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NOVDEC - DA - Renewables
open source
851,831
365,001
328,716
NOVDEC - DA - Asia Econ
open source
851,831
365,002
328,721
jf - north korea
open source
851,836
365,003
328,718
Nocember Aff
whole res - open source
851,833
365,004
328,725
Content warning theory
interp: Debaters must give a content warning at the beginning of round if mentioning any genocide.
851,840
365,005
328,739
ND- Open Source DAs
Open Source
851,853
365,006
328,736
SO - ELL and CLT CP
ELL ACCOMMODATIONS CP Plan Text: The United States ought to consider providing test translation accommodations for English Language Learners (ELL) on standardized tests. Oliveri-Turkan 14, Sultan Turkan .... and Maria Elena Oliveri .... 29 April 2014 “Considerations for Providing Test Translation Accommodations to English Language Learners on Common Core Standards?Based Assessments” ETS Research Reports Series, 2014: 1-13. https://doi.org/10.1002/ets2.12003 ELLs are a heterogeneous group with varied ethnic backgrounds, first languages, socioeconomic statuses, quality of prior schooling, and levels of English language proficiency. In the wake of the common core standards?based tests, we drew attention to several issues in thus we advocate the provision of test translation as an accommodation on standardized state tests in the United States. First, our review of the research on test translation revealed that there is little empirical research on the benefits of test translation accommodations. We reemphasized the necessity of appropriate assignment of accommodations according to particular needs of ELLs. Second, a review of state practices showed that test translation varies by purposes, policies, and practices across states. This review also revealed that few statistical measures are taken to ensure equivalence between the translated and English versions of the test. In addition, the prevalence of checklists was noted as a challenge to ensuring valid test translation practices, because they do not specify a consistent standard for human judges to apply uniformly. Because the scope of linguistic quality control might be limited, it is advisable to minimize cultural differences and attempt to evaluate whether essential meaning has not changed after translation. We recommended, as an alternative, that a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods should be employed to enhance construct equivalence. It is our hope that our review (even though it may not stand the test of time), discussion of challenges, and recommended solutions will contribute to the ongoing process of enacting policies and practices that enhance provisions for providing translation accommodations, especially in the current context of common core standards?based assessments. In conclusion, the three recommendations we consider are most critical. One, test translation should be assigned to the relevant groups of ELLs with consideration of whether ELLs have received instruction in the language of the test. Second, researchers and practitioners need more sophisticated test translation processes that help the field move beyond the limitations of relying solely on back translation. Finally, it is imperative that researchers, practitioners, and policy makers prioritize the channeling of resources to more quality control processes to ensure construct equivalence between the two tests. CLT CP Plan Text: In the United States, colleges and universities ought to consider the Classic learning Test (CLT) in undergraduate admission decisions The CLT is a reformed test that lacks the inherent disvalue of other standardized tests Miller 18 (John J. Miller, the national correspondent for National Review and the director of the Dow Journalism Program at Hillsdale College, “A Better Test”, National Review, https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2018/11/12/standardized-tests-higher-education-reform/, 2018) IR Two entrepreneurs take on the college-entrance-exam duopoly Jeremy Tate remembers when he tried to inspire his high-school students with talk of great things. “I brought up ethics, astronomy, and more,” he says. “I wanted them to understand the importance of their education.” Then a girl spoke up: “Why would it matter if it’s not on the SAT?” Her question has haunted him ever since — and it also roused him to found the Classic Learning Test (CLT), a company that seeks to challenge the duopoly of the ACT and the SAT, the pair of tests that dominate the world of college-entrance exams and increasingly dictate the content of America’s school curricula. Two years ago, only about 1,000 students took the CLT, and few college admissions officers even knew what it was. Last year, more than 10,000 took it, and more than 100 schools accepted it on applications. Tate hopes for 35,000 test-takers this school year, and possibly 100,000 within three years. In short order, the CLT has started to become to standardized tests what homeschooling and the classical-education movement are to public schools: a flourishing alternative for parents and teachers whose vision of learning differs sharply from what goes on in most of America’s classrooms. Its continued success may even persuade some schools to return to more traditional content. “We’re trying to encourage familiarity with the Western canon and offer a rigorous measure of reasoning, education, and academic formation,” says Tate. “We also want students to read the Great Books, and we think this test is a way to get them to do that.” The 37-year-old Tate was born in Oregon but grew up mostly in Maryland. His mother was a public-school teacher, and Tate followed her into the profession. He earned a degree at Louisiana State University and taught for three years in Brooklyn. That’s where he first witnessed what he regards as the central crisis in American education: “We have an epidemic of student complacency,” he says. “We’ve removed the great questions of life from our public