Datasets:

Hellisotherpeople

/

OpenCaseList-Deduplicated

like 0

Emerging tech doesn’t cause war

Talmadge 19

Talmadge 19 (Caitlin Talmadge is Associate Professor of Security Studies in the School of Foreign at Georgetown University, as well as Senior Non-Resident Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution. "Emerging technology and intra-war escalation risks: Evidence from the Cold War, implications for today." https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2019.1631811)

the relationship between emerging tech and escalation may not be as straightforward The debate tends to portray them as a powerful independent variable an exogenous factor that is both necessary and sufficient to cause conflict escalation This paper argues emerging tech are more likely to function as intervening variables they may be necessary in some cases, but they alone are not sufficient and sometimes not necessary The strongest drivers of escalation will actually lie elsewhere, in the realms of politics and strategy concern is warranted, but determinism is not overemphasis on the dangers ignores the critical role of political and strategic choices in shaping the impact of tech and also could lead to a misplaced faith in arms control or other means of trying to stuff the technological genie back in the bottle

relationship between emerging tech and escalation may not be straightforward debate portray them as an exogenous factor necessary and sufficient to cause conflict This argues emerging tech are intervening variables they are not sufficient, and sometimes not necessary strongest drivers of escalation lie elsewhere overemphasis on dangers ignores strategic choices and lead to a misplaced faith in arms control

Yet the future relationship between emerging technologies and escalation may not be as straightforward as these statements imply. The debate about emerging technologies tends to portray them as a powerful independent variable – an exogenous factor that is both necessary and sufficient to cause conflict escalation. This paper argues instead that emerging technologies are more likely to function as intervening variables; they may be necessary for escalation to happen in some cases, but they alone are not sufficient, and sometimes they will not even be necessary. The strongest drivers of escalation will actually lie elsewhere, in the realms of politics and strategy. As a result, concern about new technologies is warranted, but determinism is not. An overemphasis on the dangers of technology alone ignores the critical role of political and strategic choices in shaping the impact of technology, and also could lead to a misplaced faith in arms control or other means of trying to stuff the technological genie back in the bottle.5

<h4>Emerging tech doesn’t <u>cause war</u> </h4><p><strong>Talmadge 19</strong> </p><p>(Caitlin Talmadge is Associate Professor of Security Studies in the School of Foreign at Georgetown University, as well as Senior Non-Resident Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution. "Emerging technology and intra-war escalation risks: Evidence from the Cold War, implications for today." https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2019.1631811)</p><p>Yet <u>the</u> future <u><mark>relationship between</u> <u><strong>emerging tech</u></strong></mark>nologies <u><mark>and escalation may not be</mark> as <strong><mark>straightforward</u></strong></mark> as these statements imply. <u>The <mark>debate</u></mark> about emerging technologies <u>tends to <mark>portray them as</mark> a powerful independent variable</u> – <u><mark>an</u> <u><strong>exogenous</mark> <mark>factor</u></strong></mark> <u>that is both <strong><mark>necessary</strong> and <strong>sufficient</strong> to cause conflict</mark> <strong>escalation</u></strong>. <u><mark>This</mark> paper <mark>argues</u></mark> instead that <u><mark>emerging tech</u></mark>nologies <u><mark>are</mark> more likely to function as <mark>intervening variables</u></mark>; <u>they may be necessary</u> for escalation to happen <u>in some cases, but <mark>they</mark> alone <mark>are not <strong>sufficient</u></strong>, <u>and</u></mark> <u><mark>sometimes</u></mark> they will <u><mark>not</u></mark> even be <u><strong><mark>necessary</u></strong></mark>. <u>The <mark>strongest <strong>drivers of escalation</strong></mark> will actually <mark>lie elsewhere</mark>, in the realms of <strong>politics</strong> and <strong>strategy</u></strong>. As a result, <u>concern</u> about new technologies <u>is warranted, but <strong>determinism is not</u></strong>. An <u><mark>overemphasis on</mark> the <mark>dangers</u></mark> of technology alone <u><mark>ignores</mark> the critical role of political and <mark>strategic choices</mark> in shaping the impact of tech</u>nology, <u><mark>and</mark> also could <mark>lead to a <strong>misplaced faith in arms control</strong></mark> or other means of trying to stuff the technological genie <strong>back in the bottle</u></strong>.5</p>

1NC

Procurement

1NC---No Emerging Tech War

./documents/ndtceda22/Liberty/BeHo/Liberty-BeHo-Neg-Crowe-Warken-Debates-at-USNA-Round-6.docx

N

Crowe Warken Debates at USNA

6

Minnesota PP

O'Gorman

1AC - AWS 1NC - DA rights creep, K cap, CP executive 2NR - K

ndtceda22/Liberty/BeHo/Liberty-BeHo-Neg-Crowe-Warken-Debates-at-USNA-Round-6.docx

2023-01-16 14:18:32

BeHo

Liberty BeHo

Ca.....

Be.....

Ka.....

Ho.....

Liberty

Liberty

ndtceda22

NDT/CEDA College 2022-23

cx

college

Extinction---stressors cascade to nuke war.

Cribb 19

Julian Cribb 19. Author, Journalist, Editor and Science Communicator, Principal of Julian Cribb & Associates who Provide Specialist Consultancy in the Communication of Science, Agriculture, Food, Mining, Energy and the Environment, More Than Thirty Awards for Journalism. 10/03/2019. “6 - Food as an Existential Risk.” Food or War, 1st ed., Cambridge University Press. DOI.org (Crossref), doi:10.1017/9781108690126.

Detonating just 50 nuclear weapons would suffice to end civilisation in a nuclear winter, causing worldwide famine and economic collapse affecting even distant nations Eight nations have the power to terminate civilisation and two have the power to extinguish the human species the danger of nuclear conflict in fact increased in the first two decades of the twenty-first century due to modernisation new tech such as robot delivery systems, hypersonic missiles, a i and e w and continuing leakage of nuclear materials and knowhow if humanity is to be wiped out, it will most likely be as a result of an atomic conflict in the twenty-first century with world resources of food, land and water under growing stress, nothing can be ruled out chemical weapons have frequently been deployed in the Syrian civil war, which had drought ag failure and hunger among its early drivers nuclear conflict remains a distinct possibility in South Asia and the Middle East as these regions are stressed in terms of food, land and water, and their nuclear firepower is multiplying panicking regimes in Russia, the USA or even France would deploy atomic weapons in an attempt to quell invasion by desperate refugees, fleeing famine and climate chaos nuclear war cannot be excluded as a political consequence of Food insecurity that, as the hands of the ‘Doomsday Clock’ so eloquently admonish, is the most likely scenario for the premature termination of the human species

50 nuc s end civilisation in nuclear winter the danger increased with food under stress, nothing can be ruled out chem weapons in Syria had hunger among its drivers nuclear conflict remains possibil in South Asia and Mid East regions are stressed in food and firepower is multiplying panicking regimes in Russia, US or France would deploy atomic weapons to quell refugees, fleeing famine Food insecurity is the most likely scenario for termination of the species

Weapons of Mass Destruction Detonating just 50–100 out of the global arsenal of nearly 15,000 nuclear weapons would suffice to end civilisation in a nuclear winter, causing worldwide famine and economic collapse affecting even distant nations, as we saw in the previous chapter in the section dealing with South Asia. Eight nations now have the power to terminate civilisation should they desire to do so – and two have the power to extinguish the human species. According to the nuclear monitoring group Ploughshares, this arsenal is distributed as follows: – Russia, 6600 warheads (2500 classified as ‘retired’) – America, 6450 warheads (2550 classified as ‘retired’) – France, 300 warheads – China, 270 warheads – UK, 215 warheads – Pakistan, 130 warheads – India, 120 warheads – Israel, 80 warheads – North Korea, 15–20 warheads.11 Although actual numbers of warheads have continued to fall from its peak of 70,000 weapons in the mid 1980s, scientists argue the danger of nuclear conflict in fact increased in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. This was due to the modernisation of existing stockpiles, the adoption of dangerous new technologies such as robot delivery systems, hypersonic missiles, artificial intelligence and electronic warfare, and the continuing leakage of nuclear materials and knowhow to nonnuclear nations and potential terrorist organisations. In early 2018 the hands of the ‘Doomsday Clock’, maintained by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, were re-set at two minutes to midnight, the highest risk to humanity that it has ever shown since the clock was introduced in 1953. This was due not only to the state of the world’s nuclear arsenal, but also to irresponsible language by world leaders, the growing use of social media to destabilise rival regimes, and to the rising threat of uncontrolled climate change (see below).12 In an historic moment on 17 July 2017, 122 nations voted in the UN for the first time ever in favour of a treaty banning all nuclear weapons. This called for comprehensive prohibition of “a full range of nuclear-weapon-related activities, such as undertaking to develop, test, produce, manufacture, acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the use or threat of use of these weapons.”13 However, 71 other countries – including all the nuclear states – either opposed the ban, abstained or declined to vote. The Treaty vote was nonetheless interpreted by some as a promising first step towards abolishing the nuclear nightmare that hangs over the entire human species. In contrast, 192 countries had signed up to the Chemical Weapons Convention to ban the use of chemical weapons, and 180 to the Biological Weapons Convention. As of 2018, 96 per cent of previous world stocks of chemical weapons had been destroyed – but their continued use in the Syrian conflict and in alleged assassination attempts by Russia indicated the world remains at risk.14 As things stand, the only entities that can afford to own nuclear weapons are nations – and if humanity is to be wiped out, it will most likely be as a result of an atomic conflict between nations. It follows from this that, if the world is to be made safe from such a fate it will need to get rid of nations as a structure of human self-organisation and replace them with wiser, less aggressive forms of self-governance. After all, the nation state really only began in the early nineteenth century and is by no means a permanent feature of self-governance, any more than monarchies, feudal systems or priest states. Although many people still tend to assume it is. Between them, nations have butchered more than 200 million people in the past 150 years and it is increasingly clear the world would be a far safer, more peaceable place without either nations or nationalism. The question is what to replace them with. Although there may at first glance appear to be no close linkage between weapons of mass destruction and food, in the twenty-first century with world resources of food, land and water under growing stress, nothing can be ruled out. Indeed, chemical weapons have frequently been deployed in the Syrian civil war, which had drought, agricultural failure and hunger among its early drivers. And nuclear conflict remains a distinct possibility in South Asia and the Middle East, especially, as these regions are already stressed in terms of food, land and water, and their nuclear firepower or access to nuclear materials is multiplying. It remains an open question whether panicking regimes in Russia, the USA or even France would be ruthless enough to deploy atomic weapons in an attempt to quell invasion by tens of millions of desperate refugees, fleeing famine and climate chaos in their own homelands – but the possibility ought not to be ignored. That nuclear war is at least a possible outcome of food and climate crises was first flagged in the report The Age of Consequences by Kurt Campbell and the US-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies, which stated ‘it is clear that even nuclear war cannot be excluded as a political consequence of global warming’. 15 Food insecurity is therefore a driver in the preconditions for the use of nuclear weapons, whether limited or unlimited. A global famine is a likely outcome of limited use of nuclear weapons by any country or countries – and would be unavoidable in the event of an unlimited nuclear war between America and Russia, making it unwinnable for either. And that, as the mute hands of the ‘Doomsday Clock’ so eloquently admonish, is also the most likely scenario for the premature termination of the human species. Such a grim scenario can be alleviated by two measures: the voluntary banning by the whole of humanity of nuclear weapons, their technology, materials and stocks – and by a global effort to secure food against future insecurity by diverting the funds now wasted on nuclear armaments into building the sustainable food and water systems of the future (see Chapters 8 and 9).

<h4><u>Extinction</u>---stressors <u>cascade</u> to <u>nuke war</u>.</h4><p>Julian <strong>Cribb 19</strong>. Author, Journalist, Editor and Science Communicator, Principal of Julian Cribb & Associates who Provide Specialist Consultancy in the Communication of Science, Agriculture, Food, Mining, Energy and the Environment, More Than Thirty Awards for Journalism. 10/03/2019. “6 - Food as an Existential Risk.” Food or War, 1st ed., Cambridge University Press. DOI.org (Crossref), doi:10.1017/9781108690126.</p><p>Weapons of Mass Destruction</p><p><u>Detonating just</u> <u><strong><mark>50</u></strong></mark>–100 out of the global arsenal of nearly 15,000 <u><strong><mark>nuc</strong></mark>lear weapon<strong><mark>s</u></strong></mark> <u>would</u> <u><strong>suffice to <mark>end civilisation</strong> in</mark> a <strong><mark>nuclear winter</strong></mark>, causing</u> <u><strong>worldwide famine</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>economic collapse</u></strong> <u>affecting even</u> <u><strong>distant</u></strong> <u>nations</u>, as we saw in the previous chapter in the section dealing with South Asia. <u><strong>Eight nations</u></strong> now <u>have the power to</u> <u><strong>terminate civilisation</u></strong> should they desire to do so – <u>and</u> <u><strong>two</u></strong> <u>have the power to</u> <u><strong>extinguish the human species</u></strong>. According to the nuclear monitoring group Ploughshares, this arsenal is distributed as follows:</p><p>– Russia, 6600 warheads (2500 classified as ‘retired’)</p><p>– America, 6450 warheads (2550 classified as ‘retired’)</p><p>– France, 300 warheads</p><p>– China, 270 warheads</p><p>– UK, 215 warheads</p><p>– Pakistan, 130 warheads</p><p>– India, 120 warheads</p><p>– Israel, 80 warheads</p><p>– North Korea, 15–20 warheads.11</p><p>Although actual numbers of warheads have continued to fall from its peak of 70,000 weapons in the mid 1980s, scientists argue <u><mark>the</u> <u><strong>danger</u></strong></mark> <u>of nuclear conflict in fact</u> <u><strong><mark>increased</u></strong></mark> <u>in the first two decades of the twenty-first century</u>. This was <u>due to</u> the <u><strong>modernisation</u></strong> of existing stockpiles, the adoption of dangerous <u>new</u> <u><strong>tech</u></strong>nologies <u>such as robot delivery systems, hypersonic missiles,</u> <u><strong>a</u></strong>rtificial <u><strong>i</u></strong>ntelligence <u>and</u> <u><strong>e</u></strong>lectronic <u><strong>w</u></strong>arfare, <u>and</u> the <u>continuing <strong>leakage</u></strong> <u>of nuclear</u> <u><strong>materials</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>knowhow</u></strong> to nonnuclear nations and potential terrorist organisations.</p><p>In early 2018 the hands of the ‘Doomsday Clock’, maintained by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, were re-set at two minutes to midnight, the highest risk to humanity that it has ever shown since the clock was introduced in 1953. This was due not only to the state of the world’s nuclear arsenal, but also to irresponsible language by world leaders, the growing use of social media to destabilise rival regimes, and to the rising threat of uncontrolled climate change (see below).12</p><p>In an historic moment on 17 July 2017, 122 nations voted in the UN for the first time ever in favour of a treaty banning all nuclear weapons. This called for comprehensive prohibition of “a full range of nuclear-weapon-related activities, such as undertaking to develop, test, produce, manufacture, acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the use or threat of use of these weapons.”13 However, 71 other countries – including all the nuclear states – either opposed the ban, abstained or declined to vote. The Treaty vote was nonetheless interpreted by some as a promising first step towards abolishing the nuclear nightmare that hangs over the entire human species.</p><p>In contrast, 192 countries had signed up to the Chemical Weapons Convention to ban the use of chemical weapons, and 180 to the Biological Weapons Convention. As of 2018, 96 per cent of previous world stocks of chemical weapons had been destroyed – but their continued use in the Syrian conflict and in alleged assassination attempts by Russia indicated the world remains at risk.14</p><p>As things stand, the only entities that can afford to own nuclear weapons are nations – and <u><strong>if humanity is to be wiped out</strong>, it</u> <u>will</u> <u><strong>most likely</u></strong> <u>be as a <strong>result of an atomic conflict</u></strong> between nations. It follows from this that, if the world is to be made safe from such a fate it will need to get rid of nations as a structure of human self-organisation and replace them with wiser, less aggressive forms of self-governance. After all, the nation state really only began in the early nineteenth century and is by no means a permanent feature of self-governance, any more than monarchies, feudal systems or priest states. Although many people still tend to assume it is. Between them, nations have butchered more than 200 million people in the past 150 years and it is increasingly clear the world would be a far safer, more peaceable place without either nations or nationalism. The question is what to replace them with.</p><p>Although there may at first glance appear to be no close linkage between weapons of mass destruction and food, <u>in the twenty-first century <mark>with</mark> world resources of <strong><mark>food</strong></mark>, land and water <mark>under</mark> growing <strong><mark>stress, nothing can be ruled out</u></strong></mark>. Indeed, <u><strong><mark>chem</mark>ical <mark>weapons</strong></mark> have</u> <u><strong>frequently</u></strong> <u>been deployed <mark>in</mark> the <strong><mark>Syria</strong></mark>n civil war, which <mark>had</mark> <strong>drought</u></strong>, <u><strong>ag</u></strong>ricultural <u><strong>failure</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong><mark>hunger</u></strong> <u>among its</u></mark> <u><strong>early <mark>drivers</u></strong></mark>. And <u><strong><mark>nuclear conflict</u></strong> <u>remains</mark> a</u> <u><strong>distinct <mark>possibil</strong></mark>ity <mark>in <strong>South Asia</u></strong> <u>and</mark> the</u> <u><strong><mark>Mid</strong></mark>dle <strong><mark>East</u></strong></mark>, especially, <u>as these <mark>regions are</u></mark> already <u><strong><mark>stressed</u></strong> <u>in</mark> terms of <mark>food</mark>, land and water, <mark>and</mark> their</u> <u><strong>nuclear <mark>firepower</u></strong></mark> or access to nuclear materials <u><mark>is</u> <u><strong>multiplying</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>It remains an open question whether <u><strong><mark>panicking regimes</u></strong> <u>in</u> <u><strong>Russia,</mark> the <mark>US</strong></mark>A</u> <u><strong><mark>or</strong></mark> even <strong><mark>France</u></strong> <u>would</u></mark> be ruthless enough to <u><strong><mark>deploy atomic weapons</u></strong></mark> <u>in an attempt <mark>to</u> <u><strong>quell</mark> invasion</u></strong> <u>by</u> tens of millions of <u><strong>desperate <mark>refugees</strong>, fleeing</u> <u><strong>famine</mark> and climate chaos</u></strong> in their own homelands – but the possibility ought not to be ignored.</p><p>That nuclear war is at least a possible outcome of food and climate crises was first flagged in the report The Age of Consequences by Kurt Campbell and the US-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies, which stated ‘it is clear that even <u>nuclear war</u> <u><strong>cannot be excluded</u></strong> <u>as a</u> <u><strong>political consequence</u></strong> <u>of</u> global warming’. 15 <u><strong><mark>Food insecurity</u></strong></mark> is therefore a driver in the preconditions for the use of nuclear weapons, whether limited or unlimited.</p><p>A global famine is a likely outcome of limited use of nuclear weapons by any country or countries – and would be unavoidable in the event of an unlimited nuclear war between America and Russia, making it unwinnable for either. And <u><strong>that</strong>, as the</u> mute <u>hands of the ‘Doomsday Clock’ so eloquently admonish, <mark>is</u></mark> also <u><mark>the</u> <u><strong>most likely scenario</u></strong> <u>for</mark> the</u> <u><strong>premature <mark>termination of the</mark> human <mark>species</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>Such a grim scenario can be alleviated by two measures: the voluntary banning by the whole of humanity of nuclear weapons, their technology, materials and stocks – and by a global effort to secure food against future insecurity by diverting the funds now wasted on nuclear armaments into building the sustainable food and water systems of the future (see Chapters 8 and 9).</p>

1AC

1AC---PTD

1AC---Water Resources ADV

./documents/hspolicy21/Alpharetta/NaTh/Alpharetta-Nayak-Thatiparthi-Aff-UK-Round1.docx

A

UK

1

Hawken MT

Jake Melton

1AC - NEW Public Trust Doctrine 2NR - Afropessimism K Schlag K

hspolicy21/Alpharetta/NaTh/Alpharetta-Nayak-Thatiparthi-Aff-UK-Round1.docx

NaTh

Alpharetta NaTh

An.....

Na.....

An.....

Th.....

Alpharetta

Alpharetta

GA

hspolicy21

HS Policy 2021-22

cx

hs

Trade solves great power competition – regionalism causes militarized crises.

Lake 18

Lake 18. [(David Lake is a Professor of Social Sciences and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego. "Economic Openness and Great Power Competition: Lessons for China and the United States,” April 30, 2018. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3171196/] TDI

historically, great power competition has been driven primarily by exclusion or fears of exclusion from each power’s international economic zone, other great powers are compelled to develop or expand their own exclusive economic zones. The “race” for economic privilege can quickly divide the world up into economic blocs. great powers need not actually exclude one another from their zones; the fear of exclusion alone is enough to ignite the process of division. The race for privilege then draws great powers into over-expanding into unprofitable regions and, more important, militarized competition. Economic and military competition are thus linked, with the former usually driving the latter. The most significant military crises have, been over where to draw the boundaries between economic zones and subsequent challenges to those boundaries Economic closure and fear of closure have been consistent sources of great power conflict If so, great power competition could break out in the twenty-first century not because of bipolarity or any inevitable tendency toward conflict, but because neither great power can control its own protectionist forces . The British-U.S. case, again, suggests that exclusion and competition are not inevitable, but the current danger of economic closure is real and increasing. Protectionism can sour great power relations, but it is the desire for exclusive economic zones that drives great power competition and, given the possibility of coercion, influences grand strategy

great power competition has been driven primarily by exclusion The “race” for econ privilege divide the world into blocs. the fear of exclusion ignite division. privilege draws great powers and, militarized competition Economic closure have been sources of great power conflict great power competition break out because neither great power can control protectionist forces exclusion are not inevitable, but economic closure is increasing.

I develop two central arguments. First, historically, great power competition has been driven primarily by exclusion or fears of exclusion from each power’s international economic zone, including its domestic market. Great powers in the past have often used their international influence to build zones in which subordinate polities – whether these be colonies or simply states within a sphere of influence – are integrated into their economies. These economic zones, in turn, are typically biased in favor of the great power’s firms and investors, with the effect of excluding (in whole or part) the economic agents of other great powers. These other great powers, in response, are then compelled to develop or expand their own exclusive economic zones. The “race” for economic privilege can quickly divide the world up into economic blocs. Like the security dilemma, great powers need not actually exclude one another from their zones; the fear of exclusion alone is enough to ignite the process of division. The race for privilege then draws great powers into over-expanding into unprofitable regions and, more important, militarized competition. Economic and military competition are thus linked, with the former usually driving the latter. The most significant military crises have, historically, been over where to draw the boundaries between economic zones and subsequent challenges to those boundaries. Economic closure and fear of closure have been consistent sources of great power conflict in the past – and possibly will be in the future. The major exception to this trend was the peaceful transfer of dominance in Latin America from Britain to the United States in the late nineteenth century. This suggests that economic closure and great power competition is not inevitable, but a choice of the great powers themselves. Second, this international competition is driven, in turn, by domestic, rent-seeking groups and their economic interests. In all countries, scarce factors of production, import competing sectors, and domestically-oriented firms have concentrated and intense preferences for market restricting policies, including tariffs and the formation of exclusive economic zones. Consumers and free trade-oriented groups have diffuse preferences for market enhancing policies, and thus tend to lose at the ballot box and in the making of national policy. This inequality in preference intensity does not mean protectionists always win; after 1934, the United States insulated itself by shifting authority to the executive and negotiating reductions through broad, multi-product international agreements.8 Yet, as the recent return to economic nationalism of the Trump administration suggests, protectionism often wins out. Rent-seeking is a central tendency, not an inevitable success. Contemporary great power relations are at a critical juncture. As China’s influence expands, the role of special economic interests in China is especially worrisome. In pursuit of stability, political support, or private gains, the government will always be tempted to create economic zones that favor its nationals. In this way, China will be no different than the majority of great powers before it. But, given the expansive role of the state in the Chinese economy, especially its backing of outward foreign investments by its state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and the close ties between business elites and its authoritarian political leaders, however, it will be even harder for China to resist biasing any future economic zone to benefit its own firms. Although China has gained greatly from economic openness, its domestic political system will be prone to rent-seeking demands by important constituents in areas of future influence. Critically, the United States is also moving toward economic closure with the election of President Trump on a platform of economic nationalism. Demands for protection against Chinese goods have been growing over time.9 The “China shock” that followed Beijing’s joining the World Trade Organization was a huge disruption to the international division of labor, U.S. comparative advantage, and especially U.S. industry.10 The Trans-Pacific Partnership, though now defunct, was “marketed” by President Barak Obama as a means of “containing” China, both economically and militarily, but was opposed by virtually all of the candidates in the 2016 presidential election for its trade-enhancing potential. President Trump has already signaled a much more hostile and protectionist stance toward China – as well as calling for the repeal of NAFTA and even questioning the utility of the European Union. Not only has he imposed tariffs on washing machines, solar panels, steel and aluminum, dangerously declaring the latter two issues of national security, he is making exceptions on these tariffs for friends and allies. 11 Implicitly targeting China, these protectionist moves by the administration risk creating preferential trading blocs not seen since the 1930s. He has also now proposed punitive tariffs on over $60 billions of imports from China into the United States.12 Acknowledging his inconsistencies on many policy issues, Trump’s economic nationalism has remained the core of his political agenda. The threat to the liberal international economy is not only that China might seek an economic bloc in the future, but that the United States itself is turning more exclusionary. For each great power to fear that the other might seek to exclude it from its economic zone is not unreasonable. If so, great power competition could break out in the twenty-first century not because of bipolarity or any inevitable tendency toward conflict, but because neither great power can control its own protectionist forces nor signal to the other that it would not exclude it from its economic zone. The British-U.S. case, again, suggests that exclusion and competition are not inevitable, but the current danger of economic closure is real and increasing. This article is synthetic in its theory and merely suggestive in its use of historical evidence. The theory aims to integrate current work on political economy and national security, not to develop a completely original take on this relationship. In turn, rather than testing the theory in any rigorous sense or delving into particular cases to show the theoretical mechanisms at work, so to speak, it surveys selected historical episodes to illustrate central tendencies. It is the recurring pattern across multiple cases that suggests why we should worry today. The remainder of this essay is divided in three primary sections. Section I briefly outlines the analytics of economic openness and great power competition. Section II focuses on historical instances of great power competition, highlighting the role of economic openness as a central cleavage in international politics. Section III examines contemporary policies in and between China and the United States. The conclusion suggests ways that the potential for conflict may be mitigated. The Open Economy Politics of Great Power Competition All states have a tendency towards protectionism at home and exclusive economic zones abroad. A tendency, though, is not an inevitability. The pursuit of protection and economic zones by domestic interests is conditioned by the political coalition in power at any given time and institutions that aggregate and bias the articulation of social groups. 13 The tendency is also influenced, however, by the actions of other countries. Protectionism can sour great power relations, but it is the desire for exclusive economic zones that drives great power competition and, given the possibility of coercion, influences grand strategy. Thus, the theory sketched here integrates insights from international political economy (see below), the literature on domestic politics and grand strategy,14 and systemic theories of international relations.15

<h4>Trade solves great power competition – regionalism causes militarized crises.</h4><p><strong>Lake 18</strong>. [(David Lake is a Professor of Social Sciences and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego. "Economic Openness and Great Power Competition: Lessons for China and the United States,” April 30, 2018. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3171196/] TDI</p><p>I develop two central arguments. First, <u><strong>historically, <mark>great power competition</mark> <mark>has</mark> <mark>been driven primarily by</mark> <mark>exclusion</mark> or fears of exclusion from each power’s international economic zone,</u></strong> including its domestic market. Great powers in the past have often used their international influence to build zones in which subordinate polities – whether these be colonies or simply states within a sphere of influence – are integrated into their economies. These economic zones, in turn, are typically biased in favor of the great power’s firms and investors, with the effect of excluding (in whole or part) the economic agents of other great powers. These <u>other great powers</u>, in response, <u>are</u> then <u>compelled to develop or expand their own exclusive economic zones.</u> <u><strong><mark>The “race” for econ</mark>omic <mark>privilege</mark> can quickly <mark>divide the world</mark> up <mark>into</mark> economic <mark>blocs.</mark> </u></strong>Like the security dilemma, <u>great powers need not actually exclude one another from their zones; <strong><mark>the fear of exclusion</mark> alone is enough to <mark>ignite</mark> the process of <mark>division.</mark> </strong>The race for <mark>privilege</mark> then <mark>draws great powers</mark> into over-expanding into unprofitable regions <mark>and,</mark> more important, <strong><mark>militarized competition</strong></mark>. <strong>Economic and military competition are thus linked, with the former usually driving the latter.</u></strong> <u>The most significant military crises have, </u>historically, <u>been over where to draw the boundaries between economic zones and subsequent challenges to those boundaries</u>. <u><strong><mark>Economic closure</mark> and fear of closure <mark>have been</mark> consistent <mark>sources of great power conflict</u></strong></mark> in the past – and possibly will be in the future. The major exception to this trend was the peaceful transfer of dominance in Latin America from Britain to the United States in the late nineteenth century. This suggests that economic closure and great power competition is not inevitable, but a choice of the great powers themselves. Second, this international competition is driven, in turn, by domestic, rent-seeking groups and their economic interests. In all countries, scarce factors of production, import competing sectors, and domestically-oriented firms have concentrated and intense preferences for market restricting policies, including tariffs and the formation of exclusive economic zones. Consumers and free trade-oriented groups have diffuse preferences for market enhancing policies, and thus tend to lose at the ballot box and in the making of national policy. This inequality in preference intensity does not mean protectionists always win; after 1934, the United States insulated itself by shifting authority to the executive and negotiating reductions through broad, multi-product international agreements.8 Yet, as the recent return to economic nationalism of the Trump administration suggests, protectionism often wins out. Rent-seeking is a central tendency, not an inevitable success. Contemporary great power relations are at a critical juncture. As China’s influence expands, the role of special economic interests in China is especially worrisome. In pursuit of stability, political support, or private gains, the government will always be tempted to create economic zones that favor its nationals. In this way, China will be no different than the majority of great powers before it. But, given the expansive role of the state in the Chinese economy, especially its backing of outward foreign investments by its state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and the close ties between business elites and its authoritarian political leaders, however, it will be even harder for China to resist biasing any future economic zone to benefit its own firms. Although China has gained greatly from economic openness, its domestic political system will be prone to rent-seeking demands by important constituents in areas of future influence. Critically, the United States is also moving toward economic closure with the election of President Trump on a platform of economic nationalism. Demands for protection against Chinese goods have been growing over time.9 The “China shock” that followed Beijing’s joining the World Trade Organization was a huge disruption to the international division of labor, U.S. comparative advantage, and especially U.S. industry.10 The Trans-Pacific Partnership, though now defunct, was “marketed” by President Barak Obama as a means of “containing” China, both economically and militarily, but was opposed by virtually all of the candidates in the 2016 presidential election for its trade-enhancing potential. President Trump has already signaled a much more hostile and protectionist stance toward China – as well as calling for the repeal of NAFTA and even questioning the utility of the European Union. Not only has he imposed tariffs on washing machines, solar panels, steel and aluminum, dangerously declaring the latter two issues of national security, he is making exceptions on these tariffs for friends and allies. 11 Implicitly targeting China, these protectionist moves by the administration risk creating preferential trading blocs not seen since the 1930s. He has also now proposed punitive tariffs on over $60 billions of imports from China into the United States.12 Acknowledging his inconsistencies on many policy issues, Trump’s economic nationalism has remained the core of his political agenda. The threat to the liberal international economy is not only that China might seek an economic bloc in the future, but that the United States itself is turning more exclusionary. For each great power to fear that the other might seek to exclude it from its economic zone is not unreasonable. <u>If so, <mark>great power competition</mark> could <mark>break out</mark> in the twenty-first century not because of bipolarity or any inevitable tendency toward conflict, <strong>but <mark>because neither great power can control </mark>its own <mark>protectionist forces</u></strong></mark> nor signal to the other that it would not exclude it from its economic zone<u><strong>. The British-U.S. case, again, suggests that <mark>exclusion</mark> and competition <mark>are not inevitable, but</mark> the current danger of <mark>economic closure is</mark> real and <mark>increasing.</mark> </u></strong>This article is synthetic in its theory and merely suggestive in its use of historical evidence. The theory aims to integrate current work on political economy and national security, not to develop a completely original take on this relationship. In turn, rather than testing the theory in any rigorous sense or delving into particular cases to show the theoretical mechanisms at work, so to speak, it surveys selected historical episodes to illustrate central tendencies. It is the recurring pattern across multiple cases that suggests why we should worry today. The remainder of this essay is divided in three primary sections. Section I briefly outlines the analytics of economic openness and great power competition. Section II focuses on historical instances of great power competition, highlighting the role of economic openness as a central cleavage in international politics. Section III examines contemporary policies in and between China and the United States. The conclusion suggests ways that the potential for conflict may be mitigated. The Open Economy Politics of Great Power Competition All states have a tendency towards protectionism at home and exclusive economic zones abroad. A tendency, though, is not an inevitability. The pursuit of protection and economic zones by domestic interests is conditioned by the political coalition in power at any given time and institutions that aggregate and bias the articulation of social groups. 13 The tendency is also influenced, however, by the actions of other countries. <u>Protectionism can sour great power relations, but it is the desire for exclusive economic zones that drives great power competition and, given the possibility of coercion, influences grand strategy</u>. Thus, the theory sketched here integrates insights from international political economy (see below), the literature on domestic politics and grand strategy,14 and systemic theories of international relations.15</p>

1AC

1AC

1AC – WTO Credibility

./documents/hsld21/StrathHaven/Ma/Strath%20Haven-Manaker-Aff-Greenhill-Round1.docx

A

Greenhill

1

Mercer Island KS

Jharick Shields

1AC - COVID Vax 1NC - Innovation DA Supply Chain CP case 1AR - all 2NR - all 2AR - all

hsld21/StrathHaven/Ma/Strath%20Haven-Manaker-Aff-Greenhill-Round1.docx

AvMa

Strath Haven AvMa

Av.....

Ma.....

StrathHaven

Strath Haven

PA

hsld21

HS LD 2021-22

ld

hs

It turns terror, disease, and every other scenario.

Torres 16

Torres 16 (Phil Torres; author, Affiliate Scholar @ Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, founder of the X-Risks Institute, published articles for Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Salon, Journal of Future Studies, and the Journal of Evolution and Technology; 7-22-2016, "Op-ed: Climate Change Is the Most Urgent Existential Risk," FLI - Future of Life Institute, http://futureoflife.org/2016/07/22/climate-change-is-the-most-urgent-existential-risk/, accessed 8-9-2016)

according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the effects of climate change will be “severe and “irreversible a 2016 study published in Nature and authored by over twenty scientists the consequences of climate change “will extend longer than the entire history of human civilization thus far.” confirms we could be approaching a sudden, irreversible, catastrophic collapse of the global ecosystem it could result in “widespread social unrest, economic instability and loss of human life.” Given the potential for environmental degradation to elevate the likelihood of nuclear wars, nuclear terror , engineered pandemics, takeover it ought to take precedence over all other risk concerns in the near-term

according to the I P C C climate change will be “irreversible. result in widespread unrest instability nuclear terror pandemics takeover it ought to take precedence over all other concerns near-term

For example, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the effects of climate change will be “severe,” “pervasive,” and “irreversible.” Or, as a 2016 study published in Nature and authored by over twenty scientists puts it, the consequences of climate change “will extend longer than the entire history of human civilization thus far.” Furthermore, a recent article in Science Advances confirms that humanity has already escorted the biosphere into the sixth mass extinction event in life’s 3.8 billion year history on Earth. Yet another study suggests that we could be approaching a sudden, irreversible, catastrophic collapse of the global ecosystem. If this were to occur, it could result in “widespread social unrest, economic instability and loss of human life.” Given the potential for environmental degradation to elevate the likelihood of nuclear wars, nuclear terrorism, engineered pandemics, a superintelligence takeover, and perhaps even an impact winter, it ought to take precedence over all other risk concerns — at least in the near-term. Let’s make sure we get our priorities straight.

<h4>It turns terror, disease, and <u>every other scenario</u>.</h4><p><u><strong>Torres 16</u></strong> (Phil Torres; author, Affiliate Scholar @ Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, founder of the X-Risks Institute, published articles for Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Salon, Journal of Future Studies, and the Journal of Evolution and Technology; 7-22-2016, "Op-ed: Climate Change Is the Most Urgent Existential Risk," FLI - Future of Life Institute, http://futureoflife.org/2016/07/22/climate-change-is-the-most-urgent-existential-risk/, accessed 8-9-2016)</p><p>For example, <u><strong><mark>according to the</u></strong> <u><strong>I</mark>ntergovernmental <mark>P</mark>anel on <mark>C</mark>limate <mark>C</mark>hange, the effects of <mark>climate change will be</mark> “severe</u></strong>,” “pervasive,” <u><strong>and <mark>“irreversible</u></strong>.</mark>” Or, as <u><strong>a 2016 study published in Nature and authored by over twenty scientists </u></strong>puts it, <u><strong>the consequences of climate change “will extend longer than the entire history of human civilization thus far.” </u></strong>Furthermore, a recent article in Science Advances <u><strong>confirms</u></strong> that humanity has already escorted the biosphere into the sixth mass extinction event in life’s 3.8 billion year history on Earth. Yet another study suggests that <u><strong>we could be approaching a sudden, irreversible, catastrophic collapse of the global ecosystem</u></strong>. If this were to occur, <u><strong>it could <mark>result in</mark> “<mark>widespread </mark>social <mark>unrest</mark>, economic <mark>instability</mark> and loss of human life.” Given the potential for environmental degradation to elevate the likelihood of nuclear wars, <mark>nuclear terror</u></strong></mark>ism<u><strong>, engineered <mark>pandemics</mark>,</u></strong> a superintelligence<u><strong><mark> takeover</u></strong></mark>, and perhaps even an impact winter, <u><strong><mark>it ought to take precedence over all other </mark>risk <mark>concerns</u></strong></mark> — at least <u><strong>in the <mark>near-term</u></strong></mark>. Let’s make sure we get our priorities straight.</p>

1NR

BBB DA

./documents/ndtceda21/Minnesota/JoSu/Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Neg-UMN-Round3.docx

N

UMN

3

Iowa PS

Jenna Bauer

1AC - False Advertising 1NC - T Prohibit States CP Cap K Overstretch DA Floodgates DA BBB DA FTC Collapse CP on case 2NR - BBB DA States CP

ndtceda21/Minnesota/JoSu/Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Neg-UMN-Round3.docx

JoSu

Minnesota JoSu

No.....

Jo.....

Ke.....

Su.....

Minnesota

Minnesota

ndtceda21

NDT/CEDA 2021-22

cx

college

Talmadge 17 writes,

Talmadge 17

Caitlin Talmadge, xx-xx-2017, “Would China Go Nuclear?,” International Security, [Talmadge is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at the George Washington University. Dr. Caitlin Talmadge is the author of TheDictator’s Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes (Cornell University Press, 2015) and co-author of U.S. Defense Politics: the Origins of Security Policy (Routledge, 2014). Her other writings have appeared in International Security, Security Studies, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, The Non-Proliferation Review, The Washington Quarterly, The New York Times, and The Washington Post, among other outlets. Dr. Talmadge previously worked at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and as a consultant to the Office of Net Assessment at the U.S. Department of Defense]

https://muse-jhu-edu.proxy.library.cornell.edu/article/657918 recut//cheung Chinese nuclear escalation in the event of a conventional war with the United States is a significant risk the fear that the United States might be attempting conventional counterforce could lead China to engage in limited nuclear escalation to gain military advantage or coercive leverage—despite China's no-first-use policy.

Chinese nuclear escalation in the event of a conventional war is a significant risk the fear that the United States might be attempting conventional counterforce could lead China to engage in limited nuclear escalation to gain military advantage or coercive leverage

https://muse-jhu-edu.proxy.library.cornell.edu/article/657918 recut//cheung Conclusion Chinese nuclear escalation in the event of a conventional war with the United States is a significant risk, although for reasons not fully surfaced in the existing debate. A U.S. conventional campaign would indeed pose a large, though not total, threat to China's nuclear arsenal. More important than the purely military-technical implications of the U.S. campaign, however, is what China is likely to believe the campaign signals about U.S. intentions in a world where conventional deterrence has just failed. Reasonable Chinese fears that the United States might be attempting conventional counterforce, or considering or preparing for nuclear counterforce, could lead China to engage in limited nuclear escalation to gain military advantage or coercive leverage—despite China's no-first-use policy.

<h4>Talmadge 17 writes, </h4><p>Caitlin <u><strong>Talmadge</u></strong>, xx-xx-20<u><strong>17</u></strong>, “Would China Go Nuclear?,” International Security, </p><p>[Talmadge is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at the George Washington University. Dr. Caitlin Talmadge is the author of TheDictator’s Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes (Cornell University Press, 2015) and co-author of U.S. Defense Politics: the Origins of Security Policy (Routledge, 2014). Her other writings have appeared in International Security, Security Studies, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, The Non-Proliferation Review, The Washington Quarterly, The New York Times, and The Washington Post, among other outlets. Dr. Talmadge previously worked at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and as a consultant to the Office of Net Assessment at the U.S. Department of Defense] </p><p><u><strong>https://muse-jhu-edu.proxy.library.cornell.edu/article/657918 recut//cheung</p><p></u></strong>Conclusion <u><strong><mark>Chinese nuclear escalation in the event of a conventional war</mark> with the United States <mark>is a significant risk</u></strong></mark>, although for reasons not fully surfaced in the existing debate. A U.S. conventional campaign would indeed pose a large, though not total, threat to China's nuclear arsenal. More important than the purely military-technical implications of the U.S. campaign, however, is what China is likely to believe <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> campaign signals about U.S. intentions in a world where conventional deterrence has just failed. Reasonable Chinese <u><strong><mark>fear</u></strong></mark>s <u><strong><mark>that the United States might be attempting conventional counterforce</u></strong></mark>, or considering or preparing for nuclear counterforce, <u><strong><mark>could lead China to engage in limited nuclear escalation to gain military advantage or coercive leverage</mark>—despite China's no-first-use policy.</p></u></strong>

./documents/hspf21/Summit/ToJa/Summit-Tobon-Jain-Neg-Tournament%20of%20Champions%20Gold-Round3.docx

N

Tournament of Champions Gold

3

Glen Rock OS

Amrit Ammanamanchi

1NC China economy 1AC gray-zone conflicts PKOs 2NR Taiwan turns 2AR China turns NS Collapse on economy AS Collapse on PKOs

hspf21/Summit/ToJa/Summit-Tobon-Jain-Neg-Tournament%20of%20Champions%20Gold-Round3.docx

ToJa

Summit ToJa

Ma.....

To.....

Ri.....

Ja.....

Summit

Summit

NJ

hspf21

HS PF 2021-22

pf

hs

Immigration decks wage growth

Borjas ‘16

Borjas ‘16 [George Borjas is the Robert W. Scrivner Professor of Economics and Social Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School. He was awarded the IZA Prize in Labor Economics in 2011. Professor Borjas is a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research and a Research Fellow at IZA. Professor Borjas is the author of several books on immigration economics, 2016 “Yes, Immigration Hurts American Workers”, Poltico, September/ October, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/09/trump-clinton-immigration-economy-unemployment-jobs-214216, accessed 8/17/18, MJ]

When the supply of workers goes up, the price that firms have to pay to hire workers goes down. Wage trends over the past half-century suggest that a 10 percent increase in the number of workers with a particular set of skills probably lowers the wage of that group by at least 3 percent. Even after the economy has fully adjusted, those skill groups that received the most immigrants will still offer lower pay relative to those that received fewer immigrants. Both low- and high-skilled natives are affected by the influx of immigrants. But because a disproportionate percentage of immigrants have few skills, it is low-skilled American workers, including many blacks and Hispanics, who have suffered most from this wage dip As a result, the earnings of this particularly vulnerable group dropped by between $800 and $1,500 each year.

supply of workers goes up the price to hire workers goes down 10 percent increase in the number of workers with a particular set of skills probably lowers the wage of that group by at least 3 percent Both low- and high-skilled natives are affected by the influx of immigrants

This second message might be hard for many Americans to process, but anyone who tells you that immigration doesn’t have any negative effects doesn’t understand how it really works. When the supply of workers goes up, the price that firms have to pay to hire workers goes down. Wage trends over the past half-century suggest that a 10 percent increase in the number of workers with a particular set of skills probably lowers the wage of that group by at least 3 percent. Even after the economy has fully adjusted, those skill groups that received the most immigrants will still offer lower pay relative to those that received fewer immigrants. Both low- and high-skilled natives are affected by the influx of immigrants. But because a disproportionate percentage of immigrants have few skills, it is low-skilled American workers, including many blacks and Hispanics, who have suffered most from this wage dip. The monetary loss is sizable. The typical high school dropout earns about $25,000 annually. According to census data, immigrants admitted in the past two decades lacking a high school diploma have increased the size of the low-skilled workforce by roughly 25 percent. As a result, the earnings of this particularly vulnerable group dropped by between $800 and $1,500 each year.

<h4>Immigration decks wage growth</h4><p><strong>Borjas ‘16 </strong>[George Borjas is the Robert W. Scrivner Professor of Economics and Social Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School. He was awarded the IZA Prize in Labor Economics in 2011. Professor Borjas is a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research and a Research Fellow at IZA. Professor Borjas is the author of several books on immigration economics, 2016 “Yes, Immigration Hurts American Workers”, Poltico, September/ October, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/09/trump-clinton-immigration-economy-unemployment-jobs-214216<u>, accessed 8/17/18, MJ]</p><p></u>This second message might be hard for many Americans to process, but anyone who tells you that immigration doesn’t have any negative effects doesn’t understand how it really works. <u>When the <mark>supply of workers goes up</mark>, <mark>the price</mark> that firms have to pay <mark>to hire workers goes down</mark>. Wage trends over the past half-century suggest that a <strong><mark>10 percent increase</strong> in the number of workers with a particular set of skills probably lowers the wage of that group by at least <strong>3 percent</strong></mark>. Even after the economy has fully adjusted, those skill groups that received the most immigrants will still offer lower pay relative to those that received fewer immigrants.</p><p><mark>Both low- and high-skilled natives are affected by the influx of immigrants</mark>. But because a disproportionate percentage of immigrants have few skills, it is low-skilled American workers, including many blacks and Hispanics, who have suffered most from this wage dip</u>. The monetary loss is sizable. The typical high school dropout earns about $25,000 annually. According to census data, immigrants admitted in the past two decades lacking a high school diploma have increased the size of the low-skilled workforce by roughly 25 percent. <u>As a result, the earnings of this particularly vulnerable group dropped by between $800 and $1,500 each year.</p></u>

1NC vs Vestavia Hills EP

Case

AT: C2

./documents/hsld22/King/ChPa/King-ChPa-Neg-Aaron-Thomas-Memorial-Invitational-at-Cypress-Bay-Round-1.docx

N

Aaron Thomas Memorial Invitational at Cypress Bay

1

Vestavia Hills EP

Xia, Qian

1AC - Structural Violence + Econ 1NC - Util, Disease DA, Brain Drain DA, Terror DA, Case 1AR - All 2NR - All 2AR - All

hsld22/King/ChPa/King-ChPa-Neg-Aaron-Thomas-Memorial-Invitational-at-Cypress-Bay-Round-1.docx

2023-01-21 00:13:55

ChPa

King ChPa

Hey y'all I'm Chan! (they/them) or (he/him) Contact Info Email: [email protected] Messanger: https://www.facebook.com/chanh.park.167/ Please ask for consent to spread! And please give content warnings about discussions of ableist and anti-asian violence

Ch.....

Pa.....

King

King

FL

hsld22

HS LD 2022-23

ld

hs

Global economic improvement depends heavily on China’s economic recovery

Kotok 22

Kotok 22 (David Kotok co-founded Cumberland Advisors in 1973 and has been its Chief Investment Officer since inception. David’s articles and financial market commentaries have appeared in The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, Barron’s, and other publications, “Global Soft Landing Depends Heavily On China,” Seeking Alpha, 6/22/2022, https://seekingalpha.com/article/4519773-global-soft-landing-depends-heavily-on-china) - MP

Russia’s war in Ukraine and Covid-related shutdowns in China have led to both slower growth prospects and higher inflation for the global economy Worsening consumer and business sentiment, increased inflation, and central banks moving to tighten monetary policy, with the US Federal Reserve being the most aggressive, have increased the risk of a global recession recession in the UK, and Germany’s GDP likely declined in the current quarter a soft landing for the global economy may still be possible, depending on the strength of an anticipated recovery in the Chinese economy the central role that China plays in the global economy. It has the second largest economy, following the US, and is the world’s leading exporter, with critical supply chain connections to most economies the world economy remains heavily connected to the Chinese economy When China imposed widespread lockdowns in April in pursuit of its zero-Covid policy, its economy was dealt a major blow. In May, Covid restrictions were eased; supply disruptions were reduced; and economic policy stimulus measures were increased, The Chinese economy responded more robustly, than the market expected. Fallout from the Russia-Ukraine war will be a negative factor, causing a global supply shock to energy and food. China’s economy is projected to achieve an annual growth rate of about 4% this year. Economies in the Asia-Pacific region will benefit from a recovery in China. China has already had substantial success in its efforts to reduce logistics hurdles and otherwise support foreign trade. Chinese goods exports in US dollar terms increased 16.9% year/year If our expectations for a sustained recovery in China’s economy are in the ballpark, China’s stocks are likely to outperform

Worsening consumer and business sentiment a recession in the UK, and Germany’s GDP likely declined , a soft landing may still be possible depending on recovery in the Chinese economy It has the second largest economy is the world’s leading exporter, with critical supply chain connections to most economies Economies in the Asia-Pacific region will benefit from a recovery in China

Russia’s war in Ukraine and Covid-related shutdowns in China have led to both slower growth prospects and higher inflation for the global economy. What was expected to be a continued strong recovery has been transformed in the second quarter to a stalling global economy. Worsening consumer and business sentiment, increased inflation, and central banks moving to tighten monetary policy, with the US Federal Reserve being the most aggressive, have increased the risk of a global recession. The Bank of England is already predicting a recession in the UK, and Germany’s GDP likely declined in the current quarter. Nevertheless, a soft landing for the global economy may still be possible, depending on the strength of an anticipated recovery in the Chinese economy along with other large Asian economies. Positive global growth still looks likely to return in the second half of this year, with real GDP growth for the year 2022 at 3% and at a similar rate next year.We have written about the central role that China plays in the global economy. It has the second largest economy, following the US, and is the world’s leading exporter, with critical supply chain connections to most economies. While there has been a lot of talk about “decoupling” from China, the reality is that the world economy remains heavily connected to the Chinese economy. When China imposed widespread lockdowns in April in pursuit of its zero-Covid policy, its economy was dealt a major blow. Output in both the industrial and service sectors turned negative in April; port activity was disrupted; and retail sales fell some 11%.In May, Covid restrictions were eased; supply disruptions were reduced; and economic policy stimulus measures were increased, with promises of more to come. The Chinese economy responded more robustly, than the market expected. Industrial production returned to positive growth, led by automobile and electric machinery production. Fixed-asset investment rebounded, led by infrastructure investment. The decline in retail sales continued but at a slower pace, which beat market expectations. China’s Covid statistics improved dramatically. The seven-day average daily case numbers have dropped to about 200, compared with some 30,000 in April. Nevertheless, mass testing is being imposed in some areas; and there have been some new, limited shutdowns. The Chinese economy probably hit bottom in April. Economic momentum appears to be picking up in June as more of the economy comes back online, the Shanghai lockdown has been lifted, and policy stimulus measures are having an increasing effect. Monetary and fiscal measures are being targeted to support small and medium-sized enterprises, real estate, manufacturing, and infrastructure financing. “Normalization” of the supervision of technology companies, following a year of regulatory crackdowns, and an outright pledge of support for the sector are welcome news to investors. Such measures to shore up domestic demand and improve export potential will be critical for maintaining the recovery in the second half and in 2023, when external demand may continue to be weak. Fallout from the Russia-Ukraine war will be a negative factor, causing a global supply shock to energy and food. China’s economy is projected to achieve an annual growth rate of about 4% this year. That would be just half the growth rate of last year but still stronger than the growth of most other economies. Growth in 2023 may average over 5%. Future Covid outbreaks will continue to be a risk to this outlook, although the government has modified its anti-Covid policies to be somewhat less disruptive.Economies in the Asia-Pacific region will benefit from a recovery in China. Particularly important will be a reduction in the disruptions in Asia’s supply chains. China has already had substantial success in its efforts to reduce logistics hurdles and otherwise support foreign trade. Chinese goods exports in US dollar terms increased 16.9% year/year in May compared with just 3.9% in April. Supply delivery times also improved in May. Stronger growth in China and fewer restrictions on activity should have a healthy effect on the Chinese demand for the exports of other Asia-Pacific economies. South Korea’s exports to China stabilized in May. The region will be affected by the Russia-Ukraine war mainly through the impact of the war on the region’s export markets, particularly those in Europe. Nevertheless, growth rates in the region’s resilient economies are likely to remain among the globe’s strongest, with this year’s growth rates for India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines all likely to be above 5%. If our expectations for a sustained recovery in China’s economy are in the ballpark, China’s stocks are likely to outperform. That has already been the case over the past three months through June 17, an otherwise dismal period for global equity markets. During this period, the Shanghai market managed a gain of 2.0% while the S&P 500 lost 17.7% and the STOXX Europe 300 lost 11.1%. At Cumberland Advisors, we currently have a positive but underweight position in Chinese equities in our International and Global Equity ETF Portfolios. That position can change any day depending on developments.

