system we live within results in increased alienation: we feel adrift in a world we do not understand proliferation of conspiracy theories is partly a response to this situation Conspiracy theories act by narrowing the agency behind our world to a single figure of power they provide a reassuringly simple answer to ‘who is behind it all’
Folk politics presents itself as another response to the problems of overwhelming complexity If we do not understand how the world operates, the folk-political injunction is to reduce complexity down to a human scale folk-political writing is saturated with calls for a return to authenticity immediacy a world that is ‘human-scaled’, ‘tangible’, and ‘everyday’. Such thinking rejects the complexity of the contemporary world, and thereby rejects the possibility of a truly postcapitalist world It attempts to give a human face to power; whereas what is truly terrifying is the asubjective nature of the system The faces are interchangeable; the power remains the same The turn towards localism, temporary moments of resistance, and the intuitive practices of direct action all effectively attempt to condense the problems of global capitalism into concrete figures and moments
folk politics reduces politics to an ethical and individual struggle the imperative to ‘make it local’ leads folk politics to fetishise immediate results and the concrete appearance of action Delaying a corporate attack on the environment is lauded as a success – even if the company simply waits out public attention before returning once again the fetishisation of ‘immediate results’ leads to an empty pragmatism that struggles to maintain the present balance of power, rather than seeking to change structural conditions Without the necessary abstraction of strategic thought, tactics are ultimately fleeting gestures the abjuring of complexity dovetails with the neoliberal case for markets One of the primary arguments made against planning has been that the economy is simply too complex to be guided The only alternative is therefore to leave the distribution of resources to the market and reject any attempt to guide it rationally folk politics appears as an attempt to make global capitalism small enough to be thinkable Any postcapitalist project will necessarily require the creation of new cognitive maps, political narratives, technological interfaces, economic models, and mechanisms of collective control to be able to marshal complex phenomena for the betterment of humanity
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folk political tendencies are seductive
multipolar global politics, economic instability, and climate change outpace narratives Each a complex system which operates on scales that go far beyond any individual’s perception the economy’ incorporates a wide array of elements property laws biological needs, natural resources tech infrastructures, market stalls and supercomputers; and involves an enormous and interacting set of feedback loops that are irreducible we will never experience it directly
we lack a ‘cognitive map’ of our socioeconomic system
the folk-political injunction is to reduce complexity down to a human scale saturated with calls for a return to authenticity immediacy a world that is ‘human-scaled’ Such thinking rejects complexity and rejects a truly postcapitalist world
folk politics reduces politics to an ethical and individual struggle the imperative to ‘make it local’ fetishise immediate results an empty pragmatism maintain power, rather than change structural conditions Without the necessary abstraction of strategic thought, tactics are fleeting gestures the abjuring of complexity dovetails with the neoliberal case for markets
|
OVERWHELMED
Why did folk politics arise in the first place? Why is it that folk political tendencies, for all their manifest flaws, are so seductive and appealing to the movements of today? At least three answers present themselves. The first explanation is to see folk politics as a response to the problem of how to interpret and act within an ever more complex world. The second, related explanation involves situating folk politics as a reaction to the historical experiences of the communist and social democratic left. Finally, folk politics is a more immediate response to the empty spectacle of contemporary party politics.
Increasingly, multipolar global politics, economic instability, and anthropogenic climate change outpace the narratives we use to structure and make sense of our lives. Each of these is an example of what is termed a complex system, which features nonlinear dynamics, where marginally different inputs can cause dramatically divergent outputs, intricate sets of causes feedback on one another in unexpected ways, and which characteristically operates on scales of space and time that go far beyond any individual’s unaided perception.23 Globalisation, international politics, and climate change: each of these systems shapes our world, but their effects are so extensive and complicated that it is difficult to place our own experience within them. The global economy is a good example of this. In simple terms, the economy is not an object amenable to direct perception; it is distributed across time and space (you will never meet ‘the economy’ in person); it incorporates a wide array of elements, from property laws to biological needs, natural resources to technological infrastructures, market stalls and supercomputers; and it involves an enormous and intricately interacting set of feedback loops, all of which produce emergent effects that are irreducible to its individual components.24 In other words, the interaction of an economy’s parts produces effects that cannot be understood just by knowing how those parts work in isolation – it is only in grasping the relations between them that the economy can be made sense of. While we might have an idea of what an economy consists of, we will never be able to experience it directly in the same way as other phenomena. It can only be observed symptomatically through key statistical indexes (charting changes in inflation or interest rates, stock indexes, GDP, and so on), but can never be seen, heard or touched in its totality.
As a result, despite everything that has been written about capitalism, we still struggle to understand its dynamics and its mechanisms. Most importantly, we lack a ‘cognitive map’ of our socioeconomic system: a mental picture of how individual and collective human action can be situated within the unimaginable vastness of the global economy.25 Recent decades have seen an increasing complexity in the dynamics that impinge upon politics. We might consider the imminent threat of anthropogenic climate change as a new kind of problem – one that is unamenable to any simple solution and that involves such intricately woven effects that it is hard to even know where to intervene. Equally, the global economy today appears significantly more complex in terms of the mobility of capital, the intricacies of global finance and the multiplicity of actors involved. How well do our traditional political images of the world map onto these changes? For the left at least, an analysis premised on the industrial working class was a powerful way to interpret the totality of social and economic relations in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, thereby articulating clear strategic objectives. Yet the history of the global left over the course of the twentieth century attests to the ways in which this analysis failed to attend to both the range of possible liberating struggles (based in gender, race or sexuality) and the ability of capitalism to restructure itself – through the creation of the welfare state, or the neoliberal transformations of the global economy. Today, the old models often falter in the face of new problems; we lose the capacity to understand our position in history and in the world at large.
This separation between everyday experience and the system we live within results in increased alienation: we feel adrift in a world we do not understand. The cultural theorist Fredric Jameson notes that the proliferation of conspiracy theories is partly a response to this situation.26 Conspiracy theories act by narrowing the agency behind our world to a single figure of power (the Bilderberg Group, the Freemasons or some other convenient scapegoat). Despite the extraordinary complexity of some of these theories, they nevertheless provide a reassuringly simple answer to ‘who is behind it all’, and what our own role is in the situation. In other words, they act precisely as a (faulty) cognitive map.
Folk politics presents itself as another possible response to the problems of overwhelming complexity. If we do not understand how the world operates, the folk-political injunction is to reduce complexity down to a human scale. Indeed, folk-political writing is saturated with calls for a return to authenticity, to immediacy, to a world that is ‘transparent’, ‘human-scaled’, ‘tangible’, ‘slow’, ‘harmonious’, ‘simple’, and ‘everyday’.27 Such thinking rejects the complexity of the contemporary world, and thereby rejects the possibility of a truly postcapitalist world. It attempts to give a human face to power; whereas what is truly terrifying is the generally asubjective nature of the system. The faces are interchangeable; the power remains the same. The turn towards localism, temporary moments of resistance, and the intuitive practices of direct action all effectively attempt to condense the problems of global capitalism into concrete figures and moments.
In this process, folk politics often reduces politics to an ethical and individual struggle. There is a tendency sometimes to imagine that we simply need ‘good’ capitalists, or a ‘responsible’ capitalism. At the same time, the imperative to ‘make it local’ leads folk politics to fetishise immediate results and the concrete appearance of action. Delaying a corporate attack on the environment, for instance, is lauded as a success – even if the company simply waits out public attention before returning once again. Moreover, as Rosa Luxemburg pointed out long ago, the fetishisation of ‘immediate results’ leads to an empty pragmatism that struggles to maintain the present balance of power, rather than seeking to change structural conditions.28 Without the necessary abstraction of strategic thought, tactics are ultimately fleeting gestures. Finally, the abjuring of complexity dovetails with the neoliberal case for markets. One of the primary arguments made against planning has been that the economy is simply too complex to be guided.29 The only alternative is therefore to leave the distribution of resources to the market and reject any attempt to guide it rationally.30 Considered in all these ways, folk politics appears as an attempt to make global capitalism small enough to be thinkable – and at the same time, to articulate how to act upon this restricted image of capitalism. By contrast, the argument of this book is that folk-political tendencies are mistaken. If complexity presently outstrips humanity’s capacities to think and control, there are two options: one is to reduce complexity down to a human scale; the other is to expand humanity’s capacities. We endorse the latter position. Any postcapitalist project will necessarily require the creation of new cognitive maps, political narratives, technological interfaces, economic models, and mechanisms of collective control to be able to marshal complex phenomena for the betterment of humanity.
| 7,895 |
<h4>The world is too complex for local politics – multipolar global politics, economic instability, and climate change necessitates a collective response that changes the structural conditions of power rather than tinkering around at the margins.</h4><p>Nick <strong>SRNICEK AND</strong> Alex <strong>WILLIAMS 15</strong>. **Lecturer at City University London and a PhD from the London School of Economics. **Lecturer at City University London. Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work. Verso Books. 34-40.</p><p>OVERWHELMED</p><p>Why did folk politics arise in the first place? Why is it that <u><mark>folk political tendencies</u></mark>, for all their manifest flaws, <u><mark>are</mark> so <strong><mark>seductive</strong></mark> and appealing to</u> the <u>movements</u> of today? At least three answers present themselves. The first explanation is to see folk <u>politics as a response to the problem of how to interpret and act within an ever more complex world</u>. The second, related explanation involves situating folk politics as a reaction to the historical experiences of the communist and social democratic left. Finally, folk politics is a more immediate response to the empty spectacle of contemporary party politics.</p><p><u>Increasingly, <strong><mark>multipolar global politics</strong>, <strong>economic instability</strong>, and</u></mark> anthropogenic <u><strong><mark>climate change</strong> outpace </mark>the <mark>narratives </mark>we use to structure and make sense of our lives. <mark>Each</u></mark> of <u>these is an example</u> of what is termed <u><mark>a <strong>complex system</strong></mark>, which features nonlinear dynamics, where marginally different inputs can cause dramatically divergent outputs, intricate sets of causes feedback on one another in unexpected ways, and <mark>which</u></mark> characteristically <u><mark>operates on <strong>scales</strong></mark> of space and time <mark>that go <strong>far beyond any individual’s</mark> unaided <mark>perception</u></strong></mark>.23 <u>Globalisation, international politics, and climate change: each</u> of these systems <u>shapes our world, but their effects are so extensive and complicated that it is difficult to place our own experience within them</u>. The global economy is a good example of this. In simple terms, <u>the economy is not an object amenable to direct perception; it is distributed across time and space (you will never meet ‘<mark>the economy’</mark> in person); it <mark>incorporates a <strong>wide array of elements</strong></mark>, from <strong><mark>property laws</strong></mark> to <strong><mark>biological needs</strong>, <strong>natural resources</strong></mark> to <strong><mark>tech</mark>nological <mark>infrastructures</strong>, <strong>market stalls</strong> and <strong>supercomputers</strong>; and</mark> it <mark>involves</mark> <mark>an enormous and</mark> intricately <mark>interacting set of <strong>feedback loops</strong></mark>, all of which produce emergent effects <mark>that are <strong>irreducible</strong></mark> to its individual components</u>.24 In other words, <u>the interaction of an economy’s parts produces effects that cannot be understood just by knowing how those parts work in isolation – it is only in grasping the relations between them that the economy can be made sense of</u>. While we might have an idea of what an economy consists of, <u><mark>we will <strong>never</strong></mark> be able to <strong><mark>experience it directly</u></strong></mark> in the same way as other phenomena. It can only be observed symptomatically through key statistical indexes (charting changes in inflation or interest rates, stock indexes, GDP, and so on), but can never be seen, heard or touched in its totality.</p><p>As a result, despite everything that has been written about capitalism, we still struggle to understand its dynamics and its mechanisms. Most importantly, <u><mark>we <strong>lack a ‘cognitive map’</strong> of our socioeconomic system</mark>: a mental picture of how individual and collective human action can be situated within the unimaginable vastness of the global economy</u>.25 Recent decades have seen an increasing complexity in the dynamics that impinge upon politics. We might consider the imminent threat of anthropogenic climate change as a new kind of problem – one that is unamenable to any simple solution and that involves such intricately woven effects that it is hard to even know where to intervene. Equally, the global economy today appears significantly more complex in terms of the mobility of capital, the intricacies of global finance and the multiplicity of actors involved. How well do our traditional political images of the world map onto these changes? For the left at least, an analysis premised on the industrial working class was a powerful way to interpret the totality of social and economic relations in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, thereby articulating clear strategic objectives. Yet the history of the global left over the course of the twentieth century attests to the ways in which this analysis failed to attend to both the range of possible liberating struggles (based in gender, race or sexuality) and the ability of capitalism to restructure itself – through the creation of the welfare state, or the neoliberal transformations of the global economy. Today, the old models often falter in the face of new problems; we lose the capacity to understand our position in history and in the world at large.</p><p><u>This separation between everyday experience and the system we live within results in increased <strong>alienation</strong>: we feel adrift in a world we do not understand</u>. The cultural theorist Fredric Jameson notes that the <u>proliferation of conspiracy theories is partly a response to this situation</u>.26 <u>Conspiracy theories act by narrowing the agency behind our world to a single figure of power</u> (the Bilderberg Group, the Freemasons or some other convenient scapegoat). Despite the extraordinary complexity of some of these theories, <u>they</u> nevertheless <u>provide a reassuringly simple answer to ‘who is behind it all’</u>, and what our own role is in the situation. In other words, they act precisely as a (faulty) cognitive map.</p><p><u>Folk politics presents itself as another</u> possible <u>response to the problems of overwhelming complexity</u>. <u>If we do not understand how the world operates, <mark>the folk-political injunction is to <strong>reduce complexity down to a human scale</u></strong></mark>. Indeed, <u>folk-political writing is <mark>saturated with calls for a return to <strong>authenticity</u></strong></mark>, to <u><strong><mark>immediacy</u></strong></mark>, to <u><mark>a world that is</u></mark> ‘transparent’, <u><strong><mark>‘human-scaled’</strong></mark>, ‘tangible’,</u> ‘slow’, ‘harmonious’, ‘simple’, <u>and ‘everyday’.</u>27 <u><mark>Such thinking <strong>rejects</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>complexity</strong></mark> of the contemporary world, <mark>and</mark> thereby <strong><mark>rejects</mark> the possibility of <mark>a truly postcapitalist world</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>It attempts to give a human face to power; whereas what is truly terrifying</strong> is the</u> generally <u><strong>asubjective nature of the system</u></strong>. <u>The faces are interchangeable; the power remains the same</u>. <u>The turn towards localism, temporary moments of resistance, and the intuitive practices of direct action all effectively attempt to condense the problems of global capitalism into concrete figures and moments</u>.</p><p>In this process, <u><mark>folk politics</u></mark> often <u><strong><mark>reduces politics</strong> to an <strong>ethical and individual struggle</u></strong></mark>. There is a tendency sometimes to imagine that we simply need ‘good’ capitalists, or a ‘responsible’ capitalism. At the same time, <u><mark>the <strong>imperative to ‘make it local’</strong></mark> leads folk politics to <strong><mark>fetishise immediate results</strong></mark> and the concrete appearance of action</u>. <u>Delaying a corporate attack on the environment</u>, for instance, <u>is lauded as a success – even if the company simply waits out public attention before returning once again</u>. Moreover, as Rosa Luxemburg pointed out long ago, <u>the fetishisation of ‘immediate results’ leads to <mark>an <strong>empty pragmatism</strong> </mark>that struggles to <mark>maintain</mark> the present balance of <mark>power, rather than</mark> seeking to <strong><mark>change structural conditions</u></strong></mark>.28 <u><mark>Without the <strong>necessary abstraction of strategic thought</strong>, tactics are</mark> ultimately <strong><mark>fleeting gestures</u></strong></mark>. Finally, <u><mark>the abjuring of complexity <strong>dovetails with the neoliberal case for markets</u></strong></mark>. <u>One of the primary arguments made against planning has been that the economy is simply too complex to be guided</u>.29 <u>The only alternative is therefore to leave the distribution of resources to the market and reject any attempt to guide it rationally</u>.30 Considered in all these ways, <u>folk politics appears as an attempt to make global capitalism small enough to be thinkable</u> – and at the same time, to articulate how to act upon this restricted image of capitalism. By contrast, the argument of this book is that folk-political tendencies are mistaken. If complexity presently outstrips humanity’s capacities to think and control, there are two options: one is to reduce complexity down to a human scale; the other is to expand humanity’s capacities. We endorse the latter position. <u>Any postcapitalist project will <strong>necessarily require</strong> the creation of new cognitive maps, political narratives, technological interfaces, economic models, and mechanisms of collective control to be able to marshal complex phenomena for the betterment of humanity</u>.</p>
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| 610,862 |
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Wake
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Concordia BS
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Bankey
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1ac - open source
2nr - t-usfg
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college
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The plan overrides a core PLA priority which breaks the Chinese conditional compliance model – balancing CMR determines internal and external stability.
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Simpson 16
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Kurtis H. Simpson 16, Centre Director with Defence Research and Development Canada, served as the Head of Delegation abroad for the Canadian government, head of Asia Research Section at the Department of National Defence’s Chief Defence Intelligence Organization, 12/21/16, “China’s Re-Emergence: Assessing Civilian-Military Relations In Contemporary Era – Analysis,” https://www.eurasiareview.com/21122016-chinas-re-emergence-assessing-civilian-military-relations-in-contemporary-era-analysis/
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the question of can China rise peacefully must be considered? All external preoccupations rest on assumptions of continued internal stability The tipping point in China is civilian-military relations. This single factor is all determining
To date literature on civ-mil relations in the PRC) is overly reductionist built on dubious assumptions and prone to exaggerating some trends at the expense of others, including the endless political bargaining that now characterizes the relations between Party, military, and bureaucratic stakeholders
the military’s political power resources are increasing; a relationship of ‘conditional compliance’ now exists where the Party is required to negotiate with the PLA on key issues or foreign policy priorities) for its continued support the potential for fractures between the Party and PLA are increasingly possible during crises situations
the country has increasingly witnessed ‘fragmentary authoritarianism,’ where the control of a paramount leader is greatly reduced, a growing separation between the economic and political spheres more pronounced, and individual ‘pockets’ of authority the result of ‘factions’ within both the Party and the PLA—more evident. The end result is increased “bargaining between and within government and military apparatuses which requires negotiations, exchanges, and consensus building
On one level, the Party clearly controls the military as the Central Military Commission is chaired by a civilian Xi the PLAs representation on formal political decision making bodies has decreased over the years, but this does not necessary equate to a reduced level of influence Irrespective of institutional membership, military leaders retain considerable say
While loyal to the party as an institution, the PLA is not unconditionally subservient to a particular leader and retains the resources to enter the political arena if a decision is made to do so
If we have moved from a fused, ‘dual role elite’ model to one of ‘conditional compliance’ in which the military actually holds a preponderance of the power capabilities and where its interests are satisfied through concessions, bargaining, and pay-offs, empirical evidence should reflect this review of China’s three major leadership changes since the transition from the revolutionary ‘Old Guard’ to the modern technocrats confirms this
Xi’s power appears uncontested at present. Nevertheless, he is also viewed as ‘pushing the envelope too far’ and endangering the equilibrium which has been established between the Party and PLA
Xi recognizes he must earn the support of the PLA his goal of achieving the Chinese dream of building a “wealthy, powerful, democratic, civilized, and harmonious socialist modernized nation” by 2021, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CCP, is exceptionally ambitious. It will require endless commitments to competing interests in a period of economic stagnation and global economic downturn. Should the PLA come to believe they are not first in line support for Xi could erode very quickly
Projections of China’s rise to global Superpower status, or its possible implosion due to political infighting makes for rich debate regardless of outcome, China’s civil-military relations will be a determining factor in how events unfold
Civilian-military relations have morphed to a situation best described as ‘conditional compliance’ PLA support was secured through political bartering, and guarantees to prioritize military development goals on an a priori basis with other competing domestic interests
Xi risks alienating now entrenched alternative centres of power If this proves true, there is a very realistic case for the PLA to terminate its backing of the Communist Party and opt for a new type of power sharing arrangement
key indicators capable of fomenting such a dramatic change include Xi pushing his personal agenda for China and self-aggrandizement to a point where it fundamentally challenges other entrenched interests
Each of the scenarios listed is a real possibility and all would be determined by the nature of civ-mil relations in China
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can China rise peacefully ? external preoccupations rest on internal stability The tipping point is civilian-military relations. This factor is all determining
endless political bargaining characterizes relations between Party, military
conditional compliance exists where the Party is required to negotiate with the PLA on foreign policy priorities potential for fractures are increasingly possible
the country increasingly witnessed ‘fragmentary authoritarianism, result is increased “bargaining which requires negotiations, exchanges, and consensus building
While loyal to the party the PLA is not unconditionally subservient
Xi must earn support of the PLA his goal of achieving the Chinese dream by 2021 will require commitments to competing interests Should the PLA believe they are not first in line support for Xi could erode quickly
China’s rise or implosion civil-military relations will be a determining factor
key indicators of fomenting dramatic change include Xi pushing his agenda for China where it challenges entrenched interests
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China’s rising economic, political and military power is the most geopolitically significant development of the post-Cold War period. For some, America’s unipolar moment has passed, and the essential debates now focus on the rate and relativity of US hegemonic decline.1 In tandem with this, the question of can China rise peacefully must be considered?2 All such external preoccupations rest, however, on assumptions of continued economic growth and internal stability.3 The tipping point in both positive and negative scenarios alike in China is civilian-military (civ-mil) relations. This single factor is all determining, under-studied, and currently in a period of profound transition.
To date, the literature on civ-mil relations in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is overly reductionist in its scope, simplifying relations between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to a single entity, built on dubious assumptions (for example, over-emphasizing the reach and control of the Party) and finally, prone to exaggerating some trends, most notably professionalization of the military, at the expense of others, including divided loyalties, the decentralization of power, and the endless political bargaining that now characterizes the relations between Party, military, and bureaucratic stakeholders.
The purpose of this article is threefold. It will first place civ-mil relations in a historical context, mapping fundamental transitional changes between the revolutionary period (1921-1949), the politicized era (1949-1976), and the modernization years (1976-2014). Second, it will highlight evolving trend lines in CCP-PLA relations, identifying emerging tensions. Third, it will provide a cursory assessment of early signals or indications of future friction points.
A critical review of civ-mil relations in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) makes apparent that the military’s political power resources are increasing; a relationship of ‘conditional compliance’ now exists where the Party is required to negotiate with the PLA on key issues (whether it be funding increases, force development, or foreign policy priorities) for its continued support. As a result, the potential for fractures between the Party and PLA are increasingly possible during crises situations.
Prior to beginning with a historic examination of civilian-military relations in China, we need first to root our discussion in a viable theoretical framework, or model, in which to help organize the information/evidence being considered. As expansively covered by Michael Kiselycznyk and Phillip Saunders, perspectives on Chinese elite politics are relatively few in number, and often period specific.4 Each is not without its limitations, but all have explanatory potential. Of growing relevance, however, is the bureaucratic politics approach, because not only does it easily incorporate the tenets of earlier schools (such as symbiosis, factionalism, and the Party control lens) it, moreover, best captures the PRC’s current political landscape of distributive power. In essence, since the 1978 economic reforms, the CCP’s receding ideological justification for rule, and varied rates of development in China’s 34 provinces, the country has increasingly witnessed ‘fragmentary authoritarianism,’ where the control of a paramount leader (such as Mao Zedong) is greatly reduced, a growing separation between the economic and political spheres more pronounced, and individual ‘pockets’ of authority—often the result of ‘factions’ within both the Party and the PLA—more evident. The end result of this is increased “bargaining” both between and within government and military apparatuses, a process which requires negotiations, exchanges, and consensus building.5 This type of interaction is strikingly different than that which first typified Party-PLA relations in the early revolutionary period.
Party-PLA Relations during the Revolutionary Period (1921-1949)
The CCP (founded in 1921) and the PLA (established in 1927) originally enjoyed a level of intimate interaction or ‘fusion’ typical of the militaries and revolutionaries coalescing in a united front, or common cause, to overthrow an existent political order. This pattern is well documented, and will only be briefly touched upon here.6 In short, where elites regularly circulate between military and non-military posts, a symbiotic relationship forms where ideas, authorities, allegiances and circles of interaction take root, fostering a common commitment and vision towards a desired end state. In the case of China, what is referred to as ‘symbiosis’ started in 1934-35 while the Communists were in retreat during “The Long March” period. As a consequence of this shared experience, close cooperation between military and civilian figures resulted in significant overlap in leadership roles, with key individuals (most notably Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping) being dubbed “dual role elites.”7
Up until the declaration of Chinese independence, the military was a major recruiter for the Party and a strict ratio of Party members to non-Party members among combat soldiers was upheld. They were, in a sense, two faces of the same organized elite. For many years, political leaders were also generals or political commissars in military units; the party and the army “…formed throughout their history a single institutional system, with a single elite performing simultaneously the functions of political and military leadership.”8 While in many respects effective and efficient, the merger of the military with the political, particularly absent of institutions, over time opened the door to significant infighting when differences arose, often ending in intensive ideological campaigns (such as the Great Leap Forward, 1958-1961), massive popular mobilizations, and widespread national unrest.
The Politicization of the PLA under Mao Zedong (1949-1976)
Upon assuming power, Chairman Mao Zedong early on turned to the military to champion and enable his ideas and to serve as his last line of defence. While less critical in the honeymoon period of the early-1950s, the PLA was increasingly drawn into the political realm, most notably during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), a decade long period of social turmoil and populist furor spawned by the PRC’s senior most leaders. While beyond the scope of this article to discuss in any detail, the research of others chronicles how overtly enmeshed in politics the PLA became during this period, serving as a direct tool of Mao and his inner clique.9
Unable to effectively mobilize radicals and students, in early January 1967, Mao and the Central Cultural Revolutionary Group (CCRG) ordered troops to ‘support the masses of the revolutionary left.’ As the campaign developed and became ever more chaotic over the following months, the army was subsequently directed to restore order, ultimately granting PLA members sweeping latitude to use any means necessary to reaffirm peace.10 In a fluid political situation, PLA members were pitted against the populace, who asserted they were acting as directed by China’s leaders, forced to adjudicate between opposing interests, and autonomously resolve unrest all over the country with no rules of engagement, clear direction, or often even understanding of the context of a given problem as it varied dramatically throughout China depending on the parties involved, the interpretation of the ideological direction being followed, and the local agendas at play.
For more than a decade, the PLA was the only institution in the PRC still functioning. The military was decisive in both policy-making and determining power struggles on many levels.11 While the details remain opaque, in 1970-1971, military commanders were reportedly divided, with some supporting Marshal Lin Biao, Vice-Premier, in a purported counter-revolutionary coup d’état. Throughout the period, other incidents of intra-party conflict drew the military into non-military matters and significantly eroded earlier periods of harmonious symbiosis. With the death of Mao in 1976 and the rehabilitation of Deng, specific actions were undertaken to modernize the military and professionalize it. While successful on many fronts, these transformations have also not been without complications and unanticipated consequences.
A New Focus on Modernization (1976-2012): Defining Trends
Increased Professionalization
In the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, the PLA has become a focal point for reform, improvement, and de-politicization. The armed forces were downsized from 4.5 million to 2.2 today. It is rapidly becoming a more modern force which is increasingly educated, better equipped, more regimented with retirements, selection and recruiting. Doctrinal adjustments are regularly made and announced in biannual Defence White Papers, moving the army along a continuum away from land based notions of “People’s War” to concepts like “Limited War under High Technology Conditions.”12 Highlights of this trajectory include: professional military education; specialization in key knowledge sectors like cyber security; a primacy placed on science and technology; improved training and augmented technical skills; the integration and operation of more sophisticated military kit; improvements to command and control; and a focus upon combined joint operations.13
Since 1997, China’s military budget has increased at double digit rates, with much of these augmentations going to offset higher salaries, better housing, and improved facilities. In 2014, official defence spending was published as US$ 131.57 billion; the second largest in the world, and by some intelligence estimates, only half the actual number.14 Increased professionalism is, however, a two-edged sword. While on one level it removes the military from the daily entanglements of political life, it also promotes a greater sense of autonomy, corporateness, and a sense of responsibility to intervene if vital interests are threatened, coupled with the expertise to do, so should the occasion arise.15
A Reduced Emphasis upon Political Work or Ideological Study
While exceptions to the rule exist (such as the immediate period following the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre), military professionalization has generally resulted in less emphasis on political work and political education (relative to the time spent on military duties). The eroding foundations of Communist ideology are particularly of high impact on the military, as this calls directly into question the forces’ raison d’être—the promotion of Communist ideals through revolution and unqualified support of the Party. While Marxist ideology can still be invoked as required justification when needed, it is not treated in the sacrosanct manner it once was and this significantly reduces the ‘connective tissue’ seamlessly joining the Party and the PLA.
The Growing Bifurcation of Elites
China’s transition into a developed country with a relatively modern military force has demanded a move away from “dual role elites” to streams of distinct and separate senior officials who no longer share similar backgrounds, work experiences, or career paths. Promoted according to functional area expertise, few common bonds (including formal educational experience, common technical knowledge, shared management history, and common political connections) join military professionals, Party leaders, and senior civil servants, as was once the case with their revolutionary predecessors. The implications of this are important. Common frames of reference do not currently exist, and the potential for miscommunication is high. Civilian leaders do not regularly interact with their military counterparts, and a general ignorance of military tactics, training, and procedures continues, which is not systematized through effective briefing channels.16 In short, the growing bifurcation of elites impedes relationships built on trust as the distance between the military sphere and the political sphere lengthens. In particular, varying perspectives on national security issues are increasingly evident.
Divided State-Party-Citizenry Loyalties
In China, theoretically, the Communist Party, state apparatus, and military are all distinct entities with formal authorities, accountabilities, and responsibilities. In practice, the Party dominates all according to varying degrees through its membership, appointment routines, and sanctions. This too, however, is evolving. As China modernizes, power is becoming more decentralized, and the legitimacy of the Party (or lack thereof) is linked almost solely to the country’s economic performance. In fundamental respects, China’s legislature (or National People’s Congress) and its Standing Committee are now more appropriately serving an oversight function of the military. Directly linked to this is the NPC’s role in approving the military’s annual budget allocation. Once a ‘rubber-stamp’ process, this is less and less the case.
The emergence of a stronger state structure with ties to the military is fostering a duality of legally and administratively distinct centres (one state, one party) with which the PLA must successfully interact, each often sharing overlaps in membership, but at times competing and conflicting agendas.17 In short, where the Party provides guidance and direction, the state administers and implements policy on a day-to-day basis. The constitutional ambiguity of the military’s allegiance to the Party and the state potentially fosters conflictual loyalties, and challenges the asserted shorthand understanding that the Party and PLA are indivisible and the same. Moreover, the Army’s de facto loyalty to China’s citizenry is historically founded (hence the name “the People’s Liberation Army”), and when tested on 4 June 1989 [Tiananmen Square uprising in Beijing], manifested itself in command and control issues (troops in some cases would not fire of protestors). Long-standing damage to a relationship previously viewed by both sides as inviolable continues to this day, and many assert that even if ordered, such violent suppression would not happen again in light of this precedent and the fallout from it.18
Internal Factionalism within the PLA
Paralleling divided loyalties between Chinese Party, military and government bodies, one must also recognize that within each, factions exist, based upon generational, personal, professional, geographic, or institutional allegiances.19 These minor fault lines are most pronounced during crises, and they continue independent of professionalization.20 As was demonstrated by the civil-military dynamics of the Chinese government’s suppression of student demonstrators, both divisions and allegiances of interests emerged with respect to how to contain this situation and factional interests largely determined which troops would carry out the orders, who commanded them, what civilian Party leaders supported the actions, and who would be sanctioned following the mêlée. A consequence of factionalism within the PLA is that the Party’s control mechanisms (particularly because rule of law and constitutional restraints on the military are weak) needs to be robust to control not only a single military chain of command but (particularly during crises) perhaps more than one. This is not likely the case. A review of the evidence indicates the military’s influence, on the whole, is increasing, and the Party’s control decreasing.
On one level, the Party clearly controls the military as the Central Military Commission or CMC (the highest military oversight body in the PRC) is chaired by a civilian, President Xi Jinping. Moreover, the PLAs representation on formal political decision making bodies (such as the Politburo Standing Committee, the Politburo, the Central Committee, and the NPC) has decreased over the years, but this does not necessary equate to a reduced level of influence. For example, the two Vice-Chairman of the CMC are now military generals, as are the remaining other eight members. Irrespective of institutional membership, military leaders retain considerable say. Personal interactions and informal meetings with senior party elites provide venues to sway decisions. They do, also, hold important places on leading small groups dedicated to issues like Taiwan and other security questions, such as the South China Seas.21
In a similar vein, other methods of Party influence, as exercised through political commissars, party committees, and discipline inspection commissions are no longer empowered to enforce the ideological dictates of a paramount leader. In the face of diffuse reporting chains, competing allegiances, and often effective socialization by the military units they are supposed to be watching over, most do not provide the Party guardian and guidance function once so pervasive.
While perhaps overstated, Paltiel’s observation that “…China’s energies over the past century and half have given the military a prominent and even dominant role in the state, preempting civilian control and inhibiting the exercise of constitutional authority” is likely now truer than ever before in history.22 While still loyal to the party as an institution, the PLA is not unconditionally subservient to a particular leader and retains the resources to enter the political arena if (at the highest levels) a decision is made to do so.
Assessing the Implications of the Civilian-Military Trend Lines in China
The civilian-military trend lines evident in China since the end of the Cultural Revolution affirm that the symbiotic nature of the Party-PLA relationship has morphed in important respects since the late1960s. The promotion of professionalism, a reduced role for ideological indoctrination, an increasing bifurcation of civil-military elites, and growing state powers (complete with divided loyalties and continued factionalism) has complicated the political landscape informing how the CCP interacts with the PLA. If, as postulated, we have moved from a fused, ‘dual role elite’ model to one of ‘conditional compliance’ in which the military actually holds a preponderance of the power capabilities and where its interests are satisfied through concessions, bargaining, and pay-offs, empirical evidence should reflect this. A review of China’s three major leadership changes since the transition from the revolutionary ‘Old Guard’ to the modern technocrats confirms this.
Jiang Zemin (1989-2004)
Formally anointed and legitimized by Deng in 1989, Jiang assumed leadership without military credentials and few allies, viewed by many as a ‘caretaker’ Party Secretary in the wake of the Tiananmen Massacre. Despite his limitations, Jiang was well versed in the vicissitudes of palace politics. Informed by a high political acumen, he immediately promoted an image as an involved Commander-in-Chief, personally visiting all seven military regions, a sign of commitment not made by either the likes of Mao or Deng. Symbolic gestures like this were bolstered by his providing incentives to the PLA, such as: consistent raises in the defence budget; funds for military modernization; as well as equipment, logistics, and augmented R&D.23
Referred to as the ‘silk-wrapped needle,’ Jiang marshalled Party resources to not only reward, but to punish.24 His institutional authority over appointments enabled him to manipulate factions, dismiss those who opposed him, enforce new rigid retirement standards, and promote loyalists. A delicate equilibrium was established during the early-1990s until his semi-retirement in 2004,25 where Jiang guaranteed military priorities such as supporting ‘mechanization’ and an ‘information-based military’ (promoting the concept of RMA with Chinese characteristics) in exchange for the PLA backing of his legacy contributions to Marxist Leninist Mao Zedong thought with the enshrinement of his “Three Represents” doctrine.
Hu Jintao (2002-2012)
Like Jiang, Hu Jintao’s succession was the product of negotiation, compromise, and concessions. While neither opposed by the PLA, nor supported by the military ‘brass,’ Hu was a known commodity, having served as Vice-President (1998) and CMC Vice-Chairman since 1999. He was deemed acceptable until proven otherwise. In the shadow of Jiang (who retained the position of CMC Chair until 2004), Hu did not exert the same kind of influence in, nor engender the same kind of deference from, China’s military, but equally proved capable of fostering a pragmatic relationship with the army which ensured its interests, and in so doing, legitimized his leadership position.
Ceding much of the military planning and operational decisions to the PLA directly, Hu played to his strengths and focused upon national security issues (such as the successful resolution of SARs in China), which bolstered his credibility as a populist leader among the masses, indirectly increasing his power within both the military and the Party. Additionally, he focused upon foreign military security affairs (most notably, North Korea-US negotiations), which enabled him to link his personal political agenda with the military’s latest ambitions.
In according the military a distinct place in China’s national development plan, supporting China’s rise, and ensuring its vital interests, Hu recognized the military’s evolving requirement to ‘go global’ and its worldwide interests in non-combat operations, such as peacekeeping and disaster relief, as well as stakes in the open seas, outer space, and cyberspace as interest frontiers with no geographic boundaries.26 Under the slogan of ‘China’s historical mission in the new phase of the new century’ and his acquiescence to the PLA’s stated requirements ‘to win local wars under modern conditions’ by funding new technology acquisition, Hu received the army’s formal recognition for his contributions to military thought based upon “scientific development” which informed a “strategic guiding theory,” resulting in a new operational orientation for China’s military. Emulating his predecessor, Hu won ‘conditional compliance’ from the PLA by successfully bartering military needs and wants for the army’s support and endorsement of his political tenure. This was not done outside of self-interest. Hu, as did Jiang, skillfully coopted, fired, and promoted select Generals to serve his greater ends, and he did this through varied means. Ultimately, however, it was done in a manner acceptable to the military.
