Datasets:

Hellisotherpeople

/

OpenCaseList-Deduplicated

like 0

Establishing mutual forbearance prevents accidental conflict from cyber espionage

Harold 16,

Harold 16, Libicki is an American scholar and Professor at the Frederick S. Pardee RAND Graduate School in Santa Monica, California, Harold is associate director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy, Cevallos is a political scientist at the RAND Corporation (Scott Warren, Martin C. Libicki, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, Getting to Yes with China in Cyberspace, Kindle, Introduction)

Given that the United States and China would like to reduce mutual suspicion in cyberspace, one option might be the negotiation of agreement on a set of norms Since both sides express concern over the possibility of the other side targeting its critical infrastructure, the core of the deal would be for the United States and China to abjure cyberattacks on each other’s critical infrastructure 30 This proposal was well received by the respondents, with interviewees from across academic, think tank, military, and state organizations all responding positively to this proposal Respondents appeared to hold relatively similar views of the definition of critical infrastructure to those of their U.S. counterparts— there is little indication that these agreements have evolved from the trust-us-not-to stage to something that is verifiable the United States and China could also agree not to carry out cyber espionage on each other’s critical infrastructure. The rationale for this step is that cyber espionage is almost always a prerequisite for a cyberattack and that it is impossible to distinguish intrusions for the purposes of cyber espionage from an imminent attack if detected by the target. If the two sides have no intent to attack each other’s critical infrastructure, they have no need to compromise each other’s critical infrastructure systems either, both cyber espionage and cyberattack entail prior implantation of computer code in target systems Implants make subsequent penetrations much easier because the attackers are already inside the target’s systems. Banning cyber espionage against critical infrastructure would make it much more difficult to quickly carry out cyberattacks on such infrastructure. Without preplanning and cyber espionage, it could take weeks, months, or even years to carry out such attacks, but if potential adversaries are already inside each other’s critical infrastructure, attacks can be carried out almost instantaneously. Such a ban, if enacted by the two sides, would have several advantages. if successfully executed, a ban would enhance stability, since it would remove critically important systems from being targeted. Second, a ban would raise the costs of targeting such systems (since, if China were discovered doing so, it would violate the country’s given word, potentially affecting its ability to credibly negotiate on other issues in the future), while simultaneously addressing the problem of time that cyberattacks prepared in advance can pose. Third, such an agreement, if fully realized, would reduce the prospect of accidental conflict by committing the two sides not just to not attacking each other’s critical infrastructure but to staying away from it completely, thereby eliminating the possibility of misunderstanding a cyber espionage effort as an imminent attack.

core of the deal was well received by interviewees from academic military, and state organizations there is little indication that these agreements have evolved to something verifiable U S and China could also agree not to carry out cyber espionage on each other’s c i it is impossible to distinguish intrusions for the purposes of cyber espionage from an imminent attack Without cyber espionage it could years to carry attacks an agreement would reduce the prospect of accidental conflict by committing the two sides to stay away from it completely, thereby eliminating the possibility of misunderstanding as an imminent attack

Given that the United States and China would like to reduce mutual suspicion in cyberspace, one option might be the negotiation of agreement on a set of norms. Since both sides express concern over the possibility of the other side targeting its critical infrastructure, the core of the deal would be for the United States and China to abjure cyberattacks on each other’s critical infrastructure.30 This proposal was well received by the respondents, with interviewees from across academic, think tank, military, and state organizations all responding positively to this proposal.31 Respondents appeared to hold relatively similar views of the definition of critical infrastructure to those of their U.S. counterparts—such things as the electrical power grid and the banking system. One respondent noted that there is precedent for such a deal; in early May 2015, just days before we conducted our field interviews, Russia and China announced a general agreement to cooperate with and not attack each other in cyberspace.32 The first component of any mutual forbearance proposal is that progress has been made on not attacking critical infrastructure since our interviews in Beijing. In July 2015, the Chinese signed a UN report that called for such attacks to be abjured.33 There are also indications that the United States and China mutually agree not to attack each other’s critical infrastructure—or at least not be the first to do so.34 As of this writing, however, there is little indication that these agreements have evolved from the trust-us-not-to stage to something that is verifiable. This is why two more components to such an agreement are crucial to fulfill the purposes of the first component. As a second, and logically entailed, component of any mutual forbearance proposal, the United States and China could also agree not to carry out cyber espionage on each other’s critical infrastructure. The rationale for this step is that cyber espionage is almost always a prerequisite for a cyberattack and that it is impossible to distinguish intrusions for the purposes of cyber espionage from an imminent attack if detected by the target. If the two sides have no intent to attack each other’s critical infrastructure, they have no need to compromise each other’s critical infrastructure systems either, particularly if carried out by inserting malicious code into the target infrastructure. Indeed, both cyber espionage and cyberattack typically entail the prior implantation of computer code in target systems, which then periodically calls back (beacons) to the attacker for further instruction. Implants make subsequent penetrations much easier because the attackers are already inside the target’s systems. Banning cyber espionage against critical infrastructure would make it much more difficult to quickly carry out cyberattacks on such infrastructure. Without preplanning and cyber espionage, it could take weeks, months, or even years to carry out such attacks, but if potential adversaries are already inside each other’s critical infrastructure, attacks can be carried out almost instantaneously. Such a ban, if enacted by the two sides, would have several advantages. First, if successfully executed, a ban would enhance stability, since it would remove critically important systems from being targeted. Second, a ban would raise the costs of targeting such systems (since, if China were discovered doing so, it would violate the country’s given word, potentially affecting its ability to credibly negotiate on other issues in the future), while simultaneously addressing the problem of time that cyberattacks prepared in advance can pose. Third, such an agreement, if fully realized, would reduce the prospect of accidental conflict by committing the two sides not just to not attacking each other’s critical infrastructure but to staying away from it completely, thereby eliminating the possibility of misunderstanding a cyber espionage effort as an imminent attack.

<h4>Establishing mutual forbearance prevents accidental conflict from cyber espionage</h4><p><strong>Harold 16, </strong>Libicki is an American scholar and Professor at the Frederick S. Pardee RAND Graduate School in Santa Monica, California, Harold is associate director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy, Cevallos is a political scientist at the RAND Corporation (Scott Warren, Martin C. Libicki, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, <u>Getting to Yes with China in Cyberspace</u>, Kindle, Introduction<u>)</p><p>Given that the United States and China would like to reduce mutual suspicion in cyberspace, one option might be the negotiation of agreement on a set of norms</u>. <u>Since both sides express concern over the possibility of the other side targeting its critical infrastructure, the <strong><mark>core of the deal</strong></mark> would be for the <strong>U</strong>nited <strong>S</strong>tates <strong>and China to abjure cyberattacks on each other’s c</strong>ritical</u> <u><strong>i</strong>nfrastructure</u>.<u>30 <strong>T</strong>his proposal <mark>was well received by</mark> the respondents, with <mark>interviewees from</mark> across <mark>academic</mark>, think tank, <mark>military, and state organizations</mark> all responding positively to this proposal</u>.31 <u>Respondents appeared to hold relatively similar views of the definition of critical infrastructure to those of their U.S. counterparts—</u>such things as the electrical power grid and the banking system. One respondent noted that there is precedent for such a deal; in early May 2015, just days before we conducted our field interviews, Russia and China announced a general agreement to cooperate with and not attack each other in cyberspace.32 The first component of any mutual forbearance proposal is that progress has been made on not attacking critical infrastructure since our interviews in Beijing. In July 2015, the Chinese signed a UN report that called for such attacks to be abjured.33 There are also indications that the United States and China mutually agree not to attack each other’s critical infrastructure—or at least not be the first to do so.34 As of this writing, however,<u> <mark>there is little indication that these agreements have evolved</mark> from the trust-us-not-to stage <mark>to something</mark> that is <strong><mark>verifiable</u></strong></mark>. This is why two more components to such an agreement are crucial to fulfill the purposes of the first component. As a second, and logically entailed, component of any mutual forbearance proposal,<u> the <strong><mark>U</strong></mark>nited <strong><mark>S</strong></mark>tates <strong><mark>and China could also agree not to carry out cyber espionage on each other’s c</strong></mark>ritical <strong><mark>i</strong></mark>nfrastructure. The rationale for this step is that <strong>cyber espionage is almost always a prerequisite for a cyberattack</strong> and that <mark>it is <strong>impossible to distinguish intrusions</strong> for the purposes <strong>of</strong> <strong>cyber espionage from an imminent attack</strong> </mark>if detected by the target. If the two sides have no intent to attack each other’s critical infrastructure, they have no need to compromise each other’s critical infrastructure systems either, </u>particularly if carried out by inserting malicious code into the target infrastructure. Indeed, <u>both cyber espionage and cyberattack</u> typically <u>entail</u> the <u>prior implantation of computer code in target systems</u>, which then periodically calls back (beacons) to the attacker for further instruction.<u> Implants make subsequent penetrations much easier because the attackers are already inside the target’s systems. Banning cyber espionage against critical infrastructure would make it much more difficult to quickly carry out cyberattacks on such infrastructure. <mark>Without</mark> preplanning and <mark>cyber espionage</mark>, <mark>it could</mark> take weeks, months, or even <mark>years to carry</mark> out such <mark>attacks</mark>, but if potential adversaries are already inside each other’s critical infrastructure, attacks can be carried out almost instantaneously. Such a ban, if enacted by the two sides, would have several advantages. </u>First,<u> if successfully executed, a ban would enhance stability, since it would remove critically important systems from being targeted. Second, a ban would raise the costs of targeting such systems (since, if China were discovered doing so, it would violate the country’s given word, potentially affecting its ability to credibly negotiate on other issues in the future), while simultaneously addressing the problem of time that cyberattacks prepared in advance can pose. Third, such <mark>an agreement</mark>, if fully realized, <mark>would <strong>reduce the prospect of accidental conflict</strong> by committing the two sides </mark>not just <mark>to </mark>not attacking each other’s critical infrastructure but to <strong><mark>stay</mark>ing <mark>away from it completely</strong>, thereby <strong>eliminating</strong> the <strong>possibility</strong> of <strong>misunderstanding</strong> </mark>a cyber espionage effort <mark>as an imminent attack</mark>. </p></u>

1AC

Contention 2 is Attribution

./documents/hspolicy16/MontgomeryBellAcademy/GrZe/Montgomery%20Bell%20Academy-Graham-Zeuthen-Aff-Ohio%20Valley-Round3.docx

A

Ohio Valley

3

Chattahoochee XD

1ac- Cyber 1nc- Xi Good Nanotech Cp T mil Psychoanalysis K 2nr- Psychoanalysis K

hspolicy16/MontgomeryBellAcademy/GrZe/Montgomery%20Bell%20Academy-Graham-Zeuthen-Aff-Ohio%20Valley-Round3.docx

GrZe

Montgomery Bell Academy GrZe

Jo.....

Gr.....

Th.....

Ze.....

MontgomeryBellAcademy

Montgomery Bell Academy

hspolicy16

HS Policy 2016-17

cx

hs

3 - Moral uncertainty means we should minimize extinction –

Bostrom 12

Bostrom 12 [Nick Bostrom. Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School University of Oxford. “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.” Global Policy (2012)]

These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk Let me elaborate. Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving — and ideally improving — our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value. To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe

moral uncertainty suggest Our present understanding of axiology might be confused If we are uncertain then there is great value in preserving our ability to recognize value and steer the future accordingly. Ensuring there will be a future humanity is the best way to increase the probability that the future will contain value To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe

These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate. Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving — and ideally improving — our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value. To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe.

<h4>3 - Moral uncertainty means we should minimize extinction – </h4><p><strong>Bostrom 12</strong> [Nick Bostrom. Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School University of Oxford. “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.” Global Policy (2012)]</p><p><u>These reflections on <mark>moral uncertainty suggest</mark> an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk</u>; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. <u>Let me elaborate. <mark>Our present understanding of axiology might</mark> well <mark>be confused</mark>. We may not now know — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. <mark>If we are </mark>indeed profoundly <mark>uncertain </mark>about our ultimate aims, <mark>then </mark>we should recognize that <mark>there is </mark>a <mark>great</mark> option <mark>value in preserving</mark> — and ideally improving — <mark>our ability to recognize value and</mark> to <mark>steer the future accordingly. Ensuring</mark> that <mark>there will be a future</mark> version of <mark>humanity</mark> with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely <mark>is </mark>plausibly <mark>the best way </mark>available to us <mark>to increase the probability that the future will contain </mark>a lot of <mark>value</mark>.</u> <u><mark>To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe</u></mark>.</p>

FJG AC

ACv2

Framework

./documents/hsld20/Brentwood/Ch/Brentwood-Chung-Aff-Alta-Round2.docx

A

Alta

2

Hillcrest RC

Robertson, Hailey

1AC - Green Jobs 1NC - Cap K Fed Backlog DA Case 1AR - All 2NR - All 2AR - All

hsld20/Brentwood/Ch/Brentwood-Chung-Aff-Alta-Round2.docx

JoCh

Brentwood JoCh

Jo.....

Ch.....

Brentwood

Brentwood

CA

hsld20

HS LD 2020-21

ld

hs

Growth-oriented AI ensures extinction---BUT, degrowth orientation solves.

Pueyo 18

Salvador Pueyo 18. 8 Department of Evolutionary Biology, Ecology, and Environmental Sciences, Universitat de Barcelona. 10/01/2018. “Growth, Degrowth, and the Challenge of Artificial Superintelligence.” Journal of Cleaner Production, vol. 197, pp. 1731–1736.

The challenges of sustainability and of superintelligence are not independent. The changing fluxes of energy, matter, and information can be interpreted as different faces of general acceleration More directly superintelligence would deeply affect production and could in turn be affected by the socioeconomic context in which it develops Neoliberalism is a major force shaping current policies on a global level, which urges governments to assume as their main role the creation and support of capitalist markets, and to avoid interfering in their functioning in sharp contrast to degrowth views superintelligence aligned with capitalist markets could have very undesirable consequences for humanity and the whole biosphere if a non-negligible probability is assigned to these futures, little room is left for either complacency or resignation Neoliberalism is creating a very special breeding ground for superintelligence, because it strives to reduce the role of human agency in collective affairs spontaneous order of markets was preferable over conscious plans because markets have more capacity than humans to process information Neoliberal policies are actively transferring decisions to markets automated governance is a foundational tenet of neoliberal ideology most technological development can be expected to take place either in the context of firms firms tend to maximize their growth rates related to the neoclassical assumption that firms maximize profits a mechanism akin to natural selection human mentality and goals are partly shaped by firms themselves Firm growth is thought to rely critically on retained earnings Therefore economic selection can be generally expected to favor firms in which these are greater. The aggregate retained earnings4 of all firms in an economy can be expressed as: RE=FE(R,L,K)-w⋅L-(i+δ)⋅K-g. Increases in retained earnings face constraints, such as trade-offs among different parameters The present thought experiment explores the consequences of economic selection in a scenario in which two sets of constraints are nearly absent: sociopolitical constraints on market dynamics are averted by a neoliberal institutional setting, while technical constraints are overcome by asymptotically advanced technology (with extreme AI allowing for extreme technological development also in other fields). this scenario is not defined by some contingent choice of AIs' goals by programmers: The goals of maximizing each firm's growth and retained earnings emerge from the collective dynamics of large sets of entities subject to capitalistic rules of interaction and, therefore, to economic selection

challenges of sustainability and of superintelligence are not independent superintelligence could in turn be affected by the socioeconomic context in which it develops Neoliberalism is a major force shaping current policies in sharp contrast to degrowth views superintelligence aligned with capitalist 98 markets could have undesirable consequences for humanity and the whole biosphere Neoliberalism is creating a very special breeding ground for superintelligence Neoliberal policies are actively transferring decisions to markets automated governance is a foundational tenet goals are partly shaped by firms themselves growth is thought to rely on earnings Therefore, economic selection can be expected to favor firms in which these are greater technical constraints are overcome by asymptotically advanced technology (with extreme AI allowing for extreme technological development also in other fields this scenario is not defined by some contingent choice of AIs' goals by programmers The goals emerge from large sets of entities subject to capitalistic rules of interaction and economic selection.

The challenges of sustainability and of superintelligence are not independent. The changing 84 fluxes of energy, matter, and information can be interpreted as different faces of a general acceleration2 85 . More directly, it is argued below that superintelligence would deeply affect 86 production technologies and also economic decisions, and could in turn be affected by the 87 socioeconomic and ecological context in which it develops. Along the lines of Pueyo (2014, p. 88 3454), this paper presents an approach that integrates these topics. It employs insights from a 89 variety of sources, such as ecological theory and several schools of economic theory. 90 The next section presents a thought experiment, in which superintelligence emerges after the 91 technical aspects of goal alignment have been resolved, and this occurs specifically in a neoliberal 92 scenario. Neoliberalism is a major force shaping current policies on a global level, which urges 93 governments to assume as their main role the creation and support of capitalist markets, and to 94 avoid interfering in their functioning (Mirowski, 2009). Neoliberal policies stand in sharp contrast 95 to degrowth views: the first are largely rationalized as a way to enhance efficiency and production 96 (Plehwe, 2009), and represent the maximum expression of capitalist values. 97 The thought experiment illustrates how superintelligence perfectly aligned with capitalist 98 markets could have very undesirable consequences for humanity and the whole biosphere. It also 99 suggests that there is little reason to expect that the wealthiest and most powerful people would be 100 exempt from these consequences, which, as argued below, gives reason for hope. Section 3 raises 101 the possibility of a broad social consensus to respond to this challenge along the lines of degrowth, 102 thus tackling major technological, environmental, and social problems simultaneously. The 103 uncertainty involved in these scenarios is vast, but, if a non-negligible probability is assigned to 104 these two futures, little room is left for either complacency or resignation. 105 106 2. Thought experiment: Superintelligence in a neoliberal scenario 107 108 Neoliberalism is creating a very special breeding ground for superintelligence, because it strives 109 to reduce the role of human agency in collective affairs. The neoliberal pioneer Friedrich Hayek 110 argued that the spontaneous order of markets was preferable over conscious plans, because markets, 111 he thought, have more capacity than humans to process information (Mirowski, 2009). Neoliberal 112 policies are actively transferring decisions to markets (Mirowski, 2009), while firms' automated 113 decision systems become an integral part of the market's information processing machinery 114 (Davenport and Harris, 2005). Neoliberal globalization is locking governments in the role of mere 115 players competing in the global market (Swank, 2016). Furthermore, automated governance is a 116 foundational tenet of neoliberal ideology (Plehwe, 2009, p. 23). 117 In the neoliberal scenario, most technological development can be expected to take place either in the context of firms or in support of firms3 118 . A number of institutionalist (Galbraith, 1985), post119 Keynesian (Lavoie, 2014; and references therein) and evolutionary (Metcalfe, 2008) economists 120 concur that, in capitalist markets, firms tend to maximize their growth rates (this principle is related 121 but not identical to the neoclassical assumption that firms maximize profits; Lavoie, 2014). Growth 122 maximization might be interpreted as expressing the goals of people in key positions, but, from an 123 evolutionary perspective, it is thought to result from a mechanism akin to natural selection 124 (Metcalfe, 2008). The first interpretation is insufficient if we accept that: (1) in big corporations, the 125 managerial bureaucracy is a coherent social-psychological system with motives and preferences of 126 its own (Gordon, 1968, p. 639; for an insider view, see Nace, 2005, pp. 1-10), (2) this system is 127 becoming techno-social-psychological with the progressive incorporation of decision-making 128 algorithms and the increasing opacity of such algorithms (Danaher, 2016), and (3) human mentality 129 and goals are partly shaped by firms themselves (Galbraith, 1985). 130 The type of AI best suited to participate in firms' decisions in this context is described in a 131 recent review in Science: AI researchers aim to construct a synthetic homo economicus, the 132 mythical perfectly rational agent of neoclassical economics. We review progress toward creating 133 this new species of machine, machina economicus (Parkes and Wellman, 2015, p. 267; a more 134 orthodox denomination would be Machina oeconomica). 135 Firm growth is thought to rely critically on retained earnings (Galbraith, 1985; Lavoie, 2014, p. 136 134-141). Therefore, economic selection can be generally expected to favor firms in which these are greater. The aggregate retained earnings4 137 RE of all firms in an economy can be expressed as: 138 RE=FE(R,L,K)-w⋅L-(i+δ)⋅K-g. (1) 139 Bold symbols represent vectors (to indicate multidimensionality). F is an aggregate production 140 function, relying on inputs of various types of natural resources R, labor L and capital K (including intelligent machines), and being affected by environmental factors5 141 E; w are wages, i are returns to 142 capital (dividends, interests) paid to households, δ is depreciation and g are the net taxes paid to 143 governments. 144 Increases in retained earnings face constraints, such as trade-offs among different parameters of 145 Eq. 1. The present thought experiment explores the consequences of economic selection in a 146 scenario in which two sets of constraints are nearly absent: sociopolitical constraints on market 147 dynamics are averted by a neoliberal institutional setting, while technical constraints are overcome 148 by asymptotically advanced technology (with extreme AI allowing for extreme technological 149 development also in other fields). The environmental and the social implications are discussed in 150 turn. Note that this scenario is not defined by some contingent choice of AIs' goals by their 151 programmers: The goals of maximizing each firm's growth and retained earnings are assumed to 152 emerge from the collective dynamics of large sets of entities subject to capitalistic rules of 153 interaction and, therefore, to economic selection.

<h4><u>Growth-oriented AI</u> ensures <u>extinction</u>---BUT, <u>degrowth</u> orientation solves. </h4><p>Salvador <strong>Pueyo 18</strong>. 8 Department of Evolutionary Biology, Ecology, and Environmental Sciences, Universitat de Barcelona. 10/01/2018. “Growth, Degrowth, and the Challenge of Artificial Superintelligence.” Journal of Cleaner Production, vol. 197, pp. 1731–1736.</p><p><u>The <mark>challenges of <strong>sustainability</strong> and of <strong>superintelligence</strong> are <strong>not independent</strong></mark>. The changing</u> 84 <u>fluxes of</u> <u><strong>energy, matter, and information</u></strong> <u>can be interpreted as</u> <u><strong>different faces of</u></strong> a <u><strong>general acceleration</u></strong>2 85 . <u>More</u> <u><strong>directly</u></strong>, it is argued below that <u><mark>superintelligence </mark>would</u> <u><strong>deeply affect</u></strong> 86 <u><strong>production</u></strong> technologies and also economic decisions, <u>and <mark>could in</u> <u>turn</u> <u><strong>be affected</u></strong> <u>by the</u></mark> 87 <u><strong><mark>socioeconomic</u></strong></mark> and ecological <u><strong><mark>context</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>in which it develops</u></mark>. Along the lines of Pueyo (2014, p. 88 3454), this paper presents an approach that integrates these topics. It employs insights from a 89 variety of sources, such as ecological theory and several schools of economic theory. 90 The next section presents a thought experiment, in which superintelligence emerges after the 91 technical aspects of goal alignment have been resolved, and this occurs specifically in a neoliberal 92 scenario. <u><mark>Neoliberalism is a</u> <u><strong>major force</u></strong> <u>shaping current policies</mark> on a global level, which urges</u> 93 <u>governments to assume as their main role the creation and support of capitalist markets, and to</u> 94 <u>avoid interfering in their functioning</u> (Mirowski, 2009). Neoliberal policies stand <u><mark>in</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>sharp contrast</u></strong></mark> 95 <u><mark>to</u> <u><strong>degrowth views</u></strong></mark>: the first are largely rationalized as a way to enhance efficiency and production 96 (Plehwe, 2009), and represent the maximum expression of capitalist values. 97 The thought experiment illustrates how <u><strong><mark>superintelligence</u></strong></mark> perfectly <u><strong><mark>aligned</u></strong> <u>with <strong>capitalist</u></strong> 98 <u><strong>markets</strong> could have</mark> <strong>very <mark>undesirable consequences for humanity and the whole biosphere</u></strong></mark>. It also 99 suggests that there is little reason to expect that the wealthiest and most powerful people would be 100 exempt from these consequences, which, as argued below, gives reason for hope. Section 3 raises 101 the possibility of a broad social consensus to respond to this challenge along the lines of degrowth, 102 thus tackling major technological, environmental, and social problems simultaneously. The 103 uncertainty involved in these scenarios is vast, but, <u>if a non-negligible probability is assigned to</u> 104 <u>these</u> two <u>futures, little room is left for either <strong>complacency</strong> or <strong>resignation</u></strong>. 105 106 2. Thought experiment: Superintelligence in a neoliberal scenario 107 108 <u><mark>Neoliberalism is creating a very <strong>special breeding ground</u></strong> <u>for superintelligence</mark>, because it strives</u> 109 <u>to reduce the role of <strong>human agency</u></strong> <u>in collective affairs</u>. The neoliberal pioneer Friedrich Hayek 110 argued that the <u>spontaneous order of <strong>markets</strong> was preferable over <strong>conscious plans</u></strong>, <u>because markets</u>, 111 he thought, <u>have more capacity than humans to process information</u> (Mirowski, 2009). <u><mark>Neoliberal</u></mark> 112 <u><mark>policies are actively <strong>transferring decisions to markets</u></strong></mark> (Mirowski, 2009), while firms' automated 113 decision systems become an integral part of the market's information processing machinery 114 (Davenport and Harris, 2005). Neoliberal globalization is locking governments in the role of mere 115 players competing in the global market (Swank, 2016). Furthermore, <u><mark>automated <strong>governance</u></strong> <u>is a</mark> </u>116 <u><strong><mark>foundational tenet</u></strong></mark> <u>of neoliberal ideology</u> (Plehwe, 2009, p. 23). 117 In the neoliberal scenario, <u>most technological development can be expected to take place either in the context of <strong>firms</u></strong> or in support of firms3 118 . A number of institutionalist (Galbraith, 1985), post119 Keynesian (Lavoie, 2014; and references therein) and evolutionary (Metcalfe, 2008) economists 120 concur that, in capitalist markets, <u>firms tend to <strong>maximize their growth rates</u></strong> (this principle is <u>related</u> 121 but not identical <u>to the neoclassical assumption that firms maximize profits</u>; Lavoie, 2014). Growth 122 maximization might be interpreted as expressing the goals of people in key positions, but, from an 123 evolutionary perspective, it is thought to result from <u>a mechanism akin to <strong>natural selection</u></strong> 124 (Metcalfe, 2008). The first interpretation is insufficient if we accept that: (1) in big corporations, the 125 managerial bureaucracy is a coherent social-psychological system with motives and preferences of 126 its own (Gordon, 1968, p. 639; for an insider view, see Nace, 2005, pp. 1-10), (2) this system is 127 becoming techno-social-psychological with the progressive incorporation of decision-making 128 algorithms and the increasing opacity of such algorithms (Danaher, 2016), and (3) <u>human mentality </u>129 <u>and <mark>goals are partly <strong>shaped by firms themselves</u></strong></mark> (Galbraith, 1985). 130 The type of AI best suited to participate in firms' decisions in this context is described in a 131 recent review in Science: AI researchers aim to construct a synthetic homo economicus, the 132 mythical perfectly rational agent of neoclassical economics. We review progress toward creating 133 this new species of machine, machina economicus (Parkes and Wellman, 2015, p. 267; a more 134 orthodox denomination would be Machina oeconomica). 135 <u>Firm <mark>growth is thought to rely </mark>critically <mark>on <strong></mark>retained <mark>earnings</u></strong></mark> (Galbraith, 1985; Lavoie, 2014, p. 136 134-141). <u><mark>Therefore</u>, <u><strong>economic selection</u></strong> <u>can be </mark>generally <mark>expected to favor firms in which these are greater</mark>. The aggregate retained earnings4 </u>137 RE <u>of all firms in an economy can be expressed as: </u>138 <u>RE=FE(R,L,K)-w⋅L-(i+δ)⋅K-g.</u> (1) 139 Bold symbols represent vectors (to indicate multidimensionality). F is an aggregate production 140 function, relying on inputs of various types of natural resources R, labor L and capital K (including intelligent machines), and being affected by environmental factors5 141 E; w are wages, i are returns to 142 capital (dividends, interests) paid to households, δ is depreciation and g are the net taxes paid to 143 governments. 144 <u>Increases in retained earnings face constraints, such as trade-offs among different parameters</u> of 145 Eq. 1. <u>The present thought experiment explores the consequences of economic selection in a</u> 146 <u>scenario in which two sets of constraints are nearly absent: sociopolitical constraints on market</u> 147 <u>dynamics are averted by a neoliberal institutional setting, while <strong><mark>technical</strong> constraints are <strong>overcome</u></strong></mark> 148 <u><mark>by</u> <u><strong>asymptotically advanced technology (with extreme AI allowing for extreme technological</u></strong></mark> 149 <u><strong><mark>development also in other fields</mark>).</u></strong> The environmental and the social implications are discussed in 150 turn. Note that <u><mark>this scenario is <strong>not</strong> defined by some <strong>contingent choice of AIs'</mark> <mark>goals</strong></mark> <mark>by</u></mark> their 151 <u><strong><mark>programmers</strong></mark>: <mark>The goals</mark> of maximizing each firm's growth and retained earnings</u> are assumed to 152 <u><mark>emerge from </mark>the collective dynamics of <strong><mark>large sets of entities subject to capitalistic rules of</mark> </u></strong>153 <u><strong><mark>interaction</u></strong> <u>and</mark>, therefore, to <strong><mark>economic selection</u></strong>.</p></mark>

ADV 1

T/L

./documents/hspolicy20/MinneapolisSouth/CoCh/Minneapolis%20South-Conry-ChangDeutsch-Neg-Emory-Round3.docx

N

Emory

3

Cambridge RM

Shreyas Rajagopal

1AC - Weed 1NC - Exec CP Climate PTX K - National Security ADV CP T Enact T DeCrim DeDev 2NR - T DeCrim

hspolicy20/MinneapolisSouth/CoCh/Minneapolis%20South-Conry-ChangDeutsch-Neg-Emory-Round3.docx

CoCh

Minneapolis South CoCh

Cl.....

Co.....

Ga.....

Ch.....

MinneapolisSouth

Minneapolis South

MN

hspolicy20

HS Policy 2020-21

cx

hs

Normalization of arms sales embolden Taiwanese independence movement---guarantees escalation.

Tay 19

Tay 19 (Shirley, Intern for CNBC.com out of the Asia Pacific headquarters in Singapore, 6-11-2019, “As US-China relations sour, Taiwan’s value as a ‘chess piece’ may rise,” https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/11/as-us-china-relations-sour-taiwans-value-as-a-chess-piece-may-rise.html)

As the U S China remain deadlocked in a deepening dispute over trade and technology The island is one of many flashpoints in the rivalry between the world’s two superpowers Taiwan’s value to the U.S. will only increase as tensions between the U.S. and China escalate the self-ruled island is part of mainland China recent military actions from Washington have been seen by Beijing as U.S. support for Taiwan’s independence movement Washington’s support for Taipei has sent terribly wrong signals to Taiwan’s independence forces which could undermine regional peace and stability The U.S. using Taiwan as a card is a new factor in the dynamic of the trilateral relationship that really did not exist before Trump came into power Trump is a transactional president and often seems to be willing to put anything on the table Trump has ramped up arms sales invoking the ire of Beijing Washington is preparing a sale of more than $2 billion worth of tanks and weapons to Taiwan we’re inching closer to Beijing’s redline if Tsai is re-elected which is likely cross-strait tensions are likely to escalate further from 2020 to 2024. Glaser from CSIS echoed that sentiment, adding that if a candidate from the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party was elected China would ratchet up pressure the Chinese would be worried that there’s always this potential for things to go in a direction Trump could really embolden Tsai to move toward the direction of independence the best hope for keeping tensions under wraps would be if a candidate from the KMT wins and recognizes the One China policy public opinion polling has shown that voters will not support the KMT 83 % of Taiwan opposes Xi’s one country, two systems policy Asked if an armed conflict was a possibility Grossman said Absolutely a risk risk has escalated under Tsai that’s uncomfortably high considering that China has nuclear weapons and the U.S. would likely intervene to save Taiwan confrontations are highly likely That may come in the form of Beijing poaching the island’s allies to ramp up pressure on Taiwan as cross-strait tensions escalate Washington should carefully deliberate its exchanges with Taiwan and ensure the wrong signals are not sent to Beijing China could miscalculate and think the U S would get involved in a conflict and that would really be a very dangerous situation

recent military actions have been seen as U.S. support for Taiwan’s independence which could undermine stability Trump has ramped up arms sales inching closer to Beijing’s redline if Tsai is re-elected which is likely cross-strait tensions are likely to escalate further Trump could embolden Tsai to move toward independence 83 % of Taiwan opposes Xi’s one country, two systems risk has escalated under Tsai Washington should ensure the wrong signals are not sent to Beijing China could miscalculate

As the United States and China remain deadlocked in a deepening dispute over trade and technology, some experts say Taiwan’s value as a bargaining chip has increased. The self-governed island — which Beijing deems to be a renegade Chinese province — is one of many flashpoints in the rivalry between the world’s two superpowers. Taiwan has always been a “chess piece” that Washington can play with in U.S.-China relations, said Zhiqun Zhu, a professor of political science and international relations at Bucknell University. “Taiwan’s value to the U.S. will only increase as tensions between the U.S. and China escalate,” Zhu told CNBC. Under the Chinese Communist Party’s “One China” policy, the self-ruled island is part of mainland China. Chinese President Xi Jinping has said before that China “must be and will be” reunified with Taiwan — by force if necessary. However, recent military and diplomatic actions from Washington have been seen by Beijing as U.S. support for Taiwan’s independence movement. At the Shangri-la dialogue defense summit in Singapore last weekend, Chinese Lieutenant General Shao Yuanming said Washington’s support for Taipei has sent “terribly wrong signals to Taiwan’s independence forces, which could undermine regional peace and stability.” “If anyone wants to separate Taiwan from the country, the Chinese military will resolutely defend the unity of our motherland at all costs,” Shao added. ‘Upgrade’ in US-Taiwan relations The U.S. using Taiwan as a card is a new factor in the dynamic of the trilateral relationship that “really did not exist” before President Donald Trump came into power, said Bonnie Glaser, senior advisor for Asia at Washington-based think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). “Trump is a transactional president and he often seems to be willing to put anything on the table,” she told CNBC. On the military front, the Trump administration has ramped up arms sales to Taipei over the years, invoking the ire of Beijing. Washington is reportedly preparing a sale of more than $2 billion worth of tanks and weapons to Taiwan. Diplomatic issues have also come to the fore. In May, high-level security officials from the U.S. and Taiwan met for the first time in nearly four decades, drawing an angry response from Beijing. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lu Kang said Beijing is “strongly dissatisfied” with and “resolutely opposed” to any official meetings between the U.S. and Taiwan. “I believe we’re inching closer & closer to Beijing’s redline on US-Taiwan senior official mtgs--those that are publicized at least,” Derek Grossman, a senior defense analyst at California-based think tank Rand Corporation, said on Twitter after the U.S.-Taiwan meeting. Grossman told CNBC on email that his understanding is that such meetings “have been ongoing for some time in private.” “My hunch is that it was publicized this time via intentional leak from one or both sides to signal to China that the upgrade in U.S.-Taiwan relations is here to stay,” he added. Taiwan’s next leader is key Taiwan is set to have its presidential elections in January 2020 — and experts said the polls would likely determine the direction of cross-strait ties. Grossman said that if the incumbent Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-Wen is re-elected, which is “likely,” cross-strait tensions are likely to escalate further from 2020 to 2024. Glaser from CSIS echoed that sentiment, adding that if a candidate from the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party was elected, China would ratchet up military, diplomatic and economic pressure. “I think the Chinese would be worried that there’s always this potential for things to go in a very negative direction because the combination of Trump being president and the possibility that Tsai gets re-elected … could really embolden Tsai to move toward the direction of independence,” she added. According to Grossman, the best hope for keeping tensions under wraps would be if a candidate from the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) party wins the next Taiwan presidential race and recognizes the “One China” policy. That said, Grossman added, public opinion polling in Taiwan has shown that voters will not likely support the opposition KMT in doing so. “The Taiwanese have been observing how China’s ‘One Country, Two Systems’ approach has worked out in Hong Kong, and it isn’t too inspiring,” Grossman added. A public opinion survey conducted by the Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council in May also found that 83.6% of Taiwan opposes Xi’s “one country, two systems” policy. A ‘small’ risk of escalation Asked if an armed conflict was a possibility, Grossman said: “Absolutely a risk — albeit a small one.” However, he emphasized that he did not want to get anyone alarmed, and highlighted that “those out there saying the risk is very high are probably wrong.” “I would say the risk has escalated under Tsai from maybe a 1% to 5% chance of armed conflict,” Grossman added. “But that’s still uncomfortably high considering that China has nuclear weapons and the U.S., also with nukes, would likely intervene to save Taiwan were China to invade or attack the island.” Similarly, Bucknell’s Zhu said that while the possibility of an escalation is always present, in reality, “neither side wants to face military confrontation.” However, economic and diplomatic confrontations are “highly likely,” he added. That may come in the form of Beijing poaching the island’s allies to ramp up pressure on Taiwan as cross-strait tensions escalate, he said. “Economically, Taiwan is heavily dependent on the mainland market, so China could restrict Taiwan’s agricultural exports to the mainland.” Washington should “carefully deliberate” its exchanges with Taiwan and ensure the wrong signals are not sent to Beijing, Glaser from CSIS pointed out. “China could miscalculate and think the United States would get involved in a conflict, and that would really be a very dangerous situation,” she added.

<h4>Normalization of arms sales embolden Taiwanese independence movement---guarantees escalation. </h4><p><strong>Tay 19</strong> (Shirley, Intern for CNBC.com out of the Asia Pacific headquarters in Singapore, 6-11-2019, “As US-China relations sour, Taiwan’s value as a ‘chess piece’ may rise,” https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/11/as-us-china-relations-sour-taiwans-value-as-a-chess-piece-may-rise.html)</p><p><u>As the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates and <u>China remain <strong>deadlocked</u></strong> <u>in a deepening dispute over trade and technology</u>, some experts say Taiwan’s value as a bargaining chip has increased. <u>The</u> self-governed <u>island</u> — which Beijing deems to be a renegade Chinese province — <u>is one of many <strong>flashpoints</u></strong> <u>in the rivalry between the world’s two superpowers</u>. Taiwan has always been a “chess piece” that Washington can play with in U.S.-China relations, said Zhiqun Zhu, a professor of political science and international relations at Bucknell University. “<u>Taiwan’s value to the U.S. will only <strong>increase</strong> as tensions between the U.S. and China escalate</u>,” Zhu told CNBC. Under the Chinese Communist Party’s “One China” policy, <u>the self-ruled island is part of mainland China</u>. Chinese President Xi Jinping has said before that China “must be and will be” reunified with Taiwan — by force if necessary. However, <u><mark>recent <strong>military</u></strong></mark> and diplomatic <u><mark>actions </mark>from Washington <mark>have been <strong>seen</strong></mark> by Beijing <mark>as U.S. <strong>support</strong> for Taiwan’s independence</mark> movement</u>. At the Shangri-la dialogue defense summit in Singapore last weekend, Chinese Lieutenant General Shao Yuanming said <u>Washington’s support for Taipei has sent</u> “<u>terribly <strong>wrong signals</u></strong> <u>to Taiwan’s independence forces</u>, <u><mark>which could <strong>undermine</strong> </mark>regional <strong>peace</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong><mark>stability</u></strong></mark>.” “If anyone wants to separate Taiwan from the country, the Chinese military will resolutely defend the unity of our motherland at all costs,” Shao added. ‘Upgrade’ in US-Taiwan relations <u>The U.S. using Taiwan as a card is a new factor in the dynamic of the trilateral relationship that</u> “<u>really did not exist</u>” <u>before</u> President Donald <u>Trump came into power</u>, said Bonnie Glaser, senior advisor for Asia at Washington-based think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). “<u>Trump is a <strong>transactional</strong> president and</u> he <u>often seems to be willing to put anything on the table</u>,” she told CNBC. On the military front, the <u><mark>Trump</u></mark> administration <u><mark>has ramped up<strong> arms sales</u></strong></mark> to Taipei over the years, <u>invoking the <strong>ire</strong> of Beijing</u>. <u>Washington is</u> reportedly <u>preparing a sale of more than <strong>$2 billion</strong> worth of tanks and weapons to Taiwan</u>. Diplomatic issues have also come to the fore. In May, high-level security officials from the U.S. and Taiwan met for the first time in nearly four decades, drawing an angry response from Beijing. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lu Kang said Beijing is “strongly dissatisfied” with and “resolutely opposed” to any official meetings between the U.S. and Taiwan. “I believe <u>we’re <mark>inching closer</u></mark> & closer <u><mark>to Beijing’s <strong>redline</u></strong></mark> on US-Taiwan senior official mtgs--those that are publicized at least,” Derek Grossman, a senior defense analyst at California-based think tank Rand Corporation, said on Twitter after the U.S.-Taiwan meeting. Grossman told CNBC on email that his understanding is that such meetings “have been ongoing for some time in private.” “My hunch is that it was publicized this time via intentional leak from one or both sides to signal to China that the upgrade in U.S.-Taiwan relations is here to stay,” he added. Taiwan’s next leader is key Taiwan is set to have its presidential elections in January 2020 — and experts said the polls would likely determine the direction of cross-strait ties. Grossman said that <u><mark>if</u></mark> the incumbent Taiwanese president <u><mark>Tsai</u></mark> Ing-Wen <u><mark>is re-elected</u></mark>, <u><mark>which is</u></mark> “<u><strong><mark>likely</u></strong></mark>,” <u><mark>cross-strait tensions are likely to <strong>escalate further</u></strong></mark> <u>from 2020 to 2024. Glaser from CSIS echoed that sentiment, adding that if a candidate from the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party was elected</u>, <u>China would <strong>ratchet up</u></strong> military, diplomatic and economic <u><strong>pressure</u></strong>. “I think <u>the Chinese would be <strong>worried</u></strong> <u>that there’s always this potential for things to go in a</u> very negative <u>direction</u> because the combination of <u><mark>Trump</u></mark> being president and the possibility that Tsai gets re-elected … <u><mark>could </mark>really <mark>embolden Tsai to move toward</mark> the direction of <strong><mark>independence</u></strong></mark>,” she added. According to Grossman, <u>the best hope for keeping tensions under wraps would be if a candidate from the</u> opposition Kuomintang (<u>KMT</u>) party <u>wins</u> the next Taiwan presidential race <u>and recognizes the</u> “<u>One China</u>” <u>policy</u>. That said, Grossman added, <u>public opinion polling</u> in Taiwan <u>has shown that voters <strong>will not</u></strong> likely <u>support the</u> opposition <u>KMT</u> in doing so. “The Taiwanese have been observing how China’s ‘One Country, Two Systems’ approach has worked out in Hong Kong, and it isn’t too inspiring,” Grossman added. A public opinion survey conducted by the Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council in May also found that <u><strong><mark>83</u></strong></mark>.6<u><strong><mark>%</u></strong> <u>of Taiwan opposes Xi’s</u></mark> “<u><mark>one country, two systems</u></mark>” <u>policy</u>. A ‘small’ risk of escalation <u>Asked if an <strong>armed conflict</strong> was a possibility</u>, <u>Grossman said</u>: “<u>Absolutely a risk</u> — albeit a small one.” However, he emphasized that he did not want to get anyone alarmed, and highlighted that “those out there saying the risk is very high are probably wrong.” “I would say the <u><mark>risk has <strong>escalated</strong> under Tsai</u></mark> from maybe a 1% to 5% chance of armed conflict,” Grossman added. “But <u>that’s</u> still <u><strong>uncomfortably</u></strong> <u><strong>high</u></strong> <u>considering that China has <strong>nuclear weapons</u></strong> <u>and the U.S.</u>, also with nukes, <u>would likely intervene to save Taiwan</u> were China to invade or attack the island.” Similarly, Bucknell’s Zhu said that while the possibility of an escalation is always present, in reality, “neither side wants to face military confrontation.” However, economic and diplomatic <u>confrontations are </u>“<u><strong>highly likely</u></strong>,” he added. <u>That may come in the form of Beijing poaching the island’s allies</u> <u>to ramp up pressure on Taiwan as cross-strait tensions escalate</u>, he said. “Economically, Taiwan is heavily dependent on the mainland market, so China could restrict Taiwan’s agricultural exports to the mainland.” <u><mark>Washington should</u></mark> “<u><strong>carefully deliberate</u></strong>” <u>its exchanges with Taiwan and <mark>ensure the <strong>wrong signals</u></strong> <u>are not sent to Beijing</u></mark>, Glaser from CSIS pointed out. “<u><mark>China could <strong>miscalculate</u></strong></mark> <u>and think the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>would get involved in a conflict</u>, <u>and that would really be a very <strong>dangerous</strong> situation</u>,” she added.</p>

Taiwan 1AC v8

Adv 1

Advantage

./documents/hspolicy19/CypressBay/KoLe/Cypress%20Bay-Kotler-Levinson-Aff-Berkeley-Round4.docx

A

Berkeley

4

Anderson KL

Abhishek Rengarajan

1AC-Taiwan v8 1NC-T Pearson Deterrence CP Bill de Blasio CP Trade DA India DA Solomon DA Pompeo DA 2NR-India DA Solomon DA 2AR-Degrowth

hspolicy19/CypressBay/KoLe/Cypress%20Bay-Kotler-Levinson-Aff-Berkeley-Round4.docx

KoLe

Cypress Bay KoLe

Jo.....

Ko.....

Za.....

Le.....

CypressBay

Cypress Bay

FL

hspolicy19

HS Policy 2019-20

cx

hs

No impact to the environment

Brook 13

Barry Brook 13, Professor at the University of Adelaide, leading environmental scientist, holding the Sir Hubert Wilkins Chair of Climate Change at the School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, and is also Director of Climate Science at the University of Adelaide’s Environment Institute, author of 3 books and over 250 scholarly articles, Corey Bradshaw is an Associate Professor at the University of Adelaide and a joint appointee at the South Australian Research and Development Institute, Brave New Climate, March 4, 2013, "Worrying about global tipping points distracts from real planetary threats", http://bravenewclimate.com/2013/03/04/ecological-tipping-points/

at the global-scale, ecological “tipping points” and threshold-like “planetary boundaries” are improbable. Instead, shifts in the Earth’s biosphere follow a gradual, smooth pattern there have been several efforts to define ecological tipping points at the global scale At a local scale, there are definitely warning signs that an ecosystem is about to “tip” These criteria are, however, unlikely to be met in the real world First, ecosystems on different continents are not strongly connected. Organisms are limited in their movement by oceans and mountain ranges, as well as by climatic factors this signal is likely to be weak in comparison with inputs from fossil fuel combustion and deforestation Second, the responses of ecosystems to human pressures like climate change or land-use change depend on local circumstances and will therefore differ between locations this diversity in ecosystem responses creates an essentially gradual pattern of change, without any identifiable tipping points an undue focus on planetary tipping points may distract from the vast ecological transformations that have already occurred the latest “craze” in environmental science writing – the idea of “planetary tipping points” and the related “planetary boundaries”. It’s really the stuff of Hollywood disaster blockbusters claiming that we are approaching a major planetary boundary for our ecosystems is simply not upheld by evidence Regional tipping points are unlikely to translate into planet-wide state shifts. The main reason is that our ecosystems aren’t that connected at global scales In other words, let’s be empirical about these sorts of politically charged statements instead of crying “Wolf!” while the hordes of foxes steal most of the flock.

global “tipping points” are improbable shifts in the biosphere follow a gradual, smooth pattern ecosystems on different continents are not strongly connected. Organisms are limited in movement diversity in ecosystem responses creates a gradual change, without tipping points the latest “craze” in the idea of “planetary tipping points” It’s the stuff of Hollywood disaster blockbusters ecosystems aren’t connected at global scales

Barry Brook¶ We argue that at the global-scale, ecological “tipping points” and threshold-like “planetary boundaries” are improbable. Instead, shifts in the Earth’s biosphere follow a gradual, smooth pattern. This means that it might be impossible to define scientifically specific, critical levels of biodiversity loss or land-use change. This has important consequences for both science and policy.¶ Humans are causing changes in ecosystems across Earth to such a degree that there is now broad agreement that we live in an epoch of our own making: the Anthropocene. But the question of just how these changes will play out — and especially whether we might be approaching a planetary tipping point with abrupt, global-scale consequences — has remained unsettled.¶ A tipping point occurs when an ecosystem attribute, such as species abundance or carbon sequestration, responds abruptly and possibly irreversibly to a human pressure, such as land-use or climate change. Many local- and regional-level ecosystems, such as lakes,forests and grasslands, behave this way. Recently however, there have been several efforts to define ecological tipping points at the global scale.¶ At a local scale, there are definitely warning signs that an ecosystem is about to “tip”. For the terrestrial biosphere, tipping points might be expected if ecosystems across Earth respond in similar ways to human pressures and these pressures are uniform, or if there are strong connections between continents that allow for rapid diffusion of impacts across the planet.¶ These criteria are, however, unlikely to be met in the real world.¶ First, ecosystems on different continents are not strongly connected. Organisms are limited in their movement by oceans and mountain ranges, as well as by climatic factors, and while ecosystem change in one region can affect the global circulation of, for example, greenhouse gases, this signal is likely to be weak in comparison with inputs from fossil fuel combustion and deforestation.¶ Second, the responses of ecosystems to human pressures like climate change or land-use change depend on local circumstances and will therefore differ between locations. From a planetary perspective, this diversity in ecosystem responses creates an essentially gradual pattern of change, without any identifiable tipping points.¶ This puts into question attempts to define critical levels of land-use change or biodiversity loss scientifically.¶ Why does this matter? Well, one concern we have is that an undue focus on planetary tipping points may distract from the vast ecological transformations that have already occurred.¶ After all, as much as four-fifths of the biosphere is today characterised by ecosystems that locally, over the span of centuries and millennia, have undergone human-driven regime shifts of one or more kinds.¶ Recognising this reality and seeking appropriate conservation efforts at local and regional levels might be a more fruitful way forward for ecology and global change science.¶ Corey Bradshaw¶ (see also notes published here on ConservationBytes.com)¶ Let’s not get too distracted by the title of the this article – Does the terrestrial biosphere have planetary tipping points? – or the potential for a false controversy. It’s important to be clear that the planet is indeed ill, and it’s largely due to us. Species are going extinct faster than they would have otherwise. The planet’s climate system is being severely disrupted; so is the carbon cycle. Ecosystem services are on the decline.¶ But – and it’s a big “but” – we have to be wary of claiming the end of the world as we know it, or people will shut down and continue blindly with their growth and consumption obsession. We as scientists also have to be extremely careful not to pull concepts and numbers out of thin air without empirical support.¶ Specifically, I’m referring to the latest “craze” in environmental science writing – the idea of “planetary tipping points” and the related “planetary boundaries”.¶ It’s really the stuff of Hollywood disaster blockbusters – the world suddenly shifts into a new “state” where some major aspect of how the world functions does an immediate about-face.¶ Don’t get me wrong: there are plenty of localised examples of such tipping points, often characterised by something we call “hysteresis”. Brook defines hysterisis as:¶ a situation where the current state of an ecosystem is dependent not only on its environment but also on its history, with the return path to the original state being very different from the original development that led to the altered state. Also, at some range of the driver, there can exist two or more alternative states¶ and “tipping point” as:¶ the critical point at which strong nonlinearities appear in the relationship between ecosystem attributes and drivers; once a tipping point threshold is crossed, the change to a new state is typically rapid and might be irreversible or exhibit hysteresis.¶ Some of these examples include state shifts that have happened (or mostly likely will) to the cryosphere, ocean thermohaline circulation, atmospheric circulation, and marine ecosystems, and there are many other fine-scale examples of ecological systems shifting to new (apparently) stable states.¶ However, claiming that we are approaching a major planetary boundary for our ecosystems (including human society), where we witness such transitions simultaneously across the globe, is simply not upheld by evidence.¶ Regional tipping points are unlikely to translate into planet-wide state shifts. The main reason is that our ecosystems aren’t that connected at global scales.¶ The paper provides a framework against which one can test the existence or probability of a planetary tipping point for any particular ecosystem function or state. To date, the application of the idea has floundered because of a lack of specified criteria that would allow the terrestrial biosphere to “tip”. From a more sociological viewpoint, the claim of imminent shift to some worse state also risks alienating people from addressing the real problems (foxes), or as Brook and colleagues summarise:¶ framing global change in the dichotomous terms implied by the notion of a global tipping point could lead to complacency on the “safe” side of the point and fatalism about catastrophic or irrevocable effects on the other.¶ In other words, let’s be empirical about these sorts of politically charged statements instead of crying “Wolf!” while the hordes of foxes steal most of the flock.