<h4><strong>Global economic improvement depends heavily on China’s economic recovery</h4><p>Kotok 22 </strong>(David Kotok co-founded Cumberland Advisors in 1973 and has been its Chief Investment Officer since inception. David’s articles and financial market commentaries have appeared in The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, Barron’s, and other publications, “Global Soft Landing Depends Heavily On China,” Seeking Alpha, 6/22/2022, https://seekingalpha.com/article/4519773-global-soft-landing-depends-heavily-on-china) - MP</p><p><u>Russia’s war in Ukraine and Covid-related shutdowns in China have led to both slower growth prospects and higher inflation for the global economy</u>. What was expected to be a continued strong recovery has been transformed in the second quarter to a stalling global economy. <u><mark>Worsening consumer and business sentiment</mark>, increased inflation, and central banks moving to tighten monetary policy, with the US Federal Reserve being the most aggressive, have increased the risk of a global recession</u>. The Bank of England is already predicting <mark>a <u>recession in the UK, and Germany’s GDP likely declined</mark> in the current quarter</u>. Nevertheless<mark>, <u>a soft landing</mark> for the global economy <mark>may still be possible</mark>, <mark>depending on</mark> the strength of an anticipated <mark>recovery in the Chinese economy</mark> </u>along with other large Asian economies. Positive global growth still looks likely to return in the second half of this year, with real GDP growth for the year 2022 at 3% and at a similar rate next year.We have written about <u>the central role that China plays in the global economy. <mark>It has the second largest economy</mark>, following the US, and <mark>is the world’s leading exporter, with critical supply chain connections to most economies</u></mark>. While there has been a lot of talk about “decoupling” from China, the reality is that <u>the world economy remains heavily connected to the Chinese economy</u>. <u>When China imposed widespread lockdowns in April in pursuit of its zero-Covid policy, its economy was dealt a major blow.</u> Output in both the industrial and service sectors turned negative in April; port activity was disrupted; and retail sales fell some 11%.<u>In May, Covid restrictions were eased; supply disruptions were reduced; and economic policy stimulus measures were increased,</u> with promises of more to come. <u>The Chinese economy responded more robustly, than the market expected.</u> Industrial production returned to positive growth, led by automobile and electric machinery production. Fixed-asset investment rebounded, led by infrastructure investment. The decline in retail sales continued but at a slower pace, which beat market expectations. China’s Covid statistics improved dramatically. The seven-day average daily case numbers have dropped to about 200, compared with some 30,000 in April. Nevertheless, mass testing is being imposed in some areas; and there have been some new, limited shutdowns. The Chinese economy probably hit bottom in April. Economic momentum appears to be picking up in June as more of the economy comes back online, the Shanghai lockdown has been lifted, and policy stimulus measures are having an increasing effect. Monetary and fiscal measures are being targeted to support small and medium-sized enterprises, real estate, manufacturing, and infrastructure financing. “Normalization” of the supervision of technology companies, following a year of regulatory crackdowns, and an outright pledge of support for the sector are welcome news to investors. Such measures to shore up domestic demand and improve export potential will be critical for maintaining the recovery in the second half and in 2023, when external demand may continue to be weak. <u>Fallout from the Russia-Ukraine war will be a negative factor, causing a global supply shock to energy and food. China’s economy is projected to achieve an annual growth rate of about 4% this year.</u> That would be just half the growth rate of last year but still stronger than the growth of most other economies. Growth in 2023 may average over 5%. Future Covid outbreaks will continue to be a risk to this outlook, although the government has modified its anti-Covid policies to be somewhat less disruptive.<u><mark>Economies in the Asia-Pacific region will benefit from a recovery in China</mark>.</u> Particularly important will be a reduction in the disruptions in Asia’s supply chains. <u>China has already had substantial success in its efforts to reduce logistics hurdles and otherwise support foreign trade. Chinese goods exports in US dollar terms increased 16.9% year/year</u> in May compared with just 3.9% in April. Supply delivery times also improved in May. Stronger growth in China and fewer restrictions on activity should have a healthy effect on the Chinese demand for the exports of other Asia-Pacific economies. South Korea’s exports to China stabilized in May. The region will be affected by the Russia-Ukraine war mainly through the impact of the war on the region’s export markets, particularly those in Europe. Nevertheless, growth rates in the region’s resilient economies are likely to remain among the globe’s strongest, with this year’s growth rates for India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines all likely to be above 5%. <u>If our expectations for a sustained recovery in China’s economy are in the ballpark, China’s stocks are likely to outperform</u><strong>. That has already been the case over the past three months through June 17, an otherwise dismal period for global equity markets. During this period, the Shanghai market managed a gain of 2.0% while the S&P 500 lost 17.7% and the STOXX Europe 300 lost 11.1%. At Cumberland Advisors, we currently have a positive but underweight position in Chinese equities in our International and Global Equity ETF Portfolios. That position can change any day depending on developments.</p></strong>

4

./documents/hsld22/Marlborough/HoLe/Marlborough-HoLe-Neg-Damus-Hollywood-Invitational-Doubles.docx

N

Damus Hollywood Invitational

Doubles

Aragon ZA

Danielle Dosch, Nikki Aqui, Gordon Krauss

1ac - dams 1nc - nuke disarm cp, transboundary rivers cp, econ da, t prioritize, case 1ar - all 2nr - t 2ar - case, t

hsld22/Marlborough/HoLe/Marlborough-HoLe-Neg-Damus-Hollywood-Invitational-Doubles.docx

2022-11-13 17:26:59

HoLe

Marlborough HoLe

Ho.....

Le.....

Marlborough

Marlborough

CA

hsld22

HS LD 2022-23

ld

hs

Borders entrench a neocolonial framework of dependent development that destroys human dignity – mass inequality, corruption, and state failure link turns every disad

Nwune 21

Nwune 21 [Nwune, Udoka W., "Neocolonialism and Terrorist Activities in Africa: A Case Study of Nigeria." Georgia State University, 2021. https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1096&context=political_science_theses] CT

He postulated that the neocolonialism of his days (the 1950s–1970s) represents imperialism in its final and perhaps its most dangerous stage. Ultimately, to Uzoigwe (2019) Nkrumah’s postulation suggests that those who practice neocolonialism exercise power without concern and those who suffer from it are exploited without remedy Therefore, neocolonialism is the nature of relations after independence between European powers and their former colonies of the non-European world To Uzoigwe (2019) neocolonialism is accomplished under three broad categories: political and geopolitical, economic, and sociocultural. Also, he failed to emphasize which major actors on the global stage (states, IOs, MNCs, NGOs, and individuals) assist in accomplishing neocolonialism under the three broad categories. From a political and geopolitical stance, Uzoigwe argues that neocolonialism has been used primarily to achieve foreign interests, for example through what he considers the divisive western concepts that destabilizes regions and entire continents such as sub-Saharan Africa. The foreign interests of hegemonic states that surged in Africa during the Cold war period validates Uzoigwe’s argument. post-colonial state is established in a way that it reflects and mainly caters to a narrow array of interests, mainly the interests of the selfcentered political elites acting as agents to foreign interests Uzoigwe’s article demonstrates that neocolonialism will not be able to operate effectively without the cooperation of the indigenous leaders. He argued that such relationship is intended to foster dependency, which in turn undermines the sovereignty of the states concerned. This was what Ali (2014) referred to as “illusion sovereignty”. Ali (2014) organized his study with the postcolonial theory while maintaining that the colonial powers left Africa physically after states attained independence, but remained politically, economically, and socially. Ultimately, the major pre-occupation colonial state was to create conditions under which accumulation of capital by both foreign and domestic bourgeoisie would take place through the exploitation of local human and other natural resources Hegemons like the U.S, France, and Britain have directly or indirectly overthrown regimes in Africa. In most other African states, few leaders managed to stay in power after all attempts to overthrow them failed, essentially because the support of the Soviet Union during the Cold War created internal and external hurdles that frustrated the African leaders’ policies and rendered them ineffectual oigwe rightly agreed that neocolonial powers operate by skillfully manipulating states by offering carrots to friendly states and sticks to enemies. In addition, Uzoigwe (2019) argued that there two versions of neocolonialism which he referred to as old and new neocolonialism. He argued that the old new colonialism was more transparent, while new neocolonialism more sophisticated and dangerous. . They linked the origin and spread of corruption to the colonization of Africa, the long-lasting legacy of colonization and the actions and practices of major actors on the global stage which we reviewed as neocolonization in the previous section At independence, such client-patron ties between the groups favored by the colonial administration had an edge over those not favored (Leonard, 1991 as cited in Milinge, 1993). Consequently, these favored groups would constitute the earliest Nigerian elite class. The elite class was what Rodney (1972) called the ‘petty bourgeoisie', whose role was to dominate the political and economic life of most African states. According to Leonard (1991, as cited in Milinge et al., 2002) the gaining of independence for this group was merely intended for the breaking of the monopoly of the colonial administrator's political power so that they could further their own advancement and posterity. These groups replicated their British colonial master’s technique of divide and rule which involved the practice of favoring one tribe over others with the dual objective of securing loyalty of that group to the administration and encouraging rivalry between different tribes to prevent a sense of unity from evolving and threatening political interests Abada et al. (2019) argued that the nature of the Nigerian state was formed in huge extent by its colonial past and the nature of the state explains the nature of associational life within the society. Thus, the theory of postcolonial state and elite theory provide support to hypothesis that neocolonialism has induced corruption in Nigeria. No wonder, Agang (2016) argued that corruption is an indication of how the focus on materialism has led to the distortion of human dignity and the sanity of life and values. According to Agang (2016) the chances of oppression and marginalization of the majority by a peculiar social group is initiated by the fascination of the amassment of material wealth which reduces and equates human value to monetary value The consequences resulted in a pattern of scandalous wealth among the ruling class with growing poverty, unhappiness, and deprivation among many Nigerians Hadden (2016) suggests that resources acquired by corruption tend to be kept outside Nigeria by politicians instead of being invested in the local economy for its intended purpose, which therefore leaves a vacuum, depressing Nigeria’s development Therefore, corruption is a way of life in Nigeria abetted by hegemonic powers and is a way of life which existing governments neither wish to, nor can, control. 2.1.2 Bad Governance and Terrorism However, scholars such Abada and Ngwu (2019) attempted to establish that bad governance and corruption in Nigeria has given rise to certain societal challenges that led to insurgency. For instance, in the study of Abada et al. (2019) which is anchored on the theory of post-colonial state, they argued that the misuse of public resources and the failure of governance have provoked mass poverty in Nigeria which has led to the advent of terrorist groups that resort to the use of force in the expression of their discontent have argued that the terrorist activities of Boko Haram are triggered by a combination of bad governance, including the prevalent failures of state policies, inefficient and wasteful parastatals, and endemic corruption, poverty, unemployment, and extensive underdevelopment in the northern Nigeria. Therefore, these elites are the perpetrators of bad governance in Nigeria, and they are also responsible for the frustration of the citizens of Nigeria. Okoro (2020) demonstrated that the Boko Haram insurgency is a retaliation against bad governance, notably in northern Nigeria where the epidemic of poverty led to frustration and recourse to terror activities among the people, particularly the youth. The elite’s private accumulation resources at the expense of the public destabilizes the state’s institutions therefore fostering inequality, underdevelopment, and endangering the lives of citizens whom these public institutions are meant to serve. Therefore, Okoro (2020) argued that the membership profile of Boko Haram reveals that poverty and economic inequality are at its roots. However, he failed denote a strong link on what exactly causes poverty and economic inequality that leads to terrorist activities. It could possibly be embedded in what Okoro recognized as the weak nature of governance. Importantly, he found that bad governance in Nigeria served as a broader function in the emergence and growth of terrorist activities of Boko Haram.

neocolonialism represents imperialism in its most dangerous stage those who suffer are exploited without remedy neocolonialism destabilizes entire continents political elites act as agents to foreign interests foster dependency colonial powers remained politically, accumulation by foreign bourgeoisie through exploitation natural resources Hegemons have overthrown regimes in Africa At independence groups replicated colonial divide and rule neocolonialism induced corruption materialism led to the distortion of dignity oppression equates human to monetary value scandalous wealth among the ruling mass poverty i led to terrorist groups Boko Haram triggered by endemic corruption, poverty private accumulation destabilizes state institutions fostering inequality, underdevelopment, and endangering lives poverty and inequality are its roots

2.1 The Manifestation of Neocolonialism To understand the variables under investigation, it is imperative to understand the phenomenon, neocolonialism. Many other scholars have had various emotive definitions of neocolonialism, thereby arousing debates within the social sciences. A notable example of an emotive definition of neocolonialism is the Ghanaian nationalist and first President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah's definition. He postulated that the neocolonialism of his days (the 1950s–1970s) represents imperialism in its final and perhaps its most dangerous stage. Ultimately, to Uzoigwe (2019) Nkrumah’s postulation suggests that those who practice neocolonialism exercise power without concern and those who suffer from it are exploited without remedy. He disagrees with Colin Leys (1975) who believed that neocolonialism was temporary and transitional, and instead sees neocolonialism as a continuous process. Therefore, neocolonialism is the nature of relations after independence between European powers and their former colonies of the non-European world (Uzoigwe, 2019). To Uzoigwe (2019) neocolonialism is accomplished under three broad categories: political and geopolitical, economic, and sociocultural. He argues that these broad categories have both negative and positive aspects. Perhaps what he tried to recognize as the positive aspects of manifestation of neocolonialism is what I consider as the positive tenets of globalization. Also, he failed to emphasize which major actors on the global stage (states, IOs, MNCs, NGOs, and individuals) assist in accomplishing neocolonialism under the three broad categories. From a political and geopolitical stance, Uzoigwe argues that neocolonialism has been used primarily to achieve foreign interests, for example through what he considers the divisive western concepts that destabilizes regions and entire continents such as sub-Saharan Africa. The foreign interests of hegemonic states that surged in Africa during the Cold war period validates Uzoigwe’s argument. While emphasizing on historical events, Uzoigwe’s argument did not utilize significant theories to critically interrogate the phenomenon of neocolonialism. Perhaps an inclusion of relevant theories like postcolonial theory and realism would have made a huge difference in his study. For instance, adopting postcolonial theory in his study would broadly have clarified the effects of colonialism on cultures and societies, and its creation of elitism. The post-colonial state is established in a way that it reflects and mainly caters to a narrow array of interests, mainly the interests of the selfcentered political elites acting as agents to foreign interests (Ake, 1985 as cited by Abada et al, 2019). Uzoigwe’s article demonstrates that neocolonialism will not be able to operate effectively without the cooperation of the indigenous leaders. He argued that such relationship is intended to foster dependency, which in turn undermines the sovereignty of the states concerned. This was what Ali (2014) referred to as “illusion sovereignty”. Ali (2014) organized his study with the postcolonial theory while maintaining that the colonial powers left Africa physically after states attained independence, but remained politically, economically, and socially. In a similar study like Uzoigwe’s, Wyss (2016) emphasized that the ‘defense agreement’ between Britain and Nigeria demonstrated a clear manifestation of neocolonialism. Wyss (2016) argued that the British military personnel sought to ensure military facilities in Nigeria through the ‘defense agreement’ to sustain and strengthen Britain’s hegemony which was driven by the struggle between the Western and Eastern blocs during the Cold War. Perhaps, this was what Rondey (1973) in his book "How Europe Underdeveloped Africa," attempted to emphasize as a cynical short-hand expression for the strengthening of foreign exploitation in Africa to develop capitalist Europe. Certainly, indigenous elites play a role in the strengthening of foreign exploitation in Nigeria. The first Prime Minister of Nigeria, Tafawa Balewa was clearly an advocate for the defense agreement. However, Wyss (2016) in his study failed to pinpoint if this could have probably been because of the interests of the self-centered political elites that represents foreign interests. For instance, the appointment of Balewa as Prime Minister in 1957 by the British Governor General, Sir James Wilson Robertson, and his retainment of the position during independence over other preferred candidates alarmed many Nigerians, and subsequently made some Nigerians considered him pro-western. Hence, he supported the defense agreement between Nigeria and Britain and claimed that it was in Nigeria’s interest against the continued charges from the opposition in parliament, led by the AG (Action Group party), and many. According to Wyss (2016. P. 14) “In late November 1960, around 800 students descended into the streets of Lagos to demonstrate against the agreement. They carried placards that read, among other things, ‘Away with Anglo-Balewa Pact’, ‘Down with Colonial Mentality’ and ‘Keep us out of NATO’.” Ultimately, the major pre-occupation colonial state was to create conditions under which accumulation of capital by both foreign and domestic bourgeoisie would take place through the exploitation of local human and other natural resources (Ekekwe, 1985). Abada & Ngwu (2019) made a powerful theoretical framework in the study through the utilization of postcolonial theory. The theoretical framework in their study synthesizes with Uzoigwe’s stance in his study that the political rulers that emerged in postcolonial states were individuals that were specifically chosen by the departing colonial powers. Many progressive indigenous leaders who attempted to challenge the will of previous colonial powers met unfortunate fates. Hegemons like the U.S, France, and Britain have directly or indirectly overthrown regimes in Africa. For instance, in the enormous mineral wealthy Democratic Republic Congo, the C.I.A and Belgium authorities maneuvered colonel Mobutu's rise to power in 1966 in Democratic Republic Congo, by capturing, torturing, and tragically assassinating the first prime minister of Congo, Lumumba on 17th January 1961 because Lumumba refused to become an ally of the West but rather ally with East bloc. In most other African states, few leaders managed to stay in power after all attempts to overthrow them failed, essentially because the support of the Soviet Union during the Cold War created internal and external hurdles that frustrated the African leaders’ policies and rendered them ineffectual (Uzoigwe, 2019). Uzoigwe rightly agreed that neocolonial powers operate by skillfully manipulating states by offering carrots to friendly states and sticks to enemies. In addition, Uzoigwe (2019) argued that there two versions of neocolonialism which he referred to as old and new neocolonialism. He argued that the old new colonialism was more transparent, while new neocolonialism more sophisticated and dangerous. Unlike Uzoigwe, this study rejects that there was an old version of neocolonialism that was beneficial in any respects because there is absolutely nothing beneficial about neocolonialism since it interferes in the sovereignty of developing states and makes them dependent on hegemonic states. Nigeria has been affected by the shackles of neocolonialism to the extent that the state is helpless to help itself especially because neocolonialism fostered corruption and bad governance. 2.1.1 Corruption Corruption is found in states globally. Regardless of the endemic and universal nature of corruption, there is no single generally accepted definition of corruption because countries differ in their point of view as to its meaning, causes and effects (Mulinge et al., 2002). Abada et al, (2019) opined that corruption is indeed a contested concept. They described corruption as a ‘hydraheaded monster’ that has tormented Nigeria for a long time to the extent that top ranking members of Nigeria’s ruling elite have been incapable to reach a consensus on its meaning, let alone the approaches to fight it. Unsurprising, in Mulinge et al. (2002) essay, they defined corruption after Osoba (1996: p 372) as “a form of antisocial behavior by an individual or social group which confers unjust or fraudulent benefits on its perpetrators, is inconsistent with the established legal norms and prevailing moral ethos of the land and is likely to subvert or diminish the capacity of the legitimate authorities to provide fully for the material and spiritual well-being of all members of society in a just and equitable manner.” This definition failed to distinguish what social group is responsible or more likely to perpetuate this antisocial behavior. Could this social group Osaba (1996) referred to be the upper class which this study considers the Nigerian political elites? Or could it have been the middle or lower class? Notwithstanding, Mulinge et al. (2002) presented a holistic analysis of the genesis and entrenchment of corruption in sub-Saharan Africa by incorporating the historical and international contexts of the problem. They linked the origin and spread of corruption to the colonization of Africa, the long-lasting legacy of colonization and the actions and practices of major actors on the global stage which we reviewed as neocolonization in the previous section (section 2.1). Tignor (1993) observed that most of the literature on political corruption seeks to define the term and to understand why and how it arises, what effects it has on polity and economy, and how it may possibly be brought under control. Tignor (1993) focused on the debate that took place during the late colonial period to identify when corruption emerged on the political scene, and how it eventually assumed such prominence. Tignor (1993) found that corruption had long existed prior to the period Nigeria gained its independence from Britain. The political elites in power amass wealth through overwhelming corruption either as Nigerian antagonists or corroborate with colonial administrators. Tignor (1993) argued that prior to Nigeria’s independence the country had been a common place where the activities of competing nationalists were based on using the resources at their disposal to build political alliances. Clearly, these alliances were built amongst political elites and were sometimes based on patron-client ties and strengthening bonds of ethnicity. At independence, such client-patron ties between the groups favored by the colonial administration had an edge over those not favored (Leonard, 1991 as cited in Milinge, 1993). Consequently, these favored groups would constitute the earliest Nigerian elite class. The elite class was what Rodney (1972) called the ‘petty bourgeoisie', whose role was to dominate the political and economic life of most African states. According to Leonard (1991, as cited in Milinge et al., 2002) the gaining of independence for this group was merely intended for the breaking of the monopoly of the colonial administrator's political power so that they could further their own advancement and posterity. These groups replicated their British colonial master’s technique of divide and rule which involved the practice of favoring one tribe over others with the dual objective of securing loyalty of that group to the administration and encouraging rivalry between different tribes to prevent a sense of unity from evolving and threatening political interests (Mulinge et al., 2002). This voids the arguments of some scholars who were convinced that corruption stemmed primarily from electoral politics in Nigeria’s first republic (1960 – 1966). Tignor (1993) argued that the failure of the military regime that emerged after the first republic undercut the argument that corruption stemmed primarily from electoral politics through stressing the norms and values of the Nigerian elites over more structural explanations. For this study, we will adopt Mulinge et al (2002) normative definition of corruption. Mulinge et al., (2002) normatively defined corruption as the misuse of public authority or resources for personal benefit. Abada et al. (2019) argued that the nature of the Nigerian state was formed in huge extent by its colonial past and the nature of the state explains the nature of associational life within the society. Thus, the theory of postcolonial state and elite theory provide support to hypothesis that neocolonialism has induced corruption in Nigeria. The impacts of neocolonialism have kept Nigeria in ideologically westernized and material modernity. No wonder, Agang (2016) argued that corruption is an indication of how the focus on materialism has led to the distortion of human dignity and the sanity of life and values. According to Agang (2016) the chances of oppression and marginalization of the majority by a peculiar social group is initiated by the fascination of the amassment of material wealth which reduces and equates human value to monetary value. Hence, this has been the case of Nigeria since a gained independence from Britain. Osoba 1996 found that all regimes in Nigeria both military and civilian, have been encompassed by corruption. He argued that the oil boom and its revenues aided and created a deepening crisis of kleptocracy, shown in its greatest form since 1984. The consequences resulted in a pattern of scandalous wealth among the ruling class with growing poverty, unhappiness, and deprivation among many Nigerians (Osoba, 1996). Hadden (2016) suggests that resources acquired by corruption tend to be kept outside Nigeria by politicians instead of being invested in the local economy for its intended purpose, which therefore leaves a vacuum, depressing Nigeria’s development. Over the years, Nigerian elitists would not have been able to invest capital in western states without the help of foreign governments and multinational companies. Therefore, corruption is a way of life in Nigeria abetted by hegemonic powers and is a way of life which existing governments neither wish to, nor can, control. Abada et al. (2019) echoed that the government has failed to combat corruption. In fact, the January 1966 coup, which was the first military coup in Nigeria that terminated the First Republic, was due to elite corruption and the inconsistency in governance. In the words of the officer, Nzeogwu who orchestrated the coup: “We wanted to get rid of rotten and corrupt ministers, political parties, trades unions and the whole clumsy apparatus of the federal system. We wanted to gun down all the bigwigs on our way. This was the only way. We could not afford to let them live if this was to work. We got some but not all. General Ironsi was to have been shot, but we were not ruthless enough. As a result, he and the other compromisers were able to supplant us.” (Sahara Reporters, 2009) However, transition of power to the military did not solve the epidemic of bad governance and corruption. Suleiman & Karim, (2015) found that the military regime resulted in the abuse of office, corruption, human right violations, and total neglect for the rule of law. Mulinge et al (2002) argued that corruption is not driven by internal factors alone. They argued that corruption is also a consequence of external factors driven by the activities of foreign governments, aid organizations and MNCs seeking to further their own economic interests through actions and practices that condone corrupt practices or that are corrupt in themselves (Mulingeet al., 2002). According to Galtung (1998: 118 as cited in Mulinge et al., 2002) instances of massive corruption have an international dimension where the bribe giver could perhaps be a MNC, or in certain instance a corrupt politician might seek refuge abroad from prosecution in their home country, and the earnings of corruption can be concealed to private accounts in foreign destinations. The elite theory demonstrates that there is the concentration of power in the hands of the few. The autonomy of elites makes it both advantageous and possible for the governing elite strategize and use state resources to control through manipulation and corruption (Etzioni‐Halevy, 1989). This was the case right from Nigeria’s First Republic (government after independence), the country has been tormented by rampant public sector corruption manifesting in poor governance outcomes and severe developmental pathologies. Consequently, this is the reason corruption and bad governance are correlated in this study. In subsequent sections, this study will utilize corruption and bad governance together since in the case of Nigeria they are conceptually intertwined. 2.1.2 Bad Governance and Terrorism Many scholars have defined governance from various perspectives. According to Okoro (2020) the concept governance implies to the procedure of exercising political power to oversee the activities of the state. According to the UNICEF (2020, as cited in Okoro, 2020) governance constitutes of making and implementing decisions based on considerations like popular participation, respect for the rule of law, observance of human rights, transparency, free access to information, prompt responses to human needs, accommodation of diverse interests, equity, inclusiveness, effective results, and accountability. According to the Mo Ibrahim Foundation (as cited in Okoro, 2020) governance is the provision of the political, social, and economic public goods and services which is a state’s responsibility to deliver to its citizens, and which is a citizen’s right to expect from the government. Also, Fukuyama (2013) defined governance as the capacity of a government to make and implement rules, and to provide services, irrespective of whether that government is democratic or not. Therefore, if a government is unable to fulfil responsibilities such as making and implementing rules then it should be considered bad at governance. Rose et al (2019) argued that bad governance is frequently caused by corruption. Thus, many scholars such as Ibeanu (1998), Abada & Ngwu (2019), and Mbah (2017) have argued that bad governance and corruption go hand in hand. In reviewing existing literatures, the previous section (section 2.1.1) of this study examine corruption separately for clarity because in many countries bad governance can occur without corruption. Nevertheless, in Nigeria bad governance occurs with corruption since the country attained independence in 1960. Thus, in subsequent sections of this study bad governance and corruption will be combined textually. As much as there are several literatures on corruption in Africa, especially in Nigeria, there is a literature on bad governance in Nigeria. However, much of this literature has not tried to connect neocolonialism to bad governance as well as determine the extent to which a linear causal relationship between the two factors has exacerbated terrorist activities in Nigeria. Suleiman et al (2015) found that literature covering terrorist activities in the northern part of Nigeria dwelled mostly on the origin and activities of the groups through their radicalization on a religious platform. Most analyses of these existing literature have been based on the emergence of terrorist groups and activities through a religious prism (Suleiman et al., 2015). However, scholars such Abada and Ngwu (2019) attempted to establish that bad governance and corruption in Nigeria has given rise to certain societal challenges that led to insurgency. For instance, in the study of Abada et al. (2019) which is anchored on the theory of post-colonial state, they argued that the misuse of public resources and the failure of governance have provoked mass poverty in Nigeria which has led to the advent of terrorist groups that resort to the use of force in the expression of their discontent. Uzodike et al (2012) have argued that the terrorist activities of Boko Haram are triggered by a combination of bad governance, including the prevalent failures of state policies, inefficient and wasteful parastatals, and endemic corruption, poverty, unemployment, and extensive underdevelopment in the northern Nigeria. Essentially, Uzodike et al. (2012) failed to emphasize that inefficient and wasteful parastatals, poverty, unemployment, and extensive underdevelopment will not be feasible without bad governance and corruption. As a result, Nigeria is institutionally constituted so that it enjoys limited independence from the elite class highlighted in section 2.1.1. Therefore, these elites are the perpetrators of bad governance in Nigeria, and they are also responsible for the frustration of the citizens of Nigeria. Okoro (2020) demonstrated that the Boko Haram insurgency is a retaliation against bad governance, notably in northern Nigeria where the epidemic of poverty led to frustration and recourse to terror activities among the people, particularly the youth. He found weaknesses in previous justifications of scholars and analysts who opined that Islamic fundamentalism, and the emergence of an elite violent political competition between northern and southern Nigeria especially after Goodluck Jonathan emerged as president was responsible for the Boko Haram activities. The elite’s private accumulation resources at the expense of the public destabilizes the state’s institutions therefore fostering inequality, underdevelopment, and endangering the lives of citizens whom these public institutions are meant to serve. Therefore, Okoro (2020) argued that the membership profile of Boko Haram reveals that poverty and economic inequality are at its roots. However, he failed denote a strong link on what exactly causes poverty and economic inequality that leads to terrorist activities. It could possibly be embedded in what Okoro recognized as the weak nature of governance. Importantly, he found that bad governance in Nigeria served as a broader function in the emergence and growth of terrorist activities of Boko Haram.

<h4><strong>Borders entrench a neocolonial framework of dependent development that destroys human dignity – mass inequality, corruption, and state failure link turns <u>every disad</u> </h4><p>Nwune 21</strong> [Nwune, Udoka W., "Neocolonialism and Terrorist Activities in Africa: A Case Study of Nigeria." Georgia State University, 2021. https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1096&context=political_science_theses] CT</p><p>2.1 The Manifestation of Neocolonialism</p><p>To understand the variables under investigation, it is imperative to understand the phenomenon, neocolonialism. Many other scholars have had various emotive definitions of neocolonialism, thereby arousing debates within the social sciences. A notable example of an emotive definition of neocolonialism is the Ghanaian nationalist and first President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah's definition. <u>He postulated that the <strong><mark>neocolonialism</strong></mark> of his days (the 1950s–1970s) <strong><mark>represents imperialism in its </mark>final and</strong> perhaps its <strong><mark>most dangerous stage</strong></mark>.</u> <u>Ultimately, to Uzoigwe (2019) Nkrumah’s postulation suggests that those who practice <strong>neocolonialism exercise power without concern and <mark>those who suffer</strong></mark> from it <strong><mark>are exploited without remedy</u></strong></mark>. He disagrees with Colin Leys (1975) who believed that neocolonialism was temporary and transitional, and instead sees neocolonialism as a continuous process. <u>Therefore, neocolonialism is the nature of relations after independence between European powers and their former colonies of the non-European world</u> (Uzoigwe, 2019). <u>To Uzoigwe (2019) neocolonialism is accomplished under three broad categories: political and geopolitical, economic, and sociocultural. </u>He argues that these broad categories have both negative and positive aspects. Perhaps what he tried to recognize as the positive aspects of manifestation of neocolonialism is what I consider as the positive tenets of globalization. <u>Also, he failed to emphasize which <strong>major actors on the global stage (states, IOs,</strong> MNCs, <strong>NGOs</strong>, and individuals) <strong>assist in accomplishing neocolonialism</strong> under the three broad categories.</u> <u>From a political and geopolitical stance, Uzoigwe argues that <strong><mark>neocolonialism</strong></mark> has been <strong>used</strong> primarily <strong>to achieve foreign interests</strong>, for example through what he considers the divisive western concepts that <strong><mark>destabilizes </mark>regions and <mark>entire continents </mark>such as sub-Saharan Africa</strong>. The foreign interests of hegemonic states that surged in Africa during the Cold war period validates Uzoigwe’s argument. </u>While emphasizing on historical events, Uzoigwe’s argument did not utilize significant theories to critically interrogate the phenomenon of neocolonialism. Perhaps an inclusion of relevant theories like postcolonial theory and realism would have made a huge difference in his study. For instance, adopting postcolonial theory in his study would broadly have clarified the effects of colonialism on cultures and societies, and its creation of elitism. The <u><strong>post-colonial state</strong> is established in a way that it reflects and mainly <strong>caters to</strong> a <strong>narrow array of interests</strong>, mainly the interests of the selfcentered <strong><mark>political elites</strong> act</mark>ing <strong><mark>as agents to foreign interests</u></strong></mark> (Ake, 1985 as cited by Abada et al, 2019). <u>Uzoigwe’s article demonstrates that neocolonialism will not be able to operate effectively without the cooperation of the indigenous leaders. He argued that such relationship is <strong>intended to <mark>foster dependency</strong></mark>, which in turn <strong>undermines</strong> the <strong>sovereignty</strong> of the states concerned.</u> <u>This was what Ali (2014) referred to as <strong>“illusion sovereignty</strong>”.</u> <u>Ali (2014) organized his study with the postcolonial theory while maintaining that the <strong><mark>colonial powers </mark>left Africa physically</strong> after states attained independence, <strong>but <mark>remained politically, </mark>economically, and socially</strong>.</u> In a similar study like Uzoigwe’s, Wyss (2016) emphasized that the ‘defense agreement’ between Britain and Nigeria demonstrated a clear manifestation of neocolonialism. Wyss (2016) argued that the British military personnel sought to ensure military facilities in Nigeria through the ‘defense agreement’ to sustain and strengthen Britain’s hegemony which was driven by the struggle between the Western and Eastern blocs during the Cold War. Perhaps, this was what Rondey (1973) in his book "How Europe Underdeveloped Africa," attempted to emphasize as a cynical short-hand expression for the strengthening of foreign exploitation in Africa to develop capitalist Europe. Certainly, indigenous elites play a role in the strengthening of foreign exploitation in Nigeria. The first Prime Minister of Nigeria, Tafawa Balewa was clearly an advocate for the defense agreement. However, Wyss (2016) in his study failed to pinpoint if this could have probably been because of the interests of the self-centered political elites that represents foreign interests. For instance, the appointment of Balewa as Prime Minister in 1957 by the British Governor General, Sir James Wilson Robertson, and his retainment of the position during independence over other preferred candidates alarmed many Nigerians, and subsequently made some Nigerians considered him pro-western. Hence, he supported the defense agreement between Nigeria and Britain and claimed that it was in Nigeria’s interest against the continued charges from the opposition in parliament, led by the AG (Action Group party), and many. According to Wyss (2016. P. 14) “In late November 1960, around 800 students descended into the streets of Lagos to demonstrate against the agreement. They carried placards that read, among other things, ‘Away with Anglo-Balewa Pact’, ‘Down with Colonial Mentality’ and ‘Keep us out of NATO’.” <u>Ultimately, the major pre-occupation colonial state was to create conditions under which <strong><mark>accumulation </mark>of capital <mark>by</mark> both <mark>foreign</mark> and domestic <mark>bourgeoisie</strong></mark> would take place <strong><mark>through </mark>the <mark>exploitation </mark>of local human and</strong> other <strong><mark>natural resources</u></strong></mark> (Ekekwe, 1985). Abada & Ngwu (2019) made a powerful theoretical framework in the study through the utilization of postcolonial theory. The theoretical framework in their study synthesizes with Uzoigwe’s stance in his study that the political rulers that emerged in postcolonial states were individuals that were specifically chosen by the departing colonial powers. Many progressive indigenous leaders who attempted to challenge the will of previous colonial powers met unfortunate fates. <u><strong><mark>Hegemons</strong></mark> like the U.S, France, and Britain <strong><mark>have </mark>directly or indirectly <mark>overthrown regimes in Africa</strong></mark>. </u>For instance, in the enormous mineral wealthy Democratic Republic Congo, the C.I.A and Belgium authorities maneuvered colonel Mobutu's rise to power in 1966 in Democratic Republic Congo, by capturing, torturing, and tragically assassinating the first prime minister of Congo, Lumumba on 17th January 1961 because Lumumba refused to become an ally of the West but rather ally with East bloc. <u>In most other African states, few leaders managed to stay in power after all attempts to overthrow them failed, essentially because the support of the Soviet Union during the Cold War created internal and external hurdles that frustrated the African leaders’ policies and rendered them ineffectual</u> (Uzoigwe, 2019). Uz<u>oigwe rightly agreed <strong>that neocolonial powers operate by skillfully manipulating states </strong>by <strong>offering carrots</strong> to friendly states <strong>and sticks </strong>to enemies. In addition, Uzoigwe (2019) argued that there two versions of neocolonialism which he referred to as old and new neocolonialism. He argued that the old new colonialism was more transparent, while new neocolonialism more sophisticated and dangerous. </u>Unlike Uzoigwe, this study rejects that there was an old version of neocolonialism that was beneficial in any respects because there is absolutely nothing beneficial about neocolonialism since it interferes in the sovereignty of developing states and makes them dependent on hegemonic states. Nigeria has been affected by the shackles of neocolonialism to the extent that the state is helpless to help itself especially because neocolonialism fostered corruption and bad governance.</p><p>2.1.1 Corruption</p><p>Corruption is found in states globally. Regardless of the endemic and universal nature of corruption, there is no single generally accepted definition of corruption because countries differ in their point of view as to its meaning, causes and effects (Mulinge et al., 2002). Abada et al, (2019) opined that corruption is indeed a contested concept. They described corruption as a ‘hydraheaded monster’ that has tormented Nigeria for a long time to the extent that top ranking members of Nigeria’s ruling elite have been incapable to reach a consensus on its meaning, let alone the approaches to fight it. Unsurprising, in Mulinge et al. (2002) essay, they defined corruption after Osoba (1996: p 372) as “a form of antisocial behavior by an individual or social group which confers unjust or fraudulent benefits on its perpetrators, is inconsistent with the established legal norms and prevailing moral ethos of the land and is likely to subvert or diminish the capacity of the legitimate authorities to provide fully for the material and spiritual well-being of all members of society in a just and equitable manner.” This definition failed to distinguish what social group is responsible or more likely to perpetuate this antisocial behavior. Could this social group Osaba (1996) referred to be the upper class which this study considers the Nigerian political elites? Or could it have been the middle or lower class? Notwithstanding, Mulinge et al. (2002) presented a holistic analysis of the genesis and entrenchment of corruption in sub-Saharan Africa by incorporating the historical and international contexts of the problem<u>. They linked the origin and spread of <strong>corruption</strong> to the colonization of Africa, <strong>the long-lasting legacy of colonization</strong> <strong>and</strong> the actions and practices of <strong>major actors on the global stage</strong> which we reviewed as neocolonization in the previous section</u> (section 2.1). Tignor (1993) observed that most of the literature on political corruption seeks to define the term and to understand why and how it arises, what effects it has on polity and economy, and how it may possibly be brought under control. Tignor (1993) focused on the debate that took place during the late colonial period to identify when corruption emerged on the political scene, and how it eventually assumed such prominence. Tignor (1993) found that corruption had long existed prior to the period Nigeria gained its independence from Britain. The political elites in power amass wealth through overwhelming corruption either as Nigerian antagonists or corroborate with colonial administrators. Tignor (1993) argued that prior to Nigeria’s independence the country had been a common place where the activities of competing nationalists were based on using the resources at their disposal to build political alliances. Clearly, these alliances were built amongst political elites and were sometimes based on patron-client ties and strengthening bonds of ethnicity. <u><strong><mark>At independence</strong></mark>, such <strong>client-patron ties between the groups favored by the colonial administration had an edge</strong> over those not favored (Leonard, 1991 as cited in Milinge, 1993). Consequently, these favored groups would constitute the earliest Nigerian elite class. The elite class was what Rodney (1972) called the ‘petty bourgeoisie', whose role was to dominate the political and economic life of most African states. According to Leonard (1991, as cited in Milinge et al., 2002) the gaining of independence for this group was merely intended for the breaking of the monopoly of the colonial administrator's political power so that they could further their own advancement and posterity. <strong>These <mark>groups replicated</strong></mark> their British <strong><mark>colonial </mark>master’s technique of <mark>divide and rule</mark> </strong>which involved the practice of favoring one tribe over others with the dual objective of securing loyalty of that group to the administration and encouraging rivalry between different tribes to prevent a sense of unity from evolving and threatening political interests </u>(Mulinge et al., 2002). This voids the arguments of some scholars who were convinced that corruption stemmed primarily from electoral politics in Nigeria’s first republic (1960 – 1966). Tignor (1993) argued that the failure of the military regime that emerged after the first republic undercut the argument that corruption stemmed primarily from electoral politics through stressing the norms and values of the Nigerian elites over more structural explanations. For this study, we will adopt Mulinge et al (2002) normative definition of corruption. Mulinge et al., (2002) normatively defined corruption as the misuse of public authority or resources for personal benefit. <u>Abada et al. (2019) argued that the nature of the Nigerian state was formed in huge extent by its colonial past and the nature of the state explains the nature of associational life within the society. Thus, the theory of postcolonial state and elite theory provide support to hypothesis that <strong><mark>neocolonialism </mark>has <mark>induced corruption</strong></mark> in Nigeria. </u>The impacts of neocolonialism have kept Nigeria in ideologically westernized and material modernity. <u>No wonder, Agang (2016) argued that <strong>corruption is an indication of how the focus on <mark>materialism </mark>has <mark>led to the distortion of </mark>human <mark>dignity </mark>and the sanity of life</strong> and values. According to Agang (2016) the chances of <strong><mark>oppression</mark> and marginalization</strong> of the majority by a peculiar social group is <strong>initiated</strong> by the fascination of the amassment of material wealth <strong>which reduces and <mark>equates human </mark>value <mark>to monetary value</u></strong></mark>. Hence, this has been the case of Nigeria since a gained independence from Britain. Osoba 1996 found that all regimes in Nigeria both military and civilian, have been encompassed by corruption. He argued that the oil boom and its revenues aided and created a deepening crisis of kleptocracy, shown in its greatest form since 1984. <u>The consequences resulted in <strong>a pattern of <mark>scandalous</mark> <mark>wealth</mark> <mark>among</mark> <mark>the</mark> <mark>ruling</mark> class with growing poverty</strong>, unhappiness, <strong>and deprivation</strong> among many Nigerians</u> (Osoba, 1996). <u>Hadden (2016) suggests that resources acquired by corruption tend to be kept outside Nigeria by politicians instead of being invested in the local economy for its intended purpose, which therefore leaves a vacuum, depressing Nigeria’s development</u>. Over the years, Nigerian elitists would not have been able to invest capital in western states without the help of foreign governments and multinational companies. <u>Therefore, <strong>corruption is a way of life in Nigeria abetted by hegemonic powers and is a way of life which existing governments neither wish to, nor can, control.</strong> </u>Abada et al. (2019) echoed that the government has failed to combat corruption. In fact, the January 1966 coup, which was the first military coup in Nigeria that terminated the First Republic, was due to elite corruption and the inconsistency in governance. In the words of the officer, Nzeogwu who orchestrated the coup: “We wanted to get rid of rotten and corrupt ministers, political parties, trades unions and the whole clumsy apparatus of the federal system. We wanted to gun down all the bigwigs on our way. This was the only way. We could not afford to let them live if this was to work. We got some but not all. General Ironsi was to have been shot, but we were not ruthless enough. As a result, he and the other compromisers were able to supplant us.” (Sahara Reporters, 2009) However, transition of power to the military did not solve the epidemic of bad governance and corruption. Suleiman & Karim, (2015) found that the military regime resulted in the abuse of office, corruption, human right violations, and total neglect for the rule of law. Mulinge et al (2002) argued that corruption is not driven by internal factors alone. They argued that corruption is also a consequence of external factors driven by the activities of foreign governments, aid organizations and MNCs seeking to further their own economic interests through actions and practices that condone corrupt practices or that are corrupt in themselves (Mulingeet al., 2002). According to Galtung (1998: 118 as cited in Mulinge et al., 2002) instances of massive corruption have an international dimension where the bribe giver could perhaps be a MNC, or in certain instance a corrupt politician might seek refuge abroad from prosecution in their home country, and the earnings of corruption can be concealed to private accounts in foreign destinations. The elite theory demonstrates that there is the concentration of power in the hands of the few. The autonomy of elites makes it both advantageous and possible for the governing elite strategize and use state resources to control through manipulation and corruption (Etzioni‐Halevy, 1989). This was the case right from Nigeria’s First Republic (government after independence), the country has been tormented by rampant public sector corruption manifesting in poor governance outcomes and severe developmental pathologies. Consequently, this is the reason corruption and bad governance are correlated in this study. In subsequent sections, this study will utilize corruption and bad governance together since in the case of Nigeria they are conceptually intertwined.</p><p><u>2.1.2 Bad Governance and Terrorism</p><p></u>Many scholars have defined governance from various perspectives. According to Okoro (2020) the concept governance implies to the procedure of exercising political power to oversee the activities of the state. According to the UNICEF (2020, as cited in Okoro, 2020) governance constitutes of making and implementing decisions based on considerations like popular participation, respect for the rule of law, observance of human rights, transparency, free access to information, prompt responses to human needs, accommodation of diverse interests, equity, inclusiveness, effective results, and accountability. According to the Mo Ibrahim Foundation (as cited in Okoro, 2020) governance is the provision of the political, social, and economic public goods and services which is a state’s responsibility to deliver to its citizens, and which is a citizen’s right to expect from the government. Also, Fukuyama (2013) defined governance as the capacity of a government to make and implement rules, and to provide services, irrespective of whether that government is democratic or not. Therefore, if a government is unable to fulfil responsibilities such as making and implementing rules then it should be considered bad at governance. Rose et al (2019) argued that bad governance is frequently caused by corruption. Thus, many scholars such as Ibeanu (1998), Abada & Ngwu (2019), and Mbah (2017) have argued that bad governance and corruption go hand in hand. In reviewing existing literatures, the previous section (section 2.1.1) of this study examine corruption separately for clarity because in many countries bad governance can occur without corruption. Nevertheless, in Nigeria bad governance occurs with corruption since the country attained independence in 1960. Thus, in subsequent sections of this study bad governance and corruption will be combined textually. As much as there are several literatures on corruption in Africa, especially in Nigeria, there is a literature on bad governance in Nigeria. However, much of this literature has not tried to connect neocolonialism to bad governance as well as determine the extent to which a linear causal relationship between the two factors has exacerbated terrorist activities in Nigeria. Suleiman et al (2015) found that literature covering terrorist activities in the northern part of Nigeria dwelled mostly on the origin and activities of the groups through their radicalization on a religious platform. Most analyses of these existing literature have been based on the emergence of terrorist groups and activities through a religious prism (Suleiman et al., 2015). <u>However, scholars such Abada and Ngwu (2019) attempted to establish that <strong>bad governance and corruption</strong> in Nigeria has <strong>given rise to</strong> certain societal challenges that led to <strong>insurgency</strong>. For instance, in the study of Abada et al. (2019) which is anchored on the theory of post-colonial state, they argued that <strong>the misuse of public resources and the failure of governance have provoked <mark>mass poverty i</strong></mark>n Nigeria <strong>which has <mark>led to </mark>the advent of <mark>terrorist groups</strong></mark> that resort to the use of force in the expression of their discontent</u>. Uzodike et al (2012) <u>have argued that the terrorist activities of <strong><mark>Boko Haram</strong></mark> are <strong><mark>triggered by </mark>a combination of bad governance</strong>, including the prevalent failures of state policies, inefficient and wasteful parastatals, and <strong><mark>endemic corruption, poverty</strong></mark>, unemployment, and extensive underdevelopment in the northern Nigeria. </u>Essentially, Uzodike et al. (2012) failed to emphasize that inefficient and wasteful parastatals, poverty, unemployment, and extensive underdevelopment will not be feasible without bad governance and corruption. As a result, Nigeria is institutionally constituted so that it enjoys limited independence from the elite class highlighted in section 2.1.1. <u>Therefore, these elites are the perpetrators of bad governance in Nigeria, and they are also responsible for the frustration of the citizens of Nigeria. Okoro (2020) demonstrated that the Boko Haram insurgency is a retaliation against bad governance, notably in northern Nigeria where the epidemic of poverty led to frustration and recourse to terror activities among the people, particularly the youth.</u> He found weaknesses in previous justifications of scholars and analysts who opined that Islamic fundamentalism, and the emergence of an elite violent political competition between northern and southern Nigeria especially after Goodluck Jonathan emerged as president was responsible for the Boko Haram activities. <u>T<strong>he elite’s <mark>private accumulation </mark>resources at the expense of the public <mark>destabilizes</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>state</strong></mark>’s <strong><mark>institutions</strong></mark> therefore <strong><mark>fostering inequality, underdevelopment, and endangering</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>lives</strong></mark> of citizens whom these public institutions are meant to serve. Therefore, Okoro (2020) argued that the membership profile of Boko Haram reveals that <strong><mark>poverty and </mark>economic <mark>inequality are </mark>at <mark>its roots</mark>. However, he failed denote a strong link on what exactly causes poverty and economic inequality that leads to terrorist activities. It could possibly be embedded in what Okoro recognized as the weak nature of governance. Importantly, he found that bad governance in Nigeria served as a broader function in the emergence and growth of terrorist activities of Boko Haram.</p></u></strong>

AC

Colonialism

./documents/hsld22/StrakeJesuitCollegePreparatory/OlZh/StrakeJesuitCollegePreparatory-OlZh-Aff-49th-Harvard-National-Forensics-Tournament-Round-1.docx

A

49th Harvard National Forensics Tournament

1

Edina DS

Piliero

AC - Africa NC - Cap K AR - case NR - all AR - same

hsld22/StrakeJesuitCollegePreparatory/OlZh/StrakeJesuitCollegePreparatory-OlZh-Aff-49th-Harvard-National-Forensics-Tournament-Round-1.docx

2023-02-18 17:17:04

OlZh

Strake Jesuit College Preparatory OlZh

Hi. If I don't meet any of your theory interpretations, please message me what to change. Like you, I also want to set the best norms for debate. If not, then by default I meet these theory interpretations.

Ol.....

Zh.....