Xi Jinping (2012-Present)
Xi Jinping’s rise to power in 2012, while replicating the ‘horse-trading’ of Jiang and Hu, marks a fundamental departure in leadership style. Often described as a transformative leader, Xi is openly critical of his predecessors and rails against earlier periods where reform stalled and corruption grew.27 An advocate of ‘top-level design,’ incrementalism is being supplanted by a massive attempt to centralize all aspects of the CCP’s power, which includes a major restructuring of the economy, government, administration, and military.
Nicknamed “the gun and the knife” as a slight for his attempts to simultaneously control the army, police, spies, and the ‘graft busters,’ Xi’s power appears uncontested at present. Nevertheless, he is also viewed as ‘pushing the envelope too far’ and endangering the equilibrium which has been established between the Party and PLA over the past 25 years. For example, only two years into his mandate, he fostered a Cult of Personality, “the Spirit of Xi Jinping” which was officially elevated to the same standing as that of Mao and Deng, by comparison, foundational figures in Chinese history. His open attacks of political ‘enemies’ (most notably Zhou Yongkang, a Politburo Standing Committee member and former security czar) breeds fear among almost every senior official, all of whom are vulnerable on some point. Equally true, an unprecedented anti-corruption campaign is inciting comrades to turn on comrades, not unlike a massive game of prisoner’s dilemma.
Nowhere is the pressure for reform greater than in the PLA. Xi advocates administering the army with strictness and austerity, promoting frugality and obedience. At his direction, “mass-line educational campaigns” designed to “rectify work style” through criticism and self-criticism are being implemented.28 Ideological and political building is now equated with army building, as a means of ensuring the Party’s uncontested grip over the troops ideologically, politically, and organizationally. Select military regions (those opposite Taiwan and adjacent to the South China Seas) and commanders from those regions are witnessing favoritism and promotion at the expense of others. Moreover, a new “CMC Chairmanship Responsibility System” has been instituted, which directly calls into question the support of some of Xi’s senior-most generals.
A ‘hardliner’ by nature, Xi recognizes that he must earn the support of the PLA. New military priorities he supports include: accelerating modernization; Joint Command and C4ISR; training; talent management, as well as equipment and force modernization. That said, his goal of achieving the Chinese dream of building a “wealthy, powerful, democratic, civilized, and harmonious socialist modernized nation” by 2021, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CCP, is exceptionally ambitious. It will require endless commitments to competing interests in a period of economic stagnation and global economic downturn. Should the PLA come to believe they are not first in line for government largess, support for Xi could erode very quickly.29
Conclusion and Outlook
Projections of China’s purported rise to global Superpower status, or its possible implosion due to political infighting, an economic downturn, or large-scale civil unrest resulting from any number of possible reasons (ranging from the rural-urban divide or massive health issues) makes for rich debate. What is certain is that regardless of outcome, China’s civil-military relations will be a determining factor in how events unfold. This subject matter is profoundly understudied by Western scholars, particularly since the relationship between the Party and the PLA has been witnessing a fundamental transformation since the late-1960s.
Civilian-military relations in the PRC have morphed from a symbiotic nature during the revolutionary period (1921-1949), to a political nature after the founding of China in 1949, to a situation best described as ‘conditional compliance’ in the modernization era (1976-2014), where PLA support was secured through funding increases, political bartering, and guarantees to prioritize military development goals on an a priori basis with other competing domestic interests. Conditional compliance is an outcome of evolving civ-mil trends, which include the PLA’s professionalization and its growing sense of autonomy, reduced political study and indoctrination among Officers and enlisted men alike, the growing bifurcation of military and civilian elites, a sense of divided loyalties between the military, state, Party, and populace, as well as factionalism and weakened Party levers of control.
Irrespective of these trends, under the leadership reigns of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao (stretching from 1989-2012) an equilibrium was established where both the Party and PLA secured mutually beneficial results useful enough to keep the arrangement functioning. The succession of hardline Xi Jinping in 2012 is, however, increasingly calling this delicate balance into question.
Xi’s massive ongoing recentralization of power goals, his ‘Cult of Personality’ as China’s paramount leader, rather than acting as ‘first among peers,’ his prosecution of all possible political threats, and his zealous commitment to Communist ideology over all else, fundamentally risks alienating now entrenched alternative centres of power or ‘fragmentary authoritarianism,’ which has been a product of China’s modernization. If this proves true, there is a very realistic case for the PLA to redefine or terminate its backing of the Communist Party and opt for a new type of power sharing arrangement.
While impossible to predict, key indicators capable of fomenting such a dramatic change in China include the following: (a) President Xi pushing his personal agenda for China and self-aggrandizement to a point where it fundamentally challenges other entrenched interests; (b) a political-military crisis (such as with Japan and the East China Seas, Taiwan, or interests in the South China Seas) which involve external nations—particularly the US—and divide civilian/military interests on how to respond; or (c) a social crisis where mass mobilization takes place and civ-mil factions disagree on either how address the situation, or on who makes the decision when and where to act.
Each of the dire scenarios listed is a real possibility and all would be determined by the nature of civ-mil relations in China. Increased scholarly attention, critical thinking, and improved surveillance of early warning signals portending such possibilities must become a priority for Western intelligence analysts, militaries, and strategic planners.
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<h4>The plan overrides a core PLA priority which breaks the Chinese conditional compliance model – balancing CMR determines internal and external stability.</h4><p>Kurtis H. <strong>Simpson 16</strong>, Centre Director with Defence Research and Development Canada, served as the Head of Delegation abroad for the Canadian government, head of Asia Research Section at the Department of National Defence’s Chief Defence Intelligence Organization, 12/21/16, “China’s Re-Emergence: Assessing Civilian-Military Relations In Contemporary Era – Analysis,” https://www.eurasiareview.com/21122016-chinas-re-emergence-assessing-civilian-military-relations-in-contemporary-era-analysis/</p><p>China’s rising economic, political and military power is the most geopolitically significant development of the post-Cold War period. For some, America’s unipolar moment has passed, and the essential debates now focus on the rate and relativity of US hegemonic decline.1 In tandem with this, <u>the question of <mark>can China rise peacefully</mark> must be considered<strong><mark>?</u></strong></mark>2 <u>All</u> such <u><mark>external preoccupations rest</u></mark>, however, <u><mark>on</mark> assumptions of continued</u> economic growth and <u><mark>internal stability</u></mark>.3 <u><mark>The <strong>tipping point</u></strong></mark> in both positive and negative scenarios alike <u>in China <mark>is <strong>civilian-military</u></strong></mark> (civ-mil) <u><strong><mark>relations</strong>. This</mark> single <mark>factor is <strong>all determining</u></strong></mark>, under-studied, and currently in a period of profound transition.</p><p><u>To date</u>, the <u>literature on civ-mil relations in the</u> People’s Republic of China (<u>PRC) is overly reductionist</u> in its scope, simplifying relations between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to a single entity, <u>built on <strong>dubious assumptions</u></strong> (for example, over-emphasizing the reach and control of the Party) <u>and</u> finally, <u>prone to exaggerating some trends</u>, most notably professionalization of the military, <u>at the expense of others, including</u> divided loyalties, the decentralization of power, and <u>the <strong><mark>endless political bargaining</strong></mark> that now <mark>characterizes</mark> the <mark>relations between Party, military</mark>, and bureaucratic stakeholders</u>.</p><p>The purpose of this article is threefold. It will first place civ-mil relations in a historical context, mapping fundamental transitional changes between the revolutionary period (1921-1949), the politicized era (1949-1976), and the modernization years (1976-2014). Second, it will highlight evolving trend lines in CCP-PLA relations, identifying emerging tensions. Third, it will provide a cursory assessment of early signals or indications of future friction points.</p><p>A critical review of civ-mil relations in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) makes apparent that <u>the military’s political power resources are increasing; a relationship of ‘<strong><mark>conditional compliance</strong></mark>’ now <mark>exists where the Party is required to negotiate with the PLA on</mark> key issues</u> (whether it be funding increases, force development, <u>or <strong><mark>foreign policy priorities</strong></mark>) for its continued support</u>. As a result, <u>the <mark>potential for <strong>fractures</strong></mark> between the Party and PLA <mark>are increasingly possible</mark> during crises situations</u>.</p><p>Prior to beginning with a historic examination of civilian-military relations in China, we need first to root our discussion in a viable theoretical framework, or model, in which to help organize the information/evidence being considered. As expansively covered by Michael Kiselycznyk and Phillip Saunders, perspectives on Chinese elite politics are relatively few in number, and often period specific.4 Each is not without its limitations, but all have explanatory potential. Of growing relevance, however, is the bureaucratic politics approach, because not only does it easily incorporate the tenets of earlier schools (such as symbiosis, factionalism, and the Party control lens) it, moreover, best captures the PRC’s current political landscape of distributive power. In essence, since the 1978 economic reforms, the CCP’s receding ideological justification for rule, and varied rates of development in China’s 34 provinces, <u><mark>the country</mark> has <mark>increasingly witnessed ‘fragmentary authoritarianism,</mark>’ where the control of a paramount leader</u> (such as Mao Zedong) <u>is greatly reduced, a growing separation between the economic and political spheres more pronounced, and individual ‘pockets’ of authority</u>—often <u>the result of ‘factions’ within both the Party and the PLA—more evident. The end <mark>result</u></mark> of this <u><mark>is <strong>increased “bargaining</u></strong></mark>” both <u>between and within government and military apparatuses</u>, a process <u><mark>which <strong>requires negotiations, exchanges, and consensus building</u></strong></mark>.5 This type of interaction is strikingly different than that which first typified Party-PLA relations in the early revolutionary period.</p><p>Party-PLA Relations during the Revolutionary Period (1921-1949)</p><p>The CCP (founded in 1921) and the PLA (established in 1927) originally enjoyed a level of intimate interaction or ‘fusion’ typical of the militaries and revolutionaries coalescing in a united front, or common cause, to overthrow an existent political order. This pattern is well documented, and will only be briefly touched upon here.6 In short, where elites regularly circulate between military and non-military posts, a symbiotic relationship forms where ideas, authorities, allegiances and circles of interaction take root, fostering a common commitment and vision towards a desired end state. In the case of China, what is referred to as ‘symbiosis’ started in 1934-35 while the Communists were in retreat during “The Long March” period. As a consequence of this shared experience, close cooperation between military and civilian figures resulted in significant overlap in leadership roles, with key individuals (most notably Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping) being dubbed “dual role elites.”7</p><p>Up until the declaration of Chinese independence, the military was a major recruiter for the Party and a strict ratio of Party members to non-Party members among combat soldiers was upheld. They were, in a sense, two faces of the same organized elite. For many years, political leaders were also generals or political commissars in military units; the party and the army “…formed throughout their history a single institutional system, with a single elite performing simultaneously the functions of political and military leadership.”8 While in many respects effective and efficient, the merger of the military with the political, particularly absent of institutions, over time opened the door to significant infighting when differences arose, often ending in intensive ideological campaigns (such as the Great Leap Forward, 1958-1961), massive popular mobilizations, and widespread national unrest.</p><p>The Politicization of the PLA under Mao Zedong (1949-1976)</p><p>Upon assuming power, Chairman Mao Zedong early on turned to the military to champion and enable his ideas and to serve as his last line of defence. While less critical in the honeymoon period of the early-1950s, the PLA was increasingly drawn into the political realm, most notably during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), a decade long period of social turmoil and populist furor spawned by the PRC’s senior most leaders. While beyond the scope of this article to discuss in any detail, the research of others chronicles how overtly enmeshed in politics the PLA became during this period, serving as a direct tool of Mao and his inner clique.9</p><p>Unable to effectively mobilize radicals and students, in early January 1967, Mao and the Central Cultural Revolutionary Group (CCRG) ordered troops to ‘support the masses of the revolutionary left.’ As the campaign developed and became ever more chaotic over the following months, the army was subsequently directed to restore order, ultimately granting PLA members sweeping latitude to use any means necessary to reaffirm peace.10 In a fluid political situation, PLA members were pitted against the populace, who asserted they were acting as directed by China’s leaders, forced to adjudicate between opposing interests, and autonomously resolve unrest all over the country with no rules of engagement, clear direction, or often even understanding of the context of a given problem as it varied dramatically throughout China depending on the parties involved, the interpretation of the ideological direction being followed, and the local agendas at play.</p><p>For more than a decade, the PLA was the only institution in the PRC still functioning. The military was decisive in both policy-making and determining power struggles on many levels.11 While the details remain opaque, in 1970-1971, military commanders were reportedly divided, with some supporting Marshal Lin Biao, Vice-Premier, in a purported counter-revolutionary coup d’état. Throughout the period, other incidents of intra-party conflict drew the military into non-military matters and significantly eroded earlier periods of harmonious symbiosis. With the death of Mao in 1976 and the rehabilitation of Deng, specific actions were undertaken to modernize the military and professionalize it. While successful on many fronts, these transformations have also not been without complications and unanticipated consequences.</p><p>A New Focus on Modernization (1976-2012): Defining Trends</p><p>Increased Professionalization</p><p>In the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, the PLA has become a focal point for reform, improvement, and de-politicization. The armed forces were downsized from 4.5 million to 2.2 today. It is rapidly becoming a more modern force which is increasingly educated, better equipped, more regimented with retirements, selection and recruiting. Doctrinal adjustments are regularly made and announced in biannual Defence White Papers, moving the army along a continuum away from land based notions of “People’s War” to concepts like “Limited War under High Technology Conditions.”12 Highlights of this trajectory include: professional military education; specialization in key knowledge sectors like cyber security; a primacy placed on science and technology; improved training and augmented technical skills; the integration and operation of more sophisticated military kit; improvements to command and control; and a focus upon combined joint operations.13</p><p>Since 1997, China’s military budget has increased at double digit rates, with much of these augmentations going to offset higher salaries, better housing, and improved facilities. In 2014, official defence spending was published as US$ 131.57 billion; the second largest in the world, and by some intelligence estimates, only half the actual number.14 Increased professionalism is, however, a two-edged sword. While on one level it removes the military from the daily entanglements of political life, it also promotes a greater sense of autonomy, corporateness, and a sense of responsibility to intervene if vital interests are threatened, coupled with the expertise to do, so should the occasion arise.15</p><p>A Reduced Emphasis upon Political Work or Ideological Study</p><p>While exceptions to the rule exist (such as the immediate period following the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre), military professionalization has generally resulted in less emphasis on political work and political education (relative to the time spent on military duties). The eroding foundations of Communist ideology are particularly of high impact on the military, as this calls directly into question the forces’ raison d’être—the promotion of Communist ideals through revolution and unqualified support of the Party. While Marxist ideology can still be invoked as required justification when needed, it is not treated in the sacrosanct manner it once was and this significantly reduces the ‘connective tissue’ seamlessly joining the Party and the PLA.</p><p>The Growing Bifurcation of Elites</p><p>China’s transition into a developed country with a relatively modern military force has demanded a move away from “dual role elites” to streams of distinct and separate senior officials who no longer share similar backgrounds, work experiences, or career paths. Promoted according to functional area expertise, few common bonds (including formal educational experience, common technical knowledge, shared management history, and common political connections) join military professionals, Party leaders, and senior civil servants, as was once the case with their revolutionary predecessors. The implications of this are important. Common frames of reference do not currently exist, and the potential for miscommunication is high. Civilian leaders do not regularly interact with their military counterparts, and a general ignorance of military tactics, training, and procedures continues, which is not systematized through effective briefing channels.16 In short, the growing bifurcation of elites impedes relationships built on trust as the distance between the military sphere and the political sphere lengthens. In particular, varying perspectives on national security issues are increasingly evident.</p><p>Divided State-Party-Citizenry Loyalties</p><p>In China, theoretically, the Communist Party, state apparatus, and military are all distinct entities with formal authorities, accountabilities, and responsibilities. In practice, the Party dominates all according to varying degrees through its membership, appointment routines, and sanctions. This too, however, is evolving. As China modernizes, power is becoming more decentralized, and the legitimacy of the Party (or lack thereof) is linked almost solely to the country’s economic performance. In fundamental respects, China’s legislature (or National People’s Congress) and its Standing Committee are now more appropriately serving an oversight function of the military. Directly linked to this is the NPC’s role in approving the military’s annual budget allocation. Once a ‘rubber-stamp’ process, this is less and less the case.</p><p>The emergence of a stronger state structure with ties to the military is fostering a duality of legally and administratively distinct centres (one state, one party) with which the PLA must successfully interact, each often sharing overlaps in membership, but at times competing and conflicting agendas.17 In short, where the Party provides guidance and direction, the state administers and implements policy on a day-to-day basis. The constitutional ambiguity of the military’s allegiance to the Party and the state potentially fosters conflictual loyalties, and challenges the asserted shorthand understanding that the Party and PLA are indivisible and the same. Moreover, the Army’s de facto loyalty to China’s citizenry is historically founded (hence the name “the People’s Liberation Army”), and when tested on 4 June 1989 [Tiananmen Square uprising in Beijing], manifested itself in command and control issues (troops in some cases would not fire of protestors). Long-standing damage to a relationship previously viewed by both sides as inviolable continues to this day, and many assert that even if ordered, such violent suppression would not happen again in light of this precedent and the fallout from it.18</p><p>Internal Factionalism within the PLA</p><p>Paralleling divided loyalties between Chinese Party, military and government bodies, one must also recognize that within each, factions exist, based upon generational, personal, professional, geographic, or institutional allegiances.19 These minor fault lines are most pronounced during crises, and they continue independent of professionalization.20 As was demonstrated by the civil-military dynamics of the Chinese government’s suppression of student demonstrators, both divisions and allegiances of interests emerged with respect to how to contain this situation and factional interests largely determined which troops would carry out the orders, who commanded them, what civilian Party leaders supported the actions, and who would be sanctioned following the mêlée. A consequence of factionalism within the PLA is that the Party’s control mechanisms (particularly because rule of law and constitutional restraints on the military are weak) needs to be robust to control not only a single military chain of command but (particularly during crises) perhaps more than one. This is not likely the case. A review of the evidence indicates the military’s influence, on the whole, is increasing, and the Party’s control decreasing.</p><p><u>On one level, the Party clearly controls the military as the Central Military Commission</u> or CMC (the highest military oversight body in the PRC) <u>is chaired by a civilian</u>, President <u>Xi</u> Jinping. Moreover, <u>the PLAs representation on formal political decision making bodies</u> (such as the Politburo Standing Committee, the Politburo, the Central Committee, and the NPC) <u>has decreased over the years, but this does not necessary equate to a reduced level of influence</u>. For example, the two Vice-Chairman of the CMC are now military generals, as are the remaining other eight members. <u>Irrespective of institutional membership, military leaders retain considerable say</u>. Personal interactions and informal meetings with senior party elites provide venues to sway decisions. They do, also, hold important places on leading small groups dedicated to issues like Taiwan and other security questions, such as the South China Seas.21</p><p>In a similar vein, other methods of Party influence, as exercised through political commissars, party committees, and discipline inspection commissions are no longer empowered to enforce the ideological dictates of a paramount leader. In the face of diffuse reporting chains, competing allegiances, and often effective socialization by the military units they are supposed to be watching over, most do not provide the Party guardian and guidance function once so pervasive.</p><p>While perhaps overstated, Paltiel’s observation that “…China’s energies over the past century and half have given the military a prominent and even dominant role in the state, preempting civilian control and inhibiting the exercise of constitutional authority” is likely now truer than ever before in history.22 <u><mark>While</u></mark> still <u><mark>loyal to the party</mark> as an institution, <mark>the PLA is <strong>not unconditionally subservient</strong></mark> to a particular leader and retains the resources to enter the political arena if</u> (at the highest levels) <u>a decision is made to do so</u>.</p><p>Assessing the Implications of the Civilian-Military Trend Lines in China</p><p>The civilian-military trend lines evident in China since the end of the Cultural Revolution affirm that the symbiotic nature of the Party-PLA relationship has morphed in important respects since the late1960s. The promotion of professionalism, a reduced role for ideological indoctrination, an increasing bifurcation of civil-military elites, and growing state powers (complete with divided loyalties and continued factionalism) has complicated the political landscape informing how the CCP interacts with the PLA. <u>If</u>, as postulated, <u>we have moved from a fused, ‘dual role elite’ model to one of ‘conditional compliance’ in which the military actually holds a preponderance of the power capabilities and where its interests are satisfied through concessions, bargaining, and pay-offs, empirical evidence should reflect this</u>. A <u>review of China’s three major leadership changes since the transition from the revolutionary ‘Old Guard’ to the modern technocrats confirms this</u>.</p><p>Jiang Zemin (1989-2004)</p><p>Formally anointed and legitimized by Deng in 1989, Jiang assumed leadership without military credentials and few allies, viewed by many as a ‘caretaker’ Party Secretary in the wake of the Tiananmen Massacre. Despite his limitations, Jiang was well versed in the vicissitudes of palace politics. Informed by a high political acumen, he immediately promoted an image as an involved Commander-in-Chief, personally visiting all seven military regions, a sign of commitment not made by either the likes of Mao or Deng. Symbolic gestures like this were bolstered by his providing incentives to the PLA, such as: consistent raises in the defence budget; funds for military modernization; as well as equipment, logistics, and augmented R&D.23</p><p>Referred to as the ‘silk-wrapped needle,’ Jiang marshalled Party resources to not only reward, but to punish.24 His institutional authority over appointments enabled him to manipulate factions, dismiss those who opposed him, enforce new rigid retirement standards, and promote loyalists. A delicate equilibrium was established during the early-1990s until his semi-retirement in 2004,25 where Jiang guaranteed military priorities such as supporting ‘mechanization’ and an ‘information-based military’ (promoting the concept of RMA with Chinese characteristics) in exchange for the PLA backing of his legacy contributions to Marxist Leninist Mao Zedong thought with the enshrinement of his “Three Represents” doctrine.</p><p>Hu Jintao (2002-2012)</p><p>Like Jiang, Hu Jintao’s succession was the product of negotiation, compromise, and concessions. While neither opposed by the PLA, nor supported by the military ‘brass,’ Hu was a known commodity, having served as Vice-President (1998) and CMC Vice-Chairman since 1999. He was deemed acceptable until proven otherwise. In the shadow of Jiang (who retained the position of CMC Chair until 2004), Hu did not exert the same kind of influence in, nor engender the same kind of deference from, China’s military, but equally proved capable of fostering a pragmatic relationship with the army which ensured its interests, and in so doing, legitimized his leadership position.</p><p>Ceding much of the military planning and operational decisions to the PLA directly, Hu played to his strengths and focused upon national security issues (such as the successful resolution of SARs in China), which bolstered his credibility as a populist leader among the masses, indirectly increasing his power within both the military and the Party. Additionally, he focused upon foreign military security affairs (most notably, North Korea-US negotiations), which enabled him to link his personal political agenda with the military’s latest ambitions.</p><p>In according the military a distinct place in China’s national development plan, supporting China’s rise, and ensuring its vital interests, Hu recognized the military’s evolving requirement to ‘go global’ and its worldwide interests in non-combat operations, such as peacekeeping and disaster relief, as well as stakes in the open seas, outer space, and cyberspace as interest frontiers with no geographic boundaries.26 Under the slogan of ‘China’s historical mission in the new phase of the new century’ and his acquiescence to the PLA’s stated requirements ‘to win local wars under modern conditions’ by funding new technology acquisition, Hu received the army’s formal recognition for his contributions to military thought based upon “scientific development” which informed a “strategic guiding theory,” resulting in a new operational orientation for China’s military. Emulating his predecessor, Hu won ‘conditional compliance’ from the PLA by successfully bartering military needs and wants for the army’s support and endorsement of his political tenure. This was not done outside of self-interest. Hu, as did Jiang, skillfully coopted, fired, and promoted select Generals to serve his greater ends, and he did this through varied means. Ultimately, however, it was done in a manner acceptable to the military.</p><p>Xi Jinping (2012-Present)</p><p>Xi Jinping’s rise to power in 2012, while replicating the ‘horse-trading’ of Jiang and Hu, marks a fundamental departure in leadership style. Often described as a transformative leader, Xi is openly critical of his predecessors and rails against earlier periods where reform stalled and corruption grew.27 An advocate of ‘top-level design,’ incrementalism is being supplanted by a massive attempt to centralize all aspects of the CCP’s power, which includes a major restructuring of the economy, government, administration, and military.</p><p>Nicknamed “the gun and the knife” as a slight for his attempts to simultaneously control the army, police, spies, and the ‘graft busters,’ <u>Xi’s power appears uncontested at present. Nevertheless, he is also viewed as ‘pushing the envelope too far’ and endangering the equilibrium which has been established between the Party and PLA</u> over the past 25 years. For example, only two years into his mandate, he fostered a Cult of Personality, “the Spirit of Xi Jinping” which was officially elevated to the same standing as that of Mao and Deng, by comparison, foundational figures in Chinese history. His open attacks of political ‘enemies’ (most notably Zhou Yongkang, a Politburo Standing Committee member and former security czar) breeds fear among almost every senior official, all of whom are vulnerable on some point. Equally true, an unprecedented anti-corruption campaign is inciting comrades to turn on comrades, not unlike a massive game of prisoner’s dilemma.</p><p>Nowhere is the pressure for reform greater than in the PLA. Xi advocates administering the army with strictness and austerity, promoting frugality and obedience. At his direction, “mass-line educational campaigns” designed to “rectify work style” through criticism and self-criticism are being implemented.28 Ideological and political building is now equated with army building, as a means of ensuring the Party’s uncontested grip over the troops ideologically, politically, and organizationally. Select military regions (those opposite Taiwan and adjacent to the South China Seas) and commanders from those regions are witnessing favoritism and promotion at the expense of others. Moreover, a new “CMC Chairmanship Responsibility System” has been instituted, which directly calls into question the support of some of Xi’s senior-most generals.</p><p>A ‘hardliner’ by nature, <u><mark>Xi</mark> recognizes</u> that <u>he <mark>must <strong>earn</strong></mark> the <mark>support of the PLA</u></mark>. New military priorities he supports include: accelerating modernization; Joint Command and C4ISR; training; talent management, as well as equipment and force modernization. That said, <u><mark>his goal of <strong>achieving the Chinese dream</strong></mark> of building a “wealthy, powerful, democratic, civilized, and harmonious socialist modernized nation” <strong><mark>by 2021</strong></mark>, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CCP, is <strong>exceptionally ambitious</strong>. It <mark>will require</mark> endless <mark>commitments to <strong>competing interests</strong></mark> in a period of economic stagnation and global economic downturn. <mark>Should the PLA</mark> come to <mark>believe <strong>they are not first in line</u></strong></mark> for government largess, <u><mark>support for Xi could erode</mark> very <mark>quickly</u></mark>.29</p><p>Conclusion and Outlook</p><p><u>Projections of <mark>China’s</u></mark> purported <u><mark>rise</mark> to global Superpower status, <mark>or</mark> its possible <strong><mark>implosion</mark> due to political infighting</u></strong>, an economic downturn, or large-scale civil unrest resulting from any number of possible reasons (ranging from the rural-urban divide or massive health issues) <u>makes for rich debate</u>. What is certain is that <u>regardless of outcome, China’s <strong><mark>civil-military relations will be a determining factor</strong></mark> in how events unfold</u>. This subject matter is profoundly understudied by Western scholars, particularly since the relationship between the Party and the PLA has been witnessing a fundamental transformation since the late-1960s.</p><p><u>Civilian-military relations</u> in the PRC <u>have morphed</u> from a symbiotic nature during the revolutionary period (1921-1949), to a political nature after the founding of China in 1949, <u>to a situation best described as ‘conditional compliance’</u> in the modernization era (1976-2014), where <u>PLA support was secured through</u> funding increases, <u><strong>political bartering</strong>, and guarantees to prioritize military development goals on an a priori basis with other competing domestic interests</u>. Conditional compliance is an outcome of evolving civ-mil trends, which include the PLA’s professionalization and its growing sense of autonomy, reduced political study and indoctrination among Officers and enlisted men alike, the growing bifurcation of military and civilian elites, a sense of divided loyalties between the military, state, Party, and populace, as well as factionalism and weakened Party levers of control.</p><p>Irrespective of these trends, under the leadership reigns of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao (stretching from 1989-2012) an equilibrium was established where both the Party and PLA secured mutually beneficial results useful enough to keep the arrangement functioning. The succession of hardline Xi Jinping in 2012 is, however, increasingly calling this delicate balance into question.</p><p><u>Xi</u>’s massive ongoing recentralization of power goals, his ‘Cult of Personality’ as China’s paramount leader, rather than acting as ‘first among peers,’ his prosecution of all possible political threats, and his zealous commitment to Communist ideology over all else, fundamentally <u>risks <strong>alienating now entrenched alternative centres of power</u></strong> or ‘fragmentary authoritarianism,’ which has been a product of China’s modernization. <u>If this proves true, there is a very realistic case for the PLA to</u> redefine or <u><strong>terminate its backing of the Communist Party</strong> and opt for a new type of power sharing arrangement</u>.</p><p>While impossible to predict, <u><mark>key indicators</mark> capable <mark>of fomenting</mark> such a <mark>dramatic change</u></mark> in China <u><mark>include</u></mark> the following: (a) President <u><strong><mark>Xi pushing his</mark> personal <mark>agenda for China</strong></mark> and self-aggrandizement to a point <mark>where it</mark> fundamentally <mark>challenges</mark> other <mark>entrenched interests</u></mark>; (b) a political-military crisis (such as with Japan and the East China Seas, Taiwan, or interests in the South China Seas) which involve external nations—particularly the US—and divide civilian/military interests on how to respond; or (c) a social crisis where mass mobilization takes place and civ-mil factions disagree on either how address the situation, or on who makes the decision when and where to act.</p><p><u>Each of the</u> dire <u>scenarios listed is a real possibility and all would be determined by the nature of civ-mil relations in China</u>. Increased scholarly attention, critical thinking, and improved surveillance of early warning signals portending such possibilities must become a priority for Western intelligence analysts, militaries, and strategic planners.</p>
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[1] Lethal autonomous weapons lack the ability to reflect upon other agents and empathize before a strike – that disrespects humanity and overlooks the value of personhood.
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Pfaff 19 C. Anthony Pfaff, 3-4-2019, "Respect for Persons and the Ethics of Autonomous Weapons and Decision Support Systems," Strategy Bridge, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/3/4/respect-for-persons-and-the-ethics-of-autonomous-weapons-and-decision-support-systems SJCP//JG
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Drawing on Kant, Robert Sparrow argues respect for persons entails that, even in war, one must acknowledge the personhood of those with whom one interacts, including the enemy Acknowledging that personhood requires whatever one does to another, it is done intentionally with the knowledge that, whatever the act is, it is affecting another person This relationship does not require communication or even the awareness by one actor that he or she may be acted upon by another. It just requires the reasons actors give for any act that affects another human being take into account the respect owed that particular human being. To make life-and-death decisions absent that relationship subjects human beings to an impersonal and pre-determined process, and subjecting human beings to such a process is disrespectful of their status as human beings. a concern arises when non-moral agents impose moral consequences on moral agents. Consider, for example, an artificially intelligent system that provides legal judgments on human violators engineers could design a machine that could consider a larger quantity and variety of data than could a human judge. The difficulty with the judgment the machine renders, however, is that the machine cannot put itself in the position of the person it is judging and ask, “If I were in that person’s circumstances, would I have done the same thing?” It is the inability to not only empathize but then employ that empathy to generate additional reasons to act (or not act) that makes the machine’s judgment impersonal and pre-determined This ability to interact with other moral agents is thus central to treating others morally. Being in an interpersonal relationship allows all sides to give and take reasons regarding how they are to be treated by the other and to take up relevant factors they may not have considered before-hand.[10] In fact, what might distinguish machine judgments from human ones is the human ability to establish what is relevant as part of the judicial process rather than before-hand. That ability is what creates space for sentiments such as mercy and compassion to arise. This point is why only persons—so far at least—can show respect for other persons. So, if it seems wrong to subject persons to legal penalties based on machine judgment, it seems even more wrong to subject them to life-and-death decisions based on machine judgment. A machine might be able to enforce the law, but it is less clear if it can provide justice, much less mercy what distinguishes murder from justified killing cannot be expressed by a “set of rules that distinguish murder from other forms of killing, but only by its place within a wider network of moral and emotional responses.”