schools. Nobody studies philosophy, ethics, or religion. Any element of the transcendent is gone. Everything is utilitarian and the students are bored.” Tate eventually moved back to Mary¬land and took a job at Broadneck High School, close to the shores of Chesapeake Bay. One of his duties there was to help students who had flunked English. “I was supposed to teach them with the same terrible textbook that already had failed them,” he says. “I decided to ignore it and instead to immerse them in Flannery O’Connor.” A southern Catholic, O’Connor wrote fiction about the big ideas that Tate says public schools have rejected. “Her short stories absolutely hooked them,” he says, citing “Good Country People” and “A Good Man Is Hard to Find” in particular. “It made my students aware of greater realities.” Around the same time, to earn extra income on nights and weekends, Tate had started to teach SAT-preparation courses. He also encountered parents and teachers who were frustrated by the SAT’s decision to align itself with Common Core, the initiative to set de facto national curriculum standards. “Their dissatisfaction was intense,” he says. “So I assumed that somebody would develop a new standardized test for them.” He looked around but couldn’t find any serious efforts to take on the twin behemoths of the ACT and SAT. Tate mentioned this to David Wagner, a childhood friend who had built a career in management consulting. In 2015, they decided to do it themselves, forming the CLT as a private company, with headquarters in Annapolis. Today, Tate is its president and Wagner its CEO. “We have an opportunity to become a leader in educational assessments and a true competitor to the ACT and SAT,” says Wagner. For college admissions officers, the value of a good standardized test is obvious: Unlike grade-point averages and letters of recommendation, such a test allows them to compare students on a common scale. The originators of the SAT (first given in 1926) and the ACT (in 1959) also thought that their efforts would bust up class privileges, giving the bright children of Wisconsin factory workers a chance to shine alongside the WASPish graduates of swanky boarding schools in Massachusetts. They talked of enabling a “meritocracy” (even as picky classicists scoffed at the word’s Latin root and Greek suffix, regarding it as an ugly linguistic chimera). By the 1960s, millions of aspiring meritocrats took one or both of the tests, establishing the now-familiar rituals that involve yellow No. 2 pencils, filled-in ovals, and Saturday-morning sitzfleisch. The tests also came under severe scrutiny, with allegations that parents could game the system by purchasing test-prep instruction for their kids. Others charged that tests were biased against racial and ethnic minorities. Sensitive to these criticisms, the ACT and SAT have struggled to wipe out anything that might grant one type of student an undue advantage over another. They avoid questions about yachts or farms or beach volleyball because some students may relate to them better than others do. All such subjects are verboten, as are words such as “verboten,” which might give an edge to kids with German-speaking ancestors. This leveling impulse has wiped out anything resembling an assumption of cultural literacy, including many things that lots of parents want their kids to know. Mentioning an “Achilles’ heel” might help the students who have read Homer. A passage from the Bible could aid churchgoers. Even a reference to Mount Vernon is suspect because it conceivably could assist a kid who once visited George Washington’s home on a class trip. “This is why we see so many questions about penguins in Antarctica,” says Mark Bauerlein, an English professor at Emory University who once wrote questions for standardized tests and now advises the CLT. “Everyone is equally distant.” None of this necessarily renders the ACT and SAT worthless, but it does mean the tests don’t measure much of the knowledge that a good education ought to include. Last summer, CLT researcher Nicholas Sileo took a close look at the reading sections of SAT practice tests. He found that more than 40 percent of the passages focused on scientific topics, but only a single question considered ethics, and none mentioned religion. About 15 percent dealt with the role of women in society. The tests drew from a handful of classic novelists but more often relied on modern writers such as Lydia Minatoya, Daniyal Mueenuddin, and Carlos Ruiz Zafón. Abraham Lincoln showed up but the Founding Fathers were completely absent. “They’ve eliminated a lot of meaningful content,” says Tate. That’s bad enough. But the denuded tests have an effect that may be even worse: As schools become more obsessed with test scores, fueled in part by Common Core, they’re feeling greater pressure to reshape their curricula and to “teach to the test,” as the saying goes. If the test doesn’t reward students who have studied what Matthew Arnold called “the best that has been thought and said,” then there’s little point in preferring Mark Twain (who is not on the practice exams) to MacDonald Harris (who is). As the girl said: Why would it matter if it’s not on the SAT? One response among some colleges and universities has been to quit requiring standardized tests entirely: More than 1,000 are now “test optional,” according to FairTest, a group that has campaigned for years against high-stakes exams. In June, the University of Chicago made headlines when it joined the movement, which also includes Brandeis, Catholic University, and New York University. The CLT takes a different approach. Rather than giving up on tests, it seeks to make a better one. The sample version on its website features passages from Aristotle, Benjamin Franklin, Adam Smith, Pope John Paul II, and even Susan Rice, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations during the Obama administration. Students read these for comprehension and