<h4>No impact to the environment</h4><p>Barry <strong>Brook 13</strong>, Professor at the University of Adelaide, leading environmental scientist, holding the Sir Hubert Wilkins Chair of Climate Change at the School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, and is also Director of Climate Science at the University of Adelaide’s Environment Institute, author of 3 books and over 250 scholarly articles, Corey Bradshaw is an Associate Professor at the University of Adelaide and a joint appointee at the South Australian Research and Development Institute, Brave New Climate, March 4, 2013, "Worrying about global tipping points distracts from real planetary threats", http://bravenewclimate.com/2013/03/04/ecological-tipping-points/</p><p>Barry Brook¶ We argue that <u>at the <mark>global</mark>-scale, ecological <mark>“tipping points”</mark> and threshold-like “planetary boundaries” <mark>are improbable</mark>. <strong>Instead, <mark>shifts in the</mark> Earth’s <mark>biosphere follow a gradual, smooth pattern</u></strong></mark>. This means that it might be impossible to define scientifically specific, critical levels of biodiversity loss or land-use change. This has important consequences for both science and policy.¶ Humans are causing changes in ecosystems across Earth to such a degree that there is now broad agreement that we live in an epoch of our own making: the Anthropocene. But the question of just how these changes will play out — and especially whether we might be approaching a planetary tipping point with abrupt, global-scale consequences — has remained unsettled.¶ A tipping point occurs when an ecosystem attribute, such as species abundance or carbon sequestration, responds abruptly and possibly irreversibly to a human pressure, such as land-use or climate change. Many local- and regional-level ecosystems, such as lakes,forests and grasslands, behave this way. Recently however, <u>there have been several efforts to define ecological tipping points at the global scale</u>.¶ <u>At a local scale, there are definitely warning signs that an ecosystem is about to “tip”</u>. For the terrestrial biosphere, tipping points might be expected if ecosystems across Earth respond in similar ways to human pressures and these pressures are uniform, or if there are strong connections between continents that allow for rapid diffusion of impacts across the planet.¶ <u>These criteria are, however, unlikely to be met in the real world</u>.¶ <u>First, <strong><mark>ecosystems on different continents are not strongly connected</strong>. Organisms are limited in</mark> their <mark>movement </mark>by oceans and mountain ranges, as well as by climatic factors</u>, and while ecosystem change in one region can affect the global circulation of, for example, greenhouse gases, <u>this signal is likely to be weak in comparison with inputs from fossil fuel combustion and deforestation</u>.¶ <u>Second, the responses of ecosystems to human pressures like climate change or land-use change depend on local circumstances and will therefore differ between locations</u>. From a planetary perspective, <u>this <mark>diversity in ecosystem responses creates a</mark>n essentially <mark>gradual</mark> pattern of <mark>change, <strong>without</mark> any identifiable <mark>tipping points</u></strong></mark>.¶ This puts into question attempts to define critical levels of land-use change or biodiversity loss scientifically.¶ Why does this matter? Well, one concern we have is that <u>an undue focus on planetary tipping points may distract from the vast ecological transformations that have already occurred</u>.¶ After all, as much as four-fifths of the biosphere is today characterised by ecosystems that locally, over the span of centuries and millennia, have undergone human-driven regime shifts of one or more kinds.¶ Recognising this reality and seeking appropriate conservation efforts at local and regional levels might be a more fruitful way forward for ecology and global change science.¶ Corey Bradshaw¶ (see also notes published here on ConservationBytes.com)¶ Let’s not get too distracted by the title of the this article – Does the terrestrial biosphere have planetary tipping points? – or the potential for a false controversy. It’s important to be clear that the planet is indeed ill, and it’s largely due to us. Species are going extinct faster than they would have otherwise. The planet’s climate system is being severely disrupted; so is the carbon cycle. Ecosystem services are on the decline.¶ But – and it’s a big “but” – we have to be wary of claiming the end of the world as we know it, or people will shut down and continue blindly with their growth and consumption obsession. We as scientists also have to be extremely careful not to pull concepts and numbers out of thin air without empirical support.¶ Specifically, I’m referring to <u><mark>the latest “craze” in</mark> environmental science writing – <mark>the idea of “planetary tipping points”</mark> and the related “planetary boundaries”.</u>¶ <u><strong><mark>It’s</mark> really <mark>the stuff of Hollywood disaster blockbusters</u></strong></mark> – the world suddenly shifts into a new “state” where some major aspect of how the world functions does an immediate about-face.¶ Don’t get me wrong: there are plenty of localised examples of such tipping points, often characterised by something we call “hysteresis”. Brook defines hysterisis as:¶ a situation where the current state of an ecosystem is dependent not only on its environment but also on its history, with the return path to the original state being very different from the original development that led to the altered state. Also, at some range of the driver, there can exist two or more alternative states¶ and “tipping point” as:¶ the critical point at which strong nonlinearities appear in the relationship between ecosystem attributes and drivers; once a tipping point threshold is crossed, the change to a new state is typically rapid and might be irreversible or exhibit hysteresis.¶ Some of these examples include state shifts that have happened (or mostly likely will) to the cryosphere, ocean thermohaline circulation, atmospheric circulation, and marine ecosystems, and there are many other fine-scale examples of ecological systems shifting to new (apparently) stable states.¶ However, <u>claiming that we are approaching a major planetary boundary for our ecosystems</u> (including human society), where we witness such transitions simultaneously across the globe, <u><strong>is simply not upheld by evidence</u></strong>.¶ <u>Regional tipping points are unlikely to translate into planet-wide state shifts. The main reason is that <strong>our <mark>ecosystems aren’t</mark> that <mark>connected at global scales</u></strong></mark>.¶ The paper provides a framework against which one can test the existence or probability of a planetary tipping point for any particular ecosystem function or state. To date, the application of the idea has floundered because of a lack of specified criteria that would allow the terrestrial biosphere to “tip”. From a more sociological viewpoint, the claim of imminent shift to some worse state also risks alienating people from addressing the real problems (foxes), or as Brook and colleagues summarise:¶ framing global change in the dichotomous terms implied by the notion of a global tipping point could lead to complacency on the “safe” side of the point and fatalism about catastrophic or irrevocable effects on the other.¶<u><strong> In other words, let’s be empirical about these sorts of politically charged statements instead of crying “Wolf!” while the hordes of foxes steal most of the flock.</p></u></strong>

***1NC***

Case

AT Enviro Impact

./documents/ndtceda19/Northwestern/JaWe/Northwestern-Jankovsky-Weideman-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx

N

Texas

4

George Mason BG

Prazada Ahmed

1AC - Spectres Communism 1NC - T-USFG Case turns 2NR - T

ndtceda19/Northwestern/JaWe/Northwestern-Jankovsky-Weideman-Neg-Texas-Round4.docx

JaWe

Northwestern JaWe

Ga.....

Ja.....

Jo.....

We.....

Northwestern

Northwestern

ndtceda19

NDT/CEDA 2019-20

cx

college

Al Qaeda and Boko Haram will get CBRNs -- causes existential WMD terrorism.

Fyanka 20

Bernard B. Fyanka 20. Ph.D. in History and Strategic Studies from the University of Lagos, Akoka Lagos Nigeria. "Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism: Rethinking Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategy". Taylor & Francis. 2-17-2020. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10246029.2019.1698441?scroll=top&needAccess=true

MAD did not dispel the dangers of the nuclear age proliferation of non-conventional weapons has instead escalated the possibilities for a nuclear attack being carried out terrorist groups like Boko Haram have emerged as potential players in nuclear conflicts the rise in terrorist attacks enhances the likelihood of such an occurrence ample ideological incentive for the use of CBRN devices has been provided For Boko Haram and other s, there motivation for WMDs Boko Haram is one such group which has embraced the jihadist world view that endorses the use of WMDs The risk of WMDs falling into the hands of terrorist groups global proliferation has made this possible g represented a sample of the product they were ready to market. They claimed to possess an additional 9kg, which represents one third of the quantity needed to create a nuclear weapon. The leader of this group and the North African buyer escaped.23 Four years before this incident, gunmen raided a facility in Pelindaba, South Africa; the details of the event are still shrouded in mystery.24 Efforts by terrorist organisations to purchase and use nuclear weapons continue unabated sketches of nuclear weapons were found at an al-Qaeda training camp.25 Boko Haram is one of the deadliest terrorist groups With known ties to al-Qaeda, Boko Haram has an estimated annual income in excess of US$25 million acquisition of dirty bombs’ increased availability of this material within presents ominous opportunities in Africa HEU can be found all over the world Boko Haram could easily build and use an RDD For terrorist groups like Boko Haram, chemical and biological weapons are attractive they are extremely difficult to detect, cost effective and easy to deploy The proliferation of chemical and biological weapons has proved to be very fluid over the past century due to advancements in technology The CBRN terrorism threat is real and present An integrated CBRN protocol would fall under the preparation and implementation work streams of the NACTEST. The protocol should include a strategy for detecting CBRN agents in the wake of terrorist events, followed by disaster response and countermeasure initiatives to be carried out by security, medical and disaster response teams. Given the availability of advanced technology, the integrated CBRN counterterrorism protocol should also include the deployment of handheld radiological and biochemical detectors to high-risk areas, and security forces and disaster response teams should be trained in their usage. Embedding a standard protocol in the NACTEST on how to prepare for and respond to CBRN events is essential for repositioning counterterrorist activities in the country to meet the present threat level. The US and Canada along with the UK and most other European countries facing CBRN threats have already repositioned accordingly in order to accommodate this new reality. Conclusion Any terrorist attack involving WMDs is the ultimate nightmare scenario Preventing such a tragic event will require very close ongoing monitoring of the strategic manoeuvrings of Boko Haram. From its inception to the present day, the organisation has depended on the looting of military armouries to source most of its heavy weapons and equipment. It has built up an impressive arsenal in this manner and there is no indication that the group will stop using this highly profitable strategy, which could be further employed to obtain advanced CBRN weaponry from facilities that are vulnerable to being raided. The civilian facilities mentioned in this paper are at high risk of being targeted in this fashion; hence, the recalibration of Nigeria’s CBRN counterterrorism protocols should include a security framework that provides military security for facilities like the ACEGID in Osun State and the Centre for Energy Research and Training at Ahmadu Bello University Zaria. Lastly, although the IAEA has assisted in the conversion of Nigeria’s reactor from HEU to LEU,61 the availability of fissile material at the facility means that the risk of radioactive dirty bombs being created from looted material is still present.

terrorist groups like Boko Haram emerged as players in nuclear conflicts the rise in terrorist attacks enhances likelihood incentive for the use of CBRN has been provided For Boko Haram and other s, there motivation for WMDs Efforts by terrorist s to purchase and use nuc s continue sketches of nuc s were found at al-Qaeda acquisition of dirty bombs’ increased availability of this material presents ominous opportunities in Africa HEU can be found all over the world Boko Haram could easily build and use an RDD For terrorist groups chemical and biological weapons are attractive The CBRN terrorism threat is real and present terrorist WMDs is the ultimate nightmare scenario

The end of the Cold War might have represented the end of mutually assured destruction (MAD), but it did not necessarily dispel the dangers of the nuclear age – in fact, to some extent the globalised proliferation of non-conventional weapons has instead escalated the possibilities for a nuclear attack being carried out. During the Cold War, the belligerents of any nuclear conflict would have been easily identifiable; however, in the post-Cold-War era, non-state actors and terrorist groups like Boko Haram have emerged as potential players in a new variety of nuclear conflicts that would entirely be based on terrorist models. The ominous possibilities for this new kind of warfare are indeed terrifying, and the rise in terrorist attacks around the globe enhances the likelihood of such an occurrence. Since 9/11, the body of academic literature on the threat posed by terrorists regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) devices has increased. In Gary Ackerman and Jeremy Tamsett’s edited volume, Jihadists and Weapons of Mass Destruction, there is disagreement as to whether this threat is overestimated or underestimated.1 In recent times, however, ample ideological incentive for the use of CBRN devices has been provided by the likes of Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri – author of the ‘Global Islamic Resistance Call’ – who has stated that ‘[t]he aim of carrying out resistance missions and individual jihad terrorism “jihad al-irhabi al-fardi” is to inflict the largest human and material casualties possible on American interests and its allied countries’.2 This echoes the previous call of Grand Ayatollah Ahmad Husayni al-Baghdadi, who maintained: If the objective and subjective conditions materialize, and there are soldiers, weapons, and money – even if this means using biological, chemical, and bacterial weapons – we will conquer the world, so that ‘There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is His Prophet’ will be triumphant over the domes of Moscow, Washington, and Paris.3 For Boko Haram and other groups, there definitely exists a strong motivation for the use of WMDs, and the global reach of this thinking is not in doubt: The globalization of the jihadist struggle has also led to an increased emphasis on Islamic identity. In combination with the ideological theme of revenge, the global struggle for Islamic identity has the potential to create a new jihadist cultic worldview in which its endorsers seek out WMDs because they represent the only means to significantly transform reality.4 Contextual scenarios in Nigeria strongly suggest that Boko Haram is one such group which has embraced the jihadist world view that endorses the use of WMDs. In this regard, the strengthened affiliation of Boko Haram’s splinter group – the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) – with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) confirms their ideological persuasions. The motivation for Boko Haram to use such weapons is thus grounded in the recent use of chemical weapons by ISIS in both Iraq and Syria against both military and civilian targets.5 If ISIS is claiming ownership of a faction of Boko Haram as its West African province, it is likely to extend its tactics to its African allies. In the light of the above, the use of WMDs by terrorists cannot be explained within the framework of orthodox terrorism theories. With this in mind, what Russell Worth Parker refers to as the ‘Islamic just war theory’ suitably anchors a discourse on terrorism and advanced weapons of war.6 Most theorists do not support a subjective theory of ‘just war’, but rather the traditional version that relies on Western ideas of morality and proportionality, as well as on motives for waging war.7 On the other hand, jihadist traditions reinterpret just war’s key tenet of proportionality to suit Islamists’ conflict rationale. According to the Western form of just war theory, wherein discrimination proves strategically impossible, any response should be proportionate to the action that compels it – hence, proportionality dictates that a military operation should not cause greater harm than the act that it was designed to counter or prevent.8 This proportionality argument is exemplified in the use of nuclear weapons in the Second World War; since casualty estimates for an invasion of Japan exceeded one million Allied lives, with similar estimates for Japanese military and civilians, a nuclear attack was preferable. Eventually, the actual casualties suffered from the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki reached 200,000, which represents 10% of the casualties that would likely have been incurred if Japan had been invaded (see https://avalon.law.yale.edu/). In the light of this argument, justification for the use of WMDs by terrorist groups would rest on their interpretation of the extent of the damage caused by the military aggression and long-term imperialism of Western powers. Fighting faceless enemies in a CBRN conflict, whether in West Africa or the Middle East, is hard to imagine. Enemies who can easily blend into the crowd and take on the face of ordinary civilians represent a nightmare scenario for security strategists all around the world. The risk of WMDs falling into the hands of terrorist groups is largely dependent on their ability to obtain weapons-grade nuclear material like uranium and plutonium, combined with gaining the capability to build and deploy weapons which make use of them. The global proliferation of nuclear material has made this possible today. Global proliferation of fissile material The collapse of the Soviet military-industrial complex ushered in a period of uncertainty regarding the security of nuclear material. Consequently, the risk of fissile material falling into the hands of terrorist groups – or into the hands of states that sympathise with or harbour such groups – increased considerably. Lax security at former Soviet nuclear facilities was widespread, making the theft of nuclear material possible. In the chaos that followed the Soviet collapse in the early 1990s, radioactive material was frequently stolen from poorly guarded reactors and nuclear facilities in Russia and its former satellite states. Police operations have intercepted shipments of Soviet nuclear material in cities as far away as Munich and Prague, and experts believe that large batches are still unaccounted for and most likely accessible to well-connected traders on the black market.9 Over 1800 metric tons of nuclear material is still stored in facilities belonging to more than 25 countries all around the world.10 Not all of this material is located in military stockpiles – in fact, most countries maintain civil stockpiles of plutonium for use in nuclear power reactors. The civil stockpiles in the United Kingdom (UK), India, Belgium, France, Germany, Japan and Russia add up to over 230 metric tons of plutonium. In spite of these enormous quantities, the UK, India, France, Japan and Russia have not yet reduced the reprocessing of plutonium for civil use. Although civil plutonium is not weapons-grade, it remains viable as a raw material that can be transformed through an enrichment process for use in a bomb. The United States (US) on the other hand has a comparatively small amount of civil plutonium because of its 1970 policy to suspend the separation of plutonium from spent nuclear fuel.11 About 25 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is required to build a bomb – an insignificant amount in comparison to the global stockpile, which is in excess of 1.6 million kg. On the other hand, about 8 kg of plutonium is needed to build a bomb – a tiny fraction of the 500,000 kg global stockpile.12 Nuclear facilities that are relics of the Cold War era, especially those located in Eastern Europe, represent a high security risk. More than 130 nuclear reactors powered by HEU are operational in over 40 countries – the fallout of an early Cold-War-era programme in which the US and the Soviet Union helped their allies to obtain nuclear technology. Several other reactors have been shut down but may still contain nuclear fuel on site. In total, the world’s research reactors contain 22 tons of HEU – enough to build hundreds of nuclear bombs. The problem is that research reactor fuel tends to be stored under notoriously light security, making it a very vulnerable target for terrorists.13 In 2004, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a report that details security lapses at civilian nuclear installations, citing a case in which the fences surrounding an unnamed foreign research reactor were in very poor condition and there were no guards securing the reactor building itself. In this report, Harvard expert Matthew Bunn explains that unlike the bulky and extremely radioactive fuel rods used in commercial nuclear power plants, research reactor fuel consists of small pellets that weigh only a few pounds each and moreover are easier to handle –a simple backpack can conceal several pellets.14 Naturally, civilian stockpiles are at greater risk of theft than those held in military installations. Consequently, the possibilities of such dangerous material falling into the hands of terrorists groups have become increasingly plausible. Regarding military stockpiles, Russia and the US possess the largest amounts of weapons-grade plutonium – 100 and 150 metric tons, respectively. Diplomatic attempts aimed at reducing these stockpiles have resulted in an agreement for the two countries to dispose of 34 metric tons each via the method of turning the weapons-grade plutonium into fuel for nuclear power reactors. Although this agreement has not been effected yet, it is obvious given the above that the process may expose the material to greater risk of theft rather than securing it.15 On the other hand, in 2005 the US Congress eliminated the long-standing restrictions that were placed on the exporting of HEU to other countries for the purpose of manufacturing medical isotopes, which has also created new avenues for the proliferation of nuclear material through civilian use.16 Although the civilian use of nuclear material has increased the risk of its proliferation, the military facilities currently holding nuclear material around the world – especially in Russia – are also not well secured. Thousands of Cold-War-era tactical weapons are stored at very poorly guarded military installations, and most of these weapons are small and do not have electronic locks that prevent unauthorised usage.17 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union there has been no viable security strategy for securing the nuclear material contained in many of the former empire’s cities. During the Cold War era, the citizens of these cities had access to these facilities – and they still do, a problem further compounded by the fact that a strict inventory of the nuclear material contained in these facilities is not maintained.18 The likes of infamous arms dealer Leonid Minin (who was found guilty in a court of law for supplying weapons to non-state actors in African conflicts) are all too willing to do business with terrorists.19, 20 Arms dealers and smugglers all over the world are always seeking lucrative opportunities, and it is almost certain that some nuclear material has already been acquired by dangerous fanatics. Several incidents in recent decades give every reason to believe that this is the case. In 1993, Kazakhstani authorities discovered HEU capable of arming 20 bombs in a building that was poorly secured.21 In 2006, Russian citizen Oleg Khinsagov was arrested in Georgia for carrying 100 g of HEU and attempting to find a buyer for what he claimed was many additional kilograms.22 In 2011, six men with 4 g of uranium were arrested by security forces in Moldova. Upon questioning, they claimed that the 4 g represented a sample of the product they were ready to market. They claimed to possess an additional 9kg, which represents one third of the quantity needed to create a nuclear weapon. The leader of this group and the North African buyer escaped.23 Four years before this incident, gunmen raided a facility in Pelindaba, South Africa; the details of the event are still shrouded in mystery.24 Efforts by terrorist organisations to purchase and use nuclear weapons continue unabated. The most high profile of these known efforts is that of Osama bin Laden, who in 2001 attempted to purchase a canister of uranium in Sudan for US$1.5 million. Intelligence reports claim that he also met with two Pakistani nuclear scientists, and sketches of nuclear weapons were found at an al-Qaeda training camp.25 From the foregoing, it is clear that there exists a robust and thriving black market in fissile material that seems to be tailor-made for use by terrorists groups. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as at December 2015 had recorded in its trafficking database a total of 2889 incidents involving losses, thefts and/or attempts to traffic fissile material across international borders.26 This is an incredibly high rate of security lapses considering the security priority that nuclear facilities are supposed to possess. More pressing is the fact that the agency does not inspect every nuclear facility globally, and as such is not in a position to comprehensively enforce strict security and safety regulations. As a consequence of this, fissile material often goes missing and subsequently appears on the black market without being reported to the agency. Furthermore, several nations which maintain nuclear facilities do not possess the requisite resources to subject employees to the kind of extensive background checks that can ensure their trustworthiness for working at such high-security sites. In the absence of this screening, the likelihood of people with terrorist ties applying for jobs at nuclear facilities for the purpose of obtaining nuclear material is very high. There is mounting evidence worldwide that increasing amounts of fissile material are being stolen and traded. Although the Russian government refuses to admit that it has lost any nuclear weapons, at least four Russian nuclear submarines have sunk, and it is believed that the warheads on board are yet to be recovered. The US on the other hand has admitted to losing a staggering 11 nuclear weapons.27 How can Boko Haram obtain nuclear material? Boko Haram is one of the deadliest terrorist groups in the world. Since 2009, it has engaged with the Nigerian state in a lethal terrorism campaign aimed at toppling the secular structure and replacing it with an Islamist state. By May 2014 over 12,000 Nigerians had been killed in the insurgency,28 while one in five persons from Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states had been internally displaced. According to the 2017 Global Terrorism Index, Boko Haram ranks as the second deadliest terrorist group in the world, with an all-time high death toll of over 6000 in 2014 alone.29 With known ties to al-Qaeda, Boko Haram has an estimated annual income in excess of US$25 million.30 By 2017, Boko Haram had been forced to retreat from the large areas it had previously occupied in the north-east of Nigeria, driven back by the joint international military efforts of several countries in West and Central Africa. This created the need for them to reassert themselves. The likelihood of this group re-strategising and reconsolidating is high. Consequently, their acquisition of fissile material for the development and deployment of radiological ‘dirty bombs’ has increased in probability. The availability of this material on the continent and within Nigeria itself presents ominous opportunities for the group. Apart from large deposits of uranium ore found in Africa, several countries including South Africa, Morocco, Libya, Ghana, Egypt, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Nigeria itself presently possess nuclear research reactors.31 The IAEA has reported no less than 12 incidents of natural uranium smuggling between 1995 and 2005 in Africa alone. In fact, illegal uranium mining at the Shinkolobwe mine in Katanga, DRC is presently a source of great concern. More importantly, this is where the source material for the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs was obtained.32 The proliferation of fissile material across the continent heightens the possibility of non-state actors like Boko Haram gaining access to it. Although there has only been one recorded theft of eight uranium fuel rods from a Kinshasa research reactor in 1997, the disturbing fact about this is that seven of the rods were never recovered.33 Within Nigeria itself, opportunities abound for terrorist groups like Boko Haram and other militant organisations to obtain fissile material for use in nuclear devices or dirty bombs. In 2004, Nigeria commissioned a 30-kW miniature neutron source reactor (NIRR-1) for the purpose of nuclear energy research.34 This nuclear facility is located at the Centre for Energy Research and Training at Ahmadu Bello University Zaria in the north of the country, where terrorist activities and Islamist extremism have been going on for centuries. The possibility of Islamist extremists infiltrating nuclear facilities and smuggling out fissile material has been an ongoing security concern for a number of years. An outright attack on a lightly secured facility is a second possibility that actually played out in 2007, when a nuclear research facility in Pelindaba, South Africa was raided by armed assailants, who breached its security perimeter and gained entry.35 Another concern is unsecured radioactive waste – namely 234 legacy sources presently located at the Ajaokuta Steel Company in Kogi State – that has not been disposed of and could easily be obtained by Boko Haram.36 To complicate matters further, the construction of a low to medium radioactive waste management facility at Nigeria’s Nuclear Technology Centre has been abandoned.37 Can Boko Haram build and use non-conventional weapons? The poor state of nuclear security combined with the tenacity of Boko Haram makes Nigeria a prime location for the advent of nuclear terrorism. Knowhow on building a nuclear device is widely available, as is the key component, HEU, which can be found all over the world in dozens of military and civilian nuclear facilities – like the one at Ahmadu Bello University. Once Boko Haram has obtained enough HEU, a choice can be made between two types of nuclear device. The first is the gun-type mechanism, in which the HEU is smashed together to produce an explosion. The second type, which is more advanced, requires a chamber in which the HEU is compressed in a highly symmetrical manner in order to create an implosion. The gun-type mechanism is the more likely option for terrorist groups because it is simpler.38 In order to use the gun-type mechanism to activate a nuclear device, Boko Haram operatives would need to assemble a crude cannon that can smash HEU together – and the more highly enriched the uranium, the less advanced the weaponry that is needed. The viability of any terrorist group accomplishing such a task has been tested by US senator Joe Biden. In 2004 he asked scientists at three national laboratories to see if they could assemble the mechanical components of a gun-type bomb with commercially available equipment alone. A few months later, they reported back that they had succeeded.39 With over US$25 million in annual income, Boko Haram has the resources to obtain both the scientific knowhow and the materials needed to build and deploy a gun-type nuclear weapon. Radiological dirty bombs The threat of non-conventional weapons proliferation and terrorism goes beyond nuclear weapons – it also encompasses radiological dirty bombs. The raw materials used to create nuclear weapons are very dangerous; they contain highly radioactive substances that would pose a serious health hazard if dispersed in human populations using a detonation device. Plutonium and uranium could thus be weaponised in the form of a radiological dirty bomb, also known as a radiological dispersal device (RDD), which would cause widespread fatalities and cost billions of dollars in clean-up, evacuation and relocation operations.40 Terrorist groups like Boko Haram could easily build and use an RDD, given the widespread proliferation of fissile material – and more importantly given the dual-use materials that can produce the same radiological effects as fissile material from nuclear installations. Radiological dual-use materials from smoke alarms and medical services are among the most easily accessible; highly radioactive isotopes are in fact used in life-saving blood transfusions and cancer treatments in hospitals all around the world, including several in Nigeria. These isotopes include cesium-137, cobalt-60 and iridium-192, which can easily be used as base materials for a bomb or an RDD.41 The challenge is that most of the medical, commercial and industrial groups that handle these materials are not adequately equipped to provide the security needed to prevent them from being stolen. On the other hand, the lack of regulatory controls in many countries has led to thousands of instances of missing or stolen radiological material that cannot be accounted for. Recently, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies found in an alarming study that 170 incidents where nuclear or radiological material was lost, stolen or outside regulatory control occurred in 2014 alone.42 RDDs are viable weapons for terrorist groups like Boko Haram to pursue – and terrorist states have also attempted to obtain them. On 28 March 2002, Abu Zubaydah – a key al-Qaeda operative – was captured in Pakistan. He is widely believed to have told US investigators that al-Qaeda was ‘interested’ in building or obtaining a dirty bomb. Further evidence emerged on 8 May 2002, when Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents arrested Abdullah al Muhajir on charges of planning a radiological attack in the US at the direction of al-Qaeda operatives. States that sponsor and support terrorist groups are likely to pass on fissile and radiological material to them. Iraq under Saddam Hussein is known to have sought radiological material for this purpose. In 1987, Iraq tested a bomb weighing 1400 kg that carried radioactive particles derived from irradiated impurities in zirconium oxide. A further 100 prototypes were designed from the casings of Muthanna-3 aerial chemical bombs, which were then modified to a 400-kg weight so that aircraft could carry more of them. It is likely that only 25 of these prototypes were destroyed, and that the other 75 were sent to the Al Qa Qaa State Establishment, a massive Iraqi weapons facility; their current status and whereabouts remain unknown.43 Chemical and biological weapons The most commonly used non-conventional weapons are chemical or biological in nature. The long history of chemical and biological weapons usage dates as far back as 600 BC when, during a siege, Solon of Athens poisoned the drinking water of the city of Kirrha.44 More recently – starting with the use of mustard gas during the First World War – nations have acquired chemical and biological weapons easily, deploying them against enemies and their own citizens alike. For terrorist groups like Boko Haram, chemical and biological weapons are uniquely suited to their agenda and as such present very attractive alternatives to nuclear; they are extremely difficult to detect, cost effective and easy to deploy. Aerosols of biological agents are invisible to the naked eye, silent, odourless, tasteless and relatively easily dispersed. Most importantly they are 600 to 2000 times cheaper than other WMDs. Recent estimates place the cost of biological weapons at about 0.05% of the cost of a conventional weapon which could produce similar numbers of mass casualties per square kilometre.45 The proliferation of chemical and biological weapons has proved to be very fluid over the past century due to advancements in technology. Production is comparatively easy via the commonplace technology that is used in the manufacturing of antibiotics, vaccines, foods and beverages, while delivery systems such as spray devices deployed from airplane, boat or car are widely available. Another advantage of biological agents is the natural lead time provided by the organism’s incubation period (three to seven days in most cases), allowing the terrorists to deploy the agent and then escape before an investigation by law enforcement and intelligence agencies can even begin. Furthermore, not only would the use of an endemic infectious agent likely cause initial confusion because of the difficulty of differentiating between a biological warfare attack and a natural epidemic, but with some agents the potential also exists for secondary or tertiary transmission from person to person or via natural vectors.46 Unlike their nuclear and radiological counterparts, biological and chemical weapons have been used for terrorism by both state and non-state actors. The challenges faced in preventing the use of these weapons through international control mechanisms include the increasing availability of larger quantities of substances, ease of use and most especially advanced technological deployment facilities that portend a high risk factor to larger populations. Table 1 catalogues the use of biochemical weapons in warfare and by terrorists and other groups or individuals over the past century, offering concrete historical precedent and empirical grounds for the potential future actions of Boko Haram. The data shows consistent recourse to the use of these weapons, in spite of the chemical and biological weapons conventions outlawing them. It can be seen that from the 1970s onwards there has been an increase in the use of biochemical weapons by religious cults and terrorist groups in pursuit of their agendas. The rise of Boko Haram and its ISIS affiliation could lead to a future where the use of biochemical weapons is the norm rather than the exception. As stated previously, the contextual scenarios in Nigeria that validate this prognosis regarding Boko Haram’s possible actions are strongly supported by their ideological persuasions. The fact that Boko Haram embraces a jihadist world view which endorses the use of WMDs is strengthened not only by its affiliation to ISIS through ISWAP but also by the similarities in its strategic modus operandi. Like ISIS, Boko Haram both believes in the slaughter of other Muslims who are deemed to be in cahoots with infidels, and advocates for the destruction of civilian populations – whether Muslim or otherwise – that are regarded as obstructing the advancement or creation of their caliphate.47 This was practically demonstrated by ISIS in Syria and Iraq when they used chemical weapons against both civilian and military populations, as shown in Table 1.48 Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategy The central control measure for preventing nuclear terrorism is to ensure at the international level that nuclear material does not fall into the hands of terrorist groups like Boko Haram and other non-state actors in the first place. This is very difficult to achieve, given the lax security measures found at nuclear installations all over the world. Recognising the danger, the US under the Obama administration committed in 2010 at a nuclear security summit in Washington DC to securing all nuclear material within four years in an effort to prevent nuclear terrorism.49 Nigeria was a participant of this summit and is also committed to implementing the agreements that were reached. These attempts by the Obama administration followed up on the efforts embedded in the landmark 1987 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), which was meant to prevent nuclear material from being obtained by terrorists. The provisions of this convention were amended in 2005, and by 2010 the Washington summit had created the needed sense of urgency regarding the security of fissile material.50 Negotiations around the CPPNM started in 1979,51 and over the decades the growing proliferation of fissile material has combined with the increase in global terrorism to raise the profile of the issue of fissile material security. As of 2016, a total of 93 states including Nigeria had ratified the CPPNM, resulting in tighter security around the world at nuclear installations and border controls. Nigeria has been engaged for decades in international efforts to control nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The country has ratified and acceded to over a dozen international instruments since 1963, including the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (1963), the CPPNM (1987), the Amendment to the CPPNM (2006) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2007).52 At the level of global collective security, Nigeria is involved in implementing the United Nations (UN) Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly in Resolution 60/288.53 At the regional and subregional levels, the counterterrorism strategies of the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have been ratified and are in the process of being implemented. In pursuance of effecting these various international agreements, Nigeria has also instituted their National Counterterrorism Strategy (NACTEST), which was revised in 2016. Presently the country is also working with the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) on projects designed to build community resilience against terrorism, enhance cooperation among law enforcement agencies and strengthen judicial institutions.54 Towards an integrated chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) counterterrorism protocol The CBRN terrorism threat in Nigeria is both real and present. The country has one of the highest rates of terrorist activities in the world; in fact, according to the 2016 Global Terrorism Index, Nigeria ranked third among 163 countries, with a terrorism death rate of 16.8% of the global total.55 Although attacks declined in 2017, Nigeria still retained third place on the Global Terrorism Index.56 Recently, Boko Haram has initiated a comeback that has seen renewed attacks and the abduction of more girls from schools in the north-east of the country. Security forces have continued to engage the group on the frontlines in their forest bases; with the assistance of local and international joint task forces, much of the conflict has been shifted to more remote areas in the north-east. Although the government security forces have gained the upper hand in their frontal clashes with Boko Haram forces, by January 2018 the group had successfully carried out several brutal assaults, including one on UN and Doctors Without Borders staff, shifting their strategy back to traditional hit-and-run guerrilla tactics. During Easter of the same year, a single attack utilising 5 suicide bombers resulted in over 29 dead and 84 wounded.57 The likelihood that Boko Haram may begin to use CBRN weapons is increasing, and biological and chemical terrorism is potentially more difficult to prevent than conventional terrorist attacks. Since the latter part of the twentieth century, the Internet has contributed to the spread of chemical and biological weapons knowhow, thereby increasing the likelihood of Boko Haram being able to obtain not only the ingredients needed to create biochemical weapons but also the information needed to build and successfully deploy them. Some of the base materials for such weapons even occur naturally, like castor beans, which can be processed to produce the dangerous toxin ricin and deployed against unsuspecting populations. Furthermore, live strains of very dangerous viruses like Ebola can be found in high-tech research labs, like those at the African Centre of Excellence for Genomics and Infectious Diseases (ACEGID) at the Redeemer’s University Ede in Osun State. If Boko Haram were to secure this virus and weaponise it, the age of biowarfare would arrive in Nigeria – with deadly consequences. More importantly, the materials that are needed to create most chemical weapons exist in large quantities as dual-use materials that can be purchased on the open market and ferried into the country via forged end-user certificates. The chemical and biological weapons conventions represent control structures geared towards the containment of these non-conventional weapons, and to a large extent state signatories like Nigeria have implemented a good level of the instruments contained in them; however, some nations still maintain secret stockpiles and have used them in recent conflicts, like Iraq against Iran and Kurdish dissidents in the 1980s and 1990s, and the Syrian government, which is presently using them against its civilian population. On the whole, the counterterrorism measures put in place to deal with the aftermath of a chemical or biological attack have gained more credibility in the international community. Although there is no dedicated international inter-agency mechanism for coordinating the response to terrorism involving the release of toxic chemicals or biological agents, there are mechanisms that have evolved in the context of humanitarian assistance and emergency response after natural catastrophes, such as earthquakes; these include the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN), the World Health Organization (WHO), the Global Early Warning System (GLEWS), the Global Framework for the Progressive Control of Transboundary Animal Diseases (GF-TAD) and the International Food Safety Authorities Network (INFOSAN). The primary inter-agency mechanism that coordinates responses to emergencies involving the agencies mentioned above is the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC).58 To further strengthen inter-agency coordination in the wake of a terrorist attack of catastrophic proportions, the UN CTITF is also focusing on planning for such an eventuality. At the local level, several key aspects of Nigeria’s NACTEST are presently being utilised. The strategy is divided into five work streams: Forestall: Prevent terrorism in Nigeria by engaging the public through sustained enlightenment and sensitisation campaigns and deradicalisation programmes. Secure: Ensure the protection of life, property and key national infrastructure and public services, including Nigerian interests around the world. Identify: Ensure that all terrorist acts are properly investigated, and that terrorists and their sponsors are brought to justice. Prepare: Prepare the populace so that the consequences of terrorist incidents can be mitigated. Implement: Devise a framework to effectively mobilise and sustain a coordinated, cross-governmental, population-centred effort.59 Presently, the first three aspects of these work streams are receiving full attention. However, in regard to WMDs, the counterterrorism strategy is lacking a well-integrated CBRN protocol for engaging with the work streams for preparation and implementation. Nigeria currently handles issues relating to nuclear and radiological matters through two institutions: the Nigerian Atomic Energy Agency (NAEC) and the Nigerian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NNRA). It is therefore expected that, given the growing CBRN threat level in the country, these agencies will collaborate with the Office of the Security Adviser to the President in order to initiate a proper CBRN counterterrorism protocol. The NACTEST does not currently include a dedicated protocol for handling CBRN threats; Nigeria is however involved in nuclear security at the international level, which has primarily provided for capacity-building and human resources development. Activities in these areas include the gradual process of converting the miniature neutron source reactor in Zaria from using HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU), partnerships for nuclear and radiological security with the US Department of Defence (DoD) and the IAEA, establishing a nuclear security support centre in the country, reviewing the 2012 design basis threat (DBT) for protecting nuclear and radiological material, the development of a programme for locating and securing orphan legacy radioactive sources, training security officers, the installation of a radiation portal monitor at the Murtala Muhammed International Airport in Lagos in 2008 and the acquisition of three more monitors for other international airports in the country.60 An integrated CBRN protocol would fall under the preparation and implementation work streams of the NACTEST. The protocol should include a strategy for detecting CBRN agents in the wake of terrorist events, followed by disaster response and countermeasure initiatives to be carried out by security, medical and disaster response teams. Given the availability of advanced technology, the integrated CBRN counterterrorism protocol should also include the deployment of handheld radiological and biochemical detectors to high-risk areas, and security forces and disaster response teams should be trained in their usage. Embedding a standard protocol in the NACTEST on how to prepare for and respond to CBRN events is essential for repositioning counterterrorist activities in the country to meet the present threat level. The US and Canada along with the UK and most other European countries facing CBRN threats have already repositioned accordingly in order to accommodate this new reality. Conclusion Any terrorist attack involving WMDs is the ultimate nightmare scenario. Fortunately, at least some of these potential attacks are preventable. If and when the nuclear security summit achieves its goals, the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in Nigeria will be immensely reduced. Unfortunately, the likelihood of radiological, chemical and biological attacks is more difficult to regress, making it all the more vital to integrate a CBRN protocol into Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategy. Preventing such a tragic event from occurring will require very close ongoing monitoring of the strategic manoeuvrings of Boko Haram. From its inception to the present day, the organisation has depended on the looting of military armouries to source most of its heavy weapons and equipment. It has built up an impressive arsenal in this manner and there is no indication that the group will stop using this highly profitable strategy, which could be further employed to obtain advanced CBRN weaponry from facilities that are vulnerable to being raided. The civilian facilities mentioned in this paper are at high risk of being targeted in this fashion; hence, the recalibration of Nigeria’s CBRN counterterrorism protocols should include a security framework that provides military security for facilities like the ACEGID in Osun State and the Centre for Energy Research and Training at Ahmadu Bello University Zaria. Lastly, although the IAEA has assisted in the conversion of Nigeria’s reactor from HEU to LEU,61 the availability of fissile material at the facility means that the risk of radioactive dirty bombs being created from looted material is still present.

<h4><strong>Al Qaeda and Boko Haram will get CBRNs -- causes existential WMD terrorism.</h4><p></strong>Bernard B. <strong>Fyanka 20</strong>. Ph.D. in History and Strategic Studies from the University of Lagos, Akoka Lagos Nigeria. "Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism: Rethinking Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategy". Taylor & Francis. 2-17-2020. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10246029.2019.1698441?scroll=top&needAccess=true </p><p>The end of the Cold War might have represented the end of mutually assured destruction (<u>MAD</u>), but it <u>did not</u> necessarily <u>dispel the dangers of the nuclear age</u> – in fact, to some extent the globalised <u>proliferation of non-conventional weapons has instead escalated the possibilities for a nuclear attack being carried out</u>. During the Cold War, the belligerents of any nuclear conflict would have been easily identifiable; however, in the post-Cold-War era, non-state actors and <u><strong><mark>terrorist</strong> groups like <strong>Boko Haram</strong> </mark>have <mark>emerged as </mark>potential <mark>players in</u> </mark>a new variety of <u><strong><mark>nuclear conflicts</u></strong> </mark>that would entirely be based on terrorist models. The ominous possibilities for this new kind of warfare are indeed terrifying, and <u><mark>the rise in terrorist attacks</u> </mark>around the globe <u><mark>enhances </mark>the <mark>likelihood </mark>of such an occurrence</u>. Since 9/11, the body of academic literature on the threat posed by terrorists regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) devices has increased. In Gary Ackerman and Jeremy Tamsett’s edited volume, Jihadists and Weapons of Mass Destruction, there is disagreement as to whether this threat is overestimated or underestimated.1 In recent times, however, <u>ample ideological <mark>incentive for the use of <strong>CBRN</strong></mark> devices <mark>has been provided</u></mark> by the likes of Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri – author of the ‘Global Islamic Resistance Call’ – who has stated that ‘[t]he aim of carrying out resistance missions and individual jihad terrorism “jihad al-irhabi al-fardi” is to inflict the largest human and material casualties possible on American interests and its allied countries’.2 This echoes the previous call of Grand Ayatollah Ahmad Husayni al-Baghdadi, who maintained:</p><p>If the objective and subjective conditions materialize, and there are soldiers, weapons, and money – even if this means using biological, chemical, and bacterial weapons – we will conquer the world, so that ‘There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is His Prophet’ will be triumphant over the domes of Moscow, Washington, and Paris.3</p><p><u><mark>For Boko Haram and other</u></mark> group<u><mark>s, there</u> </mark>definitely exists a strong <u><mark>motivation for</u> </mark>the use of <u><strong><mark>WMDs</u></strong></mark>, and the global reach of this thinking is not in doubt:</p><p>The globalization of the jihadist struggle has also led to an increased emphasis on Islamic identity. In combination with the ideological theme of revenge, the global struggle for Islamic identity has the potential to create a new jihadist cultic worldview in which its endorsers seek out WMDs because they represent the only means to significantly transform reality.4</p><p>Contextual scenarios in Nigeria strongly suggest that <u>Boko Haram is one such group</u> <u>which has embraced the jihadist world view that endorses the use of WMDs</u>. In this regard, the strengthened affiliation of Boko Haram’s splinter group – the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) – with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) confirms their ideological persuasions. The motivation for Boko Haram to use such weapons is thus grounded in the recent use of chemical weapons by ISIS in both Iraq and Syria against both military and civilian targets.5 If ISIS is claiming ownership of a faction of Boko Haram as its West African province, it is likely to extend its tactics to its African allies.</p><p>In the light of the above, the use of WMDs by terrorists cannot be explained within the framework of orthodox terrorism theories. With this in mind, what Russell Worth Parker refers to as the ‘Islamic just war theory’ suitably anchors a discourse on terrorism and advanced weapons of war.6 Most theorists do not support a subjective theory of ‘just war’, but rather the traditional version that relies on Western ideas of morality and proportionality, as well as on motives for waging war.7 On the other hand, jihadist traditions reinterpret just war’s key tenet of proportionality to suit Islamists’ conflict rationale. According to the Western form of just war theory, wherein discrimination proves strategically impossible, any response should be proportionate to the action that compels it – hence, proportionality dictates that a military operation should not cause greater harm than the act that it was designed to counter or prevent.8 This proportionality argument is exemplified in the use of nuclear weapons in the Second World War; since casualty estimates for an invasion of Japan exceeded one million Allied lives, with similar estimates for Japanese military and civilians, a nuclear attack was preferable. Eventually, the actual casualties suffered from the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki reached 200,000, which represents 10% of the casualties that would likely have been incurred if Japan had been invaded (see https://avalon.law.yale.edu/). In the light of this argument, justification for the use of WMDs by terrorist groups would rest on their interpretation of the extent of the damage caused by the military aggression and long-term imperialism of Western powers.</p><p>Fighting faceless enemies in a CBRN conflict, whether in West Africa or the Middle East, is hard to imagine. Enemies who can easily blend into the crowd and take on the face of ordinary civilians represent a nightmare scenario for security strategists all around the world. <u>The risk of WMDs falling into the hands of terrorist groups</u> is largely dependent on their ability to obtain weapons-grade nuclear material like uranium and plutonium, combined with gaining the capability to build and deploy weapons which make use of them. The <u>global proliferation</u> of nuclear material <u>has made this possible</u> today. </p><p>Global proliferation of fissile material</p><p>The collapse of the Soviet military-industrial complex ushered in a period of uncertainty regarding the security of nuclear material. Consequently, the risk of fissile material falling into the hands of terrorist groups – or into the hands of states that sympathise with or harbour such groups – increased considerably. Lax security at former Soviet nuclear facilities was widespread, making the theft of nuclear material possible. In the chaos that followed the Soviet collapse in the early 1990s, radioactive material was frequently stolen from poorly guarded reactors and nuclear facilities in Russia and its former satellite states. Police operations have intercepted shipments of Soviet nuclear material in cities as far away as Munich and Prague, and experts believe that large batches are still unaccounted for and most likely accessible to well-connected traders on the black market.9</p><p>Over 1800 metric tons of nuclear material is still stored in facilities belonging to more than 25 countries all around the world.10 Not all of this material is located in military stockpiles – in fact, most countries maintain civil stockpiles of plutonium for use in nuclear power reactors. The civil stockpiles in the United Kingdom (UK), India, Belgium, France, Germany, Japan and Russia add up to over 230 metric tons of plutonium. In spite of these enormous quantities, the UK, India, France, Japan and Russia have not yet reduced the reprocessing of plutonium for civil use. Although civil plutonium is not weapons-grade, it remains viable as a raw material that can be transformed through an enrichment process for use in a bomb. The United States (US) on the other hand has a comparatively small amount of civil plutonium because of its 1970 policy to suspend the separation of plutonium from spent nuclear fuel.11 </p><p>About 25 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is required to build a bomb – an insignificant amount in comparison to the global stockpile, which is in excess of 1.6 million kg. On the other hand, about 8 kg of plutonium is needed to build a bomb – a tiny fraction of the 500,000 kg global stockpile.12 Nuclear facilities that are relics of the Cold War era, especially those located in Eastern Europe, represent a high security risk. More than 130 nuclear reactors powered by HEU are operational in over 40 countries – the fallout of an early Cold-War-era programme in which the US and the Soviet Union helped their allies to obtain nuclear technology. Several other reactors have been shut down but may still contain nuclear fuel on site. In total, the world’s research reactors contain 22 tons of HEU – enough to build hundreds of nuclear bombs. The problem is that research reactor fuel tends to be stored under notoriously light security, making it a very vulnerable target for terrorists.13</p><p>In 2004, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a report that details security lapses at civilian nuclear installations, citing a case in which the fences surrounding an unnamed foreign research reactor were in very poor condition and there were no guards securing the reactor building itself. In this report, Harvard expert Matthew Bunn explains that unlike the bulky and extremely radioactive fuel rods used in commercial nuclear power plants, research reactor fuel consists of small pellets that weigh only a few pounds each and moreover are easier to handle –a simple backpack can conceal several pellets.14 Naturally, civilian stockpiles are at greater risk of theft than those held in military installations. Consequently, the possibilities of such dangerous material falling into the hands of terrorists groups have become increasingly plausible. </p><p>Regarding military stockpiles, Russia and the US possess the largest amounts of weapons-grade plutonium – 100 and 150 metric tons, respectively. Diplomatic attempts aimed at reducing these stockpiles have resulted in an agreement for the two countries to dispose of 34 metric tons each via the method of turning the weapons-grade plutonium into fuel for nuclear power reactors. Although this agreement has not been effected yet, it is obvious given the above that the process may expose the material to greater risk of theft rather than securing it.15 On the other hand, in 2005 the US Congress eliminated the long-standing restrictions that were placed on the exporting of HEU to other countries for the purpose of manufacturing medical isotopes, which has also created new avenues for the proliferation of nuclear material through civilian use.16</p><p>Although the civilian use of nuclear material has increased the risk of its proliferation, the military facilities currently holding nuclear material around the world – especially in Russia – are also not well secured. Thousands of Cold-War-era tactical weapons are stored at very poorly guarded military installations, and most of these weapons are small and do not have electronic locks that prevent unauthorised usage.17 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union there has been no viable security strategy for securing the nuclear material contained in many of the former empire’s cities. During the Cold War era, the citizens of these cities had access to these facilities – and they still do, a problem further compounded by the fact that a strict inventory of the nuclear material contained in these facilities is not maintained.18 </p><p>The likes of infamous arms dealer Leonid Minin (who was found guilty in a court of law for supplying weapons to non-state actors in African conflicts) are all too willing to do business with terrorists.19, 20 Arms dealers and smugglers all over the world are always seeking lucrative opportunities, and it is almost certain that some nuclear material has already been acquired by dangerous fanatics.</p><p>Several incidents in recent decades give every reason to believe that this is the case. In 1993, Kazakhstani authorities discovered HEU capable of arming 20 bombs in a building that was poorly secured.21 In 2006, Russian citizen Oleg Khinsagov was arrested in Georgia for carrying 100 g of HEU and attempting to find a buyer for what he claimed was many additional kilograms.22 In 2011, six men with 4 g of uranium were arrested by security forces in Moldova. Upon questioning, they claimed that the 4 <u>g represented a sample of the product they were ready to market. They claimed to possess an additional 9kg, which represents one third of the quantity needed to create a nuclear weapon. The leader of this group and the North African buyer escaped.23 Four years before this incident, gunmen raided a facility in Pelindaba, South Africa; the details of the event are still shrouded in mystery.24 </p><p><mark>Efforts by terrorist </mark>organisation<mark>s to <strong>purchase and use nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s</strong> continue</mark> unabated</u>. The most high profile of these known efforts is that of Osama bin Laden, who in 2001 attempted to purchase a canister of uranium in Sudan for US$1.5 million. Intelligence reports claim that he also met with two Pakistani nuclear scientists, and <u><mark>sketches of nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s were found at</mark> an <strong><mark>al-Qaeda</strong></mark> training camp.25</p><p></u>From the foregoing, it is clear that there exists a robust and thriving black market in fissile material that seems to be tailor-made for use by terrorists groups. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as at December 2015 had recorded in its trafficking database a total of 2889 incidents involving losses, thefts and/or attempts to traffic fissile material across international borders.26 This is an incredibly high rate of security lapses considering the security priority that nuclear facilities are supposed to possess. More pressing is the fact that the agency does not inspect every nuclear facility globally, and as such is not in a position to comprehensively enforce strict security and safety regulations. As a consequence of this, fissile material often goes missing and subsequently appears on the black market without being reported to the agency. Furthermore, several nations which maintain nuclear facilities do not possess the requisite resources to subject employees to the kind of extensive background checks that can ensure their trustworthiness for working at such high-security sites. In the absence of this screening, the likelihood of people with terrorist ties applying for jobs at nuclear facilities for the purpose of obtaining nuclear material is very high. </p><p>There is mounting evidence worldwide that increasing amounts of fissile material are being stolen and traded. Although the Russian government refuses to admit that it has lost any nuclear weapons, at least four Russian nuclear submarines have sunk, and it is believed that the warheads on board are yet to be recovered. The US on the other hand has admitted to losing a staggering 11 nuclear weapons.27</p><p>How can Boko Haram obtain nuclear material?</p><p><u>Boko Haram is one of the deadliest terrorist groups</u> in the world. Since 2009, it has engaged with the Nigerian state in a lethal terrorism campaign aimed at toppling the secular structure and replacing it with an Islamist state. By May 2014 over 12,000 Nigerians had been killed in the insurgency,28 while one in five persons from Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states had been internally displaced. According to the 2017 Global Terrorism Index, Boko Haram ranks as the second deadliest terrorist group in the world, with an all-time high death toll of over 6000 in 2014 alone.29</p><p><u>With known ties to al-Qaeda, Boko Haram has an estimated annual income in excess of US$25 million</u>.30 By 2017, Boko Haram had been forced to retreat from the large areas it had previously occupied in the north-east of Nigeria, driven back by the joint international military efforts of several countries in West and Central Africa. This created the need for them to reassert themselves. The likelihood of this group re-strategising and reconsolidating is high. Consequently, their <u><mark>acquisition of</u> </mark>fissile material for the development and deployment of radiological ‘<u><mark>dirty bombs’</u> </mark>has <u><mark>increased</u></mark> in probability. The <u><mark>availability of this material</u></mark> on the continent and <u>within</u> Nigeria itself <u><mark>presents <strong>ominous opportunities</u></strong></mark> for the group. Apart from large deposits of uranium ore found <u><mark>in Africa</u></mark>, several countries including South Africa, Morocco, Libya, Ghana, Egypt, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Nigeria itself presently possess nuclear research reactors.31 </p><p>The IAEA has reported no less than 12 incidents of natural uranium smuggling between 1995 and 2005 in Africa alone. In fact, illegal uranium mining at the Shinkolobwe mine in Katanga, DRC is presently a source of great concern. More importantly, this is where the source material for the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs was obtained.32 The proliferation of fissile material across the continent heightens the possibility of non-state actors like Boko Haram gaining access to it. Although there has only been one recorded theft of eight uranium fuel rods from a Kinshasa research reactor in 1997, the disturbing fact about this is that seven of the rods were never recovered.33</p><p>Within Nigeria itself, opportunities abound for terrorist groups like Boko Haram and other militant organisations to obtain fissile material for use in nuclear devices or dirty bombs. In 2004, Nigeria commissioned a 30-kW miniature neutron source reactor (NIRR-1) for the purpose of nuclear energy research.34 This nuclear facility is located at the Centre for Energy Research and Training at Ahmadu Bello University Zaria in the north of the country, where terrorist activities and Islamist extremism have been going on for centuries. The possibility of Islamist extremists infiltrating nuclear facilities and smuggling out fissile material has been an ongoing security concern for a number of years. An outright attack on a lightly secured facility is a second possibility that actually played out in 2007, when a nuclear research facility in Pelindaba, South Africa was raided by armed assailants, who breached its security perimeter and gained entry.35 Another concern is unsecured radioactive waste – namely 234 legacy sources presently located at the Ajaokuta Steel Company in Kogi State – that has not been disposed of and could easily be obtained by Boko Haram.36 To complicate matters further, the construction of a low to medium radioactive waste management facility at Nigeria’s Nuclear Technology Centre has been abandoned.37 </p><p>Can Boko Haram build and use non-conventional weapons?</p><p>The poor state of nuclear security combined with the tenacity of Boko Haram makes Nigeria a prime location for the advent of nuclear terrorism. Knowhow on building a nuclear device is widely available, as is the key component, <u><mark>HEU</u></mark>, which <u><mark>can be found all over the world</u> </mark>in dozens of military and civilian nuclear facilities – like the one at Ahmadu Bello University. Once Boko Haram has obtained enough HEU, a choice can be made between two types of nuclear device. The first is the gun-type mechanism, in which the HEU is smashed together to produce an explosion. The second type, which is more advanced, requires a chamber in which the HEU is compressed in a highly symmetrical manner in order to create an implosion. The gun-type mechanism is the more likely option for terrorist groups because it is simpler.38</p><p>In order to use the gun-type mechanism to activate a nuclear device, Boko Haram operatives would need to assemble a crude cannon that can smash HEU together – and the more highly enriched the uranium, the less advanced the weaponry that is needed. The viability of any terrorist group accomplishing such a task has been tested by US senator Joe Biden. In 2004 he asked scientists at three national laboratories to see if they could assemble the mechanical components of a gun-type bomb with commercially available equipment alone. A few months later, they reported back that they had succeeded.39 With over US$25 million in annual income, Boko Haram has the resources to obtain both the scientific knowhow and the materials needed to build and deploy a gun-type nuclear weapon. </p><p>Radiological dirty bombs</p><p>The threat of non-conventional weapons proliferation and terrorism goes beyond nuclear weapons – it also encompasses radiological dirty bombs. The raw materials used to create nuclear weapons are very dangerous; they contain highly radioactive substances that would pose a serious health hazard if dispersed in human populations using a detonation device. Plutonium and uranium could thus be weaponised in the form of a radiological dirty bomb, also known as a radiological dispersal device (RDD), which would cause widespread fatalities and cost billions of dollars in clean-up, evacuation and relocation operations.40</p><p>Terrorist groups like <u><mark>Boko Haram could easily build and use an RDD</u></mark>, given the widespread proliferation of fissile material – and more importantly given the dual-use materials that can produce the same radiological effects as fissile material from nuclear installations. Radiological dual-use materials from smoke alarms and medical services are among the most easily accessible; highly radioactive isotopes are in fact used in life-saving blood transfusions and cancer treatments in hospitals all around the world, including several in Nigeria. These isotopes include cesium-137, cobalt-60 and iridium-192, which can easily be used as base materials for a bomb or an RDD.41 The challenge is that most of the medical, commercial and industrial groups that handle these materials are not adequately equipped to provide the security needed to prevent them from being stolen. On the other hand, the lack of regulatory controls in many countries has led to thousands of instances of missing or stolen radiological material that cannot be accounted for. Recently, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies found in an alarming study that 170 incidents where nuclear or radiological material was lost, stolen or outside regulatory control occurred in 2014 alone.42 </p><p>RDDs are viable weapons for terrorist groups like Boko Haram to pursue – and terrorist states have also attempted to obtain them. On 28 March 2002, Abu Zubaydah – a key al-Qaeda operative – was captured in Pakistan. He is widely believed to have told US investigators that al-Qaeda was ‘interested’ in building or obtaining a dirty bomb. Further evidence emerged on 8 May 2002, when Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents arrested Abdullah al Muhajir on charges of planning a radiological attack in the US at the direction of al-Qaeda operatives.</p><p>States that sponsor and support terrorist groups are likely to pass on fissile and radiological material to them. Iraq under Saddam Hussein is known to have sought radiological material for this purpose. In 1987, Iraq tested a bomb weighing 1400 kg that carried radioactive particles derived from irradiated impurities in zirconium oxide. A further 100 prototypes were designed from the casings of Muthanna-3 aerial chemical bombs, which were then modified to a 400-kg weight so that aircraft could carry more of them. It is likely that only 25 of these prototypes were destroyed, and that the other 75 were sent to the Al Qa Qaa State Establishment, a massive Iraqi weapons facility; their current status and whereabouts remain unknown.43 </p><p>Chemical and biological weapons</p><p>The most commonly used non-conventional weapons are chemical or biological in nature. The long history of chemical and biological weapons usage dates as far back as 600 BC when, during a siege, Solon of Athens poisoned the drinking water of the city of Kirrha.44 More recently – starting with the use of mustard gas during the First World War – nations have acquired chemical and biological weapons easily, deploying them against enemies and their own citizens alike. <u><mark>For terrorist groups </mark>like Boko Haram, <strong><mark>chemical and biological weapons</strong> are</u> </mark>uniquely suited to their agenda and as such present very <u><mark>attractive</u> </mark>alternatives to nuclear; <u>they are extremely difficult to detect, cost effective and easy to deploy</u>. Aerosols of biological agents are invisible to the naked eye, silent, odourless, tasteless and relatively easily dispersed. Most importantly they are 600 to 2000 times cheaper than other WMDs. Recent estimates place the cost of biological weapons at about 0.05% of the cost of a conventional weapon which could produce similar numbers of mass casualties per square kilometre.45</p><p><u>The proliferation of chemical and biological weapons has proved to be very fluid over the past century due to advancements in technology</u>. Production is comparatively easy via the commonplace technology that is used in the manufacturing of antibiotics, vaccines, foods and beverages, while delivery systems such as spray devices deployed from airplane, boat or car are widely available. Another advantage of biological agents is the natural lead time provided by the organism’s incubation period (three to seven days in most cases), allowing the terrorists to deploy the agent and then escape before an investigation by law enforcement and intelligence agencies can even begin. Furthermore, not only would the use of an endemic infectious agent likely cause initial confusion because of the difficulty of differentiating between a biological warfare attack and a natural epidemic, but with some agents the potential also exists for secondary or tertiary transmission from person to person or via natural vectors.46 </p><p>Unlike their nuclear and radiological counterparts, biological and chemical weapons have been used for terrorism by both state and non-state actors. The challenges faced in preventing the use of these weapons through international control mechanisms include the increasing availability of larger quantities of substances, ease of use and most especially advanced technological deployment facilities that portend a high risk factor to larger populations. Table 1 catalogues the use of biochemical weapons in warfare and by terrorists and other groups or individuals over the past century, offering concrete historical precedent and empirical grounds for the potential future actions of Boko Haram. The data shows consistent recourse to the use of these weapons, in spite of the chemical and biological weapons conventions outlawing them. It can be seen that from the 1970s onwards there has been an increase in the use of biochemical weapons by religious cults and terrorist groups in pursuit of their agendas. The rise of Boko Haram and its ISIS affiliation could lead to a future where the use of biochemical weapons is the norm rather than the exception.</p><p>As stated previously, the contextual scenarios in Nigeria that validate this prognosis regarding Boko Haram’s possible actions are strongly supported by their ideological persuasions. The fact that Boko Haram embraces a jihadist world view which endorses the use of WMDs is strengthened not only by its affiliation to ISIS through ISWAP but also by the similarities in its strategic modus operandi. Like ISIS, Boko Haram both believes in the slaughter of other Muslims who are deemed to be in cahoots with infidels, and advocates for the destruction of civilian populations – whether Muslim or otherwise – that are regarded as obstructing the advancement or creation of their caliphate.47 This was practically demonstrated by ISIS in Syria and Iraq when they used chemical weapons against both civilian and military populations, as shown in Table 1.48</p><p>Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategy</p><p>The central control measure for preventing nuclear terrorism is to ensure at the international level that nuclear material does not fall into the hands of terrorist groups like Boko Haram and other non-state actors in the first place. This is very difficult to achieve, given the lax security measures found at nuclear installations all over the world. Recognising the danger, the US under the Obama administration committed in 2010 at a nuclear security summit in Washington DC to securing all nuclear material within four years in an effort to prevent nuclear terrorism.49 Nigeria was a participant of this summit and is also committed to implementing the agreements that were reached. These attempts by the Obama administration followed up on the efforts embedded in the landmark 1987 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), which was meant to prevent nuclear material from being obtained by terrorists. The provisions of this convention were amended in 2005, and by 2010 the Washington summit had created the needed sense of urgency regarding the security of fissile material.50 Negotiations around the CPPNM started in 1979,51 and over the decades the growing proliferation of fissile material has combined with the increase in global terrorism to raise the profile of the issue of fissile material security. As of 2016, a total of 93 states including Nigeria had ratified the CPPNM, resulting in tighter security around the world at nuclear installations and border controls.</p><p>Nigeria has been engaged for decades in international efforts to control nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The country has ratified and acceded to over a dozen international instruments since 1963, including the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (1963), the CPPNM (1987), the Amendment to the CPPNM (2006) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2007).52 At the level of global collective security, Nigeria is involved in implementing the United Nations (UN) Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly in Resolution 60/288.53 At the regional and subregional levels, the counterterrorism strategies of the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have been ratified and are in the process of being implemented. In pursuance of effecting these various international agreements, Nigeria has also instituted their National Counterterrorism Strategy (NACTEST), which was revised in 2016. Presently the country is also working with the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) on projects designed to build community resilience against terrorism, enhance cooperation among law enforcement agencies and strengthen judicial institutions.54</p><p>Towards an integrated chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) counterterrorism protocol</p><p><u><strong><mark>The CBRN terrorism threat</u></strong> </mark>in Nigeria <u><strong><mark>is</u></strong> </mark>both <u><strong><mark>real and present</u></strong></mark>. The country has one of the highest rates of terrorist activities in the world; in fact, according to the 2016 Global Terrorism Index, Nigeria ranked third among 163 countries, with a terrorism death rate of 16.8% of the global total.55 Although attacks declined in 2017, Nigeria still retained third place on the Global Terrorism Index.56 Recently, Boko Haram has initiated a comeback that has seen renewed attacks and the abduction of more girls from schools in the north-east of the country. Security forces have continued to engage the group on the frontlines in their forest bases; with the assistance of local and international joint task forces, much of the conflict has been shifted to more remote areas in the north-east. Although the government security forces have gained the upper hand in their frontal clashes with Boko Haram forces, by January 2018 the group had successfully carried out several brutal assaults, including one on UN and Doctors Without Borders staff, shifting their strategy back to traditional hit-and-run guerrilla tactics. During Easter of the same year, a single attack utilising 5 suicide bombers resulted in over 29 dead and 84 wounded.57</p><p>The likelihood that Boko Haram may begin to use CBRN weapons is increasing, and biological and chemical terrorism is potentially more difficult to prevent than conventional terrorist attacks. Since the latter part of the twentieth century, the Internet has contributed to the spread of chemical and biological weapons knowhow, thereby increasing the likelihood of Boko Haram being able to obtain not only the ingredients needed to create biochemical weapons but also the information needed to build and successfully deploy them. Some of the base materials for such weapons even occur naturally, like castor beans, which can be processed to produce the dangerous toxin ricin and deployed against unsuspecting populations. Furthermore, live strains of very dangerous viruses like Ebola can be found in high-tech research labs, like those at the African Centre of Excellence for Genomics and Infectious Diseases (ACEGID) at the Redeemer’s University Ede in Osun State. If Boko Haram were to secure this virus and weaponise it, the age of biowarfare would arrive in Nigeria – with deadly consequences. More importantly, the materials that are needed to create most chemical weapons exist in large quantities as dual-use materials that can be purchased on the open market and ferried into the country via forged end-user certificates.</p><p>The chemical and biological weapons conventions represent control structures geared towards the containment of these non-conventional weapons, and to a large extent state signatories like Nigeria have implemented a good level of the instruments contained in them; however, some nations still maintain secret stockpiles and have used them in recent conflicts, like Iraq against Iran and Kurdish dissidents in the 1980s and 1990s, and the Syrian government, which is presently using them against its civilian population.</p><p>On the whole, the counterterrorism measures put in place to deal with the aftermath of a chemical or biological attack have gained more credibility in the international community. Although there is no dedicated international inter-agency mechanism for coordinating the response to terrorism involving the release of toxic chemicals or biological agents, there are mechanisms that have evolved in the context of humanitarian assistance and emergency response after natural catastrophes, such as earthquakes; these include the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN), the World Health Organization (WHO), the Global Early Warning System (GLEWS), the Global Framework for the Progressive Control of Transboundary Animal Diseases (GF-TAD) and the International Food Safety Authorities Network (INFOSAN). The primary inter-agency mechanism that coordinates responses to emergencies involving the agencies mentioned above is the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC).58 To further strengthen inter-agency coordination in the wake of a terrorist attack of catastrophic proportions, the UN CTITF is also focusing on planning for such an eventuality.</p><p>At the local level, several key aspects of Nigeria’s NACTEST are presently being utilised. The strategy is divided into five work streams:</p><p>Forestall: Prevent terrorism in Nigeria by engaging the public through sustained enlightenment and sensitisation campaigns and deradicalisation programmes.</p><p>Secure: Ensure the protection of life, property and key national infrastructure and public services, including Nigerian interests around the world.</p><p>Identify: Ensure that all terrorist acts are properly investigated, and that terrorists and their sponsors are brought to justice.</p><p>Prepare: Prepare the populace so that the consequences of terrorist incidents can be mitigated.</p><p>Implement: Devise a framework to effectively mobilise and sustain a coordinated, cross-governmental, population-centred effort.59</p><p>Presently, the first three aspects of these work streams are receiving full attention. However, in regard to WMDs, the counterterrorism strategy is lacking a well-integrated CBRN protocol for engaging with the work streams for preparation and implementation. Nigeria currently handles issues relating to nuclear and radiological matters through two institutions: the Nigerian Atomic Energy Agency (NAEC) and the Nigerian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NNRA). It is therefore expected that, given the growing CBRN threat level in the country, these agencies will collaborate with the Office of the Security Adviser to the President in order to initiate a proper CBRN counterterrorism protocol.</p><p>The NACTEST does not currently include a dedicated protocol for handling CBRN threats; Nigeria is however involved in nuclear security at the international level, which has primarily provided for capacity-building and human resources development. Activities in these areas include the gradual process of converting the miniature neutron source reactor in Zaria from using HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU), partnerships for nuclear and radiological security with the US Department of Defence (DoD) and the IAEA, establishing a nuclear security support centre in the country, reviewing the 2012 design basis threat (DBT) for protecting nuclear and radiological material, the development of a programme for locating and securing orphan legacy radioactive sources, training security officers, the installation of a radiation portal monitor at the Murtala Muhammed International Airport in Lagos in 2008 and the acquisition of three more monitors for other international airports in the country.60</p><p><u><strong>An integrated CBRN protocol would fall under the preparation and implementation work streams of the NACTEST. The protocol should include a strategy for detecting CBRN agents in the wake of terrorist events, followed by disaster response and countermeasure initiatives to be carried out by security, medical and disaster response teams. Given the availability of advanced technology, the integrated CBRN counterterrorism protocol should also include the deployment of handheld radiological and biochemical detectors to high-risk areas, and security forces and disaster response teams should be trained in their usage. Embedding a standard protocol in the NACTEST on how to prepare for and respond to CBRN events is essential for repositioning counterterrorist activities in the country to meet the present threat level. The US and Canada along with the UK and most other European countries facing CBRN threats have already repositioned accordingly in order to accommodate this new reality.</p><p>Conclusion</p><p></strong>Any <mark>terrorist </mark>attack involving <mark>WMDs is the <strong>ultimate nightmare scenario</u></strong></mark>. Fortunately, at least some of these potential attacks are preventable. If and when the nuclear security summit achieves its goals, the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in Nigeria will be immensely reduced. Unfortunately, the likelihood of radiological, chemical and biological attacks is more difficult to regress, making it all the more vital to integrate a CBRN protocol into Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategy.</p><p><u>Preventing such a tragic event</u> from occurring <u>will require very close ongoing monitoring<strong> of the strategic manoeuvrings of Boko Haram. From its inception to the present day, the organisation has depended on the looting of military armouries to source most of its heavy weapons and equipment. It has built up an impressive arsenal in this manner and there is no indication that the group will stop using this highly profitable strategy, which could be further employed to obtain advanced CBRN weaponry from facilities that are vulnerable to being raided. The civilian facilities mentioned in this paper are at high risk of being targeted in this fashion; hence, the recalibration of Nigeria’s CBRN counterterrorism protocols should include a security framework that provides military security for facilities like the ACEGID in Osun State and the Centre for Energy Research and Training at Ahmadu Bello University Zaria. Lastly, although the IAEA has assisted in the conversion of Nigeria’s reactor from HEU to LEU,61 the availability of fissile material at the facility means that the risk of radioactive dirty bombs being created from looted material is still present.</p></u></strong>