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respect entails one must acknowledge personhood including the enemy whatever one does to another intentionally with the knowledge that the act is affecting another person concern arises when non-moral agents impose moral consequences on moral agents inability to empathize ability to interact central to treating others morally subject life-and-death decisions based on machine judgment justified killing only within moral and emotional responses
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KILLING AND RESPECT FOR OTHERS Drawing on Kant, Robert Sparrow argues respect for persons entails that, even in war, one must acknowledge the personhood of those with whom one interacts, including the enemy. Acknowledging that personhood requires whatever one does to another, it is done intentionally with the knowledge that, whatever the act is, it is affecting another person.[7] This relationship does not require communication or even the awareness by one actor that he or she may be acted upon by another. It just requires the reasons actors give for any act that affects another human being take into account the respect owed that particular human being. To make life-and-death decisions absent that relationship subjects human beings to an impersonal and pre-determined process, and subjecting human beings to such a process is disrespectful of their status as human beings. Thus, a concern arises when non-moral agents impose moral consequences on moral agents. Consider, for example, an artificially intelligent system that provides legal judgments on human violators. It is certainly conceivable that engineers could design a machine that could consider a larger quantity and variety of data than could a human judge. The difficulty with the judgment the machine renders, however, is that the machine cannot put itself in the position of the person it is judging and ask, “If I were in that person’s circumstances, would I have done the same thing?” It is the inability to not only empathize but then employ that empathy to generate additional reasons to act (or not act) that makes the machine’s judgment impersonal and pre-determined.[8] Absent an interpersonal relationship between judge and defendant, defendants have little ability to appeal to the range of sensibilities human judges may have to get beyond the letter of the law and decide in their favor. In fact, the European Union has enshrined the right of persons not to be subject to decisions based solely on automated data processing. In the United States, a number of states limit the applicability to computer-generated decisions and typically ensure an appeals process where a human makes any final decisions.[9] This ability to interact with other moral agents is thus central to treating others morally. Being in an interpersonal relationship allows all sides to give and take reasons regarding how they are to be treated by the other and to take up relevant factors they may not have considered before-hand.[10] In fact, what might distinguish machine judgments from human ones is the human ability to establish what is relevant as part of the judicial process rather than before-hand. That ability is what creates space for sentiments such as mercy and compassion to arise. This point is why only persons—so far at least—can show respect for other persons. So, if it seems wrong to subject persons to legal penalties based on machine judgment, it seems even more wrong to subject them to life-and-death decisions based on machine judgment. A machine might be able to enforce the law, but it is less clear if it can provide justice, much less mercy. Sparrow further observes that what distinguishes murder from justified killing cannot be expressed by a “set of rules that distinguish murder from other forms of killing, but only by its place within a wider network of moral and emotional responses.”[11] Rather, combatants must “acknowledge the morally relevant features” that render another person a legitimate target for killing. In doing so, they must also grant the possibility that the other person may have the right not to be attacked by virtue of their non-combatant status or other morally relevant feature.[12]
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<h4>[1] Lethal autonomous weapons lack the ability to reflect upon other agents and empathize before a strike – that disrespects humanity and overlooks the value of personhood.</h4><p><strong>Pfaff 19</strong> C. Anthony Pfaff, 3-4-2019, "Respect for Persons and the Ethics of Autonomous Weapons and Decision Support Systems," Strategy Bridge, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/3/4/respect-for-persons-and-the-ethics-of-autonomous-weapons-and-decision-support-systems SJCP//JG</p><p>KILLING AND RESPECT FOR OTHERS <u><strong>Drawing on Kant, Robert Sparrow argues <mark>respect</mark> for persons <mark>entails</mark> that, even in war, <mark>one must acknowledge</mark> the <mark>personhood</mark> of those with whom one interacts, <mark>including the enemy</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Acknowledging that personhood requires <mark>whatever one does to another</mark>, it is done <mark>intentionally</mark> <mark>with the knowledge that</mark>, whatever <mark>the act is</mark>, it is <mark>affecting another person</u></strong></mark>.[7] <u><strong>This relationship does not require communication or even the awareness by one actor that he or she may be acted upon by another. It just requires the reasons actors give for any act that affects another human being take into account the respect owed that particular human being. To make life-and-death decisions absent that relationship subjects human beings to an impersonal and pre-determined process, and subjecting human beings to such a process is disrespectful of their status as human beings. </u></strong>Thus, <u><strong>a <mark>concern arises when non-moral agents impose moral consequences on moral agents</mark>. Consider, for example, an artificially intelligent system that provides legal judgments on human violators</u></strong>. It is certainly conceivable that <u><strong>engineers could design a machine that could consider a larger quantity and variety of data than could a human judge. The difficulty with the judgment the machine renders, however, is that the machine cannot put itself in the position of the person it is judging and ask, “If I were in that person’s circumstances, would I have done the same thing?” It is the <mark>inability</mark> <mark>to</mark> not only <mark>empathize</mark> but then employ that empathy to generate additional reasons to act (or not act) that makes the machine’s judgment impersonal and pre-determined</u></strong>.[8] Absent an interpersonal relationship between judge and defendant, defendants have little ability to appeal to the range of sensibilities human judges may have to get beyond the letter of the law and decide in their favor. In fact, the European Union has enshrined the right of persons not to be subject to decisions based solely on automated data processing. In the United States, a number of states limit the applicability to computer-generated decisions and typically ensure an appeals process where a human makes any final decisions.[9] <u><strong>This <mark>ability to interact</mark> with other moral agents is thus <mark>central to treating others morally</mark>. Being in an interpersonal relationship allows all sides to give and take reasons regarding how they are to be treated by the other and to take up relevant factors they may not have considered before-hand.[10] In fact, what might distinguish machine judgments from human ones is the human ability to establish what is relevant as part of the judicial process rather than before-hand. That ability is what creates space for sentiments such as mercy and compassion to arise. This point is why only persons—so far at least—can show respect for other persons. So, if it seems wrong to subject persons to legal penalties based on machine judgment, it seems even more wrong to <mark>subject</mark> them to <mark>life-and-death decisions based on machine judgment</mark>. A machine might be able to enforce the law, but it is less clear if it can provide justice, much less mercy</u></strong>. Sparrow further observes that <u><strong>what distinguishes murder from <mark>justified killing</mark> cannot be expressed by a “set of rules that distinguish murder from other forms of killing, but <mark>only</mark> by its place <mark>within</mark> a wider network of <mark>moral and emotional responses</mark>.”</u></strong>[11] Rather, combatants must “acknowledge the morally relevant features” that render another person a legitimate target for killing. In doing so, they must also grant the possibility that the other person may have the right not to be attacked by virtue of their non-combatant status or other morally relevant feature.[12]</p>
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Churchill R6 – 1AC v Westwood SK
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1AC
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Offense
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./documents/hsld20/StrakeJesuit/Xi/Strake%20Jesuit-Xie-Aff-Winston%20Churchill%20Classic%20TOC%20and%20NIETOC%20Qualifier-Round6.docx
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A
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Winston Churchill Classic TOC and NIETOC Qualifier
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6
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Westwood SK
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Miguel Harvey
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1ac - korsgaard
1nc - util irondome da ai innovation da aff
1ar - advantage das
2nr - innovation aff
2ar - aff innovation
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hsld20/StrakeJesuit/Xi/Strake%20Jesuit-Xie-Aff-Winston%20Churchill%20Classic%20TOC%20and%20NIETOC%20Qualifier-Round6.docx
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HS LD 2020-21
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hs
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2,951,979 |
Deterrence is sustainable---even if overly reliant on certainty, that’s best and correlates with great power peace
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Miller ’16
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Miller ’16 (Franklin C. Miller – MPA @ Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School, principal of The Scowcroft Group, served 22 years in senior positions in the Department of Defense and four additional years on the National Security Council staff as a special assistant to the President, member of the Defense Policy Board and the US Strategic Command Senior Advisory Group, five time recipient of the Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Medal, awarded the Norwegian Royal Order of Merit (Grand Officer) and the French Legion of Honor (Officer). Keith B. Payne – PhD with distinction in International Relational @ USC, Professor and Head of the Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy, Chairman of the U.S. Strategic Command’s Senior Advisory Group, Strategy and Policy Panel, editor-in-chief of Comparative Strategy: An International Journal, and co-chair of the U.S. Nuclear Strategy Forum.. “No First-Use Advocacy: Contradictions and Guesswork,” 2016, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/09/08/no_first-use_advocacy__contradictions_and_guesswork__110034.html)
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what limited historical evidence is available in this regard suggests that on some occasions US nuclear deterrence has been important to the deterrence of non-nuclear threats the most informed and comprehensive analyses of primary sources indicate that US nuclear deterrence at least contributed to the deterrence of Saddam Hussein’s use of CBW in the 1991 Gulf War nuclear deterrence appears to have helped deter in 1991 from the founding of the nation state system in 1648 through 1945 the major powers in Europe went to war with each other seven times per century not even the recent memory of the catastrophic losses of World War I were sufficient to deter World War II After 1945 and the establishment of nuclear deterrence, this history has not repeated itself and the percentage of the world’s population lost to war has declined dramatically This does not prove the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence per se but the association in time at least suggests the powerful limiting effect
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the most informed and comprehensive analyses indicate nuclear deterrence contributed to deterrence of Saddam use of CBW in the Gulf War from 1648 through 1945 major powers went to war seven times per century After nuclear deterrence this history has not repeated itself and percentage lost to war has declined dramatically the association in time at least suggests the powerful limiting effect
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Indeed, what limited historical evidence is available in this regard suggests that on some occasions US nuclear deterrence has been important to the deterrence of non-nuclear threats. For example, the most informed and comprehensive analyses of primary sources indicate that US nuclear deterrence at least contributed to the deterrence of Saddam Hussein’s use of CBW in the 1991 Gulf War.[v] Kimball and Reif simply dismiss or ignore these analyses when they claim as a sweeping rule that nuclear deterrence is unnecessary to deter threats that it, in fact, appears to have helped deter in 1991. In addition, it should be noted that from the founding of the nation state system in 1648 through 1945, the major powers in Europe went to war with each other an average of seven times per century; not even the recent memory of the catastrophic losses of World War I were sufficient to deter World War II. After 1945 and the establishment of nuclear deterrence, this history has not repeated itself and the percentage of the world’s population lost to war has declined dramatically. This does not “prove” the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence per se, but the association in time at least suggests the powerful limiting effect
| 1,223 |
<h4>Deterrence is sustainable---even if overly reliant on certainty, that’s best and correlates with great power peace</h4><p><strong>Miller ’16</strong> (<u>Franklin C. Miller</u> – MPA @ Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School, principal of The Scowcroft Group, served 22 years in senior positions in the Department of Defense and four additional years on the National Security Council staff as a special assistant to the President, member of the Defense Policy Board and the US Strategic Command Senior Advisory Group, five time recipient of the Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Medal, awarded the Norwegian Royal Order of Merit (Grand Officer) and the French Legion of Honor (Officer). <u>Keith B. Payne</u> – PhD with distinction in International Relational @ USC, Professor and Head of the Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy, Chairman of the U.S. Strategic Command’s Senior Advisory Group, Strategy and Policy Panel, editor-in-chief of Comparative Strategy: An International Journal, and co-chair of the U.S. Nuclear Strategy Forum.. “No First-Use Advocacy: Contradictions and Guesswork,” 2016, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/09/08/no_first-use_advocacy__contradictions_and_guesswork__110034.html)</p><p>Indeed, <u>what limited historical evidence is available in this regard suggests that on some occasions US nuclear deterrence <strong>has been</strong> important to the deterrence of non-nuclear threats</u>. For example, <u><strong><mark>the most informed</mark> <mark>and</mark> <mark>comprehensive analyses</strong></mark> of primary sources <strong><mark>indicate</strong></mark> that US <strong><mark>nuclear deterrence</strong></mark> at least <strong><mark>contributed to</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>deterrence of Saddam</strong></mark> Hussein’s <strong><mark>use</mark> <mark>of CBW in the</strong></mark> 1991 <strong><mark>Gulf War</u></strong></mark>.[v] Kimball and Reif simply dismiss or ignore these analyses when they claim as a sweeping rule that <u>nuclear deterrence</u> is unnecessary to deter threats that it, in fact, <u>appears to have helped deter in 1991</u>. In addition, it should be noted that <u><strong><mark>from</strong></mark> the founding of the nation state system in <strong><mark>1648 through 1945</u></strong></mark>, <u>the <strong><mark>major powers</strong></mark> in Europe <strong><mark>went to war</strong></mark> with each other</u> an average of <u><strong><mark>seven times per century</u></strong></mark>; <u>not even the recent memory of the catastrophic losses of World War I were sufficient to deter World War II</u>. <u><strong><mark>After</strong></mark> 1945 and the establishment of <strong><mark>nuclear deterrence</mark>, <mark>this history has not repeated itself</mark> <mark>and</mark> the <mark>percentage</strong></mark> of the world’s population <strong><mark>lost to war has declined dramatically</u></strong></mark>. <u>This does not</u> “<u>prove</u>” <u>the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence per se</u>, <u>but <strong><mark>the association in time</mark> <mark>at least suggests</mark> <mark>the powerful limiting effect</mark> </p></u></strong>
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offense
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ac intermediate arsenals
nc new affs bad nebel 2020 da oil pic
1ar two new off all
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2ar second new off
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1,636,271 |
IR scenario analysis unlocks an intellectual openness to overcome cognitive biases and incorporate complementary theories while making research policy-relevant
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Sus 20
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Sus 20—Postdoctoral Fellow at the Hertie School of Governance and works in the Dahrendorf Forum, which is a joint initiative by the Hertie School, the London School of Economics and Political Science, and Stiftung Mercator [Monika Sus and Marcel Hadeed (Dahrendorf Research Associate at the Hertie School of Governance), February 2020, “Theory-infused and policy-relevant: On the usefulness of scenario analysis for international relations”, Contemporary Security Policy, Accessed through the Wake Forest Library]
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value of scenario analysis for IR scholarship
to fill the gap between IR theory and real-world problems scholars embrace a spirit of intellectual openness, recognizing both the need for greater flexibility in the theoretical formulations and the possibility of complementarity by other theories and approaches” This added value of scenario analysis as a complementary approach to traditional IR methods. most obvious advantage of scenario analysis as a methodology lies in its ability to tackle future events. there are no specified instruments within traditional IR methods which would allow scholars to go beyond past and present.
scenario analysis offers more than the possibility to talk about the future.
Confronting enduring assumptions
explorative scenarios stimulate creative thinking by challenging the deeply held assumptions of their authors. this method is helpful for overcoming enduring cognitive biases—mental errors such as linearity, presentism, and group think caused by the subconscious and simplified information processing of humans Humans have the tendencies to focus on the present at the expense of the future and to think about the future in linear terms by extrapolating past trends into the future. we rarely introduce discontinuities into theory or to attempt to determine what causes them to happen Scenario analysis attends to “deeper, otherwise left implicit, assumptions about continuous and linear patterns of development” process of scenario development invites the participants to reveal and question convictions which have so far remained unchallenged, and to question the linearity of world developments.
ability of reexamining one’s own assumptions and going beyond linear patterns of development is essential for IR scholarship.
foresight helps IR scholars to exit the tunnel vision on world affairs and discover potentially valuable nonlinear lines of development. These can be both innovative in terms of scholarship, and policy-relevant by offering a reflection on unexpected discontinuities. it can facilitate the intellectual capability to think the unthinkable
Bringing forward new research questions
Scenario analysis starts with confronting one’s enduring assumptions and developing multiple causal possibilities, through which scholars can potentially discover topics that have not been examined before. One of the greatest challenges for any scholar is to identify innovative venues for research that might bring the discipline forward Since the prime feature of scenario analysis is to detect rapid and significant shifts in trajectories, or the forces behind them, this method succors scenario analysis can identify research agendas for further investigation scenario analysis seems to be the right tool to advance innovative research since it helps scholars drive their research into new areas, away from moribund topics that have been followed for many decades. innovative research topics confront the uncertainties that are crucial for policymakers to be monitored closely.
Another added value of the scenario analysis for IR scholarship lies in its ability to provide comprehensive causal reasoning and thus to tackle complex issues. the world’s complexity combined with abrupt shifts poses a challenge for IR scholarship. possibility to accommodate multiple driving forces, to take into account different values they might take and finally to combine them with each other and see how they affect the dependent variable, makes the scenario approach quite unique. Traditional IR methods work with a limited number of independent variables scenarios are highly apt for dealing with complexity and uncertainty and providing academia with a tool for “actionable clarity in understanding contemporary global issues”
interdisciplinary conversation takes place prior to and during the research phase, rather than after it. scenario analysis can be useful for shedding light on developments that would have been overlooked by narrower research designs. In security studies scenario analysis can connect the dots between hard, soft, traditional and non-traditional understandings of security and capture the interplay of economic-societalenvironmental and technological changes. Imposing interdisciplinarity helps to counter the “hyper-fragmentation of knowledge” that “makes it difficult for even scholars in different disciplines to understand each other, much less policy-makers and general public”
Complex real-world issues tackled using scenario analysis include the Israel-Palestine conflict Turkey’s geopolitical environment prospects of the United States– China conflict and the consequences of Brexit for EU foreign and security policy
Stepping out of the ivory tower
scenario analysis enables IR scholars to establish a channel of communication with policy-makers A participatory scenario process forges “deep and shared understanding between its participants” academics and policy-makers work together, confront their world visions and assumptions and arrive at an agreement upon which they develop narratives for alternative futures. scenario analysis can be perceived as a tool towards more exchange between academia and policy-making that can contribute to a better understanding between the two worlds. For policymakers, it provides the opportunity to consider long-term trends For academics, it provides insight into which trends are most concerning for policy-makers, allowing them to check and ultimately enhance the relevance of their research agendas.
policy dialogue benefits from scenarios’ accessibility to a broader audience. Scenario publications tend to be shorter and easier to read than the average academic publication scenario publications are more suitable to the time- and attention-constraints of many policy-makers, they improve the accessibility of research findings for the policy world (Cairney & Kwiatkowski, 2017). An illustrative example is offered by a foresight exercise conducted by the Aspen Institute Berlin in 2017. A group of academics, think tank experts and policy-makers developed scenarios on the future of the liberal world order that served as raw material for a newspaper from the future titled “The Aspen Insight” and dated October 21, 2025. Not only did the presentation of the newspaper catch the attention of many Berlin-based policy-makers but the “The Aspen Insight” was also attached as a supplement to the Berlin daily Tagesspiegel, and reached more than 300,000 readers.11
scenario analysis for IR scholarship highlight distinct benefits for academics that want to tackle the challenges of today’s world via their research.
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scenario analysis for IR scholarship
fill the gap between theory and real problems scholars embrace intellectual openness, recognizing greater flexibility in theoretical formulations and possibility of complementarity by other theories advantage of scenario analysis lies in its ability to tackle future events.
this method overcom cognitive biases such as linearity and group think caused by the subconscious process invites participants to reveal and question convictions which remained unchallenged, and question linearity of developments.
foresight helps scholars exit tunnel vision on affairs These can be innovative in scholarship, and policy-relevant offering a reflection to think the unthinkable
innovative research confront uncertainties that are crucial for policymakers to monitor
possibility to accommodate multiple driving forces, to take into account different values and combine them and see how they affect the variable makes scenario approach unique providing a tool for “actionable clarity in understanding issues”
scenario analysis can be a tool towards more exchange between academia and policy-making that contribute to a better understanding between the two to consider long-term trends and enhance relevance of research agendas.
|
Added-value of scenario analysis for IR scholarship
As Tomé and Açıkalın (2019) point out, in order to fill the gap between IR theory and real-world problems, “an increasing number of scholars have come to embrace a spirit of intellectual openness, recognizing both the need for greater flexibility in the theoretical formulations and the possibility of complementarity by other theories and approaches” (p. 12). This section discusses the added value of scenario analysis as a complementary approach to traditional IR methods. The most obvious advantage of scenario analysis as a methodology, grounded in the reservoir of foresight studies, lies by definition in its ability to tackle future events. As mentioned before, there are no specified instruments within traditional IR methods which would allow scholars to go beyond past and present. The only exception is forecasting, one of the formal methods in IR, which is, however, distinctly different from foresight.
The underlying logic of forecasting is to provide predictions about the future by drawing on mathematical models and big data-sets based on known patterns. Thus, it is not particularly suitable to accommodate discontinuities. Foresight, as described above, aims at going beyond existing patterns by developing alternative futures based on an innovative combination of multiple driving forces. Its goal is to capture a set of possible futures and learn from them by examining the causal relations between driving forces and their different evolutions. By applying scenario approaches, scholars can thus account for evolving dynamics and discuss such timely issues as the consequences of Brexit for both British and EU-security, economics and politics (Brakman, Garretsen, & Kohl, 2018; Martill & Sus, 2018; Musolff, 2017; Verschueren, 2017; Ziv et al., 2018). Yet, scenario analysis offers more than the possibility to talk about the future. We see a fourfold merit of adding scenario analysis to the range of methods applied by IR scholars.
Confronting enduring assumptions
As we presented in the previous section, the main feature of explorative scenarios, which are the subject of this paper, is to stimulate creative thinking by challenging the deeply held assumptions of their authors. In other words, this method is helpful for overcoming enduring cognitive biases—mental errors such as linearity, presentism, and group think caused by the subconscious and simplified information processing of humans (Heuer, 1999, pp. 111– 112). Humans have the tendencies to focus on the present at the expense of the future and to think about the future in linear terms by extrapolating past trends into the future. As Gaddis (1992) points out, “we tend to bias our historical and our theoretical analyses too much toward continuity (…) we rarely find a way to introduce discontinuities into theory, or to attempt to determine what causes them to happen” (p. 52). Even if Gaddis does not explicitly mention scenarios, he refers to the concepts underlying scenario approaches (Han, 2011, p. 51). Scenario analysis attends to “deeper, otherwise left implicit, assumptions about continuous and linear patterns of development” (Wilkinson et al., 2013, p. 707). The process of scenario development invites the participants to reveal and question convictions which have so far remained unchallenged, and to question the linearity of world developments.
The ability of reexamining one’s own assumptions and going beyond linear patterns of development is essential for IR scholarship. To illustrate it with two examples: IR scholars and historians did not think that the Soviet Union could collapse and were startled by its fall, the peaceful resolution of the Cold War and the transformation of the bipolar system (Davis, 2005; Gaddis, 1992). In a similar vein, United States scholars were for decades so convinced of China’s economic, political, and cultural limitations that they neglected the possibility of its sudden ascent and were taken by surprise when it happened (Hundley, Kenzer, & Peterson, 2015). Interestingly, since the rise of China became evident, the United States debate on its future has been marked by a similar linearity of thought, leading to single-outcome predictions of China’s long-term future (Kerbel, 2004). In both cases, the discipline proved incapable of anticipating events of such importance, because scholars took for granted the status quo instead of confronting their bias towards linearity and detect manifestations of upcoming change. As a result, two major geopolitical surprises—the end of the Cold War and the rise of China have at first been neglected, forcing academia to catch up.
Against this backdrop, foresight helps IR scholars to exit the tunnel vision on world affairs and discover potentially valuable nonlinear lines of development. These can be both innovative in terms of scholarship, and policy-relevant by offering a reflection on unexpected discontinuities. Thus, it can facilitate the intellectual capability to think the unthinkable (Porter, 2016, p. 259).
Bringing forward new research questions
Scenario analysis starts with confronting one’s enduring assumptions and developing multiple causal possibilities, through which scholars can potentially discover topics that have not been examined before. One of the greatest challenges for any scholar is to identify innovative venues for research that might bring the discipline forward and advance publicity for one’s work. In Lakatosian terms, such an ability is often considered an evidence of a progressive research program.10 Since the prime feature of scenario analysis is to detect rapid and significant shifts in trajectories, or the forces behind them, this method succors when defining new pressing topics for academia. In particular, as mentioned in the previous section, scenario analysis enables the detection of both weak signals and wild cards. By drawing attention to these hitherto overlooked but potentially pressing issues, scenario analysis can identify research agendas for further investigation (Barma et al., 2016). Therefore, scenario analysis seems to be the right tool to advance innovative research since it helps scholars drive their research into new areas, away from moribund topics that have been followed for many decades. By “identifying questions of likely future significance” (Barma et al., 2016, p. 6), scenario analysis can contribute to combatting the proliferation of researchers in fields occupying the political status quo, such as Soviet or Japan studies in the United States in the 1980s. At the same time, innovative research topics confront the uncertainties that are crucial for policymakers to be monitored closely.
Dealing with the complexity and interdisciplinarity of real-world issues
Another added value of the scenario analysis for IR scholarship lies in its ability to provide comprehensive causal reasoning and thus to tackle complex issues. As mentioned in the introduction, the world’s complexity combined with abrupt shifts poses a challenge for IR scholarship. The possibility to accommodate multiple driving forces, to take into account different values they might take and finally to combine them with each other and see how they affect the dependent variable, makes the scenario approach quite unique. Traditional IR methods work with a limited number of independent variables, formulate and test hypotheses usually based on the relation between a single causal variable and the dependent variable. Investigating complex causal trajectories is therefore not possible. Against this background, we agree with Barma et al. (2016) and his colleagues who argue that scenarios are highly apt for dealing with complexity and uncertainty and providing academia with a tool for “actionable clarity in understanding contemporary global issues” (p. 1).
Moreover, the scenario approach helps to tackle the challenges of interdisciplinarity that is tied to complexity. By drawing on the active participation of people from different disciplines, backgrounds, and with different expertise in the scenario development process, it brings interdisciplinarity to the table by default. The key advantage of the approach is that this interdisciplinary conversation takes place prior to and during the research phase, rather than after it. This distinguishes the scenario approach from other methods that bring interdisciplinary perspectives together but do not facilitate a discussion between them, rather letting them passively co-exist. By exploring the dynamics between seemingly unrelated vectors of change (key drivers), scenario analysis can be useful for shedding light on developments that would have been overlooked by narrower research designs. In security studies, for example, scenario analysis can connect the dots between hard, soft, traditional and non-traditional understandings of security and capture the interplay of economic-societalenvironmental and technological changes. Imposing interdisciplinarity also helps to counter the “hyper-fragmentation of knowledge” that “makes it difficult for even scholars in different disciplines to understand each other, much less policy-makers and general public” (Desch, 2015, p. 381).
Complex real-world issues that were tackled using scenario analysis include the Israel-Palestine conflict (Stein et al., 1998), Turkey’s geopolitical environment (Çelik & Blum, 2007), the prospects of the United States– China conflict (Friedberg, 2005) and the consequences of Brexit for EU foreign and security policy (Martill & Sus, 2018). An examination of these topics without the application of interdisciplinary approaches would not be possible precisely due to their multifaceted character.
Stepping out of the ivory tower
Finally, scenario analysis also enables IR scholars to establish a channel of communication with policy-makers other than conducting interviews for their own research or providing ad-hoc consultations. A participatory scenario process forges “deep and shared understanding between its participants” (Ramírez & Wilkinson, 2016, p. 21). In scenario workshops, academics and policy-makers work together, confront their world visions and assumptions and arrive at an agreement upon which they develop narratives for alternative futures. Hence, scenario analysis can be perceived as a tool towards more exchange between academia and policy-making that can contribute to a better understanding between the two worlds. For policymakers, it provides the opportunity to consider long-term trends (an occasion not often found in the day-to-day nature of politics). For academics, it provides insight into which trends are most concerning for policy-makers, allowing them to check and ultimately enhance the relevance of their research agendas.
We acknowledge the difficulty to engage policy-makers in foresight exercises caused by their time-constrains and possible lack of interest. Yet, in our experience, this problem mostly refers to high-level policy-makers. Mid-level and former officials and policy-makers have more time and willingness to participate in foresight exercises and contribute equally valuable perspectives. The participatory character of foresight exercises facilitates the exchange of views from different stakeholders on an equal level. In our case, as the evaluation has shown, it has proven to be stimulating for each of the engaged groups.
Moreover, the policy dialogue benefits from scenarios’ accessibility to a broader audience. Scenario publications tend to be shorter and easier to read than the average academic publication and as Nye (2008) rightly notes “a premium on time is a major difference between the two cultures” of academia and policy-making. Since scenario publications are more suitable to the time- and attention-constraints of many policy-makers, they improve the accessibility of research findings for the policy world (Cairney & Kwiatkowski, 2017). An illustrative example is offered by a foresight exercise conducted by the Aspen Institute Berlin in 2017. A group of academics, think tank experts and policy-makers developed scenarios on the future of the liberal world order that served as raw material for a newspaper from the future titled “The Aspen Insight” and dated October 21, 2025. Not only did the presentation of the newspaper catch the attention of many Berlin-based policy-makers but the “The Aspen Insight” was also attached as a supplement to the Berlin daily Tagesspiegel, and reached more than 300,000 readers.11
We acknowledge that the four aspects of the added value of scenario analysis for IR scholarship are interrelated and that their boundaries are not clear-cut. Yet, we believe, they highlight distinct benefits of this approach for academics that want to tackle the challenges of today’s world via their research.
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<h4>IR scenario analysis unlocks an <u>intellectual openness</u> to overcome <u>cognitive biases</u> and incorporate <u>complementary theories</u> while making research policy-relevant </h4><p><strong>Sus 20</strong>—Postdoctoral Fellow at the Hertie School of Governance and works in the Dahrendorf Forum, which is a joint initiative by the Hertie School, the London School of Economics and Political Science, and Stiftung Mercator [Monika Sus and Marcel Hadeed (Dahrendorf Research Associate at the Hertie School of Governance), February 2020, “Theory-infused and policy-relevant: On the usefulness of scenario analysis for international relations”, Contemporary Security Policy, Accessed through the Wake Forest Library] </p><p>Added-<u><strong>value of <mark>scenario analysis for IR scholarship</p><p></u></strong></mark>As Tomé and Açıkalın (2019) point out, in order <u>to <strong><mark>fill the gap</strong> between</mark> <strong>IR <mark>theory</strong> and <strong>real</mark>-world <mark>problems</u></strong></mark>, “an increasing number of <u><mark>scholars</u></mark> have come to <u><mark>embrace</mark> a spirit of <strong><mark>intellectual openness</strong>, recognizing</mark> both the need for <strong><mark>greater flexibility</strong> in</mark> the <strong><mark>theoretical formulations</strong> and</mark> the <strong><mark>possibility of complementarity</strong> by <strong>other theories</strong></mark> and approaches”</u> (p. 12). <u>This</u> section discusses the <u>added value of scenario analysis as a <strong>complementary approach</strong> to <strong>traditional IR methods</strong>.</u> The <u>most obvious <mark>advantage of <strong>scenario analysis</mark> as a methodology</u></strong>, grounded in the reservoir of foresight studies, <u><mark>lies</u></mark> by definition <u><mark>in its ability to <strong>tackle future events</strong>.</u></mark> As mentioned before, <u>there are no specified instruments within traditional IR methods which would allow scholars to go beyond past and present.</u> The only exception is forecasting, one of the formal methods in IR, which is, however, distinctly different from foresight.</p><p>The underlying logic of forecasting is to provide predictions about the future by drawing on mathematical models and big data-sets based on known patterns. Thus, it is not particularly suitable to accommodate discontinuities. Foresight, as described above, aims at going beyond existing patterns by developing alternative futures based on an innovative combination of multiple driving forces. Its goal is to capture a set of possible futures and learn from them by examining the causal relations between driving forces and their different evolutions. By applying scenario approaches, scholars can thus account for evolving dynamics and discuss such timely issues as the consequences of Brexit for both British and EU-security, economics and politics (Brakman, Garretsen, & Kohl, 2018; Martill & Sus, 2018; Musolff, 2017; Verschueren, 2017; Ziv et al., 2018). Yet, <u>scenario analysis offers more than the possibility to talk about the future.</u> We see a fourfold merit of adding scenario analysis to the range of methods applied by IR scholars.</p><p><u>Confronting enduring assumptions</p><p></u>As we presented in the previous section, the main feature of <u>explorative scenarios</u>, which are the subject of this paper, is to <u><strong>stimulate creative thinking</strong> by <strong>challenging</strong> the <strong>deeply held assumptions of their authors</strong>.</u> In other words, <u><mark>this method</mark> is helpful for <strong><mark>overcom</mark>ing</strong> enduring <strong><mark>cognitive biases</strong></mark>—mental errors <mark>such as <strong>linearity</strong></mark>, <strong>presentism</strong>, <mark>and <strong>group think</strong> caused by the <strong>subconscious</strong></mark> and <strong>simplified information processing of humans</u></strong> (Heuer, 1999, pp. 111– 112). <u>Humans have the tendencies to focus on the present at the expense of the future and to think about the future in linear terms by extrapolating past trends into the future.</u> As Gaddis (1992) points out, “we tend to bias our historical and our theoretical analyses too much toward continuity (…) <u>we rarely</u> find a way to <u>introduce <strong>discontinuities into theory</u></strong>, <u>or to attempt to determine what causes them to happen</u>” (p. 52). Even if Gaddis does not explicitly mention scenarios, he refers to the concepts underlying scenario approaches (Han, 2011, p. 51). <u>Scenario analysis attends to “<strong>deeper</strong>, otherwise left <strong>implicit</strong>, <strong>assumptions</strong> about <strong>continuous</strong> and <strong>linear patterns of development</strong>”</u> (Wilkinson et al., 2013, p. 707). The <u><strong><mark>process</mark> of scenario development</strong> <mark>invites</mark> the <mark>participants to <strong>reveal</strong> and <strong>question convictions</strong> which</mark> have <strong>so far <mark>remained unchallenged</strong>, and</mark> to <strong><mark>question</mark> the <mark>linearity of</mark> world <mark>developments</strong>.</p><p></u></mark>The <u>ability of <strong>reexamining one’s own assumptions</strong> and going <strong>beyond linear patterns</strong> of development is <strong>essential</strong> for <strong>IR scholarship</strong>.</u> To illustrate it with two examples: IR scholars and historians did not think that the Soviet Union could collapse and were startled by its fall, the peaceful resolution of the Cold War and the transformation of the bipolar system (Davis, 2005; Gaddis, 1992). In a similar vein, United States scholars were for decades so convinced of China’s economic, political, and cultural limitations that they neglected the possibility of its sudden ascent and were taken by surprise when it happened (Hundley, Kenzer, & Peterson, 2015). Interestingly, since the rise of China became evident, the United States debate on its future has been marked by a similar linearity of thought, leading to single-outcome predictions of China’s long-term future (Kerbel, 2004). In both cases, the discipline proved incapable of anticipating events of such importance, because scholars took for granted the status quo instead of confronting their bias towards linearity and detect manifestations of upcoming change. As a result, two major geopolitical surprises—the end of the Cold War and the rise of China have at first been neglected, forcing academia to catch up. </p><p>Against this backdrop, <u><mark>foresight helps</mark> IR <mark>scholars</mark> to <strong><mark>exit</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>tunnel vision</strong> on</mark> world <mark>affairs</mark> and discover potentially valuable nonlinear lines of development. <mark>These can be</mark> both <strong><mark>innovative</strong> in</mark> terms of <strong><mark>scholarship</strong>, and <strong>policy-relevant</strong></mark> by <mark>offering a <strong>reflection</strong></mark> on <strong>unexpected discontinuities</strong>.</u> Thus, <u>it can facilitate the <strong>intellectual capability</strong> <mark>to <strong>think the unthinkable</u></strong></mark> (Porter, 2016, p. 259).</p><p><u>Bringing forward new research questions</p><p>Scenario analysis starts with <strong>confronting one’s enduring assumptions</strong> and <strong>developing multiple causal possibilities</strong>, through which scholars can potentially discover topics that have not been examined before. One of the greatest challenges for any scholar is to identify innovative venues for research that might bring the discipline forward</u> and advance publicity for one’s work. In Lakatosian terms, such an ability is often considered an evidence of a progressive research program.10 <u>Since the prime feature of scenario analysis is to <strong>detect rapid and significant shifts</strong> in <strong>trajectories</strong>, or the <strong>forces behind them</strong>, this method succors</u> when defining new pressing topics for academia. In particular, as mentioned in the previous section, scenario analysis enables the detection of both weak signals and wild cards. By drawing attention to these hitherto overlooked but potentially pressing issues, <u>scenario analysis can identify research agendas for <strong>further investigation</u></strong> (Barma et al., 2016). Therefore, <u>scenario analysis seems to be the right tool to <strong>advance innovative research</strong> since it helps scholars <strong>drive their research into new areas</strong>, away from moribund topics that have been followed for many decades.</u> By “identifying questions of likely future significance” (Barma et al., 2016, p. 6), scenario analysis can contribute to combatting the proliferation of researchers in fields occupying the political status quo, such as Soviet or Japan studies in the United States in the 1980s. At the same time, <u><mark>innovative research</mark> topics <strong><mark>confront</mark> the <mark>uncertainties</strong> that are <strong>crucial for policymakers</strong> to</mark> be <mark>monitor</mark>ed closely.</p><p></u>Dealing with the complexity and interdisciplinarity of real-world issues</p><p><u>Another added value of the scenario analysis for IR scholarship lies in its ability to provide <strong>comprehensive causal reasoning</strong> and thus to <strong>tackle complex issues</strong>.</u> As mentioned in the introduction, <u>the <strong>world’s complexity</strong> combined with <strong>abrupt shifts</strong> poses a challenge for IR scholarship.</u> The <u><mark>possibility to <strong>accommodate multiple driving forces</strong>, to <strong>take into account different values</strong></mark> they might take <mark>and</mark> finally to <strong><mark>combine them</mark> with each other</strong> <mark>and <strong>see how they affect the</mark> dependent <mark>variable</strong></mark>, <mark>makes</mark> the <mark>scenario approach</mark> quite <mark>unique</mark>. Traditional IR methods work with a limited number of independent variables</u>, formulate and test hypotheses usually based on the relation between a single causal variable and the dependent variable. Investigating complex causal trajectories is therefore not possible. Against this background, we agree with Barma et al. (2016) and his colleagues who argue that <u><strong>scenarios are highly apt</strong> for <strong>dealing with complexity</strong> and <strong>uncertainty</strong> and <mark>providing</mark> academia with <mark>a tool for “<strong>actionable clarity</strong> in <strong>understanding</mark> contemporary global <mark>issues</strong>”</u></mark> (p. 1).</p><p>Moreover, the scenario approach helps to tackle the challenges of interdisciplinarity that is tied to complexity. By drawing on the active participation of people from different disciplines, backgrounds, and with different expertise in the scenario development process, it brings interdisciplinarity to the table by default. The key advantage of the approach is that this <u>interdisciplinary conversation takes place prior to and during the research phase, rather than after it.</u> This distinguishes the scenario approach from other methods that bring interdisciplinary perspectives together but do not facilitate a discussion between them, rather letting them passively co-exist. By exploring the dynamics between seemingly unrelated vectors of change (key drivers), <u>scenario analysis can be useful for shedding light on developments that would have been overlooked by narrower research designs. In <strong>security studies</u></strong>, for example, <u>scenario analysis can <strong>connect the dots</strong> between hard, soft, traditional and non-traditional understandings of security and capture the <strong>interplay of economic-societalenvironmental</strong> and <strong>technological changes</strong>. Imposing interdisciplinarity</u> also <u>helps to <strong>counter</strong> the “<strong>hyper-fragmentation of knowledge</strong>” that “makes it difficult for even scholars in different disciplines to understand each other, much less policy-makers and general public”</u> (Desch, 2015, p. 381).</p><p><u>Complex real-world issues</u> that were <u>tackled using scenario analysis include the Israel-Palestine conflict</u> (Stein et al., 1998), <u>Turkey’s geopolitical environment</u> (Çelik & Blum, 2007), the <u>prospects of the United States– China conflict</u> (Friedberg, 2005) <u>and the consequences of Brexit for EU foreign and security policy</u> (Martill & Sus, 2018). An examination of these topics without the application of interdisciplinary approaches would not be possible precisely due to their multifaceted character.</p><p><u>Stepping out of the ivory tower</p><p></u>Finally, <u>scenario analysis</u> also <u>enables <strong>IR scholars</strong> to <strong>establish</strong> a <strong>channel of communication with policy-makers</u></strong> other than conducting interviews for their own research or providing ad-hoc consultations. <u>A participatory scenario process forges “<strong>deep and shared understanding</strong> between its participants”</u> (Ramírez & Wilkinson, 2016, p. 21). In scenario workshops, <u>academics and policy-makers work together, confront their world visions and assumptions and arrive at an agreement upon which they develop narratives for alternative futures.</u> Hence, <u><mark>scenario analysis can be</mark> perceived as <mark>a tool towards <strong>more exchange between academia and policy-making</strong> that</mark> can <mark>contribute to a <strong>better understanding between the two</strong></mark> worlds. For policymakers, it provides the opportunity <mark>to consider <strong>long-term trends</u></strong></mark> (an occasion not often found in the day-to-day nature of politics). <u>For academics, it provides insight into which trends are most concerning for policy-makers, allowing them to check <mark>and</mark> ultimately <mark>enhance</mark> the <strong><mark>relevance of</mark> their <mark>research agendas</strong>.</p><p></u></mark>We acknowledge the difficulty to engage policy-makers in foresight exercises caused by their time-constrains and possible lack of interest. Yet, in our experience, this problem mostly refers to high-level policy-makers. Mid-level and former officials and policy-makers have more time and willingness to participate in foresight exercises and contribute equally valuable perspectives. The participatory character of foresight exercises facilitates the exchange of views from different stakeholders on an equal level. In our case, as the evaluation has shown, it has proven to be stimulating for each of the engaged groups.</p><p>Moreover, the <u><strong>policy dialogue</strong> benefits from <strong>scenarios’ accessibility</strong> to a <strong>broader audience</strong>. Scenario publications tend to be shorter and easier to read than the average academic publication</u> and as Nye (2008) rightly notes “a premium on time is a major difference between the two cultures” of academia and policy-making. Since <u>scenario publications are <strong>more suitable</strong> to the <strong>time- and attention-constraints</strong> of many policy-makers, they improve the accessibility of research findings for the policy world (Cairney & Kwiatkowski, 2017). An illustrative example is offered by a foresight exercise conducted by the Aspen Institute Berlin in 2017. A group of academics, think tank experts and policy-makers developed scenarios on the future of the liberal world order that served as raw material for a newspaper from the future titled “The Aspen Insight” and dated October 21, 2025. Not only did the presentation of the newspaper catch the attention of many Berlin-based policy-makers but the “The Aspen Insight” was also attached as a supplement to the Berlin daily Tagesspiegel, and reached more than 300,000 readers.11</p><p></u>We acknowledge that the four aspects of the added value of <u>scenario analysis for IR scholarship</u> are interrelated and that their boundaries are not clear-cut. Yet, we believe, they <u>highlight distinct benefits</u> of this approach <u>for academics that want to <strong>tackle the challenges of today’s world via their research</strong>.</p></u>
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The 1AC is an ideological fantasy constructed by relentless planning at the expense of scapegoated identities, all for recognition from the Other in an attempt to fill the lack.