grammar. There’s also a math section. “We believe that a certain body of knowledge should be a component of education,” says Thomas Mach, vice president for academics at Cedarville University, a Christian school in Ohio that adopted the CLT earlier this year. “Many of our students come from families that believe this, and the CLT evaluates what they know.”nStudents who take the CLT have two hours to answer 120 questions. They earn a point for every correct answer and receive their results the same day. CLT’s website claims that a score of 114 is comparable to a perfect score on the ACT or SAT. A handful of students earn perfect scores on those tests every year, but so far nobody has done the same on the CLT. The top score, says Tate, is 118. “Our test is tough, which makes it easier for schools to distinguish between the best candidates.” Most of the schools that accept the CLT are small liberal-arts colleges or have religious affiliations. A few enjoy national reputations, such as Hillsdale College (where I teach) and Wheaton College. The largest is Liberty University, with 15,000 residential students. Many are tiny: The Native American Bible College in Kansas enrolls fewer than a hundred. Tate says the next steps will be to increase the number of schools that accept the test and to work with classically minded secondary schools that want to use the CLT as a way to gauge the progress of their own students. The CLT is a unique adapted standardized test that enhances measures for colleges to use in admissions decisions Mull 17 (Teresa Mull, policy advisor for education at The Heartland Institute and managing editor of School Reform News and a research fellow at The Heartland Institute, “STUDENT PUBLISHES COMPARISON OF ACT AND CLASSIC LEARNING TEST”, The Heartland Institute Freedom Rising, https://www.heartland.org/news-opinion/news/student-reflects-on-taking-both-the-act-and-classic-learning-test, 2017) cw//az recut A homeschool student who took both the ACT and the Classic Learning Test (CLT) says ACT disfavors students with no Common Core experience. The ACT and SAT college entrance exams are tied to the Common Core State Standards, a set of national standards dictating what students should know at the end of each grade level. The CLT was developed in 2015 to give students an alternative to the ACT and SAT. More than 80 colleges and universities accept CLT for college admission. ACT ‘Unfair’ to Homeschoolers Olivia Dennison, a homeschooled student from West Virginia, took the ACT and CLT within a week of each other. Dennison says the ACT was biased toward students who studied Common Core-aligned curricula. “I have no experience with Common Core,” Dennison told School Reform News. “I’ve always been homeschooled, and so all I know about Common Core is what I’ve researched about it, and I’ve read that the ACT is very based on Common Core. The ACT is very unfair to students who are growing up in differently styled classrooms. Whether that be a homeschool, a Christian school, a charter school, whatever it is, students with no Common Core experience can definitely be at an unfair disadvantage.” ‘Working to the Test’ Dennison says ACT stresses test-taking skills, whereas CLT emphasizes full comprehension of learning materials. “The ACT is based on students working to the test and not on students being lifelong learners, which is the point of education,” Dennison said. “Some pros with the CLT would be that I thought there were a perfectly balanced number of passages on creationism and evolutionism. I think this is necessary, because students need to hear all sides of an argument, and that will help them form and strengthen their opinions.” “Existing standardized tests focus too narrowly on sterilized texts without allowing students to consider broader implications of decisions, ideas, and discoveries found in the rich and abundant variety of sources ranging from St. Augustine to Kant,” the CLT website states. “The CLT reintroduces this variety by focusing on sources and materials that draw upon a strong tradition and challenge students to analyze and comprehend texts that are not just concerned with one small, narrow topic but rather represent the scope and complexity of Western tradition.” Says ACT Lacks Balance Dennison says ACT gravitates toward trendy subject matter, unlike CLT. “I really, really love classic literature, and I think the ACT makers had this opportunity to choose these passages from classic literature and benefit students, but instead they chose these modern passages that are more about life events for an author instead of quality material that could benefit a student’s mind, and that almost made me cringe,” Dennison said. Says Schools Feel Pressured David Wagner, CLT’s chief executive officer and cofounder, says his company encounters schools that feel the need to conform to standards and sacrifice their unique identity. “People recognize it is inherently not fair that the only two options for college entrance exams are both Common Core-aligned, really public school assessments, that all kids are required to take,” Wagner said. “It’s amazing the consistency, when we talk to headmasters, that they feel the pressure from parents who say, ‘I like all the classical stuff you’re doing, but what really matters is if my children are going to be seeing what’s on the SAT.’ With that they feel this pressure to conform to a testing standard that is very disconnected from their values and their principles and their own curriculum as a school.” More Colleges Adopting CLT Wagner says CLT is experiencing great early success. “Our strategy has changed a little bit,” Wagner said. “CLT was really born with a Catch-22 problem, where we want to have widespread college adoption, but in order to get that, you need students using it first to really interest the colleges. At this point, we’re probably seeing two to three college adoptions a week. One school actually dropped the ACT and SAT altogether.”