StrakeJesuitCollegePreparatory

Strake Jesuit College Preparatory

TX

hsld22

HS LD 2022-23

ld

hs

***Extinction first – always VTL

Bernstein ‘2

Bernstein ‘2

There is a basic value inherent in organic being, a basic affirmation, "The Yes' of Life" (IR 81). 15 "The self-affirmation of being becomes emphatic in the opposition of life to death this affirmation of life that is in all organic being has a binding obligatory force upon human beings. This blindly self-enacting "yes" gains obligating force in the seeing freedom of man, who as the supreme outcome of nature's purposive labor is no longer its automatic executor but, with the power obtained from knowledge, can become its destroyer as well. He must adopt the "yes" into his will and impose the "no" to not-being on his power Modern technology has transformed the nature and consequences of human action so radically that the underlying premises of traditional ethics are no longer valid. For the first time in history human beings possess the knowledge and the power to destroy life on this planet, including human life. Not only is there the new possibility of total nuclear disaster; there are the even more invidious and threatening possibilities that result from the unconstrained use of technologies that can destroy the environment required for life. We need a new categorical imperative that might be as follows: Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life"; or expressed negatively Do not compromise the conditions for an indefinite continuation of humanity on earth"; or again turned positive:

There is a basic value inherent in being emphatic in the opposition to death this affirmation has a binding obligatory force Modern technology transformed consequences of human action so traditional ethics are no longer valid human beings possess power to destroy this planet a new categorical imperative might be Do not compromise an indefinite continuation of humanity on earth

(Richard J., Vera List Prof. Phil. – New School for Social Research, “Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation”, p. 188-192) There is a basic value inherent in organic being, a basic affirmation, "The Yes' of Life" (IR 81). 15 "The self-affirmation of being becomes emphatic in the opposition of life to death. Life is the explicit confrontation of being with not-being. . . . The 'yes' of all striving is here sharpened by the active `no' to not-being" (IR 81-2). Furthermore — and this is the crucial point for Jonas — this affirmation of life that is in all organic being has a binding obligatory force upon human beings. This blindly self-enacting "yes" gains obligating force in the seeing freedom of man, who as the supreme outcome of nature's purposive labor is no longer its automatic executor but, with the power obtained from knowledge, can become its destroyer as well. He must adopt the "yes" into his will and impose the "no" to not-being on his power. But precisely this transition from willing to obligation is the critical point of moral theory at which attempts at laying a foundation for it come so easily to grief. Why does now, in man, that become a duty which hitherto "being" itself took care of through all individual willings? (IR 82). We discover here the transition from is to "ought" — from the self-affirmation of life to the binding obligation of human beings to preserve life not only for the present but also for the future. But why do we need a new ethics? The subtitle of The Imperative of Responsibility — In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age — indicates why we need a new ethics. Modern technology has transformed the nature and consequences of human action so radically that the underlying premises of traditional ethics are no longer valid. For the first time in history human beings possess the knowledge and the power to destroy life on this planet, including human life. Not only is there the new possibility of total nuclear disaster; there are the even more invidious and threatening possibilities that result from the unconstrained use of technologies that can destroy the environment required for life. The major transformation brought about by modern technology is that the consequences of our actions frequently exceed by far anything we can envision. Jonas was one of the first philosophers to warn us about the unprecedented ethical and political problems that arise with the rapid development of biotechnology. He claimed that this was happening at a time when there was an "ethical vacuum," when there did not seem to be any effective ethical principles to limit ot guide our ethical decisions. In the name of scientific and technological "progress," there is a relentless pressure to adopt a stance where virtually anything is permissible, includ-ing transforming the genetic structure of human beings, as long as it is "freely chosen." We need, Jonas argued, a new categorical imperative that might be formulated as follows: "Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life"; or expressed negatively: "Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such a life"; or simply: "Do not compromise the conditions for an indefinite continuation of humanity on earth"; or again turned positive: "In your present choices, include the future wholeness of Man among the objects of your will."

<h4><strong>***Extinction first – always VTL</h4><p>Bernstein ‘2</p><p></strong>(Richard J., Vera List Prof. Phil. – New School for Social Research, “Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation”, p. 188-192)</p><p><u><strong><mark>There is a basic value inherent in</mark> organic <mark>being</mark>, a basic affirmation, "The Yes' of Life" (IR 81). 15 "The self-affirmation of being becomes <mark>emphatic in the opposition</strong></mark> <strong>of life <mark>to death</u></strong></mark>. Life is the explicit confrontation of being with not-being. . . . The 'yes' of all striving is here sharpened by the active `no' to not-being" (IR 81-2). Furthermore — and this is the crucial point for Jonas — <u><strong><mark>this affirmation</mark> of life that is in </strong>all organic<strong> being <mark>has a binding obligatory force</mark> upon human beings. This blindly self-enacting "yes" gains obligating force in the seeing freedom of man, who as the supreme outcome of nature's purposive labor is no longer its automatic executor but, with the power obtained from knowledge, can become its destroyer as well. He must adopt the "yes" into his will and impose the "no" to not-being on his power</u></strong>. But precisely this transition from willing to obligation is the critical point of moral theory at which attempts at laying a foundation for it come so easily to grief. Why does now, in man, that become a duty which hitherto "being" itself took care of through all individual willings? (IR 82). We discover here the transition from is to "ought" — from the self-affirmation of life to the binding obligation of human beings to preserve life not only for the present but also for the future. But why do we need a new ethics? The subtitle of The Imperative of Responsibility — In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age — indicates why we need a new ethics. <u><strong><mark>Modern technology</mark> has <mark>transformed</mark> the nature and <mark>consequences of human action so</mark> radically that the underlying premises of <mark>traditional ethics are no longer valid</mark>. For the first time in history <mark>human beings possess</mark> the knowledge and the <mark>power to destroy</mark> </strong>life on <strong><mark>this planet</mark>, including human life. Not only is there the new possibility of total nuclear disaster; there are the even more invidious and threatening possibilities that result from the unconstrained use of technologies that can destroy the environment required for life. </u></strong>The major transformation brought about by modern technology is that the consequences of our actions frequently exceed by far anything we can envision. Jonas was one of the first philosophers to warn us about the unprecedented ethical and political problems that arise with the rapid development of biotechnology. He claimed that this was happening at a time when there was an "ethical vacuum," when there did not seem to be any effective ethical principles to limit ot guide our ethical decisions. In the name of scientific and technological "progress," there is a relentless pressure to adopt a stance where virtually anything is permissible, includ-ing transforming the genetic structure of human beings, as long as it is "freely chosen." <u><strong>We need</u></strong>, Jonas argued, <u><strong><mark>a new categorical imperative</mark> that <mark>might be</mark> </u></strong>formulated <u><strong>as follows: </u></strong>"<u><strong>Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life"; or expressed negatively</u></strong>: "Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such a life"; or simply: "<u><strong><mark>Do not compromise</mark> the conditions for <mark>an indefinite continuation of humanity on earth</mark>"; or again turned positive:</u></strong> "In your present choices, include the future wholeness of Man among the objects of your will."</p>

K

./documents/hspolicy14/NewTrier/ByLo/New%20Trier-Byrne-Lowe-Aff-Iowa%20Caucus-Round4.docx

A

Iowa Caucus

4

Wayzata GA

Ian Miller

1AC- NOPP (MSL and No War) 1NC2NR- Blow Up Debate

hspolicy14/NewTrier/ByLo/New%20Trier-Byrne-Lowe-Aff-Iowa%20Caucus-Round4.docx

ByLo

New Trier ByLo

AJ.....

By.....

Wi.....

Lo.....

NewTrier

New Trier

hspolicy14

HS Policy 2014-15

cx

hs

Reps don’t cause war – remember the AFF said ME presence is bad

Reiter 95

Reiter 95 DAN REITER is a Professor of Political Science at Emory University and has been an Olin post-doctoral fellow in security studies at Harvard “Exploring the Powder Keg Myth” International Security v20 No2 Autumn 1995 pp 5-34 JSTOR

Therefore, if preemptive wars seem infrequent within the set of wars alone, then this would have to be considered strong evidence in favor of the most skeptical view of preemptive war even when the sample is rigged to make preemptive wars seem frequent they are still rare events The rarity of preemptive wars offers preliminary support for the view, that the preemption scenario does not tell us much about how war breaks out Closer examination casts doubt on the validity of hypotheses that hostile images of the enemy increase the chances of preemption such fears may not be sufficient to cause war the conditions hypothesized to stimulate preemption—hostile images of the adversary are present to a very high degree these are insubstantial causal forces This reduces even further the significance of these forces as causes of war. a relationship is not demonstrated by the results of such a test.

if preemptive wars seem infrequent this would be most skeptical view Close examination casts doubt on the validity of hypotheses that hostile images of the enemy increase the chances fears may not be sufficient to cause war hostile images are present to a very high degree. these are insubstantial causal forces This reduces significance of these as causes of war

A criticism of assessing the frequency of preemptive wars by looking only at wars themselves is that this misses the non-events, that is, instances in which preemption would be predicted but did not occur. However, excluding non-events should bias the results in favor of finding that preemptive war is an important path to war, as the inclusion of non-events could only make it seem that the event was less frequent. Therefore, if preemptive wars seem infrequent within the set of wars alone, then this would have to be considered strong evidence in favor of the third, most skeptical view of preemptive war, because even when the sample is rigged to make preemptive wars seem frequent (by including only wars), they are still rare events. Below, a few cases in which preemption did not occur are discussed to illustrate factors that constrain preemption. The rarity of preemptive wars offers preliminary support for the third, most skeptical view, that the preemption scenario does not tell us much about how war breaks out. Closer examination of the three cases of preemption, set forth below, casts doubt on the validity of the two preemption hypotheses discussed earlier: that hostile images of the enemy increase the chances of preemption, and that belief in the dominance of the offense increases the chances of preemption. In each case there are motives for war aside from fear of an imminent attack, indicating that such fears may not be sufficient to cause war. In addition, in these cases of war the two conditions hypothesized to stimulate preemption—hostile images of the adversary and belief in the military advantages of striking first—are present to a very high degree. This implies that these are insubstantial causal forces, as they are associated with the outbreak of war only when they are present to a very high degree. This reduces even further the significance of these forces as causes of war. To illustrate this point, consider an analogy: say there is a hypothesis that saccharin causes cancer. Discovering that rats who were fed a lot of saccharin and also received high levels of X-ray exposure, which we know causes cancer, had a higher risk for cancer does not, however, set off alarm bells about the risks of saccharin. Though there might be a relationship between saccharin consumption and cancer, this is not demonstrated by the results of such a test.

<h4>Reps don’t cause war – remember the AFF said ME presence is bad</h4><p><strong>Reiter 95</strong> DAN REITER is a Professor of Political Science at Emory University and has been an Olin post-doctoral fellow in security studies at Harvard “Exploring the Powder Keg Myth” International Security v20 No2 Autumn 1995 pp<u> 5-34 JSTOR</p><p></u>A criticism of assessing the frequency of preemptive wars by looking only at wars themselves is that this misses the non-events, that is, instances in which preemption would be predicted but did not occur. However, excluding non-events should bias the results in favor of finding that preemptive war is an important path to war, as the inclusion of non-events could only make it seem that the event was less frequent. <u><strong>There</strong>fore, <mark>if preemptive wars seem infrequent</mark> within the set of wars alone, then <mark>this would</mark> have to <mark>be</mark> considered strong evidence in favor of the</u> third, <u><strong><mark>most skeptical view</mark> of preemptive war</u></strong>, because <u>even when the sample is rigged to make preemptive wars seem frequent</u> (by including only wars), <u>they are still rare events</u>. Below, a few cases in which preemption did not occur are discussed to illustrate factors that constrain preemption. <u>The rarity of preemptive wars offers preliminary support for the</u> third, most skeptical <u>view, that the preemption scenario does not tell us much about how war breaks out</u>. <u><strong><mark>Close</mark>r <mark>examination</u></strong></mark> of the three cases of preemption, set forth below, <u><strong><mark>casts doubt on the validity of</u></strong></mark> the two preemption <u><strong><mark>hypotheses</u></strong></mark> discussed earlier: <u><strong><mark>that hostile images of the enemy increase the chances</mark> of preemption</u></strong>, and that belief in the dominance of the offense increases the chances of preemption. In each case there are motives for war aside from fear of an imminent attack, indicating that <u><strong>such <mark>fears may not be sufficient to cause war</u></strong></mark>. In addition, in these cases of war <u><strong>the</u></strong> two <u><strong>conditions hypothesized to stimulate preemption—<mark>hostile images </mark>of the adversary</u></strong> and belief in the military advantages of striking first—<u><strong><mark>are present to a very high degree</u></strong>.</mark> This implies that <u><strong><mark>these are insubstantial causal forces</u></strong></mark>, as they are associated with the outbreak of war only when they are present to a very high degree. <u><strong><mark>This reduces</mark> even further the <mark>significance of these</mark> forces <mark>as causes of war</mark>.</u></strong> To illustrate this point, consider an analogy: say there is a hypothesis that saccharin causes cancer. Discovering that rats who were fed a lot of saccharin and also received high levels of X-ray exposure, which we know causes cancer, had a higher risk for cancer does not, however, set off alarm bells about the risks of saccharin. Though there might be <u><strong>a relationship</u></strong> between saccharin consumption and cancer, this <u><strong>is not demonstrated by the results of such a test.</p></u></strong>

2ac

case

Reps

./documents/ndtceda15/Kentucky/HaRo/Kentucky-Hampton-Roman-Aff-GSU-Round8.docx

A

GSU

8

West Georgia MS

Brass

1ac - same as round 4 1nc white supremacy k 2nr white supremacy k

ndtceda15/Kentucky/HaRo/Kentucky-Hampton-Roman-Aff-GSU-Round8.docx

HaRo

Kentucky HaRo

Ho.....

Ha.....

Ma.....

Ro.....

Kentucky

Kentucky

ndtceda15

NDT/CEDA 2015-16

cx

college

No chance of war from economic decline---best and most recent data

Drezner 12

Drezner 12,

The final outcome addresses the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict analysts asserted the financial crisis would lead states to increase use of force internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or great power conflict aggregate data suggests otherwise The average level of peacefulness in 2012 is the same as 2007 Interstate violence has declined since the start of the financial crisis as have military expenditures studies confirm the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict the crisis has not generated protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected Given the severity, reach and depth of the 2008 financial crisis the proper comparison is with Great Depression by that standard, the outcome variables look impressive

analysts asserted crisis would lead states to use force diversionary wars or great power conflict aggregate data suggests otherwise, average peacefulness in 2012 is the same as 07 Interstate violence has declined since the financial crisis studies confirm the Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict not generated protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion Given the severity, reach and depth of the 08 crisis, the proper comparison is with Depression by that standard, the outcome look impressive

Daniel W. Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf The final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.37 Whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggests otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has constructed a “Global Peace Index” annually since 2007. A key conclusion they draw from the 2012 report is that “The average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.”38 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis – as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.39 Rogers Brubaker concludes, “the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected.”40 None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating swimmingly. Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to pre-crisis levels, primarily due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the developed world have all lagged behind. But the Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard “V”-shaped recovery was unreasonable. One financial analyst characterized the post-2008 global economy as in a state of “contained depression.”41 The key word is “contained,” however. Given the severity, reach and depth of the 2008 financial crisis, the proper comparison is with Great Depression. And by that standard, the outcome variables look impressive. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff concluded in This Time is Different: “that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe global recession since World War II – and not even worse – must be regarded as fortunate.”42

<h4><u>No</u> chance of war from economic decline---<u>best</u> and <u>most recent</u> data </h4><p><strong>Drezner 12</strong>,</p><p>Daniel W. Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf</p><p><u><strong>The final outcome addresses</u></strong> a dog that hasn’t barked: <u><strong>the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict</u></strong> and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple <u><strong><mark>analysts asserted</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong>the financial <mark>crisis would lead states to</mark> increase</u></strong> their <u><strong><mark>use</mark> of <mark>force</u></strong></mark> as a tool for staying in power.37 Whether through greater <u><strong>internal repression, <mark>diversionary wars</mark>, arms races, <mark>or</u></strong></mark> a ratcheting up of <u><strong><mark>great power conflict</u></strong></mark>, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder. </p><p>The <u><strong><mark>aggregate data suggests otherwise</u></strong>,</mark> however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has constructed a “Global Peace Index” annually since 2007. A key conclusion they draw from the 2012 report is that “<u><strong>The <mark>average</mark> level of <mark>peacefulness in 2012 is</u></strong></mark> approximately <u><strong><mark>the same as</u></strong></mark> it was in <u><strong>20<mark>07</u></strong></mark>.”38 <u><strong><mark>Interstate violence</u></strong></mark> in particular <u><strong><mark>has</u></strong> <u><strong>declined</u></strong> <u><strong>since the</mark> start of the <mark>financial crisis</u></strong></mark> – <u><strong>as have military expenditures</u></strong> in most sampled countries. Other <u><strong><mark>studies confirm</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>the</mark> Great <mark>Recession has</u></strong> <u><strong>not triggered any increase in violent conflict</u></strong></mark>; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.39 Rogers Brubaker concludes, “<u><strong>the crisis has <mark>not</u></strong></mark> to date <u><strong><mark>generated</u></strong></mark> the surge in <u><strong><mark>protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion</mark> that might have been expected</u></strong>.”40</p><p>None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating swimmingly. Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to pre-crisis levels, primarily due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the developed world have all lagged behind. But the Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard “V”-shaped recovery was unreasonable. One financial analyst characterized the post-2008 global economy as in a state of “contained depression.”41 The key word is “contained,” however. <u><strong><mark>Given the severity, reach and depth of the</mark> 20<mark>08</mark> financial <mark>crisis</u></strong>, <u><strong>the proper comparison is with</mark> Great <mark>Depression</u></strong></mark>. And <u><strong><mark>by that standard, the outcome</mark> variables <mark>look impressive</u></strong></mark>. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff concluded in This Time is Different: “that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe global recession since World War II – and not even worse – must be regarded as fortunate.”42</p>

Round 4

2AC

Ex-Im Politics DA

./documents/ndtceda15/Wyoming/MaMc/Wyoming-Marcum-McFarland-Aff-Harvard-Round4.docx

A

Harvard

4

Kentucky Grasse-Noparstak

DeLong

1AC - CSGs Advantages- Crisis Instability SLOCS 1NC - T Power Projection Consult JOC CMR DA Assurance DA Ex-Im Politics DA Security K 2N - Assurance DA

ndtceda15/Wyoming/MaMc/Wyoming-Marcum-McFarland-Aff-Harvard-Round4.docx

MaMc

Wyoming MaMc

Ma.....

Ma.....

Hu.....

Mc.....

Wyoming

Wyoming

ndtceda15

NDT/CEDA 2015-16

cx

college

Zero impact – perceived vulnerability isn’t true – no impact on national security even from massive blackouts

Clark 12

Paul Clark 12, MA Candidate, Intelligence/Terrorism Studies, American Military University; Senior Analyst, Chenega Federal Systems, 4/28/12, “The Risk of Disruption or Destruction of Critical U.S. Infrastructure by an Offensive Cyber Attack,” http://blog.havagan.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/The-Risk-of-Disruption-or-Destruction-of-Critical-U.S.-Infrastructure-by-an-Offensive-Cyber-Attack.pdf

In 2003, a physical breakdown occurred This singular occurrence has been used as evidence that the grid is fragile and subject to severe disruption through cyber-attack, This perceived fragility is not real when viewed in the context of the robustness of the electrical grid intelligence chief of U.S. Cyber Command stated an attack was unlikely to succeed because of the "huge amounts of resiliency built into the [electrical] system that makes that kind of catastrophic thing very difficult This is supported by a grid that has proven robust in the face of large natural catastrophes the U.S. grid fails frequently Power outages have occurred steadily the effect is mitigated by policies and procedures that are meant to restore services as quickly as possible The electrical grid suffers service interruptions regularly and yet commerce does not collapse the economy is affected but does not collapse and even after massive damage national security is not affected because U.S. military capability is not degraded increased focus on cyber-security has led to concern that the perceived risk is greater than the actual risk cyber-war is "more hype than hazard" most cyber-attacks are categorized as information theft, network compromise, or website defacement Even the high profile threat of an "Electronic Pearl Harbor despite being repeated by senior government officials has been found to be only a slight possibility

perceived fragility is not real when viewed in the context of the robustness of the grid an attack was unlikely to succeed because of huge amounts of resiliency built in grid has proven robust in the face of large catastrophes Power outage is mitigated by policies that restore services quickly The grid suffers service interruptions regularly yet commerce does not collapse the economy does not collapse national security is not affected because U.S. military capability is not degraded cyber-war is " hype a slight possibility

In 2003, a simple physical breakdown occurred - trees shorted a power line and caused a fault - that had a cascading effect and caused a power blackout across the Northeast (Lewis 2010). This singular occurrence has been used as evidence that the electrical grid is fragile and subject to severe disruption through cyber-attack, a disruption that could cost billions of dollars, brings business to a halt, and could even endanger lives - if compounded by other catastrophic events (Brennan 2012). A power disruption the size of the 2003 blackout, the worst in American history at that time (Minkel 2008), is a worst case scenario and used as an example of the fragility of the U.S. energy grid. This perceived fragility is not real when viewed in the context of the robustness of the electrical grid.¶ When asked about cyber-attacks against the electrical grid in April of 2012. the intelligence chief of U.S. Cyber Command Rear Admiral Samuel Cox stated that an attack was unlikely to succeed because of the "huge amounts of resiliency built into the [electrical] system that makes that kind of catastrophic thing very difficult" (Capaccio 2012). This optimistic view is supported by an electrical grid that has proven to be robust in the face of large natural catastrophes. Complex systems like the electrical grid in the U.S. are prone to failures and the U.S. grid fails frequently. Despite efforts to reduce the risk out power outages, the risk is always present. Power outages that affect more than 50.000 people have occurred steadily over the last 20 years at a rate of 12% annually and the frequency of large catastrophes remains relatively high and outages the size of the 2003 blackout are predicted to occur every 25 years (Minkel 2008). In a complex system that is always at risk of disruption, the effect is mitigated by policies and procedures that are meant to restore services as quickly as possible. The most visible of these policies is the interstate Emergency Management Assistance Compact, a legally binding agreement allowing combined resources to be quickly deployed in response to a catastrophic disaster such as power outages following a severe hurricane (Kapucu, Augustin and Garayev 2009).¶ The electrical grid suffers service interruptions regularly, it is a large and complex system supporting the largest economy in the world, and yet commerce does not collapse (Lewis 2010). Despite blizzards, earthquakes, fires, and hurricanes that cause blackouts, the economy is affected but does not collapse and even after massive damage like that caused by Hurricane Katrina, national security is not affected because U.S. military capability is not degraded (Lewis 2010).¶ Cyber-security is an ever-increasing concern in an increasingly electronic and interconnected world. Cyber-security is a high priority "economic and national security challenge" (National Security Council n.d.) because cyber-attacks are expected to become the top national security threat (Robert S. Mueller 2012). In response to the threat Congress is crafting legislation to enhance cyber-security (Brito and Watkins 2012) and the Department of Homeland Security budget for cyber-security has been significantly increased (U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 2012).¶ This increased focus on cyber-security has led to concern that the perceived risk is greater than the actual risk, a situation that has resulted in an imbalance between security and privacy and civil liberties (American Civil Liberties Union 2012). In 1993 a Rand Corporation paper predicted that "cyberwar is coming" and twenty years later the prediction is the same and critics argue that cyber-war is "more hype than hazard" (Rid 2012). A review of high profile cyber-attacks shows that, with the exception of Stuxnet and the limited Israeli disruption of Syrian air defense networks, most cyber-attacks are categorized as information theft, network compromise, or website defacement (Lewis 2012). Even the high profile threat of an "Electronic Pearl Harbor" (Bronk 2009). despite being repeated by senior government officials like U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta (Rid 2012) , has been found to be only a slight possibility (Wilson 2005).

<h4>Zero impact – <u>perceived</u> vulnerability isn’t true – no impact on national security even from massive blackouts </h4><p>Paul <strong>Clark 12</strong>, MA Candidate, Intelligence/Terrorism Studies, American Military University; Senior Analyst, Chenega Federal Systems, 4/28/12, “The Risk of Disruption or Destruction of Critical U.S. Infrastructure by an Offensive Cyber Attack,” http://blog.havagan.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/The-Risk-of-Disruption-or-Destruction-of-Critical-U.S.-Infrastructure-by-an-Offensive-Cyber-Attack.pdf</p><p><u>In 2003, a</u> simple <u>physical breakdown occurred</u> - trees shorted a power line and caused a fault - that had a cascading effect and caused a power blackout across the Northeast (Lewis 2010). <u>This</u> <u>singular occurrence</u> <u>has been used as evidence that the</u> electrical <u>grid is fragile and subject to severe disruption through cyber-attack,</u> a disruption that could cost billions of dollars, brings business to a halt, and could even endanger lives - if compounded by other catastrophic events (Brennan 2012). A power disruption the size of the 2003 blackout, the worst in American history at that time (Minkel 2008), is a worst case scenario and used as an example of the fragility of the U.S. energy grid. <u>This</u> <u><mark>perceived fragility</u> <u>is</u> <u>not real</u> <u>when viewed in the context of the</u> <u>robustness of the </mark>electrical <mark>grid</u></mark>.¶ When asked about cyber-attacks against the electrical grid in April of 2012. the <u>intelligence chief of U.S. Cyber Command</u> Rear Admiral Samuel Cox <u>stated</u> that <u><mark>an attack was unlikely to succeed</u> <u>because of</mark> the</u> <u>"<mark>huge amounts of resiliency</u> <u>built in</mark>to the [electrical] system that makes that kind of catastrophic thing very difficult</u>" (Capaccio 2012). <u>This</u> optimistic view <u>is supported by a</u>n electrical <u><mark>grid</mark> that <mark>has proven</u></mark> to be <u><mark>robust in the face of large </mark>natural <mark>catastrophes</u></mark>. Complex systems like the electrical grid in the U.S. are prone to failures and <u>the U.S. grid fails frequently</u>. Despite efforts to reduce the risk out power outages, the risk is always present. <u><mark>Power outage</mark>s</u> that affect more than 50.000 people <u>have occurred steadily</u> over the last 20 years at a rate of 12% annually and the frequency of large catastrophes remains relatively high and outages the size of the 2003 blackout are predicted to occur every 25 years (Minkel 2008). In a complex system that is always at risk of disruption, <u>the effect <mark>is mitigated by policies</mark> and procedures <mark>that</mark> are meant to <mark>restore services</mark> as <mark>quickly</mark> as possible</u>. The most visible of these policies is the interstate Emergency Management Assistance Compact, a legally binding agreement allowing combined resources to be quickly deployed in response to a catastrophic disaster such as power outages following a severe hurricane (Kapucu, Augustin and Garayev 2009).¶ <u><mark>The</mark> electrical <mark>grid suffers service interruptions regularly</u></mark>, it is a large and complex system supporting the largest economy in the world, <u>and <mark>yet <strong>commerce does not collapse</u></strong></mark> (Lewis 2010). Despite blizzards, earthquakes, fires, and hurricanes that cause blackouts, <u><mark>the</mark> <mark>economy</mark> is affected but</u> <u><strong><mark>does not collapse</u></strong></mark> <u>and even after massive damage</u> like that caused by Hurricane Katrina, <u><strong><mark>national security is not affected</u></strong> <u>because</u> <u><strong>U.S. military capability is not degraded</u></strong></mark> (Lewis 2010).¶ Cyber-security is an ever-increasing concern in an increasingly electronic and interconnected world. Cyber-security is a high priority "economic and national security challenge" (National Security Council n.d.) because cyber-attacks are expected to become the top national security threat (Robert S. Mueller 2012). In response to the threat Congress is crafting legislation to enhance cyber-security (Brito and Watkins 2012) and the Department of Homeland Security budget for cyber-security has been significantly increased (U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 2012).¶ This <u>increased focus on cyber-security has led to concern that the</u> <u>perceived risk is greater than the actual risk</u>, a situation that has resulted in an imbalance between security and privacy and civil liberties (American Civil Liberties Union 2012). In 1993 a Rand Corporation paper predicted that "cyberwar is coming" and twenty years later the prediction is the same and critics argue that <u><mark>cyber-war is <strong>"</mark>more <mark>hype </mark>than hazard" </u></strong>(Rid 2012). A review of high profile cyber-attacks shows that, with the exception of Stuxnet and the limited Israeli disruption of Syrian air defense networks, <u>most cyber-attacks are categorized as information theft, network compromise, or website defacement</u> (Lewis 2012). <u>Even the high profile threat of an "Electronic Pearl Harbor</u>" (Bronk 2009). <u>despite being repeated by senior government officials</u> like U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta (Rid 2012) , <u>has been found to be</u> <u><strong>only <mark>a slight possibility</u></strong></mark> (Wilson 2005).</p>

1NC

Case

1NC – Russia ADV

./documents/hspolicy21/Mamaroneck/DaTr/Mamaroneck-Davis-Tretiak-Neg-Michigan-Round6.docx

N

Michigan

6

Maine East TS

Sonny Patel

1AC - Cyber Infrastructure 2NR - States CP Infrastructure DA

hspolicy21/Mamaroneck/DaTr/Mamaroneck-Davis-Tretiak-Neg-Michigan-Round6.docx

DaTr

Mamaroneck DaTr

Jo.....

Da.....

Ki.....

Tr.....

Mamaroneck

Mamaroneck

NY

hspolicy21

HS Policy 2021-22

cx

hs

No risk of food wars – empirics prove

Allouche 11

Jeremy Allouche 11, Research Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, "The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade" Food PolicyVolume 36, Supplement 1, January 2011, Pages S3-S8 Accessed via: Science Direct Sciverse

The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity ) will lead to conflict and war. underlining reasoning comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change and greater inputs of capital have dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water wars is a dominant discourse in the media this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak none of these declarations have been followed up by military action None of the various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a c b Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument organized political bodies signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians In terms of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity does not make much sense in the light of the recent historical record. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable.¶ Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin

empirical studies do not support any Malthusian arguments. Tech and capital increased productivity humankind breached barriers that seemed unchallengeable alarmist scenarios linked resources with wars this has an instrumental purpose ministers used bellicose rhetoric The evidence seems weak none have been followed by military action None of the databases on causes of war show water as a c b water events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale political bodies signed between 3600 treaties There is no correlation between scarcity and conflict the threat does not make sense in the light of historical record

Water/food resources, war and conflict¶ The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change and greater inputs of capital have dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture. More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable.¶ Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations¶ In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level.¶ In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none of these declarations have been followed up by military action.¶ The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems.¶ None of the various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18).¶ As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), organized political bodies signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 ([FAO, 1978] and [FAO, 1984]).¶ The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example [Allouche, 2005], [Allouche, 2007] and [Rouyer, 2000]). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians ([Dinar and Dinar, 2005] and [Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006]).¶ In terms of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity does not make much sense in the light of the recent historical record. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable.¶ The debates over the likely impacts of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict ([Brauch, 2002] and [Pervis and Busby, 2004]). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin ([Barnett and Adger, 2007] and [Kevane and Gray, 2008]).

<h4>No risk of food wars – empirics prove</h4><p>Jeremy <strong>Allouche 11</strong>, Research Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, "The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade" Food PolicyVolume 36, Supplement 1, January 2011, Pages S3-S8 Accessed via: Science Direct Sciverse</p><p>Water/food resources, war and conflict¶ <u>The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity</u> (whether of food or water<u>) will lead to conflict and war.</u> The <u>underlining reasoning</u> behind most of these discourses over food and water wars <u>comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth</u> since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. <u>Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population</u> and aggregate consumption; <u>if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result.</u> Nonetheless, it seems that <u><strong>most <mark>empirical studies do not support any</mark> of these neo-<mark>Malthusian arguments.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>Tech</mark>nological change <mark>and </mark>greater inputs of <mark>capital</strong></mark> have <strong>dramatically <mark>increased</mark> labour <mark>productivity</mark> in agriculture</u>.</strong> More generally, <u>the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries <strong><mark>humankind</mark> has <mark>breached</mark> many resource <mark>barriers that seemed unchallengeable</u></strong></mark>.¶ Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations¶ <u>In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of <mark>alarmist scenarios</mark> have <mark>linked</mark> the increasing use of water <mark>resources</mark> and food insecurity <mark>with wars</mark>. The idea of water wars</u> (perhaps more than food wars) <u>is a dominant discourse in the media</u> (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, <u><mark>this</mark> type of discourse <mark>has an <strong>instrumental purpose</strong></mark>; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities</u> at the international level.¶ <u>In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign <mark>ministers</mark> have also <mark>used</mark> this <mark>bellicose rhetoric</mark>. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’</u> (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). <u>The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. <strong><mark>The evidence seems</mark> quite <mark>weak</u></strong></mark>. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, <u><strong><mark>none</mark> of these declarations <mark>have been followed</mark> up <mark>by military action</u></strong></mark>.¶ The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems.¶ <u><strong><mark>None of the</mark> various and extensive <mark>databases</strong> on</mark> the <mark>causes of war show water as a c</u></mark>asus<u><mark> b</u></mark>elli. <u>Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict</u> (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18).¶ <u>As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, <strong>more than two-thirds of over 1800 <mark>water</mark>-related ‘<mark>events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale</u></mark> </strong>(Yoffe et al., 2003). <u>Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument</u>. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), <u>organized <mark>political bodies signed</u> <u>between</mark> the year 805 and 1984 more than</u> <u><mark>3600</mark> water-related <mark>treaties</u></mark>, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 ([FAO, 1978] and [FAO, 1984]).¶ <u>The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. <mark>There is</mark> however <strong><mark>no</mark> direct <mark>correlation between</mark> water <mark>scarcity and</mark> transboundary <mark>conflict</u></strong></mark>. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example [Allouche, 2005], [Allouche, 2007] and [Rouyer, 2000]). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that <u>scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians</u> ([Dinar and Dinar, 2005] and [Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006]).¶ <u>In terms of international relations, <mark>the threat </mark>of water wars due to increasing scarcity <strong><mark>does not make</mark> much <mark>sense in the light of</mark> the recent <mark>historical record</strong></mark>. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable.¶ </u>The debates over the likely impacts of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict ([Brauch, 2002] and [Pervis and Busby, 2004]). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). <u>Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, <strong>the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin</u></strong> ([Barnett and Adger, 2007] and [Kevane and Gray, 2008]).</p>

Fridge

./documents/ndtceda16/Iowa/JaPh/Iowa-Jackson-Phalen-Neg-Indiana-Round4.docx

N

Indiana

4

Indiana PS

Mia Bonitto

1AC- Ratify Kigali Amendment 1NC- Climate Conflict K T-Restrict Politics China DA Case 2NR- China Da K Case

ndtceda16/Iowa/JaPh/Iowa-Jackson-Phalen-Neg-Indiana-Round4.docx

JaPh

Iowa JaPh

Ch.....

Ja.....

La.....

Ph.....

Iowa

Iowa

ndtceda16

NDT/CEDA 2016-17

cx

college

Adaptation solves in the interim – warming takes centuries

Mendelsohn 15

Mendelsohn 15 Robert Mendelsohn is the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor at the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, “Climate Change Demands We Change. Why Aren't We?: An Economic Perspective”, Social Research, Fall2015, Vol. 82 Issue 3, p727

literature on climate change rife with claims that climate change is equivalent to an apocalypse. Whether climate change leads to an apocalypse depends on many factors, including no mitigation no adaptation and unlucky uncertain events have droughts, floods, and tropical cyclones. The question is, how will these things change? emissions of greenhouse gases are expected to double the concentrations of greenhouse gases by 2040–2050. It will take more than another 100 years to double concentrations in the absence of mitigation. So despite the fact that fossil fuel consumption is causing a vast quantity of annual emissions it takes a very long time for concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere to double. there is a long lag between an increase in concentrations and the resulting temperature increase. One must warm the ocean to warm the climate. It takes several decades just to warm the upper layers of the ocean It takes centuries for the long-run temperature to be reached. studies suggest more modest effects of less than 2 percent of income Yet other studies suggest impacts may be closer to 0.2 percent of income Although some authors speculate about exponentially increasing damage empirical analysis suggests most sectors respond to temperature in a hill-shaped fashion For each sector, there is an ideal temperature where the net value of that sector is highest warming will be beneficial to relatively cool countries and harmful to relatively warm countries. Warming will not have the same universal effect on everybody a large fraction of the damage will not occur until far into the future Adaptation is very effective at lowering climate damage Firms, farms, and people will all change their behavior as climate changes. They will subtly adjust their timing, their choices, and their management to take into account the climate that they actually live in Adaptation makes them better off assuming zero adaptation is not realistic The damage is much lower when people adjust. It may be more difficult to predict what will happen with adaptation but simply assuming it away leads to overly pessimistic predictions of damage Predictions of impacts from climate change must take private adaptation into account in order to provide accurate measures of future damages

, it takes a very long time for concentrations of greenhouse gases to double there is a long lag It takes centuries for long-run temperature to be reached studies suggest modest effects less than 2 percent of income some speculate about exponentially increasing damage empirical analysis suggests most sectors respond in a hill-shaped fashion a large fraction of the damage will not occur until far into the future Adaptation is very effective at lowering climate damage Firms, farms, and people will all change their behavior Adaptation makes them better off assuming zero adaptation is not realistic simply assuming it away leads to overly pessimistic predictions

The Benefits of Mitigation Are Modest and Delayed The popular literature on climate change is rife with claims that climate change is equivalent to an apocalypse. Whether climate change leads to an apocalypse depends on many factors, including no mitigation, no adaptation, and unlucky uncertain events. Probably the three most frightening images of climate change are tropical cyclones, floods, and droughts. Although all these events are likely to occur in a future climate, they are also an integral component of the current climate. We already have droughts, floods, and tropical cyclones. The question is, how will these things change? According to economic models of fossil fuel consumption, emissions of greenhouse gases are expected to double the concentrations of greenhouse gases from preindustrial levels of 275 part per million equivalent (ppme) to 550 ppme by 2040–2050. It will take more than another 100 years to double concentrations again to 1,100 ppme in the absence of mitigation. So despite the fact that fossil fuel consumption is causing a vast quantity of annual emissions, it takes a very long time for the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere to double. According to climate models, a doubling of concentrations is expected to increase long-run average global temperature by 3°C, with a range between 1.5 and 4.5 degrees (IPCC 2014a). However, there is a long lag between an increase in concentrations and the resulting temperature increase. One must warm the ocean to warm the climate. It takes several decades just to warm the upper layers of the ocean. It takes centuries for the long-run temperature to be reached. The rising temperature is expected to increase the speed of the hydrological cycle. This will lead to an increase in evaporation, an increase in precipitation, and an increase in the amount of water in the atmosphere. Water vapor itself is a greenhouse gas. It represents a positive feedback mechanism and it contributes significantly to the prediction of a 3°C increase from doubling greenhouse gases. So the expectation of increased rainfall is part of the explanation why there is such a large temperature increase. That does not mean there will be increased rainfall everywhere. It simply means that average global rainfall will increase. The level of CO2 has a direct effect on ecosystems. All plants respond to higher CO2 levels in a positive fashion. Grasses respond only slightly to CO2 fertilization, whereas the yields of most crops respond vigorously. Hundreds of laboratory studies reveal an average increase in crop yields of 30 percent as CO2 concentrations double (Kimball 2007). Climate change is expected to melt ice formations. Many glaciers on land have already shrunk in response to warming, increasing flows in nearby rivers. The Arctic ice covering the sea in the North Pole is shrinking rapidly, exposing the Arctic air to the warm sea underneath and causing the most rapid warming on the planet (IPCC 2014a). Large remaining glaciers in Greenland and Antarctica might melt over the next thousand years (IPCC 2014a). The melting of the large ice deposits in Greenland and Antarctica would cause the oceans to rise to new levels never before experienced by mankind. Climate change is expected to have one final impact. In addition to the mean temperature and precipitation levels rising, there may be a change in the distribution of weather. Seasonal patterns may change with more warming in winter than summer. Interannual variance might change. Diurnal variance may drop as nights become warmer relative to days. Tropical cyclones may become more powerful. The pattern of global winds may change, shifting moisture from one place to another. More is known about global mean changes than these other changes in the distribution. It is more difficult to study variance and even more difficult to study extreme events. But it is likely that the distribution of weather events will change. What then is the consequence of climate change if greenhouse gases cause all these changes? What sectors of the economy are vulnerable? What nonmarket goods and services are at risk? The literature on impacts has long identified most of the sectors likely to be affected by climate change (Pearce et al. 1996). The vulnerable economic sectors include agriculture, coasts, forests, water, and energy. Important sectors outside the economy that would be affected include recreation, ecosystem change, human health, and aesthetics. The controversy about impacts does not concern what will be affected. The controversy is measuring the magnitude of the impact. Some studies report damages to mankind equal to 20 percent of total income (Stern 2007). Other studies suggest more modest effects of less than 2 percent of income (Pearce et al. 1996; Nordhaus 1991). Yet other studies suggest impacts may be closer to 0.2 percent of income (Mendelsohn et al. 2006). What explains estimates that vary by orders of magnitude? Although some authors speculate about exponentially increasing damage (Stern 2007), empirical analysis suggests that most sectors respond to temperature in a hill-shaped fashion (Mendelsohn and Schlesinger 1999; Tol 2002a). For each sector, there is an ideal temperature where the net value of that sector is highest. If temperatures are either colder or warmer than this ideal, warming will be either beneficial or harmful, respectively. Three important insights follow from this result. First, warming will be beneficial to relatively cool countries and harmful to relatively warm countries. Warming will not have the same universal effect on everybody. Low-latitude countries may well suffer 60 to 80 percent of the global damage (Mendelsohn et al. 2006). This is problematic because these low-latitude countries collectively contribute only a small fraction of global emissions. A large fraction of the damage from climate change is not suffered by the countries causing the emissions. There is an inherent inequity in the distribution of the costs and benefits of greenhouse gas emissions. Second, the warmer the planet gets, the more damage that warming will cause. More and more countries will be pushed beyond the ideal temperature range, and the more local temperatures exceed that range, the greater the damage will be. Third, because the most serious damage requires relatively high temperatures, a large fraction of the damage will not occur until far into the future. The present value of damage is consequently quite small. The literature also contains one other important insight. Adaptation is very effective at lowering climate damage (Mendelsohn and Neumann 1999; Mendelsohn and Dinar 2009). Firms, farms, and people will all change their behavior as climate changes. They will subtly adjust their timing, their choices, and their management to take into account the climate that they actually live in. One can see this today by comparing the behavior of people who happen to live in different climates. Farmers in warmer places plant crops suitable for that climate. People wear clothing appropriate to their climate and season. Buildings have heating and cooling systems appropriate for each climate. People and firms adapt to climate because it is in their interest to do so. Adaptation makes them better off. That does not imply there are no damages. It simply points out that assuming zero adaptation is not realistic. The damage is much lower when people adjust. It may be more difficult to predict what will happen with adaptation, but simply assuming it away leads to overly pessimistic predictions of damage. Predictions of impacts from climate change must take private adaptation into account in order to provide accurate measures of future damages (Mendelsohn 2000).

<h4><u><strong>Adaptation solves in the interim – warming takes centuries</h4><p>Mendelsohn 15</p><p></u></strong>Robert Mendelsohn is the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor at the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, “Climate Change Demands We Change. Why Aren't We?: An Economic Perspective”, Social Research, Fall2015, Vol. 82 Issue 3, p727</p><p>The Benefits of Mitigation Are Modest and Delayed</p><p>The popular <u>literature on climate change</u> is <u>rife with claims that climate change is equivalent to an apocalypse. Whether climate change leads to an apocalypse depends on many factors, including</u> <u><strong>no mitigation</u></strong>, <u><strong>no adaptation</u></strong>, <u><strong>and unlucky uncertain events</u></strong>. Probably the three most frightening images of climate change are tropical cyclones, floods, and droughts. Although all these events are likely to occur in a future climate, they are also an integral component of the current climate. We already<u><strong> have droughts, floods, and tropical cyclones. The question is, how will these things change?</p><p></u></strong>According to economic models of fossil fuel consumption, <u>emissions of greenhouse gases are expected to double the concentrations of greenhouse gases</u> from preindustrial levels of 275 part per million equivalent (ppme) to 550 ppme <u>by 2040–2050. It will take more than another 100 years to double concentrations</u> again to 1,100 ppme <u>in the absence of mitigation. So despite the fact that fossil fuel consumption is causing a vast quantity of annual emissions</u><mark>, <u><strong>it takes a very long time for</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>concentrations of greenhouse gases</mark> in the atmosphere <mark>to double</mark>.</p><p></u></strong>According to climate models, a doubling of concentrations is expected to increase long-run average global temperature by 3°C, with a range between 1.5 and 4.5 degrees (IPCC 2014a). However, <u><mark>there is a</u> <u><strong>long lag</u></strong></mark> <u>between an increase in concentrations and the resulting temperature increase. One must warm the ocean to warm the climate. It takes several decades just to warm the upper layers of the ocean</u>. <u><strong><mark>It takes centuries for</mark> the <mark>long-run temperature to be reached</mark>. </p><p></u></strong>The rising temperature is expected to increase the speed of the hydrological cycle. This will lead to an increase in evaporation, an increase in precipitation, and an increase in the amount of water in the atmosphere. Water vapor itself is a greenhouse gas. It represents a positive feedback mechanism and it contributes significantly to the prediction of a 3°C increase from doubling greenhouse gases. So the expectation of increased rainfall is part of the explanation why there is such a large temperature increase. That does not mean there will be increased rainfall everywhere. It simply means that average global rainfall will increase.</p><p>The level of CO2 has a direct effect on ecosystems. All plants respond to higher CO2 levels in a positive fashion. Grasses respond only slightly to CO2 fertilization, whereas the yields of most crops respond vigorously. Hundreds of laboratory studies reveal an average increase in crop yields of 30 percent as CO2 concentrations double (Kimball 2007).</p><p>Climate change is expected to melt ice formations. Many glaciers on land have already shrunk in response to warming, increasing flows in nearby rivers. The Arctic ice covering the sea in the North Pole is shrinking rapidly, exposing the Arctic air to the warm sea underneath and causing the most rapid warming on the planet (IPCC 2014a). Large remaining glaciers in Greenland and Antarctica might melt over the next thousand years (IPCC 2014a). The melting of the large ice deposits in Greenland and Antarctica would cause the oceans to rise to new levels never before experienced by mankind.</p><p>Climate change is expected to have one final impact. In addition to the mean temperature and precipitation levels rising, there may be a change in the distribution of weather. Seasonal patterns may change with more warming in winter than summer. Interannual variance might change. Diurnal variance may drop as nights become warmer relative to days. Tropical cyclones may become more powerful. The pattern of global winds may change, shifting moisture from one place to another. More is known about global mean changes than these other changes in the distribution. It is more difficult to study variance and even more difficult to study extreme events. But it is likely that the distribution of weather events will change.</p><p>What then is the consequence of climate change if greenhouse gases cause all these changes? What sectors of the economy are vulnerable? What nonmarket goods and services are at risk?</p><p>The literature on impacts has long identified most of the sectors likely to be affected by climate change (Pearce et al. 1996). The vulnerable economic sectors include agriculture, coasts, forests, water, and energy. Important sectors outside the economy that would be affected include recreation, ecosystem change, human health, and aesthetics. The controversy about impacts does not concern what will be affected. The controversy is measuring the magnitude of the impact. Some studies report damages to mankind equal to 20 percent of total income (Stern 2007). Other <u><strong><mark>studies suggest</mark> more <mark>modest effects</mark> of <mark>less than 2 percent of income</u></strong></mark> (Pearce et al. 1996; Nordhaus 1991). <u>Yet other studies suggest impacts may be closer to 0.2 percent of income</u> (Mendelsohn et al. 2006). What explains estimates that vary by orders of magnitude?</p><p><u>Although <mark>some</mark> authors</u> <u><strong><mark>speculate about exponentially increasing damage</u></strong></mark> (Stern 2007), <u><strong><mark>empirical analysis suggests</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>most sectors respond</mark> to temperature <mark>in a hill-shaped fashion</u></strong></mark> (Mendelsohn and Schlesinger 1999; Tol 2002a). <u>For each sector, there is an ideal temperature where the net value of that sector is highest</u>. If temperatures are either colder or warmer than this ideal, warming will be either beneficial or harmful, respectively.</p><p>Three important insights follow from this result. First, <u>warming will be beneficial to relatively cool countries and harmful to relatively warm countries. Warming will not have the same universal effect on everybody</u>. Low-latitude countries may well suffer 60 to 80 percent of the global damage (Mendelsohn et al. 2006). This is problematic because these low-latitude countries collectively contribute only a small fraction of global emissions. A large fraction of the damage from climate change is not suffered by the countries causing the emissions. There is an inherent inequity in the distribution of the costs and benefits of greenhouse gas emissions.</p><p>Second, the warmer the planet gets, the more damage that warming will cause. More and more countries will be pushed beyond the ideal temperature range, and the more local temperatures exceed that range, the greater the damage will be. Third, because the most serious damage requires relatively high temperatures, <u><strong><mark>a large fraction of the damage will not occur until far into the future</u></strong></mark>. The present value of damage is consequently quite small.</p><p>The literature also contains one other important insight. <u><strong><mark>Adaptation is very effective at lowering climate damage</u></strong></mark> (Mendelsohn and Neumann 1999; Mendelsohn and Dinar 2009). <u><strong><mark>Firms, farms, and people will all change their behavior</mark> as climate changes.</u></strong> <u>They will subtly adjust their timing, their choices, and their management to take into account the climate that they actually live in</u>. One can see this today by comparing the behavior of people who happen to live in different climates. Farmers in warmer places plant crops suitable for that climate. People wear clothing appropriate to their climate and season. Buildings have heating and cooling systems appropriate for each climate. People and firms adapt to climate because it is in their interest to do so. <u><strong><mark>Adaptation makes them better off</u></strong></mark>. That does not imply there are no damages. It simply points out that <u><strong><mark>assuming zero adaptation is not realistic</u></strong></mark>. <u>The damage is much lower when people adjust. It may be more difficult to predict what will happen with adaptation</u>, <u><strong>but <mark>simply assuming it away leads to overly pessimistic predictions</mark> of damage</u></strong>. <u>Predictions of impacts from climate change must take private adaptation into account in order to provide accurate measures of future damages</u> (Mendelsohn 2000).</p>

warrming d

cyber

./documents/ndtceda16/Georgetown/MiSh/Georgetown-Mills-Shepherd-Neg-USC-Round6.docx

N

USC

6

Kansas HW

Will Repko

1AC - new kigali 2NR - oil da

ndtceda16/Georgetown/MiSh/Georgetown-Mills-Shepherd-Neg-USC-Round6.docx

MiSh

Georgetown MiSh

Ch.....

Mi.....

Cl.....

Sh.....

Georgetown

Georgetown

ndtceda16

NDT/CEDA 2016-17

cx

college

No burnout

Bar-Yam, 16

Bar-Yam, 16 - SB and PhD in physics from MIT, president of the New England Complex Systems Institute (Yaneer Bar-Yam, "Transition to extinction: Pandemics in a connected world," Medium, 7-3-2016, https://medium.com/complex-systems-channel/transition-to-extinction-pandemics-in-a-connected-world-153867fe98f4#.2bxv2alfc)

When we introduce long range transportation into the model, the success of more aggressive strains changes They can use the long range transportation to and the more transportation routes the there is a at which pathogens become so aggressive that the entire host population dies The pathogens die at the same time but that is not exactly a consolation to the hosts With increasing levels of global transportation human civilization may be approaching such a it is really about which pathogens will be found in a system that is and Ebola can spread in a traditional approach uses historical evidence to assess the impacts of a disease , many were surprised by the spread of Ebola through West Africa in 2014 As the connectivity of the world increases to future events Even a system that seems stable can be by a few more long-range connections and connectivity is continuing to increase As the world becomes more connected, the U.S. have of social interactions with some that can be events like a mass outbreak pose a much greater risk if they do happen If a sick food service worker in an airport infects 100 passengers or a contagion event happens in mass transportation an outbreak could very well prove Long range transportation will continue to pose a threat of pandemic if its impacts cannot be contained.

aggressive strains use long range transportation to find new hosts and escape local extinction the more transportation the more pathogens survive and spread With increasing levels of global transportation civilization may be approaching a critical threshold past experience is not a good guide to future events the U.S. have highly skewed networks of social interactions with highly connected individuals that can be superspreaders an outbreak could prove unstoppable Long range transportation will pose a threat if its impacts cannot be contained

When we introduce long range transportation into the model, the success of more aggressive strains changes. They can use the long range transportation to find new hosts and escape local extinction. Figure 3 shows that the more transportation routes introduced into the model, the more higher aggressive pathogens are able to survive and spread. As we add more long range transportation, there is a critical point at which pathogens become so aggressive that the entire host population dies. The pathogens die at the same time, but that is not exactly a consolation to the hosts. We call this the phase transition to extinction (Figure 4). With increasing levels of global transportation, human civilization may be approaching such a critical threshold. In the paper we wrote in 2006 about the dangers of global transportation for pathogen evolution and pandemics [8], we mentioned the risk from Ebola. Ebola is a horrendous disease that was present only in isolated villages in Africa. It was far away from the rest of the world only because of that isolation. Since Africa was developing, it was only a matter of time before it reached population centers and airports. While the model is about evolution, it is really about which pathogens will be found in a system that is highly connected, and Ebola can spread in a highly connected world. The traditional approach to public health uses historical evidence analyzed statistically to assess the potential impacts of a disease. As a result, many were surprised by the spread of Ebola through West Africa in 2014. As the connectivity of the world increases, past experience is not a good guide to future events. A key point about the phase transition to extinction is its suddenness. Even a system that seems stable, can be destabilized by a few more long-range connections, and connectivity is continuing to increase. So how close are we to the tipping point? We don’t know but it would be good to find out before it happens. While Ebola ravaged three countries in West Africa, it only resulted in a handful of cases outside that region. One possible reason is that many of the airlines that fly to west Africa stopped or reduced flights during the epidemic [9]. In the absence of a clear connection, public health authorities who downplayed the dangers of the epidemic spreading to the West might seem to be vindicated. As with the choice of airlines to stop flying to west Africa, our analysis didn’t take into consideration how people respond to epidemics. It does tell us what the outcome will be unless we respond fast enough and well enough to stop the spread of future diseases, which may not be the same as the ones we saw in the past. As the world becomes more connected, the dangers increase. Are people in western countries safe because of higher quality health systems? Countries like the U.S. have highly skewed networks of social interactions with some very highly connected individuals that can be “superspreaders.” The chances of such an individual becoming infected may be low but events like a mass outbreak pose a much greater risk if they do happen. If a sick food service worker in an airport infects 100 passengers, or a contagion event happens in mass transportation, an outbreak could very well prove unstoppable. Watch this mock video of a pathogen spreading globally through land and air transportation. Long range transportation will continue to pose a threat of pandemic if its impacts cannot be contained.