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Gunder 05 SJBE
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Gunder 05 Michael Gunder, 2005, “The Production of Desirous Space: Mere Fantasies of the Utopian City?” Planning Theory 2005 4: 173, DOI: 10.1177/1473095205054604, all brackets were in the original text, SJBE
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Now knowledge and technology, not the Master’s injunction, become ‘agency expressing a logic of governmentality and expertise (including that of planning) that does not prohibit enjoyment, but rather channels jouissance in ways that produces a “bio-politics” (after Foucault) of an alienated subject that has no option, but to enjoy and be satisfied’ (Hillier and Gunder, 2005; McGowan, 2004; Zˇ izˇek, 2004b; Zupancic, 2004). In this regard, ‘a nation exists only as long as its specific enjoyment continues to be materialised in a set of social practices and submitted through national myths [or fantasies] that structure these practices’ (Zˇ izˇek, 1993: 202). In this light, the role of planning is to facilitate enjoyment by sustainably providing the correct space – healthy, competitive, fit and attractive – where enjoyment can be effectively materialized and maximized under the imperative of global capitalism In response to the dominant ‘logic’ of global competitiveness, the technocrats and experts including planners, shape, contextualize and implement public policy in the interest of the dominant hegemonic bloc In turn, this defines what is blighted and dysfunctional and in need of planning remedy Yet this lack and its resolution are more often technical in nature, rather than political. Contemporary injunctions are to enjoy – or at least to sustain our happiness – regardless of what we actually desire. Happiness is not a class of truth, but one of an ontological class of being where: ‘happiness’ relies on the subject’s inability or unreadiness fully to confront the consequences of its desire: the price of happiness is that the subject remains stuck in the inconsistency of its desires. In our daily lives, we (pretend to) desire things which we do not really desire, so that, ultimately, the worst thing that can happen is for us to get what we ‘officially’ desire Planning continues to succeed because it underpins the primal desire of most subjects in society for a conflict-free, safe and assured happy future, even if it can only deliver this as a fantasy-scenario of material happiness, rather than as an impossible reality that actually sates all desires (Gunder, 2003a, 2003b). This is a fantasy predicated on an obedience to a shallow consumptive quantitative imperative to be materially happy, which often occurs at the expense of our actual qualitative psychic desires. Further, ‘the fantasy of a utopian harmonious social world can only be sustained if all the persisting disorders can be attributed to an alien intruder . . . a certain particularity which cannot be assimilated, but instead must be eliminated’ (Stavrakakis, 1999: 108). This is the stranger, the Other that is not us that can act as the ‘“scapegoat” to be stigmatised as the one who is blamed for our lack, the Evil force that stole our precious jouissance’ and stopped the fantasy from achieving its utopian vision (Stavrakakis, 2003a: 58). Even our ‘“complex” contemporary societies rely on the basic divide between included and excluded’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 86). Zˇ izˇek (2004b: 86) continues: in any society ‘there is a multitude within the system and a multitude of those excluded, and simply to encompass them both within the scope of the same notion amounts to the same obscenity as equating starvation with dieting.’ Ideological fantasies as to what constitutes an enjoyable and satisfying city are deployed to hide the dysfunctions and unpredictabilities that are ubiquitous throughout all social spheres, particularly for those lacking in sufficient capital to offset adversity. This is in contrast to the existing social reality, where political processes, such as planning, appear to strive for public participation culminating in an harmonious public consensus, when of course this is but an ideological foil that excludes in the name of a ‘general interest’ defined by a privileged few and legitimized by technocratic ‘reason’. This is a perspective that situates our very social reality, including space and social interaction, as principally constituted and composed of ideological fantasy constructs, misrecognitions and misunderstandings (see Hillier, 2003). Here, it is the desire of this Other that we fundamentally seek and wish to please as we constantly strive to return to our idealized primordial desire for infant maternal security and contentment (Hillier and Gunder, 2005). So we construct and share illusions and fantasies – ideologies – that we are somehow achieving this impossible task. It is the aggregate of these Others, and the illusions we generate about them and ourselves, that constitutes the social reality that is our lived space.
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‘agency produces fantasies , the role of planning is to provid the space where enjoyment can be maximized Planning underpins the desire for future it can only deliver a fantasy-scenario , rather than an impossible reality that sates desires ‘the fantasy can only be sustained if disorders can be attributed to a ‘“scapegoat” to be stigmatised rely on the divide between included and excluded’ Ideological fantasies hide the dysfunctions ubiquitous throughout social spheres it is the desire of this Other that we wish to please So we construct and share fantasies that we are achieving this task of social reality
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Jouissance is one of the four structuring elements of social discourse,4 or social interactions, links and relationships, where synchronic language meets diachronic speech to evoke an effect on the Other (Lacan, 2004: 3). Zupancic (2004) associates Lacan’s (2004) theory of the Four Discourses (see Gunder, 2003a, 2004; Hillier and Gunder, 2005) with the Marxian theory of commodification and surplus-value via Lacan’s concept of surplus-enjoyment (plus-de-jouir). Lacan (2004: 111) contends that surplusvalue and surplus-enjoyment are historically equivalent, especially in the situation of the Master’s injunction of ‘No!’ in the emerging early phase of Calvinistic repressive capitalism. In contrast to the historical authority and rationality of the Master’s repressive command, late capitalism is structured under a rationality of the university or bureaucracy. Now knowledge and technology, not the Master’s injunction, become ‘agency expressing a logic of governmentality and expertise (including that of planning) that does not prohibit enjoyment, but rather channels jouissance in ways that produces a “bio-politics” (after Foucault) of an alienated subject that has no option, but to enjoy and be satisfied’ (Hillier and Gunder, 2005; McGowan, 2004; Zˇ izˇek, 2004b; Zupancic, 2004). In this regard, ‘a nation exists only as long as its specific enjoyment continues to be materialised in a set of social practices and submitted through national myths [or fantasies] that structure these practices’ (Zˇ izˇek, 1993: 202). This is taken further by the barely challenged international hegemonic discourse of global capitalization and the fantasies it induces in externally structuring the nation state’s very enjoyment (Stavrakakis, 2003a: 63; Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 61). Even the ruling British Labour government, with its ‘Third Way’, in contrast to its tradition of socialism, has placed ‘economic globalisation’ as ‘the most significant factor in shaping Labour Party thinking since the early 1990s’ (Allmendinger, 2003: 326). As McGowan (2004) observes: we trust fully in the staying power of global capitalism. The alternatives, which once seemed to be just around the corner, have become unimaginable today. The universe of global capitalism is, or so we think, here to stay, and we best not do anything to risk our status within it. Hence, we pledge our allegiance to it, and we put our trust in it. This is the fundamental mode of contemporary obedience to authority. Only by coming to understand this obedience to the dictates of global capitalism as obedience can we hope to break out of it. Global capitalism seems an unsurpassable horizon simply because we have not properly recognized our own investment in sustaining it. We see it as unsurpassable because we don’t want to lose it – and the imaginary satisfaction that it provides. (McGowan, 2004: 193) Illusion resides under this global fantasy of capital where ‘the basic feature of’ this dominant cultural imperative ‘no longer operates on the level of ideals and identifications, but directly on the level of regulating jouissance’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 113). Even in Lefebvre’s day, this was a capitalism where surplus-value was synonymous with surplus-enjoyment supporting the injunction: ‘you must enjoy!’. In this light, the role of planning is to facilitate enjoyment by sustainably providing the correct space – healthy, competitive, fit and attractive – where enjoyment can be effectively materialized and maximized under the imperative of global capitalism. Consequently: urbanism is nothing more than an ideology that claims to be either ‘art’ or ‘technology’ or ‘science’, depending on the context. This ideology pretends to be straightforward, yet it obfuscates, harbours things unsaid: which it covers, which it contains, as a form of will tending towards efficiency. Urbanism is doubly fetishistic. First, it implies the fetishism of satisfaction. What about vested interests? They must be satisfied, and therefore their needs must be understood and catered to, unchanged . . . Second, it implies the fetishism of space. Space is creation. Whoever creates space creates whatever it is that fills space. The place engenders the thing and the good place engenders good things. (Lefebvre, 2003: 159) This is exacerbated further in the current milieu of consumerist post-democracy personified by the master signifier: global capitalism. ‘Post-democracy is founded on an attempt to exclude the political awareness of lack and negativity from the political domain, leading to a political order which retains the token institutions of liberal democracy but neutralizes the centrality of political antagonism’ (Stavrakakis, 2003a: 59). In response to the dominant ‘logic’ of global competitiveness, the technocrats and experts including planners, shape, contextualize and implement public policy in the interest of the dominant hegemonic bloc. This is constructed under the logics and knowledges of university discourses (see Gunder, 2004), with an objective to remove existing or potential urban blight,‘dis-ease’ and dysfunction detracting from local enjoyment and global competitiveness (Gunder, 2005; McGuirk, 2004). Of course, the hegemonic network, or bloc, initially shapes the debate as to what constitutes desired enjoyment and what is lacking in urban competitiveness. In turn, this defines what is blighted and dysfunctional and in need of planning remedy. This is predicated on a logic, or more accurately a rhetoric, that a lack of a particular defined type of enjoyment, or competitiveness, is inherently unhealthy for the aggregate social body. Planners, programmers, and users want solutions. For what? To make people happy. To order them to be happy. It is a strange way of interpreting happiness. The science of the urban phenomenon cannot respond to these demands without the risk of validating external restrictions imposed by ideology and power. (Lefebvre, 2003: 141) Yet this lack and its resolution are more often technical in nature, rather than political. As a consequence, the technocrats in partnership with their ‘dominant stakeholders’ can ensure the impression of happiness for the many, while, not to mention, achieving the stakeholders’ specific interests. Material happiness for all but that evil other Lacanian theory suggests that a subject’s jouissance is given freest rein when an act of desire contains a dimension of transgression. It is the ‘little sin’ that gives the most pleasure; it is the prohibition as such which elevates a common everyday object into an object of desire (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 177). The bio-politics of contemporary planning are predicated on enjoyment – you will enjoy! – not the prior duality of repression/freedom of the Weberian capitalist master’s injunction: ‘No you cannot do that!’. The achievements of traditional utopian goals were ones of freedom to act against the repression of the negative injunction. Contemporary injunctions are to enjoy – or at least to sustain our happiness – regardless of what we actually desire. Happiness is not a class of truth, but one of an ontological class of being where: ‘happiness’ relies on the subject’s inability or unreadiness fully to confront the consequences of its desire: the price of happiness is that the subject remains stuck in the inconsistency of its desires. In our daily lives, we (pretend to) desire things which we do not really desire, so that, ultimately, the worst thing that can happen is for us to get what we ‘officially’ desire. Happiness is thus hypocritical: it is the happiness dreaming about things we do not really want. (Zˇ izˇek, 2002a: 59–60) Planning continues to succeed because it underpins the primal desire of most subjects in society for a conflict-free, safe and assured happy future, even if it can only deliver this as a fantasy-scenario of material happiness, rather than as an impossible reality that actually sates all desires (Gunder, 2003a, 2003b). This is a fantasy predicated on an obedience to a shallow consumptive quantitative imperative to be materially happy, which often occurs at the expense of our actual qualitative psychic desires. In our contemporary global society the ‘moral law’ is no longer the imperative that acts as a limitation, stopping us from enjoying too much. Instead, the cultural imperative, the now dominant moral Law itself, in its injunction for us to enjoy becomes ‘the ultimate “transgression”’ should one wish to pursue a life of moderation (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 174). Further, ‘the fantasy of a utopian harmonious social world can only be sustained if all the persisting disorders can be attributed to an alien intruder . . . a certain particularity which cannot be assimilated, but instead must be eliminated’ (Stavrakakis, 1999: 108). This is the stranger, the Other that is not us that can act as the ‘“scapegoat” to be stigmatised as the one who is blamed for our lack, the Evil force that stole our precious jouissance’ and stopped the fantasy from achieving its utopian vision (Stavrakakis, 2003a: 58). Even our ‘“complex” contemporary societies rely on the basic divide between included and excluded’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 86). Zˇ izˇek (2004b: 86) continues: in any society ‘there is a multitude within the system and a multitude of those excluded, and simply to encompass them both within the scope of the same notion amounts to the same obscenity as equating starvation with dieting.’ It is continually this Other that permits the delusion of harmony in our identity defining groups and for this to transpire we require an Other, external to the group for the group to define itself. We require a disparity, or gap, to allocate a degree of difference to an Other to conceptualize the group identification as who we are not and on this Other we can attribute all the signs of disharmony that jeopardize our shared fantasy (Zˇ izˇek, 1997: 5). Difference is essential to complete our fantasy of harmony, but only by providing the sacrificial Other on which we can blame the disappointment of the fantasy to deliver (Zˇ izˇek, 2004a: 158–9). In this light, planning,‘as part of the apparatus of the modern state, makes its own imprint, has its own powers for good and evil’ (Sandercock, 2004: 134). This is especially so as planning identifies, or at least names and legitimizes, what constitutes an urban pathology that detracts from what is desirous of the globally competitive city. Planning then sets out to remedy this lack or deficiency. Civil society, i.e. the public stage, and media of information dissemination are central to this process. Of course, our media are not ideologically neutral. As a consequence, media access for putting forth particular tropes of desire constitutes a central component of social, as well as economic, capital. This is well documented by Flyvbjerg (1998a) where the Aalborg Chamber of Commerce controlled the editorial content of the local newspaper. This argument is central to that of Chomsky’s (2003) multinational corporate steering of mass media content in the, so-called, ‘free’ press. This is where the mass media are free to publish almost anything, provided, of course, they do not alienate their corporate clients who provide their majority of income and profits via their advertising payments. Gunder (2003b) documented how planning actors and their affiliated partners gained public agreement via the rhetorical use of culturally shared ‘master signifiers’ and their related metonymies and metaphors. Here each signifier was linked to associations in the public’s unconscious that induced a conscious expression of desire for a particular set of values or specific consequential actions. Effective deployment of rhetorical tropes can seduce subjects ‘to relinquish previous desires (including identifications and embrace new ones) – or alternatively, to invest all the more completely in old ones’ (Bracher, 1993: 51–2). For example, does anyone wish to live in a city that is losing enjoyment to other locations because it lacks the fitness to compete? In Lacan, the construction of reality is continuous with the field of desire. Desire and reality are intimately connected . . . The nature of their link can only be revealed in fantasy . . . when harmony is not present it has to be somehow introduced in order for our reality to be coherent. It has to be introduced through a fantasmatic social construction. (Stavrakakis, 1999: 62–3) This is where, from a Lacanian outlook, by accepting rationalization as the means to fulfil a desire for completeness – via the utilization of falsifying words – ‘man does not adapt himself to reality; he adapts reality to himself’ (Roudinesco, 1997: 114). Ideological fantasies as to what constitutes an enjoyable and satisfying city are deployed to hide the dysfunctions and unpredictabilities that are ubiquitous throughout all social spheres, particularly for those lacking in sufficient capital to offset adversity. Social reality ‘is sustained by the “as if”, the fantasy of what things are like’ (Dean, 2001: 627). Rationalization, or realrationalität as Flyvbjerg (1998a) calls it, exists between the everyday activities of social life and the held universal ideals or values of what ought to be, even if it is not so, in social reality. The belief that planning is not political, but technical ‘allows the myths of objectivity, value neutrality, and technical reason to persist, and thereby fosters a certain delusion about planning practice’ (Sandercock, 2004: 134). Sandercock (2004: 134) continues: planning ‘helps to redefine political debate, producing new sources of power and legitimacy, changing the force field in which we operate’. Lefebvre suggests that planning is based on a strategy of mixing scientificity and rationality with ideology. ‘Here, as elsewhere, scientificity is an ideology, an excrescence grafted onto real, but fragmentary, knowledge’ (Lefebvre, 2003: 166). In particular, Lefebvre argues that quantitative expertise including the technology of urban planning is largely a myth. This is because planning administrators: and bad administrators at that, rarely use much actual technology. However, they have the ability to persuade the people as a whole that because these are technological decisions they should be accepted. In other words, a large part of Lefebvre’s criticism [of planners] is not that technocrats are technocrats, but that they are precisely the opposite. Technology should be put to the service of everyday life, of social life rather than being precisely the condition of its suppression and control. Urbanism, for example, is an ideology that operates under the cover of this myth of technology. (Elden, 2004: 145) Social reality can only exist in the symbolic and imaginary registries as it is composed, that is constructed, as a ‘result of a certain historically specific set of discursive practices and power mechanisms’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2001: 66). Flyvbjerg (1998a) illustrates this well in his exposé of the Aalborg Chamber of Commerce’s intervention in that city’s planning process. Here this grouping of dominant business people is given hegemonic voice to determine what constitutes acceptable transportation modes and spatial development in Aalborg’s town centre. In this example the planner’s technical facts, by themselves, produced the weaker argument. This was perhaps because the dissemination of these facts and their implications for planning action were ineffectively articulated to the public, if at all, via the local information media controlled by the Chamber of Commerce. In contrast, in Sydney, McGuirk (2004) documented how planners actively participated in and facilitated the dominant network of actors successfully pushing for a series of local, regional and national policies supporting Sydney’s global competitiveness. It appeared to be of little consequence that these policies induced adverse effects on the rest of the country, not to mention many of Sydney’s residents. Not dissimilarly, the Auckland case cited in the introduction illustrates how the planners actively consulted the dominant commercial stakeholders in developing their growth strategy, yet failed to have direct consultation with the Region’s actual residents (ARGF, 1999; Gunder, 2003a). Planners and their governance forum of dominant stakeholders appeared to inherently know what is in the best interests of their region’s residents. Planning as agonistic ethics Notwithstanding the ‘full rendering of the antagonisms which traverse our society, we indulge in the notion of society as an organic whole, kept together by forces of solidarity and co-operation’ (Zˇ izˇek, 1997: 6). Planning is one such instrument that shapes and justifies the governing ideals of utopian desire and in this ‘sphere, the fantasmatic ideal of harmony is dominant’ (Stavrakakis, 1999: 110). The subtle and not so subtle application of power defines truth, reason and rationality and this particularly comprises the deployment of power in our planning and related practices (Flyvbjerg, 1998a). Moreover, a Lacanian line of reasoning about knowledge and truth indicates that the constituting components of these induced fantasies of truth and rationality are mediated on the wants and needs of actors with the capacity to inflict their desires and wants on the Other and, as if, these desires belong to those who have been imposed on. This is via assertions of unquestionable ‘truth’, which are often supported and empowered by selected ‘distorted’ knowledge, practices and language put forward by their ideological supporters, employed professional experts and controlled media. Further, in this light traditional Kantian and related enlightenment ‘ethics is nothing more than a convenient tool for any ideology that tries to pass off its own commandments as authentic, spontaneous, and “honorable” inclinations of the subject’ (Zupancic, 1998: 41). In contrast to traditional ethics, Lacan’s (1992) theorizing may provide an alternative way to develop new values beyond those already constituted by society as traditional morals of good or evil shaping acceptable behaviours. Traditional ethics is predicated on a reality principle as to what is possible without transgression in social reality. As Zupancic (2003: 77) observes, this ‘reality principle itself is ideologically mediated; one could even claim that it constitutes the highest form of ideology, the ideology that presents itself as empirical factor or (biological, economic . . .) necessity.’ This ‘beyond good or evil’ does not have to lead to postmodern nihilism, rather Lacan lays a groundwork for an ethics of the Real, where through acknowledgement of this Real that we cannot know or articulate we can establish new ‘truths’ in relationship to the ‘good’ (Stavrakakis, 2003b; Zupancic, 2000, 2003). This is through a mechanism of ethical sublimation where we create ‘a certain space, scene, or “stage” that enables us to value something that is situated beyond the reality principle, as well as beyond the principle of common good’ (Zupancic, 2003: 78). It is the space, or stage, created when the planner, or other actor, makes the ethical decision to recommend an action or permission that is contrary to existing regulations, precedence, professional expectations, or cultural imperatives. This is perhaps because somehow for the planner, perhaps simply driven by strong feelings, the ‘correct’ and expected action is perceived as not being the right thing to do. From the Lacanian perspective of the ethics of the Real, to make the sensed wrong into a rightness is the ethically correct task, even if this requires the agent to act against what he/she thinks society expects of that actor. This act of transcending the reality principle, and being true to the actor’s desires,5 makes possible a new good, a new potential, it changes the rules as to what is possible (Gunder and Hillier, 2004: 230). ‘The ethical, then, is the constellation of events in which the subject frees herself from the symbolic law (“freedom”), commits herself to an act (“agency”), and thereby makes it possible for the law to be rethought’ (Kay, 2003: 109). The ethical ‘act is an “excessive”, trans-strategic intervention which redefines the rules and contours of the existing order’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 81). Viewed from this perspective, Kant’s categorical imperative must be rethought itself as purely transgressive: the ethical act proper is a transgression of the legal norm – a transgression which, in contrast to a simple criminal violation, does not simply violate the legal norm, but redefines what is a legal norm. The moral law does not follow the Good – it generates a new shape of what counts as ‘Good’. (Zˇ izˇek, 2001: 170) This is a transgression that introduces new spaces for what can be considered ‘good’ and hence a wider space for jouissance, beyond that of mere technically produced materialist satisfaction. Of course, a key question becomes: how can a credible planner, or other actor, transcend the accepted norms and expectations of a society to create a new space for a new concept of ‘good’? Further, how can one effectively and reasonably mobilize such an ethics of the Real in everyday life when it is so contrary to the consensual instrumental rationality of the modern project and its ready-made solutions, that are, arguably planning’s purpose and foundations? Planning theorists (e.g. Gunder and Hillier, 2004; Pløger, 2004) and researchers in other disciplines (e.g. Mouffe, 1999, 2000; Stavrakakis, 2003a; Thrift, 2004a, 2004b) are currently attempting to address these complex issues that essentially require new insight and perhaps even profound change in our very relationships towards social reality, itself. Further, they are attempting to do so in a manner that does not simply impose a new intransigent set of ideals to replace our late-modern cultural imperatives, but rather to encourage diverse opportunities for multiple opening in which imminence may continually occur (after Deleuze). Coherent and implementable means to achieve this desired state are yet to emerge as new knowledges and practices, if they can ever do so. Yet, this author suggests that mere awareness and articulation of the impossible implications that the Lacanian Real has on traditional rationality are perhaps one of many points of commencement. Of course, this discourse also may fall into the trap leading to transcendental idealism, i.e. a process of identifying a lack, or void, in our knowledge and practices and then presenting a hegemonic solution that must be implemented, regardless of effect and affect! This author suggests that to change social reality, to begin to question and where necessary traverse our norms and laws, while avoiding the imperative of idealism, calls for a return to agonism that reawakens the political awareness of lack and negativity in place of the technical injunction: you will enjoy! This permits a space for an inclusive acceptance of strife or agonism that does not exclude the Others’ voice attempting to articulate their desires and wants in response to the ‘irreducibility of the Real’ (Stavrakakis, 2003b: 331). Rather this re-politicization of the planning problematic from that of the technical, quantified, solution is one that values Lacan’s Real and Lefebvre’s lived space by making the ‘key “jump from quantity to quality”, from antagonisms subordinated to differences to the predominant role of antagonism’ as pure agonism (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 92). In Lefebvre’s city ‘unconscious desires and passions lay dormant, dormant beneath the surface of the real, within the surreal . . . waiting for . . . the day they can be realized in actual conscious life’ (Merrifield, 2000: 178). In this regard, rather than continuing to fill the lack generating the urban problematic and produce a largely phallic enjoyment, Stavrakakis (2003b: 332) reminds us that in Lacan’s later teachings he spoke of another form ‘of jouissance – female or feminine jouissance – which values this lack per se as something that entails a different kind of enjoyment.’ Perhaps this feminine jouissance may be more appropriate to politicize the needs and wants of lived space. Yet, to do so would require a politics that acknowledges the impossibility of the Lacanian Real. In contrast to the notion that what is meant by an utopia is an imagined ‘ideal society; what characterizes utopia is literally the construction of a u-topic space, a social space outside the existing parameters, the parameters of what appears to be “possible” in the existing social universe’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 123). This proposed utopia is one that may permit, at least aspects of Lefebvre’s ‘lived space’ of the qualitative to be both visible and articulated in conscious life. Rather than contestant cities and regions competing globally under one cultural imperative to attract and retain finite capital and resources via one ‘logic’ and vision, this article calls for a planning ethos that encourages diverse groups within cities and regions to actively contest their perspectives and desires without threat of exclusion. To achieve such a state requires planning ‘to find ways of working with agonism without automatically recurring to procedures, voting, representativity, forced consensus or compromises’ that inherently exclude (Pløger, 2004: 87). This requires a planning ethos predicated on a central awareness of the irreducible Real. This is an understanding that any forced resolution always excludes a remainder, what cannot be articulated or perceived. Further, this remainder will continue to have unconscious effect in terms of what drives our materialized actions. This suggests an overt democratic planning process, representative of a society that is explicitly and overtly hegemonic for all participants, not tacitly hegemonic in its privileging of specific groups with access to power and technocratic justification that is constituted under a logic implicitly desiring social order (Critchley, cited in Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 95). This is in contrast to the existing social reality, where political processes, such as planning, appear to strive for public participation culminating in an harmonious public consensus, when of course this is but an ideological foil that excludes in the name of a ‘general interest’ defined by a privileged few and legitimized by technocratic ‘reason’. In contrast, a strong society ‘places conflict and power at its centre’ by guaranteeing the very ‘existence of conflict’ (Flyvbjerg, 1998b: 229). Our current dominating fantasy of harmony is sustained by the illusion of continued consumer abundance produced and brought by the cornucopia of global capitalism, at least for the first world. This enjoyment of global capitalism ‘constitutes a (partial) reality with hegemonic appeal, a horizon sustained by the hegemony of an administration of desire with seemingly unlimited resources’ (Stavrakakis, 2003a: 61). Of course, resources and global carrying capacities are axiomatically finite. So perhaps must be our desires, for they can never be sated. Traversing our fundamental fantasy for harmony: a start, not a conclusion! Lacan and his followers, such as Stavrakakis, Zˇ izˇek or Zupancic, produce valid arguments for a psychoanalytically derived philosophy of reality and ideology ‘capable of theorizing the ways our deepest commitments bind us to practices of domination’ (Dean, 2001: 627). Revealing and transversing the ideological constructs that shape and structure our social reality is inadequate in itself as a mere academic critical exercise of knowledge production. This author argues that we must radically challenge our underlying beliefs for ourselves, and, in particular, not externalize them to ‘larger cultural practices and technologies’ so that hegemonic networks, or partnerships, of dominant actors, including intellectuals and bureaucratic professionals, can do our believing and desiring for us through planning and related diverse agencies of social guidance (Dean, 2001: 628). To do so we must traverse our fundamental fantasies that seek harmony and security. This article’s application of Lacan, augmented with some of Lefebvre’s urban insights, gives us a combination of Freudian and Marxist thought that is considerably at odds to that conjured up by the Frankfurt School’s vision of society as ‘a liberated collective culture’ with little space for the individual histories of unique subjects (Jameson, 2003: 8). The latter is the School, or project, drawing on Marx and Freud, which eventually created the Habermasian product of communicative rationality. This is a rationality that sought as its seldom if ever achieved ideal, to produce undistorted (ideologically free) speech acts ‘based on recognition of the corresponding validity claims of comprehensiveness, truth, truthfulness, and rightness’ constituting a basis for consensually agreement as to how we should act (Habermas, 1979: 3). Yet, as Hillier (2003) illustrates, this is an ideal of undistorted speech that is an impossibility because of the Lacanian Real and the incompleteness it always induces in language, not to mention the impossibility of absolute truth. Yet, this author would agree with Habermas’ call for the supremacy of discourse over mere technical reason. Habermas’ last two validity claims of truthfulness to our desires and the need to act in regard of what our unconscious feeling says is rightness, even if this sense is perhaps not readily justifiable with symbolic knowledge and reasoned argument, should be given due regard through our discourses. In contrast to Habermas’ validity claims of truth and comprehensiveness, Lacan’s theorizing suggests a much more fundamental contextualization of urban ideology based on the fantasies we construct to paper over the lack induced by the Real. This is a perspective that situates our very social reality, including space and social interaction, as principally constituted and composed of ideological fantasy constructs, misrecognitions and misunderstandings (see Hillier, 2003). As Jameson (2003: 37–8) observes, we owe to Lacan ‘the first new and as yet insufficiently developed concept of the nature of ideology since Marx’. Drawing on Althusser, Jameson (2003: 37–8) continues that ideology is ‘the “representation” of the Imaginary relationships of individuals to their Real conditions of existence’, so that ‘the individual subject invents a “lived” relationship with collective systems.’ This is a symbolic, materialized, relationship of practices and rituals (Krips, 2003: 149). Here, it is the desire of this Other that we fundamentally seek and wish to please as we constantly strive to return to our idealized primordial desire for infant maternal security and contentment (Hillier and Gunder, 2005). So we construct and share illusions and fantasies – ideologies – that we are somehow achieving this impossible task. It is the aggregate of these Others, and the illusions we generate about them and ourselves, that constitutes the social reality that is our lived space.