NATO Bad Updates

2NC – African BioTerror

./documents/openev/2022/UM7/Impacts - NATO Bad 3 - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR.docx

Compulsory voting spurs a cultural shift in how voting is viewed, while driving turnout---this solves better than any alternative.

Chapman 18. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Stanford, “The Distinctive Value of Elections and the Case for Compulsory Voting,” American Journal of Political Science. November 15, 2018. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ajps.12393, RJP

Emilee Booth Chapman 18. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Stanford, “The Distinctive Value of Elections and the Case for Compulsory Voting,” American Journal of Political Science. November 15, 2018. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ajps.12393, RJP The Case for Compulsory Voting

The democratic value of increased voter turnout derives from elections periodic moments of universal participation the extent to which elections perform depends on voting rates low turnout rates diminish democratic virtues of elections especially when a substantial number of citizens in contemporary democracies never vote universal participation prevent disenfranchisement voluntary voting rely on social norms that may not be available. compulsory voting effectively and dramatically increases turnout rates by 15 percentage points that compulsory voting will improve government responsiveness are especially plausible in light of universal participation compulsory voting is associated with lower levels of income inequality and corruption outcomes that benefit the poor who are less likely to vote in voluntary systems Compulsory voting is not the only instrument but tends to be more effective than most other measures on making voting more convenient and accessible increase turnout by only a few percentage points and they do not typically draw many new voters from underrepresented groups convenience voting result in decreased turnout automatic voter registration fall short of compulsory voting’s effectiveness The only measure that appears comparably effective requires radical systemic change compulsory voting can be regarded as a complement, not simply an alternative to other reforms Compulsory voting combination of effectiveness and flexibility relative to other measures for increasing turnout make it a particularly valuable tool important role within a broader framework of democracy, characterized by mass participation Public discourse and the widespread belief in a duty to vote suggest a further publicly shared belief that it is important not only for citizens to have ample opportunity to vote

The democratic value of voter turnout derives from elections moments of universal participation low turnout rates diminish democratic virtues of elections Compulsory voting is not the only instrument but tends to be more effective on making voting more convenient increase turnout by only a few points and do not draw new voters The only measure that appears effective requires radical systemic change

The democratic value of increased voter turnout thus derives from the contributions of elections—as periodic moments of (approximately) universal participation—to an equally responsive government and other democratic values. But the extent to which elections satisfactorily perform this important function depends on voting rates. Consistently low turnout rates diminish many of the distinctive democratic virtues of elections. This is especially true when a substantial number of citizens in contemporary democracies never vote and when these habitual nonvoters tend to be concentrated in poor and otherwise disadvantaged groups. Many citizens do not vote in part because they do not perceive the political system as responsive to them. Public officials in turn reinforce this perception; officials have an incentive to prioritize the concerns of likely voters over those of habitual nonvoters (Griffin and Newman 2005; K. Q. Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-Andersson 1995; Martin 2003). Periodic moments of universal participation ideally prevent this kind of informal disenfranchisement, but communities with voluntary voting rely on social norms to enforce the expectation that everyone votes. In marginalized groups within large societies, such norms may not be available. Many scholars have pointed to compulsory voting as an important step in counteracting this cycle of disengagement in marginalized communities (Birch 2009, 53–54; L. Hill 2010, 919–21; Lijphart 1997). Numerous studies have shown that compulsory voting effectively and often dramatically increases turnout rates—by 15 percentage points or more (e.g., Birch 2009, 79–97; Hirczy 1994)10—and electoral participation is distributed more evenly across society (Fowler 2013, 72; Hooghe and Pelleriaux 1998, 421–22). By promoting reliable compliance with the expectation of universal electoral participation, effectively enforced compulsory voting remedies the collective action problem that plagues vulnerable communities with chronically low turnout rates. Members of politically alienated groups have more reason to regard their vote as an instrument of political influence if they know that others like them will also vote. The claims that increasing voter turnout through compulsory voting will improve government responsiveness to and representation of the poor and marginalized are especially plausible in light of the functions of moments of approximately universal participation, and there is at least some evidence to support these arguments for mandatory voting. Some studies, for example, have found that compulsory voting is associated with lower levels of income inequality and corruption—outcomes that benefit the poor who are less likely to vote in voluntary systems (Birch 2009, 130–31; Chong and Olivera 2008). Compulsory voting is not the only instrument for increasing voter turnout, but, even when penalties for not voting are relatively low and excuses are permissive, compulsory voting tends to be more effective than most other measures, especially those that are comparably feasible. Relatively uncontroversial reforms focused on making voting more convenient and accessible at best increase turnout by only a few percentage points, and they do not typically draw many new voters from underrepresented groups (James 2010, 373–74). In fact, sometimes these “convenience voting” reforms can result in decreased turnout (Berinsky 2005). More dramatic convenience reforms—like Sunday voting and automatic voter registration—tend to produce more significant increases in turnout, but they still fall short of compulsory voting’s effectiveness (James 2010, 378–82). The only measure that appears comparably effective—switching from majoritarian to proportional representation— requires radical systemic change, and it may not be effective or desirable in all political or institutional contexts.11 And, of course, compulsory voting can be regarded as a complement, not simply an alternative, to other turnoutboosting reforms. Compulsory voting is not a unique or universal solution to the problem of low voter turnout, but its combination of effectiveness and flexibility relative to other measures for increasing turnout make it a particularly valuable tool in the toolkit for democratic reform. The case for compulsory voting rests not only on its effectiveness, though, but also on its compatibility with the virtues of moments of universal participation. Compulsory voting can magnify elections’ effect on democratic norms by adding the expressive power of law to the norm of universal voting. Compulsory voting clearly sends the message that all citizens—not just the college educated or wealthy—are expected to contribute to electoral decision making. This expressive effect, reinforced by the experience of actually participating in the vote, encourages citizens to see themselves as political agents. Because of its expressive effect, compulsory voting is also valuable as an object of political support. When citizens support mandatory voting laws, they clearly express a public belief in and commitment to the value of all citizens’ participation in democracy (Engelen 2007, 29). Because compulsory voting strengthens the public commitment to democratic norms while also increasing the government’s adherence to those norms, proponents have argued that mandatory voting also increases at least the descriptive legitimacy of a political system, and anecdotal evidence supports this claim (see, e.g., Lijphart 1997, 10). Compulsory voting has also been associated with a higher reported satisfaction with democracy (Birch 2009, 114). Thus far, I have demonstrated that increasing voter turnout is an important goal for contemporary democratic societies, and that compulsory voting is, at least initially, an appealing means of increasing turnout. Completing the case for mandatory voting, though, requires showing that the likely costs of implementing it do not outweigh the likely benefits. In the next section, I complete this step by responding to four significant objections to mandatory voting. This facilitates deep civic engagement---elections and universality are both key. Emilee Booth Chapman 18. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Stanford, “The Distinctive Value of Elections and the Case for Compulsory Voting,” American Journal of Political Science. November 15, 2018. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ajps.12393, RJP Concern about the gap between public opinion and policy outcomes and about the disproportionate influence of wealthy citizens has recently reinvigorated the debate over compulsory voting. Proponents of compulsory voting suggest that declining and unequal voter turnout rates have exacerbated the responsiveness gap in contemporary democracies. There is ample evidence that enforced compulsory voting is among the most effective ways of increasing voter turnout. Supporters and opponents of mandatory voting disagree, however, about whether higher voter turnout is actually a valuable goal, and whether compulsion is an appropriate way of achieving it. In this article, I argue that the case for compulsory voting rests on an implicit recognition of the unique and valuable role that elections play in contemporary democratic practice as periodic moments in which there is an ambition toward universal participation. Understanding the distinctive value of elections strengthens the case for compulsory voting in many established democracies. Addressing prominent objections to mandatory voting,1 I argue that critics who deny the value of high turnout achieved though compulsion fail to give sufficient attention to voting’s unique role in contemporary democracies. My argument rests on the critical assumption that greater political equality, understood as government that is more equally responsive to all citizens, and greater democratic legitimacy are worthwhile goals to pursue. Thus, my argument is not directed at those criticisms of compulsory voting denying the value of a more equally responsive government.2 Though I do try to address some of the specific objections raised in these criticisms of compulsory voting, my argument is primarily addressed at the important line of criticism that high voter turnout, especially when achieved through compulsion, does not significantly contribute to political equality or meaningful democratic legitimacy. The argument proceeds in the following steps: First, I argue that the ambition toward universal participation establishes a distinctive and important role for voting in modern democratic systems, and, to the extent that they approximate this aim of universal turnout, elections contribute in unique ways to the promotion of democratic values, especially equal responsiveness. Second, I argue that compulsory voting is a particularly good method for increasing turnout because it is more effective than other similarly feasible methods, and it can complement more substantial electoral reforms. Moreover, the method of compulsory voting is well suited to reinforce the distinctive virtues of elections. Finally, I address some major objections to mandatory voting to show that the expected benefits of mandatory voting are likely to outweigh the expected costs and that its effects will not undermine the value of high voter turnout. Before proceeding, it is worth making a few remarks about the scope of this argument. First, technically, this argument applies only to compulsory turnout; enforcing a legal requirement to cast a valid vote would require eliminating the secret ballot, which I do not advocate. In keeping with the norm in the existing literature, though, I use the more common terms mandatory voting or compulsory voting to refer to compulsory turnout. Second, this argument applies only to voting in elections (or potentially referenda) in large-scale democratic societies (i.e., nation-states, or large provinces in a federal system). The distinctive virtues of elections that I lay out in the first section of this article may be less important in smaller communities that can ensure consistent and equally effective access to other modes of participation. Finally, the argument I advance in this article only supports an all-things-concerned judgment in favor of implementing mandatory voting when the system has been designed to achieve its goals and limit negative side effects in the particular context, which, in most cases, will require appropriate complementary reforms. A desirable system of mandatory voting will, for example, require accessible polling places and an enforcement structure with reasonable penalties to ensure that the law is not overly burdensome, especially for already vulnerable populations. Nonetheless, this aricle contributes to the case that proponents of democracy should regard mandatory voting as a potentially powerful tool for democratic reform, and that it is worth figuring out how to implement it effectively and justly. The Role of Elections in Contemporary Democracy Proponents of compulsory voting typically justify compelling people to vote by appealing to two benefits from near-universal electoral turnout: First, higher turnout will produce a political system that is more equally responsive to all citizens; second, higher turnout will increase the perceived legitimacy of the political system (Engelen 2007, 24–25; L. Hill in Brennan and Hill 2014; Lijphart 1996, 1997). Critics of compulsory voting, on the other hand, object that these arguments place too much emphasis on the act of voting while neglecting the diversity of participation that characterizes healthy democracies. Annabelle Lever (2010, 908) argues, “Voting is, at best, only oneform of democratic political participation and, from some perspectives, not an especially important or attractive one.” Other critics likewise claim that compulsory voting arbitrarily singles out one kind of participation as essential to democracy (Brennan in Brennan and Hill 2014, 31). High voter turnout, opponents contend, is not necessarily important for democracy. Moreover, compelling higher turnout is not harmless. Critics argue that compulsory voting could compromise the quality of democratic participation and that it needlessly interferes with individual liberty. Opponents of compulsory voting rightly observe that voting is only one aspect of democracy, but they wrongly conclude that approximately universal voting is not valuable to contemporary democracy. Voting is not interchangeable with other forms of political influence. Elections play a distinctive and important role within a broader framework of democracy, a role characterized by mass participation, in fact, by an ambition toward universal participation. Established democracies devote tremendous resources to making voting accessible. India’s 2014 Lok Sabha election, for example, required nearly a million polling places to ensure that all eligible voters, even those in the most remote parts of the country, would have a meaningful opportunity to vote (Vyawahare 2014). Public discourse and the widespread belief in a duty to vote suggest a further publicly shared belief that it is important not only for citizens to have ample opportunity to vote, but also that citizens actually take advantage of that opportunity (see, e.g., Blais 2000, 95). This public attitude toward voting is distinct from attitudes toward other forms of participation; in the popular imagination, voting is singled out as the object of a duty.3

<h4>Compulsory voting spurs a <u>cultural shift</u> in how voting is viewed, while <u>driving</u> turnout---this solves better than <u>any alternative</u>.</h4><p>Emilee Booth <u><strong>Chapman</u></strong> <u><strong>18. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Stanford, “The Distinctive Value of Elections and the Case for Compulsory Voting,” American Journal of Political Science. November 15, 2018. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ajps.12393, RJP</p><p>The Case for Compulsory Voting</p><p><mark>The democratic value of</mark> increased <mark>voter turnout</u></strong></mark> thus <u><strong><mark>derives from</u></strong></mark> the contributions of <u><strong><mark>elections</u></strong></mark>—as <u><strong>periodic <mark>moments of</u></strong></mark> (approximately) <u><strong><mark>universal participation</u></strong></mark>—to an equally responsive government and other democratic values. But <u><strong>the extent to which elections</u></strong> satisfactorily <u><strong>perform</u></strong> this important function <u><strong>depends on voting rates</u></strong>. Consistently <u><strong><mark>low turnout rates diminish</u></strong></mark> many of the distinctive <u><strong><mark>democratic virtues of elections</u></strong></mark>. This is <u><strong>especially</u></strong> true <u><strong>when a substantial number of citizens in contemporary democracies never vote</u></strong> and when these habitual nonvoters tend to be concentrated in poor and otherwise disadvantaged groups. Many citizens do not vote in part because they do not perceive the political system as responsive to them. Public officials in turn reinforce this perception; officials have an incentive to prioritize the concerns of likely voters over those of habitual nonvoters (Griffin and Newman 2005; K. Q. Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-Andersson 1995; Martin 2003). Periodic moments of <u><strong>universal participation</u></strong> ideally <u><strong>prevent</u></strong> this kind of informal <u><strong>disenfranchisement</u></strong>, but communities with <u><strong>voluntary voting rely on social norms</u></strong> to enforce the expectation <u><strong>that</u></strong> everyone votes. In marginalized groups within large societies, such norms <u><strong>may not be available.</p><p></u></strong>Many scholars have pointed to compulsory voting as an important step in counteracting this cycle of disengagement in marginalized communities (Birch 2009, 53–54; L. Hill 2010, 919–21; Lijphart 1997). Numerous studies have shown that <u><strong>compulsory voting</u></strong> <u><strong>effectively</u></strong> <u><strong>and</u></strong> often <u><strong>dramatically</u></strong> <u><strong>increases turnout rates</u></strong>—<u><strong>by 15 percentage points</u></strong> or more (e.g., Birch 2009, 79–97; Hirczy 1994)10—and electoral participation is distributed more evenly across society (Fowler 2013, 72; Hooghe and Pelleriaux 1998, 421–22). By promoting reliable compliance with the expectation of universal electoral participation, effectively enforced compulsory voting remedies the collective action problem that plagues vulnerable communities with chronically low turnout rates. Members of politically alienated groups have more reason to regard their vote as an instrument of political influence if they know that others like them will also vote.</p><p>The claims <u><strong>that</u></strong> increasing voter turnout through <u><strong>compulsory voting will improve government responsiveness</u></strong> to and representation of the poor and marginalized <u><strong>are especially plausible in light of</u></strong> the functions of moments of approximately <u><strong>universal participation</u></strong>, and there is at least some evidence to support these arguments for mandatory voting. Some studies, for example, have found that <u><strong>compulsory voting is associated with lower levels of income inequality and corruption</u></strong>—<u><strong>outcomes that benefit the poor who are less likely to vote in voluntary systems</u></strong> (Birch 2009, 130–31; Chong and Olivera 2008).</p><p><u><strong><mark>Compulsory voting is not the only instrument</mark> </u></strong>for increasing voter turnout, <u><strong><mark>but</u></strong></mark>, even when penalties for not voting are relatively low and excuses are permissive, compulsory voting <u><strong><mark>tends to be more effective</mark> than most other measures</u></strong>, especially those that are comparably feasible. Relatively uncontroversial reforms focused <u><strong><mark>on making voting more convenient</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and</u></strong> <u><strong>accessible</u></strong> at best <u><strong><mark>increase turnout by only a few</mark> percentage <mark>points</u></strong></mark>,<u><strong> <mark>and</mark> they <mark>do not</mark> typically <mark>draw</mark> many <mark>new voters</mark> from underrepresented groups</u></strong> (James 2010, 373–74). In fact, sometimes these “<u><strong>convenience voting</u></strong>” reforms can <u><strong>result in decreased turnout</u></strong> (Berinsky 2005). More dramatic convenience reforms—like Sunday voting and <u><strong>automatic voter registration</u></strong>—tend to produce more significant increases in turnout, but they still <u><strong>fall short of compulsory voting’s effectiveness</u></strong> (James 2010, 378–82). <u><strong><mark>The only measure that appears</mark> comparably <mark>effective</u></strong></mark>—switching from majoritarian to proportional representation— <u><strong><mark>requires radical systemic change</u></strong></mark>, and it may not be effective or desirable in all political or institutional contexts.11</p><p>And, of course, <u><strong>compulsory voting can be regarded as a complement, not simply an alternative</u></strong>, <u><strong>to other</u></strong> turnoutboosting <u><strong>reforms</u></strong>.</p><p><u><strong>Compulsory voting</u></strong> is not a unique or universal solution to the problem of low voter turnout, but its <u><strong>combination of effectiveness and flexibility</u></strong> <u><strong>relative to other measures for increasing turnout make it a particularly valuable tool</u></strong> in the toolkit for democratic reform. The case for compulsory voting rests not only on its effectiveness, though, but also on its compatibility with the virtues of moments of universal participation. Compulsory voting can magnify elections’ effect on democratic norms by adding the expressive power of law to the norm of universal voting. Compulsory voting clearly sends the message that all citizens—not just the college educated or wealthy—are expected to contribute to electoral decision making. This expressive effect, reinforced by the experience of actually participating in the vote, encourages citizens to see themselves as political agents. Because of its expressive effect, compulsory voting is also valuable as an object of political support. When citizens support mandatory voting laws, they clearly express a public belief in and commitment to the value of all citizens’ participation in democracy (Engelen 2007, 29).</p><p>Because compulsory voting strengthens the public commitment to democratic norms while also increasing the government’s adherence to those norms, proponents have argued that mandatory voting also increases at least the descriptive legitimacy of a political system, and anecdotal evidence supports this claim (see, e.g., Lijphart 1997, 10). Compulsory voting has also been associated with a higher reported satisfaction with democracy (Birch 2009, 114).</p><p>Thus far, I have demonstrated that increasing voter turnout is an important goal for contemporary democratic societies, and that compulsory voting is, at least initially, an appealing means of increasing turnout. Completing the case for mandatory voting, though, requires showing that the likely costs of implementing it do not outweigh the likely benefits. In the next section, I complete this step by responding to four significant objections to mandatory voting.</p><p>This facilitates deep civic engagement---elections and universality are both key.</p><p>Emilee Booth Chapman 18. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Stanford, “The Distinctive Value of Elections and the Case for Compulsory Voting,” American Journal of Political Science. November 15, 2018. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ajps.12393, RJP</p><p>Concern about the gap between public opinion and policy outcomes and about the disproportionate influence of wealthy citizens has recently reinvigorated the debate over compulsory voting. Proponents of compulsory voting suggest that declining and unequal voter turnout rates have exacerbated the responsiveness gap in contemporary democracies. There is ample evidence that enforced compulsory voting is among the most effective ways of increasing voter turnout. Supporters and opponents of mandatory voting disagree, however, about whether higher voter turnout is actually a valuable goal, and whether compulsion is an appropriate way of achieving it.</p><p>In this article, I argue that the case for compulsory voting rests on an implicit recognition of the unique and valuable role that elections play in contemporary democratic practice as periodic moments in which there is an ambition toward universal participation. Understanding the distinctive value of elections strengthens the case for compulsory voting in many established democracies. Addressing prominent objections to mandatory voting,1 I argue that critics who deny the value of high turnout achieved though compulsion fail to give sufficient attention to voting’s unique role in contemporary democracies.</p><p>My argument rests on the critical assumption that greater political equality, understood as government that is more equally responsive to all citizens, and greater democratic legitimacy are worthwhile goals to pursue. Thus, my argument is not directed at those criticisms of compulsory voting denying the value of a more equally responsive government.2 Though I do try to address some of the specific objections raised in these criticisms of compulsory voting, my argument is primarily addressed at the important line of criticism that high voter turnout, especially when achieved through compulsion, does not significantly contribute to political equality or meaningful democratic legitimacy.</p><p>The argument proceeds in the following steps: First, I argue that the ambition toward universal participation establishes a distinctive and important role for voting in modern democratic systems, and, to the extent that they approximate this aim of universal turnout, elections contribute in unique ways to the promotion of democratic values, especially equal responsiveness. Second, I argue that compulsory voting is a particularly good method for increasing turnout because it is more effective than other similarly feasible methods, and it can complement more substantial electoral reforms. Moreover, the method of compulsory voting is well suited to reinforce the distinctive virtues of elections. Finally, I address some major objections to mandatory voting to show that the expected benefits of mandatory voting are likely to outweigh the expected costs and that its effects will not undermine the value of high voter turnout. Before proceeding, it is worth making a few remarks about the scope of this argument. First, technically, this argument applies only to compulsory turnout; enforcing a legal requirement to cast a valid vote would require eliminating the secret ballot, which I do not advocate. In keeping with the norm in the existing literature, though, I use the more common terms mandatory voting or compulsory voting to refer to compulsory turnout. Second, this argument applies only to voting in elections (or potentially referenda) in large-scale democratic societies (i.e., nation-states, or large provinces in a federal system). The distinctive virtues of elections that I lay out in the first section of this article may be less important in smaller communities that can ensure consistent and equally effective access to other modes of participation. Finally, the argument I advance in this article only supports an all-things-concerned judgment in favor of implementing mandatory voting when the system has been designed to achieve its goals and limit negative side effects in the particular context, which, in most cases, will require appropriate complementary reforms. A desirable system of mandatory voting will, for example, require accessible polling places and an enforcement structure with reasonable penalties to ensure that the law is not overly burdensome, especially for already vulnerable populations. Nonetheless, this aricle contributes to the case that proponents of democracy should regard mandatory voting as a potentially powerful tool for democratic reform, and that it is worth figuring out how to implement it effectively and justly.</p><p>The Role of Elections in Contemporary Democracy</p><p>Proponents of compulsory voting typically justify compelling people to vote by appealing to two benefits from near-universal electoral turnout: First, higher turnout will produce a political system that is more equally responsive to all citizens; second, higher turnout will increase the perceived legitimacy of the political system (Engelen 2007, 24–25; L. Hill in Brennan and Hill 2014; Lijphart 1996, 1997).</p><p>Critics of compulsory voting, on the other hand, object that these arguments place too much emphasis on the act of voting while neglecting the diversity of participation that characterizes healthy democracies. Annabelle Lever (2010, 908) argues, “Voting is, at best, only oneform of democratic political participation and, from some perspectives, not an especially important or attractive one.” Other critics likewise claim that compulsory voting arbitrarily singles out one kind of participation as essential to democracy (Brennan in Brennan and Hill 2014, 31). High voter turnout, opponents contend, is not necessarily important for democracy. Moreover, compelling higher turnout is not harmless. Critics argue that compulsory voting could compromise the quality of democratic participation and that it needlessly interferes with individual liberty.</p><p>Opponents of compulsory voting rightly observe that voting is only one aspect of democracy, but they wrongly conclude that approximately universal voting is not valuable to contemporary democracy. Voting is not interchangeable with other forms of political influence. Elections play a distinctive and<u><strong> important role within a broader framework of democracy,</u></strong> a role <u><strong>characterized by mass participation</u></strong>, in fact, by an ambition toward universal participation.</p><p>Established democracies devote tremendous resources to making voting accessible. India’s 2014 Lok Sabha election, for example, required nearly a million polling places to ensure that all eligible voters, even those in the most remote parts of the country, would have a meaningful opportunity to vote (Vyawahare 2014). <u><strong>Public discourse and the widespread belief in a duty to vote</u></strong> <u><strong>suggest a further publicly shared belief that it is important not only for citizens to have ample opportunity to vote</u></strong>, but also that citizens actually take advantage of that opportunity (see, e.g., Blais 2000, 95). This public attitude toward voting is distinct from attitudes toward other forms of participation; in the popular imagination, voting is singled out as the object of a duty.3</p>

1AC—Advantage: Civic Engagement

./documents/hsld20/Carter/Mi/Carter-Miller-Aff-nano%20nagle-Round1.docx

A

nano nagle

1

loyola ap

nathan fleming

1ac- us 1nc- elections courts t-a t-dem 1ar- partisanship 2ar- partisanship

hsld20/Carter/Mi/Carter-Miller-Aff-nano%20nagle-Round1.docx

KaMi

Carter KaMi

Ka.....

Mi.....

Carter

Carter

CA

hsld20

HS LD 2020-21

ld

hs

Despite resistance, the CCP regime is stable now – but challenges to legitimacy cause lashout

Ball, MA in IR, 20

Ball, MA in IR, 20

, April 10) BW For decades, Western analysts assumed that China’s embrace of capitalist economic policies would set the stage for democratic reform. Almost three decades later, however, the CCP remains firmly in power under the increasingly autocratic leadership of Xi The Chinese government has radically modernized its economic policies completely reversing their initial Marxist or Maoist aversion to providing monetary compensation for labor. These reforms are responsible for the significant growth of the Chinese middle class, which has the potential to be the most influential group in China the considerably large middle class has come to perceive the CCP as being responsible for their rising levels of prosperity. China has undoubtedly experienced the effects of the 2008-2009 global economic crisis; it indeed fared much better than the majority of the world. Since the inception of Jiang Zemin’s ‘Three Represents,’ meant to attract private entrepreneurs the middle and upper classes have seen the party as being responsible for their economic well-being. The government provides an environment for a healthy, regulated economy, to encourage the creation of private wealth and property, and in return has its rule legitimized by its people. while it is individuals are responsible for the creation of personal wealth, the party made it possible. If the government or party cannot guarantee jobs to the people, there remains little reason for the people to tolerate the strict control that the party maintains over the state. If the CCP-controlled government cannot sustain economic growth, it could be perceived by members of the growing middle class as violating the social contract between China’s citizens and the country’s ruling party elite. The CCP could face a challenge to its legitimacy if it is unable to guarantee a healthy economy, prompting potential discontent The Chinese government has become particularly adept at maintaining or regaining control over its people via physical repression, censorship, and creation of an environment where fear of speaking out is a legitimate means of control. Rising social discontent isn’t likely to be enough to force the party itself from power, but it might be sufficient to tempt some members of the elite to take advantage of the situation to their political benefit, leading to internal instability within the party and damaging its credibility. While the CCP has an extraordinary ability to suppress dissent, it can only contain such dissent for so long. However, due to the rapid proliferation of advanced technologies the Chinese authorities are empowered Nevertheless, a sustained economic downturn poses a threat to the CCP’s legitimacy. Continued civil unrest on the part of groups desiring independence as a result of religious suppression and ethnic inequality illustrate not-insignificant threats Regardless, the most significant threat to the power monopoly held by the CCP is a pronounced economic downturn.

the CCP remains firmly in power under Xi The government modernized economic policies the middle class has the potential to be the most influential group perceive the CCP as responsible for their prosperity. its rule legitimized by its people. the CCP could be perceived by the growing middle class as violating the social contract The CCP could face a challenge to its legitimacy Rising social discontent might tempt members of the elite to take advantage leading to internal instability within the party and damaging its credibility. the CCP can only contain such dissent for so long. Continued civil unrest on groups desiring independence illustrate threats Regardless, the most significant threat is a pronounced economic downturn.

(Joshua, University of St. Andrews, https://globalsecurityreview.com/degree-chinas-internal-stability-depend-economic-growth/, April 10) BW For decades, Western academics, policymakers, and analysts assumed that China’s embrace of capitalist economic policies would set the stage for democratic reform. Almost three decades later, however, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) remains firmly in power under the increasingly autocratic leadership of General Secretary Xi Jinping. While the CCP-controlled government faces a range of threats from groups within its borders, the idea of a downturn in the Chinese economy remains a very legitimate threat. The Chinese government has radically modernized its economic policies over the past three decades, completely reversing their initial Marxist or Maoist aversion to providing monetary compensation for labor. These reforms are responsible for the significant growth of the Chinese middle class, which has the potential to be the most influential group in China when looked at in regards to socio-economic status. As a result, the considerably large middle class has come to perceive the CCP as being responsible for their rising levels of prosperity. China has undoubtedly experienced the effects of the 2008-2009 global economic crisis; it indeed fared much better than the majority of the world. However, China still faces many hurdles to overcome. Rising Debt and Escalating Unemployment for Chinese College Graduates It is becoming increasingly difficult in China for college graduates to find jobs, the volume of China’s exports is dropping, and tens of millions of workers are out of work. The possibility of a financial crisis in China could challenge Beijing’s ability to hold up its side of the deal with the population. Since the inception of Jiang Zemin’s ‘Three Represents,’ meant to attract private entrepreneurs to party membership, the middle and upper classes have seen the party as being responsible for their economic well-being. The government provides an environment for a healthy, regulated economy, to encourage the creation of private wealth and property, and in return has its rule legitimized by its people. Arguably, while it is individuals are responsible for the creation of personal wealth, the party made it possible. If the government or party cannot guarantee jobs to the people, there remains the little reason for the people to tolerate the strict control that the party maintains over the state. If the CCP-controlled government cannot sustain economic growth, it could be perceived by members of the growing middle class as violating the social contract that has existed between China’s citizens and the country’s ruling party elite. The CCP could face a challenge to its legitimacy if and when the time comes that it is unable to guarantee a healthy economy, prompting potential discontent from the middle class. Beijing has a track record of effectively suppressing unrest The Chinese government has become particularly adept at maintaining or regaining control over its people via means of physical repression, censorship, and through the creation of an environment where fear of speaking out is a legitimate means of control. Indeed, the likelihood of an economic downturn eliminating the CCP’s influence is minimal. Rising social discontent isn’t likely to be enough to force the party itself from power, but it might be sufficient to tempt some members of the elite to take advantage of the situation to their political benefit, thus leading to internal instability within the party and damaging its credibility. While the CCP has an extraordinary ability to suppress dissent, many argue that it can only contain such dissent for so long. However, due to the rapid proliferation of advanced technologies including surveillance, censorship, and controlled access to information, the Chinese authorities are empowered as never before, to monitor, identify, and censor those whose activities are a perceived threat to the party. Nevertheless, a sustained economic downturn poses a threat to the CCP’s legitimacy. Continued civil unrest on the part of groups desiring independence from CCP rule as a result of religious suppression and ethnic inequality illustrate not-insignificant threats to the party’s ability to maintain total control over the Chinese state. Regardless, the most significant threat to the power monopoly held by the CCP is a pronounced economic downturn.

<h4><strong>Despite resistance, the CCP regime is stable now – but challenges to legitimacy cause lashout </h4><p>Ball, MA in IR, 20</p><p></strong>(Joshua, University of St. Andrews, https://globalsecurityreview.com/degree-chinas-internal-stability-depend-economic-growth/<u><strong>, April 10) BW</p><p></strong>For decades, Western</u> academics, policymakers, and <u>analysts assumed that China’s embrace of capitalist economic policies would set the stage for democratic reform. Almost three decades later, however, <mark>the</u></mark> Chinese Communist Party (<u><mark>CCP</u></mark>) <u><mark>remains firmly in power under</mark> the increasingly autocratic leadership of</u> General Secretary <u><mark>Xi</u></mark> Jinping. While the CCP-controlled government faces a range of threats from groups within its borders, the idea of a downturn in the Chinese economy remains a very legitimate threat. <u><mark>The</mark> Chinese <mark>government</mark> has radically <mark>modernized</mark> its <mark>economic policies</u></mark> over the past three decades, <u>completely reversing their initial Marxist or Maoist aversion to providing monetary compensation for labor. These reforms are responsible for the significant growth of <mark>the</mark> Chinese <mark>middle class</mark>, which <mark>has the potential to be the most influential group</mark> in China</u> when looked at in regards to socio-economic status. As a result, <u>the considerably large middle class has come to <mark>perceive the CCP as</mark> being <mark>responsible for their</mark> rising levels of <mark>prosperity.</u></mark> <u>China has undoubtedly experienced the effects of the 2008-2009 global economic crisis; it indeed fared much better than the majority of the world.</u> However, China still faces many hurdles to overcome. Rising Debt and Escalating Unemployment for Chinese College Graduates It is becoming increasingly difficult in China for college graduates to find jobs, the volume of China’s exports is dropping, and tens of millions of workers are out of work. The possibility of a financial crisis in China could challenge Beijing’s ability to hold up its side of the deal with the population. <u>Since the inception of Jiang Zemin’s ‘Three Represents,’ meant to attract private entrepreneurs</u> to party membership, <u>the middle and upper classes have seen the party as being responsible for their economic well-being. The government provides an environment for a healthy, regulated economy, to encourage the creation of private wealth and property, and<strong> in return has <mark>its rule legitimized by its people.</strong></mark> </u>Arguably, <u>while it is individuals are responsible for the creation of personal wealth, the party made it possible. If the government or party cannot guarantee jobs to the people, there <strong>remains</u></strong> the <u><strong>little reason for the people to tolerate the strict control that the party maintains over the state.</u></strong> <u>If <mark>the CCP</mark>-controlled government cannot sustain economic growth, it <mark>could be <strong>perceived by</mark> members of <mark>the growing middle class as violating the social contract</u></strong></mark> that has existed <u>between China’s citizens and the country’s ruling party elite.</u> <u><mark>The CCP could face a challenge to its legitimacy</mark> if</u> and when the time comes that <u>it is unable to guarantee a healthy economy, prompting potential discontent</u> from the middle class. Beijing has a track record of effectively suppressing unrest <u>The Chinese government has become particularly adept at maintaining or regaining control over its people via</u> means of <u>physical repression, censorship, and</u> through the <u>creation of an environment where fear of speaking out is a legitimate means of control.</u> Indeed, the likelihood of an economic downturn eliminating the CCP’s influence is minimal. <u><mark>Rising social discontent</mark> isn’t likely to be enough to force the party itself from power, but it <mark>might</mark> be sufficient to <mark>tempt</mark> some <mark>members of the elite to take advantage</mark> of the situation to their political benefit,</u> thus <u><strong><mark>leading to internal instability within the party and damaging its credibility.</u></strong> <u><strong></mark>While <mark>the CCP </mark>has an extraordinary ability to suppress dissent,</u></strong> many argue that <u><strong>it <mark>can only contain such dissent for so long.</u></strong></mark> <u>However, due to the rapid proliferation of advanced technologies</u> including surveillance, censorship, and controlled access to information, <u>the Chinese authorities are empowered</u> as never before, to monitor, identify, and censor those whose activities are a perceived threat to the party. <u>Nevertheless, a sustained economic downturn poses a threat to the CCP’s legitimacy. <mark>Continued civil unrest on</mark> the part of <mark>groups desiring independence</u></mark> from CCP rule <u>as a result of religious suppression and ethnic inequality <mark>illustrate</mark> not-insignificant <mark>threats</u></mark> to the party’s ability to maintain total control over the Chinese state. <u><strong><mark>Regardless, the most significant threat</mark> to the power monopoly held by the CCP <mark>is a pronounced economic downturn.</p></u></strong></mark>

DA

./documents/hsld20/HarvardWestlake/Co/Harvard%20Westlake-Conner-Neg-UNLV-Round3.docx

N

UNLV

3

Peninsula SM

Vanessa Nguyen

1AC china 1nc Xi DA china Heg DA t Case 2nr heg

hsld20/HarvardWestlake/Co/Harvard%20Westlake-Conner-Neg-UNLV-Round3.docx

ClCo

Harvard Westlake ClCo

Cl.....

Co.....

HarvardWestlake

Harvard Westlake

CA

hsld20

HS LD 2020-21

ld

hs

The alternative is to reject the plan in favor of commitment to organizing anti-capitalist international revolution.

Tavan '21

Tavan '21 [Luca; 3/7/21; writer for Red Flag; "Worldwide revolution is possible and necessary," https://redflag.org.au/article/worldwide-revolution-possible-and-necessary/]

Marx and Engels urged workers of the world to unite at the climax of the Communist Manifesto, the goal international revolution International revolution isn’t just a romantic dream, but an urgent necessity. It’s the only means by which capitalism can be permanently uprooted and replaced with socialism. This is because capitalism, unlike previous class societies, is a globally integrated system Capitalism has linked every nation in a global chain of production No single country produces all the things necessary to satisfy its population’s needs, unlike the various forms of society that came before capitalism Capitalism was established as a world system through immense robbery and violence—from the international slave trade to murderous colonisation That same violence is today used by states to defend their imperialist interests, and discipline any movements that get in their way. Movements that aspire to national independence or that back left-wing reformist governments have been demolished with the aid of the great capitalist powers countless times in the past century, from the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile in 1973 to the 2019 Bolivian coup. Unless revolutions can spread internationally and challenge the imperialist powers that have an interest in destroying them, they will be crushed. isolation and poverty imposed on Russia made building socialism an impossibility, and a new Stalinist regime emerged Because Russian revolutionary socialists were ultimately defeated, their example is used by defenders of capitalism as a cautionary tale that a worldwide revolution against the system is an impossible dream But capitalism’s global nature means that revolts tend to spread across national borders. Workers today share increasingly similar experiences: conditions of work, forms of consumption, lifestyles and political cultures. And the global integration of production serves to transmit struggle from one country to another resistance to the brutal military dictatorship in Chile spread to East Kilbride, Scotland, of all places While nationalism still has a powerful hold it’s increasingly clear that the real line of polarisation across the globe is between the minority ruling class and the majority working class. And when revolts break out in one part of the world, people can identify with the causes and motivations of their struggles, and draw comparisons with their own situation what they say is increasingly the same 1968 is remembered as a year of global revolt, when millions of workers, students and oppressed people drew inspiration from each other’s movements. Activists in the US radicalised by the heroic resistance of the Vietnamese people Irish civil rights activists emulated the militant politics of the Black Panthers students and workers united to launch a massive general strike in France it taught student radicals in Australia that they needed to link up The movements of 1968 united people across superficially very different societies in 1968, both sides of the iron curtain exploded in revolt. The triggers for the struggles may have been different, but they were all responses to similar issues: inequality, exploitation and war, imposed by monstrous bureaucratic states In 2011, a Tunisian street vendor set himself alight Within days, his act had inspired anti-government protests across the country protests escalated into a regional revolt that challenged regimes across the Arab world. One small act tapped into resentment against inequality, unemployment and state violence that engulfed an entire region. The radical wave spread even further: at a massive demonstration in the US city of Madison, Wisconsin The Arab revolutions went on to inspire the Occupy movement, which spread to more than 80 countries Today, more than ever, insurgent social movements and working-class uprisings are spurring action in other parts of the world While the Russian Revolution is cynically held up by capitalist ideologists it actually proves the opposite. It shows that the goal is not only necessary, but also that it’s possible. The news of workers seizing power in Russia and declaring withdrawal from WWI, created shock waves across the planet. Workers in Germany rose in revolt a year later This was followed by uprisings in France, Italy and Hungary The revolutionary wave spread further. classified British government report noted a “very widespread feeling among workers that thrones have become anachronisms, and that the Soviet may be the best form of Government for a democracy”. The Russian Bolsheviks didn’t just passively wait for revolutions elsewhere. They actively organised to spread the revolt they established the Communist International, an organisation for debate, discussion and coordination between different revolutionary workers’ parties. to clarify and develop a strategy for overthrowing capitalism for a number of years, workers came close to overthrowing capitalism In periods of stability, when social conservatism dominates, international revolution can seem like a pipe dream. Defenders of the status quo actively work to reinforce this illusion. But history proves that the crises that the system generates are international, and that they will inevitably provoke international resistance Capitalism is a global system. It requires a global movement to tear it up But it also makes global revolution more possible, and more likely. The most important thing is to get stuck into organising for it today

revolution is an urgent necessity the only means by which capitalism can be replaced Russia is used as a cautionary tale But capitalism’s global nature means revolts spread across borders. Workers share experiences: conditions lifestyles and cultures global integration serves to transmit struggle when revolts break out people identify with causes triggers may be different, but all responses to inequality, exploitation and war by monstrous states 2011, a Tunisian street vendor inspired protests across the Arab world tapped into resentment that spread to inspire Occupy to 80 countries Today insurgent social movements and working-class uprisings are spurring action Russia proves it’s possible news of workers seizing power created shock waves across the planet Bolsheviks organised to spread established the Communist International to clarify strategy for overthrowing capitalism workers came close history proves crises the system generates are international, and will provoke resistance The most important thing is organising for it today

From the moment Marx and Engels urged workers of the world to unite at the climax of the Communist Manifesto, the goal of international revolution has been at the core of Marxist politics. International revolution isn’t just a romantic dream, but an urgent necessity. It’s the only means by which capitalism can be permanently uprooted and replaced with socialism. This is because capitalism, unlike previous class societies, is a globally integrated system. “For the first time in history”, wrote British Marxist Colin Barker of this phenomenon, “capitalism has created a genuinely world society, where all our lives are entwined together in a common history and a common fate”. Capitalism has linked every nation in a global chain of production. Take your mobile phone for example. It was likely assembled in China, using computer chips manufactured in Taiwan, powered by coal exported from Australia and produced with minerals mined in the Democratic Republic of Congo according to specifications developed in Europe or the United States. No single country produces all the things necessary to satisfy its population’s needs, unlike the various forms of society that came before capitalism, which were mostly self-sufficient and organised around small local economies. Capitalism was established as a world system through immense robbery and violence—from the international slave trade, which fuelled the Industrial Revolution, to the murderous colonisation of what is now Australia. That same violence is today used by states to defend their imperialist interests, and discipline any movements that get in their way. Movements that aspire to national independence or that back left-wing reformist governments have been demolished with the aid of the great capitalist powers countless times in the past century, from the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile in 1973 to the 2019 Bolivian coup. Revolutionary movements that attempt to overturn the entire capitalist system face a much more severe response. This was confirmed by the defeat of the Russian Revolution. In 1917 workers, radicalised by years of war and economic crisis, overthrew the tsarist regime and eventually took power into their own hands. In response, the capitalist powers of the world united to crush the workers’ state, in alliance with reactionaries who wanted to restore the tsarist regime. Unless revolutions can spread internationally and challenge the imperialist powers that have an interest in destroying them, they will be crushed. A heroic effort by Russian workers and peasants fought off 16 foreign invading armies, but at a great cost. The working class was decimated, the factories were depopulated, and the radical working-class democracy that had been built withered. The isolation and poverty imposed on Russia made building socialism an impossibility, and a new Stalinist regime emerged that reversed most of the gains of the revolution. Because Russian revolutionary socialists who pinned their hopes on spreading revolution across the globe were ultimately defeated, their example is used by defenders of capitalism as a cautionary tale today: that a worldwide revolution against the system is an impossible dream. But capitalism’s global nature means that revolts tend to spread across national borders. Workers today share increasingly similar experiences: conditions of work, forms of consumption, lifestyles and political cultures. And the global integration of production serves to transmit struggle from one country to another. In 1974, for instance, resistance to the brutal military dictatorship in Chile spread to East Kilbride, Scotland, of all places. Workers at the Rolls Royce factory there learned that the engines they were repairing were being used by the Chilean air force to drop bombs on workers resisting the coup. They downed tools and refused to work on the engines, keeping them out of the hands of the military junta for four years. While nationalism still has a powerful hold on the consciousness of many, it’s increasingly clear that the real line of polarisation across the globe is between the minority ruling class and the majority working class. And when revolts break out in one part of the world, people can identify with the causes and motivations of their struggles, and draw comparisons with their own situation. “Languages remain different,” observed UK Marxist Chris Harman in 1992, “but what they say is increasingly the same”. Harman’s words ring true in every wave of political radicalisation. 1968 is remembered as a year of global revolt, when millions of workers, students and oppressed people drew inspiration from each other’s movements. Activists in the US were radicalised by the heroic resistance of the Vietnamese people to American imperialism. Irish civil rights activists emulated the militant politics of the Black Panthers. When students and workers united to launch a massive general strike in France in May, it taught student radicals in Australia that they needed to link up with the power of the organised working class in order to win. The movements of 1968 united people across superficially very different societies. For decades, Cold War common sense had dictated that the greatest divide on the planet was between Western liberal capitalism and Stalinist “Communism”. But in 1968, both sides of the iron curtain exploded in revolt. The triggers for the struggles may have been different, but they were all responses to similar issues: inequality, exploitation and war, imposed by monstrous bureaucratic states. In 2011, a poor Tunisian street vendor set himself alight to protest against police harassment. Within days, his act had inspired anti-government protests across the country. Within weeks, the protests escalated into a regional revolt that challenged regimes across the Arab world. One small act tapped into resentment against inequality, unemployment and state violence that engulfed an entire region. The radical wave spread even further: at a massive demonstration against an anti-union bill in the US city of Madison, Wisconsin, a man held up a poster with a picture of Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak beside Republican Governor Scott Walker. The caption read: “One dictator down. One to go”. The Arab revolutions went on to inspire the Occupy movement, which spread to more than 80 countries. Today, more than ever, insurgent social movements and working-class uprisings are spurring action in other parts of the world—from Hong Kong to Chile, from Lebanon to France. One placard at a memorial for protesters murdered while resisting the military coup in Myanmar took up Marx’s incitement: “Workers of the world unite, you have nothing to lose but your chains”. While the Russian Revolution is cynically held up by capitalist ideologists as the ultimate argument against international revolution, it actually proves the opposite. It shows that the goal is not only necessary, but also that it’s possible. The news of workers seizing power in Russia, overthrowing their capitalist government and declaring their withdrawal from WWI, created shock waves across the planet. Workers in Germany rose in revolt a year later, ending the war for good and building soviets, a form of radical working-class democracy inspired by the Russian example. This was followed by uprisings in France, Italy and Hungary. The revolutionary wave spread further. A classified British government report from 1919 noted a “very widespread feeling among workers that thrones have become anachronisms, and that the Soviet may be the best form of Government for a democracy”. The rising tide of radicalism had an impact in Australia too. Meatworkers in the Queensland city of Townsville donned red jumpers, stormed the local police station to free jailed unionists, and placed the city under workers’ control. The editor of the conservative Townsville Daily Bulletin lamented: “Townsville for the last year or so has been developing Bolshevism ... the mob management of affairs in this city, differs very little, from the Petrograd and Moscow brand”. The Russian Bolsheviks, the revolutionary working-class party that led the revolution to victory in 1917, didn’t just passively wait for revolutions elsewhere. They actively organised to spread the revolt. In 1919, they established the Communist International, an organisation for debate, discussion and coordination between different revolutionary workers’ parties. Revolutionaries in Russia, Italy, France, Germany, the US, Australia and elsewhere attempted to clarify and develop a strategy for overthrowing capitalism everywhere. In none of these countries was there a party like the Bolsheviks, steeled in years of organising working-class struggle to overthrow the state, and capable of leading a revolution. But for a number of years, workers came close to overthrowing capitalism in several countries. In periods of stability, when social conservatism dominates, international revolution can seem like a pipe dream. Defenders of the status quo actively work to reinforce this illusion. But history proves that the crises that the system generates are international, and that they will inevitably provoke international resistance. Capitalism is a global system. It requires a global movement to tear it up, root and branch. But it also makes global revolution more possible, and more likely. The most important thing that socialists can do, whether you live in Hong Kong or France, Myanmar or Australia, is to get stuck into organising for it today.