<h4>No burnout </h4><p><strong>Bar-Yam, 16</strong> - SB and PhD in physics from MIT, president of the New England Complex Systems Institute (Yaneer Bar-Yam, "Transition to extinction: Pandemics in a connected world," Medium, 7-3-2016, https://medium.com/complex-systems-channel/transition-to-extinction-pandemics-in-a-connected-world-153867fe98f4#.2bxv2alfc)</p><p><u><strong>When we introduce long range transportation into the model, the success of more <mark>aggressive strains</mark> changes</u></strong>. <u><strong>They can <mark>use</mark> the <mark>long range transportation to</mark> </u></strong><mark>find new hosts<u><strong></mark> <mark>and</mark> </u></strong><mark>escape local extinction</mark>. Figure 3 shows that <u><strong><mark>the more transportation</mark> routes</u></strong> introduced into the model, <u><strong><mark>the</mark> </u></strong><mark>more</mark> higher aggressive <mark>pathogens</mark> are able to <mark>survive and spread</mark>.</p><p>As we add more long range transportation, <u><strong>there is a </u></strong>critical point <u><strong>at which pathogens become so aggressive that the entire host population dies</u></strong>. <u><strong>The pathogens die at the same time</u></strong>, <u><strong>but that is not exactly a consolation to the hosts</u></strong>. We call this the phase transition to extinction (Figure 4). <u><strong><mark>With increasing levels of global transportation</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>human <mark>civilization may be approaching</mark> such <mark>a</mark> </u></strong><mark>critical threshold</mark>.</p><p>In the paper we wrote in 2006 about the dangers of global transportation for pathogen evolution and pandemics [8], we mentioned the risk from Ebola. Ebola is a horrendous disease that was present only in isolated villages in Africa. It was far away from the rest of the world only because of that isolation. Since Africa was developing, it was only a matter of time before it reached population centers and airports. While the model is about evolution, <u><strong>it is really about which pathogens will be found in a system that is </u></strong>highly connected, <u><strong>and Ebola can spread in a </u></strong>highly connected world.</p><p>The <u><strong>traditional approach</u></strong> to public health <u><strong>uses historical evidence</u></strong> analyzed statistically <u><strong>to assess the</u></strong> potential <u><strong>impacts of a disease</u></strong>. As a result<u><strong>, many were surprised by the spread of Ebola through West Africa in 2014</u></strong>. <u><strong>As the connectivity of the world increases</u></strong>, <mark>past experience is not a good guide</mark> <u><strong><mark>to future events</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>A key point about the phase transition to extinction is its suddenness. <u><strong>Even a system that seems stable</u></strong>, <u><strong>can be </u></strong>destabilized<u><strong> by a few more long-range connections</u></strong>, <u><strong>and connectivity is continuing to increase</u></strong>.</p><p>So how close are we to the tipping point? We don’t know but it would be good to find out before it happens.</p><p>While Ebola ravaged three countries in West Africa, it only resulted in a handful of cases outside that region. One possible reason is that many of the airlines that fly to west Africa stopped or reduced flights during the epidemic [9]. In the absence of a clear connection, public health authorities who downplayed the dangers of the epidemic spreading to the West might seem to be vindicated.</p><p>As with the choice of airlines to stop flying to west Africa, our analysis didn’t take into consideration how people respond to epidemics. It does tell us what the outcome will be unless we respond fast enough and well enough to stop the spread of future diseases, which may not be the same as the ones we saw in the past. <u><strong>As the world becomes more connected, </u></strong>the dangers increase.</p><p>Are people in western countries safe because of higher quality health systems? Countries like <u><strong><mark>the U.S. have</mark> </u></strong><mark>highly skewed networks<u><strong></mark> <mark>of social interactions with</mark> some </u></strong>very <mark>highly connected individuals<u><strong></mark> <mark>that can be</u></strong></mark> “<mark>superspreaders</mark>.” The chances of such an individual becoming infected may be low but <u><strong>events like a mass outbreak pose a much greater risk if they do happen</u></strong>. <u><strong>If a sick food service worker in an airport infects 100 passengers</u></strong>, <u><strong>or a contagion event happens in mass transportation</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>an outbreak could</mark> very well <mark>prove</mark> </u></strong><mark>unstoppable</mark>.</p><p>Watch this mock video of a pathogen spreading globally through land and air transportation. <u><strong><mark>Long range transportation will</mark> continue to <mark>pose a threat</mark> of pandemic <mark>if its impacts cannot be contained</mark>.</p></u></strong>

1AC

./documents/hspolicy20/Mamaroneck/MiRa/Mamaroneck-Miller-Rahman-Aff-GBX-Round1.docx

A

GBX

1

Niles West BB

Jordan Di

1AC - Forensics 2NR - ESR Stim

hspolicy20/Mamaroneck/MiRa/Mamaroneck-Miller-Rahman-Aff-GBX-Round1.docx

MiRa

Mamaroneck MiRa

Ja.....

Mi.....

Ra.....

Ra.....

Mamaroneck

Mamaroneck

NY

hspolicy20

HS Policy 2020-21

cx

hs

Discrediting Trumpian populism’s key to avoid extinction

de Waal 16

Alex de Waal 16, Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation at the Fletcher School at Tufts University, 12/5/16, “Garrison America and the Threat of Global War,” http://bostonreview.net/war-security-politics-global-justice/alex-de-waal-garrison-america-and-threat-global-war

Trump’s supporters will wake up to the fact that they have been duped, or realize the futility of voting for a wrecker out of a sense of alienated desperation The progressives’ silver lining to 2016 is had Clinton won, the Trump constituency would have been back in four years’ with a more ruthless and ideological candidate. Better for plutocratic populism to fail early economic and financial crisis led to global calamity. Something similar could happen today we are in a steady unpicking of the liberal peace the historic decline in wars appears to have been reversed What does a world in global, generalized war look like? deep states are strangling liberalism emboldened middle powers and revanchist powers (such as Russia) rearming and taking unilateral military action regional rivals threatening one another, some with nuclear weapons and others with possibilities of acquiring them generalized war is a conflict of destabilization a global political market of rival plutocracies comes into view. Add virulent reactionary populism and it resembles a war on democracy If we see punitive trade wars territorial disputes are in prospect Liberal multilateralism is seeking common wins through peaceful negotiation We may see regional arms races, nuclear proliferation A cabal of plutocratic populists would applaud one another’s readiness to tear up cosmopolitan liberalism Garrison America could collude with regimes in Russia, China, Turkey bringing a façade of stability for as long as they collude—and war when they fall out the plutocratic populist order is a future that does not work The importance of maintaining a commitment to public goods and the global commons—including the future of the planet remain evergreen. We need to find a new global political settlement without having to suffer the catastrophic traumas of trying everything else first

Better for populism to fail early we are liberal peace What does a world in global war look like? states emboldened middle and revanchist powers threatening with nuclear weapons Add reactionary populism it resembles war on democracy punitive trade wars territorial disputes Liberal multilat is seeking common wins through peaceful negotiation cabal of populists would tear up cosmopolitan liberalism Russia, China, Turkey bring a façade of stability and war when they fall out

Trump’s promises have been so vague that it will be hard for him to disappoint. Nonetheless, many of his supporters will wake up to the fact that they have been duped, or realize the futility of voting for a wrecker out of a sense of alienated desperation. The progressives’ silver lining to the 2016 election is that, had Clinton won, the Trump constituency would have been back in four years’ time, probably with a more ruthless and ideological candidate. Better for plutocratic populism to fail early. But the damage inflicted in the interim could be terrible—even irredeemable if it were to include swinging a wrecking ball at the Paris Climate Agreement out of simple ignorant malice. Polanyi recounts how economic and financial crisis led to global calamity. Something similar could happen today. In fact we are already in a steady unpicking of the liberal peace that glowed at the turn of the millennium. Since approximately 2008, the historic decline in the number and lethality of wars appears to have been reversed. Today’s wars are not like World War I, with formal declarations of war, clear war zones, rules of engagement, and definite endings. But they are wars nonetheless. What does a world in global, generalized war look like? We have an unwinnable “war on terror” that is metastasizing with every escalation, and which has blurred the boundaries between war and everything else. We have deep states—built on a new oligarchy of generals, spies, and private-sector suppliers—that are strangling liberalism. We have emboldened middle powers (such as Saudi Arabia) and revanchist powers (such as Russia) rearming and taking unilateral military action across borders (Ukraine and Syria). We have massive profiteering from conflicts by the arms industry, as well as through the corruption and organized crime that follow in their wake (Afghanistan). We have impoverishment and starvation through economic warfare, the worst case being Yemen. We have “peacekeeping” forces fighting wars (Somalia). We have regional rivals threatening one another, some with nuclear weapons (India and Pakistan) and others with possibilities of acquiring them (Saudi Arabia and Iran). Above all, today’s generalized war is a conflict of destabilization, with big powers intervening in the domestic politics of others, buying influence in their security establishments, bribing their way to big commercial contracts and thereby corroding respect for government, and manipulating public opinion through the media. Washington, D.C., and Moscow each does this in its own way. Put the pieces together and a global political market of rival plutocracies comes into view. Add virulent reactionary populism to the mix and it resembles a war on democracy. What more might we see? Economic liberalism is a creed of optimism and abundance; reactionary protectionism feeds on pessimistic scarcity. If we see punitive trade wars and national leaders taking preemptive action to secure strategic resources within the walls of their garrison states, then old-fashioned territorial disputes along with accelerated state-commercial grabbing of land and minerals are in prospect. We could see mobilization against immigrants and minorities as a way of enflaming and rewarding a constituency that can police borders, enforce the new political rightness, and even become electoral vigilantes. Liberal multilateralism is a system of seeking common wins through peaceful negotiation; case-by-case power dealing is a zero-sum calculus. We may see regional arms races, nuclear proliferation, and opportunistic power coalitions to exploit the weak. In such a global political marketplace, we would see middle-ranking and junior states rewarded for the toughness of their bargaining, and foreign policy and security strategy delegated to the CEOs of oil companies, defense contractors, bankers, and real estate magnates. The United Nations system appeals to leaders to live up to the highest standards. The fact that they so often conceal their transgressions is the tribute that vice pays to virtue. A cabal of plutocratic populists would revel in the opposite: applauding one another’s readiness to tear up cosmopolitan liberalism and pursue a latter-day mercantilist naked self-interest. Garrison America could opportunistically collude with similarly constituted political-military business regimes in Russia, China, Turkey, and elsewhere for a new realpolitik global concert, redolent of the early nineteenth-century era of the Congress of Vienna, bringing a façade of stability for as long as they collude—and war when they fall out. And there is a danger that, in response to a terrorist outrage or an international political crisis, President Trump will do something stupid, just as Europe’s leaders so unthinkingly strolled into World War I. The multilateral security system is in poor health and may not be able to cope. Underpinning this is a simple truth: the plutocratic populist order is a future that does not work. If illustration were needed of the logic of hiding under the blanket rather than facing difficult realities, look no further than Trump’s readiness to deny climate change. We have been here before, more or less, and from history we can gather important lessons about what we must do now. The importance of defending civility with democratic deliberation, respecting human rights and values, and maintaining a commitment to public goods and the global commons—including the future of the planet—remain evergreen. We need to find our way to a new 1945—and the global political settlement for a tamed and humane capitalism—without having to suffer the catastrophic traumas of trying everything else first.

<h4>Discrediting Trumpian populism’s key to avoid extinction </h4><p>Alex <u><strong>de Waal 16</u></strong>, Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation at the Fletcher School at Tufts University, 12/5/16, “Garrison America and the Threat of Global War,” http://bostonreview.net/war-security-politics-global-justice/alex-de-waal-garrison-america-and-threat-global-war</p><p><u><strong>Trump’s</u></strong> promises have been so vague that it will be hard for him to disappoint. Nonetheless, many of his <u><strong>supporters will wake up to the fact that they have been duped, or realize the futility of voting for a wrecker out of a sense of alienated desperation</u></strong>. <u><strong>The progressives’ silver lining to</u></strong> the <u><strong>2016</u></strong> election <u><strong>is</u></strong> that, <u><strong>had Clinton won, the Trump constituency would have been back in four years’</u></strong> time, probably <u><strong>with a more ruthless and ideological candidate. <mark>Better for</mark> plutocratic <mark>populism to fail early</u></strong></mark>. But the damage inflicted in the interim could be terrible—even irredeemable if it were to include swinging a wrecking ball at the Paris Climate Agreement out of simple ignorant malice.</p><p>Polanyi recounts how <u><strong>economic and financial crisis led to global calamity. Something similar could happen today</u></strong>. In fact <u><strong><mark>we are</u></strong></mark> already <u><strong>in a steady unpicking of the <mark>liberal peace</u></strong></mark> that glowed at the turn of the millennium. Since approximately 2008, <u><strong>the historic decline in</u></strong> the number and lethality of <u><strong>wars appears to have been reversed</u></strong>. Today’s wars are not like World War I, with formal declarations of war, clear war zones, rules of engagement, and definite endings. But they are wars nonetheless.</p><p><u><strong><mark>What does a world in global</mark>, generalized <mark>war look like?</u></strong></mark> We have an unwinnable “war on terror” that is metastasizing with every escalation, and which has blurred the boundaries between war and everything else. We have <u><strong>deep <mark>states</u></strong></mark>—built on a new oligarchy of generals, spies, and private-sector suppliers—that <u><strong>are strangling liberalism</u></strong>. We have <u><strong><mark>emboldened middle</mark> powers</u></strong> (such as Saudi Arabia) <u><strong><mark>and revanchist powers</mark> (such as Russia) rearming and taking unilateral military action</u></strong> across borders (Ukraine and Syria). We have massive profiteering from conflicts by the arms industry, as well as through the corruption and organized crime that follow in their wake (Afghanistan). We have impoverishment and starvation through economic warfare, the worst case being Yemen. We have “peacekeeping” forces fighting wars (Somalia). We have <u><strong>regional rivals <mark>threatening</mark> one another, some <mark>with nuclear weapons</u></strong></mark> (India and Pakistan) <u><strong>and others with possibilities of acquiring them</u></strong> (Saudi Arabia and Iran).</p><p>Above all, today’s <u><strong>generalized war is a conflict of destabilization</u></strong>, with big powers intervening in the domestic politics of others, buying influence in their security establishments, bribing their way to big commercial contracts and thereby corroding respect for government, and manipulating public opinion through the media. Washington, D.C., and Moscow each does this in its own way. Put the pieces together and <u><strong>a global political market of rival plutocracies comes into view. <mark>Add</mark> virulent <mark>reactionary populism</u></strong></mark> to the mix <u><strong>and <mark>it resembles</mark> a <mark>war on democracy</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>What more might we see? Economic liberalism is a creed of optimism and abundance; reactionary protectionism feeds on pessimistic scarcity. <u><strong>If we see <mark>punitive trade wars</u></strong> </mark>and national leaders taking preemptive action to secure strategic resources within the walls of their garrison states, then old-fashioned <u><strong><mark>territorial disputes</u></strong> </mark>along with accelerated state-commercial grabbing of land and minerals <u><strong>are in prospect</u></strong>. We could see mobilization against immigrants and minorities as a way of enflaming and rewarding a constituency that can police borders, enforce the new political rightness, and even become electoral vigilantes.</p><p><u><strong><mark>Liberal multilat</mark>eralism <mark>is</u></strong></mark> a system of <u><strong><mark>seeking common wins through peaceful negotiation</u></strong></mark>; case-by-case power dealing is a zero-sum calculus. <u><strong>We may see regional arms races, nuclear proliferation</u></strong>, and opportunistic power coalitions to exploit the weak. In such a global political marketplace, we would see middle-ranking and junior states rewarded for the toughness of their bargaining, and foreign policy and security strategy delegated to the CEOs of oil companies, defense contractors, bankers, and real estate magnates.</p><p>The United Nations system appeals to leaders to live up to the highest standards. The fact that they so often conceal their transgressions is the tribute that vice pays to virtue. <u><strong>A <mark>cabal of</mark> plutocratic <mark>populists would</u></strong></mark> revel in the opposite: <u><strong>applaud</u></strong>ing <u><strong>one another’s readiness to <mark>tear up cosmopolitan liberalism</u></strong></mark> and pursue a latter-day mercantilist naked self-interest. <u><strong>Garrison America could</u></strong> opportunistically <u><strong>collude with</u></strong> similarly constituted political-military business <u><strong>regimes in <mark>Russia, China, Turkey</u></strong></mark>, and elsewhere for a new realpolitik global concert, redolent of the early nineteenth-century era of the Congress of Vienna, <u><strong><mark>bring</mark>ing <mark>a façade of stability</mark> for as long as they collude—<mark>and war when they fall out</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>And there is a danger that, in response to a terrorist outrage or an international political crisis, President Trump will do something stupid, just as Europe’s leaders so unthinkingly strolled into World War I. The multilateral security system is in poor health and may not be able to cope.</p><p>Underpinning this is a simple truth: <u><strong>the plutocratic populist order is a future that does not work</u></strong>. If illustration were needed of the logic of hiding under the blanket rather than facing difficult realities, look no further than Trump’s readiness to deny climate change.</p><p>We have been here before, more or less, and from history we can gather important lessons about what we must do now. <u><strong>The importance of</u></strong> defending civility with democratic deliberation, respecting human rights and values, and <u><strong>maintaining a commitment to public goods and the global commons—including the future of the planet</u></strong>—<u><strong>remain evergreen. We need to find</u></strong> our way to <u><strong>a new</u></strong> 1945—and the <u><strong>global political settlement</u></strong> for a tamed and humane capitalism—<u><strong>without having to suffer the catastrophic traumas of trying everything else first</u></strong>.</p>

1AR

Off

Their M

./documents/ndtceda17/Minnesota/AsLe/Minnesota-Asirvatham-Leburu-Aff-Pitt%20RR-Round1.docx

A

Pitt RR

1

Northwestern Jankovsky-Weideman

Bunas

1AC - Cost Coverage Cartels 2NR - DeDev Case

ndtceda17/Minnesota/AsLe/Minnesota-Asirvatham-Leburu-Aff-Pitt%20RR-Round1.docx

AsLe

Minnesota AsLe

Ro.....

As.....

Te.....

Le.....

Minnesota

Minnesota

ndtceda17

NDT/CEDA 2017-18

cx

college

[5] Solutions to oppression need to be grounded in policy rather than abstraction. K’s must be tied to an implementable, political solution to be effective.

Bryant 12:

Bryant 12: Left,” Larval Subjects—Levi R. Bryant’s philosophy blog, November 11th, Available Online at http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/, Accessed 02-21-2014)

Unfortunately, the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction. It’s good at carrying out critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at proposing any sort of realistic constructions of alternatives This type of “revolutionary” is the greatest friend of the reactionary and capitalist because they do more to drive people into the embrace of reigning ideology we’re like underpants gnomes, saying “revolution is the answer!” without addressing any of the infrastructural questions We’re intoxicated with critique because it’s easy and safe. We best every opponent with critique. We occupy a position of moral superiority with critique. But this system is destructive

the left falls prey to abstraction. It’s poor at proposing realistic alternatives “revolutionary” is the greatest friend of the reactionary because they drive people into the reigning ideology we’re saying “revolution is the answer!” without addressing infrastructural questions We’re intoxicated with critique because it’s easy and safe. But this system is destructive

Unfortunately, the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction. It’s good at carrying out critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at proposing any sort of realistic constructions of alternatives. This because it thinks abstractly in its own way, ignoring how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of attraction would have to be remade to create a workable alternative. Here I’m reminded by the “underpants gnomes” depicted in South Park: The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit that goes like this: Phase 1: Collect Underpants Phase 2: ? Phase 3: Profit! They even have a catchy song to go with their work: Well this is sadly how it often is with the academic left. Our plan seems to be as follows: Phase 1: Ultra-Radical Critique Phase 2: ? Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation! Our problem is that we seem perpetually stuck at phase 1 without ever explaining what is to be done at phase 2. Often the critiques articulated at phase 1 are right, but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems with those critiques nonetheless. In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives. In order for new collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1. Yet this is where everything begins to fall apart. Even though these critiques are often right, we express them in ways that only an academic with a PhD in critical theory and post-structural theory can understand. How exactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhD’s in the humanities can understand him? Who are these things for? We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only universities can afford, with presses that don’t have a wide distribution, and give our talks at expensive hotels at academic conferences attended only by other academics. Again, who are these things for? Is it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry and tenure, than producing change in the world? If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesn’t make a sound! Seriously dudes and dudettes, what are you doing? But finally, and worst of all, us Marxists and anarchists all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they don’t embrace every bit of the doxa that we endorse. We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the inquisition (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and identifications in general?). This type of “revolutionary” is the greatest friend of the reactionary and capitalist because they do more to drive people into the embrace of reigning ideology than to undermine reigning ideology. These are the people that keep Rush Limbaugh in business. Well done! But this isn’t where our most serious shortcomings lie. Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. We almost never make concrete proposals for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced, and when we do, our critique-intoxicated cynics and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. How, I wonder, are we to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals? We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption. That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution of medicines, etc., etc., etc. What are your proposals? How will you meet these problems? How will you navigate the existing mediations or semiotic and material features of infrastructure? Marx and Lenin had proposals. Do you? Have you even explored the cartography of the problem? Today we are so intellectually bankrupt on these points that we even have theorists speaking of events and acts and talking about a return to the old socialist party systems, ignoring the horror they generated, their failures, and not even proposing ways of avoiding the repetition of these horrors in a new system of organization. Who among our critical theorists is thinking seriously about how to build a distribution and production system that is responsive to the needs of global consumption, avoiding the problems of planned economy, ie., who is doing this in a way that gets notice in our circles? Who is addressing the problems of micro-fascism that arise with party systems (there’s a reason that it was the Negri & Hardt contingent, not the Badiou contingent that has been the heart of the occupy movement). At least the ecologists are thinking about these things in these terms because, well, they think ecologically. Sadly we need something more, a melding of the ecologists, the Marxists, and the anarchists. We’re not getting it yet though, as far as I can tell. Indeed, folks seem attracted to yet another critical paradigm, Laruelle. I would love, just for a moment, to hear a radical environmentalist talk about his ideal high school that would be academically sound. How would he provide for the energy needs of that school? How would he meet building codes in an environmentally sound way? How would she provide food for the students? What would be her plan for waste disposal? And most importantly, how would she navigate the school board, the state legislature, the federal government, and all the families of these students? What is your plan? What is your alternative? I think there are alternatives. I saw one that approached an alternative in Rotterdam. If you want to make a truly revolutionary contribution, this is where you should start. Why should anyone even bother listening to you if you aren’t proposing real plans? But we haven’t even gotten to that point. Instead we’re like underpants gnomes, saying “revolution is the answer!” without addressing any of the infrastructural questions of just how revolution is to be produced, what alternatives it would offer, and how we would concretely go about building those alternatives. Masturbation. “Underpants gnome” deserves to be a category in critical theory; a sort of synonym for self-congratulatory masturbation. We need less critique not because critique isn’t important or necessary– it is –but because we know the critiques, we know the problems. We’re intoxicated with critique because it’s easy and safe. We best every opponent with critique. We occupy a position of moral superiority with critique. But do we really do anything with critique? What we need today, more than ever, is composition or carpentry. Everyone knows something is wrong. Everyone knows this system is destructive and stacked against them. Even the Tea Party knows something is wrong with the economic system, despite having the wrong economic theory. None of us, however, are proposing alternatives. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.

<h4>[5] Solutions to oppression need to be grounded in policy rather than abstraction. K’s must be tied to an implementable, political solution to be effective. </h4><p><strong>Bryant 12:</strong> Left,” Larval Subjects—Levi R. Bryant’s philosophy blog, November 11th, Available Online at http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/, Accessed 02-21-2014)</p><p><u><strong>Unfortunately, <mark>the</mark> academic <mark>left falls prey to</mark> its own form of <mark>abstraction. It’s</mark> good at carrying out critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very <mark>poor at proposing</mark> any sort of <mark>realistic</mark> constructions of <mark>alternatives</u></strong></mark>. This because it thinks abstractly in its own way, ignoring how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of attraction would have to be remade to create a workable alternative. Here I’m reminded by the “underpants gnomes” depicted in South Park: The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit that goes like this: Phase 1: Collect Underpants Phase 2: ? Phase 3: Profit! They even have a catchy song to go with their work: Well this is sadly how it often is with the academic left. Our plan seems to be as follows: Phase 1: Ultra-Radical Critique Phase 2: ? Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation! Our problem is that we seem perpetually stuck at phase 1 without ever explaining what is to be done at phase 2. Often the critiques articulated at phase 1 are right, but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems with those critiques nonetheless. In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives. In order for new collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1. Yet this is where everything begins to fall apart. Even though these critiques are often right, we express them in ways that only an academic with a PhD in critical theory and post-structural theory can understand. How exactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhD’s in the humanities can understand him? Who are these things for? We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only universities can afford, with presses that don’t have a wide distribution, and give our talks at expensive hotels at academic conferences attended only by other academics. Again, who are these things for? Is it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry and tenure, than producing change in the world? If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesn’t make a sound! Seriously dudes and dudettes, what are you doing? But finally, and worst of all, us Marxists and anarchists all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they don’t embrace every bit of the doxa that we endorse. We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the inquisition (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and identifications in general?). <u><strong>This type of <mark>“revolutionary” is the greatest friend of the reactionary</mark> and capitalist <mark>because they</mark> do more to <mark>drive people into the</mark> embrace of <mark>reigning ideology</u></strong></mark> than to undermine reigning ideology. These are the people that keep Rush Limbaugh in business. Well done! But this isn’t where our most serious shortcomings lie. Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. We almost never make concrete proposals for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced, and when we do, our critique-intoxicated cynics and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. How, I wonder, are we to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals? We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption. That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution of medicines, etc., etc., etc. What are your proposals? How will you meet these problems? How will you navigate the existing mediations or semiotic and material features of infrastructure? Marx and Lenin had proposals. Do you? Have you even explored the cartography of the problem? Today we are so intellectually bankrupt on these points that we even have theorists speaking of events and acts and talking about a return to the old socialist party systems, ignoring the horror they generated, their failures, and not even proposing ways of avoiding the repetition of these horrors in a new system of organization. Who among our critical theorists is thinking seriously about how to build a distribution and production system that is responsive to the needs of global consumption, avoiding the problems of planned economy, ie., who is doing this in a way that gets notice in our circles? Who is addressing the problems of micro-fascism that arise with party systems (there’s a reason that it was the Negri & Hardt contingent, not the Badiou contingent that has been the heart of the occupy movement). At least the ecologists are thinking about these things in these terms because, well, they think ecologically. Sadly we need something more, a melding of the ecologists, the Marxists, and the anarchists. We’re not getting it yet though, as far as I can tell. Indeed, folks seem attracted to yet another critical paradigm, Laruelle. I would love, just for a moment, to hear a radical environmentalist talk about his ideal high school that would be academically sound. How would he provide for the energy needs of that school? How would he meet building codes in an environmentally sound way? How would she provide food for the students? What would be her plan for waste disposal? And most importantly, how would she navigate the school board, the state legislature, the federal government, and all the families of these students? What is your plan? What is your alternative? I think there are alternatives. I saw one that approached an alternative in Rotterdam. If you want to make a truly revolutionary contribution, this is where you should start. Why should anyone even bother listening to you if you aren’t proposing real plans? But we haven’t even gotten to that point. Instead <u><strong><mark>we’re</mark> like underpants gnomes, <mark>saying “revolution is the answer!” without addressing</mark> any of the <mark>infrastructural questions</u></strong></mark> of just how revolution is to be produced, what alternatives it would offer, and how we would concretely go about building those alternatives. Masturbation. “Underpants gnome” deserves to be a category in critical theory; a sort of synonym for self-congratulatory masturbation. We need less critique not because critique isn’t important or necessary– it is –but because we know the critiques, we know the problems. <u><strong><mark>We’re intoxicated with critique because it’s easy and safe.</mark> We best every opponent with critique. We occupy a position of moral superiority with critique. <mark>But</u></strong></mark> do we really do anything with critique? What we need today, more than ever, is composition or carpentry. Everyone knows something is wrong. Everyone knows <u><strong><mark>this system is destructive</u></strong></mark> and stacked against them. Even the Tea Party knows something is wrong with the economic system, despite having the wrong economic theory. None of us, however, are proposing alternatives. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.</p>

1AC

Advocacy

Underview

./documents/hsld20/WestRanch/ve/West%20Ranch-venkatasuramanian-Aff-Isidore%20Newman-Doubles.docx

A

Isidore Newman

Doubles

Giovanni Cutri

forgot

1aC Stock 1nc Black Nihlism performance DA 1ar ALL 2nr K 2a4 ROB

hsld20/WestRanch/ve/West%20Ranch-venkatasuramanian-Aff-Isidore%20Newman-Doubles.docx

shve

West Ranch shve

sh.....

ve.....

WestRanch

West Ranch

CA

hsld20

HS LD 2020-21

ld

hs

Resolved denotes a proposal to be enacted by law

Words and Phrases 1964

Words and Phrases 1964 Permanent Edition

to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature; similar to the word “enact,” defined as to establish by law

to express determination by resolution or legislature to establish by law”.

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

<h4><strong>Resolved denotes a proposal to be enacted by law </h4><p>Words and Phrases 1964 </strong>Permanent Edition </p><p>Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “<u><strong><mark>to express</mark> an opinion or <mark>determination by resolution or </mark>vote; as ‘it was resolved by the <mark>legislature</mark>;</u></strong>” It is of <u><strong>similar</u></strong> force <u><strong>to the word “enact,”</u></strong> which is <u><strong>defined</u></strong> by Bouvier <u><strong>as</u></strong> meaning “<u><strong><mark>to establish by law</u></strong>”.<strong></mark> </p></strong>

nr v elijah pitt

./documents/hsld19/BergenCounty/Sa/Bergen%20County-Savransky-Neg-blue%20key-Round5.docx

N

blue key

5

elijah pitt

ethan uhlig

hsld19/BergenCounty/Sa/Bergen%20County-Savransky-Neg-blue%20key-Round5.docx

MaSa

Bergen County MaSa

Ma.....

Sa.....

BergenCounty

Bergen County

NJ

hsld19

HS LD 2019-20

ld

hs

Extinction---executive flexibility is key to respond to terror, rogue states, and prolif.

Yoo 17

John Yoo 17. Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, and a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. “Trump’s Syria Strike Was Constitutional.” National Review. 4/13/2017. https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/04/trump-syria-strike-constitutional-presidents-have-broad-war-powers

The Framers realized the obvious Foreign affairs are unpredictable and involve the highest of stakes, making them unsuitable to regulation by preexisting legislation they demand swift, decisive action sometimes under pressured or even emergency circumstances that is best carried out by a branch of government that does not suffer from multiple vetoes or that is delayed by disagreements Congress is too large and unwieldy to take the swift and decisive action required Even when it has access to the same intelligence as the executive branch, Congress’s loose, decentralized structure would paralyze American policy while foreign threats grew While pro-Congress critics worry about a president’s foreign adventurism, the real threat to our national security could come from inaction and isolationism the War Powers Resolution No federal court has ever upheld the resolution Even Congress has never enforced it Our Constitution has succeeded because it favors swift presidential action in war, later checked by Congress’s funding power A radical change in the system might appease critics of presidential power. But it could also seriously threaten American national security In order to forestall another 9/11 attack, or take advantage of a window of opportunity to strike terrorists or rogue nations, the executive branch needs flexibility Time for congressional deliberation, which can lead to passivity and isolation and not smarter decisions, will come at the price of speed and secrecy The Constitution creates a presidency that can respond forcefully to prevent serious threats to our national security As we confront the new challenges of terrorism, rogue nations, and WMD proliferation, now is not the time to introduce sweeping, untested changes

Foreign affairs are unpredictable unsuitable to regulation by legislation they demand swift, decisive action under pressured or emergency circumstances War Powers No court has ever upheld Congress has never enforced it A radical change in the system could seriously threaten national security to take advantage of a window of opportunity to strike the executive needs flexibility deliberation can lead to passivity at the price of speed and secrecy The presidency can respond to prevent terrorism, rogue nations, and WMD prolif

The Framers realized the obvious. Foreign affairs are unpredictable and involve the highest of stakes, making them unsuitable to regulation by preexisting legislation. Instead, they can demand swift, decisive action — sometimes under pressured or even emergency circumstances — that is best carried out by a branch of government that does not suffer from multiple vetoes or that is delayed by disagreements. Congress is too large and unwieldy to take the swift and decisive action required in wartime. Our Framers replaced the Articles of Confederation, which had failed in the management of foreign relations because they had no single executive, with the Constitution’s single president for precisely this reason. Even when it has access to the same intelligence as the executive branch, Congress’s loose, decentralized structure would paralyze American policy while foreign threats grew. Congress has no political incentive to mount and see through its own wartime policy. Members of Congress, who are interested in keeping their seats at the next election, do not want to take stands on controversial issues where the future is uncertain. They will avoid like the plague any vote that will anger large segments of the electorate. They prefer that the president take the political risks and be held accountable for failure. Congress is too large and unwieldy to take the swift and decisive action required in wartime. Congress’s track record when it has opposed presidential leadership has not been a happy one. Perhaps the most telling example was the Senate’s rejection of the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I. Congress’s isolationist urge kept the United States out of Europe at a time when democracies fell and Fascism grew in their place. Even as Europe and Asia plunged into war, Congress passed the Neutrality Acts designed to keep the United States out of the conflict. President Franklin Roosevelt violated those laws to help the Allies and draw the nation into war against the Axis. While pro-Congress critics worry about a president’s foreign adventurism, the real threat to our national security could come from inaction and isolationism. Many point to the Vietnam War as an example of the faults of the “imperial presidency.” Vietnam, however, could not have continued without the consistent support of Congress in raising a large military and paying for hostilities. And Vietnam ushered in a period of congressional dominance that witnessed American setbacks in the Cold War and the passage of the ineffectual War Powers Resolution. Congress passed the resolution in 1973 over President Richard Nixon’s veto, and no president has ever accepted the constitutionality of its 60-day limit on the use of troops abroad. No federal court has ever upheld the resolution. Even Congress has never enforced it. Despite the record of practice and the Constitution’s institutional design, critics nevertheless argue that we should radically remake the American way of war. They typically base their claim on Congress’s power to “declare war.” But these observers read the 18th-century constitutional text through a modern lens by interpreting “declare war” to mean “start war.” When the Constitution was written, however, a declaration of war served diplomatic notice about a change in legal relations between nations. It had little to do with launching hostilities. In the century before the Constitution, for example, Great Britain — where the Framers got the idea of declaring war — fought numerous major conflicts but declared war only once beforehand. Our Constitution sets out specific procedures for passing laws, appointing officers, and making treaties. There are none for waging war because the Framers expected the president and Congress to struggle over war through the national political process. In fact, other parts of the Constitution, properly read, support this reading. Article I, Section 10, for example, declares that the states shall not “engage” in war “without the consent of Congress” unless “actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.” This provision creates exactly the limits desired by anti-war critics, complete with an exception for self-defense. If the Framers had wanted to require congressional permission before the president could wage war, they simply could have repeated this provision and applied it to the executive. Presidents, of course, do not have complete freedom to take the nation to war. Congress has ample powers to control presidential policy, if it wants to. Only Congress can raise the military, which gives it the power to block, delay, or modify war plans. Before 1945, the United States had such a small peacetime military that presidents who started a war would have to go hat in hand to Congress to build an army to fight it. Since World War II, Congress has authorized and funded our large standing military, one primarily designed to conduct offensive, not defensive, operations (as we learned all too tragically on 9/11) and to swiftly project power worldwide. If Congress wanted to discourage presidential initiative in war, it could build a smaller, less offense-minded military. A radical change in the system for making war might appease critics of presidential power. But it could also seriously threaten American national security. Congress’s check on the presidency lies not just in the long-term raising of the military. It can also block any immediate armed conflict through the power of the purse. If Congress feels it has been misled in authorizing war, or it disagrees with the president’s decisions, all it need do is cut off funds, either all at once or gradually. It can reduce the size of the military, shrink or eliminate units, or freeze supplies. Using the power of the purse does not even require affirmative congressional action. Congress can just sit on its hands and refuse to pass a law funding the latest presidential adventure, and the war will end quickly. Even the Kosovo war, which lasted little more than two months and involved no ground troops, required special funding legislation. The Framers expected Congress’s power of the purse to serve as the primary check on presidential war. During the 1788 Virginia ratifying convention. Patrick Henry attacked the Constitution for failing to limit executive militarism. James Madison responded: “The sword is in the hands of the British king; the purse is in the hands of the Parliament. It is so in America, as far as any analogy can exist.” Congress ended America’s involvement in Vietnam by cutting off all funds for the war. Our Constitution has succeeded because it favors swift presidential action in war, later checked by Congress’s funding power. If a president continues to wage war without congressional authorization, as in Libya, Kosovo, or Korea, it is only because Congress has chosen not to exercise its easy check. We should not confuse a desire to escape political responsibility for a defect in the Constitution. A radical change in the system for making war might appease critics of presidential power. But it could also seriously threaten American national security. In order to forestall another 9/11 attack, or take advantage of a window of opportunity to strike terrorists or rogue nations, the executive branch needs flexibility. It is not hard to think of situations where congressional consent cannot be obtained in time to act. Time for congressional deliberation, which can lead to passivity and isolation and not smarter decisions, will come at the price of speed and secrecy. The Constitution creates a presidency that can respond forcefully to prevent serious threats to our national security. Presidents can take the initiative, and Congress can use its funding power to check presidents. Instead of demanding a legalistic process to begin war, the Framers left war to politics. As we confront the new challenges of terrorism, rogue nations, and WMD proliferation, now is not the time to introduce sweeping, untested changes in the way we make war.

<h4>Extinction---executive flexibility is key to respond to terror, rogue states, and prolif.</h4><p>John <strong>Yoo</strong> <strong>17</strong>. Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, and a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. “Trump’s Syria Strike Was Constitutional.” National Review. 4/13/2017. https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/04/trump-syria-strike-constitutional-presidents-have-broad-war-powers</p><p><u>The Framers realized the <strong>obvious</u></strong>. <u><mark>Foreign affairs are <strong>unpredictable</mark> and involve the highest of stakes</strong>, making them <strong><mark>unsuitable to regulation by</mark> preexisting <mark>legislation</u></strong></mark>. Instead, <u><mark>they</u></mark> can <u><mark>demand <strong>swift, decisive action</strong></mark> </u>— <u>sometimes <mark>under <strong>pressured</strong> or</mark> even <strong><mark>emergency circumstances</u></strong></mark> — <u>that is best carried out by a branch of government that does not suffer from multiple vetoes or that is delayed by disagreements</u>. <u>Congress is too large and unwieldy to take the swift and decisive action required</u> in wartime. Our Framers replaced the Articles of Confederation, which had failed in the management of foreign relations because they had no single executive, with the Constitution’s single president for precisely this reason. <u>Even when it has access to the same intelligence as the executive branch, Congress’s loose, decentralized structure would paralyze American policy while foreign threats grew</u>. Congress has no political incentive to mount and see through its own wartime policy. Members of Congress, who are interested in keeping their seats at the next election, do not want to take stands on controversial issues where the future is uncertain. They will avoid like the plague any vote that will anger large segments of the electorate. They prefer that the president take the political risks and be held accountable for failure. Congress is too large and unwieldy to take the swift and decisive action required in wartime. Congress’s track record when it has opposed presidential leadership has not been a happy one. Perhaps the most telling example was the Senate’s rejection of the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I. Congress’s isolationist urge kept the United States out of Europe at a time when democracies fell and Fascism grew in their place. Even as Europe and Asia plunged into war, Congress passed the Neutrality Acts designed to keep the United States out of the conflict. President Franklin Roosevelt violated those laws to help the Allies and draw the nation into war against the Axis. <u>While pro-Congress critics worry about a president’s foreign adventurism, the real threat to our national security could come from <strong>inaction and isolationism</u></strong>. Many point to the Vietnam War as an example of the faults of the “imperial presidency.” Vietnam, however, could not have continued without the consistent support of Congress in raising a large military and paying for hostilities. And Vietnam ushered in a period of congressional dominance that witnessed American setbacks in the Cold War and the passage of <u>the</u> ineffectual <u><mark>War Powers</mark> Resolution</u>. Congress passed the resolution in 1973 over President Richard Nixon’s veto, and no president has ever accepted the constitutionality of its 60-day limit on the use of troops abroad. <u><strong><mark>No</mark> federal <mark>court has ever upheld</mark> the resolution</u></strong>. <u>Even <strong><mark>Congress has never enforced it</u></strong></mark>. Despite the record of practice and the Constitution’s institutional design, critics nevertheless argue that we should radically remake the American way of war. They typically base their claim on Congress’s power to “declare war.” But these observers read the 18th-century constitutional text through a modern lens by interpreting “declare war” to mean “start war.” When the Constitution was written, however, a declaration of war served diplomatic notice about a change in legal relations between nations. It had little to do with launching hostilities. In the century before the Constitution, for example, Great Britain — where the Framers got the idea of declaring war — fought numerous major conflicts but declared war only once beforehand. Our Constitution sets out specific procedures for passing laws, appointing officers, and making treaties. There are none for waging war because the Framers expected the president and Congress to struggle over war through the national political process. In fact, other parts of the Constitution, properly read, support this reading. Article I, Section 10, for example, declares that the states shall not “engage” in war “without the consent of Congress” unless “actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.” This provision creates exactly the limits desired by anti-war critics, complete with an exception for self-defense. If the Framers had wanted to require congressional permission before the president could wage war, they simply could have repeated this provision and applied it to the executive. Presidents, of course, do not have complete freedom to take the nation to war. Congress has ample powers to control presidential policy, if it wants to. Only Congress can raise the military, which gives it the power to block, delay, or modify war plans. Before 1945, the United States had such a small peacetime military that presidents who started a war would have to go hat in hand to Congress to build an army to fight it. Since World War II, Congress has authorized and funded our large standing military, one primarily designed to conduct offensive, not defensive, operations (as we learned all too tragically on 9/11) and to swiftly project power worldwide. If Congress wanted to discourage presidential initiative in war, it could build a smaller, less offense-minded military. A radical change in the system for making war might appease critics of presidential power. But it could also seriously threaten American national security. Congress’s check on the presidency lies not just in the long-term raising of the military. It can also block any immediate armed conflict through the power of the purse. If Congress feels it has been misled in authorizing war, or it disagrees with the president’s decisions, all it need do is cut off funds, either all at once or gradually. It can reduce the size of the military, shrink or eliminate units, or freeze supplies. Using the power of the purse does not even require affirmative congressional action. Congress can just sit on its hands and refuse to pass a law funding the latest presidential adventure, and the war will end quickly. Even the Kosovo war, which lasted little more than two months and involved no ground troops, required special funding legislation. The Framers expected Congress’s power of the purse to serve as the primary check on presidential war. During the 1788 Virginia ratifying convention. Patrick Henry attacked the Constitution for failing to limit executive militarism. James Madison responded: “The sword is in the hands of the British king; the purse is in the hands of the Parliament. It is so in America, as far as any analogy can exist.” Congress ended America’s involvement in Vietnam by cutting off all funds for the war. <u>Our Constitution has succeeded because it <strong>favors swift presidential action</strong> in war, later checked by Congress’s funding power</u>. If a president continues to wage war without congressional authorization, as in Libya, Kosovo, or Korea, it is only because Congress has chosen not to exercise its easy check. We should not confuse a desire to escape political responsibility for a defect in the Constitution. <u><mark>A radical change in the system</u></mark> for making war <u>might appease critics of presidential power. But it <mark>could</mark> also <strong><mark>seriously threaten</mark> American <mark>national security</u></strong></mark>. <u>In order <mark>to</mark> forestall another 9/11 attack, or <mark>take advantage of a <strong>window of opportunity</strong> to strike</mark> <strong>terrorists</strong> or <strong>rogue nations</strong>, <mark>the executive</mark> branch <mark>needs <strong>flexibility</u></strong></mark>. It is not hard to think of situations where congressional consent cannot be obtained in time to act. <u>Time for congressional <mark>deliberation</mark>, which <mark>can lead to <strong>passivity</mark> and isolation and not smarter decisions</strong>, will <strong>come <mark>at the price of speed and secrecy</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>The</mark> Constitution creates a <mark>presidency</mark> that <mark>can <strong>respond </mark>forcefully</strong> <mark>to prevent</mark> serious threats to our national security</u>. Presidents can take the initiative, and Congress can use its funding power to check presidents. Instead of demanding a legalistic process to begin war, the Framers left war to politics. <u>As we confront the <strong>new challenges</strong> of <strong><mark>terrorism</strong>, <strong>rogue nations</strong>, and <strong>WMD</mark> <mark>prolif</mark>eration</strong>, now is not the time to introduce sweeping, untested changes</u> in the way we make war.</p>

1NC

Adv 2---1NC

./documents/hspolicy21/Westminster/SaYa/Westminster-Sayers-Yao-Neg-Kentucky-Semis.docx

N

Kentucky

Semis

Eagan LS

Panel

1AC - Ag Subsidies 1NC - T Protection States CP Politics DA Settler Colonialism K Uncooperative Federalism CP Steal the Funding CP Exec Flex turn 2NC - T Protection States Case 1NR - Exec Flex Turn 2NR - T Protection

hspolicy21/Westminster/SaYa/Westminster-Sayers-Yao-Neg-Kentucky-Semis.docx

SaYa

Westminster SaYa

Be.....

Sa.....

Br.....

Ya.....

Westminster

Westminster

GA

hspolicy21

HS Policy 2021-22

cx

hs

Even a small war causes extinction.

Cribb 17

Cribb 17 Julian Cribb, Emeritus Faculty, Australian National University and Fellow, Australian Academy of Technology, Science and Engineering, SURVIVING THE 21ST CENTURY: HUMANITY’S TEN GREAT CHALLENGES AND HOW WE CAN OVERCOME THEM, Switzerland: Springer International, 2017, p. 67-68.

even a limited conflict among lesser actors in the arms race, for example between Pakistan and India could still imperil the entire world things will spiral out of control as communications fail and panic spreads, mushrooming into general conflict over a much wider region. Firestorms throw up a shocking amount of smoke it would block out sunlight, chilling the planet enough to cause crop-killing frosts first round effects of the war would be worldwide panic and financial collapse as food supplies give out . A billion would perish within weeks, and billions more over the months nations, on this calculus, have the tools to terminate civilisation, and possibly the human species

even a limited conflict between Pakistan and India could imperil the world things will spiral out of control as communications fail and panic spreads mushrooming into general conflict over a much wider region Firestorms throw up smoke it would block sunlight, chilling the planet enough to cause crop-killing frosts first round effects would be worldwide panic and financial collapse as food supplies give out A billion would perish within weeks, and billions more over the months nations have the tools to terminate the human species

How large a nuclear release is required to precipitate a nuclear winter is still subject to technical debate, but with the greatly improved models developed for climate science, recent estimates suggest as few as 50 Hiroshima-sized bombs (15 kilotonnes each) would do it—or the use of only one weapon in every 200 from the global nuclear arsenal (Robock 2009 ). This puts a very different complexion on the contemporary risks facing humanity. First, it suggests that even a limited conflict among lesser actors in the arms race, for example between Pakistan and India, India and China or Israel and Iran, and involving mainly the use of “battlefield” nukes could still imperil the entire world. In Lights Out: how it all ends , nuclear experts Alan Robock and Brian Toon examined the effects of a regional war (Robock and Toon 2012 ). To begin with, they argue, a ‘limited nuclear war’ is highly unlikely as, with the release of a handful of battlefield nukes, things will very quickly spiral out of control as communications fail and panic spreads, mushrooming into a more general conflict involving dozens of weapons spread over a much wider region. Firestorms in the megacities would throw up a shocking amount of smoke, ash and dust—around 70 billion tonnes is the estimate for an India/Pakistan clash. Running this through climate models they found it would block out sunlight, chilling the planet by an average 1.25° for up to 10 years—enough to cause crop-killing frosts , even in midsummer. This would sharply reduce and in some regions eliminate farm production for several years. Normal world grain stocks are sufficient to feed humanity for only about 2–3 months, so one of the first round effects of the war would be worldwide panic and financial collapse as food supplies give out and grain prices soar astronomically. A billion people living on the margins of hunger would probably perish within weeks, and billions more over the ensuing months. In the early twenty-first century at least eight nations, on this calculus, have the tools to terminate civilisation, and possibly the human species, on their own, while at least two more aspire to the power to do so. Meanwhile the shadow of possible nuclear and chemical terrorism, and their consequences, is lengthening.