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<h4>The 1AC is an ideological fantasy constructed by relentless planning at the expense of scapegoated identities, all for recognition from the Other in an attempt to fill the lack.</h4><p><strong>Gunder 05</strong> Michael Gunder, 2005, “The Production of Desirous Space: Mere Fantasies of the Utopian City?” Planning Theory 2005 4: 173, DOI: 10.1177/1473095205054604, all brackets were in the original text,<u><strong> SJBE</p><p></u></strong>Jouissance is one of the four structuring elements of social discourse,4 or social interactions, links and relationships, where synchronic language meets diachronic speech to evoke an effect on the Other (Lacan, 2004: 3). Zupancic (2004) associates Lacan’s (2004) theory of the Four Discourses (see Gunder, 2003a, 2004; Hillier and Gunder, 2005) with the Marxian theory of commodification and surplus-value via Lacan’s concept of surplus-enjoyment (plus-de-jouir). Lacan (2004: 111) contends that surplusvalue and surplus-enjoyment are historically equivalent, especially in the situation of the Master’s injunction of ‘No!’ in the emerging early phase of Calvinistic repressive capitalism. In contrast to the historical authority and rationality of the Master’s repressive command, late capitalism is structured under a rationality of the university or bureaucracy. <u><strong>Now knowledge and technology, not the Master’s injunction, become <mark>‘agency </mark>expressing a logic of governmentality and expertise (including that of planning) that does not prohibit enjoyment, but rather channels jouissance in ways that <mark>produces</mark> a “bio-politics” (after Foucault) of an alienated subject that has no option, but to enjoy and be satisfied’ (Hillier and Gunder, 2005; McGowan, 2004; Zˇ izˇek, 2004b; Zupancic, 2004). In this regard, ‘a nation exists only as long as its specific enjoyment continues to be materialised in a set of social practices and submitted through national myths [or <mark>fantasies</mark>] that structure these practices’ (Zˇ izˇek, 1993: 202).</u></strong> This is taken further by the barely challenged international hegemonic discourse of global capitalization and the fantasies it induces in externally structuring the nation state’s very enjoyment (Stavrakakis, 2003a: 63; Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 61). Even the ruling British Labour government, with its ‘Third Way’, in contrast to its tradition of socialism, has placed ‘economic globalisation’ as ‘the most significant factor in shaping Labour Party thinking since the early 1990s’ (Allmendinger, 2003: 326). As McGowan (2004) observes: we trust fully in the staying power of global capitalism. The alternatives, which once seemed to be just around the corner, have become unimaginable today. The universe of global capitalism is, or so we think, here to stay, and we best not do anything to risk our status within it. Hence, we pledge our allegiance to it, and we put our trust in it. This is the fundamental mode of contemporary obedience to authority. Only by coming to understand this obedience to the dictates of global capitalism as obedience can we hope to break out of it. Global capitalism seems an unsurpassable horizon simply because we have not properly recognized our own investment in sustaining it. We see it as unsurpassable because we don’t want to lose it – and the imaginary satisfaction that it provides. (McGowan, 2004: 193) Illusion resides under this global fantasy of capital where ‘the basic feature of’ this dominant cultural imperative ‘no longer operates on the level of ideals and identifications, but directly on the level of regulating jouissance’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 113). Even in Lefebvre’s day, this was a capitalism where surplus-value was synonymous with surplus-enjoyment supporting the injunction: ‘you must enjoy!’. <u><strong>In this light<mark>, the role of planning is to</mark> facilitate enjoyment by sustainably <mark>provid</mark>ing <mark>the</mark> correct <mark>space</mark> – healthy, competitive, fit and attractive – <mark>where enjoyment can be</mark> effectively materialized and <mark>maximized</mark> under the imperative of global capitalism</u></strong>. Consequently: urbanism is nothing more than an ideology that claims to be either ‘art’ or ‘technology’ or ‘science’, depending on the context. This ideology pretends to be straightforward, yet it obfuscates, harbours things unsaid: which it covers, which it contains, as a form of will tending towards efficiency. Urbanism is doubly fetishistic. First, it implies the fetishism of satisfaction. What about vested interests? They must be satisfied, and therefore their needs must be understood and catered to, unchanged . . . Second, it implies the fetishism of space. Space is creation. Whoever creates space creates whatever it is that fills space. The place engenders the thing and the good place engenders good things. (Lefebvre, 2003: 159) This is exacerbated further in the current milieu of consumerist post-democracy personified by the master signifier: global capitalism. ‘Post-democracy is founded on an attempt to exclude the political awareness of lack and negativity from the political domain, leading to a political order which retains the token institutions of liberal democracy but neutralizes the centrality of political antagonism’ (Stavrakakis, 2003a: 59). <u><strong>In response to the dominant ‘logic’ of global competitiveness, the technocrats and experts including planners, shape, contextualize and implement public policy in the interest of the dominant hegemonic bloc</u></strong>. This is constructed under the logics and knowledges of university discourses (see Gunder, 2004), with an objective to remove existing or potential urban blight,‘dis-ease’ and dysfunction detracting from local enjoyment and global competitiveness (Gunder, 2005; McGuirk, 2004). Of course, the hegemonic network, or bloc, initially shapes the debate as to what constitutes desired enjoyment and what is lacking in urban competitiveness. <u><strong>In turn, this defines what is blighted and dysfunctional and in need of planning remedy</u></strong>. This is predicated on a logic, or more accurately a rhetoric, that a lack of a particular defined type of enjoyment, or competitiveness, is inherently unhealthy for the aggregate social body. Planners, programmers, and users want solutions. For what? To make people happy. To order them to be happy. It is a strange way of interpreting happiness. The science of the urban phenomenon cannot respond to these demands without the risk of validating external restrictions imposed by ideology and power. (Lefebvre, 2003: 141) <u><strong>Yet this lack and its resolution are more often technical in nature, rather than political.</u></strong> As a consequence, the technocrats in partnership with their ‘dominant stakeholders’ can ensure the impression of happiness for the many, while, not to mention, achieving the stakeholders’ specific interests. Material happiness for all but that evil other Lacanian theory suggests that a subject’s jouissance is given freest rein when an act of desire contains a dimension of transgression. It is the ‘little sin’ that gives the most pleasure; it is the prohibition as such which elevates a common everyday object into an object of desire (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 177). The bio-politics of contemporary planning are predicated on enjoyment – you will enjoy! – not the prior duality of repression/freedom of the Weberian capitalist master’s injunction: ‘No you cannot do that!’. The achievements of traditional utopian goals were ones of freedom to act against the repression of the negative injunction. <u><strong>Contemporary injunctions are to enjoy – or at least to sustain our happiness – regardless of what we actually desire. Happiness is not a class of truth, but one of an ontological class of being where: ‘happiness’ relies on the subject’s inability or unreadiness fully to confront the consequences of its desire: the price of happiness is that the subject remains stuck in the inconsistency of its desires. In our daily lives, we (pretend to) desire things which we do not really desire, so that, ultimately, the worst thing that can happen is for us to get what we ‘officially’ desire</u></strong>. Happiness is thus hypocritical: it is the happiness dreaming about things we do not really want. (Zˇ izˇek, 2002a: 59–60) <u><strong><mark>Planning</mark> continues to succeed because it <mark>underpins the</mark> primal <mark>desire</mark> of most subjects in society <mark>for </mark>a conflict-free, safe and assured happy <mark>future</mark>, even if <mark>it can only deliver </mark>this as <mark>a fantasy-scenario </mark>of material happiness<mark>, rather than </mark>as <mark>an impossible reality that </mark>actually <mark>sates </mark>all <mark>desires</mark> (Gunder, 2003a, 2003b). This is a fantasy predicated on an obedience to a shallow consumptive quantitative imperative to be materially happy, which often occurs at the expense of our actual qualitative psychic desires.</u></strong> In our contemporary global society the ‘moral law’ is no longer the imperative that acts as a limitation, stopping us from enjoying too much. Instead, the cultural imperative, the now dominant moral Law itself, in its injunction for us to enjoy becomes ‘the ultimate “transgression”’ should one wish to pursue a life of moderation (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 174). <u><strong>Further, <mark>‘the fantasy</mark> of a utopian harmonious social world <mark>can only be sustained if</mark> all the persisting <mark>disorders can be attributed to a</mark>n alien intruder . . . a certain particularity which cannot be assimilated, but instead must be eliminated’ (Stavrakakis, 1999: 108). This is the stranger, the Other that is not us that can act as the <mark>‘“scapegoat” to be stigmatised</mark> as the one who is blamed for our lack, the Evil force that stole our precious jouissance’ and stopped the fantasy from achieving its utopian vision (Stavrakakis, 2003a: 58). Even our ‘“complex” contemporary societies <mark>rely on the </mark>basic <mark>divide between included and excluded’</mark> (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 86). Zˇ izˇek (2004b: 86) continues: in any society ‘there is a multitude within the system and a multitude of those excluded, and simply to encompass them both within the scope of the same notion amounts to the same obscenity as equating starvation with dieting.’</u></strong> It is continually this Other that permits the delusion of harmony in our identity defining groups and for this to transpire we require an Other, external to the group for the group to define itself. We require a disparity, or gap, to allocate a degree of difference to an Other to conceptualize the group identification as who we are not and on this Other we can attribute all the signs of disharmony that jeopardize our shared fantasy (Zˇ izˇek, 1997: 5). Difference is essential to complete our fantasy of harmony, but only by providing the sacrificial Other on which we can blame the disappointment of the fantasy to deliver (Zˇ izˇek, 2004a: 158–9). In this light, planning,‘as part of the apparatus of the modern state, makes its own imprint, has its own powers for good and evil’ (Sandercock, 2004: 134). This is especially so as planning identifies, or at least names and legitimizes, what constitutes an urban pathology that detracts from what is desirous of the globally competitive city. Planning then sets out to remedy this lack or deficiency. Civil society, i.e. the public stage, and media of information dissemination are central to this process. Of course, our media are not ideologically neutral. As a consequence, media access for putting forth particular tropes of desire constitutes a central component of social, as well as economic, capital. This is well documented by Flyvbjerg (1998a) where the Aalborg Chamber of Commerce controlled the editorial content of the local newspaper. This argument is central to that of Chomsky’s (2003) multinational corporate steering of mass media content in the, so-called, ‘free’ press. This is where the mass media are free to publish almost anything, provided, of course, they do not alienate their corporate clients who provide their majority of income and profits via their advertising payments. Gunder (2003b) documented how planning actors and their affiliated partners gained public agreement via the rhetorical use of culturally shared ‘master signifiers’ and their related metonymies and metaphors. Here each signifier was linked to associations in the public’s unconscious that induced a conscious expression of desire for a particular set of values or specific consequential actions. Effective deployment of rhetorical tropes can seduce subjects ‘to relinquish previous desires (including identifications and embrace new ones) – or alternatively, to invest all the more completely in old ones’ (Bracher, 1993: 51–2). For example, does anyone wish to live in a city that is losing enjoyment to other locations because it lacks the fitness to compete? In Lacan, the construction of reality is continuous with the field of desire. Desire and reality are intimately connected . . . The nature of their link can only be revealed in fantasy . . . when harmony is not present it has to be somehow introduced in order for our reality to be coherent. It has to be introduced through a fantasmatic social construction. (Stavrakakis, 1999: 62–3) This is where, from a Lacanian outlook, by accepting rationalization as the means to fulfil a desire for completeness – via the utilization of falsifying words – ‘man does not adapt himself to reality; he adapts reality to himself’ (Roudinesco, 1997: 114). <u><strong><mark>Ideological fantasies</mark> as to what constitutes an enjoyable and satisfying city are deployed to <mark>hide the dysfunctions</mark> and unpredictabilities that are <mark>ubiquitous throughout</mark> all <mark>social spheres</mark>, particularly for those lacking in sufficient capital to offset adversity.</u></strong> Social reality ‘is sustained by the “as if”, the fantasy of what things are like’ (Dean, 2001: 627). Rationalization, or realrationalität as Flyvbjerg (1998a) calls it, exists between the everyday activities of social life and the held universal ideals or values of what ought to be, even if it is not so, in social reality. The belief that planning is not political, but technical ‘allows the myths of objectivity, value neutrality, and technical reason to persist, and thereby fosters a certain delusion about planning practice’ (Sandercock, 2004: 134). Sandercock (2004: 134) continues: planning ‘helps to redefine political debate, producing new sources of power and legitimacy, changing the force field in which we operate’. Lefebvre suggests that planning is based on a strategy of mixing scientificity and rationality with ideology. ‘Here, as elsewhere, scientificity is an ideology, an excrescence grafted onto real, but fragmentary, knowledge’ (Lefebvre, 2003: 166). In particular, Lefebvre argues that quantitative expertise including the technology of urban planning is largely a myth. This is because planning administrators: and bad administrators at that, rarely use much actual technology. However, they have the ability to persuade the people as a whole that because these are technological decisions they should be accepted. In other words, a large part of Lefebvre’s criticism [of planners] is not that technocrats are technocrats, but that they are precisely the opposite. Technology should be put to the service of everyday life, of social life rather than being precisely the condition of its suppression and control. Urbanism, for example, is an ideology that operates under the cover of this myth of technology. (Elden, 2004: 145) Social reality can only exist in the symbolic and imaginary registries as it is composed, that is constructed, as a ‘result of a certain historically specific set of discursive practices and power mechanisms’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2001: 66). Flyvbjerg (1998a) illustrates this well in his exposé of the Aalborg Chamber of Commerce’s intervention in that city’s planning process. Here this grouping of dominant business people is given hegemonic voice to determine what constitutes acceptable transportation modes and spatial development in Aalborg’s town centre. In this example the planner’s technical facts, by themselves, produced the weaker argument. This was perhaps because the dissemination of these facts and their implications for planning action were ineffectively articulated to the public, if at all, via the local information media controlled by the Chamber of Commerce. In contrast, in Sydney, McGuirk (2004) documented how planners actively participated in and facilitated the dominant network of actors successfully pushing for a series of local, regional and national policies supporting Sydney’s global competitiveness. It appeared to be of little consequence that these policies induced adverse effects on the rest of the country, not to mention many of Sydney’s residents. Not dissimilarly, the Auckland case cited in the introduction illustrates how the planners actively consulted the dominant commercial stakeholders in developing their growth strategy, yet failed to have direct consultation with the Region’s actual residents (ARGF, 1999; Gunder, 2003a). Planners and their governance forum of dominant stakeholders appeared to inherently know what is in the best interests of their region’s residents. Planning as agonistic ethics Notwithstanding the ‘full rendering of the antagonisms which traverse our society, we indulge in the notion of society as an organic whole, kept together by forces of solidarity and co-operation’ (Zˇ izˇek, 1997: 6). Planning is one such instrument that shapes and justifies the governing ideals of utopian desire and in this ‘sphere, the fantasmatic ideal of harmony is dominant’ (Stavrakakis, 1999: 110). The subtle and not so subtle application of power defines truth, reason and rationality and this particularly comprises the deployment of power in our planning and related practices (Flyvbjerg, 1998a). Moreover, a Lacanian line of reasoning about knowledge and truth indicates that the constituting components of these induced fantasies of truth and rationality are mediated on the wants and needs of actors with the capacity to inflict their desires and wants on the Other and, as if, these desires belong to those who have been imposed on. This is via assertions of unquestionable ‘truth’, which are often supported and empowered by selected ‘distorted’ knowledge, practices and language put forward by their ideological supporters, employed professional experts and controlled media. Further, in this light traditional Kantian and related enlightenment ‘ethics is nothing more than a convenient tool for any ideology that tries to pass off its own commandments as authentic, spontaneous, and “honorable” inclinations of the subject’ (Zupancic, 1998: 41). In contrast to traditional ethics, Lacan’s (1992) theorizing may provide an alternative way to develop new values beyond those already constituted by society as traditional morals of good or evil shaping acceptable behaviours. Traditional ethics is predicated on a reality principle as to what is possible without transgression in social reality. As Zupancic (2003: 77) observes, this ‘reality principle itself is ideologically mediated; one could even claim that it constitutes the highest form of ideology, the ideology that presents itself as empirical factor or (biological, economic . . .) necessity.’ This ‘beyond good or evil’ does not have to lead to postmodern nihilism, rather Lacan lays a groundwork for an ethics of the Real, where through acknowledgement of this Real that we cannot know or articulate we can establish new ‘truths’ in relationship to the ‘good’ (Stavrakakis, 2003b; Zupancic, 2000, 2003). This is through a mechanism of ethical sublimation where we create ‘a certain space, scene, or “stage” that enables us to value something that is situated beyond the reality principle, as well as beyond the principle of common good’ (Zupancic, 2003: 78). It is the space, or stage, created when the planner, or other actor, makes the ethical decision to recommend an action or permission that is contrary to existing regulations, precedence, professional expectations, or cultural imperatives. This is perhaps because somehow for the planner, perhaps simply driven by strong feelings, the ‘correct’ and expected action is perceived as not being the right thing to do. From the Lacanian perspective of the ethics of the Real, to make the sensed wrong into a rightness is the ethically correct task, even if this requires the agent to act against what he/she thinks society expects of that actor. This act of transcending the reality principle, and being true to the actor’s desires,5 makes possible a new good, a new potential, it changes the rules as to what is possible (Gunder and Hillier, 2004: 230). ‘The ethical, then, is the constellation of events in which the subject frees herself from the symbolic law (“freedom”), commits herself to an act (“agency”), and thereby makes it possible for the law to be rethought’ (Kay, 2003: 109). The ethical ‘act is an “excessive”, trans-strategic intervention which redefines the rules and contours of the existing order’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 81). Viewed from this perspective, Kant’s categorical imperative must be rethought itself as purely transgressive: the ethical act proper is a transgression of the legal norm – a transgression which, in contrast to a simple criminal violation, does not simply violate the legal norm, but redefines what is a legal norm. The moral law does not follow the Good – it generates a new shape of what counts as ‘Good’. (Zˇ izˇek, 2001: 170) This is a transgression that introduces new spaces for what can be considered ‘good’ and hence a wider space for jouissance, beyond that of mere technically produced materialist satisfaction. Of course, a key question becomes: how can a credible planner, or other actor, transcend the accepted norms and expectations of a society to create a new space for a new concept of ‘good’? Further, how can one effectively and reasonably mobilize such an ethics of the Real in everyday life when it is so contrary to the consensual instrumental rationality of the modern project and its ready-made solutions, that are, arguably planning’s purpose and foundations? Planning theorists (e.g. Gunder and Hillier, 2004; Pløger, 2004) and researchers in other disciplines (e.g. Mouffe, 1999, 2000; Stavrakakis, 2003a; Thrift, 2004a, 2004b) are currently attempting to address these complex issues that essentially require new insight and perhaps even profound change in our very relationships towards social reality, itself. Further, they are attempting to do so in a manner that does not simply impose a new intransigent set of ideals to replace our late-modern cultural imperatives, but rather to encourage diverse opportunities for multiple opening in which imminence may continually occur (after Deleuze). Coherent and implementable means to achieve this desired state are yet to emerge as new knowledges and practices, if they can ever do so. Yet, this author suggests that mere awareness and articulation of the impossible implications that the Lacanian Real has on traditional rationality are perhaps one of many points of commencement. Of course, this discourse also may fall into the trap leading to transcendental idealism, i.e. a process of identifying a lack, or void, in our knowledge and practices and then presenting a hegemonic solution that must be implemented, regardless of effect and affect! This author suggests that to change social reality, to begin to question and where necessary traverse our norms and laws, while avoiding the imperative of idealism, calls for a return to agonism that reawakens the political awareness of lack and negativity in place of the technical injunction: you will enjoy! This permits a space for an inclusive acceptance of strife or agonism that does not exclude the Others’ voice attempting to articulate their desires and wants in response to the ‘irreducibility of the Real’ (Stavrakakis, 2003b: 331). Rather this re-politicization of the planning problematic from that of the technical, quantified, solution is one that values Lacan’s Real and Lefebvre’s lived space by making the ‘key “jump from quantity to quality”, from antagonisms subordinated to differences to the predominant role of antagonism’ as pure agonism (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 92). In Lefebvre’s city ‘unconscious desires and passions lay dormant, dormant beneath the surface of the real, within the surreal . . . waiting for . . . the day they can be realized in actual conscious life’ (Merrifield, 2000: 178). In this regard, rather than continuing to fill the lack generating the urban problematic and produce a largely phallic enjoyment, Stavrakakis (2003b: 332) reminds us that in Lacan’s later teachings he spoke of another form ‘of jouissance – female or feminine jouissance – which values this lack per se as something that entails a different kind of enjoyment.’ Perhaps this feminine jouissance may be more appropriate to politicize the needs and wants of lived space. Yet, to do so would require a politics that acknowledges the impossibility of the Lacanian Real. In contrast to the notion that what is meant by an utopia is an imagined ‘ideal society; what characterizes utopia is literally the construction of a u-topic space, a social space outside the existing parameters, the parameters of what appears to be “possible” in the existing social universe’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 123). This proposed utopia is one that may permit, at least aspects of Lefebvre’s ‘lived space’ of the qualitative to be both visible and articulated in conscious life. Rather than contestant cities and regions competing globally under one cultural imperative to attract and retain finite capital and resources via one ‘logic’ and vision, this article calls for a planning ethos that encourages diverse groups within cities and regions to actively contest their perspectives and desires without threat of exclusion. To achieve such a state requires planning ‘to find ways of working with agonism without automatically recurring to procedures, voting, representativity, forced consensus or compromises’ that inherently exclude (Pløger, 2004: 87). This requires a planning ethos predicated on a central awareness of the irreducible Real. This is an understanding that any forced resolution always excludes a remainder, what cannot be articulated or perceived. Further, this remainder will continue to have unconscious effect in terms of what drives our materialized actions. This suggests an overt democratic planning process, representative of a society that is explicitly and overtly hegemonic for all participants, not tacitly hegemonic in its privileging of specific groups with access to power and technocratic justification that is constituted under a logic implicitly desiring social order (Critchley, cited in Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 95). <u><strong>This is in contrast to the existing social reality, where political processes, such as planning, appear to strive for public participation culminating in an harmonious public consensus, when of course this is but an ideological foil that excludes in the name of a ‘general interest’ defined by a privileged few and legitimized by technocratic ‘reason’.</u></strong> In contrast, a strong society ‘places conflict and power at its centre’ by guaranteeing the very ‘existence of conflict’ (Flyvbjerg, 1998b: 229). Our current dominating fantasy of harmony is sustained by the illusion of continued consumer abundance produced and brought by the cornucopia of global capitalism, at least for the first world. This enjoyment of global capitalism ‘constitutes a (partial) reality with hegemonic appeal, a horizon sustained by the hegemony of an administration of desire with seemingly unlimited resources’ (Stavrakakis, 2003a: 61). Of course, resources and global carrying capacities are axiomatically finite. So perhaps must be our desires, for they can never be sated. Traversing our fundamental fantasy for harmony: a start, not a conclusion! Lacan and his followers, such as Stavrakakis, Zˇ izˇek or Zupancic, produce valid arguments for a psychoanalytically derived philosophy of reality and ideology ‘capable of theorizing the ways our deepest commitments bind us to practices of domination’ (Dean, 2001: 627). Revealing and transversing the ideological constructs that shape and structure our social reality is inadequate in itself as a mere academic critical exercise of knowledge production. This author argues that we must radically challenge our underlying beliefs for ourselves, and, in particular, not externalize them to ‘larger cultural practices and technologies’ so that hegemonic networks, or partnerships, of dominant actors, including intellectuals and bureaucratic professionals, can do our believing and desiring for us through planning and related diverse agencies of social guidance (Dean, 2001: 628). To do so we must traverse our fundamental fantasies that seek harmony and security. This article’s application of Lacan, augmented with some of Lefebvre’s urban insights, gives us a combination of Freudian and Marxist thought that is considerably at odds to that conjured up by the Frankfurt School’s vision of society as ‘a liberated collective culture’ with little space for the individual histories of unique subjects (Jameson, 2003: 8). The latter is the School, or project, drawing on Marx and Freud, which eventually created the Habermasian product of communicative rationality. This is a rationality that sought as its seldom if ever achieved ideal, to produce undistorted (ideologically free) speech acts ‘based on recognition of the corresponding validity claims of comprehensiveness, truth, truthfulness, and rightness’ constituting a basis for consensually agreement as to how we should act (Habermas, 1979: 3). Yet, as Hillier (2003) illustrates, this is an ideal of undistorted speech that is an impossibility because of the Lacanian Real and the incompleteness it always induces in language, not to mention the impossibility of absolute truth. Yet, this author would agree with Habermas’ call for the supremacy of discourse over mere technical reason. Habermas’ last two validity claims of truthfulness to our desires and the need to act in regard of what our unconscious feeling says is rightness, even if this sense is perhaps not readily justifiable with symbolic knowledge and reasoned argument, should be given due regard through our discourses. In contrast to Habermas’ validity claims of truth and comprehensiveness, Lacan’s theorizing suggests a much more fundamental contextualization of urban ideology based on the fantasies we construct to paper over the lack induced by the Real. <u><strong>This is a perspective that situates our very social reality, including space and social interaction, as principally constituted and composed of ideological fantasy constructs, misrecognitions and misunderstandings (see Hillier, 2003).</u></strong> As Jameson (2003: 37–8) observes, we owe to Lacan ‘the first new and as yet insufficiently developed concept of the nature of ideology since Marx’. Drawing on Althusser, Jameson (2003: 37–8) continues that ideology is ‘the “representation” of the Imaginary relationships of individuals to their Real conditions of existence’, so that ‘the individual subject invents a “lived” relationship with collective systems.’ This is a symbolic, materialized, relationship of practices and rituals (Krips, 2003: 149). <u><strong>Here, <mark>it is the desire of this Other that</mark> <mark>we</mark> fundamentally seek and <mark>wish to please</mark> as we constantly strive to return to our idealized primordial desire for infant maternal security and contentment (Hillier and Gunder, 2005). <mark>So we construct and share </mark>illusions and <mark>fantasies</mark> – ideologies – <mark>that we are </mark>somehow <mark>achieving this</mark> impossible <mark>task</mark>. It is the aggregate <mark>of</mark> these Others, and the illusions we generate about them and ourselves, that constitutes the <mark>social reality</mark> that is our lived space.</p></u></strong>
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2 – Anticipating nuclear extinction breeds empathy and care – distancing ourselves from considering extinction reifies detached elitism
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Offord, 17
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Offord, 17—Faculty of Humanities, School of Humanities Research and Graduate Studies, Bentley Campus (Baden, “BEYOND OUR NUCLEAR ENTANGLEMENT,” Angelaki, 22:3, 17-25, dml) [ableist language modifications denoted by brackets]
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You are steered towards overwhelming and inexplicable pain when you consider the nuclear entanglement that the species finds itself in the fact of living in the nuclear age presents an existential, aesthetic, ethical and psychological challenge that defines human consciousness. Although an immanent threat and ever-present danger to the very existence of the human species, living with the possibility of nuclear war has infiltrated the matrix of modernity so profoundly as to [shut down] our mind-set to respond adequately. We have chosen to ignore the facts at the heart of the nuclear program we have chosen to live with the capacity and possibility of a collective, pervasive and even planetary-scale suicide; and the techno-industrial-national powers that claim there is “no immediate danger” ad infinitum The question of our times is whether we have an equal or more compelling capacity and willingness to end this impoverished but ever-present logic of pain and uncertainty. How not simply to bring about disarmament, but to go beyond this politically charged nuclear algorithm? responding to the nuclear algorithm is an imperative. Your politics, ethics and scholarship are indivisible in this cause. An acute sense of care for the world, informed by pacifist and non-violent, de-colonialist approaches to knowledge and practice, pervades your concern. You are aware that there are other ways of knowing than those you are familiar and credentialed with You use your scholarship to shake up the world to unsettle the epistemic and structural violence that is ubiquitous to neoliberalism and its machinery; to create dialogic and learning spaces for the work of critical human rights and critical justice to take place. All this, and to enable an ethics of intervention through understanding what is at the very heart of the impulse living in a nuclear armed world, your challenge is to reconceptualise the human community to see how we can learn to co-exist with others in conviviality and also learn to co-survive with the non-human, even to flourish the planet itself is inherently involved as a participant in its future you realise that your struggle is not confined to legislation, and law, though they have their role. It must go further to produce “creative intellectual exchange that might release new ethical energies for mutually assured survival.” Taking an anti-nuclear stance and enabling a post-nuclear activism demands a revolution Recognising the entanglement of nuclearism requires a profound shift in focus from the human-centric to a more-than-human co-survival. In the end, you realise “it is not realistic to toil for peace if we do not proceed to a disarmament of the bellicose culture in which we live.” what makes the nuclear algorithm work involves a politically engineered and deeply embedded insecurity-based recipe to elide the nuclear threat from everyday life. The spectre of nuclear obliteration can appear abstract and distant, not our everyday business within this recipe is the creation of a moral tyranny of distance, an abnegation of myself with the other. One of modernity's greatest and earliest achievements was the mediation of the self with the world. How this became a project assisted and shaped through the military-industrial-technological-capitalist complex is fraught and hard to untangle. But as a critical scholar you have come to see through that complex, and you put energies into challenging that tyranny of distance, to activate a politics, ethics and scholarship that recognises the other as integral to yourself
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when you consider the nuclear existential ethical challenge the matrix of modernity shut down our mind-set to respond We have chosen to ignore the facts to live with the possibility of planetary-scale suicide The question is whether we have capacity to end this logic responding is an imperative sense of care informed by pacifist and non-violent, de-colonialist approaches pervades your concern use scholarship to unsettle violence reconceptualise the human community to see how we can learn to co-survive struggle produce “creative intellectual exchange that release new ethical energies for survival an anti-nuclear stance and post-nuclear activism requires shift in focus nuclear obliteration can appear abstract not our business this is the creation of a moral tyranny of distance you have to see through that and put energies into challenging that tyranny of distance
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You are steered towards overwhelming and inexplicable pain when you consider the nuclear entanglement that the species Homo sapiens finds itself in. This is because the fact of living in the nuclear age presents an existential, aesthetic, ethical and psychological challenge that defines human consciousness. Although an immanent threat and ever-present danger to the very existence of the human species, living with the possibility of nuclear war has infiltrated the matrix of modernity so profoundly as to paralyse [shut down] our mind-set to respond adequately. We have chosen to ignore the facts at the heart of the nuclear program with its dangerous algorithm; we have chosen to live with the capacity and possibility of a collective, pervasive and even planetary-scale suicide; and the techno-industrial-national powers that claim there is “no immediate danger” ad infinitum.8 This has led to one of the key logics of modernity's insanity. As Harari writes: “Nuclear weapons have turned war between superpowers into a mad act of collective suicide, and therefore forced the most powerful nations on earth to find alternative and peaceful ways to resolve conflicts.”9 This is the nuclear algorithm at work, a methodology of madness. In revisiting Jacques Derrida in “No Apocalypse, Not Now (Full Speed Ahead, Seven Missiles, Seven Missives),”10 who described nuclear war as a “non-event,” it is clear that the pathology of the “non-event” remains as active as ever even in the time of Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un with their stichomythic nuclear posturing. The question of our times is whether we have an equal or more compelling capacity and willingness to end this impoverished but ever-present logic of pain and uncertainty. How not simply to bring about disarmament, but to go beyond this politically charged, as well as mythological and psychological nuclear algorithm? How to find love amidst the nuclear entanglement; the antidote to this entanglement? Is it possible to end the pathology of power that exists with nuclear capacity? Sadly, the last lines of Nitin Sawhney's “Broken Skin” underscore this entanglement: Just 5 miles from India's nuclear test site Children play in the shade of the village water tank Here in the Rajasthan desert people say They're proud their country showed their nuclear capability.11 As an activist scholar working in the fields of human rights and cultural studies, responding to the nuclear algorithm is an imperative. Your politics, ethics and scholarship are indivisible in this cause. An acute sense of care for the world, informed by pacifist and non-violent, de-colonialist approaches to knowledge and practice, pervades your concern. You are aware that there are other ways of knowing than those you are familiar and credentialed with. You are aware that you are complicit in the prisons that you choose to live inside,12 and that there is no such thing as an innocent bystander. You use your scholarship to shake up the world from its paralysis, abjection and amnesia; to unsettle the epistemic and structural violence that is ubiquitous to neoliberalism and its machinery; to create dialogic and learning spaces for the work of critical human rights and critical justice to take place. All this, and to enable an ethics of intervention through understanding what is at the very heart of the critical human rights impulse, creating a “dialogue for being, because I am not without the other.”13 Furthermore, as a critical human rights advocate living in a nuclear armed world, your challenge is to reconceptualise the human community as Ashis Nandy has argued, to see how we can learn to co-exist with others in conviviality and also learn to co-survive with the non-human, even to flourish. A dialogue for being requires a leap into a human rights frame that includes a deep ecological dimension, where the planet itself is inherently involved as a participant in its future. This requires scholarship that “thinks like a mountain.”14 A critical human rights approach understands that it cannot be simply human-centric. It requires a nuanced and arresting clarity to present perspectives on co-existence and co-survival that are from human and non-human viewpoints.15 Ultimately, you realise that your struggle is not confined to declarations, treaties, legislation, and law, though they have their role. It must go further to produce “creative intellectual exchange that might release new ethical energies for mutually assured survival.”16 Taking an anti-nuclear stance and enabling a post-nuclear activism demands a revolution within the field of human rights work. Recognising the entanglement of nuclearism with the Anthropocene, for one thing, requires a profound shift in focus from the human-centric to a more-than-human co-survival. It also requires a fundamental shift in understanding our human culture, in which the very epistemic and rational acts of sundering from co-survival with the planet and environment takes place. In the end, you realise, as Raimon Panikkar has articulated, “it is not realistic to toil for peace if we do not proceed to a disarmament of the bellicose culture in which we live.”17 Or, as Geshe Lhakdor suggests, there must be “inner disarmament for external disarmament.”18 In this sense, it is within the cultural arena, our human society, where the entanglement of subjective meaning making, nature and politics occurs, that we need to disarm. It is 1982, and you are reading Jonathan Schell's The Fate of the Earth on a Sydney bus. Sleeping has not been easy over the past few nights as you reluctantly but compulsively read about the consequences of nuclear war. For some critics, Schell's account is high polemic, but for you it is more like Rabindranath Tagore: it expresses the suffering we make for ourselves. What you find noteworthy is that although Schell's scenario of widespread destruction of the planet through nuclear weaponry, of immeasurable harm to the bio-sphere through radiation, is powerfully laid out, the horror and scale of nuclear obliteration also seems surreal and far away as the bus makes its way through the suburban streets. A few years later, you read a statement from an interview with Paul Tibbets, the pilot of “Enola Gay,” the plane that bombed Hiroshima. He says, “The morality of dropping that bomb was not my business.”19 This abstraction from moral responsibility – the denial of the implications on human life and the consequences of engagement through the machinery of war – together with the sweeping amnesia that came afterwards from thinking about the bombing of Hiroshima, are what make you become an environmental and human rights activist. You realise that what makes the nuclear algorithm work involves a politically engineered and deeply embedded insecurity-based recipe to elide the nuclear threat from everyday life. The spectre of nuclear obliteration, like the idea of human rights, can appear abstract and distant, not our everyday business. You realise that within this recipe is the creation of a moral tyranny of distance, an abnegation of myself with the other. One of modernity's greatest and earliest achievements was the mediation of the self with the world. How this became a project assisted and shaped through the military-industrial-technological-capitalist complex is fraught and hard to untangle. But as a critical human rights scholar you have come to see through that complex, and you put energies into challenging that tyranny of distance, to activate a politics, ethics and scholarship that recognises the other as integral to yourself. Ultimately, even, to see that the other is also within.20
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<h4>2 – Anticipating nuclear extinction <u>breeds empathy</u> and <u>care</u> – distancing ourselves from considering extinction <u>reifies</u> detached elitism</h4><p><strong>Offord, 17</strong>—Faculty of Humanities, School of Humanities Research and Graduate Studies, Bentley Campus (Baden, “BEYOND OUR NUCLEAR ENTANGLEMENT,” Angelaki, 22:3, 17-25, dml) [ableist language modifications denoted by brackets]</p><p><u>You are steered towards <strong>overwhelming</strong> and <strong>inexplicable pain</strong> <mark>when you consider </mark>the <strong>nuclear entanglement</strong> that the species</u> Homo sapiens <u>finds itself in</u>. This is because <u>the fact of living in <mark>the nuclear </mark>age presents an <strong><mark>existential</strong></mark>, <strong>aesthetic</strong>, <strong><mark>ethical</strong></mark> and <strong>psychological <mark>challenge</strong></mark> that defines human consciousness. Although an <strong>immanent threat</strong> and <strong>ever-present danger</strong> to the <strong>very existence</strong> of the human species, living with the possibility of nuclear war has <strong>infiltrated <mark>the matrix of modernity</mark> so profoundly</strong> as to</u> paralyse <u>[<strong><mark>shut down</strong></mark>] <mark>our mind-set to respond</mark> adequately. <mark>We have chosen to <strong>ignore the facts</strong></mark> at the heart of the nuclear program</u> with its dangerous algorithm; <u>we have chosen <mark>to <strong>live with the </mark>capacity</strong> and <strong><mark>possibility</strong> of</mark> a <strong>collective</strong>, <strong>pervasive</strong> and even <strong><mark>planetary-scale suicide</strong></mark>; and the techno-industrial-national powers that claim there is “<strong>no immediate danger</strong>” ad infinitum</u>.8 This has led to one of the key logics of modernity's insanity. As Harari writes: “Nuclear weapons have turned war between superpowers into a mad act of collective suicide, and therefore forced the most powerful nations on earth to find alternative and peaceful ways to resolve conflicts.”9 This is the nuclear algorithm at work, a methodology of madness. In revisiting Jacques Derrida in “No Apocalypse, Not Now (Full Speed Ahead, Seven Missiles, Seven Missives),”10 who described nuclear war as a “non-event,” it is clear that the pathology of the “non-event” remains as active as ever even in the time of Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un with their stichomythic nuclear posturing. <u><mark>The question</mark> of our times <mark>is whether we have</mark> an <strong>equal</strong> or <strong>more compelling <mark>capacity</strong></mark> and <strong>willingness</strong> <mark>to <strong>end this</mark> impoverished but ever-present <mark>logic</strong></mark> of pain and uncertainty. How not simply to <strong>bring about disarmament</strong>, but to <strong>go beyond</strong> this politically charged</u>, as well as mythological and psychological <u><strong>nuclear algorithm</strong>?</u> How to find love amidst the nuclear entanglement; the antidote to this entanglement? Is it possible to end the pathology of power that exists with nuclear capacity? Sadly, the last lines of Nitin Sawhney's “Broken Skin” underscore this entanglement: Just 5 miles from India's nuclear test site Children play in the shade of the village water tank Here in the Rajasthan desert people say They're proud their country showed their nuclear capability.11 As an activist scholar working in the fields of human rights and cultural studies, <u><mark>responding </mark>to the nuclear algorithm <mark>is an <strong>imperative</strong></mark>. Your <strong>politics</strong>, <strong>ethics</strong> and <strong>scholarship are indivisible</strong> in this cause. An <strong>acute <mark>sense of care</mark> for the world</strong>, <mark>informed by <strong>pacifist</strong> and <strong>non-violent</strong>, <strong>de-colonialist approaches</strong></mark> to knowledge and practice, <strong><mark>pervades your concern</strong></mark>. You are <strong>aware</strong> that there are <strong>other ways of knowing</strong> than those you are familiar and credentialed with</u>. You are aware that you are complicit in the prisons that you choose to live inside,12 and that there is no such thing as an innocent bystander. <u>You <mark>use</mark> your <mark>scholarship to <strong></mark>shake up the world</u></strong> from its paralysis, abjection and amnesia; <u>to <strong><mark>unsettle </mark>the epistemic</strong> and <strong>structural <mark>violence</strong></mark> that is ubiquitous to neoliberalism and its machinery; to <strong>create dialogic</strong> and <strong>learning spaces</strong> for the work of critical human rights and critical justice to take place. All this, and to <strong>enable an ethics of intervention</strong> through understanding what is at the very heart of the</u> critical human rights <u>impulse</u>, creating a “dialogue for being, because I am not without the other.”13 Furthermore, as a critical human rights advocate <u>living in a nuclear armed world, your challenge is to <strong><mark>reconceptualise the human community</u></strong></mark> as Ashis Nandy has argued, <u><mark>to see how we can learn to <strong></mark>co-exist with others in conviviality</strong> and also learn to <strong><mark>co-survive </mark>with the non-human</strong>, even to <strong>flourish</u></strong>. A dialogue for being requires a leap into a human rights frame that includes a deep ecological dimension, where <u>the planet itself is <strong>inherently involved as a participant</strong> in its future</u>. This requires scholarship that “thinks like a mountain.”14 A critical human rights approach understands that it cannot be simply human-centric. It requires a nuanced and arresting clarity to present perspectives on co-existence and co-survival that are from human and non-human viewpoints.15 Ultimately, <u>you realise that your <mark>struggle</mark> is <strong>not confined to</u></strong> declarations, treaties, <u><strong>legislation</strong>, and <strong>law</strong>, <strong>though they have their role</strong>. It must go further to <mark>produce “<strong>creative intellectual exchange</strong></mark> <mark>that</mark> might <mark>release <strong>new ethical energies for </mark>mutually assured <mark>survival</strong></mark>.”</u>16 <u>Taking <mark>an <strong>anti-nuclear stance</strong></mark> <mark>and</mark> <strong>enabling a <mark>post-nuclear activism</strong></mark> demands a <strong>revolution</u></strong> within the field of human rights work. <u>Recognising the <strong>entanglement of nuclearism</u></strong> with the Anthropocene, for one thing, <u><strong><mark>requires</mark> a profound <mark>shift in focus</strong></mark> from the <strong>human-centric</strong> to a <strong>more-than-human co-survival</strong>.</u> It also requires a fundamental shift in understanding our human culture, in which the very epistemic and rational acts of sundering from co-survival with the planet and environment takes place. <u>In the end, you realise</u>, as Raimon Panikkar has articulated, <u>“it is not realistic to toil for peace if we do not proceed to a disarmament of the bellicose culture in which we live.”</u>17 Or, as Geshe Lhakdor suggests, there must be “inner disarmament for external disarmament.”18 In this sense, it is within the cultural arena, our human society, where the entanglement of subjective meaning making, nature and politics occurs, that we need to disarm. It is 1982, and you are reading Jonathan Schell's The Fate of the Earth on a Sydney bus. Sleeping has not been easy over the past few nights as you reluctantly but compulsively read about the consequences of nuclear war. For some critics, Schell's account is high polemic, but for you it is more like Rabindranath Tagore: it expresses the suffering we make for ourselves. What you find noteworthy is that although Schell's scenario of widespread destruction of the planet through nuclear weaponry, of immeasurable harm to the bio-sphere through radiation, is powerfully laid out, the horror and scale of nuclear obliteration also seems surreal and far away as the bus makes its way through the suburban streets. A few years later, you read a statement from an interview with Paul Tibbets, the pilot of “Enola Gay,” the plane that bombed Hiroshima. He says, “The morality of dropping that bomb was not my business.”19 This abstraction from moral responsibility – the denial of the implications on human life and the consequences of engagement through the machinery of war – together with the sweeping amnesia that came afterwards from thinking about the bombing of Hiroshima, are what make you become an environmental and human rights activist. You realise that <u>what <strong>makes the nuclear algorithm work</strong> involves a politically engineered and deeply embedded insecurity-based recipe to <strong>elide the nuclear threat from everyday life</strong>. The spectre of <mark>nuclear obliteration</u></mark>, like the idea of human rights, <u><mark>can appear <strong>abstract</strong></mark> and <strong>distant</strong>, <strong><mark>not our</mark> everyday <mark>business</u></strong></mark>. You realise that <u>within <mark>this </mark>recipe <mark>is the creation of a <strong>moral tyranny of distance</strong></mark>, an abnegation of myself with the other. One of modernity's greatest and earliest achievements was the mediation of the self with the world. How this became a project assisted and shaped through the military-industrial-technological-capitalist complex is fraught and hard to untangle. But as a critical</u> human rights <u>scholar <mark>you have </mark>come <mark>to <strong>see through that </mark>complex</strong>, <mark>and</mark> you <mark>put energies into <strong>challenging that tyranny of distance</strong></mark>, to activate a <strong>politics</strong>, <strong>ethics</strong> and <strong>scholarship that recognises the other as integral to yourself</u></strong>. Ultimately, even, to see that the other is also within.20</p>
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Sokolsky says it’s fears of US “regime change” that cause increased elite pressure [KU is blue]
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Sokolsky 17
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Sokolsky 17—(nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, MA in IR from Johns Hopkins). Sokolsky, Richard D. 2017. The New NATO-Russia Military Balance: Implications for European Security. Vol. 13. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
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Political Considerations are subject to rapid and sometimes unpredictable change. the Kremlin would prefer to have the Baltic s in its sphere of influence instead of having NATO troops within 100 miles of St. Petersburg. However, the past decade suggests the Kremlin is sensitive to the costs of its actions and respect NATO’s security guarantee. they have shown great capacity to judge when the costs of their belligerence are too high. They have walked up to NATO’s red lines, but they have not crossed them. The wars in Georgia and Ukraine were fought against much weaker adversaries without a NATO security guarantee. Putin’s propensity to wage war against NATO and intentions toward the Baltic states cannot be made on the basis of Georgia and Ukraine or Syria. actions in Ukraine are indicative of how seriously the Kremlin views NATO . Moscow’s annexation of Crimea and aggression in Ukraine were calculated steps to prevent Ukraine advancing toward NATO — a major strategic setback for Russia . it would be hard for Moscow to replicate the favorable circumstances in the Baltic region Russia enjoyed in Crimea. the Baltic states are already in NATO. An outright military assault on them would risk an all-out war with NATO. decision to go to war against NATO would be political . The Russian elite’s paramount concern is has a deepseated fear of political instability and U.S. designs for regime change. As Putin’s advisers put it, “The Americans are trying to . . . cause regime change in Russia via events in Ukraine.” It would be extremely risky for the Kremlin to the most powerful military alliance in the world . Putin’s decision to launch a conventional war against NATO would involve weigh political objectives against costs and risks of military action. There is room for Putin to miscalculate . But he is likely to conclude Russia would eventually face the full weight of NATO military in response to a Russian attack— based on his judgment that NATO leaders and the U.S. president would not want to suffer the consequences if the alliance fail to deliver on its security guarantee—the end of the alliance and a dramatic blow to the political fortunes of NATO leaders. Russia enjoys favorable geography and a numerical advantage over NATO in manpower in an initial military attack against the Baltic states.