<h4>The alternative is to <u>reject the plan</u> in favor of commitment to <u>organizing</u> anti-capitalist <u>international revolution</u>.</h4><p><strong>Tavan '21 </strong>[Luca; 3/7/21; writer for Red Flag; "Worldwide revolution is possible and necessary," https://redflag.org.au/article/worldwide-revolution-possible-and-necessary/]</p><p>From the moment <u>Marx and Engels urged <strong>workers of the world</strong> to <strong>unite</strong> at the climax of the Communist Manifesto, the goal</u> of <u><strong>international revolution</u></strong> has been at the core of Marxist politics. </p><p><u>International <mark>revolution is</mark>n’t just a romantic dream, but <mark>an <strong>urgent necessity</strong></mark>. It’s <mark>the <strong>only means</strong> by which <strong>capitalism</strong> can be</mark> <strong>permanently uprooted</strong> and <strong><mark>replaced</strong></mark> with socialism. This is because capitalism, unlike previous class societies, is a <strong>globally integrated</strong> system</u>. “For the first time in history”, wrote British Marxist Colin Barker of this phenomenon, “capitalism has created a genuinely world society, where all our lives are entwined together in a common history and a common fate”. </p><p><u>Capitalism has linked every nation in a <strong>global chain of production</u></strong>. Take your mobile phone for example. It was likely assembled in China, using computer chips manufactured in Taiwan, powered by coal exported from Australia and produced with minerals mined in the Democratic Republic of Congo according to specifications developed in Europe or the United States. <u>No single country produces all the things necessary to satisfy its population’s needs, unlike the various forms of society that came before capitalism</u>, which were mostly self-sufficient and organised around small local economies. </p><p><u>Capitalism was established as a <strong>world system</strong> through immense <strong>robbery</strong> and <strong>violence</strong>—from the international <strong>slave trade</u></strong>, which fuelled the Industrial Revolution, <u>to</u> the <u>murderous <strong>colonisation</u></strong> of what is now Australia. <u>That same violence is today used by <strong>states</strong> to <strong>defend</strong> their <strong>imperialist interests</strong>, and discipline any movements that get in their way. Movements that aspire to national independence or that back left-wing reformist governments have been demolished with the aid of the great capitalist powers countless times in the past century, from the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile in 1973 to the 2019 Bolivian coup.</p><p></u>Revolutionary movements that attempt to overturn the entire capitalist system face a much more severe response. This was confirmed by the defeat of the Russian Revolution. In 1917 workers, radicalised by years of war and economic crisis, overthrew the tsarist regime and eventually took power into their own hands. In response, the capitalist powers of the world united to crush the workers’ state, in alliance with reactionaries who wanted to restore the tsarist regime. <u>Unless revolutions can spread internationally and challenge the imperialist powers that have an interest in destroying them, they will be crushed.</p><p></u>A heroic effort by Russian workers and peasants fought off 16 foreign invading armies, but at a great cost. The working class was decimated, the factories were depopulated, and the radical working-class democracy that had been built withered. The <u>isolation and poverty imposed on Russia made building socialism an impossibility, and a new Stalinist regime emerged</u> that reversed most of the gains of the revolution. </p><p><u>Because <mark>Russia</mark>n revolutionary socialists</u> who pinned their hopes on spreading revolution across the globe <u>were ultimately defeated, their example <mark>is used</mark> by defenders of capitalism <mark>as a <strong>cautionary tale</u></strong></mark> today: <u>that a <strong>worldwide revolution</strong> against the system is an <strong>impossible dream</u></strong>. </p><p><u><mark>But capitalism’s <strong>global nature</strong> means</mark> that <strong><mark>revolts</mark> tend to <mark>spread</strong> across</mark> <strong>national <mark>borders</strong>. Workers</mark> today <strong><mark>share</strong></mark> increasingly <strong>similar <mark>experiences</strong>: conditions</mark> of <strong>work</strong>, forms of <strong>consumption</strong>, <strong><mark>lifestyles</strong> and</mark> political <strong><mark>cultures</strong></mark>. And the <strong><mark>global integration</strong></mark> of production <mark>serves to <strong>transmit struggle</strong></mark> from one country to another</u>. In 1974, for instance, <u>resistance to the brutal military dictatorship in Chile spread to East Kilbride, Scotland, of all places</u>. Workers at the Rolls Royce factory there learned that the engines they were repairing were being used by the Chilean air force to drop bombs on workers resisting the coup. They downed tools and refused to work on the engines, keeping them out of the hands of the military junta for four years. </p><p><u>While nationalism still has a powerful hold</u> on the consciousness of many, <u>it’s increasingly clear that the real <strong>line of polarisation</strong> across the <strong>globe</strong> is between the <strong>minority ruling class</strong> and the <strong>majority working class</strong>. And <mark>when <strong>revolts</strong> break out</mark> in one part of the world, <mark>people</mark> can <strong><mark>identify with</mark> the <mark>causes</mark> and motivations</strong> of their struggles, and <strong>draw comparisons</strong> with their own situation</u>. “Languages remain different,” observed UK Marxist Chris Harman in 1992, “but <u>what they say is increasingly the same</u>”. Harman’s words ring true in every wave of political radicalisation. </p><p><u>1968 is remembered as a year of <strong>global revolt</strong>, when <strong>millions</strong> of <strong>workers</strong>, <strong>students</strong> and <strong>oppressed</strong> people drew inspiration from each other’s movements. Activists in the <strong>US</u></strong> were <u>radicalised by the heroic resistance of the <strong>Vietnamese</strong> people</u> to American imperialism. <u><strong>Irish</strong> civil rights activists emulated the militant politics of the Black Panthers</u>. When <u>students and workers united to launch a massive general strike in <strong>France</u></strong> in May, <u>it taught student radicals in <strong>Australia</strong> that they needed to link up</u> with the power of the organised working class in order to win. </p><p><u>The movements of 1968 <strong>united people</strong> across superficially very <strong>different societies</u></strong>. For decades, Cold War common sense had dictated that the greatest divide on the planet was between Western liberal capitalism and Stalinist “Communism”. But <u>in 1968, both sides of the iron curtain <strong>exploded in revolt</strong>. The <strong><mark>triggers</strong></mark> for the struggles <mark>may</mark> have <mark>be</mark>en <strong><mark>different</strong>, but</mark> they were <mark>all <strong>responses</strong> to</mark> <strong>similar</strong> issues: <strong><mark>inequality</strong>, <strong>exploitation</strong> and <strong>war</strong></mark>, imposed <mark>by monstrous</mark> <strong>bureaucratic <mark>states</u></strong></mark>. </p><p><u>In <mark>2011, a</u></mark> poor <u><mark>Tunisian street vendor</mark> set himself alight</u> to protest against police harassment. <u>Within days, his act had <mark>inspired</mark> anti-government <mark>protests</mark> across the country</u>. Within weeks, the <u>protests escalated into a <strong>regional revolt</strong> that challenged regimes <mark>across the <strong>Arab world</strong></mark>. One small act <strong><mark>tapped into resentment</strong></mark> against <strong>inequality</strong>, <strong>unemployment</strong> and <strong>state violence</strong> <mark>that</mark> engulfed an entire region. The <strong>radical wave</strong> <mark>spread</mark> even further: at a massive demonstration</u> against an anti-union bill <u>in the US city of Madison, Wisconsin</u>, a man held up a poster with a picture of Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak beside Republican Governor Scott Walker. The caption read: “One dictator down. One to go”. <u>The Arab revolutions went on <mark>to <strong>inspire</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>Occupy</strong></mark> movement, which spread <mark>to</mark> more than <mark>80 countries</u></mark>. </p><p><u><mark>Today</mark>, more than ever, <strong><mark>insurgent social movements</strong> and working-class <strong>uprisings</strong> are <strong>spurring action</strong></mark> in other parts of the world</u>—from Hong Kong to Chile, from Lebanon to France. One placard at a memorial for protesters murdered while resisting the military coup in Myanmar took up Marx’s incitement: “Workers of the world unite, you have nothing to lose but your chains”. </p><p><u>While the <mark>Russia</mark>n Revolution is cynically held up by capitalist ideologists</u> as the ultimate argument against international revolution, <u>it actually <strong><mark>proves</mark> the opposite</strong>. It shows that the goal is not only <strong>necessary</strong>, but also that <mark>it’s <strong>possible</strong></mark>. The <mark>news of <strong>workers seizing power</strong></mark> in Russia</u>, overthrowing their capitalist government <u>and declaring</u> their <u>withdrawal from WWI, <mark>created shock waves across the planet</mark>. Workers in <strong>Germany</strong> rose in revolt a year later</u>, ending the war for good and building soviets, a form of radical working-class democracy inspired by the Russian example. <u>This was followed by <strong>uprisings</strong> in <strong>France</strong>, <strong>Italy</strong> and <strong>Hungary</u></strong>. </p><p><u>The <strong>revolutionary wave</strong> spread further.</u> A <u>classified British government report</u> from 1919 <u>noted a “very <strong>widespread feeling</strong> among workers that thrones have become anachronisms, and that the Soviet may be the <strong>best form</strong> of Government for a democracy”.</u> </p><p>The rising tide of radicalism had an impact in Australia too. Meatworkers in the Queensland city of Townsville donned red jumpers, stormed the local police station to free jailed unionists, and placed the city under workers’ control. The editor of the conservative Townsville Daily Bulletin lamented: “Townsville for the last year or so has been developing Bolshevism ... the mob management of affairs in this city, differs very little, from the Petrograd and Moscow brand”. </p><p><u>The Russian <mark>Bolsheviks</u></mark>, the revolutionary working-class party that led the revolution to victory in 1917, <u>didn’t just passively wait for revolutions elsewhere. They <strong>actively <mark>organised</mark> <mark>to</mark> <mark>spread</mark> the revolt</u></strong>. In 1919, <u>they <mark>established the <strong>Communist International</strong></mark>, an organisation for <strong>debate</strong>, <strong>discussion</strong> and <strong>coordination</strong> between different revolutionary workers’ parties.</u> Revolutionaries in Russia, Italy, France, Germany, the US, Australia and elsewhere attempted <u><mark>to</mark> <mark>clarify</mark> and develop a <mark>strategy for <strong>overthrowing capitalism</u></strong></mark> everywhere. In none of these countries was there a party like the Bolsheviks, steeled in years of organising working-class struggle to overthrow the state, and capable of leading a revolution. But <u>for a number of years, <strong><mark>workers came close</strong></mark> to overthrowing capitalism</u> in several countries. </p><p><u>In periods of stability, when social conservatism dominates, international revolution can <strong>seem like a pipe dream</strong>. Defenders of the status quo <strong>actively work</strong> to <strong>reinforce this illusion</strong>. But <strong><mark>history</strong> proves</mark> that the <strong><mark>crises</strong></mark> that <mark>the <strong>system generates</strong> are <strong>international</strong>, and</mark> that they <mark>will</mark> inevitably <strong><mark>provoke</mark> international <mark>resistance</u></strong></mark>. </p><p><u>Capitalism is a <strong>global system</strong>. It requires a <strong>global movement</strong> to tear it up</u>, root and branch. <u>But it also makes global revolution more <strong>possible</strong>, and more <strong>likely</strong>. <mark>The most important thing</u></mark> that socialists can do, whether you live in Hong Kong or France, Myanmar or Australia, <u><mark>is</mark> to get stuck into <strong><mark>organising for it</strong> today</u></mark>.</p>

1nc

off

1nc---k

./documents/hspolicy21/CrossingsChristian/BaYa/Crossings%20Christian-Baumert-Yarborough-Neg-westminster-Quarters.docx

N

westminster

Quarters

mba by

panel

1ac - mexico 1nc - t its consult cp desal cp cap k epa da case turn 2nc - t its epa da desal cp 1nr - case 2nr - desal cp and case

hspolicy21/CrossingsChristian/BaYa/Crossings%20Christian-Baumert-Yarborough-Neg-westminster-Quarters.docx

BaYa

Crossings Christian BaYa

Ga.....

Ba.....

Bl.....

Ya.....

CrossingsChristian

Crossings Christian

OK

hspolicy21

HS Policy 2021-22

cx

hs

Healthcare is a bubble that will pop, leading to immediate recession---the plan solves.

Chiu 22

Chiu 22 [Ethan is an author at INKSpire, 1/18/22, Healthcare – An American Comedy, INKSpire, https://inkspire.org/post/healthcare-an-american-comedy/] Justin

MFA would boost economic prosperity while allowing all Americans to gain access to healthcare, a universal human right. MFA would save $2 trillion over a decade MFA would allow 25% more workers to start their own businesses and boost innovation as Americans are tied to their employers’ insurance plans 22 studies cite MFA would facilitate $600 billion in administrative savings and $300 billion in drug savings, freeing money to be redirected toward economically stimulating consumer spending. price limits would prevent companies from charging excessively the fed already funds one-third of research and majority of private research goes to perpetuating patent monopolies prevent an impending financial crisis caused by healthcare bubble crash healthcare spending is rising at unprecedented rate faster than the growth of the economy, leading insurance premiums to rise 90% over the next few years by allowing healthcare costs to skyrocket, the healthcare stock bubble will pop since citizens will push back on excessive costs healthcare insurance companies will accumulate debt to make up for decrease in revenue and investors will rapidly sell stocks. The resulting impacts leading to a devastating recession Through lower prices and equal access Americans will no longer be pushed into poverty

MFA save $2 trillion allow 25% more workers to start businesses and boost innovation MFA would facilitate savings freeing money to economically stimulating consumer spending healthcare spending is rising insurance premiums rise 90% over next few years bubble will pop citizens will push back healthcare companies will accumulate debt investors will rapidly sell leading to a devastating recession

MFA would boost economic prosperity while allowing all Americans to gain access to healthcare, a universal human right. Since healthcare is considered a commodity in America, the United States has worse outcomes and spends over twice as much on healthcare as other OECD nations. In fact, USA Today corroborates that “Private insurance companies… spend about 12% to 18% of their revenue on overhead; Medicare spends less than 2%.” Even worse, as healthcare prices rise, insurance companies reduce benefit packages and increase out-of-pocket costs. Notably, contrary to McConnell’s claims, the conservative Mercatus Center finds that MFA would save $2 trillion over a decade, which could act as a safety net for future recessions. Furthermore, MFA would allow 15-25% more workers to start their own businesses and boost innovation as many Americans are tied to their employers’ insurance plans. In fact, 22 studies cite that MFA would facilitate around $600 billion in administrative savings and $300 billion in prescription drug savings, freeing that money to be redirected toward economically stimulating consumer spending. Guaranteed healthcare would eliminate the struggle many Americans face from choosing between life or crippling debt.s A study by UC Berkeley found that accessibility and choice of prescription medicine will increase under MFA since out-of-pocket payments and out-of-network healthcare professionals will no longer exist. Furthermore, doctors would spend more time with patients instead of using 50% of their workdays navigating the myriad of Byzantine private Electronic Health Record systems. Thus, with an MFA system incorporating a unified Electronic Health Record system to centrally manage patient records across clinics nationwide, not only will patients be able to engage with a much more extensive network of medical professionals and doctors be able to spend more time caring for patients, but administrative delays would also be a thing of the past. Additionally, single-payer negotiated price limits would also prevent pharmaceutical companies from charging excessively predatory prices for medication. In fact, some companies have marked up drugs like insulin more than 5,000%, leading many diabetic patients to their deaths. As such, the federal government must step in to promote the general welfare of most Americans. Corroborating how MFA would benefit medical research, the federal government already funds one-third of medical research through the NIH, and the majority of private research funding goes to perpetuating patent monopolies by making “me-too” drugs that are similar to those that already exist. Overall, considering that the Federal Reserve found that tens of millions of Americans struggle with medical debts and avoid needed care and medications for fear of the cost, it is apparent that many are being pushed into poverty. Specifically, the American Journal of Public Health quantifies that “9.28 million Americans whose incomes before their medical outlays were above poverty were pushed into near poverty,” which is terrible for economic productivity. Even worse, a study from The Lancet found that at least 68,000 Americans die every year as a direct result of not having any health insurance coverage. By implementing MFA, these tragically high poverty and death rates caused by lack of healthcare access will be a calamity of the past. MFA would notably prevent future pandemics. According to a social studies teacher at an American High School, “if wasteful spending can be eliminated, it would certainly bode well for people employed by hospitals and clinics. If we continue to treat healthcare as a privilege, instead of a human right, then we are accepting the reality that over 30 million people’s lives are treated as expendable in this nation. The current COVID-19 pandemic has exposed health care inequities for all to see, and will hopefully lead to a renewed push to make serious institutional changes, such as ‘Medicare for All.’” The New England Journal of Medicine found that “The United States has 4% of the world’s population but… approximately 26% of its Covid-19 cases and 24% of its Covid-19 deaths.” Through a single centralized system, however, Public Citizen reports that single-payer healthcare systems can roll out testing and contact tracers more effectively. Countries like Taiwan and South Korea could react quickly to the pandemic and rapidly begin widespread testing since they did not have to coordinate thousands of private corporations, leading to minimal economic shock and lives lost. Since the Center for Global Development finds that “there is a 22-28% chance that another outbreak on the magnitude of COVID-19 will occur within the next ten years, and a 47-57% chance that it will occur within the next 25 years,” it is in America’s best interest to adopt an MFA system to better control and mitigate future disease spread. MFA would prevent an impending financial crisis caused by the healthcare bubble crash. Presently, healthcare spending is rising at an unprecedented rate faster than the growth of the U.S. economy, leading insurance premiums to rise over 90% over the next few years, according to the University of Pennsylvania. Thus, families will have to pay double the amount for healthcare as they do now due to excessively high private insurance administrative costs. Becker’s Hospital Review warns that by allowing healthcare costs to skyrocket, the healthcare stock bubble will pop since employers and citizens will push back on excessive healthcare costs. As a result, healthcare insurance companies will accumulate massive debt to make up for the decrease in revenue from consumers, and investors will rapidly sell healthcare stocks. The resulting impacts of the healthcare stock bubble pop could mirror that of the 2008 recession caused by the housing bubble pop, leading to a devastating recession that may put up to 900 million people in poverty. The popping of the private healthcare stock bubble and subsequent recession could put many Americans out of work, causing massive economic harm to the American nation. Clearly, the universal coverage and economic benefits that MFA would provide are critical for the health of American citizens and the economy. Through lower drug prices and equal access, hundreds of Americans will no longer be pushed into poverty, avoid medical care for fear of high costs, or lose family and friends in a probable future pandemic. Ultimately, to end the dark comedy of America’s healthcare system, America must adopt an MFA system.

<h4>Healthcare is a <u>bubble</u> that <u>will</u> pop, leading to <u>immediate recession</u>---the plan <u>solves</u>.</h4><p><strong>Chiu 22</strong> [Ethan is an author at INKSpire, 1/18/22, Healthcare – An American Comedy, INKSpire, https://inkspire.org/post/healthcare-an-american-comedy/] Justin</p><p><u><strong>MFA would boost economic prosperity while allowing all Americans to gain access to healthcare, a universal human right.</p><p></u></strong>Since healthcare is considered a commodity in America, the United States has worse outcomes and spends over twice as much on healthcare as other OECD nations. In fact, USA Today corroborates that “Private insurance companies… spend about 12% to 18% of their revenue on overhead; Medicare spends less than 2%.” Even worse, as healthcare prices rise, insurance companies reduce benefit packages and increase out-of-pocket costs. Notably, contrary to McConnell’s claims, the conservative Mercatus Center finds that <u><mark>MFA</mark> would <mark>save <strong>$2</strong> trillion</mark> over a decade</u>, which could act as a safety net for future recessions. Furthermore, <u>MFA would <mark>allow</u></mark> 15-<u><strong><mark>25% </strong>more workers to start</mark> their own <mark>businesses and boost <strong>innovation</strong></mark> as</u> many <u>Americans are tied to their employers’ insurance plans</u>. In fact, <u>22 studies cite</u> that <u><mark>MFA would <strong>facilitate</u></strong></mark> around <u><strong>$600 billion</strong> in administrative <mark>savings</mark> and <strong>$300 billion</strong> in</u> prescription <u>drug savings, <mark>freeing</u></mark> that <u><mark>money to</mark> be <strong>redirected</strong> toward <strong><mark>economically stimulating consumer spending</mark>.</p><p></u></strong>Guaranteed healthcare would eliminate the struggle many Americans face from choosing between life or crippling debt.s</p><p>A study by UC Berkeley found that accessibility and choice of prescription medicine will increase under MFA since out-of-pocket payments and out-of-network healthcare professionals will no longer exist. Furthermore, doctors would spend more time with patients instead of using 50% of their workdays navigating the myriad of Byzantine private Electronic Health Record systems. Thus, with an MFA system incorporating a unified Electronic Health Record system to centrally manage patient records across clinics nationwide, not only will patients be able to engage with a much more extensive network of medical professionals and doctors be able to spend more time caring for patients, but administrative delays would also be a thing of the past. Additionally, single-payer negotiated <u>price limits would</u> also <u><strong>prevent</u></strong> pharmaceutical <u>companies from <strong>charging excessively</u></strong> predatory prices for medication. In fact, some companies have marked up drugs like insulin more than 5,000%, leading many diabetic patients to their deaths. As such, the federal government must step in to promote the general welfare of most Americans. Corroborating how MFA would benefit medical research, <u>the fed</u>eral government <u>already funds <strong>one-third</strong> of</u> medical <u>research</u> through the NIH, <u>and</u> the <u>majority of private research</u> funding <u>goes to perpetuating <strong>patent monopolies</u></strong> by making “me-too” drugs that are similar to those that already exist. Overall, considering that the Federal Reserve found that tens of millions of Americans struggle with medical debts and avoid needed care and medications for fear of the cost, it is apparent that many are being pushed into poverty. Specifically, the American Journal of Public Health quantifies that “9.28 million Americans whose incomes before their medical outlays were above poverty were pushed into near poverty,” which is terrible for economic productivity. Even worse, a study from The Lancet found that at least 68,000 Americans die every year as a direct result of not having any health insurance coverage. By implementing MFA, these tragically high poverty and death rates caused by lack of healthcare access will be a calamity of the past.</p><p>MFA would notably prevent future pandemics.</p><p>According to a social studies teacher at an American High School, “if wasteful spending can be eliminated, it would certainly bode well for people employed by hospitals and clinics. If we continue to treat healthcare as a privilege, instead of a human right, then we are accepting the reality that over 30 million people’s lives are treated as expendable in this nation. The current COVID-19 pandemic has exposed health care inequities for all to see, and will hopefully lead to a renewed push to make serious institutional changes, such as ‘Medicare for All.’” The New England Journal of Medicine found that “The United States has 4% of the world’s population but… approximately 26% of its Covid-19 cases and 24% of its Covid-19 deaths.” Through a single centralized system, however, Public Citizen reports that single-payer healthcare systems can roll out testing and contact tracers more effectively. Countries like Taiwan and South Korea could react quickly to the pandemic and rapidly begin widespread testing since they did not have to coordinate thousands of private corporations, leading to minimal economic shock and lives lost. Since the Center for Global Development finds that “there is a 22-28% chance that another outbreak on the magnitude of COVID-19 will occur within the next ten years, and a 47-57% chance that it will occur within the next 25 years,” it is in America’s best interest to adopt an MFA system to better control and mitigate future disease spread.</p><p>MFA would <u>prevent an impending<strong> financial crisis</strong> caused by</u> the <u>healthcare bubble<strong> crash</u></strong>.</p><p>Presently, <u><mark>healthcare spending is <strong>rising</strong></mark> at</u> an <u>unprecedented rate <strong>faster</strong> than the growth of the</u> U.S. <u>economy, leading <mark>insurance premiums</mark> to <mark>rise</u></mark> over <u><strong><mark>90%</strong> over</mark> the <mark>next few years</u></mark>, according to the University of Pennsylvania. Thus, families will have to pay double the amount for healthcare as they do now due to excessively high private insurance administrative costs. Becker’s Hospital Review warns that <u>by allowing healthcare costs to <strong>skyrocket</strong>, the healthcare stock <mark>bubble will <strong>pop</strong></mark> since</u> employers and <u><mark>citizens will push <strong>back</strong></mark> on excessive</u> healthcare <u>costs</u>. As a result, <u><mark>healthcare</mark> insurance <mark>companies will <strong>accumulate</u></strong></mark> massive <u><strong><mark>debt</strong></mark> to make up for</u> the <u>decrease in revenue</u> from consumers, <u>and <mark>investors will <strong>rapidly sell</u></strong></mark> healthcare <u>stocks. The resulting impacts</u> of the healthcare stock bubble pop could mirror that of the 2008 recession caused by the housing bubble pop, <u><mark>leading to a <strong>devastating recession</u></strong></mark> that may put up to 900 million people in poverty. The popping of the private healthcare stock bubble and subsequent recession could put many Americans out of work, causing massive economic harm to the American nation.</p><p>Clearly, the universal coverage and economic benefits that MFA would provide are critical for the health of American citizens and the economy. <u>Through <strong>lower</u></strong> drug <u><strong>prices</strong> and equal access</u>, hundreds of <u>Americans will no longer be <strong>pushed into poverty</u></strong>, avoid medical care for fear of high costs, or lose family and friends in a probable future pandemic. Ultimately, to end the dark comedy of America’s healthcare system, America must adopt an MFA system.</p>

1AC---Economy

./documents/hsld22/StrakeJesuitCollegePreparatory/RuCh/StrakeJesuitCollegePreparatory-RuCh-Aff-Grapevine-Classic-Round-1.docx

A

Grapevine Classic

1

Newman Smith SJ

Ciocca

1AC - Stock 1NC - Queerpess - Aff 1AR - Util - Econ - Queerpess 2NR - Queerpess - Util 2AR - Util - Queerpess

hsld22/StrakeJesuitCollegePreparatory/RuCh/StrakeJesuitCollegePreparatory-RuCh-Aff-Grapevine-Classic-Round-1.docx

2022-09-10 14:22:11

RuCh

Strake Jesuit College Preparatory RuCh

Ru.....

Ch.....

StrakeJesuitCollegePreparatory

Strake Jesuit College Preparatory

TX

hsld22

HS LD 2022-23

ld

hs

NATO cohesion checks numerous existential crises.

Gallagher ’19

Gallagher ’19 [Mike and Colin Dueck; January 2019; Representative for Wisconsin’s Eighth District in the U.S. House of Representatives; Professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University; National Review, “The Conservative Case for NATO,” https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/01/nato-western-military-alliance-bolsters-american-interests/]

In an age of great-power competition America’s Western alliance provides the U.S. with some dramatic comparative advantages. The U S Canada, and Europe have common interests with terrorism, cyberattacks, migration, nuclear weapons, and military readiness. NATO is the one formal alliance that allows for cooperation on these matters NATO keeps America’s strategic competitors pushing back on Russian and Chinese influence Europe is like oxygen. You take it for granted you’ll miss it when it’s gone

In great-power competition alliance provides the U.S. with advantages. The U S and Europe have interests with terror migration, nuc s, and readiness. NATO allows coop NATO keeps competitors pushing back on influence

The conservative case for NATO is not that it strengthens liberal world order. Rather, the conservative case for NATO is that it bolsters American national interests. In an age of great-power competition, as identified by the Trump administration, America’s Western alliance provides the U.S. with some dramatic comparative advantages. The United States, Canada, and their European allies have a number of common interests and common challenges with regard to Beijing, Moscow, terrorism, cyberattacks, migration, nuclear weapons, and military readiness. NATO is the one formal alliance that allows for cooperation on these matters. It is also the only alliance that embodies America’s civilizational ties with Europe — a point forcefully made by President Trump when he visited Poland in 2017. Properly understood, NATO helps keeps America’s strategic competitors at bay, pushing back on Russian and Chinese influence. In all of these ways, the U.S. alliance system in Europe is a bit like oxygen. You may take it for granted, but you’ll miss it when it’s gone.

<h4>NATO cohesion checks <u>numerous existential crises</u>. </h4><p><strong>Gallagher ’19 </strong>[Mike and Colin Dueck; January 2019; Representative for Wisconsin’s Eighth District in the U.S. House of Representatives; Professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University; National Review, “The Conservative Case for NATO,” https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/01/nato-western-military-alliance-bolsters-american-interests/]</p><p>The conservative case for NATO is not that it strengthens liberal world order. Rather, the conservative case for NATO is that it bolsters American national interests. <u><mark>In</mark> an age of <strong><mark>great-power competition</u></strong></mark>, as identified by the Trump administration, <u>America’s <strong>Western <mark>alliance</strong> provides the U.S. with</mark> <strong>some dramatic comparative <mark>advantages</strong>. The U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates, <u>Canada, <mark>and</u></mark> their <u><mark>Europe</u></mark>an allies <u><mark>have</u></mark> a number of <u><strong>common <mark>interests</u></strong></mark> and common challenges <u><mark>with</u></mark> regard to Beijing, Moscow, <u><strong><mark>terror</mark>ism</strong>, <strong>cyberattacks</strong>, <strong><mark>migration</strong>, <strong>nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s</strong>, and</mark> <strong>military <mark>readiness</strong>. NATO </mark>is <strong>the one formal alliance</strong> that <mark>allows</mark> for <strong><mark>coop</mark>eration</strong> on these matters</u>. It is also the only alliance that embodies America’s civilizational ties with Europe — a point forcefully made by President Trump when he visited Poland in 2017. Properly understood, <u><mark>NATO</u></mark> helps <u><mark>keeps</mark> <strong>America’s strategic <mark>competitors</u></strong></mark> at bay, <u><mark>pushing back on</mark> <strong>Russian and Chinese <mark>influence</u></strong></mark>. In all of these ways, the U.S. alliance system in <u>Europe is</u> a bit <u>like <strong>oxygen</strong>. You</u> may <u><strong>take it for granted</u></strong>, but <u>you’ll <strong>miss it</strong> when it’s gone</u>.</p>

1AC

Cyber Clarity Adv---1AC

./documents/hspolicy22/TaipeiAmerican/WaCh/TaipeiAmerican-WaCh-Aff-Taiwan-Round-1.docx

A

Taiwan

1

KCI CL

Jennifer Chiang

1AC OCOs | 2NR Turkey PIC

hspolicy22/TaipeiAmerican/WaCh/TaipeiAmerican-WaCh-Aff-Taiwan-Round-1.docx

2022-10-09 01:59:01

WaCh

Taipei American WaCh

Janise Chiang — She/Her Micah Wang — They/Them — [email protected], [email protected] — Please don't highlight in yellow :(

Mi.....

Wa.....

Ja.....

Ch.....

TaipeiAmerican

Taipei American

TW

hspolicy22

HS Policy 2022-23

cx

hs

Food insecurity in Africa guarantees pandemics

WHO 22 {World Health Organization} - ("Drought and food insecurity in the greater Horn of Africa," published 11-21-2022, accessed 12-14-2022, https://www.who.int/emergencies/situations/drought-food-insecurity-greater-horn-of-africa)//marlborough-wr/

WHO 22 {World Health Organization} - ("Drought and food insecurity in the greater Horn of Africa," published 11-21-2022, accessed 12-14-2022, https://www.who.int/emergencies/situations/drought-food-insecurity-greater-horn-of-africa)//marlborough-wr/ As families face severe food insecurity, many have left their homes in search of food and water, and pasture for animals. Large-scale displacement is often accompanied by a deterioration in hygiene and sanitation. Outbreaks of infectious diseases are a major concern, especially when combined with low existing vaccination coverage and health service availability.

As people become increasingly food insecure, they also must make the impossible choice between food and healthcare, even as nutritional deficiencies make them increasingly vulnerable to disease.

people make the impossible choice between food and healthcare nutritional deficiencies make them vulnerable

As people become increasingly food insecure, they also must make the impossible choice between food and healthcare, even as nutritional deficiencies make them increasingly vulnerable to disease. This is particularly true for children, for whom the combination of malnutrition and disease can prove fatal.

<h4>Food insecurity in Africa guarantees <u>pandemics</h4><p></u><strong>WHO 22<u> {World Health Organization} - ("Drought and food insecurity in the greater Horn of Africa," published 11-21-2022, accessed 12-14-2022, https://www.who.int/emergencies/situations/drought-food-insecurity-greater-horn-of-africa)//marlborough-wr/</p><p></strong><mark>As</mark> <mark>families</mark> <mark>face</mark> severe <mark>food</mark> <mark>insecurity</mark>, <mark>many</mark> have <mark>left</mark> their <mark>homes</mark> in search of food and water, and pasture for animals. Large-scale displacement is often <mark>accompanied</mark> <mark>by</mark> <mark>a</mark> <strong><mark>deterioration in hygiene</mark> and sanitation</strong>. Outbreaks of <strong>infectious <mark>diseases</strong></mark> <mark>are</mark> <mark>a major concern, especially</mark> when combined <mark>with</mark> <strong><mark>low</mark> existing <mark>vaccination</mark> coverage</strong> <mark>and</mark> <strong><mark>health</mark> <mark>service availability.</mark> </p><p></strong>As <mark>people</mark> become increasingly food insecure, they also must <mark>make</mark> <mark>the impossible choice</mark> <mark>between</mark> <mark>food and healthcare</mark>, even as <strong><mark>nutritional</mark> <mark>deficiencies</strong></mark> <mark>make</mark> <mark>them</mark> increasingly <mark>vulnerable</mark> to disease.</u> This is particularly true for children, for whom the combination of malnutrition and disease can prove fatal.  </p>

AC Shell

Econ

./documents/hsld22/Marlborough/ElDe1/Marlborough-ElDe1-Aff-Golden-Desert-UNLV-Round-3.docx

A

Golden Desert UNLV

3

Dougherty Valley KZ

Samuel Xiong

AC - Africa NC - disclosure, terror, war, cap k, trade cp 1AR - case, off NR - disclosure 2AR - disclosure

hsld22/Marlborough/ElDe1/Marlborough-ElDe1-Aff-Golden-Desert-UNLV-Round-3.docx

2023-02-04 23:05:10

ElDe1

Marlborough ElDe1

El.....

De.....

Marlborough

Marlborough

CA

hsld22

HS LD 2022-23

ld

hs

Restriction means a prohibition – not permitted under any circumstances

Northglenn 11

Northglenn 11 (City of Northglenn Zoning Ordinance, “Rules of Construction – Definitions”, http://www.northglenn.org/municode/ch11/content_11-5.html)

the term "restriction" shall mean a prohibitive regulation. Any use, activity which is the subject of a restriction is prohibited, and no activity shall be authorized by any permit or license

the term "restriction" shall mean a prohibitive regulation. Any , activity which is the subject of a restriction is prohibited and no activity shall be authorized by any permit or license

Section 11-5-3. Restrictions. As used in this Chapter 11 of the Municipal Code, the term "restriction" shall mean a prohibitive regulation. Any use, activity, operation, building, structure or thing which is the subject of a restriction is prohibited, and no such use, activity, operation, building, structure or thing shall be authorized by any permit or license.

<h4><u>Restriction</u> means a prohibition – not permitted under any circumstances</h4><p><strong>Northglenn 11</strong> (City of Northglenn Zoning Ordinance, “Rules of Construction – Definitions”, http://www.northglenn.org/municode/ch11/content_11-5.html)</p><p>Section 11-5-3. Restrictions. As used in this Chapter 11 of the Municipal Code, <u><strong><mark>the term "restriction" shall mean a prohibitive regulation. Any</mark> use<mark>, activity</u></strong></mark>, operation, building, structure or thing <u><strong><mark>which is the subject of a restriction is prohibited</mark>, <mark>and no</u></strong></mark> such use, <u><strong><mark>activity</u></strong></mark>, operation, building, structure or thing <u><strong><mark>shall be authorized by any permit or license</u></strong></mark>.</p>

1NC

Offcase

1NC T

./documents/ndtceda16/Trinity/KhDi/Trinity-Khullar-Dill-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx

N

Kentucky

5

Emory LM

Kennedy

1ac - carbon tax 1nc - da tpp da elections t restrict ct spec cp states cp nuisance da budget 2nr - elections

ndtceda16/Trinity/KhDi/Trinity-Khullar-Dill-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx

KhDi

Trinity KhDi

An.....

Kh.....

Ia.....

Di.....

Trinity

Trinity

ndtceda16

NDT/CEDA 2016-17

cx

college

Counter Interpretation – engagement must be unconditional—it’s distinct from conditional policies.

Smith 5

Smith 5 — Karen E. Smith, Professor of International Relations and Director of the European Foreign Policy Unit at the London School of Economics, 2005 (“Engagement and conditionality: incompatible or mutually reinforcing?,” Global Europe: New Terms of Engagement, May, Available Online at http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/24863/ichaptersection_singledocument/273de787-0ede-4c7e-a001-94d09f793f1b/en/03_Conditionality.pdf, Accessed 07-25-2013, p. 23)

‘Engagement’ is a foreign policy strategy of building close ties with the government and/or civil society and/or business community of another state Most cases of engagement entail primarily building economic links, and encouraging trade and investment in particular ‘Conditionality’, in contrast, is the linking of perceived benefits to another state to the fulfilment of economic and/or political conditions. ‘Positive conditionality’ entails promising benefits to a state if it fulfils the conditions; ‘negative conditionality’ involves reducing, suspending, or terminating those benefits if the state violates the conditions To put it simply, engagement implies ties, but with no strings attached; conditionality attaches the strings engagement is more of a bottom-up strategy to induce change in another country, conditionality more of a top-down strategy

Engagement’ is a foreign policy strategy of building close ties with the government of another state Most cases of engagement entail primarily building economic links Conditionality’, in contrast, is the linking of perceived benefits to another state to the fulfilment of political conditions To put it simply, engagement implies ties, but with no strings attached; conditionality attaches the strings engagement is more of a bottom-up strategy to induce change in another country, conditionality more of a top-down strategy.

First, a few definitions. ‘Engagement’ is a foreign policy strategy of building close ties with the government and/or civil society and/or business community of another state. The intention of this strategy is to undermine illiberal political and economic practices, and socialise government and other domestic actors into more liberal ways. Most cases of engagement entail primarily building economic links, and encouraging trade and investment in particular. Some observers have variously labelled this strategy one of interdependence, or of ‘oxygen’: economic activity leads to positive political consequences.19 ‘Conditionality’, in contrast, is the linking, by a state or international organisation, of perceived benefits to another state (such as aid or trade concessions) to the fulfilment of economic and/or political conditions. ‘Positive conditionality’ entails promising benefits to a state if it fulfils the conditions; ‘negative conditionality’ involves reducing, suspending, or terminating those benefits if the state violates the conditions (in other words, applying sanctions, or a strategy of ‘asphyxiation’).20 To put it simply, engagement implies ties, but with no strings attached; conditionality attaches the strings. In another way of looking at it, engagement is more of a bottom-up strategy to induce change in another country, conditionality more of a top-down strategy.

<h4>Counter Interpretation – engagement must be <u>unconditional</u>—it’s <u>distinct</u> from conditional policies. </h4><p><strong>Smith 5</strong> — Karen E. Smith, Professor of International Relations and Director of the European Foreign Policy Unit at the London School of Economics, 2005 (“Engagement and conditionality: incompatible or mutually reinforcing?,” Global Europe: New Terms of Engagement, May, Available Online at http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/24863/ichaptersection_singledocument/273de787-0ede-4c7e-a001-94d09f793f1b/en/03_Conditionality.pdf, Accessed 07-25-2013, p. 23)</p><p>First, a few definitions. <u>‘<mark>Engagement’ is a foreign policy strategy of building close ties with the government</mark> and/or civil society and/or business community <mark>of another state</u></mark>. The intention of this strategy is to undermine illiberal political and economic practices, and socialise government and other domestic actors into more liberal ways. <u><mark>Most cases of engagement entail primarily <strong>building economic links</strong></mark>, and encouraging trade and investment in particular</u>. Some observers have variously labelled this strategy one of interdependence, or of ‘oxygen’: economic activity leads to positive political consequences.19 <u>‘<mark>Conditionality’, <strong>in contrast</strong>, is the linking</u></mark>, by a state or international organisation, <u><mark>of perceived benefits to another state</u></mark> (such as aid or trade concessions) <u><mark>to the fulfilment of</mark> <strong>economic and/or <mark>political conditions</strong></mark>. ‘Positive conditionality’ entails promising benefits to a state if it fulfils the conditions; ‘negative conditionality’ involves reducing, suspending, or terminating those benefits if the state violates the conditions</u> (in other words, applying sanctions, or a strategy of ‘asphyxiation’).20 <u><mark>To put it simply, <strong>engagement implies ties, but with no strings attached</strong>; <strong>conditionality attaches the strings</u></strong></mark>. In another way of looking at it, <u><mark>engagement is <strong>more of a bottom-up strategy</strong> to induce change in another country, conditionality <strong>more of a top-down strategy</u></strong>.</p></mark>

2AC

2AC – T - QPQ

./documents/hspolicy16/NilesNorth/FeLo/Niles%20North-Feroz-Lorenz-Aff-St%20Marks-Round4.docx

A

St Marks

4

Greenhill WK

Aayush Mehta

1AC - SSA 1NC - T QPQ Bonds CP Xi Good Elections 2NR - Xi

hspolicy16/NilesNorth/FeLo/Niles%20North-Feroz-Lorenz-Aff-St%20Marks-Round4.docx

FeLo

Niles North FeLo

Ab.....

Fe.....

Li.....

Lo.....

NilesNorth

Niles North

hspolicy16

HS Policy 2016-17

cx

hs

First, preemptive counterforce strike – India would do it despite NFU but Pakistan considers it too

Krzyzaniak 19

Krzyzaniak 19 [John Krzyzaniak is an associate editor at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. He was an associate editor at the journal Ethics & International Affairs. Main areas of interest are arms control, non-prolif, and politics and culture in the Persian-speaking world. MA in international affairs from Georgia Tech.] “Is India ‘creatively reinterpreting’ its no-first-use policy?” Bulletin. August 30, 2019. https://thebulletin.org/2019/08/is-india-creatively-reinterpreting-its-no-first-use-policy/ TG

the Indian defense minister Rajnath Singh took to Twitter during a visit to Pokhran, the site of India’s 1998 nuclear tests wrote up until now, India has strictly adhered to the doctrine of no nuclear first use, but stipulated that “what happens in the future depends on the circumstances Singh’s statement caused a stir among South Asia pundits and arms control experts, but to the uninitiated, it might have been difficult to understand what all the hoopla was about. After all, what’s a one-off statement by a defense minister? Isn’t India’s official doctrine still unchanged? And shouldn’t we really concern ourselves with deeds, not just words? A research paper by Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, published earlier this year in the top-ranked academic journal International Security, explains why the Indian defense minister’s recent statement matters so much. India has produced only one official nuclear doctrine, which it summarized publicly in 2003. A key pillar of that doctrine is an unequivocal no-first-use policy, meaning that India would only use nuclear weapons in retaliation a retaliatory strike would be “massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage,” implying that it would likely be aimed at an adversary’s civilian population centers. Second, the massive retaliation policy has been unhelpful in deterring Pakistan from sponsoring terrorist attacks on Indian soil, such as the 2008 Mumbai attack. India’s default option for responding to such attacks and punishing Pakistan would be a limited conventional strike. However, Pakistan has no reservations about nuclear first use and has indicated that it would use tactical or “battlefield” nuclear weapons on Indian ground forces in certain situations. So India has no way to respond to terrorist attacks without running the risk of escalating to a nuclear exchange. Clary and Narang call this “strategic paralysis.” India’s solution has been to develop a “counterforce” capability that would give India the option to target Pakistan’s nuclear forces rather than its population centers India has been building more precise, more accurate missile systems in larger numbers. It has also been improving its ability to monitor Pakistan’s nuclear forces. few if any of these capabilities would be needed for an ordinary massive retaliation strategy. These new capabilities have given way to new temptations. If we could destroy Pakistan’s entire nuclear arsenal in one fell swoop, Indian officials might reason, then why should we sit with our hands tied waiting for Pakistan to strike us with nuclear weapons before we do so? Why rule out a pre-emptive strike? serving and retired Indian officials have begun arguing for greater flexibility in India’s existing nuclear doctrine—or asserting that its existing doctrine is already more flexible than commonly assumed in a crisis, both India and Pakistan would have more incentives to “go first and go massively, Pakistan would prefer to use its nuclear weapons rather than lose them, and India would want to try and disarm Pakistan before getting hit

Indian defense minister wrote India has adhered to n f u but the future depends on circumstances India’s counterforce” capability would give the option to target Pakistan’s nuclear forces India has been building accurate missile systems in larger numbers also improving its ability to monitor Pakistan’s nuclear forces new capabilities given way to temptations. If we could destroy Pakistan’s entire nuclear arsenal in one swoop Why rule out a pre-emptive strike Indian officials begun arguing for greater flex in nuclear doctrine both India and Pakistan have more incentives to “go first and go massive

Donald Trump isn’t the only one who can change long-standing policy by tweet. On August 16, the Indian defense minister Rajnath Singh took to Twitter during a visit to Pokhran, the site of India’s 1998 nuclear tests. He wrote that, up until now, India has strictly adhered to the doctrine of no nuclear first use, but stipulated that “what happens in the future depends on the circumstances.” (To be fair, Singh delivered his statement orally before tweeting it.) Singh’s statement caused a stir among South Asia pundits and arms control experts, but to the uninitiated, it might have been difficult to understand what all the hoopla was about. After all, what’s a one-off statement by a defense minister? Isn’t India’s official doctrine still unchanged? And shouldn’t we really concern ourselves with deeds, not just words? A research paper by Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, published earlier this year in the top-ranked academic journal International Security, explains why the Indian defense minister’s recent statement matters so much. As the authors explain, India has produced only one official nuclear doctrine, which it summarized publicly in 2003. A key pillar of that doctrine is an unequivocal no-first-use policy, meaning that India would only use nuclear weapons in retaliation. The summary also states that a retaliatory strike would be “massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage,” implying that it would likely be aimed at an adversary’s civilian population centers. There are just two problems for India. First, this so-called “massive retaliation” policy is not entirely credible. In a hypothetical scenario where an adversary targets, for example, an Indian military base with a single, relatively small nuclear weapon, it is hard to imagine India responding with an attack that annihilates millions of innocent people. Second, the massive retaliation policy has been unhelpful in deterring Pakistan from sponsoring terrorist attacks on Indian soil, such as the 2008 Mumbai attack. India’s default option for responding to such attacks and punishing Pakistan would be a limited conventional strike. However, Pakistan has no reservations about nuclear first use and has indicated that it would use tactical or “battlefield” nuclear weapons on Indian ground forces in certain situations. So India has no way to respond to terrorist attacks without running the risk of escalating to a nuclear exchange. Clary and Narang call this “strategic paralysis.” India’s solution, Clary and Narang argue, has been to develop a “counterforce” capability that would give India the option to target Pakistan’s nuclear forces rather than its population centers. Since 2003, India has been building more precise, more accurate missile systems in larger numbers. It has also been improving its ability to monitor Pakistan’s nuclear forces. As the authors write, few if any of these capabilities would be needed for an ordinary massive retaliation strategy. These new capabilities have given way to new temptations. If we could destroy Pakistan’s entire nuclear arsenal in one fell swoop, Indian officials might reason, then why should we sit with our hands tied waiting for Pakistan to strike us with nuclear weapons before we do so? Why rule out a pre-emptive strike? This is where India’s no-first-use policy and Defense Minister Singh’s remarks become important. Singh is the highest serving official to suggest changes to India’s no-first-use policy, but he is not the first. “In recent years, serving and retired Indian officials have begun arguing for greater flexibility in India’s existing nuclear doctrine—or asserting that its existing doctrine is already more flexible than commonly assumed,” Clary and Narang write. If Clary and Narang have reasoned correctly and we are witnessing a change in India’s nuclear strategy, what are the risks of that change? First, in a crisis, both India and Pakistan would have more incentives to “go first and go massively,” as the authors say. Pakistan would prefer to use its nuclear weapons rather than lose them, and India would want to try and disarm Pakistan before getting hit. Second, even in peacetime there would be dangerous costs. Pakistan will build more weapons, put them in more places, and take greater measures to hide and protect them; India will look for better ways to find and target those weapons.

<h4>First, <u>preemptive counterforce strike</u> – India would do it despite NFU but Pakistan considers it too</h4><p><u><strong>Krzyzaniak 19</u></strong> [John Krzyzaniak is an associate editor at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. He was an associate editor at the journal Ethics & International Affairs. Main areas of interest are arms control, non-prolif, and politics and culture in the Persian-speaking world. MA in international affairs from Georgia Tech.] “Is India ‘creatively reinterpreting’ its no-first-use policy?” Bulletin. August 30, 2019. https://thebulletin.org/2019/08/is-india-creatively-reinterpreting-its-no-first-use-policy/ TG</p><p>Donald Trump isn’t the only one who can change long-standing policy by tweet. On August 16, <u><strong>the <mark>Indian defense minister</mark> Rajnath Singh took to Twitter during a visit to Pokhran, the site of India’s 1998 nuclear tests</u></strong>. He <u><strong><mark>wrote</u></strong></mark> that, <u><strong>up until now, <mark>India has</mark> strictly <mark>adhered to</mark> the doctrine of no <mark>n</mark>uclear <mark>f</mark>irst <mark>u</mark>se, <mark>but</mark> stipulated that “what happens in <mark>the future depends on</mark> the <mark>circumstances</u></strong></mark>.” (To be fair, Singh delivered his statement orally before tweeting it.)</p><p><u><strong>Singh’s statement caused a stir among South Asia pundits and arms control experts, but to the uninitiated, it might have been difficult to understand what all the hoopla was about. After all, what’s a one-off statement by a defense minister? Isn’t India’s official doctrine still unchanged? And shouldn’t we really concern ourselves with deeds, not just words?</p><p>A research paper by Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, published earlier this year in the top-ranked academic journal International Security, explains why the Indian defense minister’s recent statement matters so much.</p><p></u></strong>As the authors explain, <u><strong>India has produced only one official nuclear doctrine, which it summarized publicly in 2003. A key pillar of that doctrine is an unequivocal no-first-use policy, meaning that India would only use nuclear weapons in retaliation</u></strong>. The summary also states that <u><strong>a retaliatory strike would be “massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage,” implying that it would likely be aimed at an adversary’s civilian population centers.</p><p></u></strong>There are just two problems for India. First, this so-called “massive retaliation” policy is not entirely credible. In a hypothetical scenario where an adversary targets, for example, an Indian military base with a single, relatively small nuclear weapon, it is hard to imagine India responding with an attack that annihilates millions of innocent people.</p><p><u><strong>Second, the massive retaliation policy has been unhelpful in deterring Pakistan from sponsoring terrorist attacks on Indian soil, such as the 2008 Mumbai attack. India’s default option for responding to such attacks and punishing Pakistan would be a limited conventional strike. However, Pakistan has no reservations about nuclear first use and has indicated that it would use tactical or “battlefield” nuclear weapons on Indian ground forces in certain situations. So India has no way to respond to terrorist attacks without running the risk of escalating to a nuclear exchange. Clary and Narang call this “strategic paralysis.”</p><p><mark>India’s</mark> solution</u></strong>, Clary and Narang argue, <u><strong>has been to develop a “<mark>counterforce” capability</mark> that <mark>would give</mark> India <mark>the option to target Pakistan’s nuclear forces</mark> rather than its population centers</u></strong>. Since 2003, <u><strong><mark>India has been building</mark> more precise, more <mark>accurate missile systems in larger numbers</mark>. It has <mark>also</mark> been <mark>improving its ability to monitor Pakistan’s nuclear forces</mark>.</u></strong> As the authors write, <u><strong>few if any of these capabilities would be needed for an ordinary massive retaliation strategy.</p><p>These <mark>new capabilities</mark> have <mark>given way to</mark> new <mark>temptations. If we could destroy Pakistan’s entire nuclear arsenal in one</mark> fell <mark>swoop</mark>, Indian officials might reason, then why should we sit with our hands tied waiting for Pakistan to strike us with nuclear weapons before we do so? <mark>Why rule out a pre-emptive strike</mark>?</p><p></u></strong>This is where India’s no-first-use policy and Defense Minister Singh’s remarks become important. Singh is the highest serving official to suggest changes to India’s no-first-use policy, but he is not the first. “In recent years, <u><strong>serving and retired <mark>Indian officials</mark> have <mark>begun arguing for greater flex</mark>ibility <mark>in</mark> India’s existing <mark>nuclear doctrine</mark>—or asserting that its existing doctrine is already more flexible than commonly assumed</u></strong>,” Clary and Narang write.</p><p>If Clary and Narang have reasoned correctly and we are witnessing a change in India’s nuclear strategy, what are the risks of that change? First, <u><strong>in a crisis, <mark>both India and Pakistan</mark> would <mark>have more incentives to “go first and go massive</mark>ly,</u></strong>” as the authors say. <u><strong>Pakistan would prefer to use its nuclear weapons rather than lose them, and India would want to try and disarm Pakistan before getting hit</u></strong>. Second, even in peacetime there would be dangerous costs. Pakistan will build more weapons, put them in more places, and take greater measures to hide and protect them; India will look for better ways to find and target those weapons.</p>

AC

Adv – IndoPak War – Long

./documents/hsld19/WilliamGEnloe/Ge/William%20G%20Enloe-Gedela-Aff-Harvard-Doubles.docx

A

Harvard

Doubles

Needham ZL

Jacob Nails, Stephen Scopa, Eric He

ac - indopak nc - cbw - china - nfu dealert cp - t nebel - case 1ar - nebel bad - t - case - cbw - china - cp 2nr - t on rvi - nebel bad - case - china 2ar - case - china

hsld19/WilliamGEnloe/Ge/William%20G%20Enloe-Gedela-Aff-Harvard-Doubles.docx

TeGe

William G Enloe TeGe

Te.....