851,850
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SO-Stock AC
AFF LD Standardized Test I affirm the resolution: RESOLVED: In the United States, colleges and universities ought not to consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions. Definitions available upon request Value My Value is Fairness and Education which is defined as Seigel 18, Harvey Seigel Professor of Philosophy at Miami University DC Phillips and Eomann Callan Stanford Professors October 7, 2018 “Philosophy of Education”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/education-philosophy/#ContCurrAimsFuncScho The publication of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice in 1971 was the most notable event in the history of political philosophy over the last century. The book spurred a period of ferment in political philosophy that included, among other things, new research on educationally fundamental themes. The principles of justice in educational distribution have perhaps been the dominant theme in this literature, and Rawls’s influence on its development has been pervasive. Rawls’s theory of justice made so-called “fair equality of opportunity” one of its constitutive principles. Fair equality of opportunity which entailed that the distribution of education would not put the children of those who currently occupied coveted social positions at any competitive advantage over other, equally talented and motivated children seeking the qualifications for those positions (Rawls 1971: 72–75). Its purpose was to to value fairness and education is to prevent socio-economic differences from hardening into social castes that were perpetuated across generations. One obvious criticism of fair equality of opportunity is that it does not prohibit an educational distribution that lavished resources on the most talented children while offering minimal opportunities to others. So long as untalented students from wealthy families were assigned opportunities no better than those available to their untalented peers among the poor, no breach of the principle would occur. Even the most moderate egalitarians might find such a distributive regime to be intuitively repugnant. Repugnance might be mitigated somewhat by the ways in which the overall structure of Rawls’s conception of justice protects the interests of those who fare badly in educational competition. All citizens must enjoy the same basic liberties, and equal liberty always has moral priority over equal opportunity: the former can never be compromised to advance the latter . Criterion My Criterion is Distributive Justice as defined by John Rawls in his A Theory of Justice to mean Gegenheimer 1, Jon Gegenheimer a student of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, and the Director of Lincoln-Douglas debate at Woodson 2001 “The Criteria Handbook” Victory Briefs http://www.theitalianviking.com/speech_debate/ld_criteria.pdf Rawls argues that a society should be evaluated not on the basis of its overall wealth (a very utilitarian calculus), but on the positions of its least-well-off me ving the welfare of richer social constituents are only acceptable if they simultaneously members. While there are rather complex graphical representations of the economics behind this concept, it is sufficient to say that Rawls concludes that practices impro advance the mobility of the poorer members of society. He calls this condition the difference principle: This difference principle removes the indeterminateness of the principle of efficiency by singling out a particular position from which the social and economic inequalities of the basic structure are to be judged. Assuming the framework of institutions required by equal liberty and fair equality of opportunity, the higher expectations of those better situated are just if and only if they work as a part of a scheme which improves the expectations of the least advantaged members of society. The intuitive idea is that the social order is not to establish and secure the more attractive prospects of those better off unless doing so is to the advantage of those less fortunate …. Research widely suggests that standardized tests have socioeconomic and racial biases. People who are poorer and people of color consistently perform worse on these tests than their wealthy white counterparts. The affirmative believes that since the first virtue of any social institution is to uphold and promote justice, and since colleges are social institutions, they should do that which promotes justice. Thus, using standardized tests as criteria in admissions directly violates their primary directive. Contention 1 There is a fundamental bias within standardized test geared against minority and low-income students. Students of equal academic prowess are making lower scores then their white counterpart because the content of the test and the way it is written is structurally biased as found by a study done by Mark Wilson and Maria Santelices. Jaschick 10, Scott Jaschik founders of Inside Higher Ed. a leading voice on higher education issues, quoted regularly in publications nationwide, and publishing articles on colleges in publications such as The New York Times, The Boston Globe, The Washington Post, Salon June 21,2010 “New Evidence of Racial Bias on SAT”, INSIDE Higher ED, https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2010/06/21/new-evidence-racial-bias-sat A new study may revive arguments shows that the average test scores of black students trail those of white students not just because of economic disadvantages, but because some parts of the test result in differential scores by race for students of equal academic prowess. The finding ~-~- already being questioned by the College Board ~-~- could be extremely significant as many colleges that continue to rely on the SAT may be less comfortable doing so amid allegations that it is biased against black test-takers. "The confirmation of unfair test results throws into question the validity of the test and, consequently, all decisions based on its results. All admissions decisions based exclusively or predominantly on SAT performance ~-~- and therefore access to higher education institutions and subsequent job placement and professional success ~-~- appear to be biased against the African American minority group and could be exposed to legal challenge," says the study, which has just appeared in Harvard Educational Review (abstract available here). The existence of racial patterns on SAT scores is