<h4><strong>Even a <u>small war</u> causes extinction.</h4><p><u>Cribb 17</u></strong> Julian Cribb, Emeritus Faculty, Australian National University and Fellow, Australian Academy of Technology, Science and Engineering, SURVIVING THE 21ST CENTURY: HUMANITY’S TEN GREAT CHALLENGES AND HOW WE CAN OVERCOME THEM, Switzerland: Springer International, 2017, p. 67-68.</p><p>How large a nuclear release is required to precipitate a nuclear winter is still subject to technical debate, but with the greatly improved models developed for climate science, recent estimates suggest as few as 50 Hiroshima-sized bombs (15 kilotonnes each) would do it—or the use of only one weapon in every 200 from the global nuclear arsenal (Robock 2009 ). This puts a very different complexion on the contemporary risks facing humanity. First, it suggests that<u><strong> <mark>even a limited conflict</mark> among lesser actors in the arms race, for example <mark>between Pakistan and India</u></strong></mark>, India and China or Israel and Iran, and involving mainly the use of “battlefield” nukes<u><strong> <mark>could</mark> still <mark>imperil the </mark>entire<mark> world</u></strong></mark>. In Lights Out: how it all ends , nuclear experts Alan Robock and Brian Toon examined the effects of a regional war (Robock and Toon 2012 ). To begin with, they argue, a ‘limited nuclear war’ is highly unlikely as, with the release of a handful of battlefield nukes,<u><strong> <mark>things will </u></strong></mark>very quickly <u><strong><mark>spiral out of control as communications fail and panic spreads</mark>, <mark>mushrooming into </u></strong></mark>a<u><strong><mark> </u></strong></mark>more <u><strong><mark>general conflict</mark> </u></strong>involving dozens of weapons spread<u><strong><mark> over a much wider region</mark>. <mark>Firestorms</mark> </u></strong>in the megacities would<u><strong><mark> throw up</mark> a shocking amount of <mark>smoke</u></strong></mark>, ash and dust—around 70 billion tonnes is the estimate for an India/Pakistan clash. Running this through climate models they found <u><strong><mark>it would block </mark>out<mark> sunlight, chilling the planet</u></strong></mark> by an average 1.25° for up to 10 years—<u><strong><mark>enough to cause crop-killing frosts</u></strong></mark> , even in midsummer. This would sharply reduce and in some regions eliminate farm production for several years. Normal world grain stocks are sufficient to feed humanity for only about 2–3 months, so one of the<u><strong><mark> first round effects</mark> of the war<mark> would be worldwide panic and financial collapse as food supplies</mark> <mark>give out </u></strong></mark>and grain prices soar astronomically<u><strong>. <mark>A billion </u></strong></mark>people living on the margins of hunger<u><strong> <mark>would</mark> </u></strong>probably <u><strong><mark>perish within weeks, and billions more over the </u></strong></mark>ensuing <u><strong><mark>months</u></strong></mark>. In the early twenty-first century at least eight<u><strong> <mark>nations</mark>, on this calculus, <mark>have the tools to terminate </mark>civilisation, and possibly <mark>the human species</u></strong></mark>, on their own, while at least two more aspire to the power to do so. Meanwhile the shadow of possible nuclear and chemical terrorism, and their consequences, is lengthening. </p>

1AC

NFU Aff – Policy v14

Norms

./documents/ndtceda18/Minnesota/RaLa/Minnesota-Rao-Lamet-Aff-7%20-%20Navy-Round2.docx

A

7 - Navy

2

George Mason LR

Judd Kimball

1AC - NFU 2NR - Russia DA Shift DA Allies DA

ndtceda18/Minnesota/RaLa/Minnesota-Rao-Lamet-Aff-7%20-%20Navy-Round2.docx

RaLa

Minnesota RaLa

Br.....

Ra.....

Jo.....

La.....

Minnesota

Minnesota

ndtceda18

NDT/CEDA 2018-19

cx

college

Nuclear war causes extinction

Ward 18 https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/19/17873822/nuclear-war-weapons-bombs-how-kill

Alex Ward 18. Staff writer @ Vox covering international security and defense issues, co-host of Vox's "Worldly" podcast, formerly an associate director in the Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security where he worked on military issues and US foreign policy, wrote the #NatSec2016 newsletter for War on the Rocks. 12-26-18. “This is exactly how a nuclear war would kill you.” Vox. https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/19/17873822/nuclear-war-weapons-bombs-how-kill

. That means Trump could theoretically decide to launch a nuclear strike before an adversary’s nukes go off in America. In the heat of battle, the US military might detect an incoming nuclear attack from No Ko and the president could decide to respond with a similar strike. potential nuclear conflict between the U S and No Ko worries most experts Trump and Kim spent most of 2017 threatening to bomb each other with nuclear weapons there remains a genuine fear — perhaps slightly allayed now following Washington and Pyongyang’s diplomatic thaw — that the leaders might escalate their public squabble into a nuclear conflict. “a full-blown war with North Korea wouldn’t be as bad as you think. It would be much, much worse millions would die the US would likely have to send in around 200,000 troops to destroy Kim’s nuclear arsenal. Seoul would already — lie in ruins due to North Korea’s large artillery capabilities. Kim would launch nukes at the U S Washington would almost certainly respond in kind, leading to one of the worst wars in world history the roughly 140-kiloton explosive North Korea tested in September 2017 in the heart of Washington, DC 220,000 would die from this one attack alone while another 450,000 would sustain injuries It’s very likely that North Korea wouldn’t launch just one bomb, but multiple at DC and likely some at New York City, the West Coast, and possibly US military bases in Guam and/or Hawaii. Radiation poisoning is a horrible way to die It’s worth reiterating that all of the above are estimates for one strike on one location. An actual nuclear war would have much wider and more devastating consequences. And if that war spiraled out of control, the effects after the conflict would be much worse than the attacks themselves It’s possible you have an idea of what a post-nuclear hellscape looks like. After all, disaster movies are obsessed with that kind of world. But scientists and other nuclear experts care deeply about this issue too — and their research shows the movies may be too optimistic. The most devastating long-term effects of a nuclear war actually come down to the black smoke that attacks produce In a nuclear war, cities and industrial areas would be targeted, thereby producing tons of smoke as they burn. Some of that smoke would make it into the stratosphere — above the weather — where it would stay for years because there’s no rain to wash it out. That smoke would expand around the world as it heats up, blocking out sunlight over much of Earth. As a result, the world would experience colder temperatures and less precipitation, depleting much of the globe’s agricultural output. That, potentially, would lead to widespread famine in a matter of years If the scenario came to pass “almost everybody on the planet would die.”

Trump could theoretically launch before nukes go off In the heat of battle, the military might detect an attack the U S and No Ko worries experts leaders might escalate squabble into nuclear conflict millions would die Seoul in ruins Kim would launch nukes leading to the worst wars in history in DC 220,000 would die from one attack alone if that war spiraled the effects would be much worse black smoke would block out sunlight experience cold depleting ag lead to widespread famine “almost everybody on the planet would die.”

But the United States has consistently refused to adopt a “no first use” policy — a policy not to be the first one in a conflict to use a nuclear weapon, and to use them only if the other side uses them first. That means Trump could theoretically decide to launch a nuclear strike before an adversary’s nukes go off in America. In the heat of battle, the US military might detect an incoming nuclear attack from North Korea and the president could decide to respond with a similar strike. Either way, the president is the one who ultimately decides to put the process of launching a nuclear strike in motion — but he still has a few steps to complete. 2) A US military officer opens the “football” Once the president has decided the situation requires a nuclear strike, the military officer who is always by the president’s side opens the “football.” The leather-clad case contains an outline of the nuclear options available to the president — including possible targets, like military installations or cities, that the US’s roughly 800 nuclear weapons ready to launch within minutes can hit — and instructions for contacting US military commanders and giving them orders to launch the missiles with warheads on them. 3) Trump talks with military and civilian advisers The president is the sole decision-maker, but he would consult with civilian and military advisers before he issues the order to launch a nuclear weapon. A key person Trump must talk to is the Pentagon’s deputy director of operations in charge of the National Military Command Center, or “war room,” the heart of the Defense Department that directs nuclear command and control. The president can include whomever else he wants in the conversation. He would almost certainly consult Gen. John Hyten, commander of US Strategic Command, since Hyten is responsible for knowing what the US can hit with its nuclear weapons. But Trump would likely also include Defense Secretary James Mattis, National Security Adviser John Bolton, and Gen. Joseph Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in that conversation as well. The chat also doesn’t have to be held in the White House’s Situation Room; it can happen anywhere over a secured phone line. If any of the advisers felt such an attack would be illegal — like if Trump simply wanted to nuke Pyongyang despite no apparent threat — they could advise the president against going ahead with the strike. Last November, Hyten publicly said he wouldn’t accept an illegal order from Trump to launch a nuclear attack. “He’ll tell me what to do, and if it’s illegal, guess what’s going to happen?” Hyten told an audience at the Halifax International Security Forum last year. “I’m gonna say, ‘Mr. President, that’s illegal.’” He continued by outlining what the military could consider an illegal order: if a nuclear attack isn’t proportional to the actual threat, for instance, or if the attack would cause unnecessary suffering. However, what does and doesn’t constitute a “legal” order is still up for debate and was the focus of a congressional hearing last November. Either way, if Hyten refused to follow the order, Trump could fire him and replace him with someone who would carry it out. 4) The president gives the official order to strike After the conversation, a senior officer in the “war room” has to formally verify that the command is coming from the president. The officers recite a code — “Bravo Charlie,” for example — and the president must then respond with a code printed on the “biscuit,” the card with the codes on it. Then members of the “war room” communicate with the people who will initiate and launch the attack. Depending on the plan chosen by the president, the command will go to US crews operating the submarines carrying nuclear missiles, warplanes that can drop nuclear bombs, or troops overseeing intercontinental ballistic missiles on land. 5) Launch crews prepare to attack The launch crews receive the plan and prepare for attack. This involves unlocking various safes, entering a series of codes, and turning keys to launch the missiles. Crews must “execute the order, not question it,” Cirincione told Maizland. 6) Missiles fly toward the enemy It could take as little as five minutes for intercontinental ballistic missiles to launch from the time the president officially orders a strike. Missiles launched from submarines take about 15 minutes. And then the president waits to see if they hit their target. The three main risks of nuclear war — and one wild card Those that have nuclear weapons, many have argued, will never use them. The destruction and human devastation is so unimaginable that it’s hard to believe a world leader will launch them again, they say. But no one can guarantee they won’t be used at least once more — and that possibility keeps most nuclear experts up at night. They disagree wildly as to what the next nuclear use might look like or how it might happen, but they almost unanimously cite the same three risks. 1) US vs. North Korea war The potential nuclear conflict between the United States and North Korea worries most experts — and likely most people on Earth. That makes sense: Trump and Kim, the North Korean premier, spent most of 2017 threatening to bomb each other with nuclear weapons. Kim actually gained a missile capable enough of reaching the entirety of the United States, although questions remain about whether it could make it all the way with a warhead on top and detonate. Still, there remains a genuine fear — perhaps slightly allayed now following Washington and Pyongyang’s diplomatic thaw — that the leaders might escalate their public squabble into a nuclear conflict. In February, Yochi Dreazen wrote for Vox that “a full-blown war with North Korea wouldn’t be as bad as you think. It would be much, much worse,” in part because “millions — plural — would die.” As Dreazen recounts, the US would likely have to send in around 200,000 troops to destroy Kim’s nuclear arsenal. Seoul, South Korea’s capital, would soon — if not already — lie in ruins due to North Korea’s large artillery capabilities. None of that may even be the worst part: Bruce Klingner, a 20-year veteran of the CIA who spent years studying North Korea, told me that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein had stood by in 2002 as the US methodically built up the forces it used to invade the country — and oust Hussein — the following year. He said there was little chance that Kim would follow in Hussein’s footsteps and patiently allow the Pentagon to deploy the troops and equipment it would need for a full-on war with North Korea. “The conventional wisdom used to be that North Korea would use only nuclear weapons as part of a last gasp, twilight of the gods, pull the temple down upon themselves kind of move,” said Klingner, who now works for the conservative Heritage Foundation. “But we have to prepare for the real possibility that Kim would use nuclear weapons in the early stages of a conflict, not the latter ones.” In effect, any attempt to overthrow the Kim regime would prompt North Korea to launch nukes at the United States. Washington would almost certainly respond in kind, leading to one of the worst wars in world history. 2) US vs. Russia war Few experts discounted the idea that the US and Russia could yet engage in a nuclear war despite a decades-long standoff. After all, they’ve come close a few times. Here are just two examples: In September 1983, a missile attack system made it seem like the US had launched weapons at the Soviet Union. One man, Soviet Lt. Col. Stanislav Petrov, decided it was a false alarm and didn’t report the alert. Had he done so, Moscow likely would’ve responded with an actual nuclear strike. Stanislav Petrov, a former Soviet military officer known in the West as “The man who saved the world’’ for his role in averting a nuclear war over a false missile alarm, died in May, 2015 at age 77. Stanislav Petrov, a former Soviet military officer known in the West as “The man who saved the world’’ for his role in averting a nuclear war over a false missile alarm, died in May 2015 at age 77. Pavel Golovkin/AP Two months later, a too-real NATO war game — Able Archer 83 — made the Soviets believe Western forces were preparing for an actual attack. Moscow put its nuclear arsenal on high alert, but ultimately, neither side came to nuclear blows. Today, two main reasons explain why a US-Russia nuclear fight is a major concern. The first is the most obvious: Moscow just has so many nuclear weapons. Russia is the only country that could match the US bomb-for-bomb in any conflict. The longer Moscow has its weapons, the thinking goes, the higher the chance it uses them on the US — or vice versa. The second reason is the most troublesome: Washington and Moscow may be on a collision course. Russia is expanding further into Europe and encroaching on NATO territory. There’s even fear that Putin might authorize an invasion of a Baltic country that once was a part of the Soviet Union but is now in NATO. If that happens, the US would be treaty-bound to defend the Baltic country, almost assuredly setting up a shooting war with Moscow. Experts disagree on what would happen next. Some, including the Trump administration, claim Russia would use nuclear weapons early in a fight as a way to “escalate to deescalate” — do something so brash at the start of a conflict that it has to end before it gets even worse. Others say Russia would use the weapons only if its forces are on the brink of defeat. Magnets depicting Russian President Putin and President Trump on sale in Helsnki, Finland. Magnets depicting Russian President Putin and President Trump on sale in Helsnki, Finland. Alexander Demianchuk\TASS via Getty Images But Olga Oliker and Andrey Baklitskiy, experts on Russia’s nuclear strategy, wrote at War on the Rocks in February that Moscow’s “military doctrine clearly states that nuclear weapons will be used only in response to an adversary using nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction,” or if the country’s survival is in doubt. In other words, they say Russia would only use nukes in retaliation or to avoid certain extinction. Washington, of course, would likely respond with its own nuclear strikes after Moscow dropped its bombs. At that point, they’d be in a full-blown nuclear war with the potential to destroy each other and much of the world (more on that below). 3) India vs. Pakistan war India and Pakistan have gone to war four times since 1947, when Britain partitioned what had been a single colony into Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan. The worry today, though, is that a fifth conflict could go nuclear. Protesters hurl stones towards police and paramilitary men during clashes on the outskirts of Srinagar, India, on October 16, 2018. Protesters hurl stones towards police and paramilitary men during clashes on the outskirts of Srinagar, India, on October 16, 2018. Waseem Andrabi/Hindustan Times via Getty Images After decades of testing, India officially became a nuclear power in 1998. Islamabad, which had started a uranium enrichment program in the 1970s, soon joined New Delhi in the nuclear club. Two of their fights — the 1999 Kargil War and the 2001-’02 Twin Peaks Crisis — happened with fully functioning nuclear arsenals, but ultimately, neither country chose to use them. But the opportunity keeps presenting itself. Each side claims the other has violated an ongoing ceasefire in the contested, but India-administered, Kashmir region. The region continues to be roiled by violence; for instance, six people were killed in separate instances on September 27. The dispute over Kashmir is a key reason for current India-Pakistan tensions — and has the potential to spiral out of control. Javier Zarracina/Vox Some fear that India and Pakistan may reach for the proverbial nuclear button sooner rather than later. Here’s just one reason why, according to an April report by Tom Hundley for Vox: The Pakistan navy is likely to soon place nuclear-tipped cruise missiles on up to three of its five French-built diesel-electric submarines. ... Even more disturbing, Pakistani military authorities say they are considering the possibility of putting nuclear-tipped cruise missiles on surface vessels. ... Pakistan says its decision to add nuclear weapons to its navy is a direct response to India’s August 2016 deployment of its first nuclear submarine, the Arihant. A second, even more advanced Indian nuclear submarine, the Arighat, began sea trials last November, and four more boats are scheduled to join the fleet by 2025. That will give India a complete “nuclear triad,” which means the country will have the ability to deliver a nuclear strike by land-based missiles, by warplanes, and by submarines. In effect, India and Pakistan are in a nuclear arms race, and historical enemies will soon patrol dangerous waters in close proximity with nuclear weapons aboard their vessels. While there’s no real indication a fifth India-Pakistan war is on the horizon, it’s possible one flare-up puts both countries on the path to a nuclear crisis. Wild card: Trump’s temperament Cirincione, the head of the Ploughshares Fund, told me the risk of nuclear war is increasing because of one factor: Trump. “He is the greatest nuclear risk in the world, more than any person, any group, or any nation,” he said. “The policies he is pursuing are making most of our nuclear risks worse, and he is tearing down the global institutions that have reduced and restrained nuclear risks over the last few decades.” Activists marches with a model of a nuclear rocket during a demonstration against nuclear weapons on in Berlin, Germany, on November 18, 2017. About 700 demonstrators protested against the escalation of threat of nuclear attack between the US and North Ko Activists marches with a model of a nuclear rocket during a demonstration against nuclear weapons on in Berlin, Germany, on November 18, 2017. About 700 demonstrators protested against the escalation of threat of nuclear attack between the US and North Korea. Adam Berry/Getty Images Here’s what he means: The administration’s Nuclear Posture Review, released in February, lowered the threshold for dropping a bomb on an enemy. Basically, the US said that it would launch low-yield nuclear weapons — smaller, less deadly bombs — in response to nonnuclear strikes, such as a major cyberattack. That was in contrast with previous US administrations, which said they would respond with a nuke only in the event of the most egregious threats against the US, like the possible use of a biological weapon. The document also calls for more, smaller weapons on submarines and other platforms to attack enemies. Many experts worry that having tinier nukes makes them more usable, thereby increasing the chance of a skirmish turning into a full-blown nuclear war. (Think, for example, of the US-China trade war escalating to the point that Trump thinks his only option is to launch a smaller nuke, or how Trump could respond to Beijing after a devastating cyberattack on US infrastructure.) Plus, increasing the arsenal in this way would partially undo decades of the US’s work to stop nuclear proliferation around the world. Some experts, like Georgetown’s Kroenig, say having smaller tactical weapons is actually a good idea. Our current arsenal, which prioritizes older and bigger nukes, leads adversaries to think we would never use it. Having smaller bombs that America might use, then, makes the chance of a nuclear conflict less likely. “It gives us more options to threaten that limited response,” Kroenig told me. “We raise the bar with these lower-yield weapons.” But the Trump risk may have less to do with what kinds of bombs he has and more to do with his temperament. Take his tweet from January 2 toward the end of his spat with Kim Jong Un, the North Korean leader: Donald J. Trump ✔ @realDonaldTrump North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un just stated that the “Nuclear Button is on his desk at all times.” Will someone from his depleted and food starved regime please inform him that I too have a Nuclear Button, but it is a much bigger & more powerful one than his, and my Button works! 475K 7:49 PM - Jan 2, 2018 Twitter Ads info and privacy 324K people are talking about this While tensions with North Korea were high early on in Trump’s presidency, he has yet to face a situation, like his predecessors did, where it seemed nuclear war was likely. The 13-day Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, where the Soviet Union had secretly placed missiles in Cuba — just 90 miles from the US mainland — comes to mind. Members of President John F. Kennedy’s team, especially his military advisers, called for airstrikes on Cuba and even an invasion. But Kennedy decided to set up a blockade of the island and try to work out a diplomatic settlement with the Soviets, in part because a military confrontation might turn nuclear. Ultimately, the situation ended when they agreed on a deal: The Soviets would withdraw the missiles from the island, and the US would take out its missiles in Turkey. Before that conclusion, both sides came as close to nuclear war as ever. Customers gather to watch President John F. Kennedy as he delivers a televised address to the nation on the subject of the Cuban Missile Crisis, on October 22, 1962. Customers gather to watch President John F. Kennedy as he delivers a televised address to the nation on the subject of the Cuban Missile Crisis, on October 22, 1962. Ralph Crane/The LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images How would Trump handle himself in a similar situation? Would he resist the urges of some in his military brass to strike an enemy — perhaps with a lower-yield nuke — or would he simply tweet out a threat in a hair-trigger moment? The fact is we don’t know — but what we do know about Trump makes his demeanor in such a situation a potential, even if very small, nuclear risk. Here’s what happens in a nuclear attack The theory around whether someone might drop a nuclear bomb takes away from the most serious matter in these discussions: the human and physical toll. Simply put, a nuclear strike of any magnitude would unleash suffering on a scale not seen since World War II. And with the advances in nuclear technology since then, it’s possible the devastation of the next nuclear strike would be far, far worse. It’s hard to picture what the effect of a modern-day nuclear attack would actually look like. But Wellerstein, the nuclear historian, created a website called Nukemap that allows users to “drop” a specific bomb — say, the roughly 140-kiloton explosive North Korea tested in September 2017 — on any target. So I did just that, detonating that North Korean device on the Capitol building in the heart of Washington, DC — and, well, see for yourself: Christina Animashaun/Vox Roughly 220,000 people would die from this one attack alone, according to the Nukemap estimate, while another 450,000 would sustain injuries. By comparison, America’s two nuclear attacks on Japan in 1945 killed and injured a total of around 200,000 people (granted, Hiroshima and Nagasaki had smaller populations than the Washington metro area). It’s very likely that North Korea wouldn’t launch just one bomb, but multiple at DC and likely some at New York City, the West Coast, and possibly US military bases in Guam and/or Hawaii. But for simplicity’s sake, let’s focus on the effects of this one horrible attack. The center yellow circle is the fireball radius — that is, the mushroom cloud — which would extend out about 0.25 square miles. Those within the green circle, approximately a 1.2-square-mile area, would face the heaviest dose of radiation. “Without medical treatment, there can be expected between 50% and 90% mortality from acute effects alone. Dying takes between several hours and several weeks,” according to the website. Radiation poisoning is a horrible way to die. Here are just some of the symptoms people sick with radiation get: Nausea and vomiting Spontaneous bleeding Diarrhea, sometimes bloody Severely burnt skin that may peel off The dark grey circle in the middle is where a shock wave does a lot of damage. In that 17-square-mile area, the bomb would flatten residential buildings, certainly killing people in or near them. Debris and fire would be everywhere. People in the bigger yellow circle, a 33.5-square-mile area, would receive third-degree burns. “There’s a bright flash of light,” Brian Toon, a scientist and expert on nuclear disasters at the University of Colorado Boulder, told me about when the bomb goes off. Those exposed to the light, which would stretch for miles, would get those burns if their skin were exposed. The light would also “easily ignite fires with flammable objects like leaves, twigs, paper, or your clothing,” he added. The victims may not feel much pain, however, because the burn will destroy pain nerves. Still, some will suffer major scarring or have the inability to use certain limbs, and others might require amputation, according to Wellerstein’s site. A mother tends her injured child, a victim of the atomic bomb blast at Hiroshima. A mother tends her injured child, a victim of the atomic bomb blast at Hiroshima. Keystone/Getty Images The biggest circle encompasses the near entirety of the air-blast zone: a 134-square-mile area. People can still die, or at least receive severe injuries, in that location. The blast would break windows, and those standing near the glass might be killed by shards, or at least shed blood from myriad cuts. Those who survive the bombing and its effects will have to walk through burning rubble and pass lifeless, charred bodies to reach safety. Some of them will ultimately survive, but others will succumb to sustained injuries or radiation. The wind, meanwhile, will carry the irradiated debris and objects — known as fallout because they drop from the sky — far outside the blast zone and sicken countless others. As for Washington, it will likely take decades and billions of dollars not only to rebuild the city but clean it of radiation entirely. It’s worth reiterating that all of the above are estimates for one strike on one location. An actual nuclear war would have much wider and more devastating consequences. And if that war spiraled out of control, the effects after the conflict would be much worse than the attacks themselves — and change the course of human history. “Almost everybody on the planet would die” It’s possible you have an idea of what a post-nuclear hellscape looks like. After all, disaster movies are obsessed with that kind of world. But scientists and other nuclear experts care deeply about this issue too — and their research shows the movies may be too optimistic. Alan Robock, an environmental sciences professor at Rutgers University, has spent decades trying to understand what a nuclear war would do to the planet. The sum of his work, along with other colleagues’, is based on economic, scientific, and agricultural models. Here’s what he found: The most devastating long-term effects of a nuclear war actually come down to the black smoke, along with the dust and particulates in the air, that attacks produce. People walking through the ruins of Hiroshima in the weeks following the atomic bomb blast. People walking through the ruins of Hiroshima in the weeks following the atomic bomb blast. Bernard Hoffman/The LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images In a nuclear war, cities and industrial areas would be targeted, thereby producing tons of smoke as they burn. Some of that smoke would make it into the stratosphere — above the weather — where it would stay for years because there’s no rain to wash it out. That smoke would expand around the world as it heats up, blocking out sunlight over much of Earth. As a result, the world would experience colder temperatures and less precipitation, depleting much of the globe’s agricultural output. That, potentially, would lead to widespread famine in a matter of years. The impact on the world, however, depends on the amount of rising smoke. While scientists’ models and estimates vary, it’s believed that around 5 million to 50 millions tons of black smoke could lead to a so-called “nuclear autumn,” while 50 million to 150 millions tons of black smoke might plunge the world into a “nuclear winter.” If the latter scenario came to pass, Robock told me, “almost everybody on the planet would die.”

<h4><strong>Nuclear war causes extinction</h4><p></strong>Alex <strong>Ward 18</strong>. Staff writer @ Vox covering international security and defense issues, co-host of Vox's "Worldly" podcast, formerly an associate director in the Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security where he worked on military issues and US foreign policy, wrote the #NatSec2016 newsletter for War on the Rocks. 12-26-18. “This is exactly how a nuclear war would kill you.” Vox. <u><strong>https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/19/17873822/nuclear-war-weapons-bombs-how-kill</p><p></u></strong>But the United States has consistently refused to adopt a “no first use” policy — a policy not to be the first one in a conflict to use a nuclear weapon, and to use them only if the other side uses them first<u>. That means <mark>Trump</mark> <strong><mark>could theoretically</u></strong></mark> <u>decide to <mark>launch</mark> a nuclear strike <strong><mark>before</mark> an adversary’s <mark>nukes go off</mark> in America</strong>. <mark>In the <strong>heat of battle</strong>, the</mark> US <mark>military might <strong>detect</strong> an</mark> incoming nuclear <mark>attack</mark> from</u> <u><strong>No</u></strong>rth <u><strong>Ko</u></strong>rea <u>and the president could <strong>decide to respond with a similar strike. </u></strong>Either way, the president is the one who ultimately decides to put the process of launching a nuclear strike in motion — but he still has a few steps to complete. 2) A US military officer opens the “football” Once the president has decided the situation requires a nuclear strike, the military officer who is always by the president’s side opens the “football.” The leather-clad case contains an outline of the nuclear options available to the president — including possible targets, like military installations or cities, that the US’s roughly 800 nuclear weapons ready to launch within minutes can hit — and instructions for contacting US military commanders and giving them orders to launch the missiles with warheads on them. 3) Trump talks with military and civilian advisers The president is the sole decision-maker, but he would consult with civilian and military advisers before he issues the order to launch a nuclear weapon. A key person Trump must talk to is the Pentagon’s deputy director of operations in charge of the National Military Command Center, or “war room,” the heart of the Defense Department that directs nuclear command and control. The president can include whomever else he wants in the conversation. He would almost certainly consult Gen. John Hyten, commander of US Strategic Command, since Hyten is responsible for knowing what the US can hit with its nuclear weapons. But Trump would likely also include Defense Secretary James Mattis, National Security Adviser John Bolton, and Gen. Joseph Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in that conversation as well. The chat also doesn’t have to be held in the White House’s Situation Room; it can happen anywhere over a secured phone line. If any of the advisers felt such an attack would be illegal — like if Trump simply wanted to nuke Pyongyang despite no apparent threat — they could advise the president against going ahead with the strike. Last November, Hyten publicly said he wouldn’t accept an illegal order from Trump to launch a nuclear attack. “He’ll tell me what to do, and if it’s illegal, guess what’s going to happen?” Hyten told an audience at the Halifax International Security Forum last year. “I’m gonna say, ‘Mr. President, that’s illegal.’” He continued by outlining what the military could consider an illegal order: if a nuclear attack isn’t proportional to the actual threat, for instance, or if the attack would cause unnecessary suffering. However, what does and doesn’t constitute a “legal” order is still up for debate and was the focus of a congressional hearing last November. Either way, if Hyten refused to follow the order, Trump could fire him and replace him with someone who would carry it out. 4) The president gives the official order to strike After the conversation, a senior officer in the “war room” has to formally verify that the command is coming from the president. The officers recite a code — “Bravo Charlie,” for example — and the president must then respond with a code printed on the “biscuit,” the card with the codes on it. Then members of the “war room” communicate with the people who will initiate and launch the attack. Depending on the plan chosen by the president, the command will go to US crews operating the submarines carrying nuclear missiles, warplanes that can drop nuclear bombs, or troops overseeing intercontinental ballistic missiles on land. 5) Launch crews prepare to attack The launch crews receive the plan and prepare for attack. This involves unlocking various safes, entering a series of codes, and turning keys to launch the missiles. Crews must “execute the order, not question it,” Cirincione told Maizland. 6) Missiles fly toward the enemy It could take as little as five minutes for intercontinental ballistic missiles to launch from the time the president officially orders a strike. Missiles launched from submarines take about 15 minutes. And then the president waits to see if they hit their target. The three main risks of nuclear war — and one wild card Those that have nuclear weapons, many have argued, will never use them. The destruction and human devastation is so unimaginable that it’s hard to believe a world leader will launch them again, they say. But no one can guarantee they won’t be used at least once more — and that possibility keeps most nuclear experts up at night. They disagree wildly as to what the next nuclear use might look like or how it might happen, but they almost unanimously cite the same three risks. 1) US vs. North Korea war The <u>potential nuclear conflict between <mark>the</u> <u><strong>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><mark>and</u> <u><strong>No</u></strong></mark>rth <u><strong><mark>Ko</u></strong></mark>rea <u><strong><mark>worries</mark> most <mark>experts</u></strong></mark> — and likely most people on Earth. That makes sense: <u>Trump and Kim</u>, the North Korean premier, <u>spent most of 2017</u> <u><strong>threatening to bomb each other with nuclear weapons</u></strong>. Kim actually gained a missile capable enough of reaching the entirety of the United States, although questions remain about whether it could make it all the way with a warhead on top and detonate. Still, <u>there remains a genuine fear — perhaps slightly <strong>allayed</u></strong> <u>now following Washington and Pyongyang’s <strong>diplomatic thaw</u></strong> <u>— that the <mark>leaders might</u> <u><strong>escalate</mark> their public <mark>squabble into</mark> a <mark>nuclear conflict</mark>. </u></strong>In February, Yochi Dreazen wrote for Vox that <u>“a full-blown war with North Korea wouldn’t be as bad as you think. It would be</u> <u><strong>much, much worse</u></strong>,” in part because “<u><strong><mark>millions</u></strong></mark> — plural — <u><mark>would die</u></mark>.” As Dreazen recounts, <u>the US would likely have to send in around 200,000 troops to destroy Kim’s nuclear arsenal. <strong><mark>Seoul</u></strong></mark>, South Korea’s capital, <u>would</u> soon — if not <u><strong>already</u></strong> <u>— lie <mark>in</u> <u><strong>ruins</u></strong></mark> <u>due to North Korea’s large artillery capabilities. </u>None of that may even be the worst part: Bruce Klingner, a 20-year veteran of the CIA who spent years studying North Korea, told me that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein had stood by in 2002 as the US methodically built up the forces it used to invade the country — and oust Hussein — the following year. He said there was little chance that Kim would follow in Hussein’s footsteps and patiently allow the Pentagon to deploy the troops and equipment it would need for a full-on war with North Korea. “The conventional wisdom used to be that North Korea would use only nuclear weapons as part of a last gasp, twilight of the gods, pull the temple down upon themselves kind of move,” said Klingner, who now works for the conservative Heritage Foundation. “But we have to prepare for the real possibility that Kim would use nuclear weapons in the early stages of a conflict, not the latter ones.” In effect, any attempt to overthrow the <u><mark>Kim</u></mark> regime <u><mark>would</u></mark> prompt North Korea to <u><strong><mark>launch nukes</mark> at the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates. <u>Washington would almost certainly</u> <u><strong>respond in kind</strong>, <mark>leading to</mark> one of <mark>the</u> <u><strong>worst wars in</mark> world <mark>history</u></strong></mark>. 2) US vs. Russia war Few experts discounted the idea that the US and Russia could yet engage in a nuclear war despite a decades-long standoff. After all, they’ve come close a few times. Here are just two examples: In September 1983, a missile attack system made it seem like the US had launched weapons at the Soviet Union. One man, Soviet Lt. Col. Stanislav Petrov, decided it was a false alarm and didn’t report the alert. Had he done so, Moscow likely would’ve responded with an actual nuclear strike. Stanislav Petrov, a former Soviet military officer known in the West as “The man who saved the world’’ for his role in averting a nuclear war over a false missile alarm, died in May, 2015 at age 77. Stanislav Petrov, a former Soviet military officer known in the West as “The man who saved the world’’ for his role in averting a nuclear war over a false missile alarm, died in May 2015 at age 77. Pavel Golovkin/AP Two months later, a too-real NATO war game — Able Archer 83 — made the Soviets believe Western forces were preparing for an actual attack. Moscow put its nuclear arsenal on high alert, but ultimately, neither side came to nuclear blows. Today, two main reasons explain why a US-Russia nuclear fight is a major concern. The first is the most obvious: Moscow just has so many nuclear weapons. Russia is the only country that could match the US bomb-for-bomb in any conflict. The longer Moscow has its weapons, the thinking goes, the higher the chance it uses them on the US — or vice versa. The second reason is the most troublesome: Washington and Moscow may be on a collision course. Russia is expanding further into Europe and encroaching on NATO territory. There’s even fear that Putin might authorize an invasion of a Baltic country that once was a part of the Soviet Union but is now in NATO. If that happens, the US would be treaty-bound to defend the Baltic country, almost assuredly setting up a shooting war with Moscow. Experts disagree on what would happen next. Some, including the Trump administration, claim Russia would use nuclear weapons early in a fight as a way to “escalate to deescalate” — do something so brash at the start of a conflict that it has to end before it gets even worse. Others say Russia would use the weapons only if its forces are on the brink of defeat. Magnets depicting Russian President Putin and President Trump on sale in Helsnki, Finland. Magnets depicting Russian President Putin and President Trump on sale in Helsnki, Finland. Alexander Demianchuk\TASS via Getty Images But Olga Oliker and Andrey Baklitskiy, experts on Russia’s nuclear strategy, wrote at War on the Rocks in February that Moscow’s “military doctrine clearly states that nuclear weapons will be used only in response to an adversary using nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction,” or if the country’s survival is in doubt. In other words, they say Russia would only use nukes in retaliation or to avoid certain extinction. Washington, of course, would likely respond with its own nuclear strikes after Moscow dropped its bombs. At that point, they’d be in a full-blown nuclear war with the potential to destroy each other and much of the world (more on that below). 3) India vs. Pakistan war India and Pakistan have gone to war four times since 1947, when Britain partitioned what had been a single colony into Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan. The worry today, though, is that a fifth conflict could go nuclear. Protesters hurl stones towards police and paramilitary men during clashes on the outskirts of Srinagar, India, on October 16, 2018. Protesters hurl stones towards police and paramilitary men during clashes on the outskirts of Srinagar, India, on October 16, 2018. Waseem Andrabi/Hindustan Times via Getty Images After decades of testing, India officially became a nuclear power in 1998. Islamabad, which had started a uranium enrichment program in the 1970s, soon joined New Delhi in the nuclear club. Two of their fights — the 1999 Kargil War and the 2001-’02 Twin Peaks Crisis — happened with fully functioning nuclear arsenals, but ultimately, neither country chose to use them. But the opportunity keeps presenting itself. Each side claims the other has violated an ongoing ceasefire in the contested, but India-administered, Kashmir region. The region continues to be roiled by violence; for instance, six people were killed in separate instances on September 27. The dispute over Kashmir is a key reason for current India-Pakistan tensions — and has the potential to spiral out of control. Javier Zarracina/Vox Some fear that India and Pakistan may reach for the proverbial nuclear button sooner rather than later. Here’s just one reason why, according to an April report by Tom Hundley for Vox: The Pakistan navy is likely to soon place nuclear-tipped cruise missiles on up to three of its five French-built diesel-electric submarines. ... Even more disturbing, Pakistani military authorities say they are considering the possibility of putting nuclear-tipped cruise missiles on surface vessels. ... Pakistan says its decision to add nuclear weapons to its navy is a direct response to India’s August 2016 deployment of its first nuclear submarine, the Arihant. A second, even more advanced Indian nuclear submarine, the Arighat, began sea trials last November, and four more boats are scheduled to join the fleet by 2025. That will give India a complete “nuclear triad,” which means the country will have the ability to deliver a nuclear strike by land-based missiles, by warplanes, and by submarines. In effect, India and Pakistan are in a nuclear arms race, and historical enemies will soon patrol dangerous waters in close proximity with nuclear weapons aboard their vessels. While there’s no real indication a fifth India-Pakistan war is on the horizon, it’s possible one flare-up puts both countries on the path to a nuclear crisis. Wild card: Trump’s temperament Cirincione, the head of the Ploughshares Fund, told me the risk of nuclear war is increasing because of one factor: Trump. “He is the greatest nuclear risk in the world, more than any person, any group, or any nation,” he said. “The policies he is pursuing are making most of our nuclear risks worse, and he is tearing down the global institutions that have reduced and restrained nuclear risks over the last few decades.” Activists marches with a model of a nuclear rocket during a demonstration against nuclear weapons on in Berlin, Germany, on November 18, 2017. About 700 demonstrators protested against the escalation of threat of nuclear attack between the US and North Ko Activists marches with a model of a nuclear rocket during a demonstration against nuclear weapons on in Berlin, Germany, on November 18, 2017. About 700 demonstrators protested against the escalation of threat of nuclear attack between the US and North Korea. Adam Berry/Getty Images Here’s what he means: The administration’s Nuclear Posture Review, released in February, lowered the threshold for dropping a bomb on an enemy. Basically, the US said that it would launch low-yield nuclear weapons — smaller, less deadly bombs — in response to nonnuclear strikes, such as a major cyberattack. That was in contrast with previous US administrations, which said they would respond with a nuke only in the event of the most egregious threats against the US, like the possible use of a biological weapon. The document also calls for more, smaller weapons on submarines and other platforms to attack enemies. Many experts worry that having tinier nukes makes them more usable, thereby increasing the chance of a skirmish turning into a full-blown nuclear war. (Think, for example, of the US-China trade war escalating to the point that Trump thinks his only option is to launch a smaller nuke, or how Trump could respond to Beijing after a devastating cyberattack on US infrastructure.) Plus, increasing the arsenal in this way would partially undo decades of the US’s work to stop nuclear proliferation around the world. Some experts, like Georgetown’s Kroenig, say having smaller tactical weapons is actually a good idea. Our current arsenal, which prioritizes older and bigger nukes, leads adversaries to think we would never use it. Having smaller bombs that America might use, then, makes the chance of a nuclear conflict less likely. “It gives us more options to threaten that limited response,” Kroenig told me. “We raise the bar with these lower-yield weapons.” But the Trump risk may have less to do with what kinds of bombs he has and more to do with his temperament. Take his tweet from January 2 toward the end of his spat with Kim Jong Un, the North Korean leader: Donald J. Trump ✔ @realDonaldTrump North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un just stated that the “Nuclear Button is on his desk at all times.” Will someone from his depleted and food starved regime please inform him that I too have a Nuclear Button, but it is a much bigger & more powerful one than his, and my Button works! 475K 7:49 PM - Jan 2, 2018 Twitter Ads info and privacy 324K people are talking about this While tensions with North Korea were high early on in Trump’s presidency, he has yet to face a situation, like his predecessors did, where it seemed nuclear war was likely. The 13-day Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, where the Soviet Union had secretly placed missiles in Cuba — just 90 miles from the US mainland — comes to mind. Members of President John F. Kennedy’s team, especially his military advisers, called for airstrikes on Cuba and even an invasion. But Kennedy decided to set up a blockade of the island and try to work out a diplomatic settlement with the Soviets, in part because a military confrontation might turn nuclear. Ultimately, the situation ended when they agreed on a deal: The Soviets would withdraw the missiles from the island, and the US would take out its missiles in Turkey. Before that conclusion, both sides came as close to nuclear war as ever. Customers gather to watch President John F. Kennedy as he delivers a televised address to the nation on the subject of the Cuban Missile Crisis, on October 22, 1962. Customers gather to watch President John F. Kennedy as he delivers a televised address to the nation on the subject of the Cuban Missile Crisis, on October 22, 1962. Ralph Crane/The LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images How would Trump handle himself in a similar situation? Would he resist the urges of some in his military brass to strike an enemy — perhaps with a lower-yield nuke — or would he simply tweet out a threat in a hair-trigger moment? The fact is we don’t know — but what we do know about Trump makes his demeanor in such a situation a potential, even if very small, nuclear risk. Here’s what happens in a nuclear attack The theory around whether someone might drop a nuclear bomb takes away from the most serious matter in these discussions: the human and physical toll. Simply put, a nuclear strike of any magnitude would unleash suffering on a scale not seen since World War II. And with the advances in nuclear technology since then, it’s possible the devastation of the next nuclear strike would be far, far worse. It’s hard to picture what the effect of a modern-day nuclear attack would actually look like. But Wellerstein, the nuclear historian, created a website called Nukemap that allows users to “drop” a specific bomb — say, <u>the roughly 140-kiloton explosive North Korea tested in September 2017</u> — on any target. So I did just that, detonating that North Korean device on the Capitol building <u><mark>in</mark> the heart of Washington, <mark>DC</u></mark> — and, well, see for yourself: Christina Animashaun/Vox Roughly <u><strong><mark>220,000</u></strong></mark> people <u><mark>would die from</mark> this</u> <u><strong><mark>one attack alone</u></strong></mark>, according to the Nukemap estimate, <u>while another 450,000 would sustain</u> <u><strong>injuries</u></strong>. By comparison, America’s two nuclear attacks on Japan in 1945 killed and injured a total of around 200,000 people (granted, Hiroshima and Nagasaki had smaller populations than the Washington metro area). <u>It’s very likely that North Korea wouldn’t launch just one bomb, but</u> <u><strong>multiple</u></strong> <u>at DC and likely some at New York City, the West Coast, and possibly US military bases in Guam and/or Hawaii. </u>But for simplicity’s sake, let’s focus on the effects of this one horrible attack. The center yellow circle is the fireball radius — that is, the mushroom cloud — which would extend out about 0.25 square miles. Those within the green circle, approximately a 1.2-square-mile area, would face the heaviest dose of radiation. “Without medical treatment, there can be expected between 50% and 90% mortality from acute effects alone. Dying takes between several hours and several weeks,” according to the website. <u>Radiation poisoning is a horrible way to die</u>. Here are just some of the symptoms people sick with radiation get: Nausea and vomiting Spontaneous bleeding Diarrhea, sometimes bloody Severely burnt skin that may peel off The dark grey circle in the middle is where a shock wave does a lot of damage. In that 17-square-mile area, the bomb would flatten residential buildings, certainly killing people in or near them. Debris and fire would be everywhere. People in the bigger yellow circle, a 33.5-square-mile area, would receive third-degree burns. “There’s a bright flash of light,” Brian Toon, a scientist and expert on nuclear disasters at the University of Colorado Boulder, told me about when the bomb goes off. Those exposed to the light, which would stretch for miles, would get those burns if their skin were exposed. The light would also “easily ignite fires with flammable objects like leaves, twigs, paper, or your clothing,” he added. The victims may not feel much pain, however, because the burn will destroy pain nerves. Still, some will suffer major scarring or have the inability to use certain limbs, and others might require amputation, according to Wellerstein’s site. A mother tends her injured child, a victim of the atomic bomb blast at Hiroshima. A mother tends her injured child, a victim of the atomic bomb blast at Hiroshima. Keystone/Getty Images The biggest circle encompasses the near entirety of the air-blast zone: a 134-square-mile area. People can still die, or at least receive severe injuries, in that location. The blast would break windows, and those standing near the glass might be killed by shards, or at least shed blood from myriad cuts. Those who survive the bombing and its effects will have to walk through burning rubble and pass lifeless, charred bodies to reach safety. Some of them will ultimately survive, but others will succumb to sustained injuries or radiation. The wind, meanwhile, will carry the irradiated debris and objects — known as fallout because they drop from the sky — far outside the blast zone and sicken countless others. As for Washington, it will likely take decades and billions of dollars not only to rebuild the city but clean it of radiation entirely. <u>It’s worth reiterating that all of the above are estimates for <strong>one strike on one location</strong>. An</u> <u><strong>actual nuclear war</u></strong> <u>would have</u> <u><strong>much wider and more devastating consequences.</u></strong> <u>And <mark>if that war</u> <u><strong>spiraled</u></strong></mark> <u>out of control, <mark>the effects</mark> <strong>after the conflict</u></strong> <u><mark>would be</u> <u><strong>much worse</mark> than the attacks themselves</u></strong> — and change the course of human history. “Almost everybody on the planet would die” <u>It’s possible you have an idea of what a post-nuclear hellscape looks like. After all, disaster movies are obsessed with that kind of world. But scientists and other nuclear experts care deeply about this issue too — and their research shows the <strong>movies may be too optimistic</strong>.</u> Alan Robock, an environmental sciences professor at Rutgers University, has spent decades trying to understand what a nuclear war would do to the planet. The sum of his work, along with other colleagues’, is based on economic, scientific, and agricultural models. Here’s what he found: <u>The most devastating long-term effects of a nuclear war actually come down to the</u> <u><strong><mark>black smoke</u></strong></mark>, along with the dust and particulates in the air, <u>that attacks produce</u>. People walking through the ruins of Hiroshima in the weeks following the atomic bomb blast. People walking through the ruins of Hiroshima in the weeks following the atomic bomb blast. Bernard Hoffman/The LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images <u>In a nuclear war, cities and industrial areas would be targeted, thereby producing</u> <u><strong>tons of smoke</u></strong> <u>as they burn. Some of that smoke <mark>would</mark> make it into the stratosphere — above the weather — where it would stay for years because there’s</u> <u><strong>no rain to wash it out</strong>. That smoke would expand around the world as it heats up, <strong><mark>block</strong></mark>ing <strong><mark>out sunlight</u></strong></mark> <u>over much of Earth. As a result, the world would <mark>experience <strong>cold</strong></mark>er temperatures and less precipitation, <mark>depleting</mark> much of the globe’s <strong><mark>ag</strong></mark>ricultural output. That, potentially, would <mark>lead to <strong>widespread famine</mark> in a matter of years</u></strong>. The impact on the world, however, depends on the amount of rising smoke. While scientists’ models and estimates vary, it’s believed that around 5 million to 50 millions tons of black smoke could lead to a so-called “nuclear autumn,” while 50 million to 150 millions tons of black smoke might plunge the world into a “nuclear winter.” <u>If the</u> latter <u>scenario came to pass</u>, Robock told me, <u><strong><mark>“almost everybody on the planet would die.”</p></u></strong></mark>

1AC

1AC

1AC Christmas Gift

./documents/hsld19/DoughertyValley/Go/Dougherty%20Valley-Goel-Aff-CPS-Round1.docx

A

CPS

1

Golden State SS

forgot

1ac - Noko 1nc - Chemical Shift and Deterrence 1ar - All 2NR - All 2AR - All

hsld19/DoughertyValley/Go/Dougherty%20Valley-Goel-Aff-CPS-Round1.docx

ArGo

Dougherty Valley ArGo

Ar.....

Go.....

DoughertyValley

Dougherty Valley

CA

hsld19

HS LD 2019-20

ld

hs

Collisions with high-value satellites guarantee nuclear escalation.

Egeli 21

Egeli 21 [Sitki Egeli is an assistant professor in the Political Science and International Relations Department of Izmir University of Economics. He was previously a director for foreign affairs in Turkey’s Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM) and vice president in charge of the defense and aerospace sectors of an international consulting firm.] “Space-to-Space Warfare and Proximity Operations: The Impact on Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications and Strategic Stability,” Published 25 Jun 2021, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2021.1942681, VM

Amid increased tensions, perhaps even an imminent military confrontation between two nuclear-armed adversaries, a high-value satellite stops functioning or communicating instantly and inexplicably This may be the outcome of impact of a collision with a meteoroid or piece of space debris small enough to have evaded detection Could this perhaps be the harbinger of a wider nuclear or nonnuclear first strike, along with which the attacker is seeking to eliminate the possibility of retaliation by degrading the defender’s capacity to command, control, and communicate with its forces ? In the absence of a clear-cut picture of what actually has happened, there is a risk that impending decisions will be made on the basis of insufficient and potentially erroneous information The resulting ultimatums, responses, or counteractions could set off a dangerous cycle of escalation and tit-for-tat actions, whereby reactions and overreactions between adversaries lead to potentially catastrophic consequences , heightened tension in orbit would have the outcome of spilling down to Earth

Amid increased tensions between two nuclear-armed adversaries, a satellite stops functioning instantly may be the outcome of space debris small enough to have evaded detection the harbinger of a wider nuclear first strike the attacker is seeking to eliminate the possibility of retaliation In the absence of a clear picture of what has happened impending decisions will be made on insufficient and erroneous info

“Amid increased tensions, perhaps even an imminent military confrontation between two nuclear-armed adversaries, a high-value (for example, early-warning or strategic communication) satellite stops functioning or communicating instantly and inexplicably. SSA sensors do not pick up any anomalies. This may be the outcome of a technical malfunction or a natural phenomenon, such as the impact of a collision with a meteoroid or piece of space debris small enough to have evaded detection. Alternatively, the satellite perhaps becomes the victim of a deliberate, undetected attack. Earth-to-space kinetic, electronic, or directed energy attacks would leave behind some trails. A cyberattack, which is harder to detect and attribute, is a strong possibility. So is a stealthy attack by hostile spacecraft. In fact, the adversary is known to have experimented with ominous small spacecraft that could easily conceal or disguise themselves until conducting a final maneuver to neutralize their targets. The victim would also be aware that, especially at distant GEO and HEO altitudes, SSA is not sufficiently comprehensive to detect and give warning of all suspicious or threatening movements as they happen. As suspicions abound, decision makers are faced with hard choices. Could this perhaps be the harbinger of a wider nuclear or nonnuclear first strike, along with which the attacker is seeking to eliminate the possibility of retaliation by degrading the defender’s capacity to command, control, and communicate with its forces? Should the defender react immediately before the remaining space-enabled NC3 elements are also compromised and its control over nuclear and nonnuclear forces degrades even further? In the absence of a clear-cut picture of what actually has happened, there is a risk that impending decisions will be made on the basis of insufficient and potentially erroneous information, and the climate will be ripe for unfounded presumptions and predispositions. The resulting ultimatums, responses, or counteractions could set off a dangerous cycle of escalation and tit-for-tat actions, whereby reactions and overreactions between adversaries lead to potentially catastrophic consequences. At a minimum, heightened tension in orbit would have the outcome of spilling down to Earth so as to further aggravate an already tense situation.?”

<h4>Collisions with <u>high-value satellites</u> guarantee <u>nuclear escalation.</h4><p></u><strong>Egeli 21 </strong>[Sitki Egeli is an assistant professor in the Political Science and International Relations Department of Izmir University of Economics. He was previously a director for foreign affairs in Turkey’s Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM) and vice president in charge of the defense and aerospace sectors of an international consulting firm.] “Space-to-Space Warfare and Proximity Operations: The Impact on Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications and Strategic Stability,” Published 25 Jun 2021, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2021.1942681, VM</p><p>“<u><mark>Amid increased tensions</mark>, perhaps even an imminent military confrontation <mark>between <strong>two nuclear-armed adversaries</strong>, a</mark> high-value</u> (for example, early-warning or strategic communication) <u><strong><mark>satellite stops functioning</mark> </strong>or communicating <strong><mark>instantly</mark> and inexplicably</u></strong>. SSA sensors do not pick up any anomalies. <u><strong>This <mark>may be the outcome of</u></strong></mark> a technical malfunction or a natural phenomenon, such as the <u>impact of a collision with a meteoroid or piece of <strong><mark>space debris small enough to have evaded detection</u></strong></mark>. Alternatively, the satellite perhaps becomes the victim of a deliberate, undetected attack. Earth-to-space kinetic, electronic, or directed energy attacks would leave behind some trails. A cyberattack, which is harder to detect and attribute, is a strong possibility. So is a stealthy attack by hostile spacecraft. In fact, the adversary is known to have experimented with ominous small spacecraft that could easily conceal or disguise themselves until conducting a final maneuver to neutralize their targets. The victim would also be aware that, especially at distant GEO and HEO altitudes, SSA is not sufficiently comprehensive to detect and give warning of all suspicious or threatening movements as they happen. As suspicions abound, decision makers are faced with hard choices. <u>Could this perhaps be <mark>the harbinger of a wider nuclear</mark> or nonnuclear <strong><mark>first strike</strong></mark>, along with which <mark>the attacker is seeking to eliminate the <strong>possibility of retaliation</strong></mark> by degrading the defender’s capacity to command, control, and communicate with its forces</u>? Should the defender react immediately before the remaining space-enabled NC3 elements are also compromised and its control over nuclear and nonnuclear forces degrades even further<u>? <mark>In the absence of a clear</mark>-cut <mark>picture of what</mark> actually <mark>has happened</mark>, there is a risk that <mark>impending decisions will be made on</mark> the basis of <mark>insufficient and</mark> potentially <strong><mark>erroneous info</mark>rmation</u></strong>, and the climate will be ripe for unfounded presumptions and predispositions. <u>The resulting ultimatums, responses, or counteractions could <strong>set off a dangerous cycle of escalation</strong> and tit-for-tat actions, whereby reactions and overreactions between adversaries lead to potentially catastrophic consequences</u>. At a minimum<u>, heightened tension in orbit would <strong>have the outcome of spilling down to Earth</u></strong> so as to further aggravate an already tense situation.?”</p>

1AC—Advantages

Advantage – Collisions

./documents/hsld21/BergenCounty/Ki/Bergen%20County-Kim-Aff-penn-Doubles.docx

A

penn

Doubles

Ridge LA

Husain, Zahra Yin, Shubo Ambrose, Malachi

1ac - asteroids 1nc - lay nc 1ar - all 2nr - all 2ar - all

hsld21/BergenCounty/Ki/Bergen%20County-Kim-Aff-penn-Doubles.docx

AnKi

Bergen County AnKi

An.....