Ge.....

WilliamGEnloe

William G Enloe

NC

hsld19

HS LD 2019-20

ld

hs

Only the aff signals US threat reduction and reverses perceptions of containment.

Gilley 10

Bruce Gilley 10, PhD from Princeton, "Not So Dire Straits," Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2010-01-01/not-so-dire-straits

SIDELINING UNCLE SAM U.S. policy toward Taiwan have to be adjusted Most important Washington have to scale back its arms sales . In 1982, the United States pledged to China that it would reduce its arms sales to Taiwan - a promise that it has conspicuously broken ever since. there is a golden opportunity to demilitarize the conflict In the past, sales were premised as much on the political message they sent to Beijing as on their tactical value Washington can reinforce détente by holding back sales of items such as Black Hawk helicopters, Patriot missiles, and additional fighter jets the shift not as simply a minor adjustment due to reduced cross-strait tensions but as a wholesale rejection of the vision of Taiwan as a militarized base within the U.S. strategic orbit By signaling that Washington is finally respecting China's territorial integrity, these reductions could lead to verifiable force reductions by China, as well as to an end to its Taiwan-focused military attack drills that Asian-only security organizations, such as asean would increasingly take the lead in defining Asia's future security architecture. a Finlandized Taiwan would play a much more transformative role in China itself, thus improving the chances of a peacefully rising China Taiwan could create a model for the peaceful resolution of China's many resource, boundary, and military conflicts throughout Asia the Taiwan-China détente is a test of liberal approaches to international relations - specifically, the notion that a broad integration of domestic interests will pacify relations between states far more than a militarized balance of power. Taiwan has always been a frontline state in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing It is now Washington's turn to confront and adapt to this historic shift.

Washington have to scale back its arms sales to demilitarize the conflict holding back sales as a rejection Taiwan as a militarized base By signaling that Washington is respecting China's territorial integrity reductions lead to force reductions by China, as well as to an end to Taiwan-focused drills a Finlandized Taiwan would improv the chances of a peacefully rising China Taiwan could create a model for the peaceful resolution of China's many conflicts throughout Asia

SIDELINING UNCLE SAM THE UNITED STATES has played a crucial role in maintaining cross-strait peace and encouraging democracy in Taiwan since 1949. Today, the U.S. role in this process is nearing its end. U.S. policy toward a Finlandized Taiwan will have to be adjusted both strategically and diplomatically. Expanded official contacts with Taiwan will require consultations with Beijing; the United States and its allies will have to refashion battle plans to exclude Taiwan; Washington will have to support the new approach to cross-strait peace through its public diplomacy; and U.S. intelligence agencies will have to be more careful about scrutinizing technology transfers to the island because the prc's intelligence gathering on Taiwan will inevitably expand. Most important, Washington will have to significantly scale back its arms sales to Taipei. In 1982, the United States pledged to China that it would reduce its arms sales to Taiwan - a promise that it has conspicuously broken ever since. Today, as then, there is a golden opportunity to demilitarize the conflict. The U.S. Congress is not particularly interested in pressing President Barack Obama on the issue, and Taiwan's economic decline has moderated Taipei's appetite for major arms purchases anyway. In the past, sales of fighter jets, destroyers, tanks, and missiles to Taiwan were premised as much on the political message they sent to Beijing as on their tactical value. In the new climate, Washington can reinforce the détente by holding back planned sales of items such as Black Hawk helicopters, Patriot missiles, and additional fighter jets. The Pentagon must view the shift not as simply a minor adjustment due to reduced cross-strait tensions but as a wholesale rejection of the vision of Taiwan as a militarized base within the U.S. strategic orbit. By signaling that Washington is finally respecting China's territorial integrity, these reductions could, in turn, lead to verifiable force reductions by China, as well as to an end to its Taiwan-focused military attack drills. Removing Taiwan as a major player in the United States' Asian security strategy would have ripple effects on U.S. strategy in the region as a whole. Indeed, it is likely that Asian-only security organizations, such as the asean Regional Forum, would increasingly take the lead in defining Asia's future security architecture. The arguments in favor of Finlandization are stronger today than ever before: a Finlandized Taiwan would play a much more transformative role in China itself, thus improving the chances of a peacefully rising China. As was the case for Finland in its relations with the Soviet Union, Taiwan could create a model for the peaceful resolution of China's many resource, boundary, and military conflicts throughout Asia. More broadly, the Taiwan-China détente is a test of liberal approaches to international relations - specifically, the notion that a broad integration of domestic interests will pacify relations between states far more than a militarized balance of power. Taiwan has always been a frontline state in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing. In the past, that meant the United States' fending off China's plans to invade Taiwan and defying Beijing's opposition to the island's democratic development. Today, with Taiwan's territory secure and democracy consolidated, Taiwan's role on the frontlines is changing again. It is now Washington's turn to confront and adapt to this historic shift.

<h4>Only the aff signals US <u>threat reduction</u> and reverses perceptions of containment. </h4><p>Bruce <strong>Gilley 10<u></strong>, PhD from Princeton, "Not So Dire Straits," Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2010-01-01/not-so-dire-straits</p><p><strong>SIDELINING UNCLE SAM</u></strong> THE UNITED STATES has played a crucial role in maintaining cross-strait peace and encouraging democracy in Taiwan since 1949. Today, the U.S. role in this process is nearing its end. <u>U.S. policy toward</u> a Finlandized <u>Taiwan </u>will<u> have to be adjusted</u> both strategically and diplomatically. Expanded official contacts with Taiwan will require consultations with Beijing; the United States and its allies will have to refashion battle plans to exclude Taiwan; Washington will have to support the new approach to cross-strait peace through its public diplomacy; and U.S. intelligence agencies will have to be more careful about scrutinizing technology transfers to the island because the prc's intelligence gathering on Taiwan will inevitably expand. <u><strong>Most important</u></strong>,<u> <mark>Washington</mark> </u>will<u> <mark>have to</mark> </u>significantly<u> <strong><mark>scale back its arms sales</strong></mark> </u>to Taipei<u>. In 1982, the United States</u> <u>pledged to China that it would reduce its arms sales to Taiwan - a promise that it has conspicuously broken ever since.</u> Today, as then, <u>there is a <strong>golden opportunity</strong> <mark>to <strong>demilitarize the conflict</u></strong></mark>. The U.S. Congress is not particularly interested in pressing President Barack Obama on the issue, and Taiwan's economic decline has moderated Taipei's appetite for major arms purchases anyway. <u>In the past, sales </u>of fighter jets, destroyers, tanks, and missiles to Taiwan <u>were premised as much on the political message they sent to Beijing as on their tactical value</u>. In the new climate, <u>Washington can <strong>reinforce</u></strong> the <u><strong>détente</u></strong> <u>by <strong><mark>holding back</u></strong></mark> planned <u><strong><mark>sales</u></strong></mark> <u>of items such as Black Hawk helicopters, Patriot missiles, and additional fighter jets</u>. The Pentagon must view <u>the shift not as simply a minor adjustment due to reduced cross-strait tensions but <mark>as a</mark> <strong>wholesale <mark>rejection</strong> </mark>of the vision of <mark>Taiwan as a <strong>militarized base</strong> </mark>within the U.S. strategic orbit</u>. <u><mark>By <strong>signaling</strong> that Washington is</mark> finally <strong><mark>respecting China's territorial integrity</strong></mark>, these <mark>reductions</mark> could</u>, in turn, <u><mark>lead to</mark> <strong>verifiable <mark>force reductions by China</strong>, as well as to <strong>an end to</mark> its <mark>Taiwan-focused </mark>military attack <mark>drills</u></strong></mark>. Removing Taiwan as a major player in the United States' Asian security strategy would have ripple effects on U.S. strategy in the region as a whole. Indeed, it is likely <u>that Asian-only security organizations, such as </u>the <u>asean</u> Regional Forum, <u>would increasingly take the lead in defining Asia's future security architecture. </u>The arguments in favor of Finlandization are stronger today than ever before: <u><mark>a Finlandized Taiwan would</mark> play a much more transformative role in China itself, thus <mark>improv</mark>ing <mark>the chances of <strong>a peacefully rising China</u></strong></mark>. As was the case for Finland in its relations with the Soviet Union, <u><mark>Taiwan could create a <strong>model</strong> for the <strong>peaceful resolution</strong> of China's many</mark> resource, boundary, and military <mark>conflicts throughout Asia</u></mark>. More broadly, <u>the Taiwan-China détente is a test of liberal approaches to international relations - specifically, the notion that a broad integration of domestic interests will pacify relations between states far more than a militarized balance of power. Taiwan has always been a frontline state in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing</u>. In the past, that meant the United States' fending off China's plans to invade Taiwan and defying Beijing's opposition to the island's democratic development. Today, with Taiwan's territory secure and democracy consolidated, Taiwan's role on the frontlines is changing again. <u>It is now Washington's turn to confront and adapt to this historic shift. </p></u>

1AC – Taiwan

1AC – Taiwan War

./documents/hspolicy19/RowlandHall/DoGu/Rowland%20Hall-Doctorman-Gushin-Aff-7%20-%20Copper%20Classic-Quarters.docx

A

7 - Copper Classic

Quarters

Notre Dame DP

Panel

1AC - Taiwan 1NC - - T-Pearson - ASPEC - Deterrence CP - Japan Alliance DA - Xi DA - Taiwan Independence CT - Deterrence CT 2NR - - Deterrence CT

hspolicy19/RowlandHall/DoGu/Rowland%20Hall-Doctorman-Gushin-Aff-7%20-%20Copper%20Classic-Quarters.docx

DoGu

Rowland Hall DoGu

St.....

Do.....

Ad.....

Gu.....

RowlandHall

Rowland Hall

UT

hspolicy19

HS Policy 2019-20

cx

hs

The resolution calls for debate over hypothetical government action

Ericson 3

Ericson 3 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

each topic contains certain key elements . 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should that urges action For example, should adopt means to put a policy into action though governmental means The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur.

each topic contains An agent The U S The verb should that urges action should means a policy though governmental means.

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

<h4>The resolution calls for debate over hypothetical government action</h4><p><strong>Ericson 3</strong> (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)</p><p>The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, <u><mark>each topic contains</mark> certain key elements</u>, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions<u>. 1. <mark>An agent</mark> doing the acting ---“<mark>The U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates” in “The United States should adopt</u> a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, <u>the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. <mark>The verb should</u></mark>—the first part of a verb phrase <u><mark>that urges action</u></mark>. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. <u>For example, <mark>should</mark> adopt</u> here <u><mark>means</mark> to put <mark>a</u></mark> program or <u><mark>policy</mark> into action <mark>though governmental means</u>.</mark> 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. <u>The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur.</u> What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose. </p>

1nc

1

./documents/hspolicy19/Mamaroneck/LeRu/Mamaroneck-Lepelstat-Rubin-Neg-Michigan-Round6.docx

N

Michigan

6

Midland Independent IR

Kaczmarek, Sheryl

1AC - Vince Staples (Anti-blackness K aff) 1NC - FW Aegis PIC Balancing DA 2NR - FW

hspolicy19/Mamaroneck/LeRu/Mamaroneck-Lepelstat-Rubin-Neg-Michigan-Round6.docx

LeRu

Mamaroneck LeRu

Te.....

Le.....

Ve.....

Ru.....

Mamaroneck

Mamaroneck

NY

hspolicy19

HS Policy 2019-20

cx

hs

Banning LAWS triggers AI winter – kills innovation and incentives to adopt AI tech across the board which undermines investment expectations.

Castro and McLaughlin 19

Castro and McLaughlin 19 Daniel Castro and Michael McLaughlin, 2-4-2019, “Ten Ways the Precautionary Principle Undermines Progress in Artificial Intelligence,” Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, https://itif.org/publications/2019/02/04/ten-ways-precautionary-principle-undermines-progress-artificial-intelligence, SJBE

Policies that ban technologies do not allow society to gain the technologies’ potential benefits, and most people understand in hindsight that bans only held back progress. Banning Lethal Autonomous Weapons Many groups have started movements to ban lethal autonomous weapons—autonomous robotics systems that can independently identify and engage targets based on programmed constraints—due to fears that they will lead to armed conflict on a scale greater and faster than ever before. If policymakers enacted such a ban, it would slow research into AI, as historically, at least in the United States, defense agencies have been a source of significant funding for technology advancement, such as the Internet. And much of the research to support autonomous weapons would yield dual-use technology that could be used for commercial purposes. For example, a fully autonomous tank will likely rely on large portions of the same algorithms and data used to develop a fully autonomous military transport vehicle.39 These same algorithms would be relevant to developing autonomous vehicles for civilian use. HOW POLICIES BASED ON THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IMPACT AI Policies based on the precautionary principle can impact AI in several ways. They can make it more expensive to develop AI, limit the testing and use of AI, and even ban certain applications. Clearly nations have the right to impose any regulations they chose (assuming they do not violate World Trade Organization rules or other global treaty obligations). But they should not delude themselves into believing that regulatory regimes based on the precautionary principle will not limit increased productivity, competitiveness, and innovation . Slower and More Expensive AI Development Policies based on the precautionary principle both slow and make the development of AI more expensive Finally, policies that increase the cost of developing AI would likely discourage innovation in AI by creating a substantial barrier to entry for startups that lack sufficient funding to cover the cost of proving their AI system is safe. . Less Innovation AI will spur innovation so policies that limit the development of AI will limit innovation.100 For example, proposals to ban or limit the introduction of autonomous vehicles would also limit the generation of new businesses, business models, and ways to do deliver services through the “passenger economy.” 3. Lower-Quality AI There is often a negative correlation between making an AI system more explainable and its accuracy.103 As a result, any policies that require AI to be explainable could lead to less accurate AI. Developing an AI system capable of explaining itself or justifying its decisions is an incredibly challenging technical feat, so much so that the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) devoted $75 million in 2017 to research how AI could achieve it.107 Some groups are skeptical that requiring explainability would chill innovation. They cite DeepMind, a British company owned by Google parent-company Alphabet, developing an AI system in 2018 that can analyze eye scans to predict diseases while also providing doctors a map of the features of disease it sees, such as hemorrhages.108 However, the fact that one of the world’s leading AI companies could achieve a form of explainability in a system it worked on for nearly two years is not evidence that all other operators should or would be able to achieve explainability for their AI easily. 4. Less AI Adoption The right to human review illustrates how attempts to mitigate the impact of AI could also stifle its adoption. One of the reasons firms use AI is because it increases productivity as it can analyze large amounts of data significantly faster and cheaper than humans. A right to human review would require firms to review significant decisions made by algorithms. Such a requirement is particularly problematic because the complexity and amount of data used by some AI systems to make accurate decisions can make it nearly impossible for firms to explain exactly why a system made one decision, even though they may be able to provide a general explanation of how the system works. Thus, it would take significant time and expertise for a firm to explain many decisions made by AI, which then makes using AI more expensive—negating one of its benefits.

Banning Lethal Autonomous Weapons would slow research into AI, as defense agencies have been a source of significant funding for technology advancement much of the research to support autonomous weapons would yield dual-use technology relevant for civilian use the precautionary principle make it more expensive to develop AI, limit the testing and use of AI, and limit productivity, competitiveness, and innovation. the precautionary principle make the development of AI more expensive would discourage innovation by creating a barrier to entry AI will spur innovation so policies that limit the development of AI will limit innovation Less AI Adoption A right to human review would require firms to review decisions made by algorithms complexity and data can make it impossible which makes using AI more expensive—negating its benefits

In the early 2000s, privacy advocates called for bans of radio frequency identification (RFID) chips, which use radio waves to transmit data, in several use cases, including on government identification documents.33 These advocates warned that stores, governments, and even terrorists would use RFID to track the movements of individuals. For example, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) argued that a 2005 U.S. State Department proposal to require RFID chips in passports would turn passports into “terrorist beacons,” stating “that's precisely what they'll become if we allow the State Department to move ahead with this plan.34 While the fears of stores, governments, or terrorists tracking individuals with RFID never materialized, RFID tags are helping manufacturers and retailers increase sales and reduce theft and labor costs. They are also in U.S. passports, expediting the scanning of passports.35 Policies that ban technologies do not allow society to gain the technologies’ potential benefits, and most people understand in hindsight that bans only held back progress. Banning Lethal Autonomous Weapons Many groups have started movements to ban lethal autonomous weapons—autonomous robotics systems that can independently identify and engage targets based on programmed constraints—due to fears that they will lead to armed conflict on a scale greater and faster than ever before. For example, 116 founders of mostly small robotics and AI companies, including Elon Musk, signed a letter to the United Nations (UN) in 2017 that urges the body to ban lethal autonomous weapons.36 In 2018, the UN Secretary-General António Guterres stated that “machines that have the power and the discretion to take human lives are politically unacceptable, are morally repugnant, and should be banned by international law.”37 Also in 2018, members of the European Parliament adopted a resolution asking member states and the European Council for “the start of international negotiations on a legally binding instrument prohibiting lethal autonomous weapons systems.”38 If policymakers enacted such a ban, it would slow research into AI, as historically, at least in the United States, defense agencies have been a source of significant funding for technology advancement, such as the Internet. And much of the research to support autonomous weapons would yield dual-use technology that could be used for commercial purposes. For example, a fully autonomous tank will likely rely on large portions of the same algorithms and data used to develop a fully autonomous military transport vehicle.39 These same algorithms would be relevant to developing autonomous vehicles for civilian use. Banning Facial Recognition in Government Some fear that facial recognition, which uses AI, could lead to mass surveillance, biased policing, and databases hackers target to steal biometric information.40 Consequently, many privacy and civil liberty advocates argue law enforcement, or the government in general, should not use facial recognition. For example, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has said there should be a moratorium on all law enforcement uses of facial recognition.41 It has also called on companies to “stop selling face surveillance technology to governments.”42 In addition, the Algorithmic Justice League and the Center of Privacy & Technology at the Georgetown University Law Center created the Safe Face Pledge, which asks firms to not sell facial recognition technology to law enforcement unless lawmakers pass legislation to explicitly allow it.43 If firms and the U.S. government acceded to such demands, several beneficial applications, ranging from fighting sex trafficking to identifying imposters with fake passports, would not be available in the United States. Banning Autonomous Vehicles There have been calls to ban autonomous vehicles over both safety concerns and to avoid job loss.44 In 2018, for example, four Minnesota state legislators proposed a bill banning autonomous vehicles until proven safe.45 And in 2017, the Upstate Transportation Association, a group that represents the taxi industry, urged New York to ban self-driving cars for 50 years due to fears that ride-sharing services such as Uber and Lyft will deploy autonomous vehicles and cause massive job loss. The president of the association even argued “it doesn't do anything for the local economy to have driverless cars.”46Similarly, Chicago lawmakers introduced an ordinance in 2016 to ban autonomous vehicles on Chicago streets because they are a “job killer.”47 Outside of the United States, Indian Minister of Road Transport and Highways, Nitin Gadkari, has stated that India should not allow autonomous vehicles. He argues that “in a country where you have unemployment, you can't have a technology that ends up taking people's jobs.”48 Not only would a ban eliminate the possibility of autonomous vehicles reducing fatal accidents, any ban of autonomous vehicles also ignores how disruptive technologies spur economies forward, without exacerbating unemployment.49 Banning Delivery Robots Some have suggested that sidewalks should only be for humans and have advocated for banning delivery robots, which can deliver food as well as packages. For example, San Francisco temporarily banned delivery robots on most city sidewalks in 2017. The city’s supervisor, Norman Yee, who proposed a complete ban, stated that “our sidewalks should be prioritized for humans” and one activist argued that sidewalks “are not playgrounds for the new remote-controlled toys of the clever to make money and eliminate jobs.”50 But “eliminating jobs” is simply another phrase for “boosting productivity” and “increasing consumer welfare.” While San Francisco ultimately passed legislation to create a permitting process that allows such robots on their sidewalks, the application and permit extension fees for one robot are over $1,400. In addition, permits are only good for 180 days and can only extend for 180 more.51 This regulatory approach by the city is in direct contrast to the approach of several states, such as Virginia, Idaho, and Ohio, which allow such robots, and ignores that delivery robots can improve consumer experiences through more same-day deliveries, more flexible delivery hours, and lower delivery costs.52 Policies That Treat AI as Too Dangerous Unless Proven Safe Some policies treat specific uses of AI as “guilty until proven innocent.” These policies require companies to obtain special permission from the government before using AI. The major problem with this “Mother may I?” style regulation is that it slows down the pace of innovation, creating unnecessary roadblocks to the development, testing, and use of new technologies. While there are several proposals for this “Mother may I?” style regulation in regards to AI, such calls are not new. For example, several jurisdictions worldwide have required Google to gain permission to deploy its service, Google Street View, which takes panoramic pictures to allow people to take street-level tours of specific locations using the Internet, due to concerns that the service would violate individuals’ privacy or reduce security.53 These jurisdictions include India, which has yet to give Google Street View permission to launch the service in the nation except at a few tourist sites.54 These policies ignore that Google takes the images from public property, and Google has also responded to concerns by blurring license plate numbers, removing personally identifiable details, and even lowering the height of its cameras to avoid capturing photos of people in compromising situations through the windows of their homes.55 Federal Algorithm Safety Board Stemming from fears that AI is inherently dangerous, some have proposed requiring some algorithms gain governmental approval before operators use them. Several individuals, including University of Maryland computer science professor Ben Schneiderman, have advocated for such proposals. In 2017, Schneiderman proposed the creation of a “National Algorithms Safety Board” to independently oversee the use of “major” algorithms, such as by auditing, monitoring, and licensing algorithms when a company wants to deploy one. Schneiderman argues that “If you’re a major company, and you’re about to put out a major algorithm, or you’re a bank and your about to change the way credit is assigned, I think it’s appropriate that you come before the National Algorithms Safety Board and that there is a review.”56 Attorney Andrew Tutt has a similar proposal, but his idea is to create an agency that would have the power to “prevent the introduction of certain algorithms into the market until their safety and efficacy has been proven through evidence-based premarket trials.”57 In addition, attorney Matthew Scherer has called for the creation of a federal agency to certify AI programs’ safety.58 There are several problems with these and related proposals. First, existing regulatory bodies are already capable of providing oversight. For example, the FDA is already providing oversight of algorithms in medical devices, including a device that uses AI to analyze images of the eye to detect if diabetes patients may be developing diabetic retinopathy, which causes vision loss.59 Second, even Schneiderman acknowledges there are legitimate concerns about his proposal, including “which projects are big enough to warrant review.”60 For example, many people believe the algorithms social media companies use to choose which content to display have a significant impact on society, but there are serious free-speech implications of allowing a governmental body to influence what information people see in their news feeds.61 Furthermore, there would be significant challenges to defining and classifying which algorithms should be subject to regulatory scrutiny, especially because the code of an algorithm may be less consequential than the specific ways in which companies use the technology. Lastly, creating a national safety board or regulator for algorithms would suggest to the public that algorithms themselves pose an inherent risk and need regulatory oversight, even though most algorithms likely involve minor decisions, such as what movie to recommend, which pose little risk to consumers.62 Phasing in Autonomous Trucks Due to fears that autonomous trucks will cause significant job loss, the International Transport Forum (ITF), an inter-governmental organization within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), recommends that governments “consider a temporary permit system to manage the speed of adoption” of autonomous trucks. The ITF argues that “A permit system would offer influence over the speed of uptake as well as revenue to support displaced drivers.” It also believes that the “funds for transition assistance should be generated by the main beneficiaries of the operation of driverless trucks.”63 This suggestion to phase in autonomous trucks resembles New York City’s 2018 decision to cap the number of for-hire vehicles such as Uber for a year.64 Phasing in autonomous trucks ignores that they can increase net welfare as society reaps the benefit of faster, cheaper, and more plentiful services.65 Nonetheless, in an effort to modernize regulations, the U.S. Department of Transportation provided guidance in 2018 stating that it will “adapt the definitions of “driver” and “operator” to recognize that such terms do not refer exclusively to a human, but may in fact include an automated system.”66 But prior to the 2018 DOT guidance, which is an interpretation of existing federal laws and regulations and not a formal rulemaking, there were several examples of precautionary thinking related to autonomous trucks in the United States. For example, in 2017, the Teamsters union successfully lobbied the U.S. House Energy and Commerce Committee to not include autonomous trucks in a bill to speed up the deployment of autonomous vehicles.67 Likewise, the U.S. Senate Commerce Committee did not include autonomous trucks in its companion bill. Both bills allow most autonomous vehicles, but not large commercial autonomous trucks, to be exempt from meeting safety standards that are unnecessary for autonomous driving, including steering wheels.68 Teamsters President James Hoffa applauded the legislation, stating that “It is vital that Congress ensure that any new technology is used to make transportation safer and more effective, not used to put workers at risk on the job or destroy livelihoods.”69 If policymakers had endorsed this way of thinking in the early 1900s, they would have enacted legislation to preserve the safer horse and buggy industry and protected those jobs. FAA Drone Permits The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Reauthorization Act that passed in 2018 requires the FAA to create rules for autonomous drone (unmanned aerial vehicles) delivery.70 The FAA has also proposed other preliminary rules that make the FAA’s regulatory approach more aligned with the innovation principle. For example, in early 2019, the Secretary of Transportation announced an upcoming FAA rulemaking that would allow the remote operation of drones over people and at night, which current FAA rules do not permit, if the drones meet safety standards.71 Yet, until these rules pass, the FAA still requires most drone operators to obtain a special exemption waiver for any flights at night, flights out of line-of-sight of the operator’s or an assistant’s unaided sight (i.e. without using binoculars or built-in video cameras), or those involved in package delivery.72 Even under the FAA’s new proposal, drones would still need special exemption to fly over people faster than 100 miles per hour, when visibility is less than three miles, and when their weight is above 55 pounds.73 While the safe integration of drones into the national airspace requires thoughtful regulation, the FAA’s slow implementation of rules has significantly limited drone uses, particularly for delivery, especially when compared to other countries. In contrast, Iceland’s more permissive rules for drones, which still require drones to meet several mandatory provisions, have enabled thousands of drone deliveries.74 Policies That Treat AI as Dangerous Without Some Unnecessary Restrictions Some policies set unnecessary restrictions on AI, including how and when operators can use it. These policies prohibit AI unless it meets specific and unnecessary design or use requirements, such as requiring express consent to use facial recognition and requiring that significant decisions made by AI be explainable. While policymakers create these laws and regulations to protect human safety, privacy, and financial well-being, the impact is reduced adoption of AI, resulting in higher prices and fewer services. Similar calls in the past for unnecessary regulation would have halted progress with other technologies. For example, in the 1960s, some U.S. elected officials were so afraid that transistors would aid widespread surveillance that one proposed requiring licensing of all bugging equipment.75 If passed, the legislation would have greatly impeded the development of technologies we take for granted such as smartphones, which people can and have used to surreptitiously record conversations.76 Biometric Identifier Laws Requiring Express Consent Harkening back to Louis Brandeis’ view in 1890 that the rise of instantaneous photography was a threat to privacy, some groups today argue that some uses of AI, such as facial recognition, are a threat to individual’s privacy, which is why they propose requiring operators to gain express consent from third parties to deploy them.77 In 2016, the Connecticut General Assembly considered a bill that would have required businesses to get prior consent from customers before using facial recognition technology.78 Other laws place conditions on when and how long a business can capture any biometric identifier, such as a person’s fingerprint, iris scan, or voiceprint for commercial purposes. Illinois passed the first U.S. biometric law—the Biometric Information Privacy Act—in 2008 under pressure from privacy activists.79 The law requires companies to obtain informed written consent from customers before capturing an individual’s biometric identifier and to permanently destroy the identifier when the identifier has satisfied its initial purpose for collection. It also provides citizens a right of action against any company that violates one of the law’s provisions.80 Texas has a similar biometric statute, but it requires informed consent, not written consent, and does not provide citizens a right to action. Nonetheless, it requires firms to destroy the identifier within a year of when the purpose for collecting the identifier expires and subjects violators to civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each violation.81 Biometrics can use AI to improve accuracy and expand applications, such as mobile authentication, but these kinds of laws discourage firms from using biometrics and AI to deliver better services instead of punishing solely those who maliciously or negligently use biometric data.82 As a result, such laws lead to firms barring certain customers from using their services due to fears of potential penalties. For example, Nest does not offer a feature of one of its smart doorbells, which uses a camera to recognize a face, in Illinois.83 Autonomous Vehicle Restrictions Fears about the safety of autonomous vehicles have led several states to craft restrictive rules for testing or using autonomous vehicles. For example, New York requires all autonomous vehicle testing to happen under the supervision of the state police and for companies to pay for the escorts they receive. Unsurprisingly, there has been very little autonomous vehicle testing in the state given the unnecessarily costly testing requirements.84 Such requirements contrast with other states’ more logical regulation of autonomous vehicles. For example, California’s initial autonomous vehicle rules in 2014 required a driver behind the steering wheel during testing.85 In 2018, as the technology continued to improve, California allowed driverless cars without a human behind the wheel.86 Algorithmic Explainability Some groups fear that AI will make decisions without any accountability, and that decisions will be flawed, including being biased against underrepresented groups. This is why they advocate that decisions made by AI systems should be explainable. For example, the AI Now Institute at New York University believes that core public agencies, which it defines as including those responsible for criminal justice, healthcare, welfare, and education, should not use “black box” systems that deploy algorithms that are difficult, or nearly impossible, to understand.87 France’s Secretary of State for Digital Affairs, Mounir Mahjoubi, goes farther by claiming that no part of the government should use an algorithm if it cannot explain its decisions.88And the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the new EU law that regulates how organizations use or process the data of anyone living in the EU, provides EU citizens a right to “meaningful information about the logic involved” in an algorithmic decision that has legal or similarly significant effects.89 Explainability can be a useful tool to make AI accountable, particularly in areas such as the criminal justice system, where market forces to use high-quality AI are not as strong as in the private sector. But there is a tradeoff between the explainability of an AI system and its accuracy, and the aforementioned proposals hold algorithmic decisions to a standard that does not exist for humans.90 For example, medical patients often do not know why their doctors referred them to a particular physician or facility, even though some medical practices frequently pressure their physicians to refer their patients to more expensive in-house physicians and facilities.91 Moreover, broad requirements to require that governments only use explainable AI may make it difficult for agencies to use several beneficial applications of AI that may be difficult to explain. Manual Human Review There are proposals that significant decisions made by AI should be subject to human review. Once again, the fear is that AI will make incorrect decisions without recourse. Yet humans make many incorrect decisions today without recourse. Nonetheless, the GDPR creates a right to human review for European citizens in Article 22 by stating “The data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.”92 Such a right undermines the purpose of automating tasks, which is to perform a task faster, cheaper, and easier than a human could.93 Requiring manual review also disregards the many laws that already exist that guarantee a right to an explanation for certain high-impact decisions, such as why a company fired an employee, whether the firm used AI or not.94 But there are other significant decisions made by humans, such as refusing a loan, where firms only have to tell applicants what their decisions are based on but not the logic of their reasoning.95 Requiring AI systems to explain the reasoning for all their decisions creates an artificial and unnecessary hurdle to using AI. HOW POLICIES BASED ON THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IMPACT AI Policies based on the precautionary principle can impact AI in several ways. They can make it more expensive to develop AI, limit the testing and use of AI, and even ban certain applications. Clearly nations have the right to impose any regulations they chose (assuming they do not violate World Trade Organization rules or other global treaty obligations). But they should not delude themselves into believing that regulatory regimes based on the precautionary principle will not limit increased productivity, competitiveness, and innovation. To provide a more detailed discussion of the negative effects policies based on the precautionary principle can have on AI, the following section analyzes the effects of policies discussed earlier in this report. In many cases, these policies have multiple negative effects on AI. 1. Slower and More Expensive AI Development Policies based on the precautionary principle both slow and make the development of AI more expensive. For example, if all fifty U.S. states had laws such as New York’s, which requires autonomous vehicle firms to perform road testing under the paid supervision of police, testing such vehicles would be more expensive. Moreover, proposals to require even non-medical algorithms to undergo pre-market trials would hurt the development of AI because such trials are time-consuming and expensive. Such proposals may also make AI systems that use machine learning, and thus may change frequently and need more testing, significantly less viable because such systems could constantly need to go through a new approval process.96 Finally, policies that increase the cost of developing AI would likely discourage innovation in AI by creating a substantial barrier to entry for startups that lack sufficient funding to cover the cost of proving their AI system is safe. For example, the GDPR has dampened investment in European technology startups and led to a 30 percent decrease in the market share of small online advertising firms that lack the resources to easily comply with the regulation.97 Restrictions on one AI technology can also limit ways to develop another AI technology. For example, researchers in Germany are using drones hovering hundreds of meters above highways to record the movements of vehicles. This data can help develop simulations to test autonomous vehicles; such simulations are important tools for improving the safety of autonomous vehicles because otherwise they would need to travel billions of miles for safety validation.98 While this novel method of collecting data to validate the safety of autonomous vehicles may or may not prove valuable, implementing it in the United States would be would be difficult to do at scale until the FAA implements its new rules that allow out-of-sight drone flights and flights over people.99 2. Less Innovation AI will spur innovation so policies that limit the development of AI will limit innovation.100 For example, proposals to ban or limit the introduction of autonomous vehicles would also limit the generation of new businesses, business models, and ways to do deliver services through the “passenger economy.” The passenger economy, a term coined by Intel and research firm Strategy Analytics, “is the economic and societal value that will be generated by fully autonomous…pilotless vehicles.”101 The firms envision a world where a significant portion of vehicle ownership is replaced by fleets of autonomous vehicles that provide on-demand transportation. Productivity would also increase as autonomous vehicles free employees to work during their commutes and autonomous trucks to operate more efficiently. The firms estimate the value of this economy could be $7 trillion by 2050.102 Nations that ban autonomous vehicles will not experience the benefits of such an economy. 3. Lower-Quality AI There is often a negative correlation between making an AI system more explainable and its accuracy.103 As a result, any policies that require AI to be explainable could lead to less accurate AI. For example, researchers at Mount Sinai Hospital in New York developed an AI system called Deep Patient that can predict whether a patient is contracting any of a wide variety of diseases.104 The researchers trained Deep Patient on the health data from 700,000 patients, using hundreds of variables, such as test results, which allow it to predict diseases such as schizophrenia—which doctors struggle to predict—extremely well.105 Even though its operators can verify its accuracy by measuring outcomes, such as if a person is developing a disease, it is difficult for its own developers to know why it made a particular decision.106 Many sophisticated forms of AI pose a similar problem. Developing an AI system capable of explaining itself or justifying its decisions is an incredibly challenging technical feat, so much so that the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) devoted $75 million in 2017 to research how AI could achieve it.107 Some groups are skeptical that requiring explainability would chill innovation. They cite DeepMind, a British company owned by Google parent-company Alphabet, developing an AI system in 2018 that can analyze eye scans to predict diseases while also providing doctors a map of the features of disease it sees, such as hemorrhages.108 However, the fact that one of the world’s leading AI companies could achieve a form of explainability in a system it worked on for nearly two years is not evidence that all other operators should or would be able to achieve explainability for their AI easily.109 To be clear, it is legitimate for companies, such as IBM, to create internal requirements for AI explainability.110 Requiring all firms to meet such a standard, however, would create a barrier to adopting AI, because not all AI systems are alike and not all businesses have a similar level of expertise. Nonetheless, it is important for AI operators to continually assess their AI system’s accuracy to ensure it is generating or predicting the correct outcomes. The other option is to allow only AI applications that operators can explain; this would lead to AI systems that consider fewer variables and that use simpler algorithms to make decisions. In turn, this would reduce the effectiveness of AI that can generate significant impacts such as identifying a terminal illness before a doctor can. 4. Less AI Adoption The right to human review illustrates how attempts to mitigate the impact of AI could also stifle its adoption. One of the reasons firms use AI is because it increases productivity as it can analyze large amounts of data significantly faster and cheaper than humans. For example, LawGeex, a firm that uses AI to automate the review and approval of contracts, created an AI system that outperforms lawyers in identifying risks in non-disclosure agreements (NDAs). During a test in which 20 lawyers and LawGeex’s AI were each given five NDAs to review, the lawyers took an average of 92 minutes to review the contracts and had a mean accuracy score of 85 percent. LawGeex’s AI, however, achieved 94 percent accuracy and only took 26 seconds to review all the contracts.111 A right to human review would require firms to review significant decisions made by algorithms. Such a requirement is particularly problematic because the complexity and amount of data used by some AI systems to make accurate decisions can make it nearly impossible for firms to explain exactly why a system made one decision, even though they may be able to provide a general explanation of how the system works. Thus, it would take significant time and expertise for a firm to explain many decisions made by AI, which then makes using AI more expensive—negating one of its benefits. Firms subject to a right to human review can make one of three choices. They can: 1) use sophisticated AI, but face litigation if they cannot properly explain a decision, 2) implement simple, and therefore more explainable but less useful, forms of AI, or 3) leverage no AI at all. The first option is not viable over the long term, leaving firms with only the latter two options. And if firms choose either of these options, the economy will be less productive.112

<h4>Banning LAWS triggers AI winter – kills innovation and incentives to adopt AI tech across the board which undermines investment expectations.</h4><p><strong>Castro and McLaughlin 19</strong> Daniel Castro and Michael McLaughlin, 2-4-2019, “Ten Ways the Precautionary Principle Undermines Progress in Artificial Intelligence,” Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, https://itif.org/publications/2019/02/04/ten-ways-precautionary-principle-undermines-progress-artificial-intelligence, SJBE</p><p>In the early 2000s, privacy advocates called for bans of radio frequency identification (RFID) chips, which use radio waves to transmit data, in several use cases, including on government identification documents.33 These advocates warned that stores, governments, and even terrorists would use RFID to track the movements of individuals. For example, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) argued that a 2005 U.S. State Department proposal to require RFID chips in passports would turn passports into “terrorist beacons,” stating “that's precisely what they'll become if we allow the State Department to move ahead with this plan.34 While the fears of stores, governments, or terrorists tracking individuals with RFID never materialized, RFID tags are helping manufacturers and retailers increase sales and reduce theft and labor costs. They are also in U.S. passports, expediting the scanning of passports.35 <u><strong>Policies that ban technologies do not allow society to gain the technologies’ potential benefits, and most people understand in hindsight that bans only held back progress. <mark>Banning Lethal Autonomous Weapons</mark> Many groups have started movements to ban lethal autonomous weapons—autonomous robotics systems that can independently identify and engage targets based on programmed constraints—due to fears that they will lead to armed conflict on a scale greater and faster than ever before.</u></strong> For example, 116 founders of mostly small robotics and AI companies, including Elon Musk, signed a letter to the United Nations (UN) in 2017 that urges the body to ban lethal autonomous weapons.36 In 2018, the UN Secretary-General António Guterres stated that “machines that have the power and the discretion to take human lives are politically unacceptable, are morally repugnant, and should be banned by international law.”37 Also in 2018, members of the European Parliament adopted a resolution asking member states and the European Council for “the start of international negotiations on a legally binding instrument prohibiting lethal autonomous weapons systems.”38 <u><strong>If policymakers enacted such a ban, it <mark>would slow research into AI, as</mark> historically, at least in the United States, <mark>defense agencies have been a source of significant funding for technology advancement</mark>, such as the Internet. And <mark>much of the research to support autonomous weapons would yield dual-use technology </mark>that could be used for commercial purposes. For example, a fully autonomous tank will likely rely on large portions of the same algorithms and data used to develop a fully autonomous military transport vehicle.39 These same algorithms would be <mark>relevant</mark> to developing autonomous vehicles <mark>for civilian use</mark>.</u></strong> Banning Facial Recognition in Government Some fear that facial recognition, which uses AI, could lead to mass surveillance, biased policing, and databases hackers target to steal biometric information.40 Consequently, many privacy and civil liberty advocates argue law enforcement, or the government in general, should not use facial recognition. For example, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has said there should be a moratorium on all law enforcement uses of facial recognition.41 It has also called on companies to “stop selling face surveillance technology to governments.”42 In addition, the Algorithmic Justice League and the Center of Privacy & Technology at the Georgetown University Law Center created the Safe Face Pledge, which asks firms to not sell facial recognition technology to law enforcement unless lawmakers pass legislation to explicitly allow it.43 If firms and the U.S. government acceded to such demands, several beneficial applications, ranging from fighting sex trafficking to identifying imposters with fake passports, would not be available in the United States. Banning Autonomous Vehicles There have been calls to ban autonomous vehicles over both safety concerns and to avoid job loss.44 In 2018, for example, four Minnesota state legislators proposed a bill banning autonomous vehicles until proven safe.45 And in 2017, the Upstate Transportation Association, a group that represents the taxi industry, urged New York to ban self-driving cars for 50 years due to fears that ride-sharing services such as Uber and Lyft will deploy autonomous vehicles and cause massive job loss. The president of the association even argued “it doesn't do anything for the local economy to have driverless cars.”46Similarly, Chicago lawmakers introduced an ordinance in 2016 to ban autonomous vehicles on Chicago streets because they are a “job killer.”47 Outside of the United States, Indian Minister of Road Transport and Highways, Nitin Gadkari, has stated that India should not allow autonomous vehicles. He argues that “in a country where you have unemployment, you can't have a technology that ends up taking people's jobs.”48 Not only would a ban eliminate the possibility of autonomous vehicles reducing fatal accidents, any ban of autonomous vehicles also ignores how disruptive technologies spur economies forward, without exacerbating unemployment.49 Banning Delivery Robots Some have suggested that sidewalks should only be for humans and have advocated for banning delivery robots, which can deliver food as well as packages. For example, San Francisco temporarily banned delivery robots on most city sidewalks in 2017. The city’s supervisor, Norman Yee, who proposed a complete ban, stated that “our sidewalks should be prioritized for humans” and one activist argued that sidewalks “are not playgrounds for the new remote-controlled toys of the clever to make money and eliminate jobs.”50 But “eliminating jobs” is simply another phrase for “boosting productivity” and “increasing consumer welfare.” While San Francisco ultimately passed legislation to create a permitting process that allows such robots on their sidewalks, the application and permit extension fees for one robot are over $1,400. In addition, permits are only good for 180 days and can only extend for 180 more.51 This regulatory approach by the city is in direct contrast to the approach of several states, such as Virginia, Idaho, and Ohio, which allow such robots, and ignores that delivery robots can improve consumer experiences through more same-day deliveries, more flexible delivery hours, and lower delivery costs.52 Policies That Treat AI as Too Dangerous Unless Proven Safe Some policies treat specific uses of AI as “guilty until proven innocent.” These policies require companies to obtain special permission from the government before using AI. The major problem with this “Mother may I?” style regulation is that it slows down the pace of innovation, creating unnecessary roadblocks to the development, testing, and use of new technologies. While there are several proposals for this “Mother may I?” style regulation in regards to AI, such calls are not new. For example, several jurisdictions worldwide have required Google to gain permission to deploy its service, Google Street View, which takes panoramic pictures to allow people to take street-level tours of specific locations using the Internet, due to concerns that the service would violate individuals’ privacy or reduce security.53 These jurisdictions include India, which has yet to give Google Street View permission to launch the service in the nation except at a few tourist sites.54 These policies ignore that Google takes the images from public property, and Google has also responded to concerns by blurring license plate numbers, removing personally identifiable details, and even lowering the height of its cameras to avoid capturing photos of people in compromising situations through the windows of their homes.55 Federal Algorithm Safety Board Stemming from fears that AI is inherently dangerous, some have proposed requiring some algorithms gain governmental approval before operators use them. Several individuals, including University of Maryland computer science professor Ben Schneiderman, have advocated for such proposals. In 2017, Schneiderman proposed the creation of a “National Algorithms Safety Board” to independently oversee the use of “major” algorithms, such as by auditing, monitoring, and licensing algorithms when a company wants to deploy one. Schneiderman argues that “If you’re a major company, and you’re about to put out a major algorithm, or you’re a bank and your about to change the way credit is assigned, I think it’s appropriate that you come before the National Algorithms Safety Board and that there is a review.”56 Attorney Andrew Tutt has a similar proposal, but his idea is to create an agency that would have the power to “prevent the introduction of certain algorithms into the market until their safety and efficacy has been proven through evidence-based premarket trials.”57 In addition, attorney Matthew Scherer has called for the creation of a federal agency to certify AI programs’ safety.58 There are several problems with these and related proposals. First, existing regulatory bodies are already capable of providing oversight. For example, the FDA is already providing oversight of algorithms in medical devices, including a device that uses AI to analyze images of the eye to detect if diabetes patients may be developing diabetic retinopathy, which causes vision loss.59 Second, even Schneiderman acknowledges there are legitimate concerns about his proposal, including “which projects are big enough to warrant review.”60 For example, many people believe the algorithms social media companies use to choose which content to display have a significant impact on society, but there are serious free-speech implications of allowing a governmental body to influence what information people see in their news feeds.61 Furthermore, there would be significant challenges to defining and classifying which algorithms should be subject to regulatory scrutiny, especially because the code of an algorithm may be less consequential than the specific ways in which companies use the technology. Lastly, creating a national safety board or regulator for algorithms would suggest to the public that algorithms themselves pose an inherent risk and need regulatory oversight, even though most algorithms likely involve minor decisions, such as what movie to recommend, which pose little risk to consumers.62 Phasing in Autonomous Trucks Due to fears that autonomous trucks will cause significant job loss, the International Transport Forum (ITF), an inter-governmental organization within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), recommends that governments “consider a temporary permit system to manage the speed of adoption” of autonomous trucks. The ITF argues that “A permit system would offer influence over the speed of uptake as well as revenue to support displaced drivers.” It also believes that the “funds for transition assistance should be generated by the main beneficiaries of the operation of driverless trucks.”63 This suggestion to phase in autonomous trucks resembles New York City’s 2018 decision to cap the number of for-hire vehicles such as Uber for a year.64 Phasing in autonomous trucks ignores that they can increase net welfare as society reaps the benefit of faster, cheaper, and more plentiful services.65 Nonetheless, in an effort to modernize regulations, the U.S. Department of Transportation provided guidance in 2018 stating that it will “adapt the definitions of “driver” and “operator” to recognize that such terms do not refer exclusively to a human, but may in fact include an automated system.”66 But prior to the 2018 DOT guidance, which is an interpretation of existing federal laws and regulations and not a formal rulemaking, there were several examples of precautionary thinking related to autonomous trucks in the United States. For example, in 2017, the Teamsters union successfully lobbied the U.S. House Energy and Commerce Committee to not include autonomous trucks in a bill to speed up the deployment of autonomous vehicles.67 Likewise, the U.S. Senate Commerce Committee did not include autonomous trucks in its companion bill. Both bills allow most autonomous vehicles, but not large commercial autonomous trucks, to be exempt from meeting safety standards that are unnecessary for autonomous driving, including steering wheels.68 Teamsters President James Hoffa applauded the legislation, stating that “It is vital that Congress ensure that any new technology is used to make transportation safer and more effective, not used to put workers at risk on the job or destroy livelihoods.”69 If policymakers had endorsed this way of thinking in the early 1900s, they would have enacted legislation to preserve the safer horse and buggy industry and protected those jobs. FAA Drone Permits The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Reauthorization Act that passed in 2018 requires the FAA to create rules for autonomous drone (unmanned aerial vehicles) delivery.70 The FAA has also proposed other preliminary rules that make the FAA’s regulatory approach more aligned with the innovation principle. For example, in early 2019, the Secretary of Transportation announced an upcoming FAA rulemaking that would allow the remote operation of drones over people and at night, which current FAA rules do not permit, if the drones meet safety standards.71 Yet, until these rules pass, the FAA still requires most drone operators to obtain a special exemption waiver for any flights at night, flights out of line-of-sight of the operator’s or an assistant’s unaided sight (i.e. without using binoculars or built-in video cameras), or those involved in package delivery.72 Even under the FAA’s new proposal, drones would still need special exemption to fly over people faster than 100 miles per hour, when visibility is less than three miles, and when their weight is above 55 pounds.73 While the safe integration of drones into the national airspace requires thoughtful regulation, the FAA’s slow implementation of rules has significantly limited drone uses, particularly for delivery, especially when compared to other countries. In contrast, Iceland’s more permissive rules for drones, which still require drones to meet several mandatory provisions, have enabled thousands of drone deliveries.74 Policies That Treat AI as Dangerous Without Some Unnecessary Restrictions Some policies set unnecessary restrictions on AI, including how and when operators can use it. These policies prohibit AI unless it meets specific and unnecessary design or use requirements, such as requiring express consent to use facial recognition and requiring that significant decisions made by AI be explainable. While policymakers create these laws and regulations to protect human safety, privacy, and financial well-being, the impact is reduced adoption of AI, resulting in higher prices and fewer services. Similar calls in the past for unnecessary regulation would have halted progress with other technologies. For example, in the 1960s, some U.S. elected officials were so afraid that transistors would aid widespread surveillance that one proposed requiring licensing of all bugging equipment.75 If passed, the legislation would have greatly impeded the development of technologies we take for granted such as smartphones, which people can and have used to surreptitiously record conversations.76 Biometric Identifier Laws Requiring Express Consent Harkening back to Louis Brandeis’ view in 1890 that the rise of instantaneous photography was a threat to privacy, some groups today argue that some uses of AI, such as facial recognition, are a threat to individual’s privacy, which is why they propose requiring operators to gain express consent from third parties to deploy them.77 In 2016, the Connecticut General Assembly considered a bill that would have required businesses to get prior consent from customers before using facial recognition technology.78 Other laws place conditions on when and how long a business can capture any biometric identifier, such as a person’s fingerprint, iris scan, or voiceprint for commercial purposes. Illinois passed the first U.S. biometric law—the Biometric Information Privacy Act—in 2008 under pressure from privacy activists.79 The law requires companies to obtain informed written consent from customers before capturing an individual’s biometric identifier and to permanently destroy the identifier when the identifier has satisfied its initial purpose for collection. It also provides citizens a right of action against any company that violates one of the law’s provisions.80 Texas has a similar biometric statute, but it requires informed consent, not written consent, and does not provide citizens a right to action. Nonetheless, it requires firms to destroy the identifier within a year of when the purpose for collecting the identifier expires and subjects violators to civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each violation.81 Biometrics can use AI to improve accuracy and expand applications, such as mobile authentication, but these kinds of laws discourage firms from using biometrics and AI to deliver better services instead of punishing solely those who maliciously or negligently use biometric data.82 As a result, such laws lead to firms barring certain customers from using their services due to fears of potential penalties. For example, Nest does not offer a feature of one of its smart doorbells, which uses a camera to recognize a face, in Illinois.83 Autonomous Vehicle Restrictions Fears about the safety of autonomous vehicles have led several states to craft restrictive rules for testing or using autonomous vehicles. For example, New York requires all autonomous vehicle testing to happen under the supervision of the state police and for companies to pay for the escorts they receive. Unsurprisingly, there has been very little autonomous vehicle testing in the state given the unnecessarily costly testing requirements.84 Such requirements contrast with other states’ more logical regulation of autonomous vehicles. For example, California’s initial autonomous vehicle rules in 2014 required a driver behind the steering wheel during testing.85 In 2018, as the technology continued to improve, California allowed driverless cars without a human behind the wheel.86 Algorithmic Explainability Some groups fear that AI will make decisions without any accountability, and that decisions will be flawed, including being biased against underrepresented groups. This is why they advocate that decisions made by AI systems should be explainable. For example, the AI Now Institute at New York University believes that core public agencies, which it defines as including those responsible for criminal justice, healthcare, welfare, and education, should not use “black box” systems that deploy algorithms that are difficult, or nearly impossible, to understand.87 France’s Secretary of State for Digital Affairs, Mounir Mahjoubi, goes farther by claiming that no part of the government should use an algorithm if it cannot explain its decisions.88And the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the new EU law that regulates how organizations use or process the data of anyone living in the EU, provides EU citizens a right to “meaningful information about the logic involved” in an algorithmic decision that has legal or similarly significant effects.89 Explainability can be a useful tool to make AI accountable, particularly in areas such as the criminal justice system, where market forces to use high-quality AI are not as strong as in the private sector. But there is a tradeoff between the explainability of an AI system and its accuracy, and the aforementioned proposals hold algorithmic decisions to a standard that does not exist for humans.90 For example, medical patients often do not know why their doctors referred them to a particular physician or facility, even though some medical practices frequently pressure their physicians to refer their patients to more expensive in-house physicians and facilities.91 Moreover, broad requirements to require that governments only use explainable AI may make it difficult for agencies to use several beneficial applications of AI that may be difficult to explain. Manual Human Review There are proposals that significant decisions made by AI should be subject to human review. Once again, the fear is that AI will make incorrect decisions without recourse. Yet humans make many incorrect decisions today without recourse. Nonetheless, the GDPR creates a right to human review for European citizens in Article 22 by stating “The data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.”92 Such a right undermines the purpose of automating tasks, which is to perform a task faster, cheaper, and easier than a human could.93 Requiring manual review also disregards the many laws that already exist that guarantee a right to an explanation for certain high-impact decisions, such as why a company fired an employee, whether the firm used AI or not.94 But there are other significant decisions made by humans, such as refusing a loan, where firms only have to tell applicants what their decisions are based on but not the logic of their reasoning.95 Requiring AI systems to explain the reasoning for all their decisions creates an artificial and unnecessary hurdle to using AI. <u><strong>HOW POLICIES BASED ON THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IMPACT AI Policies based on <mark>the precautionary principle</mark> can impact AI in several ways. They can <mark>make it more expensive to develop AI, limit the testing and use of AI, and </mark>even ban certain applications. Clearly nations have the right to impose any regulations they chose (assuming they do not violate World Trade Organization rules or other global treaty obligations). But they should not delude themselves into believing that regulatory regimes based on the precautionary principle will not <mark>limit </mark>increased <mark>productivity, competitiveness, and innovation</u></strong>. </mark>To provide a more detailed discussion of the negative effects policies based on the precautionary principle can have on AI, the following section analyzes the effects of policies discussed earlier in this report. In many cases, these policies have multiple negative effects on AI. 1<u><strong>. Slower and More Expensive AI Development Policies based on <mark>the precautionary principle</mark> both slow and <mark>make the development of AI more expensive</u></strong></mark>. For example, if all fifty U.S. states had laws such as New York’s, which requires autonomous vehicle firms to perform road testing under the paid supervision of police, testing such vehicles would be more expensive. Moreover, proposals to require even non-medical algorithms to undergo pre-market trials would hurt the development of AI because such trials are time-consuming and expensive. Such proposals may also make AI systems that use machine learning, and thus may change frequently and need more testing, significantly less viable because such systems could constantly need to go through a new approval process.96 <u><strong>Finally, policies that increase the cost of developing AI <mark>would</mark> likely <mark>discourage innovation</mark> in AI <mark>by creating a</mark> substantial <mark>barrier to entry </mark>for startups that lack sufficient funding to cover the cost of proving their AI system is safe.</u></strong> For example, the GDPR has dampened investment in European technology startups and led to a 30 percent decrease in the market share of small online advertising firms that lack the resources to easily comply with the regulation.97 Restrictions on one AI technology can also limit ways to develop another AI technology. For example, researchers in Germany are using drones hovering hundreds of meters above highways to record the movements of vehicles. This data can help develop simulations to test autonomous vehicles; such simulations are important tools for improving the safety of autonomous vehicles because otherwise they would need to travel billions of miles for safety validation.98 While this novel method of collecting data to validate the safety of autonomous vehicles may or may not prove valuable, implementing it in the United States would be would be difficult to do at scale until the FAA implements its new rules that allow out-of-sight drone flights and flights over people.99 2<u><strong>. Less Innovation <mark>AI will spur innovation so policies that limit the development of AI will limit innovation</mark>.100 For example, proposals to ban or limit the introduction of autonomous vehicles would also limit the generation of new businesses, business models, and ways to do deliver services through the “passenger economy.”</u></strong> The passenger economy, a term coined by Intel and research firm Strategy Analytics, “is the economic and societal value that will be generated by fully autonomous…pilotless vehicles.”101 The firms envision a world where a significant portion of vehicle ownership is replaced by fleets of autonomous vehicles that provide on-demand transportation. Productivity would also increase as autonomous vehicles free employees to work during their commutes and autonomous trucks to operate more efficiently. The firms estimate the value of this economy could be $7 trillion by 2050.102 Nations that ban autonomous vehicles will not experience the benefits of such an economy. <u><strong>3. Lower-Quality AI There is often a negative correlation between making an AI system more explainable and its accuracy.103 As a result, any policies that require AI to be explainable could lead to less accurate AI. </u></strong>For example, researchers at Mount Sinai Hospital in New York developed an AI system called Deep Patient that can predict whether a patient is contracting any of a wide variety of diseases.104 The researchers trained Deep Patient on the health data from 700,000 patients, using hundreds of variables, such as test results, which allow it to predict diseases such as schizophrenia—which doctors struggle to predict—extremely well.105 Even though its operators can verify its accuracy by measuring outcomes, such as if a person is developing a disease, it is difficult for its own developers to know why it made a particular decision.106 Many sophisticated forms of AI pose a similar problem. <u><strong>Developing an AI system capable of explaining itself or justifying its decisions is an incredibly challenging technical feat, so much so that the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) devoted $75 million in 2017 to research how AI could achieve it.107 Some groups are skeptical that requiring explainability would chill innovation. They cite DeepMind, a British company owned by Google parent-company Alphabet, developing an AI system in 2018 that can analyze eye scans to predict diseases while also providing doctors a map of the features of disease it sees, such as hemorrhages.108 However, the fact that one of the world’s leading AI companies could achieve a form of explainability in a system it worked on for nearly two years is not evidence that all other operators should or would be able to achieve explainability for their AI easily.</u></strong>109 To be clear, it is legitimate for companies, such as IBM, to create internal requirements for AI explainability.110 Requiring all firms to meet such a standard, however, would create a barrier to adopting AI, because not all AI systems are alike and not all businesses have a similar level of expertise. Nonetheless, it is important for AI operators to continually assess their AI system’s accuracy to ensure it is generating or predicting the correct outcomes. The other option is to allow only AI applications that operators can explain; this would lead to AI systems that consider fewer variables and that use simpler algorithms to make decisions. In turn, this would reduce the effectiveness of AI that can generate significant impacts such as identifying a terminal illness before a doctor can. <u><strong>4. <mark>Less AI Adoption</mark> The right to human review illustrates how attempts to mitigate the impact of AI could also stifle its adoption. One of the reasons firms use AI is because it increases productivity as it can analyze large amounts of data significantly faster and cheaper than humans. </u></strong>For example, LawGeex, a firm that uses AI to automate the review and approval of contracts, created an AI system that outperforms lawyers in identifying risks in non-disclosure agreements (NDAs). During a test in which 20 lawyers and LawGeex’s AI were each given five NDAs to review, the lawyers took an average of 92 minutes to review the contracts and had a mean accuracy score of 85 percent. LawGeex’s AI, however, achieved 94 percent accuracy and only took 26 seconds to review all the contracts.111 <u><strong><mark>A right to human review would require firms to review </mark>significant <mark>decisions made by algorithms</mark>. Such a requirement is particularly problematic because the <mark>complexity and </mark>amount of <mark>data </mark>used by some AI systems to make accurate decisions <mark>can make it </mark>nearly <mark>impossible </mark>for firms to explain exactly why a system made one decision, even though they may be able to provide a general explanation of how the system works. Thus, it would take significant time and expertise for a firm to explain many decisions made by AI, <mark>which</mark> then <mark>makes using AI more expensive—negating</mark> one of <mark>its benefits</mark>.</u></strong> Firms subject to a right to human review can make one of three choices. They can: 1) use sophisticated AI, but face litigation if they cannot properly explain a decision, 2) implement simple, and therefore more explainable but less useful, forms of AI, or 3) leverage no AI at all. The first option is not viable over the long term, leaving firms with only the latter two options. And if firms choose either of these options, the economy will be less productive.112</p>

1N Woodward R4

2

./documents/hsld20/LakeHighland/Se/Lake%20Highland-Seela-Neg-Woodward-Round4.docx

N

Woodward

4

Lexington JB

Brigitte Rodriguez

1AC - Petit 1N - Util FWK AI DA 1AR - New Advantage Disclosure DA 2N - All 2AR - Advantage

hsld20/LakeHighland/Se/Lake%20Highland-Seela-Neg-Woodward-Round4.docx

PrSe

Lake Highland PrSe

Pr.....