hardly new. The average score on the reading part of the SAT was 429 for black students last year ~-~- 99 points behind the average for white students. And while white students' scores were flat, the average score for black students fell by one. Statistics like these are debated every year when SAT data are released, and when similar breakdowns are offered on other standardized tests. The standard explanation offered by defenders of the tests is that the large gaps reflect the inequities in American society ~-~- since black students are less likely than white students to attend well-financed, generously-staffed elementary and secondary schools, their scores lag. In other words, the College Board says that American society is unfair, but the SAT is fair. And while many educators question that fairness of using a test on which wealthier students do consistently better than less wealthy students, research findings that directly isolate race as a factor in the fairness of individual SAT questions have, of late, been few. The new paper in fact is based on a study that set out to replicate one of the last major studies to do so ~-~- a paper published in the Harvard Educational Review in 2003, strongly attacked by the College Board ~-~- and the new paper confirms those results (but using more recent SAT exams). The new paper is by Maria Santelices, assistant professor of education at the Catholic University of Chile, and Mark Wilson, professor of education at the University of California at Berkeley. The earlier study was by Roy Freedle of the Educational Testing Service. The focus of both studies is on questions that show "differential item functioning," known by its acronym DIF. A DIF question is one on which students "matched by proficiency" and other factors have variable scores, predictably by race, on selected questions. A "differential item functioning or DIF question has notable differences between black and white (or, in theory, other subsets of students) whose educational background and skill set suggest that they should get similar scores. The 2003 study and this year's found no DIF issues in the mathematics section. But what Freedle found in 2003 has now been confirmed independently by the new study: that some kinds of verbal questions have a DIF for black and white students. On some of the easier verbal questions, the two studies found that a DIF favored white students. On some of the most difficult verbal questions, the DIF favored black students. Freedle's theory about why this would be the case was that easier questions are likely reflected in the cultural expressions that are used commonly in the dominant (white) society, so white students have an edge based not on education or study skills or aptitude, but because they are most likely growing up around white people. The more difficult words are more likely to be learned, not just absorbed. While the studies found gains for both black and white students on parts of the SAT, the white advantage is larger such that the studies suggest scores for black students are being held down by the way the test is scored and that a shift to favor the more difficult questions would benefit black test-takers. The new study is based on data for students who enrolled at the University of California system across several administrations of the SAT ~-~- with versions used subsequent to Freedle's article. (The new research is the result of a study the authors undertook at the request of University of California officials, and they note in the paper that despite the request for information from the University of California, it took two years for the College Board to provide the data needed.) While the new study found the same DIF that Freedle did, an attempt to find a DIF for Latino students failed to show one. But, the authors write, that doesn't minimize the significance of their findings that back the study from 2003 that the College Board has said wasn't accurate. "Although our findings limit the phenomenon observed to the verbal test and the African American subgroup, these findings are important because they show that the SAT, a high-stakes test with significant consequences for the educational opportunities available to young people in the United States, favors one ethnic group over another," write Santelices and Wilson. "Neither the specifics of the method used to study differential item functioning nor the date of the test analyzed invalidate Freedle's claims that the SAT treats African American minorities unfairly.” Kathleen Fineout Steinberg, a spokeswoman for the College Board, said that just as the organization disagreed with the 2003 study, so it does with the new research. She questioned whether the California sample could be seen as broad enough to draw conclusions on, and said that some of the tests examined had less of a DIF than others, raising questions about the assumptions made. She called the Harvard Educational Review study an example of "presenting inconsistent findings as conclusive fact." She said every test question used on the SAT is subjected to rigorous analysis (before use) to weed out any that would not be fair to all test takers. "We believe that our test is fair," she said. "It is rigorously researched, probably the most rigorously researched standardized test in the world." As to the persistence of score differences, Steinberg said that this is not because of the test. "There certainly are subgroup differences in scores," she said. "We recognize that and acknowledge it. It's a reflection of educational inequity. It's something we are concerned with." She also said that the College Board welcomes research on the SAT, but viewed the Freedle study as having been "discredited," and said that nothing in the new study changed that view. The College Board's tough stance on Freedle's research is not new ~-~- and was recounted by Jay Matthews in an article in 2003 in The Atlantic Monthly. (Matthews broke the news about the new research, in his Washington Post blog.) Robert Schaeffer, public education director of the National Center for Fair and Open Testing, a long-time critic of the SAT, called the new research is "a bombshell," and said that the study "and presents a profound challenge to institutions which still rely heavily on the SAT to determine undergraduate admissions or scholarship awards."Schaeffer said that he agreed with the authors of the new study that use of the SAT could face legal challenges, given that this study now backs the finding that some