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the Kremlin is sensitive to NATO’s security guarantee. They walked up to red lines, but not crossed . Georgia and Ukraine were without a guarantee. Putin’s propensity to wage war against NATO cannot be made on the basis of Georgia Ukraine or Syria. decision to war against NATO would be political The Russian elite’s paramount concern is fear of instability and U.S. designs for regime change via Ukraine.” Putin’s decision would weighi political objectives against costs . There is room to miscalculate But he conclude Russia would eventually face the full weight of NATO — based on his judgment that NATO would not want to fail on its security guarantee .
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Political Considerations Intentions, not just capabilities, matter even if they are often difficult to divine and are subject to rapid and sometimes unpredictable change. It is reasonable to assume that the Kremlin would prefer to have the Baltic states in its sphere of influence instead of having NATO troops deployed in their territory within 100 miles of St. Petersburg. It is also safe to assume that Putin aspires to deal a crippling blow to NATO’s cohesion. However, Russia’s record over the past decade—since it began to rebuild its military capabilities— suggests that the Kremlin is sensitive to the likely costs of its actions and has a healthy dose of respect for NATO’s security guarantee. Despite Russian leaders’ truculent behavior, they have shown great capacity to judge when the costs and risks of their belligerence are too high. They have walked up to NATO’s red lines, but they have not crossed them. The wars in Georgia and Ukraine were fought against much weaker adversaries without a NATO security guarantee. In Syria, the Russian military stepped into a vacuum, reassured that the United States and its allies had no intention of intervening on the ground or in the air to tip the scale in favor of rebel forces fighting President Bashar al-Assad. In short, conclusions about Putin’s propensity to wage war against NATO and his intentions toward the Baltic states cannot be made solely on the basis of his wars against Georgia and Ukraine or Russian military deployment to Syria. Russian actions in Ukraine are indicative of how seriously the Kremlin views NATO and its security guarantees to its members. Moscow’s annexation of Crimea and aggression in eastern Ukraine were calculated steps to prevent Ukraine from advancing toward NATO membership and escaping Russia’s sphere of influence—a development that would have marked a major strategic setback for Russia and an embarrassment for Putin, considering the Kremlin’s view of Ukraine as an essential buffer against a hostile and expansionist NATO. Moreover, it would be hard for Moscow to replicate the favorable circumstances in the Baltic region that Russia enjoyed in Crimea. Large Russian forces were already on the peninsula prior to the crisis and were operating from a well established infrastructure. Further, as many observers have pointed out, the Crimea operation was carried out mainly by Russia’s elite special forces units and therefore was not a true reflection of the overall state of Russian ground forces.30 Simply put, the Baltic states are already in NATO. An outright military assault on them would risk an all-out war with NATO. It is also essential to understand that the Kremlin’s decision to go to war against NATO would be political—driven by more than the sheer number of tanks, troops, and aircraft. The Russian elite’s paramount concern is its survival and the system it has built and invested in; Russia has a deepseated fear of political instability and perceived U.S. designs for regime change. As one of Putin’s closest advisers put it, “The Americans are trying to . . . cause regime change in Russia and ultimately dismember our country via events in Ukraine.”31 It would be extremely risky for the Kremlin to bet that Russian forces could attack the most powerful military alliance in the world and prevail in a conflict, because the consequences of losing—and even winning—that gamble would be catastrophic for the Russian elite and the country as a whole. In other words, Putin’s decision to launch a conventional war against NATO would involve weighing the importance of the political objectives served by a military victory against calculations of the costs and risks of military action. There is, of course, room for Putin to miscalculate or misjudge NATO’s political will to honor its Article 5 commitment. But he is likely to conclude that Russia would eventually face the full weight of NATO’s military machine in response to a Russian attack—a calculation based on his judgment that NATO’s leaders and especially the U.S. president would not want to suffer the extremely negative consequences if the alliance failed to deliver on its security guarantee—the end of the alliance and a dramatic blow to the political fortunes of NATO leaders. Conventional Military Capabilities Russia enjoys favorable geography and a numerical advantage over NATO in manpower and in every major category of combat weapons and equipment that would be used in an initial military attack against the Baltic states. This is the case even when considering the standing forces of the Baltic states, the forces that other NATO members would deploy in peacetime or on a rotational basis on Baltic (and Polish) territory, and the early arriving forces that NATO has assigned to reinforce its eastern flank in response to a strategic warning of an attack.
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<h4>Sokolsky says it’s fears of US “regime change” that cause increased elite pressure [KU is blue]</h4><p><strong>Sokolsky 17</strong>—(nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, MA in IR from Johns Hopkins). Sokolsky, Richard D. 2017. The New NATO-Russia Military Balance: Implications for European Security. Vol. 13. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.</p><p><u><strong>Political Considerations</u></strong> Intentions, not just capabilities, matter even if they are often difficult to divine and <u>are subject to <strong>rapid and sometimes unpredictable</strong> change.</u> It is reasonable to assume that <u>the Kremlin would prefer to have the <strong>Baltic</u></strong> state<u><strong>s</strong> in its sphere of influence instead of having NATO troops </u>deployed in their territory <u>within 100 miles of St. Petersburg. </u>It is also safe to assume that Putin aspires to deal a crippling blow to NATO’s cohesion. <u><strong>However,</strong> </u>Russia’s record over<u> the past decade</u>—since it began to rebuild its military capabilities—<u> suggests </u>that<u> <mark>the Kremlin is sensitive to</mark> the </u>likely <u><strong>costs</strong> of its actions and </u>has a healthy dose of <u>respect </u>for <u><strong><mark>NATO’s security guarantee</strong>.</mark> </u>Despite Russian leaders’ truculent behavior, <u>they have shown great capacity to judge when the costs </u>and risks<u> of their belligerence are too high. <mark>They </mark>have <mark>walked <strong>up to</strong> </mark>NATO’s <mark>red lines, but</mark> they <strong>have <mark>not crossed</mark> them</strong><mark>.</mark> The wars in <strong><mark>Georgia</strong> and <strong>Ukraine</strong> were </mark>fought against much weaker adversaries <strong><mark>without a</mark> NATO security <mark>guarantee</strong>.</u></mark> In Syria, the Russian military stepped into a vacuum, reassured that the United States and its allies had no intention of intervening on the ground or in the air to tip the scale in favor of rebel forces fighting President Bashar al-Assad. In short, conclusions about <u><mark>Putin’s propensity to wage war against NATO</mark> and</u> his <u>intentions toward the Baltic states <mark>cannot be made</mark> </u>solely<u> <mark>on the basis of</u></mark> his wars against <u><strong><mark>Georgia</strong></mark> and <strong><mark>Ukraine</strong> or</u></mark> Russian military deployment to <u><strong><mark>Syria</strong>.</mark> </u>Russian <u>actions in Ukraine are indicative of how seriously the Kremlin views NATO</u> and its security guarantees to its members<u>. Moscow’s annexation of <strong>Crimea</strong> and aggression in </u>eastern<u> <strong>Ukraine</strong> were calculated steps to prevent Ukraine </u>from<u> advancing toward NATO </u>membership and escaping Russia’s sphere of influence<u>—</u>a development that would have marked<u> a major strategic setback for Russia</u> and an embarrassment for Putin, considering the Kremlin’s view of Ukraine as an essential buffer against a hostile and expansionist NATO<u>.</u> Moreover, <u>it would be hard for Moscow to replicate the favorable circumstances in the Baltic region </u>that<u> Russia enjoyed in Crimea.</u> Large Russian forces were already on the peninsula prior to the crisis and were operating from a well established infrastructure. Further, as many observers have pointed out, the Crimea operation was carried out mainly by Russia’s elite special forces units and therefore was not a true reflection of the overall state of Russian ground forces.30 Simply put, <u>the Baltic states are already in NATO. An outright military assault on them would risk an all-out war with NATO. </u>It is also essential to understand that the Kremlin’s <u><strong><mark>decision to</mark> go to <mark>war against NATO would be political</u></strong></mark>—driven by more than the sheer number of tanks, troops, and aircraft<u>. <mark>The Russian elite’s</u> <u><strong>paramount concern</u></strong> <u>is</u></mark> its survival and the system it has built and invested in; Russia <u>has a <strong>deepseated <mark>fear</strong> of</mark> political <strong><mark>instability</strong> and</u></mark> perceived <u><mark>U.S. designs for <strong>regime change</strong></mark>. As</u> one of <u>Putin’s</u> closest <u>advisers put it, “The Americans are trying to . . . cause regime change in Russia </u>and ultimately dismember our country<u> <strong><mark>via </mark>events in <mark>Ukraine</strong>.”</u></mark>31<u> It would be extremely risky for the Kremlin to</u> bet that Russian forces could attack <u>the most powerful military alliance in the world </u>and prevail in a conflict, because the consequences of losing—and even winning—that gamble would be catastrophic for the Russian elite and the country as a whole<u>. </u>In other words, <u><mark>Putin’s decision</mark> to launch a conventional war against NATO <mark>would</mark> involve <mark>weigh</u>i</mark>ng the importance of the<u> <strong><mark>political objectives</strong></mark> </u>served by a military victory<u> <mark>against</mark> </u>calculations of the<u> <strong><mark>costs </mark>and risks of military action</strong><mark>.</mark> <mark>There is</u></mark>, of course, <u><strong><mark>room</mark> for Putin <mark>to miscalculate</u></strong></mark> or misjudge NATO’s political will to honor its Article 5 commitment<u>. <strong><mark>But</strong> he</mark> is likely to <mark>conclude</mark> </u>that<u> <mark>Russia would <strong>eventually</strong> face the <strong>full weight</strong> of NATO</u></mark>’s<u> military </u>machine<u> in response to a Russian attack<mark>—</u></mark>a calculation<u> <mark>based on his judgment that NATO</u></mark>’s <u>leaders and </u>especially<u> the U.S. president <mark>would not want to </mark>suffer the </u>extremely negative<u> consequences if the alliance <strong><mark>fail</u></strong></mark>ed<u> to deliver <mark>on its security guarantee</mark>—the <strong>end of the alliance</strong> and a dramatic blow to the political fortunes of NATO leaders<mark>.</mark> </u>Conventional Military Capabilities <u>Russia enjoys favorable geography and a numerical advantage over NATO in manpower </u>and in every major category of combat weapons and equipment that would be used <u>in an <strong>initial</strong> military attack against the Baltic states.</u> This is the case even when considering the standing forces of the Baltic states, the forces that other NATO members would deploy in peacetime or on a rotational basis on Baltic (and Polish) territory, and the early arriving forces that NATO has assigned to reinforce its eastern flank in response to a strategic warning of an attack. </p>
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No climate impact---bad studies and adaption.
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Gleditsch 21
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Nils P. Gleditsch 21, Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo, “This time is different! Or is it? NeoMalthusians and environmental optimists in the age of climate change,” Journal of Peace Research, pg. 5-6, 2021, SAGE. clarification denoted with brackets.
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environmental optimists raise problems with the discussion of effects of climate change and more so with popular interpretations decry the common use of choosing the high-risk [scenario] to illustrate ‘business as usual’ as misleading
causal chains from climate change to proposed effects on human beings are long and complex, and uncertainty increases every step of the way In the literature on effects of climate change, including IPCC reports, statements abound something ‘may’ lead to something else, or a variable ‘is sensitive to’ another, without guidelines for how to translate this into probabilities Uncritical use of the precautionary principle, where a remotely possible calamity unwittingly becomes probable is not helpful
Gleditsch & Nordås did not find strong evidence for a direct link between climate change and conflict argue climate change impact conflict-inducing factors this assumes correlations are transitive, which is not generally the case If A correlates with B and B with C, we know nothing about how A relates to C unless both correlations are extremely high
argument how climate change indirectly impact conflict leans heavily on negative economic consequences of climate change with little or no reference to research that deals with this topic century of climate change will have the same impact on the economy as the loss of one year of economic growth Models used in the assessment of economics of climate change are not accurate enough to provide quantitative insights and not be taken as serious forecasts
environmental optimists emphasize the role of innovations such as improvements in battery technology but also social innovations exemplified by the experimental approach to the alleviation of poverty, rewarded in the same year by the Nobel Prize in economics.12
there is a strong case for adaptation dikes and flood barriers will be cost-effective and necessary there will be increased use for
<<Marked>>
more suitable for a dry climate developed in part by GMO technology Industrialization decrease the one-sided reliance on rain-fed agriculture in the world urbanization will move millions out of the most vulnerable communities there are potentials for increasing productivity by structural change within agriculture
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raise problem with popular interp of the high-risk [scenario] as usual’ as misleading
causal chain are long and uncertain reports without guidelines how to translate into probabilities precautionary principle is not helpful
no strong evidence for direct link between climate and conflict assumes correlations are transitive
Models are not accurate to provide serious forecasts
innovation such as tech also social
strong adaptation be cost-effective
Industrialization decrease reliance urbanization move out vulnerable communities increasing productivity by structural change
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The most extreme contrarian position is, of course, to deny one or both key conclusions of the IPCC: the reality of global warming or the human contribution to it. However, most environmental optimists accept these two key conclusions but raise other problems with the panel’s discussion of the social effects of climate change and even more so with popular interpretations of the panel reports. For instance, Hausfather & Peters (2020), by no means ‘climate deniers’, decry the common use of choosing the high-risk [scenario] RCP8.59 to illustrate ‘business as usual’ as misleading.
The causal chains from climate change to the proposed effects on human beings are long and complex, and the uncertainty increases every step of the way. In the literature on the social effects of climate change, including the IPCC reports, statements abound that something ‘may’ lead to something else, or that a variable ‘is sensitive to’ another, without any guidelines for how to translate this into probabilities (Gleditsch & Nordås, 2014: 87f). Uncritical use of the precautionary principle, where any remotely possible calamity unwittingly becomes a probable event, is not helpful.
Gleditsch & Nordås (2014: 85) note that while AR5 (IPCC, 2014) did not find strong evidence for a direct link between climate change and conflict, it argued that climate change is likely to impact known conflict-inducing factors like poverty and inconsistent political institutions and therefore might have an indirect effect on conflict. But this assumes that correlations are transitive, which is not generally the case. If A correlates with B and B with C, we know nothing about how A relates to C unless both correlations are extremely high. The strongest case for the climate–conflict link is the effect of interaction between climate change and factors like poverty, state failure, or ethnic polarization. It may be more cost-effective to try to deal with these other risk factors than with global warming itself if the goal is to reduce the ‘risk multiplier’ effect of climate change on armed conflict.
The articles in this special issue do not generally see scarcity by itself as necessarily resulting in strongly negative outcomes. Factors like development, state failure, and previous overload on ecosystems continue to play an important role in that they interact with climate change to produce conflict and other social outcomes. For instance, Ide, Kristensen & Bartusevicˆius (2021) conclude that the impact of floods on political conflict are contingent on other factors such as population size and regime type. Moreover, most of the articles do not assume that scarcities are likely to arise at the global level. They may be regional (mostly in Africa), national, or local. Urban and rural areas may be affected by different scarcities. Climate change may also affect particularly strongly groups that are already at an economic or political disadvantage. The effects can be alleviated and adaptations constructed at these levels.
The argument about how climate change may indirectly impact conflict leans heavily on the negative economic consequences of climate change, but with little or no reference to the research that explicitly deals with this topic. In fact, the relevant chapter in AR5 concluded that for most sectors of the economy, the impact of climate change was likely to be dwarfed by other factors. Tol (2018) finds that the long-term global economic effects are likely to be negative, but that a century of climate change will have about the same impact on the economy as the loss of one year of economic growth. Other economists are more cautious, but the dean of climate change economics, William Nordhaus (2018: 345, 359), estimates that ‘damages are 2.1 percent of global income at 3C warming and 8.5 percent of income at 6C’, while also warning that the longer the delay in taking decisive action, the harsher the necessary countermeasures. Stern (2006) is more pessimistic, based mainly on a lower discount rate (the interest rate used to calculate the present value of future cash flows) as are Wagner & Weitzman (2015). Heal (2017) argues that the Integrated Assessment Models generally used in the assessment of the economics of climate change are not accurate enough to provide quantitative insights and should not be taken as serious forecasts. Yet, all these economists take the basically optimistic view that climate change is manageable with appropriate policies for raising the price on the emission of greenhouse gases. With a chapter heading from Wagner & Weitzman (2015: 17): ‘We can do this’.
This more optimistic assessment of climate change does not assume that the challenge will go away by itself or can be left to the market. A plausible approach, favored by most economists,10 is the imposition of a robust and increasing price on carbon emissions (whether as a carbon tax or through a cap and trade scheme) high enough to reduce the use of fossil fuels and encourage the search for their replacement. More than 25 countries had such taxes by early 2018 (Metcalf, 2019), but generally not at a level seen as necessary for limiting global warming to, say, 2C. This approach relies on the use of the market mechanism, but with targets fixed by public policy. Income from a carbon tax can be channeled back to the citizens to avoid increasing overall taxation. To speed up the transition, funds can also be allocated to the research and development of cheaper and more efficient production of various forms of fossil-free energy, including nuclear power (Goldstein & Qvist, 2019).
The response of the environmental optimists continues to emphasize the role of innovations; technological innovations, such as improvements in battery technology, the key element in the 2019 Nobel Prize in chemistry,11 but also social innovations, as exemplified by the experimental approach to the alleviation of poverty, rewarded in the same year by the Nobel Prize in economics.12
While the most important countermeasures will be directed at the mitigation of climate change, there is also a strong case for adaptation. If sea-level rise cannot be totally prevented, dikes and flood barriers will be cost-effective and necessary, at least in high-value urban areas. If parts of Africa suffer from drought, there will be increased use for new crops
<<Marked>>
that are more suitable for a dry climate, possibly developed in part by GMO technology. Industrialization in Africa can decrease the one-sided reliance on rain-fed agriculture, as it has in other parts of the world, which have moved human resources from the primary sector to industry (and then to services). Continuing urbanization will move millions out of the most vulnerable communities (Collier, 2010). While structural change failed to produce economic growth in Latin America and Africa after 1990, Africa has experienced a turnaround in the new millennium (McMillan & Rodrik, 2014) and there are also potentials for increasing productivity by structural change within agriculture in Africa (McCullough, 2017).
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<h4>No climate impact---<u>bad studies</u> and <u>adaption</u>.</h4><p>Nils P. <strong>Gleditsch 21</strong>, Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo, “This time is different! Or is it? NeoMalthusians and environmental optimists in the age of climate change,” Journal of Peace Research, pg. 5-6, 2021, SAGE. clarification denoted with brackets.</p><p>The most extreme contrarian position is, of course, to deny one or both key conclusions of the IPCC: the reality of global warming or the human contribution to it. However, most <u>environmental <strong>optimists</u></strong> accept these two key conclusions but <u><mark>raise</u></mark> other <u><mark>problem</mark>s <mark>with</mark> the</u> panel’s <u>discussion of</u> the social <u><strong>effects of climate</strong> <strong>change</strong> and</u> even <u>more so with</u> <u><strong><mark>popular interp</mark>retations</u></strong> of the panel reports. For instance, Hausfather & Peters (2020), by no means ‘climate deniers’, <u>decry the <strong>common</strong> use <mark>of</mark> choosing <mark>the <strong>high-risk</strong></mark> <strong><mark>[scenario]</u></strong></mark> RCP8.59 <u>to illustrate <strong>‘business <mark>as usual’</strong> as <strong>misleading</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>The <u><mark>causal chain</mark>s from climate change to</u> the <u><strong>proposed</strong> effects on human beings <mark>are</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>long</strong></mark> and <strong>complex</strong>, <mark>and</u></mark> the <u><strong><mark>uncertain</mark>ty increases every step</strong> of the way</u>. <u>In the literature</u> <u>on</u> the social <u>effects of climate change, including</u> the <u><strong>IPCC <mark>reports</strong></mark>, <strong>statements</strong> abound</u> that <u>something <strong>‘may’ lead</strong> to something else, or</u> that <u>a variable <strong>‘is sensitive to’ another</strong>, <mark>without</u></mark> any <u><mark>guidelines</mark> for <mark>how to <strong>translate</strong></mark> this <mark>into <strong>probabilities</u></strong></mark> (Gleditsch & Nordås, 2014: 87f). <u>Uncritical use of the <strong><mark>precautionary principle</strong></mark>, where <strong>a</u></strong>ny <u><strong>remotely</strong> possible</u> <u>calamity unwittingly becomes</u> a <u>probable</u> event, <u><strong><mark>is not helpful</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u>Gleditsch & Nordås</u> (2014: 85) note that while AR5 (IPCC, 2014) <u>did <strong><mark>no</strong></mark>t find <strong><mark>strong evidence</strong> for</mark> a <strong><mark>direct</strong> link between climate</mark> change <mark>and conflict</u></mark>, it <u><strong>argue</u></strong>d that <u>climate</u> <u>change</u> is likely to <u>impact</u> known <u><strong>conflict-inducing factors</u></strong> like poverty and inconsistent political institutions and therefore might have an indirect effect on conflict. But <u>this</u> <u><mark>assumes</u></mark> that <u><mark>correlations are <strong>transitive</strong></mark>, which is not generally the case</u>. <u>If <strong>A correlates with B</strong> and <strong>B with C</strong>, we know nothing about how <strong>A relates to C</strong> unless</u> <u><strong>both</strong> correlations</u> <u>are <strong>extremely high</u></strong>. The strongest case for the climate–conflict link is the effect of interaction between climate change and factors like poverty, state failure, or ethnic polarization. It may be more cost-effective to try to deal with these other risk factors than with global warming itself if the goal is to reduce the ‘risk multiplier’ effect of climate change on armed conflict.</p><p>The articles in this special issue do not generally see scarcity by itself as necessarily resulting in strongly negative outcomes. Factors like development, state failure, and previous overload on ecosystems continue to play an important role in that they interact with climate change to produce conflict and other social outcomes. For instance, Ide, Kristensen & Bartusevicˆius (2021) conclude that the impact of floods on political conflict are contingent on other factors such as population size and regime type. Moreover, most of the articles do not assume that scarcities are likely to arise at the global level. They may be regional (mostly in Africa), national, or local. Urban and rural areas may be affected by different scarcities. Climate change may also affect particularly strongly groups that are already at an economic or political disadvantage. The effects can be alleviated and adaptations constructed at these levels.</p><p>The <u>argument</u> about <u>how climate change</u> may <u>indirectly impact <strong>conflict</strong> leans heavily on</u> the <u><strong>negative economic consequences</strong> of climate change</u>, but <u>with little or <strong>no reference</strong> to</u> the <u>research that</u> explicitly <u>deals with this topic</u>. In fact, the relevant chapter in AR5 concluded that for most sectors of the economy, the impact of climate change was likely to be dwarfed by other factors. Tol (2018) finds that the long-term global economic effects are likely to be negative, but that a <u>century of climate change will have</u> about <u>the</u> <u><strong>same impact</strong> on the economy as the <strong>loss of one year</strong> of economic growth</u>. Other economists are more cautious, but the dean of climate change economics, William Nordhaus (2018: 345, 359), estimates that ‘damages are 2.1 percent of global income at 3C warming and 8.5 percent of income at 6C’, while also warning that the longer the delay in taking decisive action, the harsher the necessary countermeasures. Stern (2006) is more pessimistic, based mainly on a lower discount rate (the interest rate used to calculate the present value of future cash flows) as are Wagner & Weitzman (2015). Heal (2017) argues that the Integrated Assessment <u><mark>Models</u></mark> generally <u>used in the</u> <u><strong>assessment</strong> of</u> the <u>economics of climate change <mark>are <strong>not accurate</mark> enough</strong> <mark>to</mark> <mark>provide</u></mark> <u><strong>quantitative insights</strong> and</u> should <u>not be taken as <strong><mark>serious</strong> forecasts</u></mark>. Yet, all these economists take the basically optimistic view that climate change is manageable with appropriate policies for raising the price on the emission of greenhouse gases. With a chapter heading from Wagner & Weitzman (2015: 17): ‘We can do this’.</p><p>This more optimistic assessment of climate change does not assume that the challenge will go away by itself or can be left to the market. A plausible approach, favored by most economists,10 is the imposition of a robust and increasing price on carbon emissions (whether as a carbon tax or through a cap and trade scheme) high enough to reduce the use of fossil fuels and encourage the search for their replacement. More than 25 countries had such taxes by early 2018 (Metcalf, 2019), but generally not at a level seen as necessary for limiting global warming to, say, 2C. This approach relies on the use of the market mechanism, but with targets fixed by public policy. Income from a carbon tax can be channeled back to the citizens to avoid increasing overall taxation. To speed up the transition, funds can also be allocated to the research and development of cheaper and more efficient production of various forms of fossil-free energy, including nuclear power (Goldstein & Qvist, 2019).</p><p>The response of the <u>environmental optimists</u> continues to <u>emphasize the role of</u> <u><strong><mark>innovation</mark>s</u></strong>; technological innovations, <u><mark>such as</mark> <strong>improvements in battery <mark>tech</mark>nology</u></strong>, the key element in the 2019 Nobel Prize in chemistry,11 <u>but <mark>also</u></mark> <u><mark>social</mark> innovations</u>, as <u>exemplified by the <strong>experimental</strong> <strong>approach</strong> to the alleviation of <strong>poverty, rewarded in the same year by the Nobel Prize in economics.12</p><p></u></strong>While the most important countermeasures will be directed at the mitigation of climate change, <u>there is</u> also <u>a <mark>strong</mark> case for <strong><mark>adaptation</u></strong></mark>. If sea-level rise cannot be totally prevented, <u>dikes and flood barriers will <mark>be</mark> <strong><mark>cost-effective</strong></mark> and <strong>necessary</u></strong>, at least in high-value urban areas. If parts of Africa suffer from drought, <u>there will be increased use for </u><strong>new crops</p><p><u><<Marked>></p><p></u></strong> that are <u><strong>more suitable</strong> for a <strong>dry</strong> climate</u>, possibly <u>developed in part by <strong>GMO technology</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Industrialization</u></strong></mark> in Africa can <u><mark>decrease</mark> the <strong>one-sided <mark>reliance</strong></mark> on rain-fed</u> <u>agriculture</u>, as it has <u>in</u> other parts of <u>the world</u>, which have moved human resources from the primary sector to industry (and then to services). Continuing <u><mark>urbanization</mark> will</u> <u><mark>move</mark> millions <mark>out</mark> of the <strong>most <mark>vulnerable communities</u></strong></mark> (Collier, 2010). While structural change failed to produce economic growth in Latin America and Africa after 1990, Africa has experienced a turnaround in the new millennium (McMillan & Rodrik, 2014) and <u>there are</u> also <u>potentials for <mark>increasing <strong>productivity</strong> by <strong>structural</strong></mark> <strong><mark>change</strong></mark> within agriculture</u> in Africa (McCullough, 2017).</p>
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Morbeck, Strong, Lepp
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1NC T Subsets T Limit Conditions Occupied Territory PIC Article 5 PIC Assurance DA Infrastructure PTX DA Case
2NC Occupied Territory PIC T Limit Conditions
1NR Article 5 PIC Assurance DA
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Climate Change is existential
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Ng ’19
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Ng ’19 [Yew-Kwang; May 2019; Professor of Economics at Nanyang Technology University, Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia and Member of the Advisory Board at the Global Priorities Institute at Oxford University, Ph.D. in Economics from Sydney University; Global Policy, “Keynote: Global Extinction and Animal Welfare: Two Priorities for Effective Altruism,” vol. 10, no. 2, p. 258-266; RP]
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climate change causing global extinction is possible due to interrelated factors of non‐linearity, cascading effects, positive feedbacks, multiplicative factors, critical thresholds and tipping points A imminent tipping point could be ‘an abrupt ice sheet collapse [that] could cause rapid sea level rise’ There are many avenues for positive feedback replacement of an ice sea by a liquid surface from melting increases absorption of sunlight, leading to faster warming drying of forests increases forest fires and release of more carbon ocean temperatures lead to release of methane producing runaway global warming ‘The world is completely unprepared to envisage, and deal with CCC’ The threat of sea‐level rising from warming is well known, but there likely and imminent threats to the survivability of mankind the adaptability limit to climate change due to heat stress from high temperature ‘even modest warming could expose large fractions of the [world] to unprecedented heat stress’ and with substantial warming, ‘the area of land rendered uninhabitable would dwarf sea level’ making extinction likely and the moderate assessment models unreliably low we cannot rule it out probabilities of 5 per cent, 0.5 per cent or even 0.005 per cent of excessive warming and resulting extinction probabilities cannot be ruled out and are unacceptable. Even if there is only a 1 per cent probability that there is a bomb in the airplane, you want to change your flight. Extinction of the whole world is more important to avoid by a trillion times
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climate causing extinction due to non‐linearity, cascading effects, positive feedbacks and tipping points abrupt ice sheet collapse [that cause rapid sea level rise’ ocean release methane producing runaway warming The world is unprepared to deal with, sea rising heat stress’ extinction probabilities are unacceptable
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Catastrophic climate change Though by no means certain, CCC causing global extinction is possible due to interrelated factors of non‐linearity, cascading effects, positive feedbacks, multiplicative factors, critical thresholds and tipping points (e.g. Barnosky and Hadly, 2016; Belaia et al., 2017; Buldyrev et al., 2010; Grainger, 2017; Hansen and Sato, 2012; IPCC 2014; Kareiva and Carranza, 2018; Osmond and Klausmeier, 2017; Rothman, 2017; Schuur et al., 2015; Sims and Finnoff, 2016; Van Aalst, 2006).7 A possibly imminent tipping point could be in the form of ‘an abrupt ice sheet collapse [that] could cause a rapid sea level rise’ (Baum et al., 2011, p. 399). There are many avenues for positive feedback in global warming, including: the replacement of an ice sea by a liquid ocean surface from melting reduces the reflection and increases the absorption of sunlight, leading to faster warming; the drying of forests from warming increases forest fires and the release of more carbon; and higher ocean temperatures may lead to the release of methane trapped under the ocean floor, producing runaway global warming. Though there are also avenues for negative feedback, the scientific consensus is for an overall net positive feedback (Roe and Baker, 2007). Thus, the Global Challenges Foundation (2017, p. 25) concludes, ‘The world is currently completely unprepared to envisage, and even less deal with, the consequences of CCC’. The threat of sea‐level rising from global warming is well known, but there are also other likely and more imminent threats to the survivability of mankind and other living things. For example, Sherwood and Huber (2010) emphasize the adaptability limit to climate change due to heat stress from high environmental wet‐bulb temperature. They show that ‘even modest global warming could … expose large fractions of the [world] population to unprecedented heat stress’ p. 9552 and that with substantial global warming, ‘the area of land rendered uninhabitable by heat stress would dwarf that affected by rising sea level’ p. 9555, making extinction much more likely and the relatively moderate damages estimated by most integrated assessment models unreliably low. While imminent extinction is very unlikely and may not come for a long time even under business as usual, the main point is that we cannot rule it out. Annan and Hargreaves (2011, pp. 434–435) may be right that there is ‘an upper 95 per cent probability limit for S [temperature increase] … to lie close to 4°C, and certainly well below 6°C’. However, probabilities of 5 per cent, 0.5 per cent, 0.05 per cent or even 0.005 per cent of excessive warming and the resulting extinction probabilities cannot be ruled out and are unacceptable. Even if there is only a 1 per cent probability that there is a time bomb in the airplane, you probably want to change your flight. Extinction of the whole world is more important to avoid by literally a trillion times.
| 2,957 |
<h4>Climate Change is <u>existential</h4><p></u><strong>Ng ’19 </strong>[Yew-Kwang; May 2019; Professor of Economics at Nanyang Technology University, Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia and Member of the Advisory Board at the Global Priorities Institute at Oxford University, Ph.D. in Economics from Sydney University; Global Policy, “Keynote: Global Extinction and Animal Welfare: Two Priorities for Effective Altruism,” vol. 10, no. 2, p. 258-266; RP]</p><p>Catastrophic <u><mark>climate</mark> change</u> Though by no means certain, CCC <u><mark>causing</mark> <strong>global <mark>extinction</strong> </mark>is possible <mark>due to</mark> <strong>interrelated factors</strong> of <strong><mark>non‐linearity</strong>, <strong>cascading effects</strong>, <strong>positive feedbacks</strong></mark>, <strong>multiplicative factors</strong>, <strong>critical thresholds</strong> <mark>and <strong>tipping points</u></strong></mark> (e.g. Barnosky and Hadly, 2016; Belaia et al., 2017; Buldyrev et al., 2010; Grainger, 2017; Hansen and Sato, 2012; IPCC 2014; Kareiva and Carranza, 2018; Osmond and Klausmeier, 2017; Rothman, 2017; Schuur et al., 2015; Sims and Finnoff, 2016; Van Aalst, 2006).7 <u>A</u> possibly <u><strong>imminent</strong> tipping point could be</u> in the form of <u>‘an <mark>abrupt <strong>ice sheet collapse</strong> [that</mark>] could <mark>cause</u></mark> a <u><strong><mark>rapid</strong> sea level rise’</u></mark> (Baum et al., 2011, p. 399). <u>There are many avenues for <strong>positive feedback</u></strong> in global warming, including: the <u>replacement of an ice sea by a liquid</u> ocean <u>surface from melting</u> reduces the reflection and <u><strong>increases</u></strong> the <u><strong>absorption</strong> of sunlight, leading to <strong>faster warming</u></strong>; the <u>drying of <strong>forests</u></strong> from warming <u>increases forest fires and</u> the <u>release of <strong>more carbon</u></strong>; and higher <u><mark>ocean</mark> temperatures</u> may <u>lead to</u> the <u><mark>release</mark> of <strong><mark>methane</u></strong></mark> trapped under the ocean floor, <u><mark>producing <strong>runaway</strong> </mark>global <mark>warming</u></mark>. Though there are also avenues for negative feedback, the scientific consensus is for an overall net positive feedback (Roe and Baker, 2007). Thus, the Global Challenges Foundation (2017, p. 25) concludes, <u>‘<mark>The world is</u></mark> currently <u><strong>completely <mark>unprepared</strong></mark> <mark>to</mark> envisage, and</u> even less <u><mark>deal with</u>,</mark> the consequences of <u>CCC’</u>. <u>The threat of <strong><mark>sea</mark>‐level <mark>rising</strong></mark> from</u> global <u>warming is well known, but there</u> are also other <u><strong>likely</strong> and</u> more <u><strong>imminent</strong> threats to the <strong>survivability of mankind</u></strong> and other living things. For example, Sherwood and Huber (2010) emphasize <u>the <strong>adaptability limit</strong> to climate change due to <strong>heat stress</strong> from high</u> environmental wet‐bulb <u>temperature</u>. They show that <u>‘even <strong>modest</strong> </u>global <u>warming could</u> … <u>expose <strong>large fractions</strong> of the [world]</u> population <u>to <strong>unprecedented</strong> <mark>heat stress’</u></mark> p. 9552 <u>and</u> that <u>with substantial</u> global <u>warming, ‘the area of land rendered <strong>uninhabitable</u></strong> by heat stress <u>would dwarf</u> that affected by rising <u>sea level’</u> p. 9555, <u>making <strong>extinction</u></strong> much more <u><strong>likely</strong> and the</u> relatively <u>moderate</u> damages estimated by most integrated <u>assessment models <strong>unreliably low</u></strong>. While imminent extinction is very unlikely and may not come for a long time even under business as usual, the main point is that <u>we cannot rule it out</u>. Annan and Hargreaves (2011, pp. 434–435) may be right that there is ‘an upper 95 per cent probability limit for S [temperature increase] … to lie close to 4°C, and certainly well below 6°C’. However, <u>probabilities of 5 per cent, 0.5 per cent</u>, 0.05 per cent <u>or even <strong>0.005 per cent</strong> of excessive warming and</u> the <u>resulting <strong><mark>extinction probabilities</strong></mark> cannot be ruled out and <mark>are <strong>unacceptable</strong></mark>. Even if there is only a <strong>1 per cent probability</strong> that there is a</u> time <u>bomb in the airplane, you</u> probably <u>want to change your flight. Extinction of the <strong>whole world</strong> is <strong>more important</strong> to avoid by </u>literally <u>a <strong>trillion times</u></strong>. </p>
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New York City Invitational Debate and Speech Tournament
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3
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Georgetown Day XD
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Changing it up
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Infrastructure investment beats China in the tech-race
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Anderson 21
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Anderson 2-22-2021, Chairman & CEO of CG/LA Infrastructure, a firm focused on global infrastructure project development, driving productivity across countries, and maximizing the benefits of infrastructure for people in the U.S. and around the world (Norman, “The Biden Infrastructure Plan - 5 Actions To Jolt Us Awake, Now,” Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/normananderson/2021/02/22/the-biden-infrastructure-plan5-actions-to-jolt-us-awake-now/?sh=1d72f17b2ebd)//BB
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is necessary we have an enormous pent-up backlog of projects that can start showing results… this year
infrastructure
Brownfield projects can revitalize Army Corps reservoirs put 5G on interstate highways, or a make rural broadband really fast, right now
Greenfield projects speeding up investment in ultra high voltage transmission lines get butts in seats on the Dallas/Houston high speed rail project, and the Great Lakes Basin highway project, and
Infrastructure is the low-hanging fruit, and the battlefield between China and the U.S. for global influence, period It’s also the battlefield - AI, Machine Learning, 5G, Autonomy, High Voltage Transmission, along with high speed rail that is critical to the achievement of every single goal that our country can set for the future
Infrastructure Needs a Budget The 2020’s will be a decade of disruption We can either weather the storm or make the kind of strategic investments that will allow us to lead - with enormous environmental and equity benefits, coupled with the kind of productivity increases that come from rapid innovation There couldn’t be a bigger difference between the way that China is going about new infrastructure creation The problem in democracies around the world we are absent, and so China is winning infrastructure If we can get this right, the results for all of us will be extraordinary domestic growth environmental leadership and an injection of strength into the global democratic model
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is necessary we can start showing results this year
infrastructure
projects can revitalize Army Corps put 5G on highways make broadband really fast now
Infrastructure is the battlefield between China and the U.S. for global influence period It’s also the battlefield AI 5G h s r that is critical to every single goal our country can set for the future
Infrastructure Needs a Budget strategic investments will allow enormous productivity increases from rapid innovation in democracies around the world we are absent, and China is winning infrastructure results will be extraordinary domestic growth environmental leadership and injection of strength into the global democratic model
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The Focus Needs to be on Creating Project Results. Producing immediate results is necessary for our political system - how does this work, when the average highway project takes 9.5 years to move through the approval process, and 4.5 years after that for results - say cars, or autonomous trucks, zipping down the freeway? Lucky for us we are not starting from scratch - we have an enormous pent-up backlog of projects that can start showing results… this year.