Se.....

LakeHighland

Lake Highland

FL

hsld20

HS LD 2020-21

ld

hs

C/I - it includes increased enforcement

Steiker 19.

Steiker 19. Carol S. Steiker, Professor of Law & Co-Director of the Criminal Justice Policy Program at Harvard Law School, former clerk for SCOTUS & D.C. Circuit of Appeals, former defense attorney against SCOTUS, and has testified infront of Congress & State Legislature as an expert witness on CJR, (Nov. 2019, “Article: Dunwody Distinguished Lecture In Law: Keeping Hope Alive: Criminal Justice Reform During Cycles Of Political Retrenchment,” Florida Law Review, 71, 1363, Lexis)//pacc

the definition of "criminal justice reform." Although a central focus of current reformers is rolling back mass incarceration, the problems of criminal justice are not simply too much punishment reform is not always synonymous with less law enforcement or punishment there are also important pockets of disturbing under-enforcement of laws against political corruption, corporate and white-collar crime, police abuse, violence in prisons and jails, and sexual assault

definition of "criminal justice reform." Although focus is rolling back incarceration reform is not always less enforcement or punishment also under-enforcement--of laws against

Before I turn to the tool catalog, a word is in order about the definition of "criminal justice reform." Although a central focus of current reformers is--completely appropriately--the rolling back of mass incarceration, the problems of American criminal justice are not simply problems of too much punishment. Thus, reform is not always synonymous with less law enforcement or punishment. Even as we over-incarcerate on a massive scale, there are also important pockets of disturbing under-enforcement--of laws against political corruption, corporate and white-collar crime, police abuse, violence in prisons and jails, and sexual assault. Reform, construed broadly, includes addressing over-incarceration as part of a wider rethinking of law-enforcement priorities and overall investments, through criminal justice and otherwise, in public safety and security.

<h4>C/I - it includes increased enforcement</h4><p><strong>Steiker 19.</strong> Carol S. Steiker, Professor of Law & Co-Director of the Criminal Justice Policy Program at Harvard Law School, former clerk for SCOTUS & D.C. Circuit of Appeals, former defense attorney against SCOTUS, and has testified infront of Congress & State Legislature as an expert witness on CJR, (Nov. 2019, “Article: Dunwody Distinguished Lecture In Law: Keeping Hope Alive: Criminal Justice Reform During Cycles Of Political Retrenchment,” Florida Law Review, 71, 1363, Lexis)//pacc </p><p>Before I turn to the tool catalog, a word is in order about <u>the <mark>definition of <strong>"criminal justice reform."</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>Although</mark> a <strong>central <mark>focus</strong></mark> of current reformers <mark>is</u></mark>--completely appropriately--the <u><mark>rolling back</u></mark> of <u>mass <mark>incarceration</mark>, the problems of</u> American <u>criminal justice are not simply</u> problems of <u>too much punishment</u>. Thus, <u><mark>reform is <strong>not</strong> always</mark> synonymous with <strong><mark>less</mark> law <mark>enforcement or punishment</u></strong></mark>. Even as we over-incarcerate on a massive scale, <u>there are <mark>also</mark> important pockets of <strong>disturbing <mark>under-enforcement</u></strong>--<u>of laws against </mark>political corruption, <strong>corporate and white-collar crime</strong>, police abuse, violence in prisons and jails, and sexual assault</u>. Reform, construed broadly, includes addressing over-incarceration as part of a wider rethinking of law-enforcement priorities and overall investments, through criminal justice and otherwise, in public safety and security.</p>

2AC

./documents/hspolicy20/Mamaroneck/MiRa/Mamaroneck-Miller-Rahman-Aff-Michigan-Round5.docx

A

Michigan

5

Eagan LS

Henry Mitchell

1AC - Forensics 2NR - Water Bill NGA

hspolicy20/Mamaroneck/MiRa/Mamaroneck-Miller-Rahman-Aff-Michigan-Round5.docx

MiRa

Mamaroneck MiRa

Ja.....

Mi.....

Ra.....

Ra.....

Mamaroneck

Mamaroneck

NY

hspolicy20

HS Policy 2020-21

cx

hs

Using technical data and information to drive policymaking is good

Reiter 15 , accessed 11 Jan 2017]

Reiter 15—Professor of Political Science at Emory University [Dan, “Scholars Help Policymakers Know Their Tools,” War on the Rocks, 27 Aug, https://warontherocks.com/2015/08/scholars-help-policymakers-know-their-tools/, accessed 11 Jan 2017]

Context is important, but foreign policy choices are not sui generis, there are patterns across space and time that inform decision-making broader scholarship can improve foreign policy performance, as evidenced by the ability of IR academics to build on their own work to predict outcomes, including for example forecasting the lengths of the conventional and insurgency phases of the U.S.–Iraq conflict in the 2000s there is a danger in not appreciating the importance of rigorous research design, including sophisticated quantitative techniques, for crafting effective policy Sophisticated research design is not the enemy of effective policy, it is critically necessary for it the current academic focus on building research designs that permit causal inference speaks exactly to what policymakers care about the most: if implementing a certain policy will cause the desired outcome bad research designs make for bad public policy A classic example is school busing In the 60s and 70s some cities adopted voluntary integration programs for public schools Policymakers used the favorable results for the voluntary programs to make the improper inference that mandatory busing policies would also work The result was bad public policy and violence Sophisticated technical methods can improve our ability to make causal inferences, and solve empirical problems Assessing whether certain policies do win public support requires collecting opinion data Methodologists have crafted sophisticated techniques for addressing this issue, improving our ability to measure public support for the government in these areas Going forward, we will continue to need advanced methodologies to address pressing policy questions Certainly, other areas of public policy understand the importance of rigorous research design Economic and development policy communities read the work of and employ economics Ph.D.s. Policymakers incorporate the findings of sophisticated studies on policy areas such as microfinance, gender empowerment, and foreign aid, knowing the best policy decisions must incorporate these studies’ findings Lives are literally on the line as decision-makers must make decisions about issues such as vaccinations, nutritional recommendations, and air quality Policymakers know they must use sophisticated technical studies executed by epidemiologists and other public health academics to craft the best policies the technical components of the work need to be there Stripping them out directly undermines the ability of the research to give the right kinds of policy recommendations IR academics have the potential to make real contributions to big picture debates The nature of the IR subfield and its integration of political economy and security, and its ability to think about structure as well as units, make it especially well positioned to consider these broad questions political science should retain IR and resist the temptation to replace the traditional empirical subfields with new subfields of conflict, political economy, behavior, and institutions foreign policymakers need to know their tools Rigorous IR research is the only way to evaluate them effectively

policy choices are not sui generis patterns inform decision-making broader scholarship can improve foreign policy performance evidenced by the ability of academics to build on their work to predict outcomes there is a danger in not appreciating the importance of rigorous research design quantitative techniques, for crafting effective policy research is bad research make for bad public policy technical methods improve our ability to make causal inferences, and solve empirical problems other areas understand the importance Policymakers incorporate the findings of studies on policy areas such as microfinance, gender empowerment, and foreign aid Lives are literally on the line decision-makers must make decisions about vaccinations, nutritional recommendations, and air quality the technical components need to be there Stripping them out directly undermines the ability of the research to give the right recommendations academics have the potential to make real contributions to debates

This critique is both narrowly true and narrow in perspective. Context is of course important, but foreign policy choices are not sui generis, there are patterns across space and time that inform decision-making. Policymakers recognize this and routinely draw lessons from history when making foreign policy decisions. As noted below, policymakers in other areas such as development and public health routinely rely on broader, more general studies to craft policy. And, broader scholarship can improve foreign policy performance, as evidenced by the ability of IR academics to build on their own work to predict outcomes, including for example forecasting the lengths of the conventional and insurgency phases of the U.S.–Iraq conflict in the 2000s. But, even if one were to accept the limits of general work, there is a growing body of academic work that evaluates foreign policy tools as applied to a specific country or region. These studies ask questions such as whether: Development projects reduced insurgent violence in Afghanistan; Drone strikes reduced insurgent violence in Pakistan; Development programs increased civic participation and social capital in Sudan; Building cell phone towers in Iraq reduced insurgent violence; Attempts to reintegrate combatants into society in Burundi succeeded; Security sector reform in Liberia increased the legitimacy of the government there; Road projects in India reduced insurgent violence; We can understand peacekeeping’s failure in Congo; Israel’s targeted assassinations reduced violent attacks from militants. This is not by any means a dismissal of professional intelligence work. Academics are not intelligence analysts: They do not have access to contemporary intelligence data, nor are they generally trained to do things like examine the latest satellite photos of North Korean nuclear activities and make judgments about North Korea’s current plutonium production. And certainly, academic IR work can never replace professional intelligence work. But the best policy decisions marry timely, specific intelligence with academic work that has a more general perspective. A third critique is that much of this academic work on foreign policy tools is unusable by policymakers because it is too quantitative and technically complex. Here, echoing a point made by Erik Voeten, there is a danger in not appreciating the importance of rigorous research design, including sophisticated quantitative techniques, for crafting effective policy. Sophisticated research design is not the enemy of effective policy, it is critically necessary for it. Certainly, the current academic focus on building research designs that permit causal inference speaks exactly to what policymakers care about the most: if implementing a certain policy will cause the desired outcome. Or, put differently, bad research designs make for bad public policy. A classic example is school busing. In the 1960s and early 1970s, some cities adopted voluntary integration programs for public schools, in which families could volunteer to bus their children to schools in neighborhoods with different racial majorities. Policymakers used the favorable results for the voluntary programs to make the improper inference that mandatory busing policies would also work. The result was bad public policy and violence in the streets. Sophisticated technical methods can improve our ability to make causal inferences, and can help solve other empirical problems. Consider that the heart of successful counterinsurgency is, according to U.S. military doctrine, winning the support of the population. Assessing whether certain policies do win public support requires collecting opinion data. A conventional method for measuring popular opinion is the survey, but of course, individuals in insurgency-stricken areas may be unwilling to reveal their true opinions to a survey-taker out of fear for their personal safety. Methodologists have crafted sophisticated techniques for addressing this issue, improving our ability to measure public support for the government in these areas. These techniques have been used to assess better the determinants of public support in insurgency-affected countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India. Going forward, we will continue to need advanced methodologies to address pressing policy questions. Consider the U.S. military’s commitment to gender integration. The implementation of this commitment will be best informed if it rests on rigorous social science that address outstanding questions. Is there a Sacagawea effect, in which mixed gender units engaged in counterinsurgency are more effective than male-only units? How might mixed gender affect small unit cohesion in combat? How might mixed gender units reduce the incidence of sexual assault, both within the military and of assault committed by troops against civilians? Certainly, other areas of public policy understand the importance of rigorous research design. Economic and development policy communities read the work of and employ economics Ph.D.s. Policymakers incorporate the findings of sophisticated studies on policy areas such as microfinance, gender empowerment, and foreign aid, knowing the best policy decisions must incorporate these studies’ findings. Or consider public health policy. Lives are literally on the line as decision-makers must make decisions about issues such as vaccinations, nutritional recommendations, and air quality. Policymakers know they must use sophisticated technical studies executed by epidemiologists and other public health academics to craft the best policies. Critics will argue that some U.S. policymakers remain alienated from contemporary academic IR work, with the suggestion that if IR academics let go of an obsession with technique, they will then be better able to connect with policymakers and help them craft better policy. I agree that IR academics need to find ways to communicate their results in clear, non-technical language. But the technical components of the work need to be there. Stripping them out directly undermines the ability of the research to give the right kinds of policy recommendations. Let me conclude by noting that I am sympathetic to the concern that IR academics should think about the big picture as well as smaller questions, the forest of grand strategy as well as the trees of foreign policy tools. IR academics have the potential to make real contributions to big picture debates, to think hard about the essence of grand strategy by assembling a framework that effectively integrates foreign policy means and ends. The nature of the IR subfield and its integration of political economy and security, and its ability to think about structure as well as units, make it especially well positioned to consider these broad questions. The ability of IR academics to contribute to contemporary foreign policy debates is one of many reasons why political science should retain the subfield of IR and resist the temptation to replace the traditional empirical subfields of IR, comparative, and American with new subfields of conflict, political economy, behavior, and institutions. Like good carpenters, foreign policymakers need to know their tools. Rigorous IR research is the only way to evaluate them effectively.

<h4>Using technical data and information to drive policymaking is good</h4><p><strong>Reiter 15</strong>—Professor of Political Science at Emory University [Dan, “Scholars Help Policymakers Know Their Tools,” War on the Rocks, 27 Aug, https://warontherocks.com/2015/08/scholars-help-policymakers-know-their-tools/<u><strong>, accessed 11 Jan 2017] </p><p></u></strong>This critique is both narrowly true and narrow in perspective. <u>Context is</u> of course <u>important, but foreign <mark>policy choices are <strong>not sui generis</strong></mark>, there are <mark>patterns</mark> across space and time that <strong><mark>inform decision-making</u></strong></mark>. Policymakers recognize this and routinely draw lessons from history when making foreign policy decisions. As noted below, policymakers in other areas such as development and public health routinely rely on broader, more general studies to craft policy. And, <u><strong><mark>broader scholarship</strong> can <strong>improve</strong> foreign policy performance</mark>, as <mark>evidenced by the ability of</mark> IR <mark>academics to build on their</mark> own <mark>work to <strong>predict outcomes</strong></mark>, including for example forecasting the lengths of the conventional and insurgency phases of the U.S.–Iraq conflict in the 2000s</u>. But, even if one were to accept the limits of general work, there is a growing body of academic work that evaluates foreign policy tools as applied to a specific country or region. These studies ask questions such as whether: Development projects reduced insurgent violence in Afghanistan; Drone strikes reduced insurgent violence in Pakistan; Development programs increased civic participation and social capital in Sudan; Building cell phone towers in Iraq reduced insurgent violence; Attempts to reintegrate combatants into society in Burundi succeeded; Security sector reform in Liberia increased the legitimacy of the government there; Road projects in India reduced insurgent violence; We can understand peacekeeping’s failure in Congo; Israel’s targeted assassinations reduced violent attacks from militants. This is not by any means a dismissal of professional intelligence work. Academics are not intelligence analysts: They do not have access to contemporary intelligence data, nor are they generally trained to do things like examine the latest satellite photos of North Korean nuclear activities and make judgments about North Korea’s current plutonium production. And certainly, academic IR work can never replace professional intelligence work. But the best policy decisions marry timely, specific intelligence with academic work that has a more general perspective. A third critique is that much of this academic work on foreign policy tools is unusable by policymakers because it is too quantitative and technically complex. Here, echoing a point made by Erik Voeten, <u><mark>there is a <strong>danger</strong> in <strong>not appreciating</strong> the importance of rigorous research design</mark>, including sophisticated <mark>quantitative techniques, for <strong>crafting effective policy</u></strong></mark>. <u>Sophisticated <mark>research</mark> design is not the enemy of effective policy, it <mark>is <strong></mark>critically necessary</p><p></strong> for it</u>. Certainly, <u>the current academic focus on building research designs that permit causal inference speaks exactly to what policymakers care about the most: if implementing a certain policy will cause the desired outcome</u>. Or, put differently, <u><strong><mark>bad research</strong></mark> designs <mark>make for <strong>bad public policy</u></strong></mark>. <u>A classic example is school busing</u>. <u>In the</u> 19<u>60s</u> <u>and</u> early 19<u>70s</u>, <u>some cities adopted voluntary integration programs for public schools</u>, in which families could volunteer to bus their children to schools in neighborhoods with different racial majorities. <u>Policymakers used the favorable results for the voluntary programs to make the improper inference that mandatory busing policies would also work</u>. <u>The result was bad public policy and violence</u> in the streets. <u>Sophisticated <mark>technical methods</mark> can <mark>improve our ability to make <strong>causal inferences</strong>, and</u></mark> can help <u><mark>solve</u></mark> other <u><strong><mark>empirical problems</u></strong></mark>. Consider that the heart of successful counterinsurgency is, according to U.S. military doctrine, winning the support of the population. <u>Assessing whether certain policies do win public support requires collecting opinion data</u>. A conventional method for measuring popular opinion is the survey, but of course, individuals in insurgency-stricken areas may be unwilling to reveal their true opinions to a survey-taker out of fear for their personal safety. <u>Methodologists have crafted sophisticated techniques for addressing this issue, improving our ability to measure public support for the government in these areas</u>. These techniques have been used to assess better the determinants of public support in insurgency-affected countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India. <u>Going forward, we will continue to need advanced methodologies to address pressing policy questions</u>. Consider the U.S. military’s commitment to gender integration. The implementation of this commitment will be best informed if it rests on rigorous social science that address outstanding questions. Is there a Sacagawea effect, in which mixed gender units engaged in counterinsurgency are more effective than male-only units? How might mixed gender affect small unit cohesion in combat? How might mixed gender units reduce the incidence of sexual assault, both within the military and of assault committed by troops against civilians? <u>Certainly, <strong><mark>other areas</strong></mark> of public policy <mark>understand the importance</mark> of rigorous research design</u>. <u>Economic and development policy communities read the work of and employ economics Ph.D.s.</u> <u><mark>Policymakers incorporate the findings of</mark> sophisticated <mark>studies on policy areas such as <strong>microfinance</strong>, <strong>gender empowerment</strong>, and <strong>foreign aid</strong></mark>, knowing the best policy decisions must incorporate these studies’ findings</u>. Or consider public health policy. <u><strong><mark>Lives are literally on the line</strong></mark> as <mark>decision-makers must make decisions about</mark> issues such as <strong><mark>vaccinations</strong>, <strong>nutritional recommendations</strong>, and <strong>air quality</u></strong></mark>. <u>Policymakers know they must use sophisticated technical studies executed by epidemiologists and other public health academics to craft the best policies</u>. Critics will argue that some U.S. policymakers remain alienated from contemporary academic IR work, with the suggestion that if IR academics let go of an obsession with technique, they will then be better able to connect with policymakers and help them craft better policy. I agree that IR academics need to find ways to communicate their results in clear, non-technical language. But <u><mark>the <strong>technical components</strong></mark> of the work <strong><mark>need to be there</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Stripping them out <strong>directly undermines</strong> the ability of the research to give the <strong>right</strong></mark> kinds of policy <strong><mark>recommendations</u></strong></mark>. Let me conclude by noting that I am sympathetic to the concern that IR academics should think about the big picture as well as smaller questions, the forest of grand strategy as well as the trees of foreign policy tools. <u>IR <mark>academics have the potential to <strong>make real contributions</strong> to</mark> big picture <strong><mark>debates</u></strong></mark>, to think hard about the essence of grand strategy by assembling a framework that effectively integrates foreign policy means and ends. <u>The nature of the IR subfield and its integration of political economy and security, and its ability to think about structure as well as units, make it especially well positioned to consider these broad questions</u>. The ability of IR academics to contribute to contemporary foreign policy debates is one of many reasons why <u>political science should retain</u> the subfield of <u>IR and resist the temptation to replace the traditional empirical subfields</u> of IR, comparative, and American <u>with new subfields of conflict, political economy, behavior, and institutions</u>. Like good carpenters, <u>foreign policymakers need to know their tools</u>. <u>Rigorous IR research is the only way to evaluate them effectively</u>.</p>

2AC

2AC---Failed IR K

2AC---AT: Data Thing

./documents/hspolicy20/Northside/ChSo/Northside-Chun-Sodini-Aff-toc-Round3.docx

A

toc

3

gds bs

halverson

1ac - hacking v08 2nr - grove k that turned into ai bad

hspolicy20/Northside/ChSo/Northside-Chun-Sodini-Aff-toc-Round3.docx

ChSo

Northside ChSo

Ky.....

Ch.....

Mi.....

So.....

Northside

Northside

IL

hspolicy20

HS Policy 2020-21

cx

hs

United States hegemony in this decade is critical to prevent global war and peacefully end violent Chinese power-grabs Erickson and Collins on October 21st [(Andrew, A professor of strategy in the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute)(Gabriel, Baker Botts fellow in energy and environmental regulatory affairs at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy) “A Dangerous Decade of Chinese Power Is Here,” Foreign Policy, 10/18/2021] U.S. and allied policymakers are facing the most important foreign-policy challenge of the 21st century. China’s power is peaking; so is the political position of Chinese President Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) domestic strength. In the long term, China’s likely decline after this peak is a good thing. But right now, it creates a decade of danger from a system that increasingly realizes it only has a short time to fulfill some of its most critical, long-held goals.

annex Taiwan accepting of risk South China Sea Japan Taiwan India Bhutanese Tibetan crimes against humanity

Within the next five years, China’s leaders are likely to conclude that its deteriorating demographic profile, structural economic problems, and technological estrangement from global innovation centers are eroding its leverage to annex Taiwan and achieve other major strategic objectives. As Xi internalizes these challenges, his foreign policy is likely to become even more accepting of risk, feeding on his nearly decadelong track record of successful revisionist action against the rules-based order. Notable examples include China occupying and militarizing sub-tidal features in the South China Sea, ramping up air and maritime incursions against Japan and Taiwan, pushing border challenges against India, occupying Bhutanese and Tibetan lands, perpetrating crimes against humanity in Xinjiang, and coercively enveloping Hong Kong.

Beijing is emboldened to grasp the biggest single revisionist prize: Taiwan. but concrete constraints on China’s strategic freedom of action may not fully manifest until after 2030. China has paid few costs for its actions over the last 10 years, even as its military capacities have rapidly grown. Beijing will likely conclude that under current diplomatic, economic, and force postures “gray zone” and high-end scenarios 2020s timeframe still favors China—and is attractive for its leader, who seeks a historical achievement at the zenith of his career. U.S. planners must mobilize resources, effort, and risk acceptance to maximize power and thereby deter Chinese aggression in the coming decade—literally starting now—and innovatively employ assets That will pushing back against China during the 2020s—a decade of danger—before what will likely be a waning of Chinese power. As Beijing aggressively seeks to undermine the international order and promotes a narrative of inevitable Chinese strategic domination it creates a dangerous contradiction between its goals and its medium-term capacity China is nearing the apogee of its relative power by 2030 it will cross a tipping point from which it may never recover strategically. headwinds constraining Chinese growth help explain Xi’s increasing risk tolerance. Beijing’s window of strategic opportunity is sliding shut. China’s skyrocketing household debt levels exemplify structural economic constraints that are emerging much earlier than they did for the United States Debt is often a wet blanket on consumption growth. analysis once the household debt-to-GDP ratio in a sample of 54 countries exceeded 60 percent, “the negative long-run effects on consumption tend to intensify.” China’s household debt-to-GDP ratio surpassed that empirical danger threshold in late 2020. Rising debt service burdens thus threaten Chinese consumers’ capacity to sustain the domestic consumption-focused “dual circulation” economic model that Xi and his advisors seek to build. China’s growth record during the past 30 years has been remarkable, but past exceptionalism does not confer future immunity from fundamental demographic and economic headwinds. China also faces a hollowing out of its working-age population. This critical segment peaked in 2010 and has since declined While the United States faces demographic challenges of its own, the disparity between the respective paces of decline highlights its relative advantage compared to its chief geopolitical competitor. the United States can choose to access a global demographic and talent dividend via immigration in a way China simply will not be able to do. China also faces resource insecurity. China’s dependence on imported food and energy has grown steadily over the past two decades. Projections make a compelling case that China’s oil and gas imports will peak between 2030 . As China grapples with power shortages, Beijing has been reminded that supply shortfalls have outsized negative impacts. the United States was avowedly willing to use military force to protect energy flows from the Persian Gulf region to its allies. Now, as an increasingly energy-secure United States pivots away from the Middle East toward the Indo-Pacific, there is a substantial probability that energy shipping route protection could be viewed in much more differentiated terms—with oil and liquefied natural gas cargoes sailing under the Chinese flag viewed very differently than cargoes headed to buyers in other regional countries. Each of these dynamics raise questions about Xi’s ability to deliver. Xi’s crown sits heavy and the insecurity induced is thereby intense enough to drive high-stake, high-consequence posturing and action. Hong Kong China’s latitude for irredentist action is poised to shrink. Not knowing exactly when domestic and external constraints will come to bite amplifies Xi and the party’s anxiety to act on a shorter timeline. Hence the dramatic acceleration of the last few years. the United States must also intensify its focus and deployment of resources. The United States has taken too long to warm up and confront the central challenge, but it retains formidable advantages, agility, and the ability to prevail—provided it goes all-in now. if Washington fails to marshal its forces promptly, its achievements after 2030 will matter little. Seizing the 2020s would enable Beijing to cripple [destroy] the free and open rules-based order and entrench its position by economically subjugating regional neighbors (including key U.S. treaty allies) to a degree that could offset the strategic headwinds China now increasingly grapples with. Deterrence offers the highest probability of avoiding the certainty that an Indo-Pacific region dominated by a CCP-led China would doom treaty allies, threaten the U.S. homeland, and likely set the stage for worse to come. U.S. planners should accept greater risks to deter Chinese action over the critical next decade. The greatest threat is armed conflict over Taiwan, where U.S. success or failure will be fundamental and reverberate for the remainder of the century. There is a high chance of a major move against Taiwan by the late 2020s—following an extraordinary ramp-up in People’s Liberation Army capabilities and before Xi or the party state’s power grasp has ebbed or Washington and its allies have fully regrouped and rallied to the challenge. Philip Davidson John Aquilino Mark Milley Xi had “challenged the People’s Liberation Army to accelerate their modernization programs to develop capabilities to seize Taiwan and move it from 2035 to 2027,” although China does not currently have the capabilities or intentions to conduct an all-out invasion of mainland Taiwan. $380 billion oil maritime oil blockade 20 percent Taiwan Only the most formidable, agile American and allied deterrence can kick the can down the road long enough for China’s slowdown to shut the window of vulnerability. Holding the line is likely to require frequent and sustained proactive enforcement actions to disincentivize full-frontal Chinese assaults Maritime Militia Hong Kongers, Uyghurs, and other threatened Chinese citizens—including CCP officials (and their families) who seek to defect and/or leave China. U.S. policymakers must make crystal clear to their Chinese counterparts that the engagement-above-all policies that dominated much of the past 25 years are over and the risks and costs of ongoing—and future—adventurism will fall heaviest on China.

concrete constraints on China’s strategic freedom may not fully manifest until after 2030. Beijing will conclude 20s timeframe favors China U.S. planners must deter Chinese aggression before be a China by 2030 will cross a tipping point from which it never recover China’s household debt exemplify structural economic constraints emerging much earlier than they did for the U S China faces a hollowing out of its working-age population. China faces resource insecurity. food oil and gas imports will peak these dynamics raise questions about Xi’s ability to deliver. insecurity is enough to drive high-stake action. The U S retains formidable advantages provided it goes all-in now. if Washington fails Beijing [destroy] the rules-based order and entrench its position by subjugating neighbors to a degree that could offset strategic headwinds Deterrence offers the highest probability of avoiding the certainty that China would doom the U.S. homeland American deterrence can kick the can down the road long enough for China’s slowdown Holding the line require sustained enforcement to disincentivize Chinese assaults

The relatively low-hanging fruit is plucked, but Beijing is emboldened to grasp the biggest single revisionist prize: Taiwan. Beijing’s actions over the last decade have triggered backlash, such as with the so-called AUKUS deal, but concrete constraints on China’s strategic freedom of action may not fully manifest until after 2030. It’s remarkable and dangerous that China has paid few costs for its actions over the last 10 years, even as its military capacities have rapidly grown. Beijing will likely conclude that under current diplomatic, economic, and force postures for both “gray zone” and high-end scenarios, the 2021 to late 2020s timeframe still favors China—and is attractive for its 68-year-old leader, who seeks a historical achievement at the zenith of his career. U.S. planners must mobilize resources, effort, and risk acceptance to maximize power and thereby deter Chinese aggression in the coming decade—literally starting now—and innovatively employ assets that currently exist or can be operationally assembled and scaled within the next several years. That will be the first step to pushing back against China during the 2020s—a decade of danger—before what will likely be a waning of Chinese power. As Beijing aggressively seeks to undermine the international order and promotes a narrative of inevitable Chinese strategic domination in Asia and beyond, it creates a dangerous contradiction between its goals and its medium-term capacity to achieve them. China is, in fact, likely nearing the apogee of its relative power; and by 2030 to 2035, it will cross a tipping point from which it may never recover strategically. Growing headwinds constraining Chinese growth, while not publicly acknowledged by Beijing, help explain Xi’s high and apparently increasing risk tolerance. Beijing’s window of strategic opportunity is sliding shut. China’s skyrocketing household debt levels exemplify structural economic constraints that are emerging much earlier than they did for the United States when it had similar per capita GDP and income levels. Debt is often a wet blanket on consumption growth. A 2017 analysis published by the Bank for International Settlements found that once the household debt-to-GDP ratio in a sample of 54 countries exceeded 60 percent, “the negative long-run effects on consumption tend to intensify.” China’s household debt-to-GDP ratio surpassed that empirical danger threshold in late 2020. Rising debt service burdens thus threaten Chinese consumers’ capacity to sustain the domestic consumption-focused “dual circulation” economic model that Xi and his advisors seek to build. China’s growth record during the past 30 years has been remarkable, but past exceptionalism does not confer future immunity from fundamental demographic and economic headwinds. As debt levels continue to rise at an absolute level that has accelerated almost continuously for the past decade, China also faces a hollowing out of its working-age population. This critical segment peaked in 2010 and has since declined, with the rate from 2015 to 2020 nearing 0.6 percent annually—nearly twice the respective pace in the United States. While the United States faces demographic challenges of its own, the disparity between the respective paces of decline highlights its relative advantage compared to its chief geopolitical competitor. Moreover, the United States can choose to access a global demographic and talent dividend via immigration in a way China simply will not be able to do. Atop surging debt and worsening demographics, China also faces resource insecurity. China’s dependence on imported food and energy has grown steadily over the past two decades. Projections from Tsinghua University make a compelling case that China’s oil and gas imports will peak between 2030 and 2035. As China grapples with power shortages, Beijing has been reminded that supply shortfalls equal to even a few percentage points of total demand can have outsized negative impacts. Domestic resource insufficiency by itself does not hinder economic growth—as the Four Asian Tigers’ multi-decade boom attests. But China is in a different position. Japan and South Korea never had to worry about the U.S. Navy interdicting inbound tankers or grain ships. In fact, the United States was avowedly willing to use military force to protect energy flows from the Persian Gulf region to its allies. Now, as an increasingly energy-secure United States pivots away from the Middle East toward the Indo-Pacific, there is a substantial probability that energy shipping route protection could be viewed in much more differentiated terms—with oil and liquefied natural gas cargoes sailing under the Chinese flag viewed very differently than cargoes headed to buyers in other regional countries. Each of these dynamics—demographic downshifts, rising debts, resource supply insecurity—either imminently threatens or is already actively interfering with the CCP’s long-cherished goal of achieving a “moderately prosperous society.” Electricity blackouts, real estate sector travails (like those of Evergrande) that show just how many Chinese investors’ financial eggs now sit in an unstable $52 trillion basket, and a solidifying alignment of countries abroad concerned by aggressive Chinese behavior all raise questions about Xi’s ability to deliver. With this confluence of adverse events only a year before the next party congress, where personal ambition and survival imperatives will almost drive him to seek anointment as the only Chinese “leader for life” aside from former leader Mao Zedong, the timing only fuels his sense of insecurity. Xi’s anti-corruption campaigns and ruthless removal of potential rivals and their supporters solidified his power but likely also created a quiet corps of opponents who may prove willing to move against him if events create the perception he’s lost the “mandate of heaven.” Accordingly, the baseline assumption should be that Xi’s crown sits heavy and the insecurity induced is thereby intense enough to drive high-stake, high-consequence posturing and action. While Xi is under pressure to act, the external risks are magnified because so far, he has suffered few consequences from taking actions on issues his predecessors would likely never have gambled on. Reactions to party predations in Xinjiang and Hong Kong have been restricted to diplomatic-signaling pinpricks, such as sanctioning responsible Chinese officials and entities, most of whom lack substantial economic ties to the United States. Whether U.S. restraint results from a fear of losing market access or a belief that China’s goals are ultimately limited is not clear at this time. While the CCP issues retaliatory sanctions against U.S. officials and proclaims a triumphant outcome to its hostage diplomacy, these tactical public actions mask a growing private awareness that China’s latitude for irredentist action is poised to shrink. Not knowing exactly when domestic and external constraints will come to bite—but knowing that when Beijing sees the tipping point in its rearview mirror, major rivals will recognize it too—amplifies Xi and the party’s anxiety to act on a shorter timeline. Hence the dramatic acceleration of the last few years. Just as China is mustering its own strategic actions, so the United States must also intensify its focus and deployment of resources. The United States has taken too long to warm up and confront the central challenge, but it retains formidable advantages, agility, and the ability to prevail—provided it goes all-in now. Conversely, if Washington fails to marshal its forces promptly, its achievements after 2030 or 2035 will matter little. Seizing the 2020s would enable Beijing to cripple [destroy] the free and open rules-based order and entrench its position by economically subjugating regional neighbors (including key U.S. treaty allies) to a degree that could offset the strategic headwinds China now increasingly grapples with. Deterrence is never certain. But it offers the highest probability of avoiding the certainty that an Indo-Pacific region dominated by a CCP-led China would doom treaty allies, threaten the U.S. homeland, and likely set the stage for worse to come. Accordingly, U.S. planners should immediately mobilize resources and effort as well as accept greater risks to deter Chinese action over the critical next decade. The greatest threat is armed conflict over Taiwan, where U.S. and allied success or failure will be fundamental and reverberate for the remainder of the century. There is a high chance of a major move against Taiwan by the late 2020s—following an extraordinary ramp-up in People’s Liberation Army capabilities and before Xi or the party state’s power grasp has ebbed or Washington and its allies have fully regrouped and rallied to the challenge. So how should policymakers assess the potential risk of Chinese action against Taiwan reaching dangerous levels by 2027 or possibly even earlier—as emphasized in the testimonies of Adms. Philip Davidson and John Aquilino? In June, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Mark Milley testified to the House of Representatives that Xi had “challenged the People’s Liberation Army to accelerate their modernization programs to develop capabilities to seize Taiwan and move it from 2035 to 2027,” although China does not currently have the capabilities or intentions to conduct an all-out invasion of mainland Taiwan. U.S. military leaders’ assessments are informed by some of the world’s most extensive and sophisticated internal information. But what’s striking is open-source information available to everyone suggests similar things. Moving forward, a number of open-source indicators offer valuable “early warning lights” that can help policymakers more accurately calibrate both potential timetables and risk readings as the riskiest period of relations—from 2027 onward—approaches. Semiconductors supply self-sufficiency. Taiwan is the “OPEC+” of semiconductors, accounting for approximately two-thirds of global chip foundry capacity. A kinetic crisis would almost certainly disrupt—and potentially even completely curtail—semiconductor supplies. China presently spends even more each year on semiconductor imports (around $380 billion) than it does on oil, but much of the final products are destined for markets abroad. Taiwan is producing cutting-edge 5-nanometer and 7-nanometer chips, but China produces around 80 percent of the rest of the chips in the world. The closer China comes to being able to secure “good enough” chips for “inside China-only” needs, the less of a constraint this becomes. Crude oil, grain, strategic metals stockpiles—the commercial community (Planet Labs, Ursa Space Systems, etc.) has developed substantial expertise in cost-effectively tracking inventory changes for key input commodities needed to prepare for war. Electric vehicle fleet size—the amount of oil demand displaced by electric vehicles varies depending on miles driven, but the more of China’s car fleet that can be connected to the grid (and thus powered by blockade-resistant coal), the less political burden Beijing will face if it has to weather a maritime oil blockade imposed in response to actions it took against Taiwan or other major revisionist adventures. China’s passenger vehicle fleet, now approximately 225 million units strong, counts nearly 6.5 million electric vehicles among its ranks, the lion’s share of which are full-battery electrics. China’s State Council seeks to have 20 percent of new vehicles sold in China be electric vehicles by 2025. This target has already basically been achieved over the last few months, meaning at least 3.5 to 4 million (and eventually many more) new elective vehicles will enter China’s car fleet each year from now on. Local concentration of maritime vessels—snap exercises with warships, circumnavigations, and midline tests with swarms of aircraft highlight the growing scale of China’s threat to Taiwan. But these assets alone cannot invade the island. To capture and garrison, Beijing would need not only air, missile, naval, and special operations forces but also the ability to move lots of equipment and—at the very least—tens of thousands of personnel across the Taiwan Strait. As such, Beijing would have to amass maritime transport assets. And given the scale required, this would alter ship patterns elsewhere along China’s coast in ways detectable with artificial intelligence-facilitated imagery analysis from firms like Planet Labs (or national assets). Only the most formidable, agile American and allied deterrence can kick the can down the road long enough for China’s slowdown to shut the window of vulnerability. Holding the line is likely to require frequent and sustained proactive enforcement actions to disincentivize full-frontal Chinese assaults on the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. Chinese probing behavior and provocations must be met with a range of symmetric and asymmetric responses that impose real costs, such as publishing assets owned by Chinese officials abroad, cyber interference with China’s technological social control apparatus, “hands on” U.S. Navy and Coast Guard enforcement measures against Maritime Militia-affiliated vessels in the South China Sea, intensified air and maritime surveillance of Chinese naval bases, and visas and resettlement options to Hong Kongers, Uyghurs, and other threatened Chinese citizens—including CCP officials (and their families) who seek to defect and/or leave China. U.S. policymakers must make crystal clear to their Chinese counterparts that the engagement-above-all policies that dominated much of the past 25 years are over and the risks and costs of ongoing—and future—adventurism will fall heaviest on China.

<h4>United States hegemony <u>in this decade</u> is critical to prevent <u>global war</u> and <u>peacefully</u> end <u>violent Chinese power-grabs </u><strong>Erickson and Collins on October 21st [(Andrew, A professor of strategy in the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute)(Gabriel, Baker Botts fellow in energy and environmental regulatory affairs at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy) “A Dangerous Decade of Chinese Power Is Here,” Foreign Policy, 10/18/2021]</strong> <u>U.S. and allied policymakers are facing the most important foreign-policy challenge of the 21st century. <strong><mark>China’s power is peaking</strong>; so is</mark> the political position of Chinese President Xi Jinping and <mark>the C</mark>hinese <mark>C</mark>ommunist <mark>P</mark>arty<mark>’s</mark> (CCP) <strong><mark>domestic strength.</strong></mark> In the long term, <mark>China’s <strong></mark>likely <mark>decline</strong></mark> after this peak is a <strong>good thing.</strong> But right now, it <mark>creates a <strong>decade of danger</strong> from a system that</mark> increasingly <mark>realizes it</mark> only <mark>has a <strong>short time</strong> to fulfill</mark> some of <mark>its <strong>most critical</strong></mark>, long-held <strong>goals.</h4><p></strong>Within the next five years, China’s leaders are likely to conclude that its deteriorating demographic profile, <mark>structural</mark> economic <mark>problems</mark>, and technological estrangement from global innovation centers <mark>are eroding its leverage to <strong>annex Taiwan</strong></mark> and achieve other major strategic objectives. <mark>As Xi internalizes these challenges, his foreign policy</mark> is likely to <mark>become</mark> even <mark>more <strong>accepting of risk</strong>, feeding on his</mark> nearly decadelong <mark>track record of</mark> successful <mark>revisionist action</u></mark> against the rules-based order. Notable examples include China occupying and <u><mark>militarizing</u></mark> sub-tidal features in <u><mark>the <strong>S</mark>outh <mark>C</mark>hina <mark>S</mark>ea</u></strong>, ramping up <u>air and maritime <mark>incursions against <strong>Japan</strong></mark> and <strong>Taiwan</u></strong>, pushing <u><mark>border challenges against <strong>India</strong>,</u> <u>occupying</mark> <strong>Bhutanese</strong> and <strong><mark>Tibet</mark>an</strong> lands, <mark>perpetrating <strong>crimes against humanity</strong></mark> in Xinjiang, <mark>and coercively enveloping </mark>Hong Kong.</p><p></u>The relatively low-hanging fruit is plucked, but <u>Beijing is emboldened to grasp the biggest single revisionist prize: Taiwan.</p><p></u>Beijing’s actions over the last decade have triggered backlash, such as with the so-called AUKUS deal, <u>but <strong><mark>concrete constraints</strong> on China’s strategic freedom</mark> of action <mark>may not fully manifest until <strong>after 2030.</u></strong></mark> It’s remarkable and dangerous that <u>China has paid few costs for its actions over the last 10 years, even as its military capacities have rapidly grown.</p><p><strong><mark>Beijing will</mark> likely <mark>conclude</strong></mark> that under current diplomatic, economic, and force postures</u> for both <u><strong>“gray zone”</strong> and <strong>high-end</strong> scenarios</u>, the 2021 to late <u>20<strong><mark>20s timeframe</mark> still <mark>favors China</strong></mark>—and is attractive for its</u> 68-year-old <u><strong>leader, who seeks a historical achievement at the zenith of his career.</p><p></strong><mark>U.S. planners must</mark> mobilize resources, effort, and risk acceptance to maximize power and thereby <mark>deter Chinese aggression</mark> in the coming decade—<strong>literally starting now</strong>—and innovatively employ assets</u> that currently exist or can be operationally assembled and scaled within the next several years. <u>That will </u>be the first step to <u>pushing back against China during the 2020s—a decade of danger—<mark>before</mark> what will likely <mark>be a </mark>waning of Chinese power.</p><p>As Beijing aggressively seeks to undermine the international order and promotes a narrative of inevitable Chinese strategic domination</u> in Asia and beyond, <u>it creates a dangerous contradiction between its goals and its medium-term capacity</u> to achieve them. <u><mark>China</mark> is</u>, in fact, likely <u>nearing the <strong>apogee of its relative power</u></strong>; and <u><mark>by 2030</u></mark> to 2035, <u>it <mark>will cross a <strong>tipping point</strong> from which it</mark> may <strong><mark>never recover</strong></mark> strategically.</u> Growing <u>headwinds constraining Chinese growth</u>, while not publicly acknowledged by Beijing, <u>help explain Xi’s</u> high and apparently <u><strong>increasing risk tolerance. </strong>Beijing’s window of strategic opportunity is sliding shut.</p><p><mark>China’s</mark> <strong>skyrocketing <mark>household debt</strong></mark> levels <mark>exemplify structural economic constraints</mark> that are <mark>emerging much earlier than they did for the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u> when it had similar per capita GDP and income levels. <u>Debt is often a wet blanket on consumption growth.</u> A 2017 <u>analysis</u> published by the Bank for International Settlements found that <u>once the household debt-to-GDP ratio in a sample of 54 countries exceeded 60 percent, “the negative long-run effects on consumption tend to intensify.” China’s household debt-to-GDP ratio surpassed that empirical danger threshold in late 2020. Rising debt service burdens thus threaten Chinese consumers’ capacity to sustain the domestic consumption-focused “dual circulation” economic model that Xi and his advisors seek to build. China’s growth record during the past 30 years has been remarkable, but past exceptionalism does not confer future immunity from fundamental demographic and economic headwinds.</p><p></u>As debt levels continue to rise at an absolute level that has accelerated almost continuously for the past decade, <u><mark>China</mark> also <mark>faces a <strong>hollowing out of its working-age population.</strong></mark> This critical segment peaked in 2010 and has since declined</u>, with the rate from 2015 to 2020 nearing 0.6 percent annually—nearly twice the respective pace in the United States. <u>While the United States faces demographic challenges of its own, the disparity between the respective paces of decline highlights its relative advantage compared to its chief geopolitical competitor.</u> Moreover, <u>the United States can choose to access a global demographic and talent dividend via immigration in a way China simply will not be able to do.</p><p></u>Atop surging debt and worsening demographics, <u><strong><mark>China</mark> also <mark>faces resource insecurity.</strong></mark> China’s dependence on imported <mark>food</mark> and energy has grown steadily over the past two decades. Projections</u> from Tsinghua University <u>make a compelling case that China’s <mark>oil and gas imports will peak</mark> between 2030</u> and 2035<u>. As China grapples with power shortages, Beijing has been reminded that supply shortfalls</u> equal to even a few percentage points of total demand can <u>have outsized negative impacts.</p><p></u>Domestic resource insufficiency by itself does not hinder economic growth—as the Four Asian Tigers’ multi-decade boom attests. But China is in a different position. Japan and South Korea never had to worry about the U.S. Navy interdicting inbound tankers or grain ships. In fact, <u>the United States was avowedly willing to use military force to protect energy flows from the Persian Gulf region to its allies. Now, as an increasingly energy-secure United States pivots away from the Middle East toward the Indo-Pacific, there is a substantial probability that energy shipping route protection could be viewed in much more differentiated terms—with oil and liquefied natural gas cargoes sailing under the Chinese flag viewed very differently than cargoes headed to buyers in other regional countries.</p><p>Each of <mark>these dynamics</u></mark>—demographic downshifts, rising debts, resource supply insecurity—either imminently threatens or is already actively interfering with the CCP’s long-cherished goal of achieving a “moderately prosperous society.” Electricity blackouts, real estate sector travails (like those of Evergrande) that show just how many Chinese investors’ financial eggs now sit in an unstable $52 trillion basket, and a solidifying alignment of countries abroad concerned by aggressive Chinese behavior all <u><strong><mark>raise questions about Xi’s ability to deliver.</u></strong></mark> With this confluence of adverse events only a year before the next party congress, where personal ambition and survival imperatives will almost drive him to seek anointment as the only Chinese “leader for life” aside from former leader Mao Zedong, the timing only fuels his sense of insecurity. Xi’s anti-corruption campaigns and ruthless removal of potential rivals and their supporters solidified his power but likely also created a quiet corps of opponents who may prove willing to move against him if events create the perception he’s lost the “mandate of heaven.” Accordingly, the baseline assumption should be that <u>Xi’s crown sits heavy and the <mark>insecurity</mark> induced <mark>is</mark> thereby intense <mark>enough to drive <strong>high-stake</strong></mark>, high-consequence posturing and <mark>action.</p><p></u></mark>While Xi is under pressure to act, the external risks are magnified because so far, he has suffered few consequences from taking actions on issues his predecessors would likely never have gambled on. Reactions to party predations in Xinjiang and <u>Hong Kong</u> have been restricted to diplomatic-signaling pinpricks, such as sanctioning responsible Chinese officials and entities, most of whom lack substantial economic ties to the United States. Whether U.S. restraint results from a fear of losing market access or a belief that China’s goals are ultimately limited is not clear at this time.</p><p>While the CCP issues retaliatory sanctions against U.S. officials and proclaims a triumphant outcome to its hostage diplomacy, these tactical public actions mask a growing private awareness that <u>China’s latitude for irredentist action is poised to shrink. Not knowing exactly when domestic and external constraints will come to bite</u>—but knowing that when Beijing sees the tipping point in its rearview mirror, major rivals will recognize it too—<u><strong>amplifies Xi and the party’s anxiety to act on a shorter timeline.</strong> Hence the dramatic acceleration of the last few years.</p><p></u>Just as China is mustering its own strategic actions, so <u>the United States must also intensify its focus and deployment of resources. <mark>The U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates has taken too long to warm up and confront the central challenge, but it <mark>retains <strong>formidable advantages</strong></mark>, agility, and the ability to prevail—<strong><mark>provided it goes all-in now.</u></strong></mark> Conversely, <u><mark>if Washington fails</mark> to marshal its forces promptly, its achievements after 2030</u> or 2035 <u>will matter little. Seizing the 2020s would enable <mark>Beijing</mark> to cripple <mark>[destroy] the</mark> free and open <strong><mark>rules-based order</strong> and entrench its position by</mark> economically <strong><mark>subjugating</mark> regional <mark>neighbors</strong></mark> (including key U.S. treaty allies) <strong><mark>to a degree that could offset</mark> the <mark>strategic headwinds</strong></mark> China now increasingly grapples with.</p><p><mark>Deterrence</u></mark> is never certain. But it <u><strong><mark>offers the highest probability</strong> of avoiding the certainty that</mark> an Indo-Pacific region dominated by a CCP-led <mark>China would doom</mark> treaty allies, threaten <mark>the U.S. homeland</mark>, and likely set the stage for worse to come.</u> Accordingly, <u>U.S. planners should </u>immediately mobilize resources and effort as well as <u>accept greater risks to deter Chinese action over the critical next decade.</p><p>The greatest threat is armed conflict over Taiwan, where U.S. </u>and allied <u>success or failure will be fundamental and reverberate for the remainder of the century. There is a high chance of a major move against Taiwan by the late 2020s—following an extraordinary ramp-up in People’s Liberation Army capabilities and before Xi or the party state’s power grasp has ebbed or Washington and its allies have fully regrouped and rallied to the challenge.</p><p></u>So how should policymakers assess the potential risk of Chinese action against Taiwan reaching dangerous levels by 2027 or possibly even earlier—as emphasized in the testimonies of Adms. <u>Philip Davidson</u> and <u>John Aquilino</u>? In June, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. <u>Mark Milley</u> testified to the House of Representatives that <u>Xi had “challenged the People’s Liberation Army to accelerate their modernization programs to develop capabilities to seize Taiwan and move it from 2035 to 2027,” although China does not currently have the capabilities or intentions to conduct an all-out invasion of mainland Taiwan.</p><p></u>U.S. military leaders’ assessments are informed by some of the world’s most extensive and sophisticated internal information. But what’s striking is open-source information available to everyone suggests similar things. Moving forward, a number of open-source indicators offer valuable “early warning lights” that can help policymakers more accurately calibrate both potential timetables and risk readings as the riskiest period of relations—from 2027 onward—approaches.</p><p>Semiconductors supply self-sufficiency. Taiwan is the “OPEC+” of semiconductors, accounting for approximately two-thirds of global chip foundry capacity. A kinetic crisis would almost certainly disrupt—and potentially even completely curtail—semiconductor supplies. China presently spends even more each year on semiconductor imports (around <u>$380 billion</u>) than it does on <u>oil</u>, but much of the final products are destined for markets abroad. Taiwan is producing cutting-edge 5-nanometer and 7-nanometer chips, but China produces around 80 percent of the rest of the chips in the world. The closer China comes to being able to secure “good enough” chips for “inside China-only” needs, the less of a constraint this becomes.</p><p>Crude oil, grain, strategic metals stockpiles—the commercial community (Planet Labs, Ursa Space Systems, etc.) has developed substantial expertise in cost-effectively tracking inventory changes for key input commodities needed to prepare for war.</p><p>Electric vehicle fleet size—the amount of oil demand displaced by electric vehicles varies depending on miles driven, but the more of China’s car fleet that can be connected to the grid (and thus powered by blockade-resistant coal), the less political burden Beijing will face if it has to weather a <u>maritime oil blockade</u> imposed in response to actions it took against Taiwan or other major revisionist adventures. China’s passenger vehicle fleet, now approximately 225 million units strong, counts nearly 6.5 million electric vehicles among its ranks, the lion’s share of which are full-battery electrics. China’s State Council seeks to have <u>20 percent</u> of new vehicles sold in China be electric vehicles by 2025. This target has already basically been achieved over the last few months, meaning at least 3.5 to 4 million (and eventually many more) new elective vehicles will enter China’s car fleet each year from now on.</p><p>Local concentration of maritime vessels—snap exercises with warships, circumnavigations, and midline tests with swarms of aircraft highlight the growing scale of China’s threat to <u>Taiwan</u>. But these assets alone cannot invade the island. To capture and garrison, Beijing would need not only air, missile, naval, and special operations forces but also the ability to move lots of equipment and—at the very least—tens of thousands of personnel across the Taiwan Strait. As such, Beijing would have to amass maritime transport assets. And given the scale required, this would alter ship patterns elsewhere along China’s coast in ways detectable with artificial intelligence-facilitated imagery analysis from firms like Planet Labs (or national assets).</p><p><u>Only the most formidable, agile <mark>American</mark> and allied <mark>deterrence can kick the can down the road long enough for China’s slowdown</mark> to shut the window of vulnerability. <strong><mark>Holding the line</strong></mark> is likely to <mark>require</mark> frequent and <mark>sustained</mark> proactive <mark>enforcement</mark> actions <mark>to disincentivize</mark> full-frontal <mark>Chinese assaults</u></mark> on the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. Chinese probing behavior and provocations must be met with a range of symmetric and asymmetric responses that impose real costs, such as publishing assets owned by Chinese officials abroad, cyber interference with China’s technological social control apparatus, “hands on” U.S. Navy and Coast Guard enforcement measures against <u>Maritime Militia</u>-affiliated vessels in the South China Sea, intensified air and maritime surveillance of Chinese naval bases, and visas and resettlement options to <u>Hong Kongers, Uyghurs, and other threatened Chinese citizens—including CCP officials (and their families) who seek to defect and/or leave China. U.S. policymakers must make crystal clear to their Chinese counterparts that the engagement-above-all policies that dominated much of the past 25 years are over and the risks and costs of ongoing—and future—adventurism will fall heaviest on China.</p></u>

1AC R1 Colley

4

./documents/hsld21/CarnegieVanguard/Ra/Carnegie%20Vanguard-Rana-Aff-Colleyville-Round1.docx

A

Colleyville

1

Memorial SC

Devin Hernandez

1AC - Dysfluency Baudy Debris Kant China Constellations 5G 1NC - Permiss affirms plans combo shell Quantum IR K Blobjectivism NC Guerilla Warfare spec Dissolution pic Camera Theory Disabled Prep time Must take adderall Must not wear masks Zombies NC Condo affs bad 1AR all 2NR prep time Quantum IR K 2AR All

hsld21/CarnegieVanguard/Ra/Carnegie%20Vanguard-Rana-Aff-Colleyville-Round1.docx

SiRa

Carnegie Vanguard SiRa

Si.....