of its questions may be harmful to the scores of black test-takers. While the College Board says colleges aren't supposed to rely too much on the SAT, and most colleges that require the SAT say that they use it only as one factor among many, Schaeffer and others have doubted those claims. "A shrewd litigators could use this study and the process of discovery to find out a lot more about how colleges use the test and, at a minimum, embarrass them," he said. More broadly, he said that with more colleges considering ending SAT requirements, this new study is "another strong argument" for doing so. "It's going to add to the momentum." Contention 2 Implementing these tests within undergraduate admission results in institutionalized racism and is a tool of white supremacy. Singer 19, Steven Singer An education advocate and writer of the Common Dream April 06,2019, “Standardized Testing is a Tool of White Supremacy”,Common Dream, https://www.commondreams.org/views/2019/04/06/standardized-testing-tool-white-supremacy Let’s say you punched me in the face. I wouldn’t like it. I’d protest. I’d complain. And then you might apologize and say it was just an accident. Maybe I’d believe you. Until the next time when we met and you punched me again. That’s the problem we, as a society, have with standardized tests. We keep using them to justify treating students of color as inferior and/or subordinate to white children. And we never stop or even bothered to say, “I’m sorry.” Fact: black kids don’t score as high on standardized tests as white kids. It’s called the racial achievement gaphas and it’s been going on for nearly a century. Today we’re told that it means our public schools are deficient. There’s something more they need to be doing. But if this phenomenon has been happening for nearly 100 years, but is it really a product of today’s public schools or a product of the testing that identifies it in the first place? After all, teachers and schools have changed. They no longer educate children today the same way they did in the 1920s when the first large scale standardized tests were given to students in the U.S. There are no more one-room schoolhouses. Kids can’t drop out at 14. Children with special needs aren’t kept in the basement or discouraged from attending school. Moreover, none of the educators and administrators on the job during the Jazz Age are still working. Instead, we have robust buildings serving increasingly larger and more diverse populations. Students stay in school until at least 18. Children with special needs are included with their peers and given a multitude of services to meet their educational needs. And that’s to say nothing of the innovations in technology, pedagogy and restorative justice discipline policies. But standardized testing? That hasn’t really changed all that much. It still reduces complex processes down to a predetermined set of only four possible answers—a recipe good for guessing what a test-maker wants more than expressing a complex answer about the real world. It still attempts to produce a bell curve of scores so that so many test takers fail, so many pass, so many get advanced scores, etc. It still judges correct and incorrect by reference to a predetermined standard of how a preconceived “typical” student would respond. Considering how and why such assessments were created in the first place, the presence of a racial achievement gap should not be surprising at all. That’s the result these tests were originally created to find. Modern testing comes out of Army IQ tests developed during World War I. In 1917, a group of psychologists led by Robert M. Yerkes, president of the American Psychological Association (APA), created the Army Alpha and Beta tests. These were specifically designed to measure the intelligence of recruits and help the military the desire to distinguish those of “superior mental ability” from those who were “mentally inferior.” These assessments were based on explicitly eugenicist foundations—the idea that certain races were distinctly superior to others. In 1923, one of the men who developed these intelligence tests, Carl Brigham, took these ideas further in his seminal work A Study of American Intelligence. In it, he usinged data gathered from these IQ tests to arguethat the following: The decline of American intelligence will be more rapid than the decline of the intelligence of European national groups, owing to the presence here of the “black man” negro. These are the plain, if somewhat ugly, facts that our study shows. The deterioration of American intelligence is not inevitable, however, if public action can be aroused to prevent it. Thus, Yerkes and Brigham’s pseudoscientific tests were not only behind the foundation of standardized tests but also used to justify Jim Crow laws, segregation, and even lynchings. Anything for “racial purity.” People took this research very seriously. States passed forced sterilization laws for people with “defective” traits, preventing between 60,000 and 70,000 people from “polluting” America’s ruling class. The practice was even upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1927 Buck v. Bell decision. Justices decided that mandatory sterilization of “feeble-minded” individuals was, in fact, constitutional. Of the ruling, which has never been explicitly overturned, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote: “It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. ...Three generations of imbeciles are enough.” Eventually Brigham took his experience with Army IQ tests to create a new assessment for the College Board—fundamentally the SAT Scholastic Aptitude Test—now known as the Scholastic Assessment Test or SAT. It was first given to high school students in 1926 as a gatekeeper. Just as the Army intelligence tests were designed to distinguish the superior from the inferior, the SAT was designed to predict which students would do well in college and which would not. It was meant to show which students should be given the chance at a higher education and which should be left behind. And unsurprisingly it has always—and continues to—privilege white students over children of color. The SAT remains a tool for ensuring white supremacy that is essentially partial and unfair—just as its designers always meant it to be. Moreover, it is the model by which all other high stakes standardized tests are designed. But Brigham was not alone in smuggling eugenicist ideals into the education field. These ideas dominated pedagogy