Ki.....

BergenCounty

Bergen County

NJ

hsld21

HS LD 2021-22

ld

hs

The overall environment is resilient---‘existential’ threats are false

Bailey 20 [grammar edit]

Ronald Bailey 20, Science Correspondent at Reason, Member of the Society of Environmental Journalists and the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, “The Global Environmental Apocalypse Has Been Canceled”, Reason Magazine, 8/1/2020, https://reason.com/2020/08/01/the-global-environmental-apocalypse-has-been-canceled/ [grammar edit]

According to activists humanity is beset on all sides by catastrophes that could kill off civilization Are they right? Much of what people are being told about the environment is wrong the exaggeration, alarmism are the enemy of rational environmentalism environmental problems do not constitute inexorable existential threats growth and tech progress can ameliorate them Climate change is happening. It's just not the end of the world human[s] being are not causing a "sixth mass extinction," the Amazon rainforests are not the "lungs of the world," climate change is not making natural disasters worse, and fires have declined 25 percent around the world since 2003 humanity is already adapting to the ways climate change has been making weather patterns evolve, and that we will continue to adapt successfully in the future rising prosperity and increasing technological prowess will reverse most deleterious environmental trends

According to activists catastrophes could kill civilization Much is wrong exaggeration environmental problems do not constitute existential threats growth and tech progress ameliorate them Climate is not the end of the world human[s] are not causing mass extinction Amazon are not the "lungs fires declined humanity is adapting and will continue prosperity and tech prowess will reverse most trends

According to these activists and politicians, humanity is beset on all sides by catastrophes that could kill off civilization, and maybe even our species. Are they right? Absolutely not, answers the longtime environmental activist Michael Shellenberger in an engaging new book, Apocalypse Never: Why Environmental Alarmism Hurts Us All. "Much of what people are being told about the environment, including the climate, is wrong, and we desperately need to get it right," he writes. "I decided to write Apocalypse Never after getting fed up with the exaggeration, alarmism, and extremism that are the enemy of positive, humanistic, and rational environmentalism." While fully acknowledging that significant global environmental problems exist, Shellenberger argues that they do not constitute inexorable existential threats. Economic growth and technological progress, he says, can ameliorate them. Shellenberger's analysis relies on largely uncontroversial mainstream science, including reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Food and Agriculture Organization. And as a longstanding activist, Shellenberger is in a good position to parse the motives behind the purveyors of doom. Shellenberger's activism is the real deal. To raise a donation to the Rainforest Action Network, he charged his friends $5 to attend his 16th birthday party. At 17 he went to Nicaragua to experience the Sandinista revolution. In the 1990s he worked with the Landless Workers' Movement in Brazil. In 2003, Shellenberger and allies launched the New Apollo Project to jumpstart a no-carbon energy revolution over the next 10 years. In 2008, Time named him "A Hero of the Environment." He co-founded the ecomodernist Breakthrough Institute, which advocates the use of advanced technologies such as nuclear power and agricultural biotechnology to decouple the economy from the ecology, allowing both humanity and the natural world to flourish. More recently, he founded Environmental Progress, which campaigns for, among other things, the deployment of clean modern nuclear power. He is an invited expert reviewer of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's next assessment report. Ohio Passes Controversial Conscience Clause for Doctors So what does he say about climate change? "On behalf of environmentalists everywhere, I would like to formally apologize for the climate scare we created over the last 30 years," he wrote in an essay to promote his new book. "Climate change is happening. It's just not the end of the world. It's not even our most serious environmental problem." Needless to say, there are environmentalists everywhere who do not believe they have anything to apologize for. A group of six researchers assembled by the widely respected Climate Feedback fact-checking consortium rated his article as having low scientific credibility. Shellenberger doesn't devote much of Apocalypse Never to the science behind man-made climate change. He basically accepts the consensus that it's a significant problem and instead focuses on various claims about the harms it is supposedly already causing. In that promotional essay, he argues that (1) human[s] being are not causing a "sixth mass extinction," (2) the Amazon rainforests are not the "lungs of the world," (3) climate change is not making natural disasters worse, and (4) fires have declined 25 percent around the world since 2003. Shellenberger isn't denying the reality of man-made climate change. He's arguing that humanity is already adapting to the ways climate change has been making weather patterns evolve, and that we will continue to adapt successfully in the future. His book is ultimately a sustained argument that poverty is world's most important environmental problem, and that rising prosperity and increasing technological prowess will ameliorate or reverse most deleterious environmental trends.

<h4>The <u>overall</u> environment is <u>resilient</u>---‘existential’ threats are <u>false</h4><p></u>Ronald <u><strong>Bailey 20</u></strong>, Science Correspondent at Reason, Member of the Society of Environmental Journalists and the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, “The Global Environmental Apocalypse Has Been Canceled”, Reason Magazine, 8/1/2020, https://reason.com/2020/08/01/the-global-environmental-apocalypse-has-been-canceled/<u><strong> [grammar edit]</p><p><mark>According to</u></strong></mark> these <u><strong><mark>activists</u></strong></mark> and politicians, <u><strong>humanity is beset on all sides by <mark>catastrophes</mark> that <mark>could kill</mark> off <mark>civilization</u></strong></mark>, and maybe even our species. <u><strong>Are they right?</p><p></u></strong>Absolutely not, answers the longtime environmental activist Michael Shellenberger in an engaging new book, Apocalypse Never: Why Environmental Alarmism Hurts Us All. "<u><strong><mark>Much</mark> of what people are being told about the environment</u></strong>, including the climate, <u><strong><mark>is wrong</u></strong></mark>, and we desperately need to get it right," he writes. "I decided to write Apocalypse Never after getting fed up with <u><strong>the <mark>exaggeration</mark>, alarmism</u></strong>, and extremism that <u><strong>are the enemy of</u></strong> positive, humanistic, and <u><strong>rational environmentalism</u></strong>." While fully acknowledging that significant global <u><strong><mark>environmental problems</u></strong></mark> exist, Shellenberger argues that they <u><strong><mark>do not constitute</mark> inexorable <mark>existential threats</u></strong></mark>. Economic <u><strong><mark>growth and tech</u></strong></mark>nological <u><strong><mark>progress</u></strong></mark>, he says, <u><strong>can <mark>ameliorate them</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>Shellenberger's analysis relies on largely uncontroversial mainstream science, including reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Food and Agriculture Organization. And as a longstanding activist, Shellenberger is in a good position to parse the motives behind the purveyors of doom.</p><p>Shellenberger's activism is the real deal. To raise a donation to the Rainforest Action Network, he charged his friends $5 to attend his 16th birthday party. At 17 he went to Nicaragua to experience the Sandinista revolution. In the 1990s he worked with the Landless Workers' Movement in Brazil.</p><p>In 2003, Shellenberger and allies launched the New Apollo Project to jumpstart a no-carbon energy revolution over the next 10 years. In 2008, Time named him "A Hero of the Environment." He co-founded the ecomodernist Breakthrough Institute, which advocates the use of advanced technologies such as nuclear power and agricultural biotechnology to decouple the economy from the ecology, allowing both humanity and the natural world to flourish. More recently, he founded Environmental Progress, which campaigns for, among other things, the deployment of clean modern nuclear power. He is an invited expert reviewer of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's next assessment report.</p><p>Ohio Passes Controversial Conscience Clause for Doctors</p><p>So what does he say about climate change? "On behalf of environmentalists everywhere, I would like to formally apologize for the climate scare we created over the last 30 years," he wrote in an essay to promote his new book. "<u><strong><mark>Climate</mark> change <mark>is</mark> happening. It's just <mark>not the end of the world</u></strong></mark>. It's not even our most serious environmental problem." Needless to say, there are environmentalists everywhere who do not believe they have anything to apologize for. A group of six researchers assembled by the widely respected Climate Feedback fact-checking consortium rated his article as having low scientific credibility.</p><p>Shellenberger doesn't devote much of Apocalypse Never to the science behind man-made climate change. He basically accepts the consensus that it's a significant problem and instead focuses on various claims about the harms it is supposedly already causing. In that promotional essay, he argues that (1) <u><strong><mark>human[s]</mark> being <mark>are not causing</mark> a "sixth <mark>mass extinction</mark>,"</u></strong> (2) <u><strong>the <mark>Amazon</mark> rainforests <mark>are not the "lungs</mark> of the world,"</u></strong> (3) <u><strong>climate change is not making natural disasters worse, and</u></strong> (4) <u><strong><mark>fires</mark> have <mark>declined</mark> 25 percent around the world since 2003</u></strong>.</p><p>Shellenberger isn't denying the reality of man-made climate change. He's arguing that <u><strong><mark>humanity is</mark> already <mark>adapting</mark> to the ways climate change has been making weather patterns evolve, <mark>and</mark> that we <mark>will continue</mark> to adapt successfully in the future</u></strong>. His book is ultimately a sustained argument that poverty is world's most important environmental problem, and that <u><strong>rising <mark>prosperity and</mark> increasing <mark>tech</mark>nological <mark>prowess will</u></strong></mark> ameliorate or <u><strong><mark>reverse most</mark> deleterious environmental <mark>trends</u></strong></mark>.</p>

1NC vs George Mason BY

Advantage 1

Environment D: Resilient—1NC

./documents/ndtceda22/Minnesota/HaHe/Minnesota-HaHe-Neg-ADA-Fall-Championship-Round-1.docx

N

ADA Fall Championship

1

George Mason BY

Niki Brooks

1ac-RoN, warming, water scarcity 1nc- court, Spillover, PTD CP, Fetus DA, Human duty CP, ag DA, Case, 2nr- scarcity turn, case, spillover

ndtceda22/Minnesota/HaHe/Minnesota-HaHe-Neg-ADA-Fall-Championship-Round-1.docx

2022-11-16 16:37:39

HaHe

Minnesota HaHe

Be.....

Ha.....

Ja.....

He.....

Minnesota

Minnesota

ndtceda22

NDT/CEDA College 2022-23

cx

college

New drains on resources undermine effective PFAS regulations

NAWCA, ’21

NAWCA, ’21 — represents the interests of publicly owned wastewater treatment facilities, collection systems, and stormwater management agencies before the United States Congress, several Federal agencies, and in the courts. (National Association of Clean Water Agencies; “NACWA Sends Suite of Recommendations to EPA’s PFAS Council;” Published 17 June 2021; https://www.nacwa.org/news-publications/clean-water-current-archives/clean-water-current/2021/06/17/nacwa-sends-suite-of-recommendations-to-epa-s-pfas-council; //Mojica)

NACWA sent a letter on June 14 to EPC detailing specific recommendations for EPA to consider as it develops a multi-year strategy to address PFAS NACWA also hopes that the Agency will prioritize the most meaningful federal actions to reign in the seemingly endless use of a ubiquitous, nearly indestructible, anthropogenic suite of PFAS chemicals found in our everyday consumer products EPA can leverage existing environmental statutes and regulations to effectively protect human health and the environment while aggressively pursuing a “polluter pays” model Ensuring EPA has the tools and resources it needs to effectively eliminate these chemicals at the source is paramount state regulatory agencies and legislatures create a patchwork of compliance regimes that are nearly impossible to manage. NACWA encourages Accelerate Federal Research on PFAS Toxicity and Risk Continue Evaluating and Developing Regulatory Measures for Upstream Industrial Sources of PFAS under the CWA and TRI Continue to Develop CWA Analytical Methods Accelerate EPA’s Ongoing Efforts to Complete a Biosolids Risk Assessment Protect “Passive Receivers” Against CERCLA Liability Take an Aggressive Risk Management Approach Using TSCA NACWA will keep members up to speed on next steps

NACWA hopes the Agency prioritize most meaningful federal actions to reign in PFAS EPA can leverage statutes to protect health and environment Ensuring EPA has resources it needs to effectively eliminate these chemicals paramount state regimes impossible to manage NACWA encourages Federal Research Regulatory Measures CWA Methods Accelerate EPA’s Efforts to Complete a Biosolids Risk Assessment Take an Aggressive Approach

NACWA sent a letter on June 14 to EPA’s newly formed EPA PFAS Council (EPC) detailing specific recommendations for EPA to consider as it develops a multi-year strategy to address PFAS. Ultimately, EPC’s leadership in articulating a vision for addressing PFAS will not only provide greater certainty to the public at large and the regulated community, but NACWA also hopes that the Agency will prioritize the most meaningful federal actions to reign in the seemingly endless use of a ubiquitous, nearly indestructible, anthropogenic suite of PFAS chemicals found in our everyday consumer products. NACWA believes EPA can leverage existing environmental statutes and regulations to effectively protect human health and the environment while aggressively pursuing a “polluter pays” model. Due to the lack of clear federal direction, states are setting screening levels and imposing regulatory requirements – often with insufficient scientific basis or consideration of potential unintended consequences. Ensuring EPA has the tools and resources it needs to effectively eliminate these chemicals at the source is paramount to not only addressing this systemic issue but also so that state regulatory agencies and legislatures do not create a patchwork of compliance regimes that are nearly impossible to manage. NACWA encourages EPC to consider the following recommendations from the public clean water community: Accelerate Federal Research on PFAS Toxicity and Risk Continue Evaluating and Developing Regulatory Measures for Upstream Industrial Sources of PFAS under the CWA and TRI Continue to Develop CWA Analytical Methods Accelerate EPA’s Ongoing Efforts to Complete a Biosolids Risk Assessment Protect “Passive Receivers” Against CERCLA Liability Take an Aggressive Risk Management Approach Using TSCA NACWA will keep members up to speed on next steps and looks forward to participating in any public stakeholder opportunity to engage with the Agency on addressing PFAS in our environment.

<h4>New drains on resources undermine effective PFAS regulations</h4><p><strong>NAWCA, ’21</strong> — represents the interests of publicly owned wastewater treatment facilities, collection systems, and stormwater management agencies before the United States Congress, several Federal agencies, and in the courts. (National Association of Clean Water Agencies; “NACWA Sends Suite of Recommendations to EPA’s PFAS Council;” Published 17 June 2021; https://www.nacwa.org/news-publications/clean-water-current-archives/clean-water-current/2021/06/17/nacwa-sends-suite-of-recommendations-to-epa-s-pfas-council; //Mojica)</p><p><u>NACWA sent a letter on June 14 to</u> EPA’s newly formed EPA PFAS Council (<u>EPC</u>) <u>detailing specific recommendations for EPA to consider as it develops a multi-year strategy to address PFAS</u>. Ultimately, EPC’s leadership in articulating a vision for addressing PFAS will not only provide greater certainty to the public at large and the regulated community, but <u><mark>NACWA</mark> also <mark>hopes</mark> that <mark>the Agency </mark>will <strong><mark>prioritize </mark>the <mark>most meaningful federal actions</strong> to reign in</mark> the seemingly endless use of a ubiquitous, nearly indestructible, anthropogenic suite of <mark>PFAS </mark>chemicals found in our everyday consumer products</u>. NACWA believes <u><mark>EPA can leverage</mark> existing environmental <mark>statutes</mark> and regulations <mark>to</mark> effectively <mark>protect</mark> human <mark>health and </mark>the <mark>environment</mark> while aggressively pursuing a “polluter pays” model</u>. Due to the lack of clear federal direction, states are setting screening levels and imposing regulatory requirements – often with insufficient scientific basis or consideration of potential unintended consequences. <u><strong><mark>Ensuring EPA has </mark>the tools and <mark>resources it needs to effectively</mark> <mark>eliminate these chemicals</mark> at the source is <mark>paramount</u></strong></mark> to not only addressing this systemic issue but also so that <u><mark>state</mark> regulatory agencies and legislatures</u> do not <u>create a patchwork of compliance <mark>regimes</mark> that are nearly <mark>impossible to manage</mark>. <mark>NACWA encourages</u></mark> EPC to consider the following recommendations from the public clean water community: <u>Accelerate <strong><mark>Federal Research</strong></mark> on PFAS Toxicity and Risk Continue Evaluating and <strong>Developing <mark>Regulatory Measures</strong></mark> for Upstream Industrial Sources of PFAS under the CWA and TRI Continue to Develop <mark>CWA</mark> Analytical <mark>Methods</mark> <mark>Accelerate EPA’s</mark> Ongoing <mark>Efforts to Complete a Biosolids Risk Assessment</mark> Protect “Passive Receivers” Against CERCLA Liability <mark>Take an Aggressive</mark> Risk Management <mark>Approach</mark> Using TSCA NACWA will keep members up to speed on next steps</u> and looks forward to participating in any public stakeholder opportunity to engage with the Agency on addressing PFAS in our environment.</p>

1NC—Lex Quarters

1NC—OFF

1NC—DA

./documents/hspolicy21/ArchbishopMitty/KhBh/Archbishop%20Mitty-Kher-Bhadani-Neg-3%20-%20Lexington-Quarters.docx

N

3 - Lexington

Quarters

Mamaroneck BT

Panel

hspolicy21/ArchbishopMitty/KhBh/Archbishop%20Mitty-Kher-Bhadani-Neg-3%20-%20Lexington-Quarters.docx

KhBh

Archbishop Mitty KhBh

Ta.....

Kh.....

An.....

Bh.....

ArchbishopMitty

Archbishop Mitty

CA

hspolicy21

HS Policy 2021-22

cx

hs

Economic superiority and resilience solves existential threats---specifically, conflict with China.

Sitaraman 20

Sitaraman 20 [Ganesh is a professor of Law at Vanderbilt Law School, 8/11/20, A Grand Strategy of Resilience, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-08-11/grand-strategy-resilience] Justin

The coming era will be one of health crises, climate shocks, cyberattacks, and geoeconomic competition This year, a pandemic Next year, it might be a drought The year after a cyberattack could take out the grid or cut of critical supply chains the U S is woefully underprepared for handling disruptions. What it needs is an economy that can prevent these challenges and bounce back the United States needs a grand strategy of resilience The government’s goal should be to minimize disruptions—to build a system that can prevent economic disaster Climate change could pose a threat. A sustained drought threaten the global food supply. Rising sea levels flood low-lying cities. Fires already disrupt life Climate-induced crises will lead to migrations globally and social unrest and violence Cyberattacks have targeted U.S. Cyberattacks on the grid could “deny large regions access to bulk system power for months,” All these challenges play out at a time of rivalry especially geoeconomic competition—among great powers the U S has been the world’s most powerful economy and safe from outside economic pressures as China’s economic strength grows, that is likely to change. China’s ability to exploit that dependence in a future crisis or conflict should be worrisome. A strategy based on resilience deter coercion and minimize disruption

coming era one of health climate cyber and geoeconomic competition the U S is underprepared for disruptions it needs an economy that can prevent challenges and bounce back government’s should minimize disruptions a system that can prevent economic disaster Climate change sustained drought threaten global food crises lead to migrations and violence Cyberattacks on grid deny access to power U S most powerful economy and safe from pressures as China’s economic strength grows, that change China exploit that in a conflict resilience minimize disruption

Every so often in the history of the United States, there are moments of political realignment—times when the consensus that defined an era collapses and a new paradigm emerges. The liberal era ushered in by President Franklin Roosevelt defined U.S. politics for a generation. So did the neoliberal wave that followed in the 1980s. Today, that era, too, is coming to a close, its demise hastened by the election of President Donald Trump and the chaos of the coronavirus pandemic. The coming era will be one of health crises, climate shocks, cyberattacks, and geoeconomic competition among great powers. What unites those seemingly disparate threats is that each is not so much a battle to be won as a challenge to be weathered. This year, a pandemic is forcing hundreds of millions of Americans to stay at home. Next year, it might be a 1,000-year drought that devastates agriculture and food production. The year after that, a cyberattack could take out the power grid or cut of critical supply chains. If the current pandemic is any indication, the United States is woefully underprepared for handling such disruptions. What it needs is an economy, a society, and a democracy that can prevent these challenges when possible and endure, bounce back, and adapt when necessary—and do so without suffering thousands of deaths and seeing millions unemployed. What the United States needs is a grand strategy of resilience. For psychologists who research child development, resilience is what enables some children to endure traumatic events and emerge stronger and better able to navigate future stresses. For ecologists, resilience is an ecosystem’s ability to resist, recover, and adapt to ires, loods, or invasive species. For emergency, disaster relief, and homeland security experts, a resilient system is flexible, adaptable, and can withstand an impact. The writer Maria Konnikova has summed up the concept with a single question: “Do you succumb or do you surmount?” The highest goal for American policymakers should be to preserve and defend the country’s constitutional democracy while enabling Americans to thrive regardless of their race, gender, location, or origin. A society that achieves that goal will be better prepared to face the next crisis. A more equal and more just nation is a more resilient one. Although Americans tend to think of grand strategy as an overarching foreign policy vision, any true grand strategy requires a solid domestic foundation. The United States’ Cold War policy of containment, for instance, had a domestic analog, although it is less emphasized in the foreign policy community. For a generation after World War II, Democrats and Republicans alike embraced a model of regulated capitalism, with high taxes, inancial regulations, strong unions, and social safety net programs, and thus charted a path between the totalitarian control of the Soviet Union and the laissez-faire approach that had plunged the United States into the Great Depression. Regulated capitalism and containment together were the grand strategy that deined the post–World War II era. A grand strategy of resilience, likewise, will not meet with success unless the United States addresses the many forms of inequality, fragility, and weakness that undermine the country’s preparedness from within. AGE OF CRISES “Grand strategy” is a slippery term, with perhaps as many deinitions as authors who invoke it. It can describe a framework that guides and focuses leaders and societies on their aims and priorities. Critics of the notion believe this is impossible: no paradigm, they say, can help navigate a chaotic, uncertain future, and in any case, U.S. society is too polarized to identify a consensus paradigm today. But the skeptics have it backward. Grand strategy is won, not found. It emerges from argument and debate. And it is useful precisely because it offers guidance in a complex world. Start with pandemics. For hundreds of years, quarantines have been essential to preventing the spread of infectious diseases. But today’s stay-at-home orders have exacted a devastating social, eco-nomic, and psychological toll on individuals and communities. Small businesses that are closed may never reopen. Tens of millions of people are out of work. Families are struggling to juggle childcare, homeschooling, and working from home. The government’s goal should be to minimize those disruptions—to build a system that can prevent economic disaster, secure supply chains for essential materials, and massively scale up production and testing when needed. Climate change could pose an even bigger threat. A sustained drought, akin to the one that created the Dust Bowl during the Great Depression, could threaten the global food supply. Rising sea levels, especially when coupled with storms, could flood low-lying cities. Fires already disrupt life in California every year. Climate-induced crises will also lead to population migrations globally and, with them, social unrest and violence. Part of the answer is aggressive action to limit increases in temperature. But in addition, the United States must be able to endure climate shocks when they arise. Consider also the country’s dependence on technology and the vulnerabilities it entails. Cyberattacks have already targeted U.S. election systems, banks, the Pentagon, and even local governments. The city of Riviera Beach, Florida, was forced to pay a ransom to cybercriminals who had taken over its computer systems; big cities, such as Atlanta and Baltimore, have faced similar attacks. Cyberattacks on the U.S. power grid, akin to the one that led to blackouts in Ukraine in December 2015, could “deny large regions of the country access to bulk system power for weeks or even months,” according to the National Academy of Sciences. All these challenges will play out at a time of growing rivalry—and especially geoeconomic competition—among great powers. Over the last half century, the United States has been the world’s most powerful economy and has thus been relatively safe from outside economic pressures. But as China’s economic strength grows, that is likely to change. The United States and other democracies have become dependent on China for essential and nonessential goods. China’s ability to exploit that dependence in a future crisis or conflict should be extremely worrisome. A strategy based on resilience would help deter such coercion and minimize the disruption if it does occur.

<h4><u>Economic superiority</u> and <u>resilience</u> solves <u>existential threats</u>---specifically, <u>conflict</u> with <u>China</u>.</h4><p><strong>Sitaraman 20</strong> [Ganesh is a professor of Law at Vanderbilt Law School, 8/11/20, A Grand Strategy of Resilience, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-08-11/grand-strategy-resilience] Justin</p><p>Every so often in the history of the United States, there are moments of political realignment—times when the consensus that defined an era collapses and a new paradigm emerges. The liberal era ushered in by President Franklin Roosevelt defined U.S. politics for a generation. So did the neoliberal wave that followed in the 1980s. Today, that era, too, is coming to a close, its demise hastened by the election of President Donald Trump and the chaos of the coronavirus pandemic.</p><p><u>The <strong><mark>coming era</strong></mark> will be <mark>one of <strong>health</mark> crises</strong>, <strong><mark>climate</mark> shocks</strong>, <strong><mark>cyber</mark>attacks</strong>, <mark>and <strong>geoeconomic competition</u></strong></mark> among great powers. What unites those seemingly disparate threats is that each is not so much a battle to be won as a challenge to be weathered. <u>This year, a <strong>pandemic</u></strong> is forcing hundreds of millions of Americans to stay at home. <u>Next year, it might be a</u> 1,000-year <u><strong>drought</u></strong> that devastates agriculture and food production. <u>The year after</u> that, <u>a <strong>cyberattack</strong> could take out the</u> power <u>grid or cut of critical supply chains</u>. If the current pandemic is any indication, <u><mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>is</mark> <strong>woefully <mark>underprepared</strong> for</mark> handling</u> such <u><strong><mark>disruptions</strong></mark>. What <mark>it needs</mark> is <mark>an <strong>economy</u></strong></mark>, a society, and a democracy <u><mark>that can <strong>prevent</mark> these <mark>challenges</u></strong></mark> when possible <u><mark>and</u></mark> endure, <u><strong><mark>bounce back</u></strong></mark>, and adapt when necessary—and do so without suffering thousands of deaths and seeing millions unemployed. What <u>the United States needs</u> is <u>a grand strategy of resilience</u>.</p><p>For psychologists who research child development, resilience is what enables some children to endure traumatic events and emerge stronger and better able to navigate future stresses. For ecologists, resilience is an ecosystem’s ability to resist, recover, and adapt to ires, loods, or invasive species. For emergency, disaster relief, and homeland security experts, a resilient system is flexible, adaptable, and can withstand an impact. The writer Maria Konnikova has summed up the concept with a single question: “Do you succumb or do you surmount?”</p><p>The highest goal for American policymakers should be to preserve and defend the country’s constitutional democracy while enabling Americans to thrive regardless of their race, gender, location, or origin. A society that achieves that goal will be better prepared to face the next crisis. A more equal and more just nation is a more resilient one.</p><p>Although Americans tend to think of grand strategy as an overarching foreign policy vision, any true grand strategy requires a solid domestic foundation. The United States’ Cold War policy of containment, for instance, had a domestic analog, although it is less emphasized in the foreign policy community. For a generation after World War II, Democrats and Republicans alike embraced a model of regulated capitalism, with high taxes, inancial regulations, strong unions, and social safety net programs, and thus charted a path between the totalitarian control of the Soviet Union and the laissez-faire approach that had plunged the United States into the Great Depression. Regulated capitalism and containment together were the grand strategy that deined the post–World War II era. A grand strategy of resilience, likewise, will not meet with success unless the United States addresses the many forms of inequality, fragility, and weakness that undermine the country’s preparedness from within.</p><p>AGE OF CRISES</p><p>“Grand strategy” is a slippery term, with perhaps as many deinitions as authors who invoke it. It can describe a framework that guides and focuses leaders and societies on their aims and priorities. Critics of the notion believe this is impossible: no paradigm, they say, can help navigate a chaotic, uncertain future, and in any case, U.S. society is too polarized to identify a consensus paradigm today. But the skeptics have it backward. Grand strategy is won, not found. It emerges from argument and debate. And it is useful precisely because it offers guidance in a complex world.</p><p>Start with pandemics. For hundreds of years, quarantines have been essential to preventing the spread of infectious diseases. But today’s stay-at-home orders have exacted a devastating social, eco-nomic, and psychological toll on individuals and communities. Small businesses that are closed may never reopen. Tens of millions of people are out of work. Families are struggling to juggle childcare, homeschooling, and working from home. <u>The <mark>government’s</mark> goal <mark>should</mark> be to <strong><mark>minimize</u></strong></mark> those <u><strong><mark>disruptions</strong></mark>—to build <mark>a system that can <strong>prevent economic disaster</u></strong></mark>, secure supply chains for essential materials, and massively scale up production and testing when needed.</p><p><u><mark>Climate change</mark> could pose a</u>n even bigger <u><strong>threat</strong>. A <strong><mark>sustained drought</u></strong></mark>, akin to the one that created the Dust Bowl during the Great Depression, could <u><mark>threaten</mark> the <strong><mark>global food</mark> supply</strong>. Rising <strong>sea</strong> levels</u>, especially when coupled with storms, could <u><strong>flood</strong> low-lying <strong>cities</strong>. <strong>Fires</strong> already disrupt life</u> in California every year. <u><strong>Climate-induced <mark>crises</strong></mark> will</u> also <u><mark>lead to</u></mark> population <u><strong><mark>migrations</mark> globally</strong> <mark>and</u></mark>, with them, <u><strong>social unrest and <mark>violence</u></strong></mark>. Part of the answer is aggressive action to limit increases in temperature. But in addition, the United States must be able to endure climate shocks when they arise.</p><p>Consider also the country’s dependence on technology and the vulnerabilities it entails. <u>Cyberattacks have</u> already <u>targeted U.S.</u> election systems, banks, the Pentagon, and even local governments. The city of Riviera Beach, Florida, was forced to pay a ransom to cybercriminals who had taken over its computer systems; big cities, such as Atlanta and Baltimore, have faced similar attacks. <u><strong><mark>Cyberattacks</strong> on</mark> the</u> U.S. power <u><mark>grid</u></mark>, akin to the one that led to blackouts in Ukraine in December 2015, <u>could “<strong><mark>deny</mark> large regions</u></strong> of the country <u><mark>access to</mark> <strong>bulk system <mark>power</strong></mark> for</u> weeks or even <u>months,”</u> according to the National Academy of Sciences.</p><p><u>All these challenges</u> will <u><strong>play out</strong> at a time of</u> growing <u><strong>rivalry</u></strong>—and <u>especially geoeconomic competition—among great powers</u>. Over the last half century, <u>the <mark>U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u>has been the <strong>world’s <mark>most powerful</strong> <strong>economy</strong> and</u></mark> has thus been relatively <u><strong><mark>safe</strong> from</mark> outside <strong>economic <mark>pressures</u></strong></mark>. But <u><mark>as <strong>China’s</strong> economic strength <strong>grows</strong>, that</mark> is <strong>likely to <mark>change</mark>.</u></strong> The United States and other democracies have become dependent on China for essential and nonessential goods. <u><mark>China</mark>’s ability to <mark>exploit that</mark> dependence <mark>in a</mark> <strong>future crisis or <mark>conflict</strong></mark> should be</u> extremely <u><strong>worrisome</strong>. A strategy based on <mark>resilience</u></mark> would help <u><strong>deter</u></strong> such <u><strong>coercion</strong> and <strong><mark>minimize</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>disruption</u></strong></mark> if it does occur. </p>

1AC

1AC – Advantage

./documents/hsld22/WilliamGEnloe/PhDa/WilliamGEnloe-PhDa-Aff-New-York-City-Invitational-Debate-and-Speech-Tournament-Round-3.docx

A

03 - New York City Invitational Debate and Speech Tournament

3

Dallastown JK

Jenn Melin

1AC-Kant 1NC-Lay 1AR-All 2NR-All 2AR-Kant Melin votes aff

hsld22/WilliamGEnloe/PhDa/WilliamGEnloe-PhDa-Aff-New-York-City-Invitational-Debate-and-Speech-Tournament-Round-3.docx

2023-03-08 13:16:01

PhDa

William G Enloe PhDa

Ph.....

Da.....

WilliamGEnloe

William G Enloe

NC

hsld22

HS LD 2022-23

ld

hs

COVID is causing a food security crisis – only intra-African trade solves structural barriers

Akiwumi 20

Paul Akiwumi 20 {Director for Africa and Least Developed Countries, UNCTAD} - ("COVID-19: A threat to food security in Africa," UNCTAD, published 8-1-2020, accessed 12-13-2022, https://unctad.org/news/covid-19-threat-food-security-africa)//marlborough-wr/

a deep coronavirus-induced global recession threatens a nearly 4% drop in world GDP and could drag the GDP of African economies into a fall of about 1.4%, with smaller economies facing a contraction of up to 7.8%. This decline is mainly a result of export adjustments affecting primary commodity exporters and associated tax revenue losses. This in turn, reduces governments’ capacity to extend the public services needed to respond effectively to the crisis. UNCTAD estimates a regional average of about 5% in public revenue losses in Africa. Total merchandise exports are expected to contract by about 17% in 2020. With at least 60% of the African population dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods and access to food, any trade-related distortions to the sector can threaten the food security of the continent’s poor. there is a strong positive correlation between economic recession and food insecurity in Africa. Despite the continent’s huge resource endowments (including a wide availability of arable land, and a young, growing labour force, among other factors), the continent’s agricultural production alone, hampered by distribution, access, and affordability challenges, is insufficient to meet its food security needs. Africa imported about 85% of its food from outside the continent This heavy reliance on world markets is detrimental to food security, especially at a time of acute crisis. A situation exacerbated by the current COVID-19 crisis through its direct impacts on trade, logistics, production and value chains. the disruption of marketing and trade activities, and COVID-19-related panic-buying, exacerbated food price increases Administrative restrictions imposed by governments, such as lockdowns, travel restrictions and physical distancing measures have also worsened the risk of food insecurity. In Africa 73 million people are acutely food insecure. A regional slump in food production and a fall in global demand may prolong the negative trade effects of COVID-19, with poverty and food insecurity expected to continue to rise African net food exporters were among the hardest hit. They not only faced low export volumes due to depressed world demand, but also a productivity slump the impact on the food sector is disproportionately higher among smaller economies, which face a relatively deeper reduction in their food exports and resulting revenue the key COVID-19 related shock to their economies is the collapse in demand for tourism services. heavy reliance on trade taxes and duties could lead to severe COVID-19 related revenue losses in African LDCs Revenue losses greatly undermine the ability to import productivity-enhancing inputs for domestic production and food exports. In order to address the impact of COVID-19 on food security in the long term, Africa will need to build productive capacities to address underlying economic vulnerabilities African governments should ensure the movement of goods, including food, and related essential services (i.e. transportation) is guaranteed COVID-19 has clearly highlighted the degree of interconnectedness between countries and the importance of maintaining trade links to ensure minimal disruptions to food supply. African countries also need to reduce their commodity dependence, which has been among the key factors increasing their vulnerability to food insecurity. The diversification of their commodity base and value addition will be critical if augmented by a significant increase in agricultural labour productivity and the full implementation of AfCFTA food security in African countries will benefit from the effective implementation of the AfCFTA This includes through greater economic diversification (value addition and intra-African trade), the creation of jobs and revenue to fight poverty and food insecurity. the AfCFTA can support the procurement of food from closer regional markets. All these factors could go a long way to enhance the continent’s food security and reduce vulnerability to current and emerging shocks.

a deep coronavirus induced recession could drag GDP of African economies 60% of the African population dependent on agriculture trade distortions threaten food security the continent’s production hampered by distribution, access, and affordability is insufficient Africa imported 85% of its food reliance is detrimental especially at a time of crisis African exporters were among the hardest hit African governments should ensure movement is guaranteed COVID highlighted importance of trade to ensure minimal disruptions increase in labour and implementation of AfCFTA includes economic diversification ( intra-African trade) jobs regional markets

The International Monetary Fund has projected a deep coronavirus-induced global recession, which threatens a nearly 4% drop in world GDP and could drag the GDP of African economies into a fall of about 1.4%, with smaller economies facing a contraction of up to 7.8%. This decline is mainly a result of export adjustments affecting primary commodity exporters and associated tax revenue losses. This in turn, reduces governments’ capacity to extend the public services needed to respond effectively to the crisis. Overall, UNCTAD estimates a regional average of about 5% in public revenue losses in Africa. Total merchandise exports are expected to contract by about 17% in 2020. These losses will have repercussions on Africa’s progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals and Africa’s Agenda 2063. With at least 60% of the African population dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods and access to food, any trade-related distortions to the sector can threaten the food security of the continent’s poor. In addition to the impact of extreme climate shocks on agricultural productivity, there is a strong positive correlation between economic recession and food insecurity in Africa. Despite the continent’s huge resource endowments (including a wide availability of arable land, and a young, growing labour force, among other factors), the continent’s agricultural production alone, hampered by distribution, access, and affordability challenges, is insufficient to meet its food security needs. Huge food importer From 2016 to 2018, Africa imported about 85% of its food from outside the continent, leading to an annual food import bill of $35 billion, which is forecast to reach $110 billion by 2025. This heavy reliance on world markets is detrimental to food security, especially at a time of acute crisis. A situation exacerbated by the current COVID-19 crisis through its direct impacts on trade, logistics, production and value chains. In several African countries, the disruption of marketing and trade activities, and COVID-19-related panic-buying, exacerbated food price increases (especially cereals) between March and June. National policy responses to limit the impact of COVID-19 on food markets in Africa have varied, from the removal of value-added taxes on food products to export restrictions on key food items. For example, on 26 March, Kenya reduced the value-added tax on all goods from 16% to 14%. Sudan introduced a ban on sorghum exports on 15 April to ensure domestic availability.  Export restriction policies and hoarding short-circuit trade and distribution, thus exacerbating the risks of food insecurity, especially for the continent’s most vulnerable populations. Administrative restrictions imposed by governments, such as lockdowns, travel restrictions and physical distancing measures have also worsened the risk of food insecurity. These restrictions are being felt particularly strongly by low-income households and those working in the informal economy, due to their loss of livelihoods and inability to access markets. Worsening hunger In Africa, recent estimates suggest that 73 million people are acutely food insecure. Furthermore, since last year, African regions, particularly the Sahel and southern Africa, have been severely affected by climate change. And the unprecedented locust outbreak in the Horn of Africa put additional pressure on regional food systems. The region is particularly at risk, given the prevalence of conflict and political instability. A regional slump in food production and a fall in global demand may prolong the negative trade effects of COVID-19, with poverty and food insecurity expected to continue to rise in 2021. UNCTAD’s macro-econometric model assessing the possible effects of COVID-19 on African economies generates conservative estimates based only on global shocks that affected trade between Africa and the rest of the world. The results of the model show that African net food exporters were among the hardest hit. They not only faced low export volumes due to depressed world demand, but also a productivity slump. This will take time to return to equilibrium after 2020. However, the impact on the food sector is disproportionately higher among smaller economies, which face a relatively deeper reduction in their food exports and resulting revenue. In the worst-case scenario of a 4% drop in worldwide GDP, UNCTAD estimates that food exports from African countries could decline by about 3%. This could be accompanied by a total contraction in the region’s GDP of about 1.4%. At the country level, GDP contractions could reach 7.8% in Comoros, 6% in Guinea Bissau, 5.6 % in the Seychelles and 4.5% in Malawi, among others. Although food exports are important, for small island developing states (SIDS) like Comoros and the Seychelles, the key COVID-19 related shock to their economies is the collapse in demand for tourism services. Furthermore, heavy reliance on trade taxes and duties could lead to severe COVID-19 related revenue losses in African LDCs. According to UNCTAD’s forthcoming model, revenue losses could reach 5.8% in Burundi, -7.6% in Comoros, -10% in The Gambia, -10.2% in Malawi, and -7% Sierra Leone. Revenue losses greatly undermine the ability to import productivity-enhancing inputs for domestic production and food exports. Furthermore, despite the favourability of lower fuel prices for net fuel importers, the recession in least developed countries and SIDS may also lead to reduced fuel imports, as production in other sectors remains depressed. For example, countries like Burundi (-26.6%), Cabo Verde (-8.5%), Comoros (-30%) and Malawi (-15%) are all expected to import less fuels during 2020 and 2021. How to blunt the COVID-19 impact In order to address the impact of COVID-19 on food security in the long term, Africa will need to build productive capacities to address underlying economic vulnerabilities, and strengthen continental capabilities to better manage food, pandemic and/or health-related crises. Unnecessary export restrictions on food can have far-reaching consequences for the multilateral trading system and African economies. Such measures will not only impede progress in managing the current crisis, but also compromise African countries’ longer-term efforts to tackle food insecurity and poverty. African governments should ensure the movement of goods, including food, and related essential services (i.e. transportation) is guaranteed. COVID-19 has clearly highlighted the degree of interconnectedness between countries and the importance of maintaining trade links to ensure minimal disruptions to food supply. African countries also need to reduce their commodity dependence, which has been among the key factors increasing their vulnerability to food insecurity. The diversification of their commodity base and value addition will be critical in achieving this, particularly if effectively augmented by a significant increase in agricultural labour productivity and the full implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). It is likely that food security in African countries will benefit from the effective implementation of the AfCFTA. This includes through greater economic diversification (value addition and intra-African trade), the creation of jobs and revenue to fight poverty and food insecurity. Moreover, the AfCFTA can support the procurement of food from closer regional markets. All these factors could go a long way to enhance the continent’s food security and reduce vulnerability to current and emerging shocks.

<h4>COVID is causing a <u>food security crisis</u> – only intra-African trade solves <u>structural barriers</h4><p></u>Paul <strong>Akiwumi 20</strong> {Director for Africa and Least Developed Countries, UNCTAD} - ("COVID-19: A threat to food security in Africa," UNCTAD, published 8-1-2020, accessed 12-13-2022, https://unctad.org/news/covid-19-threat-food-security-africa)//marlborough-wr/</p><p>The International Monetary Fund has projected <u><mark>a <strong>deep coronavirus</mark>-<mark>induced</mark> global <mark>recession</u></strong></mark>, which <u>threatens a nearly 4% drop in world GDP and <mark>could</mark> <mark>drag</mark> the <mark>GDP of African economies</mark> into a fall of about 1.4%, with smaller economies facing a contraction of up to 7.8%.</p><p>This decline is mainly a result of export adjustments affecting primary commodity exporters and associated tax revenue losses. This in turn, reduces governments’ capacity to extend the public services needed to respond effectively to the crisis.</p><p></u>Overall, <u>UNCTAD estimates a regional average of about 5% in public revenue losses in Africa. Total merchandise exports are expected to contract by about 17% in 2020.</p><p></u>These losses will have repercussions on Africa’s progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals and Africa’s Agenda 2063. <u>With at least <strong><mark>60% of the African population dependent on agriculture</strong></mark> for their livelihoods and access to food, any <mark>trade</mark>-related <mark>distortions</mark> to the sector can <strong><mark>threaten</mark> the <mark>food security</strong></mark> of the continent’s poor.</p><p></u>In addition to the impact of extreme climate shocks on agricultural productivity, <u>there is a <strong>strong positive correlation between economic recession and food insecurity</strong> in Africa. Despite the continent’s huge resource endowments (including a wide availability of arable land, and a young, growing labour force, among other factors), <mark>the</mark> <mark>continent’s</mark> agricultural <mark>production</mark> alone, <mark>hampered</mark> <mark>by distribution, access, and affordability</mark> challenges, <mark>is insufficient</mark> to meet its food security needs.</p><p></u>Huge food importer</p><p>From 2016 to 2018, <u><mark>Africa imported</mark> about <mark>85% of its food</mark> from outside the continent</u>, leading to an annual food import bill of $35 billion, which is forecast to reach $110 billion by 2025. <u>This heavy <mark>reliance</mark> on world markets <mark>is detrimental </mark>to food security, <mark>especially</mark> <mark>at</mark> <mark>a time of</mark> acute <mark>crisis</mark>. A situation exacerbated by the current COVID-19 crisis through its direct impacts on trade, logistics, production and value chains.</u> In several African countries, <u>the disruption of marketing and trade activities, and COVID-19-related panic-buying, exacerbated food price increases</u> (especially cereals) between March and June.</p><p>National policy responses to limit the impact of COVID-19 on food markets in Africa have varied, from the removal of value-added taxes on food products to export restrictions on key food items. For example, on 26 March, Kenya reduced the value-added tax on all goods from 16% to 14%. Sudan introduced a ban on sorghum exports on 15 April to ensure domestic availability.  Export restriction policies and hoarding short-circuit trade and distribution, thus exacerbating the risks of food insecurity, especially for the continent’s most vulnerable populations.</p><p><u>Administrative restrictions imposed by governments, such as lockdowns, travel restrictions and physical distancing measures have also worsened the risk of food insecurity.</u> These restrictions are being felt particularly strongly by low-income households and those working in the informal economy, due to their loss of livelihoods and inability to access markets.</p><p>Worsening hunger</p><p><u>In Africa</u>, recent estimates suggest that <u>73 million people are acutely food insecure.</u> Furthermore, since last year, African regions, particularly the Sahel and southern Africa, have been severely affected by climate change. And the unprecedented locust outbreak in the Horn of Africa put additional pressure on regional food systems. The region is particularly at risk, given the prevalence of conflict and political instability. <u>A regional slump in food production and a fall in global demand may prolong the negative trade effects of COVID-19, with poverty and food insecurity expected to continue to rise </u>in 2021.</p><p>UNCTAD’s macro-econometric model assessing the possible effects of COVID-19 on African economies generates conservative estimates based only on global shocks that affected trade between Africa and the rest of the world. The results of the model show that <u><mark>African</mark> net food <mark>exporters</mark> <mark>were among the hardest hit</mark>. They not only faced low export volumes due to depressed world demand, but also a productivity slump</u>. This will take time to return to equilibrium after 2020. However, <u>the impact on the food sector is disproportionately higher among smaller economies, which face a relatively deeper reduction in their food exports and resulting revenue</u>. In the worst-case scenario of a 4% drop in worldwide GDP, UNCTAD estimates that food exports from African countries could decline by about 3%. This could be accompanied by a total contraction in the region’s GDP of about 1.4%. At the country level, GDP contractions could reach 7.8% in Comoros, 6% in Guinea Bissau, 5.6 % in the Seychelles and 4.5% in Malawi, among others.</p><p>Although food exports are important, for small island developing states (SIDS) like Comoros and the Seychelles, <u>the key COVID-19 related shock to their economies is the collapse in demand for tourism services.</u> Furthermore, <u>heavy reliance on trade taxes and duties could lead to severe COVID-19 related revenue losses in African LDCs</u>. According to UNCTAD’s forthcoming model, revenue losses could reach 5.8% in Burundi, -7.6% in Comoros, -10% in The Gambia, -10.2% in Malawi, and -7% Sierra Leone. <u>Revenue losses greatly undermine the ability to import productivity-enhancing inputs for domestic production and food exports. </u>Furthermore, despite the favourability of lower fuel prices for net fuel importers, the recession in least developed countries and SIDS may also lead to reduced fuel imports, as production in other sectors remains depressed. For example, countries like Burundi (-26.6%), Cabo Verde (-8.5%), Comoros (-30%) and Malawi (-15%) are all expected to import less fuels during 2020 and 2021.</p><p>How to blunt the COVID-19 impact</p><p><u>In order to address the impact of COVID-19 on food security in the long term, Africa will need to <strong>build productive capacities to address underlying economic vulnerabilities</u></strong>, and strengthen continental capabilities to better manage food, pandemic and/or health-related crises. Unnecessary export restrictions on food can have far-reaching consequences for the multilateral trading system and African economies. Such measures will not only impede progress in managing the current crisis, but also compromise African countries’ longer-term efforts to tackle food insecurity and poverty. <u><mark>African governments should ensure</mark> the <mark>movement</mark> of goods, including food, and related essential services (i.e. transportation) <mark>is guaranteed</u></mark>. <u><mark>COVID</mark>-19 has clearly <mark>highlighted</mark> the <strong>degree of interconnectedness between countries</strong> and the <strong><mark>importance</mark> <mark>of</mark> maintaining <mark>trade</mark> links</strong> <mark>to ensure</mark> <mark>minimal disruptions</mark> to food supply.</p><p>African countries also need to r<strong>educe their commodity dependence</strong>, which has been among the <strong>key factors increasing their vulnerability to food insecurity</strong>.</u> <u>The diversification of their commodity base and value addition will be critical</u> in achieving this, particularly <u>if</u> effectively <u>augmented by a significant <mark>increase in</mark> agricultural <mark>labour</mark> productivity <mark>and</mark> the full <mark>implementation of</u></mark> the African Continental Free Trade Area (<u><mark>AfCFTA</u></mark>). It is likely that <u>food security in African countries will benefit from the <strong>effective implementation of the AfCFTA</u></strong>. <u>This <mark>includes</mark> through greater <strong><mark>economic diversification</mark> <mark>(</mark>value addition and <mark>intra-African trade</strong>)</mark>, the creation of <mark>jobs</mark> and revenue to fight poverty and food insecurity.</u> Moreover, <u>the AfCFTA <strong>can support the procurement of food from closer <mark>regional</mark> <mark>markets</strong></mark>. All these factors <strong>could go a long way</strong> to enhance the continent’s food security and <strong>reduce vulnerability to current and emerging shocks</strong>.</p></u>

AC Shell

Econ

./documents/hsld22/Marlborough/ShLe/Marlborough-ShLe-Aff-Golden-Desert-(UNLV)-Round-1.docx

A

Golden Desert (UNLV)

1

Sage Oak AK

Allyson Spurlock

FMP, colonialism, econ nC- da, cp, case AR- case, da, cp Nr- dedev 2AR- case, dedev

hsld22/Marlborough/ShLe/Marlborough-ShLe-Aff-Golden-Desert-(UNLV)-Round-1.docx

2023-02-04 18:01:54

ShLe

Marlborough ShLe

Sh.....

Le.....