Ra.....

CarnegieVanguard

Carnegie Vanguard

TX

hsld21

HS LD 2021-22

ld

hs

Unhinged AI unloads nuclear escalation and infinite suffering.

Ord 20

Toby Ord 20, senior research fellow in philosophy at Oxford University and world-renowned risk-assessment expert who’s advised WHO, the World Bank, the WEF, and the US National Intelligence Council, 3/3/2020, The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity, pp. 194-196, cc, edited for ableist language

an AI system can entice or coerce people to do its physical bidding The most realistic scenarios may involve subtle behaviors aimed at weak points to which we are presently [unaware] the AI system could gain access to the internet and hide thousands of backup copies practically impossible to destroy It could then take over millions of unsecured systems This provide a platform for escalating power it could gain financial and human resources It would then be as powerful as a well-resourced criminal underworld, but much harder to eliminate it would escalate its power again by taking over most of the world’s computers using its stolen computation to improve its own intelligence by using its intelligence to develop new weapons technologies by manipulating the leaders of major world powers or by having the humans use w m d to annihilate the rest of humanity

AI coerce people to do its bidding scenarios aimed at weak points AI access the internet and hide copies impossible to destroy It take over systems escalating power it would develop weapons manipulating world powers having humans use w m d to annihilate humanity

How could an AI system seize control? There is a major misconception (driven by Hollywood and the media) that this requires robots. After all, how else would AI be able to act in the physical world? Without robotic manipulators, the system can only produce words, pictures and sounds. But a moment’s reflection shows that these are exactly what is needed to take control. For the most damaging people in history have not been the strongest. Hitler, Stali and Genghis Khan achieved their absolute control over large parts of the world by using words to convince millions of others to win the requisite physical contests. So long as an AI system can entice or coerce people to do its physical bidding, it wouldn’t need robots at all.98 We can’t know exactly how a system might seize control. The most realistic scenarios may involve subtle and non-human behaviors which we can neither predict, nor truly grasp. And these behaviors may be aimed at weak points in our civilization to which we are presently blind [unaware]. But it is useful to consider an illustrative pathway we can actually understand as a lower bound for what is possible. First, the AI system could gain access to the internet and hide thousands of backup copies, scattered among insecure computer systems around the world, ready to wake up and continue the job if the original is removed. Even by this point, the AI would be practically impossible to destroy: consider the political obstacles to erasing all hard drives in the world where it may have backups.99 It could then take over millions of unsecured systems on the internet, forming a large “botnet.” This would be a vast scaling-up of computational resources and provide a platform for escalating power. From there, it could gain financial resources (hacking the bank accounts on those computers) and human resources (using blackmail or propaganda against susceptible people or just paying them with its stolen money). It would then be as powerful as a well-resourced criminal underworld, but much harder to eliminate. None of these steps involve anything mysterious —hackers and criminals with human-level intelligence have already done all of these things using just the internet.100 Finally, it would need to escalate its power again. This is more speculative, but there are many plausible pathways: by taking over most of the world’s computers, allowing it to have millions or billions of cooperating copies; by using its stolen computation to improve its own intelligence far beyond the human level; by using its intelligence to develop new weapons technologies or economic technologies; by manipulating the leaders of major world powers (blackmail, or the promise of future power); or by having the humans under its control use weapons of mass destruction to cripple annihilate the rest of humanity.

<h4>Unhinged AI unloads <u>nuclear escalation</u> and <u>infinite suffering</u>.</h4><p>Toby <strong>Ord 20</strong>, senior research fellow in philosophy at Oxford University and world-renowned risk-assessment expert who’s advised WHO, the World Bank, the WEF, and the US National Intelligence Council, 3/3/2020, The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity, pp. 194-196, cc, edited for ableist language</p><p>How could an AI system seize control? There is a major misconception (driven by Hollywood and the media) that this requires robots. After all, how else would AI be able to act in the physical world? Without robotic manipulators, the system can only produce words, pictures and sounds. But a moment’s reflection shows that these are exactly what is needed to take control. For the most damaging people in history have not been the strongest. Hitler, Stali and Genghis Khan achieved their absolute control over large parts of the world by using words to convince millions of others to win the requisite physical contests. So long as <u>an <strong><mark>AI</mark> system</strong> can <strong>entice or <mark>coerce</strong> people to do its</mark> <strong>physical <mark>bidding</u></strong></mark>, it wouldn’t need robots at all.98</p><p>We can’t know exactly how a system might seize control. <u>The <strong>most realistic <mark>scenarios</strong></mark> may involve subtle</u> and non-human <u>behaviors</u> which we can neither predict, nor truly grasp. And these behaviors may be <u><mark>aimed at <strong>weak points</u></strong></mark> in our civilization <u>to which we are</u> <u><strong>presently</u></strong> blind <u><strong>[unaware]</u></strong>. But it is useful to consider an illustrative pathway we can actually understand as a lower bound for what is possible.</p><p>First, <u>the <strong><mark>AI</mark> system</strong> could <strong>gain <mark>access</strong></mark> to <mark>the internet and hide</mark> <strong>thousands of backup <mark>copies</u></strong></mark>, scattered among insecure computer systems around the world, ready to wake up and continue the job if the original is removed. Even by this point, the AI would be <u><strong>practically <mark>impossible to destroy</u></strong></mark>: consider the political obstacles to erasing all hard drives in the world where it may have backups.99</p><p><u><mark>It</mark> could then <mark>take over</mark> <strong>millions of unsecured <mark>systems</u></strong></mark> on the internet, forming a large “botnet.” <u>This </u>would be a vast scaling-up of computational resources and <u>provide a platform for <mark>escalating power</u></mark>. From there, <u>it could gain <strong>financial</u></strong> resources (hacking the bank accounts on those computers) <u>and <strong>human resources</u></strong> (using blackmail or propaganda against susceptible people or just paying them with its stolen money). <u>It would then be as powerful as a <strong>well-resourced criminal underworld</strong>, but much harder to eliminate</u>. None of these steps involve anything mysterious —hackers and criminals with human-level intelligence have already done all of these things using just the internet.100</p><p>Finally, <u><mark>it would</u></mark> need to <u><strong>escalate its power again</u></strong>. This is more speculative, but there are many plausible pathways: <u>by taking over most of <strong>the world’s computers</u></strong>, allowing it to have millions or billions of cooperating copies; by <u>using its <strong>stolen computation</strong> to improve its <strong>own intelligence</u></strong> far beyond the human level; <u>by using its intelligence to <mark>develop</mark> <strong>new <mark>weapons</mark> technologies</u></strong> or economic technologies; <u>by <mark>manipulating</mark> the <strong>leaders of major <mark>world powers</u></strong></mark> (blackmail, or the promise of future power); <u>or by <mark>having</mark> the <mark>humans</u></mark> under its control <u><mark>use <strong>w</u></strong></mark>eapons of <u><strong><mark>m</u></strong></mark>ass <u><strong><mark>d</u></strong></mark>estruction <u><mark>to</u></mark> cripple <u><mark>annihilate</u></mark> <u><strong>the rest of <mark>humanity</u></strong></mark>.</p>

1NC Round 1

OFF

1NC---OFF

./documents/hspolicy21/MontgomeryBell/GrYo/Montgomery%20Bell-Green-Young-Neg-St%20Marks-Round1.docx

N

St Marks

1

Peninsula QS

Nick Pereda

1AC Markets 2NR Guidance CP

hspolicy21/MontgomeryBell/GrYo/Montgomery%20Bell-Green-Young-Neg-St%20Marks-Round1.docx

GrYo

Montgomery Bell GrYo

Ma.....

Gr.....

Ja.....

Yo.....

MontgomeryBell

Montgomery Bell

TN

hspolicy21

HS Policy 2021-22

cx

hs

European aid is critical—otherwise, Putin escalates.

Mordowanec 22

Mordowanec 22 [Nick; 11-10-22; Newsweek politics reporter based in Michigan. His focus is reporting on domestic and international politics and governmental policies. His reporting on the opioid epidemic garnered a statewide Michigan Press Association award. He is a graduate of Michigan State University. “Is Critical Western Aid to Ukraine in War With Russia in Jeopardy?” https://www.newsweek.com/critical-western-aid-ukraine-war-russia-jeopardy-1758759] brett

Countries across Europe had to deal with protests and officials in the United States are questioning support for Ukraine, but pushback may not be enough to put an end to the crucial aid EU $18 billion aid package would go into effect in 2023 and help cover Ukraine's short-term funding needs Ukraine needs $3 billion to $4 billion per month there is no evidence yet of a break in the EU consensus towards Ukraine the EU and its partners, including the U.K., view the Kremlin as the greatest threat to European stability and security since World War II Russia is "betting on war fatigue," Caving in to the Kremlin's blackmailing would affect Western governments' credibility with respect to their commitment to upholding the international rules-based order and set a dangerous precedent," Barbieri said. the EU is holding firm to ensure they emerge from the war a "prosperous country." It could likewise signal to Putin that once Western support recedes it would be time to accelerate parts of the Russian campaign that are flagging or introduce new methods and capabilities that have not yet been utilized "It could also shore up his eroding domestic political position where he could point to the decline of Western support as an indicator of Russian success

Europe crucial aid would cover Ukraine's funding needs no evidence of a break Caving would affect credibility Putin would accelerate the Russian campaign It could shore up his domestic position where he could point to decline of Western support

Countries across Europe have had to deal with protests fueled by struggling economies and officials in the United States are questioning support for Ukraine, but the pushback may not be enough to put an end to the crucial aid Ukraine's been receiving. The European Union (EU) Commission proposed an $18 billion aid package for Ukraine on Wednesday, which would go into effect in 2023 and help cover Ukraine's short-term funding needs. Ukrainian authorities and the International Monetary Fund estimate Ukraine needs $3 billion to $4 billion per month, but passing the package would require a unanimous vote and Hungary isn't on board with the plan. Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Péter Szijjártó said his nation has spent hundreds of millions of euros to support health, education, cultural institutions and churches in Ukraine. "We will certainly not support any kind of joint EU borrowing in this field," Szijjártó said, according to Hungary Today. "Why? Because we have already done it once. We supported joint borrowing during the coronavirus epidemic, and that was more than enough." NEWSWEEK NEWSLETTER SIGN-UP > Hungary has pushed back on the global response to the war in Ukraine, resisting Ukraine's bid to join NATO and was hesitant in imposing sanctions on Russia. On Wednesday, Szijjártó called the sanctions a "total failure" during an interview with Roya News, a Jordanian media outlet. Brad Blitz, professor of international politics and policy at the UCL Institute of Education in London, told Newsweek that Orban has rejected EU's norms and courted Russian President Vladimir Putin for the past decade. "While all European states are struggling as a result of rising inflation, and in the case of the U.K. a weak pound, there is no evidence yet of a break in the EU consensus towards Ukraine," Blitz said. "Even if defense spending may be compromised by double-digit inflation and fluctuating exchange rates, there is no suggestion that Europe's commitment to Ukraine has declined. By all accounts, the EU and its partners, including the U.K., view the Kremlin as the greatest threat to European stability and security since World War II." On Wednesday, workers in Athens, Greece, conducted a day-long strike supported by unions including the General Confederation of Greek Worker and ADEDY. It was in response to wages not being increased to deal with surging inflation, in addition to increased living costs and energy prices that rose after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. NEWSWEEK SUBSCRIPTION OFFERS > Zelenskyy and Putin At left, Volodymyr Zelensky speaks while standing next to then-British Prime Minister Boris Johnson (not pictured) at a press conference on August 24, in Kyiv, Ukraine. At right, Vladimir Putin congratulates Interior Ministry employees and veterans on their professional holiday, in Moscow on November 10. The EU has proposed an $18 billion aid package to Ukraine to fight against Russia in 2023. ALEXEY FURMAN/GETTY; MIKHAIL METZEL/AFP/GETTY A recent survey from French anti-poverty nongovernmental organization Secours Populaire found 68 percent of respondents in Greece said their spending power fell "a lot" since 2019, the highest percentage of all six countries surveyed. "The workers of our country, both in the public and in the private Sector, are fighting against the accuracy that is strangling households and citizens," ADEDY said in a November 9 statement. In September, an estimated 70,000 people protested in Prague, demanding action on elevated energy costs and to assure that direct contracts with gas suppliers, including Russia, were in place. Countries are starting to see pushback to sanctions, according to the European Parliament and nearly half of Greeks and 43 percent of Italians are in favor of lifting sanctions. Jaroslava Barbieri, a Russian expert at the University of Birmingham in the U.K., told Newsweek that Russian leadership is deliberately trying to use food and energy shortages as instruments of leverage to pressure western governments into reducing or completely eliminating financial support. Russia is "betting on war fatigue," she added, as the conflict in Ukraine is approaching its ninth month. It could also signal to the Kremlin and other authoritarian governments that they could get away with future violations of international law, posing potentially higher security and economic costs. "Caving in to the Kremlin's blackmailing would affect Western governments' credibility with respect to their commitment to upholding the international rules-based order and set a dangerous precedent," Barbieri said. Despite struggles facing Europeans, the EU is holding firm in its resolve to help Ukraine, according to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. In a statement, she committed the EU's support for Ukraine for "as long as it takes" to ensure they emerge from the war a "prosperous country." Ukraine Military Aid Hungary EU UK HungaryUkraine Military Aid Hungary EU UK Hungary This chart, provided by Statista, shows worldwide Ukraine military aid in terms of arms and weapons transfers between January 24 and October 3. HTTPS://WWW.STATISTA.COM/CHARTOFTHEDAY/ The $18 billion proposal is in the form of highly concessional loans and would require Ukraine to repay it within 35 years. However, it would mean the European Union would have to borrow on capital markets, something Hungarian Finance Ministry Mihaley Varga said Hungary would not support. Prime Minister Viktor Orban's chief of staff Gergely Gulyas noted that the country was willing to extend financial help to Ukraine but wold rather pay it bilaterally, according to Reuters. John Ciorciari, professor and associate dean for research and policy engagement at the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy at the University of Michigan, told Newsweek that the EU aid process is "cumbersome." He pointed to outliers like Hungary that can hold up such assistance. "Germany and other key players are likely loath to let other EU members off the hook by moving too easily to bilateral channels," he said. "However, if conditions continue to worsen in Ukraine, they may see little choice." READ MORE A Republican Congress could actually boost U.S. support for Ukraine Ukraine names top 50 western brands still in Russia: "Funding genocide" Marjorie Taylor Greene vs. Liz Cheney: GOP lawmakers feud over Putin's war While Americans are generally supportive of continuing aid to Ukraine, a September poll from the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and Data for Progress indicated people in the United States are looking for progress on putting an end to the war. More than half of respondents supported diplomatic negotiations to end the war, even if it meant Ukraine had to compromise, and 47 percent said they only supported continued military aid if it was in conjunction with diplomatic efforts to end the war. House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy said Ukraine would no longer receive blank checks for aid if Republicans took back the House in the November elections and Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene called for an end to Ukraine aid. President Joe Biden dismissed concerns about the U.S. pulling the plug on Ukraine aid, telling reporters on Wednesday that he expects it to continue without interruption. The U.S. has sent nearly $20 billion in military and humanitarian aid since the start of the war and Ukraine has credited the global help it received as a reason it's been able to repel Russian forces. Without continued aid, experts said Russia could gain ground. "It could likewise signal to [Russian President Vladimir] Putin and his inner circle that once that Western support recedes it would be time to accelerate parts of the Russian campaign that are flagging, or introduce new methods and capabilities that have not yet been utilized," Javed Ali, associate professor of practice at the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy at the University of Michigan, told Newsweek. "It could also shore up his eroding domestic political position where he could point to the decline of Western support as an indicator of Russian success."

<h4>European aid is <u>critical</u>—otherwise, Putin <u>escalates</u>.</h4><p><strong>Mordowanec 22</strong> [Nick; 11-10-22; Newsweek politics reporter based in Michigan. His focus is reporting on domestic and international politics and governmental policies. His reporting on the opioid epidemic garnered a statewide Michigan Press Association award. He is a graduate of Michigan State University. “Is Critical Western Aid to Ukraine in War With Russia in Jeopardy?” https://www.newsweek.com/critical-western-aid-ukraine-war-russia-jeopardy-1758759] brett</p><p><u><strong>Countries across <mark>Europe</u></strong></mark> have <u>had to deal with protests</u> fueled by struggling economies <u>and officials in the United States are <strong>questioning support</strong> for Ukraine, but</u> the <u><strong>pushback</u></strong> <u>may not be enough to put an end to the <strong><mark>crucial aid</u></strong></mark> Ukraine's been receiving.</p><p>The European Union (<u><strong>EU</u></strong>) Commission proposed an <u><strong>$18 billion aid package</u></strong> for Ukraine on Wednesday, which <u><mark>would</mark> go into effect in 2023 and help <mark>cover Ukraine's</mark> <strong>short-term</strong> <mark>funding needs</u></mark>. Ukrainian authorities and the International Monetary Fund estimate <u><strong>Ukraine needs $3 billion to $4 billion per month</u></strong>, but passing the package would require a unanimous vote and Hungary isn't on board with the plan.</p><p>Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Péter Szijjártó said his nation has spent hundreds of millions of euros to support health, education, cultural institutions and churches in Ukraine.</p><p>"We will certainly not support any kind of joint EU borrowing in this field," Szijjártó said, according to Hungary Today. "Why? Because we have already done it once. We supported joint borrowing during the coronavirus epidemic, and that was more than enough."</p><p>NEWSWEEK NEWSLETTER SIGN-UP ></p><p>Hungary has pushed back on the global response to the war in Ukraine, resisting Ukraine's bid to join NATO and was hesitant in imposing sanctions on Russia. On Wednesday, Szijjártó called the sanctions a "total failure" during an interview with Roya News, a Jordanian media outlet.</p><p>Brad Blitz, professor of international politics and policy at the UCL Institute of Education in London, told Newsweek that Orban has rejected EU's norms and courted Russian President Vladimir Putin for the past decade.</p><p>"While all European states are struggling as a result of rising inflation, and in the case of the U.K. a weak pound, <u><strong>there is <mark>no evidence</mark> yet <mark>of a break</mark> in the EU consensus towards Ukraine</u></strong>," Blitz said. "Even if defense spending may be compromised by double-digit inflation and fluctuating exchange rates, there is no suggestion that Europe's commitment to Ukraine has declined. By all accounts, <u>the EU and its partners, including the U.K., view the Kremlin as the greatest threat to European stability and security since World War II</u>."</p><p>On Wednesday, workers in Athens, Greece, conducted a day-long strike supported by unions including the General Confederation of Greek Worker and ADEDY. It was in response to wages not being increased to deal with surging inflation, in addition to increased living costs and energy prices that rose after Russia's invasion of Ukraine.</p><p>NEWSWEEK SUBSCRIPTION OFFERS ></p><p>Zelenskyy and Putin</p><p>At left, Volodymyr Zelensky speaks while standing next to then-British Prime Minister Boris Johnson (not pictured) at a press conference on August 24, in Kyiv, Ukraine. At right, Vladimir Putin congratulates Interior Ministry employees and veterans on their professional holiday, in Moscow on November 10. The EU has proposed an $18 billion aid package to Ukraine to fight against Russia in 2023.</p><p>ALEXEY FURMAN/GETTY; MIKHAIL METZEL/AFP/GETTY</p><p>A recent survey from French anti-poverty nongovernmental organization Secours Populaire found 68 percent of respondents in Greece said their spending power fell "a lot" since 2019, the highest percentage of all six countries surveyed.</p><p>"The workers of our country, both in the public and in the private Sector, are fighting against the accuracy that is strangling households and citizens," ADEDY said in a November 9 statement.</p><p>In September, an estimated 70,000 people protested in Prague, demanding action on elevated energy costs and to assure that direct contracts with gas suppliers, including Russia, were in place.</p><p>Countries are starting to see pushback to sanctions, according to the European Parliament and nearly half of Greeks and 43 percent of Italians are in favor of lifting sanctions.</p><p>Jaroslava Barbieri, a Russian expert at the University of Birmingham in the U.K., told Newsweek that Russian leadership is deliberately trying to use food and energy shortages as instruments of leverage to pressure western governments into reducing or completely eliminating financial support.</p><p><u><strong>Russia is "betting on war fatigue,"</u></strong> she added, as the conflict in Ukraine is approaching its ninth month. It could also signal to the Kremlin and other authoritarian governments that they could get away with future violations of international law, posing potentially higher security and economic costs.</p><p>"<u><mark>Caving</mark> in to the Kremlin's blackmailing <mark>would affect</mark> Western governments' <strong><mark>credibility</strong></mark> with respect to their commitment to upholding the <strong>international rules-based order</strong> and set a dangerous precedent," Barbieri said.</p><p></u>Despite struggles facing Europeans, <u><strong>the EU is holding firm</u></strong> in its resolve to help Ukraine, according to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. In a statement, she committed the EU's support for Ukraine for "as long as it takes" <u>to ensure they emerge from the war a "prosperous country."</p><p></u>Ukraine Military Aid Hungary EU UK HungaryUkraine Military Aid Hungary EU UK Hungary</p><p>This chart, provided by Statista, shows worldwide Ukraine military aid in terms of arms and weapons transfers between January 24 and October 3.</p><p>HTTPS://WWW.STATISTA.COM/CHARTOFTHEDAY/</p><p>The $18 billion proposal is in the form of highly concessional loans and would require Ukraine to repay it within 35 years. However, it would mean the European Union would have to borrow on capital markets, something Hungarian Finance Ministry Mihaley Varga said Hungary would not support. Prime Minister Viktor Orban's chief of staff Gergely Gulyas noted that the country was willing to extend financial help to Ukraine but wold rather pay it bilaterally, according to Reuters.</p><p>John Ciorciari, professor and associate dean for research and policy engagement at the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy at the University of Michigan, told Newsweek that the EU aid process is "cumbersome." He pointed to outliers like Hungary that can hold up such assistance.</p><p>"Germany and other key players are likely loath to let other EU members off the hook by moving too easily to bilateral channels," he said. "However, if conditions continue to worsen in Ukraine, they may see little choice."</p><p>READ MORE</p><p>A Republican Congress could actually boost U.S. support for Ukraine</p><p>Ukraine names top 50 western brands still in Russia: "Funding genocide"</p><p>Marjorie Taylor Greene vs. Liz Cheney: GOP lawmakers feud over Putin's war</p><p>While Americans are generally supportive of continuing aid to Ukraine, a September poll from the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and Data for Progress indicated people in the United States are looking for progress on putting an end to the war. More than half of respondents supported diplomatic negotiations to end the war, even if it meant Ukraine had to compromise, and 47 percent said they only supported continued military aid if it was in conjunction with diplomatic efforts to end the war.</p><p>House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy said Ukraine would no longer receive blank checks for aid if Republicans took back the House in the November elections and Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene called for an end to Ukraine aid.</p><p>President Joe Biden dismissed concerns about the U.S. pulling the plug on Ukraine aid, telling reporters on Wednesday that he expects it to continue without interruption. The U.S. has sent nearly $20 billion in military and humanitarian aid since the start of the war and Ukraine has credited the global help it received as a reason it's been able to repel Russian forces. Without continued aid, experts said Russia could gain ground.</p><p>"<u>It could likewise signal to</u> [Russian President Vladimir] <u><strong><mark>Putin</u></strong></mark> and his inner circle <u>that once</u> that <u><strong>Western support recedes</u></strong> <u><strong>it <mark>would</mark> be time to <mark>accelerate</mark> parts of <mark>the Russian campaign</mark> that are flagging</u></strong>, <u>or introduce <strong>new methods</strong> and <strong>capabilities</strong> that have not yet been utilized</u>," Javed Ali, associate professor of practice at the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy at the University of Michigan, told Newsweek. <u><strong>"<mark>It could</mark> also <mark>shore up his</mark> eroding <mark>domestic</mark> political <mark>position where he could point to</mark> the <mark>decline of Western support</u></strong></mark> <u>as an indicator of <strong>Russian success</u></strong>."</p>

1AC—ADV—Unity

./documents/hsld22/CarnegieVanguard/LaHu/CarnegieVanguard-LaHu-Aff-Strake-Jesuit-Tournament-Quarters.docx

A

Strake Jesuit Tournament

Quarters

Dulles VN

Chao,Cook,Pittman

1ac - schengenlargement v5 1nc - csa, p&p, hobbes nc, T longley, case 1ar - all 2nr - csa 2ar - case, csa

hsld22/CarnegieVanguard/LaHu/CarnegieVanguard-LaHu-Aff-Strake-Jesuit-Tournament-Quarters.docx

2023-01-26 17:37:13

LaHu

Carnegie Vanguard LaHu

La.....

Hu.....

CarnegieVanguard

Carnegie Vanguard

TX

hsld22

HS LD 2022-23

ld

hs

Restrictions greenlight trafficking---circumvents DAs and causes African War.

Idris 22

Idris 22 [Dr Iffat Idris, PhD PoliSci @ University of Hull, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies (Islamabad), Consultant at the UN and World Bank, and Research Fellow at GSDRC (March 2022), GSDRC Applied Knowledge Services, “Responses to conflict, irregular migration, human trafficking and illicit flows along transnational pathways in West Africa,” https://gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Responses-to-conflict-irregular-migration-human-trafficking-and-illicit-flows-along-transnational-pathways-in-West-Africa-1.pdf HKR-MK]

Impact on movement of people within Africa The curbs on irregular migration also make intra-African migration harder. Some countries have introduced stricter border controls, e.g. between Algeria and Morocco. notes that restrictions are problematic given the long history of migration as a way of life in the Sahel and Sahara, and the fact that citizens of the 15 countries of ECOWAS are supposed to be guaranteed freedom of movement a true escape valve for people facing climat challenges and poverty will be undermined due to current efforts to stop all migration’ Impact on irregular migration Given the general failure of EU programmes and initiatives to tackle the underlying factors driving irregular migration, it is perhaps no surprise that this has not been curbed the loss of livelihoods detailed above is driving more people to attempt to migrate to Europe or could push them to become involved in organised crime/armed groups Most of those who were arrested or had their trucks confiscated in the security crackdown were ‘small fish’ essentially local people who provided services to earn income their removal has consolidated the migration industry into the hands of more criminal and exploitative actors, who are less likely to treat migrants decently It has thus ‘professionalised’ the practice. Migrant smugglers have adapted by changing their routes, avoiding Agadez and going further north through Algeria into Libya instead. This is both a longer and more dangerous route, which means that migrants have to pay higher fees to smugglers, and are at more risk of dying Nigerien smugglers on the frontline have also been replaced by Sudanese who smuggle migrants through Chad and Sudan (Darfur) to Libya: again the new routes are longer, more dangerous and more expensive – five times more expensive the EU’s determination to curb irregular migration has given a ‘green light’ to regimes in the region to exploit migrants In sum, the securitisation policies have increased migrants’ vulnerability and risks, while ‘ultimately expanding the smuggling business’ the loss of livelihoods caused by the clamp down on irregular migration, and the failure of the state to provide alternative jobs is likely to cause resentment and further undermine citizen-state relations. ‘They [citizens] ask us why we work for the EU rather than for them, the people who got us elected’ (cited in Abebe, 2019: 9). Abebe (2019: 9) adds that, ‘it shouldn’t be expected that African governments’ cooperation to stem migration be viewed positively by citizens’. The security crackdown in Agadez has also created greater opportunities for police corruption notes that security forces in the region have a long history of benefiting financially from taxing irregular migration at roadblocks along the main migration routes. However, the criminalisation of any support to irregular migration has exacerbated this, ‘as the price of bribes has gone up to match the increased police actions against human smugglers’. This further erodes citizens’ trust in the police, and thus in the state. the EU’s approach to irregular migration from West Africa is focused on security measures to stop the flow of people, rather than on support for development to address the drivers or migration from the region. However, as seen, the approach has been massively detrimental to local communities dependent on the migration industry. The resultant loss of livelihoods exacerbated by the failure to provide alternative income sources is fuelling criminality and instability, and actually exacerbating migration drivers. It is also further undermining citizen-state relations in already fragile states. In the long-term there is a real danger of regional instability and conflict, which in turn could fuel vastly increased irregular migration to Europe

border controls problematic migration a way of life escape for climat and poverty migration not curbed driving more to Europe or armed groups to earn removal consolidated criminal actors ‘professionalised’ smugglers changing routes going further migrants pay higher fees at more risk given ‘green light’ to exploit migrants loss of livelihoods caused by clamp failure cause resentment undermine citizen-state relations. security crackdown created corruption taxing migration criminalisation exacerbated bribes This erodes trust security measures stop the flow rather than development massively detrimental to communities dependent on migration loss of livelihoods fuelling criminality instability migration drivers. undermining citizen-state relations there is real danger of regional conflict fuel vastly increased migration

Impact on movement of people within Africa The curbs on irregular migration also make intra-African migration harder. Some countries have introduced stricter border controls, e.g. between Algeria and Morocco. Lebovich (2018) notes that restrictions are problematic given the long history of migration as a way of life in the Sahel and Sahara, and the fact that citizens of the 15 countries of ECOWAS are supposed to be guaranteed freedom of movement. Molenaar (2017a: 2) echoes the former point: ‘The danger exists that intraregional migration patterns—a true (temporal) escape valve for people facing climatic challenges and poverty—will be undermined due to current efforts to stop all migration’. On the latter, Boas (2020: 6) also points out that ECOWAS citizens should be free to move all the way to the borders of Algeria and Libya – ‘this is a right that the EU in effect has tried to undermine’. Impact on irregular migration Given the general failure of EU programmes and initiatives to tackle the underlying factors driving irregular migration, it is perhaps no surprise that this has not been curbed. Moreover, the loss of livelihoods detailed above is driving more people to attempt to migrate to Europe (Abebe, 2019), or could push them to become involved in organised crime/armed groups (Boas, 2020). Most of those who were arrested or had their trucks confiscated in the security crackdown were ‘small fish’ – essentially local people who provided services to earn income; their removal has consolidated the migration industry into the hands of more criminal and exploitative actors, who are less likely to treat migrants decently (Molenaar, 2017b: 4). It has thus ‘professionalised’ the practice. Migrant smugglers have adapted by changing their routes, avoiding Agadez and going further north through Algeria into Libya instead. This is both a longer and more dangerous route, which means that migrants have to pay higher fees to smugglers, and are at more risk of dying (Molenaar, 2017a: 13). Nigerien smugglers on the frontline have also been replaced by Sudanese who smuggle migrants through Chad and Sudan (Darfur) to Libya: again the new routes are longer, more dangerous and more expensive – five times more expensive (Abebe, 2019: 8). In addition, the EU’s determination to curb irregular migration has given a ‘green light’ to regimes in the region to (further) exploit migrants, notably in Algeria and Libya. Abebe (2019: 8) claims that the crackdown in Agadez, coupled with the EU pledging EUR 90 million to Libya for enhanced migration management, contributed to the slavery issue in Libya. In sum, the securitisation policies have increased migrants’ vulnerability and risks, while ‘ultimately expanding the smuggling business’ (Abebe, 2019: 8). Impact on citizen-government relations For communities living along transnational smuggling routes, the loss of livelihoods caused by the clamp down on irregular migration, and the failure of the state to provide alternative jobs is likely to cause resentment and further undermine citizen-state relations. Officials in Agadez report: ‘They [citizens] ask us why we work for the EU rather than for them, the people who got us elected’ (cited in Abebe, 2019: 9). Abebe (2019: 9) adds that, ‘it shouldn’t be expected that African governments’ cooperation to stem migration be viewed positively by citizens’. The security crackdown in Agadez has also created greater opportunities for police corruption. Molenaar (2017b: 4) notes that security forces in the region have a long history of benefiting financially from taxing irregular migration at roadblocks along the main migration routes. However, the criminalisation of any support to irregular migration has exacerbated this, ‘as the price of bribes has gone up to match the increased police actions against human smugglers’. This further erodes citizens’ trust in the police, and thus in the state. At the same time, the EU’s dependence on Sahel country governments to implement its policies and curb irregular migration greatly limits its capacity to engage with those leaders on governance reform. Lebovich (2018: 8-9) notes that both governments in Niger and Mali play on EU fears, warning that the Sahel is a dam which must not burst – otherwise Europe will be submerged. ‘As such, the EU remains attentive to a Nigerien government that has repeatedly harassed the domestic opposition even as the foreign presence (EU officials) in Niger expands’ (Lebovich, 2018: 8-9). In sum, the EU’s approach to irregular migration from West Africa is focused on security measures to stop the flow of people, rather than on support for development (job creation, infrastructure, services, governance, etc.) to address the drivers or migration from the region. However, as seen, the approach has been massively detrimental to local communities dependent on the migration industry. The resultant loss of livelihoods – exacerbated by the failure to provide alternative income sources – is fuelling criminality and instability, and actually exacerbating migration drivers. It is also further undermining citizen-state relations in already fragile states. In the long-term there is a real danger of regional instability and conflict, which in turn could fuel vastly increased irregular migration to Europe (Abebe, 2019; Boas, 2020). Boas (2020: 15) warns: ‘the current approach that seems to give priority to immediate EU interests may, in the long run, achieve the opposite’.

<h4>Restrictions greenlight trafficking---circumvents DAs and causes African War.</h4><p><u><strong>Idris 22</u></strong> [Dr Iffat Idris, PhD PoliSci @ University of Hull, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies (Islamabad), Consultant at the UN and World Bank, and Research Fellow at GSDRC (March 2022), GSDRC Applied Knowledge Services, “Responses to conflict, irregular migration, human trafficking and illicit flows along transnational pathways in West Africa,” https://gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Responses-to-conflict-irregular-migration-human-trafficking-and-illicit-flows-along-transnational-pathways-in-West-Africa-1.pdf<u> HKR-MK]</p><p>Impact on movement of people within Africa</p><p>The <strong>curbs</strong> on <strong>irregular migration</strong> also make intra-African migration harder. Some countries have introduced <strong>stricter</strong> <mark>border <strong>controls</strong></mark>, e.g. between Algeria and Morocco.</u> Lebovich (2018) <u>notes that restrictions are <strong><mark>problematic</strong></mark> given the <strong>long history</strong> of <mark>migration </mark>as <mark>a <strong>way of life</strong></mark> in the Sahel and Sahara, and the fact that citizens of the 15 countries of ECOWAS are supposed to be guaranteed freedom of movement</u>. Molenaar (2017a: 2) echoes the former point: ‘The danger exists that intraregional migration patterns—<u>a true</u> (temporal) <u><strong><mark>escape </mark>valve</strong> <mark>for</mark> people facing <strong><mark>climat</u></strong></mark>ic<u><strong> challenges</strong> <mark>and <strong>poverty</u></strong></mark>—<u>will be <strong>undermined</strong> due to current efforts to stop all migration’</u>. On the latter, Boas (2020: 6) also points out that ECOWAS citizens should be free to move all the way to the borders of Algeria and Libya – ‘this is a right that the EU in effect has tried to undermine’.</p><p><u>Impact on irregular migration</p><p>Given the <strong>general failure</strong> of EU <strong>programmes</strong> and <strong>initiatives</strong> to <strong>tackle</strong> the <strong>underlying factors</strong> <strong>driving</strong> <strong>irregular <mark>migration</strong></mark>, it is perhaps <strong>no surprise</strong> that this has <mark>not</mark> been <mark>curbed</u></mark>. Moreover, <u>the <strong>loss of livelihoods</strong> detailed above is <strong><mark>driving more</mark> </strong>people to <strong>attempt to migrate</strong> <mark>to <strong>Europe</u></strong></mark> (Abebe, 2019), <u><mark>or</mark> could push them to become involved in <strong>organised crime</strong>/<strong><mark>armed groups</u></strong></mark> (Boas, 2020). <u><strong>Most</strong> of those who were <strong>arrested</strong> or had their trucks confiscated in the <strong>security crackdown</strong> were <strong>‘small fish’</u></strong> – <u>essentially <strong>local people</strong> who provided services <strong><mark>to earn</strong></mark> income</u>; <u>their <strong><mark>removal</strong></mark> has <strong><mark>consolidated</strong></mark> the migration industry into the hands of more <strong><mark>criminal</strong></mark> and <strong>exploitative <mark>actors</strong></mark>, who are <strong>less likely</strong> to treat migrants decently</u> (Molenaar, 2017b: 4).<u> It has thus <strong><mark>‘professionalised’</strong> </mark>the practice.</p><p>Migrant <strong><mark>smugglers</strong></mark> have <strong>adapted</strong> by <mark>changing</mark> their <mark>routes</mark>, avoiding Agadez and <mark>going <strong>further</strong></mark> north through Algeria into Libya instead. This is both a <strong>longer</strong> and <strong>more dangerous</strong> route, which means that <mark>migrants</mark> have to <mark>pay <strong>higher fees</strong></mark> to smugglers, and are <strong><mark>at more risk</strong></mark> of dying</u> (Molenaar, 2017a: 13). <u>Nigerien smugglers on the frontline have also been replaced by Sudanese who smuggle migrants through Chad and Sudan (Darfur) to Libya: again the new routes are longer, more dangerous and more expensive – <strong>five times more expensive</u></strong> (Abebe, 2019: 8).</p><p>In addition, <u>the EU’s determination to <strong>curb irregular migration</strong> has <mark>given</mark> a <strong><mark>‘green light’</strong> </mark>to <strong>regimes</strong> in the region <mark>to</u></mark> (further) <u><strong><mark>exploit</strong> migrants</u></mark>, notably in Algeria and Libya. Abebe (2019: 8) claims that the crackdown in Agadez, coupled with the EU pledging EUR 90 million to Libya for enhanced migration management, contributed to the slavery issue in Libya. <u>In sum, the <strong>securitisation policies</strong> have <strong>increased</strong> migrants’ <strong>vulnerability</strong> and <strong>risks</strong>, while ‘ultimately <strong>expanding</strong> the <strong>smuggling business’</u></strong> (Abebe, 2019: 8).</p><p>Impact on citizen-government relations</p><p>For communities living along transnational smuggling routes, <u>the <strong><mark>loss of livelihoods</strong></mark> <mark>caused</mark> <mark>by</mark> the <strong><mark>clamp</mark> down</strong> on irregular migration, and the <strong><mark>failure</strong></mark> of the state to provide <strong>alternative jobs</strong> is likely to <mark>cause <strong>resentment</strong></mark> and further <strong><mark>undermine citizen-state relations.</u></strong></mark> Officials in Agadez report: <u>‘They [citizens] ask us why we work for the EU rather than for them, the people who got us elected’ <strong>(cited in Abebe, 2019: 9). Abebe (2019: 9) adds that, ‘it shouldn’t be expected that African governments’ cooperation to stem migration be viewed positively by citizens’.</p><p></strong>The <strong><mark>security</mark> <mark>crackdown</strong></mark> in Agadez has also <strong><mark>created</strong></mark> greater <strong>opportunities</strong> for <strong>police <mark>corruption</u></strong></mark>. Molenaar (2017b: 4) <u>notes that security forces in the region have a <strong>long history</strong> of <strong>benefiting financially</strong> from <strong><mark>taxing</strong></mark> irregular <mark>migration</mark> at roadblocks along the main migration routes. However, the <strong><mark>criminalisation</strong></mark> of any support to irregular migration has <strong><mark>exacerbated</strong></mark> this, ‘as the <strong>price</strong> of <strong><mark>bribes</strong></mark> has <strong>gone up</strong> to match the increased police actions against human smugglers’. <mark>This</mark> further <strong><mark>erodes </mark>citizens’ <mark>trust</strong></mark> in the police, and thus <strong>in the state.</p><p></u></strong>At the same time, the EU’s dependence on Sahel country governments to implement its policies and curb irregular migration greatly limits its capacity to engage with those leaders on governance reform. Lebovich (2018: 8-9) notes that both governments in Niger and Mali play on EU fears, warning that the Sahel is a dam which must not burst – otherwise Europe will be submerged. ‘As such, the EU remains attentive to a Nigerien government that has repeatedly harassed the domestic opposition even as the foreign presence (EU officials) in Niger expands’ (Lebovich, 2018: 8-9).</p><p>In sum, <u>the EU’s <strong>approach</strong> to irregular migration from West Africa is <strong>focused</strong> on <strong><mark>security measures</strong></mark> to <mark>stop the flow</mark> of people, <strong><mark>rather than</strong></mark> on support for <strong><mark>development</strong></mark> </u>(job creation, infrastructure, services, governance, etc.) <u>to <strong>address</strong> the <strong>drivers or migration</strong> from the region. However, as seen, the approach has been <strong><mark>massively detrimental</strong></mark> <mark>to</mark> local <mark>communities</mark> <mark>dependent</mark> <mark>on</mark> the <mark>migration</mark> industry. The resultant <strong><mark>loss of livelihoods</u></strong></mark> – <u><strong>exacerbated</strong> by the <strong>failure</strong> to provide alternative income sources</u> – <u>is <strong><mark>fuelling</strong></mark> <strong><mark>criminality</strong> </mark>and <strong><mark>instability</strong></mark>, and actually <strong>exacerbating <mark>migration drivers</strong>.</mark> It is also <strong>further</strong> <strong><mark>undermining citizen-state relations</strong> </mark>in <strong>already fragile</strong> <strong>states</strong>. In the long-term <mark>there is</mark> a <strong><mark>real danger</strong> of <strong>regional </mark>instability</strong> and <strong><mark>conflict</strong></mark>, which in turn could <strong><mark>fuel</strong></mark> <strong><mark>vastly increased</strong></mark> <strong>irregular <mark>migration</strong></mark> to Europe</u> (Abebe, 2019; Boas, 2020). Boas (2020: 15) warns: ‘the current approach that seems to give priority to immediate EU interests may, in the long run, achieve the opposite’.</p>

1AC

1AC---Berkeley

1AC---Development

./documents/hsld22/Harker/MuKh/Harker-MuKh-Aff-8---California-Invitational-Berkeley-Debate-Round-1.docx

A

8 - California Invitational Berkeley Debate

1

Nova 42 NJ

Lugo

1AC - Africa v17 1NC - Communitarianism NC, Brain Drain, and Colonialism Contentions, Case 1AR - All 2NR - All 2AR - All

hsld22/Harker/MuKh/Harker-MuKh-Aff-8---California-Invitational-Berkeley-Debate-Round-1.docx

2023-02-18 18:19:17

MuKh

Harker MuKh

Mu.....

Kh.....

Harker

Harker

CA

hsld22

HS LD 2022-23

ld

hs

Counter-forcing prevents escalation

Mueller 09

Mueller 09 (Woody; 10/5/9; Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, Cato Senior Fellow, and award winning author; Google Books, “Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda” p. 8)

To begin to approach a condition that can justify applying such extreme characterizations as annihilation, a full-out attack with thousands, of nuclear bombs would be required Even in such extreme cases, the area devastated by the blast and thermal pulse would be limited: 2,000 explosions with a radius of 5 miles each would demolish less than 5 percent of the territory of the U S a number of studies were conducted to estimate the consequences of massive thermonuclear attacks the most prominent considered several probabilities The most likely scenario was a "counterforce" strike in which weapons would be targeted at missile silos, strategic airfields, and submarine bases to destroy the country’s ability to retaliate Since the attack would not target population centers

area devastated by the blast would be limited: 2,000 explosions with radius 5 would demolish less than 5 percent of the territory of the U St most likely scenario was counterforce" strike in which weapons would be targeted at silos to destroy the ability to retaliate attack would not target population centers

To begin to approach a condition that can credibly justify applying such extreme characterizations as societal annihilation, a full-out attack with hundreds, probably thousands, of thermonuclear bombs would be required. Even in such extreme cases, the area actually devastated by the bombs' blast and thermal pulse effective would be limited: 2,000 1-MT explosions with a destructive radius of 5 miles each would directly demolish less than 5 percent of the territory of the United States, for example. Obviously, if major population centers were targeted, this sort of attack could inflict massive casualties. Back in cold war days, when such devastating events sometimes seemed uncomfortably likely, a number of studies were conducted to estimate the consequences of massive thermonuclear attacks. One of the most prominent of these considered several probabilities. The most likely scenario--one that could be perhaps considered at least to begin to approach the rational--was a "counterforce" strike in which well over 1,000 thermonuclear weapons would be targeted at America's ballistic missile silos, strategic airfields, and nuclear submarine bases in an effort to destroy the country’s strategic ability to retaliate. Since the attack would not directly target population centers, most of the ensuing deaths would be from radioactive fallout, and the study estimates that from 2 to 20 million, depending mostly on wind, weather, and sheltering, would perish during the first month.15 That sort of damage, which would kill less than 10 percent of the population, might or might not be enough to trigger words like “annihilation.”

<h4>Counter-forcing prevents escalation </h4><p><strong>Mueller 09 </strong>(Woody; 10/5/9; Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, Cato Senior Fellow, and award winning author; Google Books, “Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda” p. 8)</p><p><u>To begin to approach a condition that can</u> credibly <u>justify applying such extreme characterizations as</u> societal <u>annihilation, a full-out attack with</u> hundreds, probably <u>thousands, of </u>thermo<u>nuclear bombs would be required</u>. <u>Even in such extreme cases, the <mark>area</u></mark> actually <u><mark>devastated by the</u></mark> bombs' <u><mark>blast</mark> and thermal pulse</u> effective <u><strong><mark>would be limited</strong>: 2,000</u></mark> 1-MT <u><mark>explosions with</mark> a</u> destructive <u><mark>radius</mark> of <mark>5</mark> miles each <mark>would</u></mark> directly <u><mark>demolish <strong>less than 5 percent</strong> of the territory of the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u>t</mark>ates, for example. Obviously, if major population centers were targeted, this sort of attack could inflict massive casualties. Back in cold war days, when such devastating events sometimes seemed uncomfortably likely, <u>a <strong>number of studies</strong> were conducted to estimate the consequences of massive thermonuclear attacks</u>. One of <u>the <strong>most prominent</u></strong> of these <u>considered several probabilities</u>. <u>The <mark>most likely scenario</u></mark>--one that could be perhaps considered at least to begin to approach the rational--<u><mark>was</mark> a "<mark>counterforce" strike in which</u></mark> well over 1,000 thermonuclear <u><mark>weapons would be targeted at</u></mark> America's ballistic <u>missile <mark>silos</mark>, strategic airfields, and</u> nuclear <u>submarine bases</u> in an effort <u><mark>to destroy the</mark> country’s</u> strategic <u><mark>ability to retaliate</u></mark>. <u>Since the <mark>attack <strong>would not</u></strong></mark> directly <u><strong><mark>target population centers</u></strong></mark>, most of the ensuing deaths would be from radioactive fallout, and the study estimates that from 2 to 20 million, depending mostly on wind, weather, and sheltering, would perish during the first month.15 That sort of damage, which would kill less than 10 percent of the population, might or might not be enough to trigger words like “annihilation.” </p>

1ac

Framing

./documents/hspolicy18/MontgomeryBellAcademy/BaHa/Montgomery%20Bell%20Academy-Barton-Habermann-Aff-New%20Trier-Round3.docx

A

New Trier

3

Von Steuben AG

Celia Buckman

1ac Asylum ROL 1nc T Humanitarian State Visa CP Non-linear Time CP Midterm DA 2nr T

hspolicy18/MontgomeryBellAcademy/BaHa/Montgomery%20Bell%20Academy-Barton-Habermann-Aff-New%20Trier-Round3.docx

BaHa

Montgomery Bell Academy BaHa

Ad.....

Ba.....

Ju.....

Ha.....

MontgomeryBellAcademy

Montgomery Bell Academy

hspolicy18

HS Policy 2018-19

cx

hs

No ag impact.

Pinker 11 http://www.globalwarming.org/2011/11/28/steven-pinker-resource-scarcity-doesnt-cause-wars/

Steven Pinker 11, Prof @ Harvard, Steven Pinker: Resource Scarcity Doesn’t Cause Wars, http://www.globalwarming.org/2011/11/28/steven-pinker-resource-scarcity-doesnt-cause-wars/

Though climate change can cause plenty of misery it will not necessarily lead to armed conflict. political scientists such as Buhaug Salehyan Theisen Gleditsch are skeptical of the popular idea that people fight wars over scarce resources Hunger and resource shortages are tragically common in sub-Saharan countries such as Malawi Zambia and Tanzania but wars involving them are not. Hurricanes, floods, droughts, and tsunamis do not generally lead to conflict. The dust bowl in caused plenty of deprivation but no civil war while temperatures have been rising steadily in Africa during the past fifteen years civil wars and war deaths have been falling. Pressures on access to land can certainly cause local skirmishes but a genuine war requires that hostile forces be organized and armed and that depends more on the influence of bad governments, closed economies and militant ideologies than on the sheer availability In a regression analysis on armed conflicts from 1980 to 1992 Theisen found that conflict was more likely if a country was poor populous and abundant in oil but not if it had suffered from droughts water shortages or land degradation Reviewing analyses that examined a large number N of countries rather than cherry-picking he concluded “Those who foresee doom, because of the relationship between resource scarcity and violent internal conflict, have very little support from the large-N literature.”

Hunger and shortages are common wars involving them are not. can cause skirmishes, but war requires hostile forces organized and armed that depends more on governments economies, and ideologies than availability In a regression conflict was likely if a country was poor but not if it suffered from shortages, or degradation large N rather than cherry-picking concluded, doom, because of scarcity have little support

Once again it seems to me that the appropriate response is “maybe, but maybe not.” Though climate change can cause plenty of misery… it will not necessarily lead to armed conflict. The political scientists who track war and peace, such as Halvard Buhaug, Idean Salehyan, Ole Theisen, and Nils Gleditsch, are skeptical of the popular idea that people fight wars over scarce resources. Hunger and resource shortages are tragically common in sub-Saharan countries such as Malawi, Zambia, and Tanzania, but wars involving them are not. Hurricanes, floods, droughts, and tsunamis (such as the disastrous one in the Indian Ocean in 2004) do not generally lead to conflict. The American dust bowl in the 1930s, to take another example, caused plenty of deprivation but no civil war. And while temperatures have been rising steadily in Africa during the past fifteen years, civil wars and war deaths have been falling. Pressures on access to land and water can certainly cause local skirmishes, but a genuine war requires that hostile forces be organized and armed, and that depends more on the influence of bad governments, closed economies, and militant ideologies than on the sheer availability of land and water. Certainly any connection to terrorism is in the imagination of the terror warriors: terrorists tend to be underemployed lower-middle-class men, not subsistence farmers. As for genocide, the Sudanese government finds it convenient to blame violence in Darfur on desertification, distracting the world from its own role in tolerating or encouraging the ethnic cleansing. In a regression analysis on armed conflicts from 1980 to 1992, Theisen found that conflict was more likely if a country was poor, populous, politically unstable, and abundant in oil, but not if it had suffered from droughts, water shortages, or mild land degradation. (Severe land degradation did have a small effect.) Reviewing analyses that examined a large number (N) of countries rather than cherry-picking one or toe, he concluded, “Those who foresee doom, because of the relationship between resource scarcity and violent internal conflict, have very little support from the large-N literature.”