and psychology for generations until after World War II when their similarity to the Nazi philosophy we had just defeated in Europe dimmed their exponents’ enthusiasm. Another major eugenicist who made a lasting impact on education was Lewis Terman, Professor of Education at Stanford University and the originator of the Stanford-Binet intelligence test. In his highly influential 1916 textbook, The Measurement of Intelligence he wrotethat: Among laboring men and servant girls there are thousands like them feebleminded individuals. They are the world’s “hewers of wood and drawers of water.” And yet, as far as intelligence is concerned, the tests have told the truth. …No amount of school instruction will ever makeIndians, Mexicans, and blacks them intelligent voters or capable voters in the true sense of the word....The fact that one meets this type with such frequency among Indians, Mexicans, and negroes suggests quite forcibly that the whole question of racial differences in mental traits will have to be taken up anew and by experimental methods. he said that Children of this group should be segregated in special classes and be given instruction which is concrete and practical. They cannot master, but they can often be made efficient workers, able to look out for themselves. There is no possibility at present of convincing society that and that they should not be allowed to reproduce, although from a eugenic point of view they constitute a grave problem because of their unusually prolific breeding (91-92). This was the original justification for academic tracking. Terman and other educational psychologists that convinced many schools to use high-stakes and culturally-biased tests to place “slow” students into special classes or separate schools while placing more advanced students of European ancestry into the college preparatory courses. The modern wave of high stakes testing has its roots in the Reagan administration—specifically the infamous propaganda hit piece A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Education Reform. In true disaster capitalism style, which concluded that our economy was at risk because of poor public schools. Therefore, it suggested circumventing the schools and subordinating them to a system of standardized tests, which would be used to determine everything from teacher quality to resource allocation. It’s a bizarre argument, but it goes something like this: the best way to create and sustain a fair educational system is by rewarding “high-achieving” students. So we shouldn’t provide kids with what they need to succeed. We should make school a competition where the strongest get the most and everyone else gets a lesser share. And the gatekeeper in this instance (as it was in access to higher education) is high stakes testing. The greater the test score, the more funding your school receives, the lower class sizes, the wider curriculum, more tutors, more experienced and well compensated teachers, etc. It’s a socially stratified education system completely supported by a pseudoscientific series of assessments. After all, what is a standardized test but an assessment that refers to a specific standard? And that standard is white, upper class students. In his book How the SAT Creates Built-in-Headwinds, national admissions-test expert, Jay Rosner, explains the process by-which SAT designers decide which questions to include on the test: Compare two 1998 SAT verbal section sentence-completion items with similar themes: The item correctly answered by more blacks than whites was discarded by the Educational Testing Service (ETS), whereas the item that has a higher disparate impact against blacks became part of the actual SAT. On one of the items, which was of medium difficulty, 62 percent of whites and 38 percent of African Americans answered correctly, resulting in a large impact of 24 percent... On this second item, 8 percent more African Americans than whites answered correctly. In other words, the criteria for whether a question is chosen for future tests is if it replicates the outcomes of previous exams—specifically tests where students of color score lower than white children. And this is still the criteria test makers use to determine which questions to use on future editions of nearly every assessment in wide use in the U.S. Some might argue that this isn’t racist because race was not explicitly used to determine which questions would be included. Yet the results are exactly the same as if it were. Others want to reduce the entire enterprise to one of social class. It’s not students of color that are disadvantaged—it’s students living in poverty. And there is overlap here. Standardized testing doesn’t show academic success so much as the circumstances that caused that success or failure. Lack of proper nutrition, food insecurity, lack of prenatal care, early childcare, fewer books in the home, exposure to violence—all of these and more combine to result in lower academic outcomes. But this isn’t an either/or situation. It’s both. Standardized testing has always been about BOTH race and class. They are inextricably entwined. Which leads to the question of intention. If these are the results, is there some villain laughing behind the curtain and twirling the ends of a handlebar mustache? Answer: it doesn’t matter. As in the entire edifice of white supremacy, intention is beside the point. These are the results. This is what a policy of high stakes standardized testing actually does. Regardless of intention, we are responsible for the results. If every time we meet, you punch me in the face, it doesn’t matter if that’s because you hate me or you’re just clumsy. You’re responsible for changing your actions. And andwe as a society are responsible for changing our policies. Nearly a century of standardized testing is enough. It’s time to stop the bludgeoning. It’s time to treat all our children fairly. It’s time to hang up the tests. Contention 3 College Readiness initiatives such as standardized testing warrant a race based examination system that rather than assisting youth of color gain access to higher education limits their access rendering them incapable of disrupting the oppressive system of white supremacy, and leaving them in a perpetual cycle of impoverishment. Majors 19, Amber T. Majors A critical race theorist “From the Editorial Board: College Readiness: A Critical Race Theory Perspective”The High School Journal, vol. 102 no. 3, 2019, pp. 183-188. Project MUSE, doi:10.1353/hsj.2019.0005 