By results I don’t just mean creating new and well-paying jobs, or saving the thousands of struggling professional service firms that are in danger of turning off their computers, rather what I mean is addressing the Administration’s priorities in the way that infrastructure professionals think about investment (yes, these people exist - and they are as smart as economists!):
Brownfield projects - you can revitalize Army Corps reservoirs, or put 5G on interstate highways, or authorize the Gateway tunnel, or make rural broadband really fast, right now, tomorrow,
Greenfield projects - infrastructure is a ‘thinking short, thinking long’ business, so while you are speeding up investment in ultra high voltage transmission lines, you can also get moving on the Brent Spence Bridge, and by the end of 2024 you can get butts in seats on the Dallas/Houston high speed rail project, and the Great Lakes Basin highway project, and
New Infrastructure - this is the low-hanging fruit, and the battlefield between China and the U.S. for global influence, period. Largely private, and almost wholly environmentally friendly, this is where our economy has tremendous strengths that we are not seeing. It’s also the battlefield - AI, Machine Learning, 5G, Autonomy, High Voltage Transmission, along with high speed rail - that is critical to the achievement of every single goal that our country can set for the future.
Every infrastructure person - and every citizen - across the country can tell you the five projects that they’d like to see happen. The map above is a 500 project stimulus map that my firm, CG/LA infrastructure, created by polling people around the country. Why not engage citizens now, and show results this year, picking up steam in 2022 and in 2023? Infrastructure is 5G/AI and Electrification, and it Needs a Budget. The infrastructure of the future is going to be as different as cellular is from fixed line telephony, and that future is coming at us extremely fast… The 2020’s will be a decade of disruption - the greatest period of disruption in 100 years or more. We can either continue our course, and try and weather the storm, or we can make the kind of strategic investments that will allow us to lead - with enormous environmental and equity benefits, coupled with the kind of productivity increases that come from rapid innovation. There couldn’t be a bigger difference between the way that China is going about new infrastructure creation, with their top down, devil may care about the individual approach, and our celebration of the individual. The problem - in democracies around the world - is that we are absent, and so China is winning. Leaders Set Goals, Achieve Goals - and Create Trust. Who is in charge of infrastructure? Without an infrastructure office it is hard to tell, and this is a fatal flaw problem. The presidency needs to to bring everyone together to discuss what world we want to create, what our infrastructure vision going forward will look like. This needs to happen fast - and then we need to set goals that we all agree to: projects completed, time to project approvals, life expectancy, reduction of traffic congestion, reduction in carbon by sector, even increases in infrastructure equity. I am a business guy - everything is opportunity. Then we (all of us) need to row hard in the same direction, and achieve those goals. Action This Day. If we can get this right, the results for all of us will be extraordinary - domestic growth, environmental leadership and an injection of strength into the global democratic model. Unimaginable things can quickly be envisioned, and developed, including the return of manufacturing (advanced and distributed manufacturing) to our newly digitized and electrified heartland. Infrastructure can bring us together, but it is a very heavy lift - as in war, the first thing a president things about in the morning, and the last thing he thinks about before going to bed at night.
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<h4>Infrastructure investment beats China in the tech-race</h4><p><strong>Anderson</strong> 2-22-20<strong>21</strong>, Chairman & CEO of CG/LA Infrastructure, a firm focused on global infrastructure project development, driving productivity across countries, and maximizing the benefits of infrastructure for people in the U.S. and around the world (Norman, “<u><mark>The Biden Infrastructure</mark> <mark>Plan</u></mark> - 5 Actions To Jolt Us Awake, Now,” Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/normananderson/2021/02/22/the-biden-infrastructure-plan5-actions-to-jolt-us-awake-now/?sh=1d72f17b2ebd)//BB</p><p>The Focus Needs to be on Creating Project Results. Producing immediate results <u><mark>is necessary</u></mark> for our political system - how does this work, when the average highway project takes 9.5 years to move through the approval process, and 4.5 years after that for results - say cars, or autonomous trucks, zipping down the freeway? Lucky for us we are not starting from scratch - <u><mark>we</mark> have an enormous pent-up backlog of projects that <mark>can start showing results</mark>… <mark>this year</u></mark>. </p><p>By results I don’t just mean creating new and well-paying jobs, or saving the thousands of struggling professional service firms that are in danger of turning off their computers, rather what I mean is addressing the Administration’s priorities in the way that <u><mark>infrastructure</u></mark> professionals think about investment (yes, these people exist - and they are as smart as economists!):</p><p><u><strong>Brownfield <mark>projects</u></strong></mark> - you <u><mark>can revitalize Army Corps</mark> reservoirs</u>, or <u><mark>put 5G on</mark> interstate <mark>highways</mark>, or a</u>uthorize the Gateway tunnel, or <u><mark>make</mark> rural <mark>broadband really fast</mark>, right <mark>now</u></mark>, tomorrow,</p><p><u><strong>Greenfield projects</u></strong> - infrastructure is a ‘thinking short, thinking long’ business, so while you are <u>speeding up investment in ultra high voltage transmission lines</u>, you can also get moving on the Brent Spence Bridge, and by the end of 2024 you can <u>get butts in seats on the Dallas/Houston high speed rail project, and the Great Lakes Basin highway project, and</u> </p><p>New<u><strong> <mark>Infrastructure</u></strong></mark> - this <u><mark>is</mark> the low-hanging fruit, and <strong><mark>the</mark> <mark>battlefield</strong> between China and the U.S. for global influence</mark>, <strong><mark>period</u></strong></mark>. Largely private, and almost wholly environmentally friendly, this is where our economy has tremendous strengths that we are not seeing. <u><mark>It’s also the battlefield</mark> - <mark>AI</mark>, Machine Learning, <mark>5G</mark>, Autonomy, High Voltage Transmission, along with <strong><mark>h</strong></mark>igh <strong><mark>s</strong></mark>peed <strong><mark>r</strong></mark>ail</u> - <u><mark>that is critical to</mark> the achievement of <strong><mark>every single goal</strong></mark> that <mark>our country can set for the future</u></mark>.</p><p>Every infrastructure person - and every citizen - across the country can tell you the five projects that they’d like to see happen. The map above is a 500 project stimulus map that my firm, CG/LA infrastructure, created by polling people around the country. Why not engage citizens now, and show results this year, picking up steam in 2022 and in 2023? <u><mark>Infrastructure</u></mark> is 5G/AI and Electrification, and it <u><strong><mark>Needs a Budget</u></strong></mark>. The infrastructure of the future is going to be as different as cellular is from fixed line telephony, and that future is coming at us extremely fast… <u>The 2020’s will be a decade of disruption</u> - the greatest period of disruption in 100 years or more. <u>We can either</u> continue our course, and try and <u>weather the storm</u>, <u>or</u> we can <u>make the kind of <mark>strategic investments</mark> that <mark>will allow</mark> us to lead -</u> <u>with <mark>enormous</mark> environmental and equity benefits, coupled with the kind of <mark>productivity</mark> <mark>increases</mark> that come <mark>from rapid innovation</u></mark>. <u>There couldn’t be a bigger difference between the way that China is going about new infrastructure creation</u>, with their top down, devil may care about the individual approach, and our celebration of the individual. <u>The problem</u> - <u><mark>in <strong>democracies</strong> around the world</u></mark> - is that <u><strong><mark>we are</mark> <mark>absent</strong>, and</mark> so <strong><mark>China is winning</u></strong></mark>. Leaders Set Goals, Achieve Goals - and Create Trust. Who is in charge of infrastructure? Without an <u><strong><mark>infrastructure</u></strong></mark> office it is hard to tell, and this is a fatal flaw problem. The presidency needs to to bring everyone together to discuss what world we want to create, what our infrastructure vision going forward will look like. This needs to happen fast - and then we need to set goals that we all agree to: projects completed, time to project approvals, life expectancy, reduction of traffic congestion, reduction in carbon by sector, even increases in infrastructure equity. I am a business guy - everything is opportunity. Then we (all of us) need to row hard in the same direction, and achieve those goals. Action This Day. <u>If we can get this right, the <mark>results</mark> for all of us <mark>will be extraordinary</u></mark> - <u><strong><mark>domestic growth</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>environmental leadership</u></strong> <u>and</mark> an <mark>injection of strength into the <strong>global democratic model</u></strong></mark>. Unimaginable things can quickly be envisioned, and developed, including the return of manufacturing (advanced and distributed manufacturing) to our newly digitized and electrified heartland. Infrastructure can bring us together, but it is a very heavy lift - as in war, the first thing a president things about in the morning, and the last thing he thinks about before going to bed at night.</p>
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Innovation solves everything.
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hÉigeartaigh 17
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hÉigeartaigh 17 – Professor @ Cambridge, PhD in Genomics from Trinity College Dublin (Sean, “Technological Wild Cards: Existential Risk and a Changing Humanity”, https://www.bbvaopenmind.com/en/articles/technological-wild-cards-existential-risk-and-a-changing-humanity/, Accessed 3-7-2019)
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Technological progress offers us a vision of a remarkable future advances raised the quality of life dramatically for many and unlocked scientific directions that can lead us to a safer, cleaner, more sustainable world With technology progress can be made on all of the challenges discussed here. Advances in renewable energy and related tech and more efficient energy use that are likely to be accelerated by progress in tec such as a i can bring us to a point of zero-carbon emissions. New manufacturing capabilities provided by synthetic biology may provide cleaner ways of producing products and degrading waste. A greater scientific understanding of our natural world and the ecosystem services on which we rely will aid us in plotting a trajectory whereby critical environmental systems are maintained while allowing human flourishing Even education and women’s rights can be aided specifically by the information, coordination, and education tools that technology provides, and more generally by growing prosperity in the relevant parts of the world. There are catastrophic and existential risks that we will simply not be able to overcome without advances in science and technology. These include pandemic outbreaks whether natural or engineered The early identification of incoming asteroids and approaches to shift their path, is a topic of active research at NASA and elsewhere techniques to prevent or mitigate a supervolcanic eruption, may not be the case a century from now And in the longer run, a civilization that has spread permanently beyond the earth, enabled by advances in spaceflight, manufacturing, robotics, and terraforming, is one that is much more likely to endure the breathtaking power of the tools we are developing is not to be taken lightly We have been very lucky to muddle through the advent of nuclear weapons without a global catastroph
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renewable energy more efficient energy use accelerated by progress in a i bring us to zero-carbon emissions synthetic biology degrading waste existential risks not be able to overcome without advances in technology pandemic outbreaks identification of incoming asteroids, and approaches to shift their path techniques to prevent supervolcanic eruption civilization spread beyond earth, enabled by advances in spaceflight, manufacturing, robotics, and terraforming more likely to endure
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Technological progress now offers us a vision of a remarkable future. The advances that have brought us onto an unsustainable pathway have also raised the quality of life dramatically for many, and have unlocked scientific directions that can lead us to a safer, cleaner, more sustainable world. With the right developments and applications of technology, in concert with advances in social, democratic, and distributional processes globally, progress can be made on all of the challenges discussed here. Advances in renewable energy and related technologies, and more efficient energy use—advances that are likely to be accelerated by progress in technologies such as artificial intelligence—can bring us to a point of zero-carbon emissions. New manufacturing capabilities provided by synthetic biology may provide cleaner ways of producing products and degrading waste. A greater scientific understanding of our natural world and the ecosystem services on which we rely will aid us in plotting a trajectory whereby critical environmental systems are maintained while allowing human flourishing. Even advances in education and women’s rights globally, which will play a role in achieving a stable global population, can be aided specifically by the information, coordination, and education tools that technology provides, and more generally by growing prosperity in the relevant parts of the world. There are catastrophic and existential risks that we will simply not be able to overcome without advances in science and technology. These include possible pandemic outbreaks, whether natural or engineered. The early identification of incoming asteroids, and approaches to shift their path, is a topic of active research at NASA and elsewhere. While currently there are no known techniques to prevent or mitigate a supervolcanic eruption, this may not be the case with the tools at our disposal a century from now. And in the longer run, a civilization that has spread permanently beyond the earth, enabled by advances in spaceflight, manufacturing, robotics, and terraforming, is one that is much more likely to endure. However, the breathtaking power of the tools we are developing is not to be taken lightly. We have been very lucky to muddle through the advent of nuclear weapons without a global catastrophe. And within this century, it is realistic to expect that we will be able to rewrite much of biology to our purposes, intervene deliberately and in a large-scale way in the workings of our global climate, and even develop agents with intelligence that is fundamentally alien to ours, and may vastly surpass our own in some or even most domains—a development that would have uniquely unpredictable consequences.
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<h4>Innovation solves <u>everything</u>.</h4><p><strong>hÉigeartaigh 17</strong> – Professor @ Cambridge, PhD in Genomics from Trinity College Dublin (Sean, “Technological Wild Cards: Existential Risk and a Changing Humanity”, https://www.bbvaopenmind.com/en/articles/technological-wild-cards-existential-risk-and-a-changing-humanity/, Accessed 3-7-2019)</p><p><u>Technological progress</u> now <u>offers us a vision of a remarkable future</u>. The <u>advances</u> that have brought us onto an unsustainable pathway have also <u>raised the quality of life dramatically for many</u>, <u>and</u> have <u>unlocked scientific directions that can lead us to a safer, cleaner, more sustainable world</u>. <u>With</u> the right developments and applications of <u>technology</u>, in concert with advances in social, democratic, and distributional processes globally, <u>progress can be made on all of the challenges discussed here.</u> <u>Advances in</u> <u><strong><mark>renewable energy</u></strong></mark> <u>and</u> <u><strong>related tech</u></strong>nologies, <u>and <mark>more <strong>efficient energy use</u></strong></mark>—advances <u>that are likely to be <mark>accelerated by progress in</mark> tec</u>hnologies <u>such as <strong><mark>a</u></strong></mark>rtificial <u><strong><mark>i</u></strong></mark>ntelligence—<u>can <mark>bring us to</mark> a point of <strong><mark>zero-carbon emissions</strong></mark>. New manufacturing capabilities provided by <mark>synthetic biology</mark> may provide cleaner ways of producing products and <mark>degrading waste</mark>. A greater scientific understanding of our natural world and the ecosystem services on which we rely will aid us in plotting a trajectory whereby <strong>critical environmental systems are maintained</strong> while allowing human flourishing</u>. <u>Even</u> advances in <u>education and women’s rights</u> globally, which will play a role in achieving a stable global population, <u>can be aided specifically by the information, coordination, and education tools that technology provides, and more generally by growing prosperity in the relevant parts of the world.</u> <u>There are <strong>catastrophic</strong> and <strong><mark>existential</strong> risks </mark>that we will simply <mark>not be able to overcome <strong>without advances in</mark> science and <mark>technology</strong></mark>.</u> <u>These include</u> possible <u><strong><mark>pandemic outbreaks</u></strong></mark>, <u>whether natural or engineered</u>. <u>The early <strong><mark>identification of incoming asteroids</u></strong>, <u>and approaches to</mark> <mark>shift their path</mark>, is a topic of active research at NASA and elsewhere</u>. While currently there are no known <u><mark>techniques to prevent</mark> or mitigate a <strong><mark>supervolcanic</strong> eruption</mark>,</u> this <u>may not be the case</u> with the tools at our disposal<u> a century from now</u>. <u>And in the longer run, a <mark>civilization</mark> that has <strong><mark>spread</mark> permanently <mark>beyond</mark> the <mark>earth</strong>, enabled by advances in <strong>spaceflight</strong>, manufacturing, robotics, and terraforming</mark>, is one that is much <strong><mark>more likely to endure</u></strong></mark>. However, <u>the breathtaking power of the tools we are developing is <strong>not to be taken lightly</u></strong>. <u>We have been very lucky to muddle through the advent of nuclear weapons without a global catastroph</u>e. And within this century, it is realistic to expect that we will be able to rewrite much of biology to our purposes, intervene deliberately and in a large-scale way in the workings of our global climate, and even develop agents with intelligence that is fundamentally alien to ours, and may vastly surpass our own in some or even most domains—a development that would have uniquely unpredictable consequences.</p>
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1NC – innovation
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1AC - River Rights
1NC - T-Morse CP-ICC CP-IACHR CP-Adv K-Nietzsche DA-EPA
2NR - CP-Adv CAPITALISM USA!!!!
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Climate change is a system disruptor and a risk amplifier---only mitigation prevents biodiversity loss, marine ecosystem collapse, resource wars, global food scarcity, and extreme weather events. Uniquely—has disparate impacts.
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Pachauri & Meyer 15
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Pachauri & Meyer 15 Rajendra K. Pachauri Chairman of the IPCC, Leo Meyer Head, Technical Support Unit IPCC were the editors for this IPCC report, “Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report” http://epic.awi.de/37530/1/IPCC_AR5_SYR_Final.pdf IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer (eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, 151 pp
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Climate change will amplify existing risks and create new risks for natural and human systems Risks are unevenly distributed and are generally greater for disadvantaged people at all levels of development climate-related impacts results from the interaction of climate-related hazards with the vulnerability and exposure of human and natural systems including their ability to adapt Rising magnitudes of warming and other changes accompanied by ocean acidification increase the risk of severe, irreversible impacts The overall risks can be reduced by limiting the rate and magnitude of climate change including ocean acidification. The precise levels to trigger versible change remain uncertain, but the risk associated with crossing such thresholds increases with rising temperature it is important to evaluate the widest possible range of impacts including low-probability outcomes with large consequences A large fraction of species face increased extinction risk due to climate change as climate change interacts with other stressors plant species cannot naturally shift their geographical ranges sufficiently fast to keep up with current and high projected rates of climate change natural global climate change at rates lower than current anthropogenic climate change caused significant ecosystem shifts and species extinctions during the past millions of years Marine organisms will face progressively low oxygen levels and high rates and magnitudes of ocean acidification with associated risks exacerbated by rising ocean temperature extremes Coral reefs and polar ecosystems are highly vulnerable Climate change is projected to undermine food security Due to global marine species redistribution and marine biod reduction in sensitive regions will challenge the sustained provision of fisheries productivity and other ecosystem services For wheat, rice and maize in tropical and temperate regions climate change without adaptation is projected to negatively impact production Global temperature increases of ~4°C or more combined with increasing food demand, would pose large risks to food security globally Climate change is projected to reduce renewable surface water and groundwater resources intensifying competition for water among sectors climate change will impact human health mainly by exacerbat health problems that already exist climate change is expected to lead to increases in ill-health in many regions and especially in countries with low income the combination of high temperature and humidity is expected to compromise common human activities including growing food and working outdoors In urban areas climate change is projected to increase risks for people, assets, economies and ecosystems from heat stress storms extreme precipitation inland and coastal flooding, landslides air pollution drought water scarcity sea level rise and storm surges These risks are amplified for those lacking essential infrastructure and services Rural areas are expected to experience major impacts on water availability supply, food security, infrastructure and agricultural incomes Aggregate economic losses accelerate with increasing temperature From a poverty perspective climate change impacts are projected to slow down economic growth make poverty reduction more difficult further erode food security and prolong existing and create new poverty traps Climate change is projected to increase displace of people Populations that lack the resources for planned migration experience particularly in developing countries with low income Climate change can indirectly increase risks of violent conflicts by amplify well-documented drivers of these conflicts such as poverty and economic shocks
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Rising magnitudes of warming and accompanied ocean acidification increase the risk of irreversible impacts overall risks can be reduced by limiting the magnitude of climate change The precise levels remain uncertain, but the risk associated with crossing thresholds increases with temperature evaluate the widest possible range of impacts including low-probability with large consequences species face extinction plant cannot shift their ranges to keep up Marine organisms face low oxygen levels and acidification exacerbated by rising ocean temperature Coral and polar ecosystems are vulnerable undermine food security biod reduction challenge sustained provision of fisheries wheat, rice and maize climate change negatively impact production 4°C with increasing food demand pose risks to food globally reduce surface and groundwater intensifying competition climate change will exacerbat health problems especially in countries with low income high temperature and humidity compromise growing food and working outdoors increase risks from heat stress storms extreme precipitation flooding, landslides air pollution drought sea level rise and storm surges amplified for those lacking infrastructure economic losses accelerate with temperature to slow down growth and create new poverty traps to displacement of people risks of conflicts amplify drivers of conflicts poverty and economic shocks
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SPM 2.3 Future risks and impacts caused by a changing climate Climate change will amplify existing risks and create new risks for natural and human systems. Risks are unevenly distributed and are generally greater for disadvantaged people and communities in countries at all levels of development. {2.3} Risk of climate-related impacts results from the interaction of climate-related hazards (including hazardous events and trends) with the vulnerability and exposure of human and natural systems, including their ability to adapt. Rising rates and magnitudes of warming and other changes in the climate system, accompanied by ocean acidification, increase the risk of severe, pervasive and in some cases irreversible detrimental impacts. Some risks are particularly relevant for individual regions (Figure SPM.8), while others are global. The overall risks of future climate change impacts can be reduced by limiting the rate and magnitude of climate change, including ocean acidification. The precise levels of climate change sufficient to trigger abrupt and irreversible change remain uncertain, but the risk associated with crossing such thresholds increases with rising temperature (medium confidence). For risk assessment, it is important to evaluate the widest possible range of impacts, including low-probability outcomes with large consequences. {1.5, 2.3, 2.4, 3.3, Box Introduction.1, Box 2.3, Box 2.4} A large fraction of species faces increased extinction risk due to climate change during and beyond the 21st century, especially as climate change interacts with other stressors (high confidence). Most plant species cannot naturally shift their geographical ranges sufficiently fast to keep up with current and high projected rates of climate change in most landscapes; most small mammals and freshwater molluscs will not be able to keep up at the rates projected under RCP4.5 and above in flat landscapes in this century (high confidence). Future risk is indicated to be high by the observation that natural global climate change at rates lower than current anthropogenic climate change caused significant ecosystem shifts and species extinctions during the past millions of years. Marine organisms will face progressively lower oxygen levels and high rates and magnitudes of ocean acidification (high confidence), with associated risks exacerbated by rising ocean temperature extremes (medium confidence). Coral reefs and polar ecosystems are highly vulnerable. Coastal systems and low-lying areas are at risk from sea level rise, which will continue for centuries even if the global mean temperature is stabilized (high confidence). {2.3, 2.4, Figure 2.5} Climate change is projected to undermine food security (Figure SPM.9). Due to projected climate change by the mid-21st century and beyond, global marine species redistribution and marine biodiversity reduction in sensitive regions will challenge the sustained provision of fisheries productivity and other ecosystem services (high confidence). For wheat, rice and maize in tropical and temperate regions, climate change without adaptation is projected to negatively impact production for local temperature increases of 2°C or more above late 20th century levels, although individual locations may benefit (medium confidence). Global temperature increases of ~4°C or more 13 above late 20th century levels, combined with increasing food demand, would pose large risks to food security globally (high confidence). Climate change is projected to reduce renewable surface water and groundwater resources in most dry subtropical regions (robust evidence, high agreement), intensifying competition for water among sectors (limited evidence, medium agreement). {2.3.1, 2.3.2} Until mid-century, projected climate change will impact human health mainly by exacerbating health problems that already exist (very high confidence). Throughout the 21st century, climate change is expected to lead to increases in ill-health in many regions and especially in developing countries with low income, as compared to a baseline without climate change (high confidence). By 2100 for RCP8.5, the combination of high temperature and humidity in some areas for parts of the year is expected to compromise common human activities, including growing food and working outdoors (high confidence). {2.3.2} In urban areas climate change is projected to increase risks for people, assets, economies and ecosystems, including risks from heat stress, storms and extreme precipitation, inland and coastal flooding, landslides, air pollution, drought, water scarcity, sea level rise and storm surges (very high confidence). These risks are amplified for those lacking essential infrastructure and services or living in exposed areas. {2.3.2} Rural areas are expected to experience major impacts on water availability and supply, food security, infrastructure and agricultural incomes, including shifts in the production areas of food and non-food crops around the world (high confidence). {2.3.2} Aggregate economic losses accelerate with increasing temperature (limited evidence, high agreement), but global economic impacts from climate change are currently difficult to estimate. From a poverty perspective, climate change impacts are projected to slow down economic growth, make poverty reduction more difficult, further erode food security and prolong existing and create new poverty traps, the latter particularly in urban areas and emerging hotspots of hunger (medium confidence). International dimensions such as trade and relations among states are also important for understanding the risks of climate change at regional scales. {2.3.2} Climate change is projected to increase displacement of people (medium evidence, high agreement). Populations that lack the resources for planned migration experience higher exposure to extreme weather events, particularly in developing countries with low income. Climate change can indirectly increase risks of violent conflicts by amplifying well-documented drivers of these conflicts such as poverty and economic shocks (medium confidence). {2.3.2}
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<h4>Climate change is a <u>system disruptor</u> and a <u>risk amplifier</u>---only mitigation prevents <u>biodiversity loss</u>, <u>marine ecosystem collapse</u>, <u>resource wars</u>, <u>global food scarcity</u>, <u>and extreme weather events.</u> Uniquely—has disparate impacts. </h4><p><strong>Pachauri & Meyer 15 </strong>Rajendra K. Pachauri Chairman of the IPCC, Leo Meyer Head, Technical Support Unit IPCC were the editors for this IPCC report, “Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report” http://epic.awi.de/37530/1/IPCC_AR5_SYR_Final.pdf IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer (eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, 151 pp</p><p>SPM 2.3 Future risks and impacts caused by a changing climate <u>Climate change will <strong>amplify existing risks</strong> and <strong>create new risks for natural and human systems</u></strong>. <u>Risks are unevenly distributed and are generally greater for disadvantaged people</u> and communities in countries<u> at all levels of development</u>. {2.3} Risk of <u>climate-related impacts results from the</u> <u>interaction of climate-related hazards</u> (including hazardous events and trends) <u>with the vulnerability and exposure of human and natural systems</u>, <u>including their ability to adapt</u>. <u><mark>Rising</u></mark> rates and <u><strong><mark>magnitudes of warming</u></strong> <u>and</mark> other changes</u> in the climate system, <u><strong><mark>accompanied</mark> by <mark>ocean acidification</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>increase</mark> <mark>the risk of</mark> severe, </u>pervasive and in some cases <u><mark>irreversible</u></mark> detrimental <u><mark>impacts</u></mark>. Some risks are particularly relevant for individual regions (Figure SPM.8), while others are global. <u>The <mark>overall risks</u></mark> of future climate change impacts <u><mark>can be reduced by <strong>limiting the</mark> rate and <mark>magnitude of climate change</u></strong></mark>, <u>including ocean acidification.</u> <u><mark>The precise levels</u></mark> of climate change sufficient <u>to trigger </u>abrupt and irre<u>versible change <mark>remain uncertain, but the risk associated with <strong>crossing</mark> such <mark>thresholds increases with</mark> rising <mark>temperature</u></strong></mark> (medium confidence). For risk assessment, <u>it is important to <mark>evaluate the</u> <u><strong>widest possible range of impacts</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>including low-probability</mark> outcomes <mark>with large consequences</u></mark>. {1.5, 2.3, 2.4, 3.3, Box Introduction.1, Box 2.3, Box 2.4} <u>A large fraction of <mark>species face</u></mark>s <u><strong>increased <mark>extinction</mark> risk</u></strong> <u>due to climate change</u> during and beyond the 21st century, especially <u>as climate change interacts with other stressors</u> (high confidence). Most <u><mark>plant</mark> species <mark>cannot</mark> naturally <mark>shift their</mark> geographical <mark>ranges</mark> sufficiently fast <mark>to keep up</mark> with current and high projected rates of climate change</u> in most landscapes; most small mammals and freshwater molluscs will not be able to keep up at the rates projected under RCP4.5 and above in flat landscapes in this century (high confidence). Future risk is indicated to be high by the observation that<u> natural global climate change at rates lower than current anthropogenic climate change caused significant ecosystem shifts and species extinctions during the past millions of years</u>. <u><strong><mark>Marine organisms</mark> will <mark>face</mark> progressively <mark>low</u></strong></mark>er <u><strong><mark>oxygen levels</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>and</mark> high rates and magnitudes of ocean <mark>acidification</u></mark> (high confidence), <u>with associated risks <mark>exacerbated by rising ocean temperature</mark> extremes</u> (medium confidence). <u><strong><mark>Coral</mark> reefs <mark>and polar ecosystems are</mark> highly <mark>vulnerable</u></strong></mark>. Coastal systems and low-lying areas are at risk from sea level rise, which will continue for centuries even if the global mean temperature is stabilized (high confidence). {2.3, 2.4, Figure 2.5} <u>Climate change is projected to <mark>undermine food security</u></mark> (Figure SPM.9). <u>Due to</u> projected climate change by the mid-21st century and beyond, <u>global marine species redistribution and marine <mark>biod</u></mark>iversity <u><mark>reduction</mark> in sensitive regions will</u> <u><strong><mark>challenge</mark> the <mark>sustained provision of fisheries</u></strong></mark> <u>productivity and other ecosystem services</u> (high confidence). <u>For <mark>wheat, rice and</u> <u>maize</mark> in tropical and temperate regions</u>, <u><mark>climate change</mark> without adaptation is projected to <mark>negatively impact production</u></mark> for local temperature increases of 2°C or more above late 20th century levels, although individual locations may benefit (medium confidence). <u>Global temperature increases of ~<mark>4°C</mark> or more </u>13 above late 20th century levels, <u>combined <mark>with increasing food demand</mark>, would <mark>pose</mark> large <mark>risks to</u> <u><strong>food</mark> security <mark>globally</mark> </u></strong>(high confidence). <u>Climate change is projected to <mark>reduce</mark> renewable <strong><mark>surface</mark> water <mark>and groundwater</mark> resources</u></strong> in most dry subtropical regions (robust evidence, high agreement), <u><strong><mark>intensifying competition</mark> for water among sectors</u></strong> (limited evidence, medium agreement). {2.3.1, 2.3.2} Until mid-century, projected <u><mark>climate change will </mark>impact human health mainly by <mark>exacerbat</u></mark>ing <u><mark>health problems</mark> that already exist</u> (very high confidence). Throughout the 21st century, <u>climate change is expected to lead to <strong>increases in ill-health</u></strong> <u>in many regions and <mark>especially in</u></mark> developing <u><mark>countries with low income</u></mark>, as compared to a baseline without climate change (high confidence). By 2100 for RCP8.5, <u>the combination of <mark>high temperature and humidity</u></mark> in some areas for parts of the year <u>is expected to <mark>compromise</mark> common human activities</u>, <u>including <mark>growing food</mark> <mark>and working outdoors</u></mark> (high confidence). {2.3.2} <u>In urban areas climate change is projected to <mark>increase risks</mark> for people, assets, economies and ecosystems</u>, including risks <u><mark>from <strong>heat stress</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>storms</u></strong></mark> and <u><strong><mark>extreme precipitation</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>inland and coastal <mark>flooding,</u></strong> <u><strong>landslides</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>air pollution</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>drought</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>water scarcity</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>sea level rise</u></strong> <u>and storm surges</u></mark> (very high confidence). <u>These risks are <mark>amplified for those</mark> <mark>lacking</mark> essential</u> <u><mark>infrastructure</mark> and services </u>or living in exposed areas. {2.3.2} <u>Rural areas are expected to experience</u> <u>major impacts on water availability </u>and <u>supply, food security, infrastructure and agricultural incomes</u>, including shifts in the production areas of food and non-food crops around the world (high confidence). {2.3.2} <u><strong>Aggregate <mark>economic losses accelerate with</mark> increasing <mark>temperature</u></strong></mark> (limited evidence, high agreement), but global economic impacts from climate change are currently difficult to estimate. <u>From a poverty perspective</u>, <u><strong>climate change impacts are projected <mark>to slow down</mark> economic <mark>growth</u></strong></mark>, <u>make poverty reduction more difficult</u>, <u>further erode food security <mark>and</mark> prolong <strong>existing and <mark>create new poverty traps</u></strong></mark>, the latter particularly in urban areas and emerging hotspots of hunger (medium confidence). International dimensions such as trade and relations among states are also important for understanding the risks of climate change at regional scales. {2.3.2} <u>Climate change is projected <mark>to</mark> increase <mark>displace</u>ment</mark> <u><mark>of people</u></mark> (medium evidence, high agreement). <u>Populations that lack the resources for planned migration experience</u> higher exposure to extreme weather events, <u>particularly in developing countries with low income</u>. <u><strong>Climate change can indirectly increase <mark>risks of</mark> violent <mark>conflicts</u></strong></mark> <u>by <mark>amplify</u></mark>ing<u> well-documented <mark>drivers of</mark> these <mark>conflicts</mark> such as <mark>poverty and economic shocks</u></mark> (medium confidence). {2.3.2}</p>
|
2NC
|
DA – FISM
|
2NC – O/V
| 58,670 | 373 | 55,512 |
./documents/hspolicy20/Interlake/ChPa/Interlake-Chen-Pal-Neg-GBX-Round3.docx
| 730,493 |
N
|
GBX
|
3
|
GBS MJ
|
Kevin Hirn
|
1AC - Abolish CJS
1NC - T-USFG WCC PIC 13th CP FISM DA Cap K Presumption
2NR - WCC PIC
|
hspolicy20/Interlake/ChPa/Interlake-Chen-Pal-Neg-GBX-Round3.docx
| null | 62,389 |
ChPa
|
Interlake ChPa
| null |
Br.....
|
Ch.....
|
Sa.....
|
Pa.....
| 21,651 |
Interlake
|
Interlake
|
WA
| null | 1,019 |
hspolicy20
|
HS Policy 2020-21
| 2,020 |
cx
|
hs
| 2 |
2,039,738 |
It’s reverse causal – norms shift international market incentives and change behavior of other states, even ones that already have FRT.
|
Sherman 19. was a Cybersecurity Policy Fellow at New America, fellow at the Atlantic Council's Cyber Statecraft Initiative, works with the Tech, Law, & Security Program at American University Washington College of Law, BS in Computer Science and BA in Political Science from Duke. “The Long View of Digital Authoritarianism”. New America. Jun 20 2019. https://www.newamerica.org/weekly/long-view-digital-authoritarianism/.
|
Justin Sherman 19. was a Cybersecurity Policy Fellow at New America, fellow at the Atlantic Council's Cyber Statecraft Initiative, works with the Tech, Law, & Security Program at American University Washington College of Law, BS in Computer Science and BA in Political Science from Duke. “The Long View of Digital Authoritarianism”. New America. Jun 20 2019. https://www.newamerica.org/weekly/long-view-digital-authoritarianism/.