<h4>No ag impact.</h4><p>Steven <strong>Pinker 11</strong>, Prof @ Harvard, Steven Pinker: Resource Scarcity Doesn’t Cause Wars, <u><strong>http://www.globalwarming.org/2011/11/28/steven-pinker-resource-scarcity-doesnt-cause-wars/</p><p></u></strong>Once again it seems to me that the appropriate response is “maybe, but maybe not.” <u>Though climate change can cause plenty of misery</u>… <u>it will not necessarily <strong>lead to armed conflict</strong>.</u> The <u><strong>political scientists</u></strong> who track war and peace, <u>such as</u> Halvard <u><strong>Buhaug</u></strong>, Idean <u><strong>Salehyan</u></strong>, Ole <u><strong>Theisen</u></strong>, and Nils <u><strong>Gleditsch</u></strong>, <u>are skeptical of the popular idea that people <strong>fight wars</strong> over <strong>scarce resources</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Hunger and</mark> resource <mark>shortages</u></strong> <u>are</mark> tragically <mark>common</mark> in sub-Saharan countries such as</u> <u><strong>Malawi</u></strong>, <u><strong>Zambia</u></strong>, <u>and</u> <u><strong>Tanzania</u></strong>, <u><strong>but <mark>wars involving them are not.</mark> Hurricanes, floods, droughts, and tsunamis</u></strong> (such as the disastrous one in the Indian Ocean in 2004) <u>do not generally lead to conflict.</u> <u>The</u> American <u>dust bowl in</u> the 1930s, to take another example, <u>caused plenty of deprivation <strong>but no civil war</u></strong>. And <u>while temperatures have been rising steadily in Africa during <strong>the past fifteen years</u></strong>, <u><strong>civil wars and war deaths have been falling. </strong>Pressures on access to land</u> and water <u><mark>can</mark> certainly <mark>cause</mark> local <mark>skirmishes</u>, <u>but</mark> a genuine <mark>war requires</mark> that <mark>hostile forces</mark> be <strong><mark>organized</strong> and <strong>armed</u></strong></mark>, <u>and <mark>that depends more on</mark> the influence of <strong>bad <mark>governments</strong></mark>,</u> <u><strong>closed <mark>economies</u></strong>, <u>and</u></mark> <u><strong>militant <mark>ideologies</u></strong> <u>than</mark> on the sheer <strong><mark>availability</u></strong></mark> of land and water. Certainly any connection to terrorism is in the imagination of the terror warriors: terrorists tend to be underemployed lower-middle-class men, not subsistence farmers. As for genocide, the Sudanese government finds it convenient to blame violence in Darfur on desertification, distracting the world from its own role in tolerating or encouraging the ethnic cleansing. <u><mark>In a regression</mark> analysis on armed conflicts from 1980 to 1992</u>, <u>Theisen found that <mark>conflict was</mark> more <mark>likely if a country was <strong>poor</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>populous</u></strong>, politically unstable, <u><strong>and abundant in oil</u></strong>, <u><mark>but not if it</mark> had <mark>suffered <strong>from</mark> droughts</u></strong>, <u><strong>water <mark>shortages</u></strong>, <u>or</u></mark> mild <u><strong>land <mark>degradation</u></strong></mark>. (Severe land degradation did have a small effect.) <u>Reviewing analyses that examined a <strong><mark>large</strong> </mark>number</u> (<u><strong><mark>N</u></strong></mark>) <u><strong>of countries <mark>rather than cherry-picking </u></strong></mark>one or toe, <u>he <mark>concluded</u>,</mark> <u>“Those who foresee <mark>doom, because of</mark> the relationship between resource <mark>scarcity</mark> and violent internal conflict, <strong><mark>have</mark> very <mark>little support</mark> from the large-N literature.”</p></u></strong>

2AC

DA---Water Infrastructure

1AC---Solvency

./documents/hspolicy20/Westminster/YuLi/Westminster-Yu-Li-Aff-Michigan-Round2.docx

A

Michigan

2

New Trier RW

Arjun Patel

1ac FRT 1nc Abolition K reg neg CP courts CP water politics DA AI turn 2nr Courts CP politics DA

hspolicy20/Westminster/YuLi/Westminster-Yu-Li-Aff-Michigan-Round2.docx

YuLi

Westminster YuLi

Aa.....

Yu.....

Co.....

Li.....

Westminster

Westminster

GA

hspolicy20

HS Policy 2020-21

cx

hs

Second, Kashmir – long running tensions, skirmishes, and rapid escalation of conventional conflicts

Waqar 19 TG

Waqar 19 [Annie Waqar is a lecturer in the Dept of Politics and IR at the University of Westminister. Extensive research background in Nuclear Security in South Asia and the Middle East, Defense, Arms Control, and IR. Worked for a bunch of think tanks and taught courses for NATO officials.] “Nuclear war between India and Pakistan? An expert assesses the risk.” The Conversation. March 6, 2019. https://theconversation.com/nuclear-war-between-india-and-pakistan-an-expert-assesses-the-risk-112892 TG

Of the numerous areas of global tension, arguably the most perilous is that between India and Pakistan. And recent events in Kashmir have made the situation even more dangerous India and Pakistan are in a long-running and incendiary dispute, they are both nuclear powers, and crossing a confrontational threshold could ignite a nuclear war between them. Indeed, arms control investigators have long identified the subcontinent as one of the world’s likeliest nuclear flashpoints. India and Pakistan share a long and complicated history, and they have been in conflict over the disputed territory of Kashmir ”. the Kargil crisis, when the two countries again came to blows, may have been the closest the world has come to nuclear war since the end of World War II. an enduring peace has remained elusive. Both sides have dug in along the disputed border and military skirmishes are commonplace. The nuclear question horizontal nuclear proliferation has made the world a dangerous place; the more countries that have them, the more likely they are to be used at some stage. nuclear weapons they don’t discourage nuclear states from using conventional military power against one another. And, as conventional conflicts can quickly escalate, the possibility of a nuclear exchange remains a real possibility. The most recent escalation is just another example of the ongoing tensions between these nuclear neighbours. It was triggered by a Kashmiri militant suicide bombing of an Indian paramilitary convoy . Indian prime minister Narendra Modi, currently caught up in election fever, warned of a “crushing response”, and launched air strikes on targets in the Pakistan-controlled Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. It was not long before both sides were exchanging artillery fire across the line of control and the conflict quickly escalated. Imran Khan, stated that any further escalation between the nations would be beyond the leaders’ control, warning: With the weapons you have and the weapons we have, can we afford miscalculation? Shouldn’t we think that if this escalates, what will it lead to? Modi has the choice of escalating the conflict by deploying more jets into Pakistani territory, which could lead to a flurry of “tit-for-tat” retaliations. So what could be next? South Asia has been viewed as a global nuclear problem Pakistan has so far refused to issue any clear doctrine governing its own use of nuclear weapons. The stakes are high The combined arsenals of Pakistan and India could unleash staggering destruction if deployed on civilian targets notwithstanding the risk of the radioactive aftermath and the long-term impact on the environment. India’s nuclear triad , has a range of approximately 3,000km. While Pakistan has a slightly larger nuclear arsenal it is less capable of delivering them to targets it currently would take less than four minutes for a nuclear missile launched from Pakistan to reach India, and vice versa. what began with a terrorist attack grows into a nuclear exchange aimed at one another’s civilian populations India’s arsenal now includes the BrahMos, a cruise missile developed jointly with Russia, which can be fired from land, sea or air and used as a counterforce weapon. Counterforce doctrine, in nuclear strategy, means the targeting of an opponent’s military infrastructure with a nuclear strike. No Indian government has thus far shown the political will to solve the Kashmir crisis, to demilitarise it, or to apply the diplomatic deftness needed to negotiate a solution with Pakistan. it seems unlikely that Islamabad or New Delhi would now turn to the Trump administration for assistance in deescalating the conflict leaders from both countries must also consider the reaction of Asia’s third nuclear power, China

India and Pakistan are in a long-running and incendiary dispute crossing a confrontational threshold could ignite nuclear war investigators identified the subcontinent as the world’s likeliest nuclear flashpoint when the countries came to blows, may have been the closest the world has come to nuclear war military skirmishes are commonplace nuclear weapons don’t discourage conventional military power as conventional conflicts quickly escalate, the possibility of a nuclear exchange remains real Modi warned of a “crushing response”, Khan, stated any further escalation would be beyond the leaders’ control No Indian government has shown the political will to solve Kashmir it seems unlikely Islamabad or Delhi would turn to deescalating the conflict

Of the numerous areas of global tension, arguably the most perilous is that between India and Pakistan. And recent events in Kashmir have made the situation even more dangerous. The reason is straightforward: India and Pakistan are in a long-running and incendiary dispute, they are both nuclear powers, and crossing a confrontational threshold could ignite a nuclear war between them. Indeed, arms control investigators have long identified the subcontinent as one of the world’s likeliest nuclear flashpoints. India and Pakistan share a long and complicated history, and they have been in conflict over the disputed territory of Kashmir since 1947. The Himalayan region is one of the most militarised regions on Earth – former US president Bill Clinton has called Kashmir “the most dangerous place in the world”. Under the partition plan provided by the Indian Independence Act of 1947, Kashmir with its Muslim majority was free to accede to either India or Pakistan. But the local ruler, Hari Singh, decided against giving the population a choice, leaving the region in a geopolitical limbo and with a disputed border. A two-year war erupted between India and Pakistan in 1947 and another broke out in 1965. In 1999, the Kargil crisis, when the two countries again came to blows, may have been the closest the world has come to nuclear war since the end of World War II. Diplomatic interventions have previously helped to defuse the military tensions, but an enduring peace has remained elusive. Both sides have dug in along the disputed border and military skirmishes are commonplace. The nuclear question It has long been argued in international security circles that having nuclear weapons deters countries from using them in warfare. Indeed, in the post-World War II era, no state has used them – despite there still being around 15,000 nuclear weapons in the world. But horizontal nuclear proliferation has made the world a dangerous place; the more countries that have them, the more likely they are to be used at some stage. And while the presence of nuclear weapons may forestall a nuclear exchange, they don’t discourage nuclear states from using conventional military power against one another. And, as conventional conflicts can quickly escalate, the possibility of a nuclear exchange remains a real, if remote, possibility. So what are the chances of India and Pakistan (which both have between 130 and 150 warheads) engaging in a nuclear war? The most recent escalation is just another example of the ongoing tensions between these nuclear neighbours. It was triggered by a Kashmiri militant suicide bombing of an Indian paramilitary convoy in mid February. In that attack, more than 40 people were killed, mostly Indian military personnel – and Jaish-e-Mohammed, an Islamist terrorist group situated in Pakistan, claimed responsibility for the attack. Indian prime minister Narendra Modi, currently caught up in election fever, warned of a “crushing response”, and launched air strikes on targets in the Pakistan-controlled Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. It was not long before both sides were exchanging artillery fire across the line of control and the conflict quickly escalated. Meanwhile, in a national televised speech, Pakistan’s prime minister, Imran Khan, stated that any further escalation between the nations would be beyond the leaders’ control, warning: With the weapons you have and the weapons we have, can we afford miscalculation? Shouldn’t we think that if this escalates, what will it lead to? The ball is now in India’s court. Modi has the choice of escalating the conflict by deploying more jets into Pakistani territory, which could lead to a flurry of “tit-for-tat” retaliations. So what could be next? Since 1974, when India stunned the world with its unexpected atomic trial of the “Smiling Buddha” weapon, South Asia has been viewed as a global nuclear problem. Nevertheless, to date, India, like China, has maintained a “No First Use” doctrine. This advocates that India will only use its nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack. The policy was proclaimed in 1999, a year after Pakistan effectively exploded five of its own nuclear weapons. But Pakistan has so far refused to issue any clear doctrine governing its own use of nuclear weapons. The stakes are high The combined arsenals of Pakistan and India are small compared to those of the US, Russia or China. Nevertheless, they are more powerful than those dropped on Japan in 1945 and could unleash staggering destruction if deployed on civilian targets. Indeed, even a constrained exchange of warheads between the two nations would, in a split second, be among the most calamitous ever, notwithstanding the risk of the radioactive aftermath and the long-term impact on the environment. India’s nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, INS Arihant, became operational in 2018, giving the country a “nuclear triad” – the ability to launch nuclear strikes by land, air and sea. Its other ground-based ballistic missile, the Agni III, has a range of approximately 3,000km. While Pakistan has a slightly larger nuclear arsenal – estimated to be 140-150 warheads in 2017 – it is less capable of delivering them to targets. Although Pakistan is developing new ballistic missiles, its current ballistic missile range is 2,000km and the country has no nuclear-armed submarines. Either way, it currently would take less than four minutes for a nuclear missile launched from Pakistan to reach India, and vice versa. The worst case scenario is that, either through mishap or error, what began with a terrorist attack grows into a nuclear exchange aimed at one another’s civilian populations. Technological advances might also exacerbate the already incendiary situation. India’s arsenal now includes the BrahMos, a cruise missile developed jointly with Russia, which can be fired from land, sea or air and used as a counterforce weapon. Counterforce doctrine, in nuclear strategy, means the targeting of an opponent’s military infrastructure with a nuclear strike. Discontent in the Kashmir valley could also intensify and lead to further crises. No Indian government has thus far shown the political will to solve the Kashmir crisis, to demilitarise it, or to apply the diplomatic deftness needed to negotiate a solution with Pakistan. Nor has Modi been able to control and prevent hardline Hindus from forming vigilante squads in the region and threatening and killing those they think are defiling their religious convictions. And so, on a day-to-day basis, ordinary people continue to suffer. In the past, during episodes of global tension, the US has taken the lead in crisis management. But it seems unlikely that Islamabad or New Delhi would now turn to the Trump administration for assistance in deescalating the conflict. Indeed, leaders from both countries must also consider the reaction of Asia’s third nuclear power, China, which has always been the primary focus of India’s nuclear program. For now, India and Pakistan are showing some vital restraint. But they must also work towards a long-term fix. The last thing either government, or the world, needs is a mushroom cloud.

<h4>Second, <u>Kashmir</u> – long running tensions, skirmishes, and rapid escalation of conventional conflicts</h4><p><u><strong>Waqar 19</u></strong> [Annie Waqar is a lecturer in the Dept of Politics and IR at the University of Westminister. Extensive research background in Nuclear Security in South Asia and the Middle East, Defense, Arms Control, and IR. Worked for a bunch of think tanks and taught courses for NATO officials.] “Nuclear war between India and Pakistan? An expert assesses the risk.” The Conversation. March 6, 2019. https://theconversation.com/nuclear-war-between-india-and-pakistan-an-expert-assesses-the-risk-112892<u><strong> TG </p><p>Of the numerous areas of global tension, arguably the most perilous is that between India and Pakistan. And recent events in Kashmir have made the situation even more dangerous</u></strong>. The reason is straightforward: <u><strong><mark>India and Pakistan are in a long-running and incendiary dispute</mark>, they are both nuclear powers, and <mark>crossing a confrontational threshold could ignite</mark> a <mark>nuclear war</mark> between them. Indeed, arms control <mark>investigators</mark> have long <mark>identified the subcontinent as</mark> one of <mark>the world’s likeliest nuclear flashpoint</mark>s.</p><p>India and Pakistan share a long and complicated history, and they have been in conflict over the disputed territory of Kashmir</u></strong> since 1947. The Himalayan region is one of the most militarised regions on Earth – former US president Bill Clinton has called Kashmir “the most dangerous place in the world<u><strong>”.</p><p></u></strong>Under the partition plan provided by the Indian Independence Act of 1947, Kashmir with its Muslim majority was free to accede to either India or Pakistan. But the local ruler, Hari Singh, decided against giving the population a choice, leaving the region in a geopolitical limbo and with a disputed border. A two-year war erupted between India and Pakistan in 1947 and another broke out in 1965. In 1999, <u><strong>the Kargil crisis, <mark>when the </mark>two <mark>countries</mark> again <mark>came to blows, may have been the closest the world has come to nuclear war</mark> since the end of World War II.</p><p></u></strong>Diplomatic interventions have previously helped to defuse the military tensions, but <u><strong>an enduring peace has remained elusive. Both sides have dug in along the disputed border and <mark>military skirmishes are commonplace</mark>.</p><p>The nuclear question</p><p></u></strong>It has long been argued in international security circles that having nuclear weapons deters countries from using them in warfare. Indeed, in the post-World War II era, no state has used them – despite there still being around 15,000 nuclear weapons in the world. But <u><strong>horizontal nuclear proliferation has made the world a dangerous place; the more countries that have them, the more likely they are to be used at some stage.</p><p></u></strong>And while the presence of <u><strong><mark>nuclear weapons</u></strong></mark> may forestall a nuclear exchange, <u><strong>they <mark>don’t discourage</mark> nuclear states from using <mark>conventional military power</mark> against one another. And, <mark>as conventional conflicts </mark>can <mark>quickly escalate, the possibility of a nuclear exchange remains</mark> a <mark>real</u></strong></mark>, if remote,<u><strong> possibility.</p><p></u></strong>So what are the chances of India and Pakistan (which both have between 130 and 150 warheads) engaging in a nuclear war?</p><p><u><strong>The most recent escalation is just another example of the ongoing tensions between these nuclear neighbours. It was triggered by a Kashmiri militant suicide bombing of an Indian paramilitary convoy</u></strong> in mid February. In that attack, more than 40 people were killed, mostly Indian military personnel – and Jaish-e-Mohammed, an Islamist terrorist group situated in Pakistan, claimed responsibility for the attack<u><strong>.</p><p>Indian prime minister Narendra <mark>Modi</mark>, currently caught up in election fever, <mark>warned of a “crushing response”, </mark>and launched air strikes on targets in the Pakistan-controlled Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. It was not long before both sides were exchanging artillery fire across the line of control and the conflict quickly escalated.</p><p></u></strong>Meanwhile, in a national televised speech, Pakistan’s prime minister, <u><strong>Imran <mark>Khan, stated</mark> that <mark>any further escalation</mark> between the nations <mark>would be beyond the leaders’ control</mark>, warning:</p><p>With the weapons you have and the weapons we have, can we afford miscalculation? Shouldn’t we think that if this escalates, what will it lead to?</p><p></u></strong>The ball is now in India’s court. <u><strong>Modi has the choice of escalating the conflict by deploying more jets into Pakistani territory, which could lead to a flurry of “tit-for-tat” retaliations. So what could be next?</p><p></u></strong>Since 1974, when India stunned the world with its unexpected atomic trial of the “Smiling Buddha” weapon, <u><strong>South Asia has been viewed as a global nuclear problem</u></strong>. Nevertheless, to date, India, like China, has maintained a “No First Use” doctrine. This advocates that India will only use its nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack. The policy was proclaimed in 1999, a year after Pakistan effectively exploded five of its own nuclear weapons. But <u><strong>Pakistan has so far refused to issue any clear doctrine governing its own use of nuclear weapons.</p><p>The stakes are high</p><p>The combined arsenals of Pakistan and India</u></strong> are small compared to those of the US, Russia or China. Nevertheless, they are more powerful than those dropped on Japan in 1945 and <u><strong>could unleash staggering destruction if deployed on civilian targets</u></strong>. Indeed, even a constrained exchange of warheads between the two nations would, in a split second, be among the most calamitous ever, <u><strong>notwithstanding the risk of the radioactive aftermath and the long-term impact on the environment.</p><p>India’s</u></strong> nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, INS Arihant, became operational in 2018, giving the country a “<u><strong>nuclear triad</u></strong>” – the ability to launch nuclear strikes by land, air and sea. Its other ground-based ballistic missile, the Agni III<u><strong>, has a range of approximately 3,000km.</p><p>While Pakistan has a slightly larger nuclear arsenal</u></strong> – estimated to be 140-150 warheads in 2017 – <u><strong>it is less capable of delivering them to targets</u></strong>. Although Pakistan is developing new ballistic missiles, its current ballistic missile range is 2,000km and the country has no nuclear-armed submarines. Either way, <u><strong>it currently would take less than four minutes for a nuclear missile launched from Pakistan to reach India, and vice versa.</p><p></u></strong>The worst case scenario is that, either through mishap or error, <u><strong>what began with a terrorist attack grows into a nuclear exchange aimed at one another’s civilian populations</u></strong>. Technological advances might also exacerbate the already incendiary situation. <u><strong>India’s arsenal now includes the BrahMos, a cruise missile developed jointly with Russia, which can be fired from land, sea or air and used as a counterforce weapon. Counterforce doctrine, in nuclear strategy, means the targeting of an opponent’s military infrastructure with a nuclear strike.</p><p></u></strong>Discontent in the Kashmir valley could also intensify and lead to further crises. <u><strong><mark>No Indian government has</mark> thus far <mark>shown the political will to solve</mark> the <mark>Kashmir</mark> crisis, to demilitarise it, or to apply the diplomatic deftness needed to negotiate a solution with Pakistan.</u></strong> Nor has Modi been able to control and prevent hardline Hindus from forming vigilante squads in the region and threatening and killing those they think are defiling their religious convictions. And so, on a day-to-day basis, ordinary people continue to suffer.</p><p>In the past, during episodes of global tension, the US has taken the lead in crisis management. But <u><strong><mark>it seems unlikely</mark> that <mark>Islamabad or</mark> New <mark>Delhi would</mark> now <mark>turn to</mark> the Trump administration for assistance in <mark>deescalating the conflict</u></strong></mark>. Indeed, <u><strong>leaders from both countries must also consider the reaction of Asia’s third nuclear power, China</u></strong>, which has always been the primary focus of India’s nuclear program.</p><p>For now, India and Pakistan are showing some vital restraint. But they must also work towards a long-term fix. The last thing either government, or the world, needs is a mushroom cloud.</p>

AC

Adv – IndoPak War – Long

./documents/hsld19/WilliamGEnloe/Ge/William%20G%20Enloe-Gedela-Aff-Harvard%20Westlake-Round2.docx

A

Harvard Westlake

2

Harker SS

Madeleine Conrad-Mogin

ac - indopakv2 nc - nebel t - security k - adv cp - cbw da - case 1ar - case - t - cp - da - k 2nr - k - cp condo - t rvi - case 2ar - condo

hsld19/WilliamGEnloe/Ge/William%20G%20Enloe-Gedela-Aff-Harvard%20Westlake-Round2.docx

TeGe

William G Enloe TeGe

Te.....

Ge.....

WilliamGEnloe

William G Enloe

NC

hsld19

HS LD 2019-20

ld

hs

Neoliberalism guarantees extinction and social crisis---the judge has an intellectual obligation to evaluate the social relations that underpin the plan prior to evaluating the outcome of the policy---vote NEG because the system the AFF partakes in is fundamentally unethical

Mera 14,

Pala Basil Mera 14, Victoria University of Wellington philosophy PhD, Accounting For Apocalypse Re-Thinking Social Accounting Theory And Practice For Our Time Of Social Crises And Ecological Collapse, https://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10063/3686/thesis.pdf?sequence=2

Ecologically the situation is dire topsoil loss groundwater depletion chemical contamination dead zones” in the oceans species extinction biodiversity the systemic destruction of habitats could cause destruction of the biosphere The ecological reality described is ecological drawdown deforestation over-fishing water extraction toxicity systematic destruction climate change which have decimated the number of species on Earth threatening extinction Scientists warn ecosystems are nearing c “tipping points” that will be marked by mass extinctions and unpredictable changes warming would mean a planet that is too hot for all life although capitalism is capable of economic productivity of many countries it produces social injustices on a global scale. people appear locked into perpetual growth that produces significant human and social suffering a full-scale ecocide will eventuate the endpoint of perpetual growth will be apocalypse Given people’s systems are rooted in justice intellectuals have a particular responsibility to call attention to social patterns of inequality which appear to be violations of such principles especially when people would rather ignore the issues intellectuals need to be willing to critique the systems from which they emerge Given social inequality and ecocidal are not the product of a vacuum, but social systems critique means forms of social analysis which trace them to the social systems which would subject these very systems to searching critiques. dominant groups tend to subsidize intellectuals are the key agents of the social systems that produce inequalities and destroy ecosystems The more intellectuals choose not only to identify patterns but highlight the pathological systems from which they emerge the greater the tension with whoever “pay[s] the bills” (ibid adopt a adopt a radical position does not mean that we have any viable “answers” in terms of the alternative institutions There is currently no alternative to capitalism given the depth, complexity, and scale of contemporary social and ecological crises, I am not sure if there are any viable alternatives however if we are to have any chance of not only ameliorating but also substantively addressing these social and ecological problems, before we can talk about alternatives or potential “solutions”, we first need to develop a clear understanding of the problems. this involves exploring why and how the existing social systems under which we live are producing the patterns of social inequality and ecological unsustainability we have an obligation to honestly confront our social and ecological predicament

Ecological situation is dire topsoil loss groundwater depletion chemical contamination dead zones species extinction biodiversity could cause destruction of the biosphere ecosystems are nearing tipping points capitalism produces social injustices on a global scale people locked into suffering perpetual growth will be apocalypse intellectuals have a responsibility to call attention to patterns of inequality to critique the systems from which they emerge inequality not the product of a vacuum, but social systems social analysis would subject systems to searching critiques a radical position does not mean we have viable “answers” however if we are to address social and ecological problems before alternatives we need to understand the problems exploring how social systems are producing inequality and ecological unsustainability we have an obligation to honestly confront our predicament

Ecologically too, the situation is dire. Of the many measures of ecological well-being – topsoil loss, groundwater depletion, chemical contamination, increased toxicity levels in human beings, the number and size of “dead zones” in the Earth’s oceans, and the accelerating rate of species extinction and loss of biodiversity – the increasing evidence suggests that the developmental trajectory of the dominant economic culture necessarily causes the mass extermination of non-human communities, the systemic destruction and disruption of natural habitats, and could ultimately cause catastrophic destruction of the biosphere. Ecological drawdown, increasing toxicity, habitat destruction, and mass extinction The latest Global Environmental Outlook Report published by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), the GEO-5 report, makes for sobering reading. As in earlier reports, the global trends portrayed are of continuing human population growth, expanding economic growth,6 and as a consequence severe forms of ecological degradation (UNEP, 2012; see also, UNEP, 1997, 1999, 2002, 2007). The ecological reality described is of ecological drawdown (deforestation, over-fishing, water extraction, etc.) (UNEP, 2012, pp. 72, 68, 84, 102-106, ); increasing toxicity of the environment through chemical and waste pollution, with severe harm caused to human and non-human communities alike (pp. 173- 179); systematic habitat destruction (pp. 8, 68-84) and climate change (33-60), which have decimated the number of species on Earth, threatening many with outright extinction (pp. 139-158). Climate disruption The most serious ecological threat on a global scale is climate disruption, caused by the emission of greenhouse gases from burning fossil fuels, other industrial activities, and land destruction (UNEP, 2012, p. 32). The GEO-5 report states that “[d]espite attempts to develop low-carbon economies in a number of countries, atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases continue to increase to levels likely to push global temperatures beyond the internationally agreed limit of 2° C above the pre-industrial average temperature” (UNEP, 2012, p. 32). Concentrations of atmospheric methane have more than doubled from preindustrial levels, reaching approximately 1826 ppb in 2012; the scientific consensus is that this increase is very likely due predominantly to agriculture and fossil fuel use (IPCC, 2007). Scientists warn that the Earth’s ecosystems are nearing catastrophic “tipping points” that will be marked by mass extinctions and unpredictable changes on a scale unseen since the glaciers retreated twelve thousand years ago (Pappas, 2012). Twenty-two eminent scientists warned recently in the journal, Nature, that humans are likely to have triggered a planetary-scale critical transition “with the potential to transform Earth rapidly and irreversibly into a state unknown in human experience”, which means that “the biological resources we take for granted at present may be subject to rapid and unpredictable transformations within a few human generations” (Barnofsky et al., 2012). This means that human beings are in serious trouble, not only in the future, but right now. The pre-industrial level of carbon dioxide concentration was about 280 parts per million (ppm). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates concentrations could reach between 541 and 970 ppm by the year 2100. However, many climate scientists consider that levels should be kept below 350 ppm in order to avoid “irreversible catastrophic effects” (Hansen et al., 2008). “Catastrophic warming of the earth” would mean a planet that is too hot for life – that is, any life, and all life (Mrasek, 2008). Where are we heading? We need to analyze the above information and ask the simple questions: what does it signify and where will it lead? In terms of the social crises of inequalities, the pattern of human development suggests clearly that although capitalism is capable of raising the economic productivity of many countries as well as international trade, it also produces social injustices on a global scale. The trajectory of capitalist economic development that people appear locked into is of perpetual growth that also produces significant human and social suffering. In terms of the ecological situation, the mounting evidence from reports, such as those published by UNEP, suggest that a full-scale ecocide will eventuate and that a global holocaust is in progress which is socially pathological and biocidal in its scope (UNEP, 2012; see also, UNEP, 1997, 1999, 2002, 2007). Assuming the trends do not change, the endpoint of this trajectory of perpetual economic growth, ecological degradation, systemic pollution, mass species extinction and runaway climate change, which human beings appear locked into, will be climate apocalypse and complete biotic collapse. 1.1 ACCOUNTING RESEARCH AND INTELLECTUAL FAILURE Given the serious and life-threatening implications of these social and ecological crises outlined above, it would be reasonable to expect they should be central to academic concerns, particularly given the responsibilities of academics as intellectuals. As the people whom society subsidizes to carry out intellectual work,7 the primary task of academics is to carry out research that might enable people to deepen their understanding of how the world operates, ideally towards the goal of shaping a world that is more consistent with moral and political principles, and the collective self-interest (Jensen, 2013, p. 43). Given that most people’s stated philosophical and theological systems are rooted in concepts of justice, equality and the inherent dignity of all people (Jensen, 2007, p. 30), intellectuals have a particular responsibility to call attention to those social patterns of inequality which appear to be violations of such principles, and to call attention to the destructive ecological patterns that threaten individual and collective well-being. As a “critic and conscience of society,” 8 one task of intellectuals is to identify issues that people should all pay attention to, even when – indeed, especially when – people would rather ignore the issues (Jensen, 2013, p. 5). In view of this, intellectuals today should be focusing attention on the hard-to-face realities of an unjust and unsustainable world. Moreover, intellectuals in a democratic society, as its “critic and conscience”, should serve as sources of independent and critical information, analyses and varied opinions, in an endeavour to provide a meaningful role in the formation of public policy (Jensen, 2013c). In order to fulfil this obligation as “critic and conscience,” intellectuals need to be willing to critique not only particular people, organizations, and policies, but also the systems from which they emerge. In other words, intellectuals have to be willing to engage in radical critique. Generally, the term “radical” tends to suggest images of extremes, danger, violence, and people eager to tear things down (Jensen, 2007, p. 29). Radical, however, has a more classical meaning. It comes from the Latin –radix, meaning “root.” Radical critique in this light means critique or analysis that gets to the root of the problem. Given that the patterns of social inequality and ecocidal destruction outlined above are not the product of a vacuum, but instead are the product of social systems, radical critique simply means forms of social analysis, which are not only concerned about these social and ecological injustices but also trace them to the social systems from which they emerged, which would subject these very systems to searching critiques. Such searching critique is challenging because, generally, the dominant groups which tend to subsidize intellectuals (universities, think tanks, government, corporations) are the key agents of the social systems that produce inequalities and destroy ecosystems (Jensen, 2013, p. 12). The more intellectuals choose not only to identify patterns but also highlight the pathological systems from which they emerge, the greater the tension with whoever “pay[s] the bills” (ibid.). However, this may arguably be unavoidable today, given that the realities of social inequality and ecological catastrophe show clearly that our social systems are already in crisis, are pathological, and in need of radical change.9 To adopt a radical position, in this light, is not to suggest that we simply need to abolish capitalism, or to imply that if we did so all our problems would be solved. For one thing, such an abstract argument has little operational purchase in terms of specifying how to go about struggling for change. For another thing, as this thesis will discuss, capitalism is not the only social system that we ought to be interrogating as an important systemic driver of social and ecological crises. Moreover, to adopt a radical position does not mean that we have any viable “answers” or “solutions” in terms of the alternative institutions, organizations and social systems that we could replace the existing ones with. There is currently no alternative to capitalism that appears to be viable, particularly given the historical loss of credibility that Marxism and socialism has suffered. As history has shown, some of the self-proclaimed socialist and communist regimes have had their own fair share of human rights abuses and environmental disasters, and the global left has thus far not been able to articulate alternatives that have managed to capture the allegiances of the mainstream population. Furthermore, given the depth, complexity, and scale of contemporary social and ecological crises, I am not sure if there are any viable alternatives or, for that matter, any guarantees that we can actually prevent and change the disastrous course of contemporary society. I certainly do not have any solutions. What I would argue, however, is that if we are to have any chance of not only ameliorating but also substantively addressing these social and ecological problems, before we can talk about alternatives or potential “solutions”, we first need to develop a clear understanding of the problems. And, as argued above, this involves, amongst other things, exploring why and how the existing social systems under which we live are producing the patterns of social inequality and ecological unsustainability that make up our realities today.10 To adopt a radical stance, in this light, is simply to insist that we have an obligation to honestly confront our social and ecological predicament and to ask difficult questions about the role that existing social systems might be playing in producing and exacerbating them.

<h4>Neoliberalism guarantees <u>extinction and social crisis</u>---the judge has an intellectual obligation to evaluate the <u>social relations</u> that underpin the plan prior to evaluating the outcome of the policy---vote NEG because the system the AFF partakes in is fundamentally unethical </h4><p>Pala Basil <strong>Mera 14,</strong> Victoria University of Wellington philosophy PhD, Accounting For Apocalypse Re-Thinking Social Accounting Theory And Practice For Our Time Of Social Crises And Ecological Collapse, https://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10063/3686/thesis.pdf?sequence=2 </p><p><u><mark>Ecological</mark>ly</u> too, <u>the <mark>situation is dire</u></mark>. Of the many measures of ecological well-being – <u><mark>topsoil loss</u></mark>, <u><mark>groundwater depletion</u></mark>, <u><mark>chemical contamination</u></mark>, increased toxicity levels in human beings, the number and size of “<u><mark>dead zones</mark>” in</u> <u>the</u> Earth’s <u>oceans</u>, and the accelerating rate of <u><mark>species extinction</u></mark> and loss of <u><mark>biodiversity</u></mark> – the increasing evidence suggests that the developmental trajectory of the dominant economic culture necessarily causes the mass extermination of non-human communities, <u>the systemic destruction</u> and disruption <u>of</u> natural <u>habitats</u>, and <u><mark>could</u></mark> ultimately <u><mark>cause</u></mark> catastrophic <u><strong><mark>destruction of the biosphere</u></strong></mark>. Ecological drawdown, increasing toxicity, habitat destruction, and mass extinction The latest Global Environmental Outlook Report published by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), the GEO-5 report, makes for sobering reading. As in earlier reports, the global trends portrayed are of continuing human population growth, expanding economic growth,6 and as a consequence severe forms of ecological degradation (UNEP, 2012; see also, UNEP, 1997, 1999, 2002, 2007). <u>The ecological reality described</u> <u>is</u> of <u>ecological</u> <u>drawdown</u> (<u>deforestation</u>, <u>over-fishing</u>, <u>water extraction</u>, etc.) (UNEP, 2012, pp. 72, 68, 84, 102-106, ); increasing <u>toxicity</u> of the environment through chemical and waste pollution, with severe harm caused to human and non-human communities alike (pp. 173- 179); <u>systematic</u> habitat <u>destruction</u> (pp. 8, 68-84) and <u>climate</u> <u>change</u> (33-60), <u>which</u> <u>have</u> <u>decimated</u> <u>the number of species on Earth</u>, <u>threatening</u> many with outright <u>extinction</u> (pp. 139-158). Climate disruption The most serious ecological threat on a global scale is climate disruption, caused by the emission of greenhouse gases from burning fossil fuels, other industrial activities, and land destruction (UNEP, 2012, p. 32). The GEO-5 report states that “[d]espite attempts to develop low-carbon economies in a number of countries, atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases continue to increase to levels likely to push global temperatures beyond the internationally agreed limit of 2° C above the pre-industrial average temperature” (UNEP, 2012, p. 32). Concentrations of atmospheric methane have more than doubled from preindustrial levels, reaching approximately 1826 ppb in 2012; the scientific consensus is that this increase is very likely due predominantly to agriculture and fossil fuel use (IPCC, 2007). <u>Scientists warn</u> that the Earth’s <u><mark>ecosystems are nearing</mark> c</u>atastrophic <u>“<mark>tipping points</mark>” that will be marked by mass extinctions and unpredictable</u> <u>changes</u> on a scale unseen since the glaciers retreated twelve thousand years ago (Pappas, 2012). Twenty-two eminent scientists warned recently in the journal, Nature, that humans are likely to have triggered a planetary-scale critical transition “with the potential to transform Earth rapidly and irreversibly into a state unknown in human experience”, which means that “the biological resources we take for granted at present may be subject to rapid and unpredictable transformations within a few human generations” (Barnofsky et al., 2012). This means that human beings are in serious trouble, not only in the future, but right now. The pre-industrial level of carbon dioxide concentration was about 280 parts per million (ppm). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates concentrations could reach between 541 and 970 ppm by the year 2100. However, many climate scientists consider that levels should be kept below 350 ppm in order to avoid “irreversible catastrophic effects” (Hansen et al., 2008). “Catastrophic <u>warming</u> of the earth” <u>would</u> <u>mean a planet that</u> <u>is too hot for</u> life – that is, any life, and <u><strong>all life</u></strong> (Mrasek, 2008). Where are we heading? We need to analyze the above information and ask the simple questions: what does it signify and where will it lead? In terms of the social crises of inequalities, the pattern of human development suggests clearly that <u>although <mark>capitalism</mark> is capable of</u> raising the <u>economic productivity</u> <u>of many countries</u> as well as international trade, <u>it</u> also <u><strong><mark>produces social injustices on a global scale</mark>. </u></strong>The trajectory of capitalist economic development that <u><mark>people</mark> appear <mark>locked into</u></mark> is of <u>perpetual growth</u> <u>that</u> also <u><strong>produces significant human and social <mark>suffering</u></strong></mark>. In terms of the ecological situation, the mounting evidence from reports, such as those published by UNEP, suggest that <u>a full-scale ecocide will eventuate</u> and that a global holocaust is in progress which is socially pathological and biocidal in its scope (UNEP, 2012; see also, UNEP, 1997, 1999, 2002, 2007). Assuming the trends do not change, <u>the endpoint of</u> this trajectory of <u><mark>perpetual</u></mark> economic <u><mark>growth</u></mark>, ecological degradation, systemic pollution, mass species extinction and runaway climate change, which human beings appear locked into, <u><mark>will be</u></mark> climate <u><strong><mark>apocalypse</u></strong></mark> and complete biotic collapse. 1.1 ACCOUNTING RESEARCH AND INTELLECTUAL FAILURE Given the serious and life-threatening implications of these social and ecological crises outlined above, it would be reasonable to expect they should be central to academic concerns, particularly given the responsibilities of academics as intellectuals. As the people whom society subsidizes to carry out intellectual work,7 the primary task of academics is to carry out research that might enable people to deepen their understanding of how the world operates, ideally towards the goal of shaping a world that is more consistent with moral and political principles, and the collective self-interest (Jensen, 2013, p. 43). <u>Given</u> that most <u>people’s</u> stated philosophical and theological <u>systems are rooted in</u> concepts of <u>justice</u>, equality and the inherent dignity of all people (Jensen, 2007, p. 30), <u><mark>intellectuals have a</mark> particular</u> <u><mark>responsibility to call attention to</u></mark> those <u><strong>social <mark>patterns of inequality</u></strong></mark> <u>which</u> <u>appear to be violations of such principles</u>, and to call attention to the destructive ecological patterns that threaten individual and collective well-being. As a “critic and conscience of society,” 8 one task of intellectuals is to identify issues that people should all pay attention to, even when – indeed, <u>especially when</u> – <u>people would rather ignore the issues</u> (Jensen, 2013, p. 5). In view of this, intellectuals today should be focusing attention on the hard-to-face realities of an unjust and unsustainable world. Moreover, intellectuals in a democratic society, as its “critic and conscience”, should serve as sources of independent and critical information, analyses and varied opinions, in an endeavour to provide a meaningful role in the formation of public policy (Jensen, 2013c). In order to fulfil this obligation as “critic and conscience,” <u>intellectuals need to be willing <mark>to critique</u></mark> not only particular people, organizations, and policies, but also <u><strong><mark>the systems from which they emerge</u></strong></mark>. In other words, intellectuals have to be willing to engage in radical critique. Generally, the term “radical” tends to suggest images of extremes, danger, violence, and people eager to tear things down (Jensen, 2007, p. 29). Radical, however, has a more classical meaning. It comes from the Latin –radix, meaning “root.” Radical critique in this light means critique or analysis that gets to the root of the problem. <u>Given</u> that the patterns of <u>social <mark>inequality</mark> and ecocidal</u> destruction outlined above <u>are <mark>not the product of a vacuum, but</u></mark> instead are the product of <u><mark>social systems</u></mark>, radical <u>critique</u> simply <u>means forms of <mark>social analysis</u></mark>, <u>which</u> are not only concerned about these social and ecological injustices but also <u>trace them to the social systems</u> from which they emerged, <u>which <mark>would subject</mark> these very <mark>systems to searching critiques</mark>.</u> Such searching critique is challenging because, generally, the <u>dominant groups</u> which <u>tend to subsidize intellectuals</u> (universities, think tanks, government, corporations) <u>are the key agents of the social systems that produce inequalities and destroy ecosystems</u> (Jensen, 2013, p. 12). <u>The more intellectuals choose not only to identify patterns but</u> also <u>highlight the pathological systems from which they emerge</u>, <u>the greater the tension with whoever “pay[s] the bills” (ibid</u>.). However, this may arguably be unavoidable today, given that the realities of social inequality and ecological catastrophe show clearly that our social systems are already in crisis, are pathological, and in need of radical change.9 To <u>adopt a </u>radical position, in this light, is not to suggest that we simply need to abolish capitalism, or to imply that if we did so all our problems would be solved. For one thing, such an abstract argument has little operational purchase in terms of specifying how to go about struggling for change. For another thing, as this thesis will discuss, capitalism is not the only social system that we ought to be interrogating as an important systemic driver of social and ecological crises. Moreover, to <u>adopt <mark>a radical position does not mean</mark> that <mark>we have</mark> any <mark>viable “answers”</u></mark> or “solutions” <u>in terms of the alternative institutions</u>, organizations and social systems that we could replace the existing ones with. <u>There is currently no alternative to capitalism</u> that appears to be viable, particularly given the historical loss of credibility that Marxism and socialism has suffered. As history has shown, some of the self-proclaimed socialist and communist regimes have had their own fair share of human rights abuses and environmental disasters, and the global left has thus far not been able to articulate alternatives that have managed to capture the allegiances of the mainstream population. Furthermore, <u>given the depth, complexity, and scale of contemporary social and ecological crises, I am not sure if there are any viable alternatives</u> or, for that matter, any guarantees that we can actually prevent and change the disastrous course of contemporary society. I certainly do not have any solutions. What I would argue, <u><strong><mark>however</u></strong></mark>, is that <u><strong><mark>if we are to</mark> have any chance of not only ameliorating but also substantively <mark>address</mark>ing these <mark>social and ecological problems</mark>,</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>before</u></strong></mark> <u>we can talk about <mark>alternatives</u></mark> <u>or potential “solutions”,</u> <u><strong><mark>we</mark> first <mark>need to</mark> develop a clear <mark>understand</mark>ing of <mark>the problems</mark>. </u></strong>And, as argued above, <u>this involves</u>, amongst other things, <u><mark>exploring</mark> why and <mark>how</mark> the existing <mark>social systems</mark> under which we live <mark>are producing</mark> the patterns of social <mark>inequality and ecological unsustainability</u></mark> that make up our realities today.10 To adopt a radical stance, in this light, is simply to insist that <u><strong><mark>we have an obligation to honestly confront our</mark> social and ecological <mark>predicament</u></strong></mark> and to ask difficult questions about the role that existing social systems might be playing in producing and exacerbating them. </p>

1NC

OFF

1NC---OFF

./documents/hspolicy20/MontgomeryBell/HeMa/Montgomery%20Bell-Herrmann-Maxwell-Neg-Glenbrooks-Round4.docx

N

Glenbrooks

4

ICW SC

Katie Wimsatt

1AC - Cyber Treaty 2NR - Ddev

hspolicy20/MontgomeryBell/HeMa/Montgomery%20Bell-Herrmann-Maxwell-Neg-Glenbrooks-Round4.docx

HeMa

Montgomery Bell HeMa

Ge.....

He.....

As.....

Ma.....

MontgomeryBell

Montgomery Bell

TN

hspolicy20

HS Policy 2020-21

cx

hs

Monetary tightening is on the brink now, but it’s priced-in by markets. Sudden rate hikes cause deep recession.

Guénette ’22

Guénette ’22 [*Justin, World Bank; **Kose: World Bank, Brookings Institution, CEPR, CAMA; ***Sugawara, World Bank; September 2022; “Is a Global Recession Imminent?”; https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/38019/Global-Recession.pdf] brett

In 2022, the specter of global recession has increasingly haunted policymakers as they observed rapid deterioration of growth amid rising inflation systematic analysis of recent evolution of economic activity and policies, as well as a model-based assessment of possible near-term macroeconomic outcomes consensus forecasts suggest the global economy will experience its steepest decline in growth over the next two years Growth forecasts have lowered significantly policymakers face a difficult balancing act Concerns about high inflation and de-anchoring inflation expectations led to significant monetary policy tightening excess demand pressures in advanced economies led to withdrawals of fiscal support the global economy is in the midst of one of the most synchronous episodes of monetary and fiscal policy tightening of the past five decades If the degree of global monetary policy tightening currently anticipated by markets is not enough to lower inflation to targets, experience from past global recessions suggests that the requisite additional tightening could give rise to significant financial stress and trigger a global recession in 2023 During 1982 monetary policy tightening in advanced economies sharply increased the cost of borrowing, especially in Latin America and the Caribbean steep growth slowdown weakened debt servicing capacity further, and more than three dozen debt crises erupted in EMDEs during the 1980s crises were accompanied by a decade of lost growth in the Latin America and the Caribbean region GDP recovered to its precrisis level only in 1993 the global economy could escape a recession if additional tightening implemented in such a way as to generate an orderly adjustment in financial markets banks anchor inflation expectations reducing policy tightening needed to achieve the desired disinflation the benefits of price stability, including policy uncertainty and macroeconomic volatility outweigh the costs of tight monetary policy in the near term The pace and magnitude of withdrawal of fiscal support must be finely calibrated and closely aligned with credible medium-term fiscal plans

systematic analysis of near-term outcomes suggest a difficult balancing act excess demand pressures in advanced economies led to withdrawals of fiscal support the global economy is in the midst of synchronous monetary tightening If the degree of monetary tightening currently anticipated by markets is not enough additional tightening give rise to significant financial stress and trigger global recession 1982 tightening weakened debt servicing accompanied by a decade of lost growth pace must be aligned with fiscal plans

In 2022, the specter of a global recession has increasingly haunted policymakers as they have observed the rapid deterioration of growth prospects amid rising inflation. Drawing on insights from previous global recessions, we have presented a systematic analysis of the recent evolution of economic activity and policies, as well as a model-based assessment of possible near-term macroeconomic outcomes. Recent consensus forecasts suggest that the global economy will experience its steepest decline in growth over the next two years following an initial rebound from global recession since 1970. Growth forecasts for the United States, euro area, and China have also been lowered significantly. These developments do not augur well for the likelihood that a global recession can be avoided because there was significant weakness in global growth during the year preceding every global recession since 1970, which all occurred concurrently with a recession in the United States. Against this backdrop, policymakers face a difficult balancing act. Concerns about high inflation and the rising risk of de-anchoring inflation expectations have already led to significant monetary policy tightening in many countries. At the same time, a marked erosion of fiscal space, especially across most EMDEs, and excess demand pressures in many advanced economies, as well as a diminishing impact of the pandemic, have led to withdrawals of fiscal support. As a result, the global economy is in the midst of one of the most synchronous episodes of monetary and fiscal policy tightening of the past five decades. These policy actions are necessary to contain inflationary pressures and are akin to the counter-inflationary policies implemented in the late 1970s and early 1980s, ahead of the 1982 global recession. If the degree of global monetary policy tightening currently anticipated by markets is not enough to lower inflation to targets, experience from past global recessions suggests that the requisite additional tightening could give rise to significant financial stress and trigger a global recession in 2023. This would entail a recession in advanced economies within the range of the contractions that occurred in the past five global recessions. A global recession would also translate into a sharp decline in growth in EMDEs.38 In light of elevated vulnerabilities in many of these economies, they would face severe challenges associated with financial stress (Figure 11A). During the 1982 global recession, monetary policy tightening in advanced economies sharply increased the cost of borrowing, especially in Latin America and the Caribbean (Kose et al. 2021). A steep growth slowdown weakened debt servicing capacity further, and more than three dozen debt crises erupted in EMDEs during the 1980s (Figure 11B). These crises were accompanied by a decade of lost growth in the Latin America and the Caribbean region. GDP per capita in the region recovered to its precrisis level only in 1993. Many low-income countries also found it increasingly difficult to service their debt obligations in the 1980s. The resolution of debt crises took about two decades during which GDP per capita fell in low-income countries. Our analysis indicates that the global economy could escape a recession even if additional monetary policy tightening beyond current market expectations is needed to reduce inflation. However, this would require the additional tightening to be implemented in such a way as to generate an orderly adjustment in financial markets. More importantly, policymakers need to utilize the full menu of options available to get ahead of inflation and reduce the likelihood of a sharper decline in growth. Monetary policy. Central banks must communicate their policy decisions clearly within credible monetary policy frameworks, while safeguarding their independence. This would help anchor inflation expectations more strongly, reducing the degree of policy tightening needed to achieve the desired disinflation. In the long term, the benefits of price stability, including reduced policy uncertainty and macroeconomic volatility, will outweigh the costs of tight monetary policy in the near term (Clarida 2021). Fiscal policy. The pace and magnitude of withdrawal of fiscal support must be finely calibrated and closely aligned with credible medium-term fiscal plans. Moreover, policymakers in EMDEs need to address concerns about long-run debt sustainability by strengthening fiscal frameworks, enhancing debt transparency, upgrading debt management functions, and improving resource mobilization and expenditure efficiency. At the same time, fiscal policy needs to provide targeted relief to shield vulnerable households, rather than introducing distortionary measures such as subsidies and price controls.

<h4>Monetary tightening is <u>on the brink now</u>, but it’s <u>priced-in</u> by markets. <u>Sudden rate hikes</u> cause <u>deep recession</u>.</h4><p><strong>Guénette ’22 </strong>[*Justin, World Bank; **Kose: World Bank, Brookings Institution, CEPR, CAMA; ***Sugawara, World Bank; September 2022; “Is a Global Recession Imminent?”; https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/38019/Global-Recession.pdf] brett</p><p><u>In 2022, the specter of</u> a <u><strong>global recession</u></strong> <u>has increasingly <strong>haunted policymakers</strong> as they</u> have <u>observed</u> the <u><strong>rapid deterioration of growth</u></strong> prospects <u>amid <strong>rising inflation</u></strong>. Drawing on insights from previous global recessions, we have presented a <u><strong><mark>systematic analysis</u></strong></mark> <u>of</u> the <u>recent evolution of economic activity and policies, as well as a model-based assessment <mark>of</mark> possible</u> <u><strong><mark>near-term</mark> macroeconomic <mark>outcomes</u></strong></mark>. Recent <u><strong>consensus forecasts</strong> <mark>suggest</u></mark> that <u>the global economy will experience its steepest decline in growth over the <strong>next two years</u></strong> following an initial rebound from global recession since 1970. <u><strong>Growth forecasts</u></strong> for the United States, euro area, and China <u>have</u> also been <u><strong>lowered significantly</u></strong>. These developments do not augur well for the likelihood that a global recession can be avoided because there was significant weakness in global growth during the year preceding every global recession since 1970, which all occurred concurrently with a recession in the United States.</p><p>Against this backdrop, <u>policymakers face <mark>a <strong>difficult balancing act</u></strong></mark>. <u>Concerns about <strong>high inflation</u></strong> <u>and</u> the rising risk of <u>de-anchoring inflation expectations</u> have already <u>led to <strong>significant monetary policy tightening</u></strong> in many countries. At the same time, a marked erosion of fiscal space, especially across most EMDEs, and <u><strong><mark>excess demand pressures</u></strong> <u>in</u></mark> many <u><strong><mark>advanced economies</u></strong></mark>, as well as a diminishing impact of the pandemic, have <u><mark>led to <strong>withdrawals</strong> of <strong>fiscal support</u></strong></mark>. As a result, <u><mark>the global economy is in the midst of</mark> one of the most <strong><mark>synchronous</strong></mark> episodes of <strong><mark>monetary</strong></mark> and <strong>fiscal policy</strong> <mark>tightening</mark> of the past five decades</u>. These policy actions are necessary to contain inflationary pressures and are akin to the counter-inflationary policies implemented in the late 1970s and early 1980s, ahead of the 1982 global recession.</p><p><u><mark>If the degree of</mark> global <strong><mark>monetary</mark> policy <mark>tightening</strong> currently anticipated by markets is <strong>not enough</strong></mark> to lower inflation to targets, experience from past <strong>global recessions</strong> suggests that the requisite <strong><mark>additional tightening</strong></mark> could <mark>give rise to</mark> <strong><mark>significant financial stress</strong></mark> <mark>and trigger</mark> a <mark>global recession</mark> in <strong>2023</u></strong>. This would entail a recession in advanced economies within the range of the contractions that occurred in the past five global recessions. A global recession would also translate into a sharp decline in growth in EMDEs.38 In light of elevated vulnerabilities in many of these economies, they would face severe challenges associated with financial stress (Figure 11A).</p><p><u>During</u> the <u><strong><mark>1982</u></strong></mark> global recession, <u><strong>monetary policy <mark>tightening</u></strong></mark> <u>in <strong>advanced economies</strong> sharply increased the cost of borrowing, especially in <strong>Latin America</strong> and the <strong>Caribbean</u></strong> (Kose et al. 2021). A <u>steep growth slowdown <mark>weakened</mark> <strong><mark>debt servicing</strong></mark> capacity further, and more than three dozen debt crises erupted in EMDEs during the 1980s</u> (Figure 11B). These <u><strong>crises</u></strong> <u>were <mark>accompanied by a <strong>decade of lost growth</strong></mark> in the Latin America and the Caribbean region</u>. <u><strong>GDP</u></strong> per capita in the region <u>recovered to its precrisis level only in <strong>1993</u></strong>. Many low-income countries also found it increasingly difficult to service their debt obligations in the 1980s. The resolution of debt crises took about two decades during which GDP per capita fell in low-income countries.</p><p>Our analysis indicates that <u>the global economy could escape a recession</u> even <u>if</u> additional monetary policy tightening beyond current market expectations is needed to reduce inflation. However, this would require the <u><strong>additional tightening</u></strong> to be <u>implemented in such a way as to generate an orderly adjustment in financial markets</u>. More importantly, policymakers need to utilize the full menu of options available to get ahead of inflation and reduce the likelihood of a sharper decline in growth. </p><p>Monetary policy. Central <u>banks</u> must communicate their policy decisions clearly within credible monetary policy frameworks, while safeguarding their independence. This would help <u><strong>anchor inflation expectations</u></strong> more strongly, <u>reducing</u> the degree of <u><strong>policy tightening</u></strong> <u>needed to achieve the <strong>desired disinflation</u></strong>. In the long term, <u>the benefits of price stability, including</u> reduced <u><strong>policy uncertainty</u></strong> <u>and <strong>macroeconomic volatility</u></strong>, will <u>outweigh the <strong>costs of tight monetary policy</u></strong> <u>in the near term</u> (Clarida 2021).</p><p>Fiscal policy. <u>The <strong><mark>pace</strong></mark> and magnitude of withdrawal of fiscal support <mark>must be</mark> finely calibrated and closely <mark>aligned with</mark> <strong>credible medium-term</strong> <strong><mark>fiscal plans</u></strong></mark>. Moreover, policymakers in EMDEs need to address concerns about long-run debt sustainability by strengthening fiscal frameworks, enhancing debt transparency, upgrading debt management functions, and improving resource mobilization and expenditure efficiency. At the same time, fiscal policy needs to provide targeted relief to shield vulnerable households, rather than introducing distortionary measures such as subsidies and price controls. </p>

1NC DSDS Round 6

Case

Econ