Marlborough

Marlborough

CA

hsld22

HS LD 2022-23

ld

hs

Reforms fail – only the plan solves

Chen 18

Chen 18 [(Ashley, former President of the Brown Political Review and a Senior Staff Writer for the US Section.) “Bridging the Gap: Why China’s Hukou System Needs Reform” Brown Pollical Review, 5/28/2018. https://brownpoliticalreview.org/2018/05/bridging-gap-chinas-hukou-system-needs-reform/] BC

China’s meteoric economic rise has relied on hundreds of millions of rural migrants These migrants make incredible sacrifices for the economic opportunity of moving to a city, often leaving behind their children and their homes. , these workers’ struggles stem from a seemingly benign migration control policy called “hukou” a household registration system that controls the movements of Chinese residents and defines people by birthplace as either urban or rural. Hukou status cannot change, so even when rural migrant workers find employment in large cities such as Shanghai, they retain rural hukou status. the hukou system only exacerbates the rural-urban divide." Holding a non-local hukou in an urban area drastically hinders access to basic social services, such as public schooling, subsidized medical care, and unemployment insurance. In a country with widespread negative stereotypes about the rural poor, the hukou system only exacerbates the rural-urban divide. To improve the hukou system, the government must implement reforms that benefit those moving from the countryside and into cities. Urbanites and government leaders have rendered past hukou reform attempts ineffective. Urban residents have an economic interest in pushing for the status quo and many possess prejudiced attitudes toward migrants. One-third of Shanghai urbanites claimed they would not want a rural neighbor; only one-tenth felt the same way about having a poor one. the reforms that have managed to pass have just created new obstacles for rural migrants. For example, a 1996 law gave migrant children the right to attend elementary and middle school in the cities where their parents worked. Schools responded with temporary resident fees and additional verification requirements for the children of rural migrants, deterring migrants from bringing their children to urban areas. And since the law did not extend to high schools, the few children who did benefit had to return to the countryside to finish their education. In 2013, the government tried to introduce more drastic changes e countryside and allows them to be subject to a more relaxed birth-control policy. Most migrants thought the perks of rural hukou outweighed the meager benefits of third-tier urban hukou, so the 2013 reforms failed to produce any substantial changes. China’s most recent attempt to liberalize hukou has allowed rural hukou holders to apply for first-tier urban hukou based on a points system which takes into account adherence to the local birth-control policy, educational attainment, and employment seniority. These reforms help well-educated elites, but do little for China’s migrant underclass. The burdensome process of applying for urban hukou and the low likelihood of finding affordable housing in a first-tier city has discouraged many migrants from taking advantage of these reforms. It’s important to acknowledge that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is unlikely to eradicate hukou which plays an important role in social control To produce any substantial impacts, future reforms should focus on equalizing treatment toward holders of different types of hukou, rather than providing more opportunities for migrants to apply for higher-tier hukou.

workers’ struggles stem from hukou a system that controls movements of Chinese residents Hukou status cannot change hukou exacerbates rural-urban divide drastically hinders access to social services leaders have rendered reform attempts ineffective reforms have created new obstacles for migrants most recent points system help well-educated elites but do little for China’s underclass. The burdensome process has discouraged many migrants the CCP is unlikely to eradicate hukou

China’s meteoric economic rise has relied on hundreds of millions of rural migrants. These migrants make incredible sacrifices for the economic opportunity of moving to a city, often leaving behind their children and their homes. In fact, these workers’ struggles stem from a seemingly benign migration control policy called “hukou”—a household registration system that controls the movements of Chinese residents and defines people by birthplace as either urban or rural. Hukou status cannot change, so even when rural migrant workers find employment in large cities such as Shanghai, they retain rural hukou status. "In a country with widespread negative stereotypes about the rural poor, the hukou system only exacerbates the rural-urban divide." Holding a non-local hukou in an urban area drastically hinders access to basic social services, such as public schooling, subsidized medical care, and unemployment insurance. In a country with widespread negative stereotypes about the rural poor, the hukou system only exacerbates the rural-urban divide. To improve the hukou system, the government must implement reforms that benefit those moving from the countryside and into cities. Urbanites and government leaders have rendered past hukou reform attempts ineffective. Urban residents have an economic interest in pushing for the status quo and many possess prejudiced attitudes toward migrants. One-third of Shanghai urbanites claimed they would not want a rural neighbor; only one-tenth felt the same way about having a poor one. Unfortunately, the reforms that have managed to pass have just created new obstacles for rural migrants. For example, a 1996 law gave migrant children the right to attend elementary and middle school in the cities where their parents worked. Schools responded with temporary resident fees and additional verification requirements for the children of rural migrants, deterring migrants from bringing their children to urban areas. And since the law did not extend to high schools, the few children who did benefit had to return to the countryside to finish their education. In 2013, the government tried to introduce more drastic changes. New policies gave rural residents the ability to gain urban hukou in third-tier cities with smaller populations and fewer economic opportunities than first-tier cities. However, though rural status is associated with inconveniences and discrimination, it also comes with its share of benefits: A rural hukou guarantees its holder a small plot of land in the countryside and allows them to be subject to a more relaxed birth-control policy. Most migrants thought the perks of rural hukou outweighed the meager benefits of third-tier urban hukou, so the 2013 reforms failed to produce any substantial changes. China’s most recent attempt to liberalize hukou has allowed rural hukou holders to apply for first-tier urban hukou based on a points system which takes into account adherence to the local birth-control policy, educational attainment, and employment seniority. These reforms help well-educated elites, but do little for China’s migrant underclass. The burdensome process of applying for urban hukou and the low likelihood of finding affordable housing in a first-tier city has discouraged many migrants from taking advantage of these reforms. It’s important to acknowledge that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is unlikely to eradicate hukou, which plays an important role in social control. To produce any substantial impacts, future reforms should focus on equalizing treatment toward holders of different types of hukou, rather than providing more opportunities for migrants to apply for higher-tier hukou.

<h4><strong>Reforms fail – only the plan solves </h4><p>Chen 18 <u></strong>[(Ashley, former President of the Brown Political Review and a Senior Staff Writer for the US Section.) “Bridging the Gap: Why China’s Hukou System Needs Reform” Brown Pollical Review, 5/28/2018. https://brownpoliticalreview.org/2018/05/bridging-gap-chinas-hukou-system-needs-reform/] BC</p><p>China’s meteoric economic rise has relied on hundreds of millions of rural migrants</u>. <u>These migrants make incredible sacrifices for the economic opportunity of moving to a city, often leaving behind their children and their homes.</u> In fact<u><strong>, these <mark>workers’ struggles stem from</mark> a seemingly benign migration control policy called “<mark>hukou</mark>”</u></strong>—<u><mark>a</mark> household registration <mark>system that <strong>controls</mark> the <mark>movements of Chinese residents</strong></mark> and <strong>defines people by birthplace as either urban or rural</strong>. <mark>Hukou status cannot change</mark>, so even when rural migrant workers find employment in large cities such as Shanghai, they retain rural hukou status.</p><p></u>"In a country with widespread negative stereotypes about the rural poor, <u><strong>the <mark>hukou</mark> system only <mark>exacerbates</mark> the <mark>rural-urban divide</strong></mark>."</p><p><strong>Holding a non-local hukou in an urban area <mark>drastically hinders access to</mark> basic <mark>social services</mark>, such as public schooling, subsidized medical care, and unemployment insurance.</u></strong> <u>In a country with widespread negative stereotypes about the rural poor, <strong>the hukou system only exacerbates the rural-urban divide.</strong> To improve the hukou system, the government must implement reforms that benefit those moving from the countryside and into cities.</p><p><strong>Urbanites and government <mark>leaders have rendered</mark> past hukou <mark>reform attempts ineffective</strong></mark>. Urban residents have an economic interest in pushing for the status quo and many possess prejudiced attitudes toward migrants. One-third of Shanghai urbanites claimed they would not want a rural neighbor; only one-tenth felt the same way about having a poor one.</p><p></u>Unfortunately, <u><strong>the <mark>reforms</mark> that have managed to pass <mark>have</mark> just <mark>created new obstacles for</mark> rural <mark>migrants</mark>.</u></strong> <u>For example, a 1996 law gave migrant children the right to attend elementary and middle school in the cities where their parents worked<strong>. Schools responded with temporary resident fees and additional verification requirements for the children of rural migrants, deterring migrants from bringing their children to urban areas.</strong> And since the law did not extend to high schools, the few children who did benefit had to return to the countryside to finish their education.</p><p>In 2013, the government tried to introduce more drastic changes</u>. New policies gave rural residents the ability to gain urban hukou in third-tier cities with smaller populations and fewer economic opportunities than first-tier cities. However, though rural status is associated with inconveniences and discrimination, it also comes with its share of benefits: A rural hukou guarantees its holder a small plot of land in th<u>e countryside and allows them to be subject to a more relaxed birth-control policy. Most migrants thought the perks of rural hukou outweighed the meager benefits of third-tier urban hukou, so the 2013 reforms failed to produce any substantial changes.</p><p>China’s <mark>most recent</mark> attempt to liberalize hukou has allowed rural hukou holders to apply for first-tier urban hukou based on a <mark>points system</mark> which takes into account adherence to the local birth-control policy, educational attainment, and employment seniority<strong>. These reforms <mark>help well-educated elites</mark>, <mark>but do little for China’s</mark> migrant <mark>underclass.</u></strong> <u>The burdensome process</mark> of applying for urban hukou and the low likelihood of finding affordable housing in a first-tier city <mark>has discouraged many migrants</mark> from taking advantage of these reforms.</p><p><strong>It’s important to acknowledge that <mark>the</mark> Chinese Communist Party (<mark>CCP</mark>) <mark>is unlikely to eradicate hukou</u></strong></mark>, <u>which plays an important role in social control</u>. <u>To produce any substantial impacts, future reforms should focus on equalizing treatment toward holders of different types of hukou, rather than providing more opportunities for migrants to apply for higher-tier hukou.</p></u>

1AC—Hukou

1AC – Substance

FW

./documents/hsld22/MercerIsland/AnWa/MercerIsland-AnWa-Aff-TOC-Digital-Speech-and-Debate-Series-3-Round-4.docx

A

TOC Digital Speech and Debate Series 3

4

Montville SH

Heirigs

1ac - hukou 1nc - cap da t 1ar - all 1nr - cap 2ar - same

hsld22/MercerIsland/AnWa/MercerIsland-AnWa-Aff-TOC-Digital-Speech-and-Debate-Series-3-Round-4.docx

2023-03-13 21:25:11

AnWa

Mercer Island AnWa

Hey - I'm Anthony (he/him). Contact info is [email protected] or #4259002688, if you need to contact me for any reason

An.....

Wa.....

MercerIsland

Mercer Island

WA

hsld22

HS LD 2022-23

ld

hs

Addressing the anthropocene through policy actions and market solutions is productive—the world is getting better now but only continued investment in institutions prevents their impacts

Brook, et al, 15

Brook, et al, 15—professor of environmental sustainability at the University of Tasmania (Barry, with John Asafu-Adjaye, University of Queensland, Linus Blomqvist, Breakthrough Institute, Stewart Brand, Long Now Foundation, Ruth DeFries, Columbia Univeristy, Erle Ellis, University of Maryland, Baltimore County, Christopher Foreman, University of Maryland School of Public Policy, David Keith, Harvard University School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Martin Lewis, Stanford University, Mark Lynas, Cornell University, Ted Nordhaus, Breakthrough Institute, Roger Pielke, Jr., University of Colorado, Boulder, Rachel Pritzker, Pritzker Innovation Fund, Joyashree Roy, Jadavpur University, Mark Sagoff, George Mason University, Michael Shellenberger, Breakthrough Institute, Robert Stone, Filmmaker, and Peter Teague, Breakthrough Institute, “AN ECOMODERNIST MANIFESTO”, http://www.ecomodernism.org/manifesto/, dml)

Intensifying many human activities so that they use less land and interfere less with the natural world is the key to decoupling human development from environmental impacts. These socioeconomic and technological processes are central to economic modernization and environmental protection. Together they allow people to mitigate climate change, to spare nature, and to alleviate global poverty. 1. Humanity has flourished over the past two centuries. Average life expectancy has increased Humanity has made extraordinary progress in reducing the incidence and impacts of infectious diseases, and it has become more resilient to extreme weather and other natural disasters. Violence in all forms has declined significantly and is probably at the lowest per capita level ever experienced by the human species human beings have moved from autocratic government toward liberal democracy characterized by the rule of law and increased freedom. liberties have spread worldwide Historically large numbers of humans both in percentage and in absolute terms — are free from insecurity, penury, and servitude. human flourishing has taken a serious toll on natural, nonhuman environments and wildlife. Given that humans are completely dependent on the living biosphere, how is it possible that people are doing so much damage to natural systems without doing more harm to themselves? technologies have made humans less reliant upon the many ecosystems that once provided their only sustenance, even as those same ecosystems have often been left deeply damaged. Despite frequent assertions of limits to growth there is little evidence that human population and economic expansion will outstrip the capacity to grow food or procure critical material resources in the foreseeable future boundaries to consumption are so theoretical as to be functionally irrelevant Human civilization can flourish for millennia on energy delivered from a closed cycle With proper management, humans are at no risk of lacking sufficient agricultural land for food Given plentiful land and unlimited energy, substitutes for other material inputs to human well-being can easily be found There remain serious long-term environmental threats to human well-being the evidence is clear that they could cause significant risk of catastrophic impacts on societies and ecosystems 2. a range of long-term trends are driving significant decoupling of human well-being from environmental impacts. Decoupling can be driven by both technological and demographic trends and usually results from a combination of the two. growth rate of the population has already peaked population growth is down the size of the human population will peak this century and then start to decline. cities both drive and symbolize the decoupling of humanity from nature, performing far better than rural economies in providing efficiently for material needs while reducing environmental impacts modernization is not possible in a subsistence agrarian economy rising harvest yields have for millennia reduced the amount of land required to feed the average person. The average per-capita use of land today is vastly lower Thanks to technological improvements in agriculture the amount of land required for growing declined by one-half Agricultural intensification has allowed many parts of the world to experience net reforestation Human use of many other resources is similarly peaking. The amount of water needed has declined nitrogen has declined significantly in contradiction to the often-expressed fear of infinite growth colliding with a finite planet, demand for many material goods may be saturating as societies grow wealthier As demand for material goods is met, developed economies see higher levels of spending directed to materially less-intensive service and knowledge sectors, which account for an increasing share of economic activity. This dynamic might be even more pronounced in today’s developing economies, which may benefit from being late adopters of resource-efficient technologies. these trends mean that the total human impact on the environment can peak and decline this century. By understanding and promoting these emergent processes, humans have the opportunity to re-wild and re-green the Earth — even as developing countries achieve modern living standards, and material poverty ends. early populations with much less advanced technologies had far larger individual land footprints than societies have today The technologies that humankind’s ancestors used to meet their needs supported much lower living standards with much higher per-capita impacts on the environment. Absent a massive human die-off, any large-scale attempt at recoupling human societies to nature using these technologies would result in an unmitigated ecological and human disaster. Ecosystems around the world are threatened today because people over-rely on them it is the continued dependence of humans on natural environments that is the problem for the conservation of nature. modern technologies offer a real chance of reducing the totality of human impacts on the biosphere The modernization processes are double-edged, since they have also degraded the natural environment. Fossil fuels, mechanization and manufacturing, synthetic fertilizers and pesticides, electrification and modern transportation and communication technologies, have made larger human populations and greater consumption possible in the first place. Had technologies not improved since the Dark Ages, no doubt the human population would not have grown much either. It is also true that large, increasingly affluent urban populations have placed greater demands upon ecosystems But those same technologies have also made it possible for people to secure food, shelter, heat, light, and mobility through means that are vastly more resource- and land-efficient than at any previous time in human history. Decoupling requires the conscious acceleration of emergent decoupling processes. In some cases, the objective is the development of technological substitutes. Reducing deforestation and indoor air pollution requires the substitution of wood and charcoal with modern energy. humanity’s goal should be to use resources more productively. For example, increasing agricultural yields can reduce the conversion of forests and grasslands to farms. Humans should seek to liberate the environment from the economy. Urbanization, agricultural intensification, nuclear power, aquaculture, and desalination are all processes with a demonstrated potential to reduce human demands on the environment Climate change and other global ecological challenges are not the most important immediate concerns for the majority of the world's people. Nor should they be. A new coal-fired power station in Bangladesh may bring air pollution and rising carbon dioxide emissions but will also save lives. For millions living without light and forced to burn dung to cook their food, electricity and modern fuels, no matter the source, offer a pathway to a better life, even as they also bring new environmental challenges. climate mitigation is a technological challenge even dramatic limits to per capita global consumption would be insufficient to achieve significant climate mitigation. Absent profound technological change there is no credible path to meaningful climate mitigation we are aware of no quantified climate mitigation scenario in which technological change is not responsible for the vast majority of emissions cuts. that there have been consistent patterns associated with the ways that societies move toward cleaner sources of energy. Substituting higher-quality fuels for lower-quality ones is how virtually all societies have decarbonized, and points the way toward accelerated decarbonization in the future solar and nuclear represent the most plausible pathways that transition will take time. During that transition, other energy technologies can provide important social and environmental benefits The ethical and pragmatic path toward a just and sustainable global energy economy requires that human beings transition as rapidly as possible to energy sources that are cheap, clean, dense, and abundant. Such a path will require sustained public support for the development and deployment of clean energy technologies We write this document out of deep love and emotional connection to the natural world. By appreciating, exploring, seeking to understand, and cultivating nature, many people get outside themselves. They connect with their deep evolutionary history. Even when people never experience these wild natures directly, they affirm their existence as important for their psychological and spiritual well-being. Humans will always materially depend on nature to some degree. Even if a fully synthetic world were possible, many of us might still choose to continue to live more coupled with nature than human sustenance and technologies require. What decoupling offers is the possibility that humanity’s material dependence upon nature might be less destructive. We affirm the need and human capacity for accelerated, active, and conscious decoupling. Technological progress is not inevitable The long arc of human transformation of natural environments through technologies began well before there existed anything resembling a market or a price signal Too often, modernization is conflated with capitalism, corporate power, and laissez-faire economic policies. We reject such reductions modernization is the long-term evolution of social, economic, political, and technological arrangements in human societies Modernization has liberated ever more people from lives of poverty Greater resource productivity associated with modern socio-technological systems has allowed human societies to meet human needs with fewer resource inputs and less impact on the environment. More-productive economies are wealthier economies, capable of better meeting human needs while committing more of their economic surplus to non-economic amenities, including better human health, greater human freedom and opportunity, arts, culture, and the conservation of nature. Modernizing processes are far from complete, even in advanced developed economies. Material consumption has only just begun to peak in the wealthiest societies. Decoupling will require a sustained commitment to technological progress and the continuing evolution of social, economic, and political institutions alongside those changes. Accelerated technological progress will require the active, assertive, and aggressive participation of private sector entrepreneurs, markets, civil society, and the state we continue to embrace a strong public role in addressing environmental problems and accelerating technological innovation, including research to develop better technologies, subsidies, and other measures to help bring them to market, and regulations to mitigate environmental hazards

Humanity has flourished Violence is the lowest ever limits to growth are theoretical With management, humans are at no risk of lacking ag environmental threats could cause catastrophic impacts trends are driving decoupling population growth is down modernization is not possible in a subsistence agrarian economy Ag has allowed reforestation use of resources is peaking in contradiction to the fear of infinite growth demand may be saturating the human impact can decline this century. By promoting these processes, humans have the opportunity to re-green the Earth climate is a technological challenge even dramatic limits to consumption would be insufficient Absent profound tech change there is no credible path to mitigation Humans will always depend on nature to some degree Tech is not inevitable human transformation of environments began before a market Too often, modernization is conflated with capitalism modernization is the evolution of arrangements Modernizing processes are far from complete Decoupling will require a sustained commitment to tech progress and active participation of markets and the state

Intensifying many human activities — particularly farming, energy extraction, forestry, and settlement — so that they use less land and interfere less with the natural world is the key to decoupling human development from environmental impacts. These socioeconomic and technological processes are central to economic modernization and environmental protection. Together they allow people to mitigate climate change, to spare nature, and to alleviate global poverty. Although we have to date written separately, our views are increasingly discussed as a whole. We call ourselves ecopragmatists and ecomodernists. We offer this statement to affirm and to clarify our views and to describe our vision for putting humankind’s extraordinary powers in the service of creating a good Anthropocene. 1. Humanity has flourished over the past two centuries. Average life expectancy has increased from 30 to 70 years, resulting in a large and growing population able to live in many different environments. Humanity has made extraordinary progress in reducing the incidence and impacts of infectious diseases, and it has become more resilient to extreme weather and other natural disasters. Violence in all forms has declined significantly and is probably at the lowest per capita level ever experienced by the human species, the horrors of the 20th century and present-day terrorism notwithstanding. Globally, human beings have moved from autocratic government toward liberal democracy characterized by the rule of law and increased freedom. Personal, economic, and political liberties have spread worldwide and are today largely accepted as universal values. Modernization liberates women from traditional gender roles, increasing their control of their fertility. Historically large numbers of humans — both in percentage and in absolute terms — are free from insecurity, penury, and servitude. At the same time, human flourishing has taken a serious toll on natural, nonhuman environments and wildlife. Humans use about half of the planet’s ice-free land, mostly for pasture, crops, and production forestry. Of the land once covered by forests, 20 percent has been converted to human use. Populations of many mammals, amphibians, and birds have declined by more than 50 percent in the past 40 years alone. More than 100 species from those groups went extinct in the 20th century, and about 785 since 1500. As we write, only four northern white rhinos are confirmed to exist. Given that humans are completely dependent on the living biosphere, how is it possible that people are doing so much damage to natural systems without doing more harm to themselves? The role that technology plays in reducing humanity’s dependence on nature explains this paradox. Human technologies, from those that first enabled agriculture to replace hunting and gathering, to those that drive today’s globalized economy, have made humans less reliant upon the many ecosystems that once provided their only sustenance, even as those same ecosystems have often been left deeply damaged. Despite frequent assertions starting in the 1970s of fundamental “limits to growth,” there is still remarkably little evidence that human population and economic expansion will outstrip the capacity to grow food or procure critical material resources in the foreseeable future. To the degree to which there are fixed physical boundaries to human consumption, they are so theoretical as to be functionally irrelevant. The amount of solar radiation that hits the Earth, for instance, is ultimately finite but represents no meaningful constraint upon human endeavors. Human civilization can flourish for centuries and millennia on energy delivered from a closed uranium or thorium fuel cycle, or from hydrogen-deuterium fusion. With proper management, humans are at no risk of lacking sufficient agricultural land for food. Given plentiful land and unlimited energy, substitutes for other material inputs to human well-being can easily be found if those inputs become scarce or expensive. There remain, however, serious long-term environmental threats to human well-being, such as anthropogenic climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion, and ocean acidification. While these risks are difficult to quantify, the evidence is clear today that they could cause significant risk of catastrophic impacts on societies and ecosystems. Even gradual, non-catastrophic outcomes associated with these threats are likely to result in significant human and economic costs as well as rising ecological losses. Much of the world’s population still suffers from more-immediate local environmental health risks. Indoor and outdoor air pollution continue to bring premature death and illness to millions annually. Water pollution and water-borne illness due to pollution and degradation of watersheds cause similar suffering. 2. Even as human environmental impacts continue to grow in the aggregate, a range of long-term trends are today driving significant decoupling of human well-being from environmental impacts. Decoupling occurs in both relative and absolute terms. Relative decoupling means that human environmental impacts rise at a slower rate than overall economic growth. Thus, for each unit of economic output, less environmental impact (e.g., deforestation, defaunation, pollution) results. Overall impacts may still increase, just at a slower rate than would otherwise be the case. Absolute decoupling occurs when total environmental impacts — impacts in the aggregate — peak and begin to decline, even as the economy continues to grow. Decoupling can be driven by both technological and demographic trends and usually results from a combination of the two. The growth rate of the human population has already peaked. Today’s population growth rate is one percent per year, down from its high point of 2.1 percent in the 1970s. Fertility rates in countries containing more than half of the global population are now below replacement level. Population growth today is primarily driven by longer life spans and lower infant mortality, not by rising fertility rates. Given current trends, it is very possible that the size of the human population will peak this century and then start to decline. Trends in population are inextricably linked to other demographic and economic dynamics. For the first time in human history, over half the global population lives in cities. By 2050, 70 percent are expected to dwell in cities, a number that could rise to 80 percent or more by the century’s end. Cities are characterized by both dense populations and low fertility rates. Cities occupy just 1 to 3 percent of the Earth’s surface and yet are home to nearly four billion people. As such, cities both drive and symbolize the decoupling of humanity from nature, performing far better than rural economies in providing efficiently for material needs while reducing environmental impacts. The growth of cities along with the economic and ecological benefits that come with them are inseparable from improvements in agricultural productivity. As agriculture has become more land and labor efficient, rural populations have left the countryside for the cities. Roughly half the US population worked the land in 1880. Today, less than 2 percent does. As human lives have been liberated from hard agricultural labor, enormous human resources have been freed up for other endeavors. Cities, as people know them today, could not exist without radical changes in farming. In contrast, modernization is not possible in a subsistence agrarian economy. These improvements have resulted not only in lower labor requirements per unit of agricultural output but also in lower land requirements. This is not a new trend: rising harvest yields have for millennia reduced the amount of land required to feed the average person. The average per-capita use of land today is vastly lower than it was 5,000 years ago, despite the fact that modern people enjoy a far richer diet. Thanks to technological improvements in agriculture, during the half-century starting in the mid-1960s, the amount of land required for growing crops and animal feed for the average person declined by one-half. Agricultural intensification, along with the move away from the use of wood as fuel, has allowed many parts of the world to experience net reforestation. About 80 percent of New England is today forested, compared with about 50 percent at the end of the 19th century. Over the past 20 years, the amount of land dedicated to production forest worldwide declined by 50 million hectares, an area the size of France. The “forest transition” from net deforestation to net reforestation seems to be as resilient a feature of development as the demographic transition that reduces human birth rates as poverty declines. Human use of many other resources is similarly peaking. The amount of water needed for the average diet has declined by nearly 25 percent over the past half-century. Nitrogen pollution continues to cause eutrophication and large dead zones in places like the Gulf of Mexico. While the total amount of nitrogen pollution is rising, the amount used per unit of production has declined significantly in developed nations. Indeed, in contradiction to the often-expressed fear of infinite growth colliding with a finite planet, demand for many material goods may be saturating as societies grow wealthier. Meat consumption, for instance, has peaked in many wealthy nations and has shifted away from beef toward protein sources that are less land intensive. As demand for material goods is met, developed economies see higher levels of spending directed to materially less-intensive service and knowledge sectors, which account for an increasing share of economic activity. This dynamic might be even more pronounced in today’s developing economies, which may benefit from being late adopters of resource-efficient technologies. Taken together, these trends mean that the total human impact on the environment, including land-use change, overexploitation, and pollution, can peak and decline this century. By understanding and promoting these emergent processes, humans have the opportunity to re-wild and re-green the Earth — even as developing countries achieve modern living standards, and material poverty ends. 3. The processes of decoupling described above challenge the idea that early human societies lived more lightly on the land than do modern societies. Insofar as past societies had less impact upon the environment, it was because those societies supported vastly smaller populations. In fact, early human populations with much less advanced technologies had far larger individual land footprints than societies have today. Consider that a population of no more than one or two million North Americans hunted most of the continent’s large mammals into extinction in the late Pleistocene, while burning and clearing forests across the continent in the process. Extensive human transformations of the environment continued throughout the Holocene period: as much as three-quarters of all deforestation globally occurred before the Industrial Revolution. The technologies that humankind’s ancestors used to meet their needs supported much lower living standards with much higher per-capita impacts on the environment. Absent a massive human die-off, any large-scale attempt at recoupling human societies to nature using these technologies would result in an unmitigated ecological and human disaster. Ecosystems around the world are threatened today because people over-rely on them: people who depend on firewood and charcoal for fuel cut down and degrade forests; people who eat bush meat for food hunt mammal species to local extirpation. Whether it’s a local indigenous community or a foreign corporation that benefits, it is the continued dependence of humans on natural environments that is the problem for the conservation of nature. Conversely, modern technologies, by using natural ecosystem flows and services more efficiently, offer a real chance of reducing the totality of human impacts on the biosphere. To embrace these technologies is to find paths to a good Anthropocene. The modernization processes that have increasingly liberated humanity from nature are, of course, double-edged, since they have also degraded the natural environment. Fossil fuels, mechanization and manufacturing, synthetic fertilizers and pesticides, electrification and modern transportation and communication technologies, have made larger human populations and greater consumption possible in the first place. Had technologies not improved since the Dark Ages, no doubt the human population would not have grown much either. It is also true that large, increasingly affluent urban populations have placed greater demands upon ecosystems in distant places –– the extraction of natural resources has been globalized. But those same technologies have also made it possible for people to secure food, shelter, heat, light, and mobility through means that are vastly more resource- and land-efficient than at any previous time in human history. Decoupling human well-being from the destruction of nature requires the conscious acceleration of emergent decoupling processes. In some cases, the objective is the development of technological substitutes. Reducing deforestation and indoor air pollution requires the substitution of wood and charcoal with modern energy. In other cases, humanity’s goal should be to use resources more productively. For example, increasing agricultural yields can reduce the conversion of forests and grasslands to farms. Humans should seek to liberate the environment from the economy. Urbanization, agricultural intensification, nuclear power, aquaculture, and desalination are all processes with a demonstrated potential to reduce human demands on the environment, allowing more room for non-human species. Suburbanization, low-yield farming, and many forms of renewable energy production, in contrast, generally require more land and resources and leave less room for nature. These patterns suggest that humans are as likely to spare nature because it is not needed to meet their needs as they are to spare it for explicit aesthetic and spiritual reasons. The parts of the planet that people have not yet profoundly transformed have mostly been spared because they have not yet found an economic use for them — mountains, deserts, boreal forests, and other “marginal” lands. Decoupling raises the possibility that societies might achieve peak human impact without intruding much further on relatively untouched areas. Nature unused is nature spared. 4. Plentiful access to modern energy is an essential prerequisite for human development and for decoupling development from nature. The availability of inexpensive energy allows poor people around the world to stop using forests for fuel. It allows humans to grow more food on less land, thanks to energy-heavy inputs such as fertilizer and tractors. Energy allows humans to recycle waste water and desalinate sea water in order to spare rivers and aquifers. It allows humans to cheaply recycle metal and plastic rather than to mine and refine these minerals. Looking forward, modern energy may allow the capture of carbon from the atmosphere to reduce the accumulated carbon that drives global warming. However, for at least the past three centuries, rising energy production globally has been matched by rising atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide. Nations have also been slowly decarbonizing — that is, reducing the carbon intensity of their economies — over that same time period. But they have not been doing so at a rate consistent with keeping cumulative carbon emissions low enough to reliably stay below the international target of less than 2 degrees Centigrade of global warming. Significant climate mitigation, therefore, will require that humans rapidly accelerate existing processes of decarbonization. There remains much confusion, however, as to how this might be accomplished. In developing countries, rising energy consumption is tightly correlated with rising incomes and improving living standards. Although the use of many other material resource inputs such as nitrogen, timber, and land are beginning to peak, the centrality of energy in human development and its many uses as a substitute for material and human resources suggest that energy consumption will continue to rise through much if not all of the 21st century. For that reason, any conflict between climate mitigation and the continuing development process through which billions of people around the world are achieving modern living standards will continue to be resolved resoundingly in favor of the latter. Climate change and other global ecological challenges are not the most important immediate concerns for the majority of the world's people. Nor should they be. A new coal-fired power station in Bangladesh may bring air pollution and rising carbon dioxide emissions but will also save lives. For millions living without light and forced to burn dung to cook their food, electricity and modern fuels, no matter the source, offer a pathway to a better life, even as they also bring new environmental challenges. Meaningful climate mitigation is fundamentally a technological challenge. By this we mean that even dramatic limits to per capita global consumption would be insufficient to achieve significant climate mitigation. Absent profound technological change there is no credible path to meaningful climate mitigation. While advocates differ in the particular mix of technologies they favor, we are aware of no quantified climate mitigation scenario in which technological change is not responsible for the vast majority of emissions cuts. The specific technological paths that people might take toward climate mitigation remain deeply contested. Theoretical scenarios for climate mitigation typically reflect their creators’ technological preferences and analytical assumptions while all too often failing to account for the cost, rate, and scale at which low-carbon energy technologies can be deployed. The history of energy transitions, however, suggests that there have been consistent patterns associated with the ways that societies move toward cleaner sources of energy. Substituting higher-quality (i.e., less carbon-intensive, higher-density) fuels for lower-quality (i.e., more carbon-intensive, lower-density) ones is how virtually all societies have decarbonized, and points the way toward accelerated decarbonization in the future. Transitioning to a world powered by zero-carbon energy sources will require energy technologies that are power dense and capable of scaling to many tens of terawatts to power a growing human economy. Most forms of renewable energy are, unfortunately, incapable of doing so. The scale of land use and other environmental impacts necessary to power the world on biofuels or many other renewables are such that we doubt they provide a sound pathway to a zero-carbon low-footprint future. High-efficiency solar cells produced from earth-abundant materials are an exception and have the potential to provide many tens of terawatts on a few percent of the Earth’s surface. Present-day solar technologies will require substantial innovation to meet this standard and the development of cheap energy storage technologies that are capable of dealing with highly variable energy generation at large scales. Nuclear fission today represents the only present-day zero-carbon technology with the demonstrated ability to meet most, if not all, of the energy demands of a modern economy. However, a variety of social, economic, and institutional challenges make deployment of present-day nuclear technologies at scales necessary to achieve significant climate mitigation unlikely. A new generation of nuclear technologies that are safer and cheaper will likely be necessary for nuclear energy to meet its full potential as a critical climate mitigation technology. In the long run, next-generation solar, advanced nuclear fission, and nuclear fusion represent the most plausible pathways toward the joint goals of climate stabilization and radical decoupling of humans from nature. If the history of energy transitions is any guide, however, that transition will take time. During that transition, other energy technologies can provide important social and environmental benefits. Hydroelectric dams, for example, may be a cheap source of low-carbon power for poor nations even though their land and water footprint is relatively large. Fossil fuels with carbon capture and storage can likewise provide substantial environmental benefits over current fossil or biomass energies. The ethical and pragmatic path toward a just and sustainable global energy economy requires that human beings transition as rapidly as possible to energy sources that are cheap, clean, dense, and abundant. Such a path will require sustained public support for the development and deployment of clean energy technologies, both within nations and between them, though international collaboration and competition, and within a broader framework for global modernization and development. 5. We write this document out of deep love and emotional connection to the natural world. By appreciating, exploring, seeking to understand, and cultivating nature, many people get outside themselves. They connect with their deep evolutionary history. Even when people never experience these wild natures directly, they affirm their existence as important for their psychological and spiritual well-being. Humans will always materially depend on nature to some degree. Even if a fully synthetic world were possible, many of us might still choose to continue to live more coupled with nature than human sustenance and technologies require. What decoupling offers is the possibility that humanity’s material dependence upon nature might be less destructive. The case for a more active, conscious, and accelerated decoupling to spare nature draws more on spiritual or aesthetic than on material or utilitarian arguments. Current and future generations could survive and prosper materially on a planet with much less biodiversity and wild nature. But this is not a world we want nor, if humans embrace decoupling processes, need to accept. What we are here calling nature, or even wild nature, encompasses landscapes, seascapes, biomes and ecosystems that have, in more cases than not, been regularly altered by human influences over centuries and millennia. Conservation science, and the concepts of biodiversity, complexity, and indigeneity are useful, but alone cannot determine which landscapes to preserve, or how. In most cases, there is no single baseline prior to human modification to which nature might be returned. For example, efforts to restore landscapes to more closely resemble earlier states (“indigeneity”) may involve removing recently arrived species (“invasives”) and thus require a net reduction in local biodiversity. In other circumstances, communities may decide to sacrifice indigeneity for novelty and biodiversity. Explicit efforts to preserve landscapes for their non-utilitarian value are inevitably anthropogenic choices. For this reason, all conservation efforts are fundamentally anthropogenic. The setting aside of wild nature is no less a human choice, in service of human preferences, than bulldozing it. Humans will save wild places and landscapes by convincing our fellow citizens that these places, and the creatures that occupy them, are worth protecting. People may choose to have some services — like water purification and flood protection — provided for by natural systems, such as forested watersheds, reefs, marshes, and wetlands, even if those natural systems are more expensive than simply building water treatment plants, seawalls, and levees. There will be no one-size-fits-all solution. Environments will be shaped by different local, historical, and cultural preferences. While we believe that agricultural intensification for land-sparing is key to protecting wild nature, we recognize that many communities will continue to opt for land-sharing, seeking to conserve wildlife within agricultural landscapes, for example, rather than allowing it to revert to wild nature in the form of grasslands, scrub, and forests. Where decoupling reduces pressure on landscapes and ecosystems to meet basic human needs, landowners, communities, and governments still must decide to what aesthetic or economic purpose they wish to dedicate those lands. Accelerated decoupling alone will not be enough to ensure more wild nature. There must still be a conservation politics and a wilderness movement to demand more wild nature for aesthetic and spiritual reasons. Along with decoupling humankind’s material needs from nature, establishing an enduring commitment to preserve wilderness, biodiversity, and a mosaic of beautiful landscapes will require a deeper emotional connection to them. 6. We affirm the need and human capacity for accelerated, active, and conscious decoupling. Technological progress is not inevitable. Decoupling environmental impacts from economic outputs is not simply a function of market-driven innovation and efficient response to scarcity. The long arc of human transformation of natural environments through technologies began well before there existed anything resembling a market or a price signal. Thanks to rising demand, scarcity, inspiration, and serendipity, humans have remade the world for millennia. Technological solutions to environmental problems must also be considered within a broader social, economic, and political context. We think it is counterproductive for nations like Germany and Japan, and states like California, to shutter nuclear power plants, recarbonize their energy sectors, and recouple their economies to fossil fuels and biomass. However, such examples underscore clearly that technological choices will not be determined by remote international bodies but rather by national and local institutions and cultures. Too often, modernization is conflated, both by its defenders and critics, with capitalism, corporate power, and laissez-faire economic policies. We reject such reductions. What we refer to when we speak of modernization is the long-term evolution of social, economic, political, and technological arrangements in human societies toward vastly improved material well-being, public health, resource productivity, economic integration, shared infrastructure, and personal freedom. Modernization has liberated ever more people from lives of poverty and hard agricultural labor, women from chattel status, children and ethnic minorities from oppression, and societies from capricious and arbitrary governance. Greater resource productivity associated with modern socio-technological systems has allowed human societies to meet human needs with fewer resource inputs and less impact on the environment. More-productive economies are wealthier economies, capable of better meeting human needs while committing more of their economic surplus to non-economic amenities, including better human health, greater human freedom and opportunity, arts, culture, and the conservation of nature. Modernizing processes are far from complete, even in advanced developed economies. Material consumption has only just begun to peak in the wealthiest societies. Decoupling of human welfare from environmental impacts will require a sustained commitment to technological progress and the continuing evolution of social, economic, and political institutions alongside those changes. Accelerated technological progress will require the active, assertive, and aggressive participation of private sector entrepreneurs, markets, civil society, and the state. While we reject the planning fallacy of the 1950s, we continue to embrace a strong public role in addressing environmental problems and accelerating technological innovation, including research to develop better technologies, subsidies, and other measures to help bring them to market, and regulations to mitigate environmental hazards. And international collaboration on technological innovation and technology transfer is essential in the areas of agriculture and energy.

<h4><strong>Addressing the anthropocene through policy actions and market solutions is productive—the world is getting better now but only continued investment in institutions prevents</strong> their impacts</h4><p><strong>Brook, et al, 15</strong>—professor of environmental sustainability at the University of Tasmania (Barry, with John Asafu-Adjaye, University of Queensland, Linus Blomqvist, Breakthrough Institute, Stewart Brand, Long Now Foundation, Ruth DeFries, Columbia Univeristy, Erle Ellis, University of Maryland, Baltimore County, Christopher Foreman, University of Maryland School of Public Policy, David Keith, Harvard University School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Martin Lewis, Stanford University, Mark Lynas, Cornell University, Ted Nordhaus, Breakthrough Institute, Roger Pielke, Jr., University of Colorado, Boulder, Rachel Pritzker, Pritzker Innovation Fund, Joyashree Roy, Jadavpur University, Mark Sagoff, George Mason University, Michael Shellenberger, Breakthrough Institute, Robert Stone, Filmmaker, and Peter Teague, Breakthrough Institute, “AN ECOMODERNIST MANIFESTO”, http://www.ecomodernism.org/manifesto/, dml<u>)</p><p><strong>Intensifying many human activities</u></strong> — particularly farming, energy extraction, forestry, and settlement — <u><strong>so that they use less land and interfere less with the natural world is the key to decoupling human development from environmental impacts</strong>. These socioeconomic and technological processes are central to economic modernization and environmental protection. Together they allow people to mitigate climate change, to spare nature, and to alleviate global poverty.</p><p></u>Although we have to date written separately, our views are increasingly discussed as a whole. We call ourselves ecopragmatists and ecomodernists. We offer this statement to affirm and to clarify our views and to describe our vision for putting humankind’s extraordinary powers in the service of creating a good Anthropocene.</p><p><u>1.</p><p><strong><mark>Humanity has flourished</mark> over the past two centuries</strong>. <strong>Average life expectancy has increased</u></strong> from 30 to 70 years, resulting in a large and growing population able to live in many different environments. <u>Humanity has made extraordinary progress in reducing the incidence and impacts of infectious diseases, and it has become more resilient to extreme weather and other natural disasters.</p><p><strong><mark>Violence</mark> in all forms has declined significantly and <mark>is</mark> probably at <mark>the lowest</mark> per capita level <mark>ever</mark> experienced by the human species</u></strong>, the horrors of the 20th century and present-day terrorism notwithstanding. Globally, <u>human beings have moved from autocratic government toward liberal democracy characterized by the rule of law and increased freedom.</p><p></u>Personal, economic, and political <u>liberties have spread worldwide</u> and are today largely accepted as universal values. Modernization liberates women from traditional gender roles, increasing their control of their fertility. <u>Historically large numbers of humans</u> — <u>both in percentage and in absolute terms — are free from insecurity, penury, and servitude.</p><p></u>At the same time, <u>human flourishing has taken a serious toll on natural, nonhuman environments and wildlife.</u> Humans use about half of the planet’s ice-free land, mostly for pasture, crops, and production forestry. Of the land once covered by forests, 20 percent has been converted to human use. Populations of many mammals, amphibians, and birds have declined by more than 50 percent in the past 40 years alone. More than 100 species from those groups went extinct in the 20th century, and about 785 since 1500. As we write, only four northern white rhinos are confirmed to exist.</p><p><u>Given that humans are completely dependent on the living biosphere, how is it possible that people are doing so much damage to natural systems without doing more harm to themselves? </p><p></u>The role that technology plays in reducing humanity’s dependence on nature explains this paradox. Human <u>technologies</u>, from those that first enabled agriculture to replace hunting and gathering, to those that drive today’s globalized economy, <u>have made humans less reliant upon the many ecosystems that once provided their only sustenance, even as those same ecosystems have often been left deeply damaged.</p><p>Despite frequent assertions</u> starting in the 1970s <u>of</u> fundamental “<u><mark>limits to growth</u></mark>,” <u><strong>there is</u></strong> still remarkably <u><strong>little evidence that human population and economic expansion will outstrip the capacity </strong>to grow food or procure critical material resources in the foreseeable future</u>.</p><p>To the degree to which there are fixed physical <u>boundaries to</u> human <u>consumption</u>, they <u><strong><mark>are</mark> so <mark>theoretical</mark> as to be functionally irrelevant</u></strong>. The amount of solar radiation that hits the Earth, for instance, is ultimately finite but represents no meaningful constraint upon human endeavors. <u>Human civilization can flourish for</u> centuries and <u>millennia on energy delivered from a closed</u> uranium or thorium fuel <u>cycle</u>, or from hydrogen-deuterium fusion. <u><strong><mark>With</mark> proper <mark>management, humans are at no risk of lacking</mark> sufficient <mark>ag</mark>ricultural land for food</u></strong>. <u>Given plentiful land and unlimited energy, substitutes for other material inputs to human well-being can easily be found</u> if those inputs become scarce or expensive.</p><p><u>There remain</u>, however, <u><strong>serious long-term <mark>environmental threats</mark> to human well-being</u></strong>, such as anthropogenic climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion, and ocean acidification. While these risks are difficult to quantify, <u>the evidence is clear</u> today <u><strong>that they <mark>could cause</mark> significant risk of <mark>catastrophic impacts</mark> on societies and ecosystems</u></strong>. Even gradual, non-catastrophic outcomes associated with these threats are likely to result in significant human and economic costs as well as rising ecological losses. </p><p>Much of the world’s population still suffers from more-immediate local environmental health risks. Indoor and outdoor air pollution continue to bring premature death and illness to millions annually. Water pollution and water-borne illness due to pollution and degradation of watersheds cause similar suffering. </p><p><u>2. </p><p></u>Even as human environmental impacts continue to grow in the aggregate, <u>a range of long-term <mark>trends are</u></mark> today <u><strong><mark>driving</mark> significant <mark>decoupling</mark> of human well-being from environmental impacts</strong>.</p><p></u>Decoupling occurs in both relative and absolute terms. Relative decoupling means that human environmental impacts rise at a slower rate than overall economic growth. Thus, for each unit of economic output, less environmental impact (e.g., deforestation, defaunation, pollution) results. Overall impacts may still increase, just at a slower rate than would otherwise be the case. Absolute decoupling occurs when total environmental impacts — impacts in the aggregate — peak and begin to decline, even as the economy continues to grow.</p><p><u>Decoupling can be driven by both technological and demographic trends and usually results from a combination of the two.</p><p></u>The <u>growth rate of the</u> human <u>population <strong>has already peaked</u></strong>. Today’s <u><mark>population growth</u></mark> rate <u><mark>is</u></mark> one percent per year, <u><mark>down</u></mark> from its high point of 2.1 percent in the 1970s. Fertility rates in countries containing more than half of the global population are now below replacement level. Population growth today is primarily driven by longer life spans and lower infant mortality, not by rising fertility rates. Given current trends, it is very possible that <u>the size of the human population will peak this century and then start to decline. </p><p></u>Trends in population are inextricably linked to other demographic and economic dynamics. For the first time in human history, over half the global population lives in cities. By 2050, 70 percent are expected to dwell in cities, a number that could rise to 80 percent or more by the century’s end. Cities are characterized by both dense populations and low fertility rates.</p><p>Cities occupy just 1 to 3 percent of the Earth’s surface and yet are home to nearly four billion people. As such, <u>cities both drive and symbolize the decoupling of humanity from nature, performing far better than rural economies in providing efficiently for material needs while reducing environmental impacts</u>. </p><p>The growth of cities along with the economic and ecological benefits that come with them are inseparable from improvements in agricultural productivity. As agriculture has become more land and labor efficient, rural populations have left the countryside for the cities. Roughly half the US population worked the land in 1880. Today, less than 2 percent does. </p><p>As human lives have been liberated from hard agricultural labor, enormous human resources have been freed up for other endeavors. Cities, as people know them today, could not exist without radical changes in farming. In contrast, <u><strong><mark>modernization is not possible in a subsistence agrarian economy</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>These improvements have resulted not only in lower labor requirements per unit of agricultural output but also in lower land requirements. This is not a new trend: <u>rising harvest yields have for millennia reduced the amount of land required to feed the average person. The average per-capita use of land today <strong>is vastly lower</u></strong> than it was 5,000 years ago, despite the fact that modern people enjoy a far richer diet. <u>Thanks to technological improvements in agriculture</u>, during the half-century starting in the mid-1960s, <u>the amount of land required for growing</u> crops and animal feed for the average person <u>declined by one-half</u>.</p><p><u><mark>Ag</mark>ricultural intensification</u>, along with the move away from the use of wood as fuel, <u><strong><mark>has allowed</mark> many parts of the world to experience net <mark>reforestation</u></strong></mark>. About 80 percent of New England is today forested, compared with about 50 percent at the end of the 19th century. Over the past 20 years, the amount of land dedicated to production forest worldwide declined by 50 million hectares, an area the size of France. The “forest transition” from net deforestation to net reforestation seems to be as resilient a feature of development as the demographic transition that reduces human birth rates as poverty declines.</p><p><u>Human <mark>use of</mark> many other <mark>resources is</mark> similarly <mark>peaking</mark>. The amount of water needed</u> for the average diet <u>has declined</u> by nearly 25 percent over the past half-century. Nitrogen pollution continues to cause eutrophication and large dead zones in places like the Gulf of Mexico. While the total amount of <u>nitrogen</u> pollution is rising, the amount used per unit of production <u>has declined significantly</u> in developed nations.</p><p>Indeed, <u><strong><mark>in contradiction to the</mark> often-expressed <mark>fear of infinite growth</mark> colliding with a finite planet</strong>, <strong><mark>demand </mark>for many material goods <mark>may be saturating</mark> as societies grow wealthier</u></strong>. Meat consumption, for instance, has peaked in many wealthy nations and has shifted away from beef toward protein sources that are less land intensive. </p><p><u>As demand for material goods is met, developed economies see higher levels of spending directed to materially less-intensive service and knowledge sectors, which account for an increasing share of economic activity. This dynamic might be even more pronounced in today’s developing economies, which may benefit from being late adopters of resource-efficient technologies.</p><p></u>Taken together, <u>these trends mean that <mark>the</mark> total <mark>human impact</mark> on the environment</u>, including land-use change, overexploitation, and pollution, <u><strong><mark>can</mark> peak and <mark>decline this century</strong>. <strong>By</mark> understanding and <mark>promoting these</mark> emergent <mark>processes, humans have the opportunity to</mark> re-wild and <mark>re-green the Earth</strong></mark> — even as developing countries achieve modern living standards, and material poverty ends.</p><p></u>3.</p><p>The processes of decoupling described above challenge the idea that early human societies lived more lightly on the land than do modern societies. Insofar as past societies had less impact upon the environment, it was because those societies supported vastly smaller populations. </p><p>In fact, <u>early</u> human <u>populations with much less advanced technologies had far larger individual land footprints than societies have today</u>. Consider that a population of no more than one or two million North Americans hunted most of the continent’s large mammals into extinction in the late Pleistocene, while burning and clearing forests across the continent in the process. Extensive human transformations of the environment continued throughout the Holocene period: as much as three-quarters of all deforestation globally occurred before the Industrial Revolution. </p><p><u>The technologies that humankind’s ancestors used to meet their needs supported much lower living standards with much higher per-capita impacts on the environment. Absent a massive human die-off, any large-scale attempt at recoupling human societies to nature using these technologies would result in an unmitigated ecological and human disaster.</p><p>Ecosystems around the world are threatened today because people over-rely on them</u>: people who depend on firewood and charcoal for fuel cut down and degrade forests; people who eat bush meat for food hunt mammal species to local extirpation. Whether it’s a local indigenous community or a foreign corporation that benefits, <u>it is the continued dependence of humans on natural environments that is the problem for the conservation of nature.</p><p></u>Conversely, <u>modern technologies</u>, by using natural ecosystem flows and services more efficiently, <u><strong>offer a real chance of reducing the totality of human impacts on the biosphere</u></strong>. To embrace these technologies is to find paths to a good Anthropocene.</p><p><u>The modernization processes</u> that have increasingly liberated humanity from nature <u>are</u>, of course, <u>double-edged, since they have also degraded the natural environment. Fossil fuels, mechanization and manufacturing, synthetic fertilizers and pesticides, electrification and modern transportation and communication technologies, have made larger human populations and greater consumption possible in the first place. Had technologies not improved since the Dark Ages, no doubt the human population would not have grown much either.</p><p>It is also true that large, increasingly affluent urban populations have placed greater demands upon ecosystems</u> in distant places –– the extraction of natural resources has been globalized. <u>But those same technologies have also made it possible for people to secure food, shelter, heat, light, and mobility through means that are vastly more resource- and land-efficient than at any previous time in human history.</p><p>Decoupling</u> human well-being from the destruction of nature <u><strong>requires the conscious acceleration of emergent decoupling processes</strong>. In some cases, the objective is the development of technological substitutes. Reducing deforestation and indoor air pollution requires the substitution of wood and charcoal with modern energy.</p><p></u>In other cases, <u>humanity’s goal should be to use resources more productively. For example, increasing agricultural yields can reduce the conversion of forests and grasslands to farms. Humans should seek to liberate the environment from the economy.</p><p>Urbanization, agricultural intensification, nuclear power, aquaculture, and desalination are all processes with a demonstrated potential to reduce human demands on the environment</u>, allowing more room for non-human species. Suburbanization, low-yield farming, and many forms of renewable energy production, in contrast, generally require more land and resources and leave less room for nature.</p><p>These patterns suggest that humans are as likely to spare nature because it is not needed to meet their needs as they are to spare it for explicit aesthetic and spiritual reasons. The parts of the planet that people have not yet profoundly transformed have mostly been spared because they have not yet found an economic use for them — mountains, deserts, boreal forests, and other “marginal” lands.</p><p>Decoupling raises the possibility that societies might achieve peak human impact without intruding much further on relatively untouched areas. Nature unused is nature spared.</p><p>4.</p><p>Plentiful access to modern energy is an essential prerequisite for human development and for decoupling development from nature. The availability of inexpensive energy allows poor people around the world to stop using forests for fuel. It allows humans to grow more food on less land, thanks to energy-heavy inputs such as fertilizer and tractors. Energy allows humans to recycle waste water and desalinate sea water in order to spare rivers and aquifers. It allows humans to cheaply recycle metal and plastic rather than to mine and refine these minerals. Looking forward, modern energy may allow the capture of carbon from the atmosphere to reduce the accumulated carbon that drives global warming.</p><p>However, for at least the past three centuries, rising energy production globally has been matched by rising atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide. Nations have also been slowly decarbonizing — that is, reducing the carbon intensity of their economies — over that same time period. But they have not been doing so at a rate consistent with keeping cumulative carbon emissions low enough to reliably stay below the international target of less than 2 degrees Centigrade of global warming. Significant climate mitigation, therefore, will require that humans rapidly accelerate existing processes of decarbonization.</p><p>There remains much confusion, however, as to how this might be accomplished. In developing countries, rising energy consumption is tightly correlated with rising incomes and improving living standards. Although the use of many other material resource inputs such as nitrogen, timber, and land are beginning to peak, the centrality of energy in human development and its many uses as a substitute for material and human resources suggest that energy consumption will continue to rise through much if not all of the 21st century.</p><p>For that reason, any conflict between climate mitigation and the continuing development process through which billions of people around the world are achieving modern living standards will continue to be resolved resoundingly in favor of the latter.</p><p><u>Climate change and other global ecological challenges are not the most important immediate concerns for the majority of the world's people. Nor should they be. A new coal-fired power station in Bangladesh may bring air pollution and rising carbon dioxide emissions but will also save lives. For millions living without light and forced to burn dung to cook their food, electricity and modern fuels, no matter the source, offer a pathway to a better life, even as they also bring new environmental challenges.</p><p></u>Meaningful <u><mark>climate</mark> mitigation <mark>is</u></mark> fundamentally <u><strong><mark>a technological challenge</u></strong></mark>. By this we mean that <u><strong><mark>even dramatic limits to</mark> per capita global <mark>consumption would be insufficient</mark> to achieve significant climate mitigation</strong>. <strong><mark>Absent profound tech</mark>nological <mark>change there is no credible path to</mark> meaningful climate <mark>mitigation</u></strong></mark>. While advocates differ in the particular mix of technologies they favor, <u>we are aware of no quantified climate mitigation scenario in which technological change is not responsible for the vast majority of emissions cuts.</p><p></u>The specific technological paths that people might take toward climate mitigation remain deeply contested. Theoretical scenarios for climate mitigation typically reflect their creators’ technological preferences and analytical assumptions while all too often failing to account for the cost, rate, and scale at which low-carbon energy technologies can be deployed.</p><p>The history of energy transitions, however, suggests <u>that there have been consistent patterns associated with the ways that societies move toward cleaner sources of energy. Substituting higher-quality</u> (i.e., less carbon-intensive, higher-density) <u>fuels for lower-quality</u> (i.e., more carbon-intensive, lower-density) <u>ones is how virtually all societies have decarbonized, and points the way toward accelerated decarbonization in the future</u>. Transitioning to a world powered by zero-carbon energy sources will require energy technologies that are power dense and capable of scaling to many tens of terawatts to power a growing human economy.</p><p>Most forms of renewable energy are, unfortunately, incapable of doing so. The scale of land use and other environmental impacts necessary to power the world on biofuels or many other renewables are such that we doubt they provide a sound pathway to a zero-carbon low-footprint future.</p><p>High-efficiency solar cells produced from earth-abundant materials are an exception and have the potential to provide many tens of terawatts on a few percent of the Earth’s surface. Present-day solar technologies will require substantial innovation to meet this standard and the development of cheap energy storage technologies that are capable of dealing with highly variable energy generation at large scales.</p><p>Nuclear fission today represents the only present-day zero-carbon technology with the demonstrated ability to meet most, if not all, of the energy demands of a modern economy. However, a variety of social, economic, and institutional challenges make deployment of present-day nuclear technologies at scales necessary to achieve significant climate mitigation unlikely. A new generation of nuclear technologies that are safer and cheaper will likely be necessary for nuclear energy to meet its full potential as a critical climate mitigation technology.</p><p>In the long run, next-generation <u>solar</u>, advanced nuclear fission, <u>and nuclear</u> fusion <u>represent the most plausible pathways</u> toward the joint goals of climate stabilization and radical decoupling of humans from nature. If the history of energy transitions is any guide, however, <u>that transition will take time. During that transition, other energy technologies can provide important social and environmental benefits</u>. Hydroelectric dams, for example, may be a cheap source of low-carbon power for poor nations even though their land and water footprint is relatively large. Fossil fuels with carbon capture and storage can likewise provide substantial environmental benefits over current fossil or biomass energies. </p><p><u>The ethical and pragmatic path toward a just and sustainable global energy economy requires that human beings transition as rapidly as possible to energy sources that are cheap, clean, dense, and abundant. Such a path will require sustained public support for the development and deployment of clean energy technologies</u>, both within nations and between them, though international collaboration and competition, and within a broader framework for global modernization and development.</p><p>5.</p><p><u>We write this document out of deep love and emotional connection to the natural world. By appreciating, exploring, seeking to understand, and cultivating nature, many people get outside themselves. They connect with their deep evolutionary history. Even when people never experience these wild natures directly, they affirm their existence as important for their psychological and spiritual well-being.</p><p><strong><mark>Humans will always</mark> materially <mark>depend on nature to some degree</strong></mark>. Even if a fully synthetic world were possible, many of us might still choose to continue to live more coupled with nature than human sustenance and technologies require. What decoupling offers is the possibility that humanity’s material dependence upon nature might be less destructive. </p><p></u>The case for a more active, conscious, and accelerated decoupling to spare nature draws more on spiritual or aesthetic than on material or utilitarian arguments. Current and future generations could survive and prosper materially on a planet with much less biodiversity and wild nature. But this is not a world we want nor, if humans embrace decoupling processes, need to accept.</p><p>What we are here calling nature, or even wild nature, encompasses landscapes, seascapes, biomes and ecosystems that have, in more cases than not, been regularly altered by human influences over centuries and millennia. Conservation science, and the concepts of biodiversity, complexity, and indigeneity are useful, but alone cannot determine which landscapes to preserve, or how.</p><p>In most cases, there is no single baseline prior to human modification to which nature might be returned. For example, efforts to restore landscapes to more closely resemble earlier states (“indigeneity”) may involve removing recently arrived species (“invasives”) and thus require a net reduction in local biodiversity. In other circumstances, communities may decide to sacrifice indigeneity for novelty and biodiversity. </p><p>Explicit efforts to preserve landscapes for their non-utilitarian value are inevitably anthropogenic choices. For this reason, all conservation efforts are fundamentally anthropogenic. The setting aside of wild nature is no less a human choice, in service of human preferences, than bulldozing it. Humans will save wild places and landscapes by convincing our fellow citizens that these places, and the creatures that occupy them, are worth protecting. People may choose to have some services — like water purification and flood protection — provided for by natural systems, such as forested watersheds, reefs, marshes, and wetlands, even if those natural systems are more expensive than simply building water treatment plants, seawalls, and levees. There will be no one-size-fits-all solution.</p><p>Environments will be shaped by different local, historical, and cultural preferences. While we believe that agricultural intensification for land-sparing is key to protecting wild nature, we recognize that many communities will continue to opt for land-sharing, seeking to conserve wildlife within agricultural landscapes, for example, rather than allowing it to revert to wild nature in the form of grasslands, scrub, and forests. Where decoupling reduces pressure on landscapes and ecosystems to meet basic human needs, landowners, communities, and governments still must decide to what aesthetic or economic purpose they wish to dedicate those lands.</p><p>Accelerated decoupling alone will not be enough to ensure more wild nature. There must still be a conservation politics and a wilderness movement to demand more wild nature for aesthetic and spiritual reasons. Along with decoupling humankind’s material needs from nature, establishing an enduring commitment to preserve wilderness, biodiversity, and a mosaic of beautiful landscapes will require a deeper emotional connection to them. </p><p>6.</p><p><u>We affirm the need and human capacity for accelerated, active, and conscious decoupling. <strong><mark>Tech</mark>nological progress <mark>is not inevitable</u></strong></mark>. Decoupling environmental impacts from economic outputs is not simply a function of market-driven innovation and efficient response to scarcity. <u>The long arc of <mark>human transformation of</mark> natural <mark>environments</mark> through technologies <strong><mark>began</mark> well <mark>before</mark> there existed anything resembling <mark>a market</mark> or a price signal</u></strong>. Thanks to rising demand, scarcity, inspiration, and serendipity, humans have remade the world for millennia.</p><p>Technological solutions to environmental problems must also be considered within a broader social, economic, and political context. We think it is counterproductive for nations like Germany and Japan, and states like California, to shutter nuclear power plants, recarbonize their energy sectors, and recouple their economies to fossil fuels and biomass. However, such examples underscore clearly that technological choices will not be determined by remote international bodies but rather by national and local institutions and cultures.</p><p><u><strong><mark>Too often, modernization is conflated</u></strong></mark>, both by its defenders and critics, <u><strong><mark>with capitalism</strong></mark>, corporate power, and laissez-faire economic policies. We reject such reductions</u>. What we refer to when we speak of <u><mark>modernization is the</mark> long-term <mark>evolution of</u></mark> <u>social, economic, political, and technological <mark>arrangements</mark> in human societies</u> toward vastly improved material well-being, public health, resource productivity, economic integration, shared infrastructure, and personal freedom.</p><p><u>Modernization has liberated ever more people from lives of poverty </u>and hard agricultural labor, women from chattel status, children and ethnic minorities from oppression, and societies from capricious and arbitrary governance. <u>Greater resource productivity associated with modern socio-technological systems has allowed human societies to meet human needs with fewer resource inputs and less impact on the environment. More-productive economies are wealthier economies<strong>, capable of better meeting human needs while committing more of their economic surplus to non-economic amenities, including better human health, greater human freedom and opportunity, arts, culture, and the conservation of nature.</p><p><mark>Modernizing processes are far from complete</strong></mark>, even in advanced developed economies. Material consumption has only just begun to peak in the wealthiest societies. <mark>Decoupling</u></mark> of human welfare from environmental impacts <u><strong><mark>will require a sustained commitment to tech</mark>nological <mark>progress and</mark> the continuing evolution of social, economic, and political institutions alongside those changes. </p><p>Accelerated technological progress will require the <mark>active</mark>, assertive, and aggressive <mark>participation of</mark> private sector entrepreneurs, <mark>markets</mark>, civil society, <mark>and the state</u></strong></mark>. While we reject the planning fallacy of the 1950s, <u><strong>we continue to embrace a strong public role</strong> <strong>in addressing environmental problems</strong> and accelerating technological innovation, including research to develop better technologies, subsidies, and other measures to help bring them to market, and regulations to mitigate environmental hazards</u>. And international collaboration on technological innovation and technology transfer is essential in the areas of agriculture and energy.</p>