Domestic Example-Setting
|
China, Russia, and the United States have influenced the spread of digital authoritarianism online (or the lack thereof) via domestic example-setting viability and attractiveness of internet governance models in such large and influential countries impacts policy decisions outside those countries’ borders.
Beijing and Moscow in particular have provided viable technical and policy models that allow for censoring foreign news content and cracking down on online dissent. China’s use of sophisticated internet monitoring and filtering tools has long provided the government robust capabilities to control the flow of online content. Russia, meanwhile, is advancing plans for a national internet that would push internet fragmentation much deeper than ever before—not just filtering content on top of the internet, but altering the internet’s architecture itself. The economic benefits of a global and open internet, in contrast, have been at the core of policy documents in democratic countries like the United States that stand against digital authoritarianism online.
the capabilities that digital authoritarians demonstrate are attractive to many countries many are acting on it, as governments around the world crack down on dissent and embrace digital authoritarianism following quite closely the examples set by world powers. These policies enable authoritarian governments to further consolidate power and manage domestic instability.
When considering the emerging use of artificial intelligence in the service of digital authoritarianism policymakers ought to keep in mind the importance of domestic example-setting The fashions in which influential countries like the United States, China, and Russia engage with AI can influence other smaller states’ decisions they can also shape markets in ways that attempt to fight malicious uses of AI For countries looking to digital authoritarianism, it’s not just about having the capability (i.e., through tech exports), but about seeing how others use it.
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China and the U S influence digital authoritarianism via domestic example-setting attractiveness of governance models in influential countries impacts decisions outside borders
Beijing have provided viable policy models
many are following closely the examples set by world powers. These policies enable authoritarian governments to further consolidate power and manage domestic instability.
The fashions in which the U S engage with AI influence smaller states’ decisions they shape markets in ways that fight malicious uses For countries looking to digital authoritarianism it’s not just about capability through exports but seeing how others use it.
|
Second, world powers like China, Russia, and the United States have influenced the spread of digital authoritarianism online (or the lack thereof) via domestic example-setting. This is because the viability and attractiveness of internet governance models in such large and influential countries—for instance, the ways in which a global and open internet boosts the economy, or the ways in which digital authoritarianism allows leaders to consolidate control over information flows—impacts policy decisions outside those countries’ borders.
Beijing and Moscow in particular have provided viable technical and policy models that allow for censoring foreign news content and cracking down on online dissent. China’s use of sophisticated internet monitoring and filtering tools has long provided the government robust capabilities to control the flow of online content. Russia, meanwhile, is advancing plans for a national internet that would push internet fragmentation much deeper than ever before—not just filtering content on top of the internet, but altering the internet’s architecture itself. The economic benefits of a global and open internet, in contrast, have been at the core of policy documents in democratic countries like the United States that stand against digital authoritarianism online.
In the current political and information climate, the capabilities that digital authoritarians demonstrate are attractive to many countries. And many are acting on it, as governments around the world crack down on dissent and embrace digital authoritarianism online—oftentimes, following quite closely the examples set by world powers. These policies enable authoritarian governments to further consolidate power and manage domestic instability.
When considering the emerging use of artificial intelligence in the service of digital authoritarianism, then, policymakers ought to keep in mind the importance of domestic example-setting. The fashions in which influential countries like the United States, India, China, and Russia engage with AI can influence other smaller states’ decisions; they can also shape markets in ways that, say, attempt to fight malicious uses of AI. For countries looking to digital authoritarianism, it’s not just about having the capability (i.e., through tech exports), but about seeing how others use it.
| 2,339 |
<h4>It’s reverse causal – norms shift <u>international market incentives</u> and <u>change behavior</u> of other states, <u>even ones</u> that already have FRT. </h4><p>Justin <strong>Sherman 19<u>. was a Cybersecurity Policy Fellow at New America, fellow at the Atlantic Council's Cyber Statecraft Initiative, works with the Tech, Law, & Security Program at American University Washington College of Law, BS in Computer Science and BA in Political Science from Duke. “The Long View of Digital Authoritarianism”. New America. Jun 20 2019. https://www.newamerica.org/weekly/long-view-digital-authoritarianism/. </p><p>Domestic Example-Setting</p><p></u></strong>Second, world powers like <u><mark>China</mark>, Russia, <mark>and the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates have <mark>influence</mark>d the spread of <mark>digital authoritarianism </mark>online (<strong>or the lack thereof</strong>) <mark>via <strong>domestic example-setting</u></strong></mark>. This is because the <u><strong>viability and <mark>attractiveness of </mark>internet <mark>governance models</strong> in </mark>such <strong>large and <mark>influential countries</u></strong></mark>—for instance, the ways in which a global and open internet boosts the economy, or the ways in which digital authoritarianism allows leaders to consolidate control over information flows—<u><mark>impacts </mark>policy <mark>decisions outside </mark>those countries’ <mark>borders</mark>.</p><p><mark>Beijing </mark>and Moscow in particular <mark>have provided <strong>viable </mark>technical and <mark>policy models</u></strong> <u><strong></mark>that allow for censoring foreign news content and cracking down on online dissent. China’s use of sophisticated internet monitoring and filtering tools has long provided the government robust capabilities to control the flow of online content. Russia, meanwhile, is advancing plans for a national internet that would push internet fragmentation much deeper than ever before—not just filtering content on top of the internet, but altering the internet’s architecture itself. The economic benefits of a global and open internet, in contrast, have been at the core of policy documents in democratic countries like the United States that stand against digital authoritarianism online.</p><p></u></strong>In the current political and information climate, <u>the capabilities that digital authoritarians demonstrate are <strong>attractive to many countries</u></strong>. And <u><mark>many are </mark>acting on it, as governments around the world <strong>crack down on dissent and embrace digital authoritarianism</u></strong> online—oftentimes, <u><strong><mark>following </mark>quite <mark>closely the examples set by world powers. These policies enable authoritarian governments to further consolidate power and manage domestic instability.</p><p></strong></mark>When considering the <strong>emerging use of artificial intelligence</u></strong> <u><strong>in the service of digital authoritarianism</u></strong>, then, <u>policymakers ought to <strong>keep in mind the importance of domestic example-setting</u></strong>. <u><mark>The fashions in which <strong></mark>influential countries like <mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</strong>, </u>India,<u> China, and Russia <mark>engage with AI </mark>can <strong><mark>influence </mark>other <mark>smaller states’ decisions</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong><mark>they </mark>can also <mark>shape markets in ways that</u></strong></mark>, say, <u>attempt to <mark>fight malicious uses </mark>of AI</u>. <u><strong><mark>For countries looking to digital authoritarianism</mark>, <mark>it’s not just about </mark>having the <mark>capability </mark>(i.e., <mark>through </mark>tech <mark>exports</mark>), <mark>but </mark>about <mark>seeing how others use it.</p></u></strong></mark>
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1ac – faces – sb
|
1ac – send – michigan
|
democracy ADV – 1ac
| 19,287 | 100 | 60,463 |
./documents/hspolicy20/Westminster/BaSa/Westminster-Bald-Sayers-Aff-michigan-Semis.docx
| 741,863 |
A
|
michigan
|
Semis
|
new trier hm
|
hirn, reese, scott
|
1ac - faces - democracy cyber
1nc - t subsets settler colonialism k
2nr - k
|
hspolicy20/Westminster/BaSa/Westminster-Bald-Sayers-Aff-michigan-Semis.docx
| null | 63,212 |
BaSa
|
Westminster BaSa
| null |
Ho.....
|
Ba.....
|
Be.....
|
Sa.....
| 21,854 |
Westminster
|
Westminster
|
GA
| null | 1,019 |
hspolicy20
|
HS Policy 2020-21
| 2,020 |
cx
|
hs
| 2 |
1,541,102 |
2] The exercise of practical rationality requires that one regards practical rationality as intrinsically good – that justifies a right to freedom.
|
Wood 07 [Allen W. Wood, (Stanford University, California) "Kantian Ethics" Cambridge University Press, 2007, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/kantian-ethics/769B8CD9FCC74DB6870189AE1645FAC8, DOA:8-12-2020 // WWBW]
|
Wood 07 [Allen W. Wood, (Stanford University, California) "Kantian Ethics" Cambridge University Press, 2007, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/kantian-ethics/769B8CD9FCC74DB6870189AE1645FAC8, DOA:8-12-2020 // WWBW]
|
the most basic act through which people exercise their practical rationality is that of setting an end any being which sets itself ends is committed to regarding its end as good in this sense, and also to regarding the goodness of its end as what also makes application of the means good – that is, rationally required independently of any inclination to apply it. the rational being must also necessarily regard its own rational capacities as authoritative for what is good in general. to regard one’s capacities in this way is also to take a certain attitude toward oneself as the being that has and exercises those capacities. that capacity through which we can represent the very idea of something as good both as end and as means is not represented merely as the object of a contingent inclination, nor is it represented as good only as a means. It must be esteemed as unconditionally good, as an end in itself. the rational nature in every person is an end in itself whether the person is morally good or bad.
|
the most basic act through which people exercise practical rationality is setting an end any being which sets itself ends is committed to regarding the goodness of its end as what also makes application of the means good the rational being must also necessarily regard its own rational capacities as authoritative for what is good that capacity through which we can represent something as good must be unconditionally good
|
Kant holds that the most basic act through which people exercise their practical rationality is that of setting an end (G 4:437). To set an end is, analytically, to subject yourself to the hypothetical imperative that you should take the necessary means to the end you have set (G 4:417). This is the claim that you rationally ought to do something whether or not you are at the moment inclined to do it. It represents the action of applying that means as good (G 4:414) – in the sense of “good” that Kant explicates as: what is required by reason independently of inclination (G 4:413). Kant correctly infers that any being which sets itself ends is committed to regarding its end as good in this sense, and also to regarding the goodness of its end as what also makes application of the means good – that is, rationally required independently of any inclination to apply it. The act of setting an end, therefore, must be taken as committing you to represent some other act (the act of applying the means) as good. In doing all this, however, the rational being must also necessarily regard its own rational capacities as authoritative for what is good in general. For it treats these capacities as capable of determining which ends are good, and at the same time as grounding the goodness of the means taken toward those good ends. But to regard one’s capacities in this way is also to take a certain attitude toward oneself as the being that has and exercises those capacities. It is to esteem oneself – and also to esteem the correct exercise of one’s rational capacities in determining what is good both as an end and as a means to it. One’s other capacities, such as those needed to perform the action that is good as a means, are also regarded as good as means. But that capacity through which we can represent the very idea of something as good both as end and as means is not represented merely as the object of a contingent inclination, nor is it represented as good only as a means. It must be esteemed as unconditionally good, as an end in itself. To find this value in oneself is not at all the same as thinking of oneself as a good person. Even those who misuse their rational capacities are committed to esteeming themselves as possessing rational nature. It also does not imply that a more intelligent person (in that sense, more “rational”) is “better” than a less intelligent one. The self-esteem involved in setting an end applies to any being capable of setting an end at all, irrespective of the cleverness or even the morality of the end setting. Kant’s argument supports the conclusion, to which he adheres with admirable consistency throughout his writings, that all rational beings, clever or stupid, even good or evil, have equal (absolute) worth as ends in themselves. For Kantian ethics the rational nature in every person is an end in itself whether the person is morally good or bad.
| 2,913 |
<h4>2] The exercise of practical rationality requires that one regards practical rationality as intrinsically good – that justifies a right to freedom.</h4><p><strong>Wood 07 <u>[Allen W. Wood, (Stanford University, California) "Kantian Ethics" Cambridge University Press, 2007, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/kantian-ethics/769B8CD9FCC74DB6870189AE1645FAC8, DOA:8-12-2020 // WWBW]</p><p></u></strong>Kant holds that <u><strong><mark>the most basic act through which people exercise</mark> their <mark>practical rationality is</mark> that of <mark>setting an end</u></strong></mark> (G 4:437). To set an end is, analytically, to subject yourself to the hypothetical imperative that you should take the necessary means to the end you have set (G 4:417). This is the claim that you rationally ought to do something whether or not you are at the moment inclined to do it. It represents the action of applying that means as good (G 4:414) – in the sense of “good” that Kant explicates as: what is required by reason independently of inclination (G 4:413). Kant correctly infers that <u><strong><mark>any being which sets itself ends is committed</mark> to regarding its end as good in this sense, and also <mark>to regarding the goodness of its end as what also makes application of the means good</mark> – that is, rationally required independently of any inclination to apply it.</u></strong> The act of setting an end, therefore, must be taken as committing you to represent some other act (the act of applying the means) as good. In doing all this, however, <u><strong><mark>the rational being must also necessarily regard its own rational capacities as authoritative for what is good</mark> in general.</u></strong> For it treats these capacities as capable of determining which ends are good, and at the same time as grounding the goodness of the means taken toward those good ends. But <u><strong>to regard one’s capacities in this way is also to take a certain attitude toward oneself as the being that has and exercises those capacities. </u></strong>It is to esteem oneself – and also to esteem the correct exercise of one’s rational capacities in determining what is good both as an end and as a means to it. One’s other capacities, such as those needed to perform the action that is good as a means, are also regarded as good as means. But <u><strong><mark>that capacity through which we can represent</mark> the very idea of <mark>something as good</mark> both as end and as means is not represented merely as the object of a contingent inclination, nor is it represented as good only as a means. It <mark>must be</mark> esteemed as <mark>unconditionally good</mark>, as an end in itself.</u></strong> To find this value in oneself is not at all the same as thinking of oneself as a good person. Even those who misuse their rational capacities are committed to esteeming themselves as possessing rational nature. It also does not imply that a more intelligent person (in that sense, more “rational”) is “better” than a less intelligent one. The self-esteem involved in setting an end applies to any being capable of setting an end at all, irrespective of the cleverness or even the morality of the end setting. Kant’s argument supports the conclusion, to which he adheres with admirable consistency throughout his writings, that all rational beings, clever or stupid, even good or evil, have equal (absolute) worth as ends in themselves. For Kantian ethics <u><strong>the rational nature in every person is an end in itself whether the person is morally good or bad.</p></u></strong>
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1AC vs. Peter Eaton
|
1ac
|
Framework
| 340,542 | 220 | 44,116 |
./documents/hsld21/TraberRobinsonMcLoughlin/Ve/Traber%20Robinson%20McLoughlin-Verma-Aff-NSD%20Camp%20Tournament-Round5.docx
| 901,191 |
A
|
NSD Camp Tournament
|
5
|
Peter Eaton
|
Cameron McConoway
|
1AC - Pettit
1NC - Util - Climate DA - A Prioris - Must Ask to Spread - Case
1AR - A Prioris Bad - Must Ask to Spread - Case - A Prioris - Util
2NR - A prioris Bad - must ask to spread - util
2AR - A prioris bad
the interp was extemped
|
hsld21/TraberRobinsonMcLoughlin/Ve/Traber%20Robinson%20McLoughlin-Verma-Aff-NSD%20Camp%20Tournament-Round5.docx
| null | 75,428 |
ArVe
|
Traber Robinson McLoughlin ArVe
| null |
Ar.....
|
Ve.....
| null | null | 25,194 |
TraberRobinsonMcLoughlin
|
Traber Robinson McLoughlin
|
MN
| null | 1,029 |
hsld21
|
HS LD 2021-22
| 2,021 |
ld
|
hs
| 1 |
545,679 |
The plan requires SSO’s to administer reasonable action to prohibit ex post opportunism---that strengthens FRAND effectiveness while enabling SEP holders to capture appropriate royalties---which is the best competition-innovation balance.
|
Melamed & Shapiro 18
|
Melamed & Shapiro 18, *A. Douglas Melamed is Professor of the Practice of Law at Stanford Law School; *Carl Shapiro is the Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy at the Haas School of Business at the University of California at Berkeley; (May 2018, “How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective”, https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/How-Antitrust-Law-Can-Make-FRAND-Commitments-More-Effective.pdf)
|
The principle is straightforward industry-wide collaboration to establish procompetitive standards is permitted only if it is no more restrictive of competition than reasonably necessary to enable creation of the standards When standard setting creates technology monopolies that will enable anticompetitive ex post opportunism that would otherwise not occur an SSO that does not take effective measures to pre- vent or minimize opportunism engages in conduct that is more restrictive of competition the SSO and its members may well violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act
SSO procedures and FRAND rules should be evaluated based on whether they lead to reasonable SEP royalties using the competitive ex ante licensing standard which has been adopted by the courts in patent law FRAND rules should be evaluated based on their ability to prevent SEP holders from obtaining more than the ex ante value of their technology from implementers
This limitation would not prevent a SEP holder from profiting perhaps greatly from participating in the SSO and having patented technology included in the standard The SEP holder continues to be rewarded for its technology because inclusion of its technology can still greatly increase the volume of licensing opportunities
the case would be structured as an ordinary Rule of Reason case
the plaintiff would have to demonstrate harm to competition many of which compete with one another the harm to competition would stem from the ability of the SEP holder to exercise monopoly power by obtaining royalties in excess of the competitive ex ante level The decision to include patented technologies in the standard would be the allegedly unlawful agreement the court need not determine what a FRAND royalty is it would suffice to determine that market power has been created or exercised and that existing SSO rules and policies were not adequate to prevent the competitive harm
if the plaintiff makes the requisite showing of harm to competition the defendant(s) would then have to show some procompetitive justification the benefits of the standard
if as is likely the defendant is able to show a procompetitive justification the plaintiff would have to show that the SSO could have used available reasonable alternatives to realize efficiency benefits with less or none of the competitive harms The plaintiff might identify reasonable alternatives that would have led to a different standard based on including unpatented technology in the standard or perhaps involving fewer SEPs or fewer owners of SEPs which would be less subject to patent holdup the plaintiff could suggest alternative SSO rules that would reduce the likelihood or extent of ex post opportunism
the burden would then shift to the defendant(s) to show that the benefits of the standard could not have been realized if the SSO had adopted any of the proffered alternatives
Our overall sense is that the extant FRAND rules are useful but tend to be inadequate because they are imprecise and leave unresolved such critical issues as the meaning of a reasonable royalty the meaning of non-discriminatory to whom licenses must be offered and under what circumstances may a SEP holder obtain an injunction These imprecise FRAND commitments are therefore not sufficient to adequately prevent ex post opportunism recent revisions to IEEE’s FRAND policy leaves important questions unanswered litigation involving extant FRAND rules would likely be resolved only at the final step The defendant would be able to demonstrate the benefits created by the standard the plaintiff would be able to demonstrate the creation of market power and that other reasonable and practical rules would ameliorate the problem
The court would have available a variety of possible remedies if the plaintiff prevails Implementers that paid supracompetitive royalties or were unlawfully excluded would be entitled to damages to treble damages If the unlawful SSO conduct is regarded as the collective action SSO members would be jointly and severally liable for the damages Forward-looking injunctive relief would need to be fashioned to the requirements of the individual case a court could order the SSO to adopt a new rule it might give the SSO a period of time to develop a rule the court might order the parties to attempt to negotiate a rule or policy on which they can agree
|
industry-wide collaboration is permitted only if it is no more restrictive than reasonably necessary to enable creation of standards an SSO that does not measures to pre- vent opportunism engages in conduct that may well violate the Sherman Act
procedures should be evaluated on whether they lead to reasonable royalties using the competitive ex ante licensing standard adopted by the courts
This would not prevent a SEP holder from profiting greatly The SEP holder continues to be rewarded because inclusion can greatly increase the volume of licensing opportunities
the plaintiff would have to demonstrate harm to competition
the defendant(s) would then show some procompetitive justification
the plaintiff would have to show the SSO could have used alternatives to realize efficiency benefits with less competitive harms
the burden would then shift to the defendant(s)
The court would have a variety of possible remedies Implementers would be entitled to damages If the unlawful SSO conduct is collective members would be jointly and severally liable the court might order parties to negotiate a rule on which they can agree
|
3. Application of the Basic Legal Principles
The antitrust principle is straightforward: industry-wide collaboration through SSOs to establish procompetitive standards is permitted only if it is no more restrictive of competition than reasonably necessary to enable creation of the standards. When standard setting predictably creates technology monopolies that, if unrestrained, will enable anticompetitive ex post opportunism that would otherwise not occur, an SSO that does not take effective measures to pre- vent or minimize such ex post opportunism engages in conduct that is more restrictive of competition than necessary. In that case, the SSO and, in appropriate cases, its members, may well violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Under this principle, SSO procedures and FRAND rules should be evaluated based on whether they lead to reasonable SEP royalties, using the competitive ex ante licensing standard discussed above, which has been adopted by the courts in patent law. Put differently, FRAND rules should be evaluated based on their ability to prevent SEP holders from obtaining more than the ex ante value of their technology from implementers.
This limitation would not prevent a SEP holder from profiting, perhaps greatly, from participating in the SSO and having its patented technology included in the standard. The SEP holder continues to be rewarded for its technology because the inclusion of its technology in the standard can still greatly increase the volume of licensing opportunities available to the SEP holder.
Whether a particular set of FRAND rules are sufficiently effective in preventing ex post opportunism will depend on the particular circumstances. The procedural unfolding of the case will also depend upon the circumstances. As a general matter, the case would probably be structured as an ordinary Rule of Reason case.82
First, the plaintiff would have to demonstrate harm to competition as a result of the collaboration of the SSO’s members, many of which compete with one another. In this case, the harm to competition would stem from the ability of the SEP holder to exercise monopoly power by obtaining royalties in excess of the competitive, ex ante level. The decision to include patented technologies in the standard would be the allegedly unlawful agreement. Notably, the court need not determine what a FRAND royalty is; it would suffice to determine that market power has been created or exercised, and that existing SSO rules and policies were not adequate to prevent the competitive harm. The defendant, which could be the SSO or perhaps one or more SSO members, would win at this point if the plaintiff failed to show harm to competition. If might fail if the standard faces substantial competition and the court concludes that the SEP holder therefore does not have market power or if the SSO’s rules and policies are found to be effective in preventing ex post opportunism, even if the plaintiff or even the court thinks that other rules and policies would be preferable.
Second, if the plaintiff makes the requisite showing of harm to competition, the defendant(s) would then have to show some procompetitive justification— in this case, the benefits of the standard. These two initial steps should be straightforward.
Third, if as is likely the defendant is able to show a procompetitive justification, the plaintiff would have to show that the SSO could have used available, reasonable alternatives to realize the efficiency benefits with less or none of the competitive harms. The plaintiff might identify reasonable alternatives that would have led to a different standard, based on including unpatented technology in the standard or perhaps involving fewer SEPs or fewer owners of SEPs, which would be less subject to patent holdup. More likely, the plaintiff could suggest alternative SSO rules that would not change the standard, but would reduce the likelihood or extent of ex post opportunism. For example, the plaintiff might suggest more rigorous FRAND-type rules, such as rules that set forth more precise principles on which FRAND royalties are to be determined and the circumstances under which SEP holders might seek injunctions.
Fourth, the burden would then shift to the defendant(s) to show that the benefits of the standard could not have been realized if the SSO had adopted any of the proffered alternatives or that those alternatives were unrealistic.83 The plaintiff would be entitled to judgment if the court concludes that those benefits could have been realized with less competitive harm if the SSO had adopted the standard with different IPR rules or policies.
Our overall sense, based on experience and the empirical literature, is that the extant FRAND rules are generally useful, but tend to be inadequate because they are imprecise and leave unresolved such critical issues as (a) the meaning of a reasonable royalty, even conceptually; (b) the meaning of “non-discriminatory;” (c) to whom licenses must be offered; and (d) under what circumstances may a SEP holder obtain an injunction.84 These imprecise FRAND commitments are therefore not sufficient to adequately prevent ex post opportunism. The recent revisions to IEEE’s FRAND policy represent a significant step in the right direction, but even this advance leaves important questions unanswered.85 If FRAND rules are inadequate in these ways, litigation involving extant FRAND rules would likely be resolved only at the final, fourth step. The defendant would be able to demonstrate the benefits created by the standard; the plaintiff would be able to demonstrate the creation of market power and that other reasonable and practical rules or policies would ameliorate the problem. The case would thus turn on whether the defendant is able to demonstrate that significant benefits associated with standardization could not have been realized if the SSO had adopted those other rules or policies.
The court would have available a variety of possible remedies if the plaintiff prevails. Implementers that paid supracompetitive royalties or were unlawfully excluded in whole or in part from product markets as a result of the inadequate FRAND policies would be entitled to damages and, in some cases, to treble damages.86 If the unlawful SSO conduct is regarded as the collective action of the SSO and its members, which is likely to be the case in most instances, SSO members would be jointly and severally liable for the damages. Forward-looking injunctive relief aimed at restoring competition would need to be fashioned to the requirements of the individual case. For example, a court could order the SSO to adopt a new rule or policy proposed by the plaintiff. If the court is reluctant to take on that governance role, it might give the SSO a period of time—maybe ninety days—to develop a rule, subject to the court’s ultimate approval, which would adequately ameliorate the competitive problem created by the SSO. Alternatively or in addition, the court might order the parties to attempt to negotiate a rule or policy on which they can agree. And, depending on the circumstances, the court might order SEP holders, including at least those that were defendants in the case, to comply with the new SSO rules and policies.
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<h4>The plan requires SSO’s to administer reasonable action to prohibit ex post opportunism---that <u>strengthens FRAND effectiveness</u> while <u>enabling SEP holders</u> to capture <u>appropriate royalties</u>---which is the <u>best</u> competition-innovation balance.</h4><p><strong>Melamed & Shapiro 18</strong>, *A. Douglas Melamed is Professor of the Practice of Law at Stanford Law School; *Carl Shapiro is the Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy at the Haas School of Business at the University of California at Berkeley; (May 2018, “How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective”, https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/How-Antitrust-Law-Can-Make-FRAND-Commitments-More-Effective.pdf)</p><p>3. Application of the Basic Legal Principles</p><p><u>The</u> antitrust <u>principle is <strong>straightforward</u></strong>: <u><mark>industry-wide collaboration</u></mark> through SSOs <u>to establish procompetitive standards <mark>is <strong>permitted</u></strong> <u>only if it is <strong>no more restrictive</strong></mark> of competition <mark>than <strong>reasonably</strong> necessary to enable creation of</mark> the <mark>standards</u></mark>. <u>When standard setting</u> predictably <u>creates technology <strong>monopolies</u></strong> <u>that</u>, if unrestrained, <u>will enable <strong>anticompetitive</u></strong> <u>ex post <strong>opportunism</u></strong> <u>that would otherwise not occur</u>, <u><mark>an SSO that <strong>does not</strong></mark> take <strong>effective</strong> <mark>measures to pre- vent</mark> or minimize</u> such ex post <u><mark>opportunism engages in conduct that</mark> is <strong>more restrictive</u></strong> <u>of competition</u> than necessary. In that case, <u>the SSO and</u>, in appropriate cases, <u>its members</u>, <u><mark>may well <strong>violate</mark> Section 1</strong> of <mark>the <strong>Sherman Act</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>Under this principle, <u>SSO <mark>procedures</mark> and FRAND rules <mark>should be <strong>evaluated</u></strong></mark> <u>based <mark>on whether they lead to <strong>reasonable</strong></mark> SEP <strong><mark>royalties</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>using the competitive ex ante licensing standard</u></mark> discussed above, <u>which has been <strong><mark>adopted</strong> by the courts</mark> in patent law</u>. Put differently, <u>FRAND rules should be evaluated based on their ability to prevent SEP holders from obtaining <strong>more</strong> than the <strong>ex ante value</strong> of their <strong>technology</strong> from implementers</u>.</p><p><u><mark>This</mark> limitation <strong><mark>would not</strong> prevent a SEP holder from <strong>profiting</u></strong></mark>, <u>perhaps <strong><mark>greatly</u></strong></mark>, <u>from participating in the SSO and having</u> its <u>patented technology included in the standard</u>. <u><mark>The SEP holder <strong>continues</strong> to be <strong>rewarded</strong></mark> for its technology <mark>because</u></mark> the <u><mark>inclusion</mark> of its technology</u> in the standard <u><mark>can</mark> still <strong><mark>greatly increase</strong> the volume of licensing opportunities</u></mark> available to the SEP holder.</p><p>Whether a particular set of FRAND rules are sufficiently effective in preventing ex post opportunism will depend on the particular circumstances. The procedural unfolding of the case will also depend upon the circumstances. As a general matter, <u>the case would</u> probably <u>be structured as an ordinary <strong>Rule of Reason</strong> case</u>.82</p><p>First, <u><mark>the plaintiff would have to demonstrate <strong>harm</strong> to <strong>competition</u></strong></mark> as a result of the collaboration of the SSO’s members, <u>many of which compete with one another</u>. In this case, <u>the harm to competition would stem from the ability of the SEP holder to exercise <strong>monopoly</strong> power by obtaining royalties in <strong>excess</strong> of the <strong>competitive</u></strong>, <u>ex ante level</u>. <u>The decision to include patented technologies in the standard would be the allegedly <strong>unlawful</strong> agreement</u>. Notably, <u>the court <strong>need not</strong> determine what a FRAND royalty is</u>; <u>it would <strong>suffice</strong> to <strong>determine</strong> that <strong>market power</strong> has been <strong>created</strong> or <strong>exercised</u></strong>, <u>and that existing SSO rules and policies were <strong>not adequate</strong> to prevent the competitive harm</u>. The defendant, which could be the SSO or perhaps one or more SSO members, would win at this point if the plaintiff failed to show harm to competition. If might fail if the standard faces substantial competition and the court concludes that the SEP holder therefore does not have market power or if the SSO’s rules and policies are found to be effective in preventing ex post opportunism, even if the plaintiff or even the court thinks that other rules and policies would be preferable.</p><p>Second, <u>if the plaintiff makes the requisite showing of harm to competition</u>, <u><mark>the <strong>defendant(s)</strong> would then</mark> have to <mark>show some <strong>procompetitive justification</u></strong></mark>— in this case, <u>the <strong>benefits</strong> of the standard</u>. These two initial steps should be straightforward.</p><p>Third, <u>if as is likely the defendant is able to show a procompetitive justification</u>, <u><mark>the plaintiff would have to show</mark> that <mark>the SSO could have used</mark> available</u>, <u>reasonable <strong><mark>alternatives</strong> to realize</u></mark> the <u><strong><mark>efficiency benefits</strong> with less</mark> or <strong>none</strong> of the <mark>competitive <strong>harms</u></strong></mark>. <u>The plaintiff might identify reasonable <strong>alternatives</strong> that would have led to a <strong>different</strong> standard</u>, <u>based on including <strong>unpatented</strong> technology in the standard or perhaps involving <strong>fewer SEPs</u></strong> <u>or <strong>fewer owners</strong> of SEPs</u>, <u>which would be <strong>less subject</strong> to patent holdup</u>. More likely, <u>the plaintiff could suggest alternative SSO rules that would</u> not change the standard, but would <u><strong>reduce</strong> the <strong>likelihood</strong> or extent of ex post <strong>opportunism</u></strong>. For example, the plaintiff might suggest more rigorous FRAND-type rules, such as rules that set forth more precise principles on which FRAND royalties are to be determined and the circumstances under which SEP holders might seek injunctions.</p><p>Fourth, <u><mark>the burden would then shift to the defendant(s)</mark> to show that the benefits of the standard <strong>could not</strong> have been <strong>realized</strong> if the SSO had adopted any of the proffered <strong>alternatives</u></strong> or that those alternatives were unrealistic.83 The plaintiff would be entitled to judgment if the court concludes that those benefits could have been realized with less competitive harm if the SSO had adopted the standard with different IPR rules or policies.</p><p><u>Our overall sense</u>, based on experience and the empirical literature, <u>is that the extant FRAND rules are</u> generally <u>useful</u>, <u>but tend to be <strong>inadequate</strong> because they are <strong>imprecise</strong> and leave <strong>unresolved</strong> such critical issues as</u> (a) <u>the meaning of a <strong>reasonable</strong> royalty</u>, even conceptually; (b) <u>the meaning of</u> “<u><strong>non-discriminatory</u></strong>;” (c) <u>to whom licenses must be offered</u>; <u>and</u> (d) <u>under what circumstances may a SEP holder obtain an injunction</u>.84 <u>These <strong>imprecise</strong> FRAND commitments are therefore <strong>not sufficient</strong> to adequately prevent ex post opportunism</u>. The <u>recent revisions to IEEE’s FRAND policy</u> represent a significant step in the right direction, but even this advance <u>leaves important questions <strong>unanswered</u></strong>.85 If FRAND rules are inadequate in these ways, <u>litigation involving extant FRAND rules would likely be resolved only at the final</u>, fourth <u>step</u>. <u>The defendant would be able to <strong>demonstrate</strong> the <strong>benefits</strong> created by the standard</u>; <u>the plaintiff would be able to demonstrate the <strong>creation</strong> of <strong>market power</u></strong> <u>and that other reasonable and practical rules</u> or policies <u>would <strong>ameliorate</strong> the problem</u>. The case would thus turn on whether the defendant is able to demonstrate that significant benefits associated with standardization could not have been realized if the SSO had adopted those other rules or policies.</p><p><u><mark>The court would have</mark> <strong>available</strong> <mark>a <strong>variety</strong> of <strong>possible remedies</strong></mark> if the plaintiff prevails</u>. <u><mark>Implementers</mark> that paid supracompetitive royalties or were unlawfully excluded</u> in whole or in part from product markets as a result of the inadequate FRAND policies <u><mark>would be <strong>entitled</strong> to <strong>damages</u></strong></mark> and, in some cases, <u>to <strong>treble damages</u></strong>.86 <u><mark>If the unlawful SSO conduct is</mark> regarded as the <strong><mark>collective</mark> action</u></strong> of the SSO and its members, which is likely to be the case in most instances, <u>SSO <mark>members would be <strong>jointly</strong> and <strong>severally liable</strong></mark> for the damages</u>. <u>Forward-looking injunctive relief</u> aimed at restoring competition <u>would need to be fashioned to the requirements of the individual case</u>. For example, <u>a court could order the SSO to adopt a new rule</u> or policy proposed by the plaintiff. If the court is reluctant to take on that governance role, <u>it might give the SSO a period of time</u>—maybe ninety days—<u>to develop a rule</u>, subject to the court’s ultimate approval, which would adequately ameliorate the competitive problem created by the SSO. Alternatively or in addition, <u><mark>the court might order</mark> the <mark>parties to</mark> attempt to <mark>negotiate a rule</mark> or policy <mark>on which they can agree</u></mark>. And, depending on the circumstances, the court might order SEP holders, including at least those that were defendants in the case, to comply with the new SSO rules and policies.</p>
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1AC---Malice in the Palace
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1AC---Solvency
| 330,127 | 96 | 7,781 |
./documents/ndtceda21/Kansas/SoMa/Kansas-Soper-Mansoor-Aff-Northwestern-Round5.docx
| 624,673 |
A
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Northwestern
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5
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Michigan DH
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Brad Meloche
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1AC - MIP
1NC - FTC Tradeoff DA States CP IPR DA Patent CP Biz Con DA Con Con CP Innovation Turns on case
2NR - IPR DA
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ndtceda21/Kansas/SoMa/Kansas-Soper-Mansoor-Aff-Northwestern-Round5.docx
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SoMa
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Kansas SoMa
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Wi.....
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So.....
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Za.....
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Ma.....
| 19,391 |
Kansas
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Kansas
| null | null | 1,011 |
ndtceda21
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NDT/CEDA 2021-22
| 2,021 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
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