Round 1—Neg vs Indiana HF

1NC

Case

./documents/ndtceda16/Michigan/MeDo/Michigan-MeyersLevy-Donovan-Neg-Gonzaga-Round1.docx

N

Gonzaga

1

Indiana HF

Justice

1AC was baudrillard it was all baudrillard fw

ndtceda16/Michigan/MeDo/Michigan-MeyersLevy-Donovan-Neg-Gonzaga-Round1.docx

MeDo

Michigan MeDo

Du.....

Me.....

To.....

Do.....

Michigan

Michigan

ndtceda16

NDT/CEDA 2016-17

cx

college

Growth is unsustainable AND innovation can’t solve---shifting away from productivism is key to avoid extinction.

Büchs & Koch 17

Milena Büchs & Max Koch 17. Milena Büchs is Associate Professor in Sustainability, Economics and Low Carbon Transitions at the University of Leeds, UK. Max Koch is Professor of Social Policy at Lund University (School of Social Work), Sweden. 2017. Postgrowth and Wellbeing. Springer International Publishing. CrossRef, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-59903-8.

economic growth is regarded as a prime policy aim because it is thought to be essential for reducing poverty rising living standards and stable employment support for growth is intertwined with advocating social progress and with an optimistic view of humans’ ingenuity to solve problems Since GDP measures monetary value it excludes environmental costs as long as there is no cost associated with emitting greenhouse gases the cost for the environmental and social damage following from this is not reflected in GDP figures. GDP increases as a consequence of some types of environmental damage if deforestation and timber trade increase or if natural disasters or industrial accidents require expenditures for clean-up and reconstruction, GDP figures will rise economic growth cannot, be the main goal of economic activity because it requires increasing resource inputs, some of which are non-renewable, and generates wastes, including greenhouse gases, that disturb various ecosystems, severely threatening human and planetary functioning in the short and long term. Historically speaking, economic growth is a fairly recent phenomenon it has gone hand in hand with an exponentially increasing use of non-renewable resources such as fossil fuels While we are not yet close to running out of non-renewable resources, over time they will become more difficult and hence more expensive to recover This idea is captured by the concept of “energy returned on energy invested” EROEI In relation to oil it has been shown that the easily recoverable fields have been targeted first and that therefore greater energy and financial inputs will be required to produce more oil. the ratio of energy returned on energy invested will decrease reducing the financial incentive to invest further in the recovery of these non-renewable resources Relevant to this is also the debate about peak oil the point at which the rate of global conventional oil production reaches its maximum which is expected to take place roughly once half of global oil reserves have been produced oil prices will rise in the long term if conventional oil availability diminishes, while global demand for oil increases with continuing economic and population growth. Since economic growth in the second half of the twentieth century required increasing inputs higher prices would have a negative impact on growth the impacts of climate change are immanent and may accelerate within the very near future remaining resources could be exploited However, this would be devastating as greenhouse gas emissions need to turn net-zero by the second half of this century for there to be a good chance to limit global warming to 2° Celsius (and ideally, below that) limits of sinks to absorb gases and regenerat vital ecosystems are now attracting greater concern growth threatens soil freshwater and forests as well as the functioning of vital ecosystems and ecosystems services such as the purification of air and water, water absorption and storage and the related mitigation of droughts and floods decomposition and detoxification and absorption of wastes, pollination and pest control Recent research on planetary boundaries has started to identify thresholds of environmental pollution or disturbance of a range of ecosystems services beyond which the functioning of human life on earth will be put at risk One controversial question in the debate about economic growth and environmental impacts has been whether growth can be decoupled from the damage it causes Important to this is the theory of the Environmental Kuznets Curve this theory does not take into account the difference between relative and absolute decoupling Relative decoupling refers to the environmental impacts generated over time per unit of economic output In contrast, absolute decoupling would examine aggregate environmental impact, compared to total economic output over time. there is no evidence for absolute decoupling as total environmental impacts are still rising partly due to rebound effects Substantial environmental impacts related to everything that is consumed in rich countries occur in developing countries from which goods are imported. A focus on production-based environmental impacts would be misleading as it ignores the [and] environmental impacts that relate to a country’s living standards and that occur outside of that country. Since greenhouse gas emissions are driven by economic growth, the development of alternative economic models that do not depend on growth is urgent since continued growth “threatens the ability of the Earth to support life”

growth is intertwined with an optimistic view of ingenuity to solve problems GDP increases defo natural or industrial accidents resource inputs are non-renewable, and generates wastes disturb ecosystems, severely threatening human and planetary functioning in the short term EROEI will decrease, reducing the incentive to invest in recovery peak oil while demand increases would impact growth climate change may accelerate in the near future growth threatens soil water and forests, ecosystem services such as purification of air and water mitigation of droughts and floods detox of waste pollination and pest control Recent research identify thresholds beyond which life on earth will be at risk Important is the E K C do not take into account the difference between relative and absolute decoupling there is no ev for absolute decoupling due to rebound effects [and] impacts that occur outside that country development of alternative models that do not depend on growth is urgent since growth “threatens the ability of Earth to support life

As the previous chapters have shown, economic growth is regarded as a prime policy aim by policy makers and economists because it is thought to be essential for reducing poverty and generating rising living standards and stable levels of employment (Ben-Ami 2010: 19–20). More generally, support for economic growth is usually intertwined with advocating social progress based on scientific rationality and reason and hence with an optimistic view of humans’ ingenuity to solve problems (ibid.: 17, 20, Chap. 5). Growth criticism thus tends to be portrayed as anti-progress and inherently conservative (ibid.: Chap. 8). While it is important to acknowledge and discuss this view, it needs to be emphasised that growth criticism is formulated with long-term human welfare in mind which advocates alternative types of social progress (Barry 1998). This chapter first outlines ecological and social strands of growth critiques and then introduces relevant concepts of and positions within the postgrowth debate. Ecological Critiques of G rowth Generally speaking, two types of growth criticism can be distinguished: the first focuses on limitations of GDP as a measure of economic performance; the second goes beyond this by highlighting the inappropriateness of growth as the ultimate goal of economic activity and its negative implications for environment and society. Since GDP measures the monetary value of all final goods and services in an economy, it excludes the environmental costs generated by production. For instance, as long as there is no cost associated with emitting greenhouse gases , the cost for the environmental and social damage following from this is not reflected in GDP figures. Worse even, GDP increases as a consequence of some types of environmental damage: if deforestation and timber trade increase or if natural disasters or industrial accidents require expenditures for clean-up and reconstruction, GDP figures will rise (Douthwaite 1999: 18; Leipert 1986). Several critics of GDP as a measure of progress have proposed alternative indicators of welfare such as the Genuine Progress Indicator, Green GDPs or other approaches which factor in environmental costs (see Chap. 5 for more details), but they do not necessarily object to economic growth being the primary goal of economic activity (van den Bergh 2011). In contrast, the idea of ecological limits to growth goes beyond the critique of GDP as a measure of economic performance. Instead, it maintains that economic growth should not, and probably cannot, be the main goal of economic activity because it requires increasing resource inputs, some of which are non-renewable, and generates wastes, including greenhouse gases, that disturb various ecosystems, severely threatening human and planetary functioning in the short and long term. 4 CRITIQUES OF GROWTH 41 Resources are regarded as non-renewable if they cannot be naturally replaced at the rate of consumption (Daly and Farley 2011: 75–76). Examples include fossil fuels, earth minerals and metals, and some nuclear materials like uranium (Daly and Farley 2011: 77; Meadows et al. 2004: 87–107). Based on work by Georgescu-Roegen (1971), many ecological economists also assume that non-renewable resources cannot be fully recycled because they become degraded in the process of economic activity. Historically speaking, economic growth is a fairly recent phenomenon (Fig. 2.1). Since its onset in the late seventeenth century in Europe and mid-eighteenth century in the US (Gordon 2012), it has gone hand in hand with an exponentially increasing use of non-renewable resources such as fossil fuels (Fig. 4.1). While we are not yet close to running out of non-renewable resources, over time they will become more difficult and hence more expensive to recover. This idea is captured by the concept of “energy returned on energy invested” (EROEI). In relation to oil for instance, it has been shown that the easily recoverable fields have been targeted first and that therefore greater energy (and hence financial) inputs will be required to produce more oil. Over time, the ratio of energy returned on energy invested will decrease, reducing the financial incentive to invest further in the recovery of these non-renewable resources (Dale et al. 2011; Brandt et al. 2015: 2). Relevant to this is also the debate about peak oil—a concept coined by Shell Oil geologist Marion King Hubbert in the 1950s—the point at which the rate of global conventional oil production reaches its maximum which is expected to take place roughly once half of global oil reserves have been produced. There is still controversy about whether global peak oil will occur, and if so when, as it is difficult to predict, or get reliable data on, the rate at which alternative types of energy will replace oil (if this was to happen fast enough, peak oil might not be reached, if it has not yet occurred), the size of remaining oil reserves and the future efficiency of oil extraction technologies (Chapman 2014). However, it is plausible to assume that oil prices will rise in the long term if conventional oil availability diminishes, while global demand for oil increases with continuing economic and population growth. Since economic growth in the second half of the twentieth century required increasing inputs of conventional oil, higher oil prices would have a negative impact on growth unless alternative technologies are developed that can generate equivalent liquid fuels at lower prices (Murphy and Hall 2011). Some scholars have criticised the focus on physical/energy resource limitations as initially highlighted in the “limits to growth” debate (Meadows et al. 1972) and state that instead catastrophic climate change is likely to be a more serious and immanent threat to humanity (Schwartzman 2012). The main arguments here are first that much uncertainty remains about the potential and timing of peak oil, future availability of other fossil fuels and development of alternative low energy resources, while the impacts of climate change are already immanent and may accelerate within the very near future. Second, even if peaks in fossil fuel production occurred in the near future, remaining resources could still be exploited to their maximum. However, this would be devastating from a climate change perspective as, according to the latest IPCC scenarios, greenhouse gas emissions need to turn net-zero by the second half of this century for there to be a good chance to limit global warming to 2° Celsius (and ideally, below that) (Anderson and Peters 2016). It is telling that some of the more recent debates about ecological limits to growth put much more emphasis on environmental impacts of growth, rather than on peak oil or other resource limitations (Dietz and O’Neill 2013). Differently put, limits of sinks, especially to absorb greenhouse gases, and to the regeneration of vital ecosystems are now attracting greater concern, compared to limits of resources. Growing economic production generates increasing pressures on the environment due to pollution of air, water and soil, the destruction of natural habitats and landscapes, for instance, through deforestation and the extraction of natural resources. Therefore, growth often also threatens the regeneration of renewable resources such as healthy soil, freshwater and forests, as well as the functioning of vital ecosystems and ecosystems services such as the purification of air and water, water absorption and storage and the related mitigation of droughts and floods, decomposition and detoxification and absorption of wastes, pollination and pest control (Meadows et al. 2004: 83–84). Recent research on planetary boundaries has started to identify thresholds of environmental pollution or disturbance of a range of ecosystems services beyond which the functioning of human life on earth will be put at risk. Rockström and colleagues have identified nine such “planetary boundaries”—“climate change; rate of biodiversity loss (terrestrial and marine); interference with the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles; stratospheric ozone depletion; ocean acidification; global freshwater use; change in land use; chemical pollution; and atmospheric aerosol loading” (Rockström et al. 2009: 472). They also present evidence according to which three of these boundaries—climate change, rate of biodiversity loss and the nitrogen cycle—have already reached their limits (Rockström et al. 2009). Of those three thresholds, climate change has received most attention. The 5th Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2014) concluded that global temperatures have risen by an average of 0.85° since the 1880s (while local temperature increases can be much higher than that) and that the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere has reached unprecedented levels over the last 800,000 years—that of CO2 has now reached 405.6 parts per million (NASA, January 2017, Fig. 4.2), far surpassing the level of 350 ppm which is considered safe by many scientists (Rockström et al. 2009). The IPCC report also maintained that humans very likely contributed to at least 50% of global warming that occurred since the 1950s (IPCC 2014: 5). A range of climate change impacts can already be observed, including a 26% increase of ocean acidification since industrialisation; shrinking of glaciers, Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets, as well as arctic sea ice; and the rise of sea levels of 19 cm since 1901. This is projected to increase by an additional 82 cm by the end of this century at current levels of greenhouse gas emissions (ibid.: 13). Climate change impacts are already felt with increased occurrences of heat waves, heavy rain fall, increased risk of flooding and impacts on food and water security in a number of regions around the world. It is projected that with a rise of 2° of global temperatures, 280 million people worldwide (with greatest numbers in China, India and Bangladesh) would be affected by sea level rise, escalating to a projected 627 million people under a 4° scenario (Strauss et al. 2015: 10). At the 21st Conference of Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Paris in 2015, representatives agreed that action should be taken to limit rise of global temperatures to 2° and Fig. 4.2 Concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere. Source NASA, available from https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/carbon-dioxide/. The CO2 levels have been reconstructed from measures of trapped air in polar cap ice cores 4 CRITIQUES OF GROWTH 45 to “pursue efforts” to limit it to 1.5°. This has been adopted by 196 countries, but immense efforts and very radical reductions of greenhouse gas emissions will be required to comply with the agreement. Even if net greenhouse gas emissions were reduced to zero, surface temperatures would remain constant at their increased levels for hundreds of years to come and climate change impacts such as ocean acidification and rising sea levels would continue for hundreds or even thousands of years once global temperatures are stabilised; moreover, a range of climate change impacts are deemed irreversible (IPCC 2014: 16). One controversial question in the debate about economic growth and environmental impacts has been whether growth can be decoupled from the damage it causes. Important to this debate is the theory of the Environmental Kuznets Curve which applies Simon Kuznets’ hypothesised inverted u-shaped relationship between economic development and income inequality to the relationship between economic development and environmental degradation. According to this theory, environmental degradation is low in the early phases of economic development, then rises with increasing development up to a certain point, beyond which it falls again with advancing development because more resources can be invested to render production and consumption more efficient and less polluting. Therefore, this theory suggests that it is possible to decouple economic growth (measured in GDP) from its environmental implications. The counter-argument to this theory is that it does not take into account the difference between relative and absolute decoupling. Relative decoupling refers to the environmental impacts generated over time per unit of economic output, for instance CO2 emissions per million of US$. In contrast, absolute decoupling would examine aggregate environmental impact, compared to total economic output over time. Here it has been argued that while relative decoupling may be possible as the environmental impact per unit of economic output decreases over time due to efficiency gains, absolute decoupling is much harder to achieve while growth continues. Indeed, there is no evidence for absolute decoupling as total environmental impacts, for instance total global CO2 emissions, are still rising with rising global GDP (Jackson 2011: 67–86). This is partly due to rebound effects which we discussed in Chap. 2: rising consumption because the increase in efficiency has made it cheaper to produce/consume (Jackson 2011: 67–86; see also Czech 2013: Chap. 8 criticising “green growth”). Furthermore, if decoupling is examined at the country level, one would need to take consumptionbased resource use/emissions into account rather than productionbased impacts. Substantial environmental impacts related to everything that is consumed in rich countries occur in developing countries from which goods are imported. A focus on production-based environmental impacts would hence be misleading as it ignores the [and] environmental impacts that relate to a country’s living standards and that occur outside of that country. Social Critiques of Growth Economic growth has not only been criticised from an ecological perspective, but also from an individual and social wellbeing point of view. Here, we can again distinguish a critique of GDP as a measure of wellbeing and a wider critique which highlights potential negative consequences of economic growth for human wellbeing. Several scholars have argued that GDP is an inadequate measure of prosperity or wellbeing because it only includes market transactions and ignores activities of the informal economy in households and the volunteering sector which make an important contribution to individual and social wellbeing (Stiglitz et al. 2011; van den Bergh 2009; Jackson 2011). It also excludes the contribution of certain government services that are provided for free (Douthwaite 1999: 14; Stiglitz et al. 2011: 23), and the roles of capital stocks and of leisure in generating welfare (Costanza et al. 2015: 137). Furthermore, all market transactions make a positive contribution to GDP, regardless of whether expenditures increase or decrease welfare. Similar to the way in which environmental costs of growth are either excluded from GDP or even increase it, expenditures that arise from road accidents, divorces, crime, etc., contribute positively to GDP (ibid.: 133). The focus on market transactions also means that an increasing marketisation (or “commodification”) of an economy will be reflected in a rise of GDP, which may or may not be related to actual “welfare” outcomes (Stiglitz et al. 2011: 49). It also implies that GDP is an insufficient cross-national comparator for the quality of life, as it does not take into account the different sizes of the informal economy across countries (ibid.: 15). Furthermore, GDP does not indicate how income and consumption are distributed in society (Stiglitz et al. 2011: 44). This implies that a rise of GDP can be consistent with a rise of inequality of income and wealth. 4 CRITIQUES OF GROWTH 47 However, if greater inequality has negative impacts on social wellbeing (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009), this would be masked by rising GDP figures (Douthwaite 1999: 17). An even more fundamental criticism of GDP as a measure of wellbeing is that it focuses on the accumulation of money or wealth and thus on the material aspects of wellbeing. Such a narrow conception of the goals of economic activity and wellbeing has been criticised early on in the history of economic thought, e.g. by Aristotle’s distinction between oikonomia and chrematistics. The latter refers to the accumulation of wealth and was regarded by him as an “unnatural” activity which did not contribute to the generation of use value and wellbeing (Cruz et al. 2009: 2021). The argument that wider conceptions of wellbeing and prosperity are required has also become relevant for contemporary critiques of economic growth (Jackson 2011; Paech 2013; Schneider et al. 2010) as we will discuss this in more detail in Chap. 5. Arguments About the Psychological and S ocial Costs of G rowth The broader social critique of economic growth highlights potential “social limits” to or even negative consequences of economic growth for individual and collective wellbeing. The term “social limits to growth” was coined by Fred Hirsch (1976). He argued that the benefits of growth are initially exclusive to small elites and that these benefits disappear as soon as they spread more widely through mass consumption. For instance, only few people can own a Rembrandt painting; holiday destinations are more enjoyable when they are not overrun by hordes of other tourists; there are only few leadership positions, etc. From this perspective, there are “social limits” to the extent to which the benefits of growth can be socially expanded and equally shared. Other scholars have expressed concern about individual and collective social costs of economic growth. First, there is the argument that the need to keep up with ever-rising living standards and new consumer habits, “keeping up with the Joneses”—a lot of which is seen to be driven by advertisement and social pressure rather than real needs, for instance fashionable clothing or gadgets—can generate stress and increase the occurrence of mental disorders (James 2007; Offer 2006; Kasser 2002). 48 M. BÜCHS AND M. KOCH Second, it has been argued that economic growth can imply wider social costs. For instance, with its emphasis on individual gain, market relations and competition, and the need that it generates for spatial mobility (e.g. for successful participation in education and labour markets), it is feared to undermine moral and social capital and put a strain on family and community relations, potentially even leading to increasing divorce and crime rates (Douthwaite 1999; Daly and Cobb 1989: 50–51; Hirsch 1976). Social costs of technological development and industrialisation also include industrial workplace and traffic accidents and time lost in traffic jams and for commuting (Czech 2013: Chap. 2; Stiglitz et al. 2011: 24). Technological innovation which arises from growth can also act as a factor for job losses and increasing job insecurity (Douthwaite 1999), especially if growth rates are not sufficiently high to compensate gains in productivity. It is often assumed that growth will benefit the many because of assumed “trickle-down” effects which promise to improve the lot of the poor simply because the “cake” of available wealth is growing. While progress has been made in reducing extreme global poverty and inequality (Sala-i-Martin 2006; Rougoor and van Marrewijk 2015), the number of people living in poverty across the globe remains high.1 At the same time, income inequality in a range of countries has been rising and the situation of many of the people living in extreme poverty is not improving which means the fruits of economic growth remain to be unequally distributed (Collier 2007; Piketty and Saez 2014). The post-development debate goes even further than that in arguing that not only may growth not have reached the global poor to the extent that had been predicted by neoclassical economists, but that it can also have negative impacts on indigenous communities in developing countries, especially those who rely on local natural resources for their livelihoods which often suffer exploitation, pollution or even destruction through the inclusion of local economies into global value chains (Rahnema and Bawtree 1997). While the distinction between critiques of growth that focus on its problematic ecological and social consequences is useful for analytic purposes, the two dimensions are of course closely linked. Ecological consequences of growth have the potential to severely impact or even undermine human wellbeing. Local livelihoods are already affected by current climate change impacts such as ocean acidification and its impact on marine organisms, draughts, floods and severe weather events, the 4 CRITIQUES OF GROWTH 49 frequency of which has been rising. Accordingly, it is estimated that crop and fish yields are already diminishing in several regions (Stern 2015; IPCC 2014) and that millions of people are already being displaced and forced to migrate due to climate change and other environmental impacts (Black et al. 2011). While the overall long-term impacts of climate change and the surpassing of other planetary boundaries are difficult to predict, they clearly have the potential to substantially undermine human wellbeing. Since greenhouse gas emissions are driven by economic growth, the development of alternative economic models that do not depend on growth is urgent since continued growth “threatens to alter the ability of the Earth to support life” (Daly and Farley 2011: 12).

<h4>Growth is unsustainable AND innovation <u>can’t solve</u>---shifting away from productivism is key to avoid <u>extinction</u>. </h4><p>Milena <strong>Büchs &</strong> Max <strong>Koch 17</strong>. Milena Büchs is Associate Professor in Sustainability, Economics and Low Carbon Transitions at the University of Leeds, UK. Max Koch is Professor of Social Policy at Lund University (School of Social Work), Sweden. 2017. Postgrowth and Wellbeing. Springer International Publishing. CrossRef, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-59903-8.</p><p>As the previous chapters have shown, <u>economic growth is regarded as a prime policy aim</u> by policy makers and economists <u>because it is thought to be essential for reducing poverty </u>and generating <u>rising living standards and stable</u> levels of <u>employment</u> (Ben-Ami 2010: 19–20). More generally, <u>support for</u> economic <u><mark>growth is</u></mark> usually <u><mark>intertwined with</mark> advocating social progress</u> based on scientific rationality and reason <u>and</u> hence <u>with <mark>an <strong>optimistic view</strong> of</mark> humans’ <strong><mark>ingenuity to solve problems</u></strong></mark> (ibid.: 17, 20, Chap. 5). Growth criticism thus tends to be portrayed as anti-progress and inherently conservative (ibid.: Chap. 8). While it is important to acknowledge and discuss this view, it needs to be emphasised that growth criticism is formulated with long-term human welfare in mind which advocates alternative types of social progress (Barry 1998). This chapter first outlines ecological and social strands of growth critiques and then introduces relevant concepts of and positions within the postgrowth debate. Ecological Critiques of G rowth Generally speaking, two types of growth criticism can be distinguished: the first focuses on limitations of GDP as a measure of economic performance; the second goes beyond this by highlighting the inappropriateness of growth as the ultimate goal of economic activity and its negative implications for environment and society. <u>Since GDP measures</u> the <u>monetary value</u> of all final goods and services in an economy, <u>it excludes</u> the <u>environmental costs</u> generated by production. For instance, <u>as long as there is no cost associated with <strong>emitting</strong> greenhouse gases</u> , <u>the cost for the environmental and social damage following from this is not reflected in GDP figures.</u> Worse even, <u><mark>GDP <strong>increases</strong></mark> as a consequence of some types of environmental damage</u>: <u>if <strong><mark>defo</strong></mark>restation and timber trade increase or if <strong><mark>natural</strong></mark> disasters <mark>or <strong>industrial</strong></mark> <strong><mark>accidents</strong></mark> require expenditures for clean-up and reconstruction, <strong>GDP figures will rise</u></strong> (Douthwaite 1999: 18; Leipert 1986). Several critics of GDP as a measure of progress have proposed alternative indicators of welfare such as the Genuine Progress Indicator, Green GDPs or other approaches which factor in environmental costs (see Chap. 5 for more details), but they do not necessarily object to economic growth being the primary goal of economic activity (van den Bergh 2011). In contrast, the idea of ecological limits to growth goes beyond the critique of GDP as a measure of economic performance. Instead, it maintains that <u>economic growth</u> should not, and probably <u><strong>cannot</strong>, be the main goal of economic activity because it <strong>requires increasing <mark>resource inputs</strong></mark>, some of which <mark>are <strong>non-renewable</strong>, and generates <strong>wastes</strong></mark>, including greenhouse gases, that <strong><mark>disturb</mark> various <mark>ecosystems</strong>, <strong>severely threatening human and planetary functioning in the short</mark> and long <mark>term</mark>. </u></strong>4 CRITIQUES OF GROWTH 41 Resources are regarded as non-renewable if they cannot be naturally replaced at the rate of consumption (Daly and Farley 2011: 75–76). Examples include fossil fuels, earth minerals and metals, and some nuclear materials like uranium (Daly and Farley 2011: 77; Meadows et al. 2004: 87–107). Based on work by Georgescu-Roegen (1971), many ecological economists also assume that non-renewable resources cannot be fully recycled because they become degraded in the process of economic activity. <u>Historically speaking, economic growth is a fairly recent phenomenon</u> (Fig. 2.1). Since its onset in the late seventeenth century in Europe and mid-eighteenth century in the US (Gordon 2012), <u>it has gone hand in hand with an <strong>exponentially</strong> increasing use of non-renewable resources such as fossil fuels</u> (Fig. 4.1). <u>While we are not yet close to <strong>running out</strong> of non-renewable resources, over time they will become <strong>more difficult and hence more expensive to recover</u></strong>. <u>This idea is captured by the concept of “<strong>energy returned on energy invested</strong>”</u> (<u><strong><mark>EROEI</u></strong></mark>). <u>In relation to oil</u> for instance, <u>it has been shown that the easily recoverable fields have been targeted first and that therefore <strong>greater energy</u></strong> (<u>and</u> hence <u><strong>financial</u></strong>) <u>inputs will be required to produce more oil.</u> Over time, <u>the ratio of energy returned on energy invested <mark>will <strong>decrease</u></strong>, <u>reducing the</mark> financial <mark>incentive to invest</mark> further <mark>in</mark> the <mark>recovery</mark> of these non-renewable resources</u> (Dale et al. 2011; Brandt et al. 2015: 2). <u>Relevant to this is also the debate about <strong><mark>peak oil</u></strong></mark>—a concept coined by Shell Oil geologist Marion King Hubbert in the 1950s—<u>the point at which the rate of global conventional oil production reaches its <strong>maximum</strong> which is expected to take place roughly once half of global oil reserves have been produced</u>. There is still controversy about whether global peak oil will occur, and if so when, as it is difficult to predict, or get reliable data on, the rate at which alternative types of energy will replace oil (if this was to happen fast enough, peak oil might not be reached, if it has not yet occurred), the size of remaining oil reserves and the future efficiency of oil extraction technologies (Chapman 2014). However, it is plausible to assume that <u>oil prices <strong>will rise in the long term</strong> if conventional oil availability diminishes, <mark>while</mark> global <strong><mark>demand</strong></mark> for oil <strong><mark>increases</strong></mark> with continuing economic and population growth.</u> <u>Since economic growth in the second half of the twentieth century required <strong>increasing inputs</u></strong> of conventional oil, <u>higher</u> oil <u>prices <mark>would</mark> have a <strong>negative <mark>impact</mark> on <mark>growth</u></strong></mark> unless alternative technologies are developed that can generate equivalent liquid fuels at lower prices (Murphy and Hall 2011). Some scholars have criticised the focus on physical/energy resource limitations as initially highlighted in the “limits to growth” debate (Meadows et al. 1972) and state that instead catastrophic climate change is likely to be a more serious and immanent threat to humanity (Schwartzman 2012). The main arguments here are first that much uncertainty remains about the potential and timing of peak oil, future availability of other fossil fuels and development of alternative low energy resources, while <u>the impacts of</u> <u><strong><mark>climate change</u></strong></mark> <u>are</u> already <u>immanent and <mark>may accelerate</mark> with<mark>in the</mark> <strong>very <mark>near future</u></strong></mark>. Second, even if peaks in fossil fuel production occurred in the near future, <u>remaining resources could </u>still <u>be exploited</u> to their maximum. <u>However, this would be <strong>devastating</strong> </u>from a climate change perspective <u>as</u>, according to the latest IPCC scenarios, <u>greenhouse gas emissions <strong>need to turn net-zero</strong> by the second half of this century for there to be a good chance to limit global warming to 2° Celsius (and ideally, below that)</u> (Anderson and Peters 2016). It is telling that some of the more recent debates about ecological limits to growth put much more emphasis on environmental impacts of growth, rather than on peak oil or other resource limitations (Dietz and O’Neill 2013). Differently put, <u>limits of <strong>sinks</u></strong>, especially <u>to absorb</u> greenhouse <u>gases</u>, <u>and</u> to the <u>regenerat</u>ion of <u>vital ecosystems</u> <u>are now attracting <strong>greater concern</u></strong>, compared to limits of resources. Growing economic production generates increasing pressures on the environment due to pollution of air, water and soil, the destruction of natural habitats and landscapes, for instance, through deforestation and the extraction of natural resources. Therefore, <u><mark>growth</u></mark> often also <u><mark>threatens</u></mark> the regeneration of renewable resources such as healthy <u><strong><mark>soil</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>fresh<mark>water</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>forests</u></strong>,</mark> <u>as well as the functioning of vital <strong><mark>ecosystem</strong></mark>s and ecosystems <mark>services such as</mark> the <mark>purification of <strong>air and water</strong></mark>, water</u> <u><strong>absorption</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>storage</u></strong> <u>and the related <mark>mitigation of <strong>droughts</strong> and</u> <u><strong>floods</u></strong></mark>, <u>decomposition and <strong><mark>detox</strong></mark>ification and absorption <mark>of <strong>waste</strong></mark>s, <strong><mark>pollination</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>pest control</u></strong></mark> (Meadows et al. 2004: 83–84). <u><mark>Recent research</mark> on planetary boundaries has started to <mark>identify <strong>thresholds</strong></mark> of environmental pollution or disturbance of a range of ecosystems services <mark>beyond which</mark> the functioning of human <strong><mark>life on earth</strong> will be</mark> put <mark>at risk</u></mark>. Rockström and colleagues have identified nine such “planetary boundaries”—“climate change; rate of biodiversity loss (terrestrial and marine); interference with the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles; stratospheric ozone depletion; ocean acidification; global freshwater use; change in land use; chemical pollution; and atmospheric aerosol loading” (Rockström et al. 2009: 472). They also present evidence according to which three of these boundaries—climate change, rate of biodiversity loss and the nitrogen cycle—have already reached their limits (Rockström et al. 2009). Of those three thresholds, climate change has received most attention. The 5th Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2014) concluded that global temperatures have risen by an average of 0.85° since the 1880s (while local temperature increases can be much higher than that) and that the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere has reached unprecedented levels over the last 800,000 years—that of CO2 has now reached 405.6 parts per million (NASA, January 2017, Fig. 4.2), far surpassing the level of 350 ppm which is considered safe by many scientists (Rockström et al. 2009). The IPCC report also maintained that humans very likely contributed to at least 50% of global warming that occurred since the 1950s (IPCC 2014: 5). A range of climate change impacts can already be observed, including a 26% increase of ocean acidification since industrialisation; shrinking of glaciers, Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets, as well as arctic sea ice; and the rise of sea levels of 19 cm since 1901. This is projected to increase by an additional 82 cm by the end of this century at current levels of greenhouse gas emissions (ibid.: 13). Climate change impacts are already felt with increased occurrences of heat waves, heavy rain fall, increased risk of flooding and impacts on food and water security in a number of regions around the world. It is projected that with a rise of 2° of global temperatures, 280 million people worldwide (with greatest numbers in China, India and Bangladesh) would be affected by sea level rise, escalating to a projected 627 million people under a 4° scenario (Strauss et al. 2015: 10). At the 21st Conference of Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Paris in 2015, representatives agreed that action should be taken to limit rise of global temperatures to 2° and Fig. 4.2 Concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere. Source NASA, available from https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/carbon-dioxide/. The CO2 levels have been reconstructed from measures of trapped air in polar cap ice cores 4 CRITIQUES OF GROWTH 45 to “pursue efforts” to limit it to 1.5°. This has been adopted by 196 countries, but immense efforts and very radical reductions of greenhouse gas emissions will be required to comply with the agreement. Even if net greenhouse gas emissions were reduced to zero, surface temperatures would remain constant at their increased levels for hundreds of years to come and climate change impacts such as ocean acidification and rising sea levels would continue for hundreds or even thousands of years once global temperatures are stabilised; moreover, a range of climate change impacts are deemed irreversible (IPCC 2014: 16). <u>One controversial question in the debate about economic growth and environmental impacts has been whether growth can be <strong>decoupled from the damage it causes</u></strong>. <u><mark>Important</mark> to this</u> debate <u><mark>is the</mark> theory of the <strong><mark>E</strong></mark>nvironmental <strong><mark>K</strong></mark>uznets <strong><mark>C</strong></mark>urve</u> which applies Simon Kuznets’ hypothesised inverted u-shaped relationship between economic development and income inequality to the relationship between economic development and environmental degradation. According to this theory, environmental degradation is low in the early phases of economic development, then rises with increasing development up to a certain point, beyond which it falls again with advancing development because more resources can be invested to render production and consumption more efficient and less polluting. Therefore, this theory suggests that it is possible to decouple economic growth (measured in GDP) from its environmental implications. The counter-argument to <u>this theory</u> is that it <u><mark>do</mark>es <mark>not take into</mark> <mark>account the difference between <strong>relative and absolute decoupling</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Relative</u></strong> <u>decoupling refers to the environmental impacts generated over time <strong>per unit of economic output</u></strong>, for instance CO2 emissions per million of US$. <u>In contrast, absolute decoupling would examine <strong>aggregate environmental impact</strong>, compared to total economic output over time. </u>Here it has been argued that while relative decoupling may be possible as the environmental impact per unit of economic output decreases over time due to efficiency gains, absolute decoupling is much harder to achieve while growth continues. Indeed, <u><mark>there is <strong>no ev</strong></mark>idence <strong><mark>for absolute decoupling</strong></mark> as <strong>total</strong> environmental impacts</u>, for instance total global CO2 emissions, <u>are</u> <u><strong>still rising</u></strong> with rising global GDP (Jackson 2011: 67–86). This is <u>partly <mark>due to <strong>rebound effects</u></strong></mark> which we discussed in Chap. 2: rising consumption because the increase in efficiency has made it cheaper to produce/consume (Jackson 2011: 67–86; see also Czech 2013: Chap. 8 criticising “green growth”). Furthermore, if decoupling is examined at the country level, one would need to take consumptionbased resource use/emissions into account rather than productionbased impacts. <u>Substantial environmental impacts related to everything that is consumed in rich countries occur in <strong>developing countries from which goods are imported</strong>. A focus on production-based environmental impacts would</u> hence <u>be</u> <u><strong>misleading</u></strong> <u>as it <strong>ignores the <mark>[and]</mark> environmental <mark>impacts</u></strong></mark> <u>that relate to a country’s living standards and <mark>that occur</mark> <strong><mark>outside</strong></mark> of <strong><mark>that country</strong></mark>. </u>Social Critiques of Growth Economic growth has not only been criticised from an ecological perspective, but also from an individual and social wellbeing point of view. Here, we can again distinguish a critique of GDP as a measure of wellbeing and a wider critique which highlights potential negative consequences of economic growth for human wellbeing. Several scholars have argued that GDP is an inadequate measure of prosperity or wellbeing because it only includes market transactions and ignores activities of the informal economy in households and the volunteering sector which make an important contribution to individual and social wellbeing (Stiglitz et al. 2011; van den Bergh 2009; Jackson 2011). It also excludes the contribution of certain government services that are provided for free (Douthwaite 1999: 14; Stiglitz et al. 2011: 23), and the roles of capital stocks and of leisure in generating welfare (Costanza et al. 2015: 137). Furthermore, all market transactions make a positive contribution to GDP, regardless of whether expenditures increase or decrease welfare. Similar to the way in which environmental costs of growth are either excluded from GDP or even increase it, expenditures that arise from road accidents, divorces, crime, etc., contribute positively to GDP (ibid.: 133). The focus on market transactions also means that an increasing marketisation (or “commodification”) of an economy will be reflected in a rise of GDP, which may or may not be related to actual “welfare” outcomes (Stiglitz et al. 2011: 49). It also implies that GDP is an insufficient cross-national comparator for the quality of life, as it does not take into account the different sizes of the informal economy across countries (ibid.: 15). Furthermore, GDP does not indicate how income and consumption are distributed in society (Stiglitz et al. 2011: 44). This implies that a rise of GDP can be consistent with a rise of inequality of income and wealth. 4 CRITIQUES OF GROWTH 47 However, if greater inequality has negative impacts on social wellbeing (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009), this would be masked by rising GDP figures (Douthwaite 1999: 17). An even more fundamental criticism of GDP as a measure of wellbeing is that it focuses on the accumulation of money or wealth and thus on the material aspects of wellbeing. Such a narrow conception of the goals of economic activity and wellbeing has been criticised early on in the history of economic thought, e.g. by Aristotle’s distinction between oikonomia and chrematistics. The latter refers to the accumulation of wealth and was regarded by him as an “unnatural” activity which did not contribute to the generation of use value and wellbeing (Cruz et al. 2009: 2021). The argument that wider conceptions of wellbeing and prosperity are required has also become relevant for contemporary critiques of economic growth (Jackson 2011; Paech 2013; Schneider et al. 2010) as we will discuss this in more detail in Chap. 5. Arguments About the Psychological and S ocial Costs of G rowth The broader social critique of economic growth highlights potential “social limits” to or even negative consequences of economic growth for individual and collective wellbeing. The term “social limits to growth” was coined by Fred Hirsch (1976). He argued that the benefits of growth are initially exclusive to small elites and that these benefits disappear as soon as they spread more widely through mass consumption. For instance, only few people can own a Rembrandt painting; holiday destinations are more enjoyable when they are not overrun by hordes of other tourists; there are only few leadership positions, etc. From this perspective, there are “social limits” to the extent to which the benefits of growth can be socially expanded and equally shared. Other scholars have expressed concern about individual and collective social costs of economic growth. First, there is the argument that the need to keep up with ever-rising living standards and new consumer habits, “keeping up with the Joneses”—a lot of which is seen to be driven by advertisement and social pressure rather than real needs, for instance fashionable clothing or gadgets—can generate stress and increase the occurrence of mental disorders (James 2007; Offer 2006; Kasser 2002). 48 M. BÜCHS AND M. KOCH Second, it has been argued that economic growth can imply wider social costs. For instance, with its emphasis on individual gain, market relations and competition, and the need that it generates for spatial mobility (e.g. for successful participation in education and labour markets), it is feared to undermine moral and social capital and put a strain on family and community relations, potentially even leading to increasing divorce and crime rates (Douthwaite 1999; Daly and Cobb 1989: 50–51; Hirsch 1976). Social costs of technological development and industrialisation also include industrial workplace and traffic accidents and time lost in traffic jams and for commuting (Czech 2013: Chap. 2; Stiglitz et al. 2011: 24). Technological innovation which arises from growth can also act as a factor for job losses and increasing job insecurity (Douthwaite 1999), especially if growth rates are not sufficiently high to compensate gains in productivity. It is often assumed that growth will benefit the many because of assumed “trickle-down” effects which promise to improve the lot of the poor simply because the “cake” of available wealth is growing. While progress has been made in reducing extreme global poverty and inequality (Sala-i-Martin 2006; Rougoor and van Marrewijk 2015), the number of people living in poverty across the globe remains high.1 At the same time, income inequality in a range of countries has been rising and the situation of many of the people living in extreme poverty is not improving which means the fruits of economic growth remain to be unequally distributed (Collier 2007; Piketty and Saez 2014). The post-development debate goes even further than that in arguing that not only may growth not have reached the global poor to the extent that had been predicted by neoclassical economists, but that it can also have negative impacts on indigenous communities in developing countries, especially those who rely on local natural resources for their livelihoods which often suffer exploitation, pollution or even destruction through the inclusion of local economies into global value chains (Rahnema and Bawtree 1997). While the distinction between critiques of growth that focus on its problematic ecological and social consequences is useful for analytic purposes, the two dimensions are of course closely linked. Ecological consequences of growth have the potential to severely impact or even undermine human wellbeing. Local livelihoods are already affected by current climate change impacts such as ocean acidification and its impact on marine organisms, draughts, floods and severe weather events, the 4 CRITIQUES OF GROWTH 49 frequency of which has been rising. Accordingly, it is estimated that crop and fish yields are already diminishing in several regions (Stern 2015; IPCC 2014) and that millions of people are already being displaced and forced to migrate due to climate change and other environmental impacts (Black et al. 2011). While the overall long-term impacts of climate change and the surpassing of other planetary boundaries are difficult to predict, they clearly have the potential to substantially undermine human wellbeing. <u>Since greenhouse gas emissions are driven by economic growth, the <mark>development of <strong>alternative</mark> economic <mark>models that do not depend on growth</strong> is <strong>urgent</strong> since</mark> <strong>continued <mark>growth “threatens</mark> </u></strong>to alter <u><strong><mark>the ability of</mark> the <mark>Earth to support life</mark>”</u></strong> (Daly and Farley 2011: 12).</p>

Open source cal r2

2AC

Debt Ceiling DA

./documents/hspolicy18/MontgomeryBellAcademy/GlBr/Montgomery%20Bell%20Academy-Glen-Bradford-Aff-berkeley-Round2.docx

A

berkeley

2

asian debate league pt

tanzil chowdhury

1ac - hospitality 2nr - neolib k