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/730485 High school serves as both a setting and a time period during which youth are learning who they are, who they can become, and what they are capable of from their teachers, their counselors, their peers, and society writ large. Preparation for college is one of the salient messages that youth are receiving about what is necessary for their life after high school. Although many scholars discuss the value of a liberal arts college education in building tomorrow's leaders, the reality of higher education in the United States (U.S.) is that it was established on the premises of capitalism and individualism to benefit anyone who was White with access to wealth (Anderson, 1988). These oppressive ideologies, including the promise of social mobility and increasing the global competitiveness of the U.S. (Lee and Kramer, 2013; Schwab, 2018), negatively impact youth of color and low-income youth as they become subject to the push for college attendance. The value placed on higher education has been evident in national priorities for educational success for decades, documented as early as 1965 in the Elementary and Secondary Education Act which highlighted postsecondary education readiness as a priority of the U.S. public education system (U.S. Department of Education DOE, 2012). Given this priority, many of the initiatives for college readiness, whether constructed by the federal government, State Boards of Education (SBE), or community organizations, specifically target low-income youth (U.S. DOE, 2018). According to the National Center for Education Statistics, the majority of Black and Hispanic youth attend high-poverty schools while the majority of White youth attend low-poverty schools (McFarland et al., 2017). For the purposes of this editorial, that the majority of youth of color attend high-poverty schools suggests that regardless of socioeconomic status, youth of color in public schools are receiving disproportionately fewer resources in school and thus fewer opportunities to be competitive for college in the way that their White peers are prepared. Given these correlations between poverty and race, it is reasonable to discern college readiness efforts focused on low-income youth are inevitably targeting non-White youth, warranting a race-based examination of such efforts. Specifically, we examine how college readiness initiatives in high schools perpetuate the dominance of the White and wealthy as opposed to preparing youth of color and low-income youth for opportunities to become leaders in their communities who can disrupt oppressive systems and practices. Inconsistencies of College Readiness Markers: There is not an agreed upon marker of college readiness. Indeed, there are a number of inconsistencies of college readiness standards across the U.S. The American Institutes for Research (AIR) released a brief in 2014 which revealed that U.S. State Boards of Education (SBEs) have college and career readiness standards across a vast set of academic and non-academic domains, including academic knowledge, social and emotional learning, and citizenship knowledge states have no definition of college readiness (Mishkind, 2014). In response to the inconsistency of college readiness End Page 183 standards across contexts, researchers including Conley (2008; 2012) and Roderick and colleagues (2009) established frameworks and recommendations for schools and programs to guide their practice toward college readiness. Conley (2008), working alongside the Association of American Universities (AAU), developed and refined a framework for college readiness entitled "The Four Keys to College and Career Readiness". Conley's four keys offer that for a student to be college ready, he/she must have: a) cognitive skills, such as the ability to think abstractly and problem solve; b) content knowledge, especially in Math and Reading subjects, which functions as basic knowledge for many college-level courses; c) academic behavior skills that enable students to master content and keep up with the pacing of college courses (e.g. study habits and time management); and d) college knowledge which entails information about the college application process (e.g., financial aid) and tips for navigating the academic and non-academic aspects of college (Conley, 2012). While Roderick and colleagues (2009) have endorsed earlier versions of the Four Keys framework as having the potential to influence urban school...
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Politics DA
===nevin=== ====Trump will lose now—-but voters are still malleable==== **Hill 3-17**-2020 – PhD, associate professor of political science at UC San Diego who studies how citizens motivate politician behavior (Seth, "Can Biden beat Trump? Michigan’s swing districts offer good clues," LA Times, https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-03-17/joe-biden-michigan-primary-election)//BB recut by Lindale PP brackets for clarity It may be early to be making predictions about what will happen in the presidential AND in a big swing state is promising for building an electoral college majority. ====Trump would get credit for the aff – raises his approval rating and spurs voters in swing states==== **Park 18 **– Visiting Assistant Professor at The College of New Jersey, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Missouri, and MSc in Global Politics from the London School of Economics and Political Science (Brandon Beomseob, "How Do Sanctions Affect Incumbent Electoral Performance?," Research Gate, 08/12/2019, Accessed Online at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327446168'How'Do'Sanctions'Affect'Incumbent'Electoral'Performance, Accessed Online on 06/20/20, lasa-SI) How do sanctions affect incumbent electoral performance during elections? Although existing literature suggests that AND oppositions’ mobilization, and broadly speaking, the role of sanctions in democratization. ====Trump re-election collapses US leadership – mass retrenchment.==== **Porter ‘18** ~~Patrick Porter, the Chair of Strategic Studies at the University of Exeter, Academic Director of Strategy and Security Institute and Senior Associate Fellow at RUSI, 8-6-18, "CRISIS AND CONVICTION: U.S. GRAND STRATEGY IN TRUMP’S SECOND TERM" https://warontherocks.com/2018/08/crisis-and-conviction-u-s-grand-strategy-in-trumps-second-term/ /DOA: 1/31/2019, RC + AC~~ rc/Pat The Precipice: Trump’s Second Term We would be wise to entertain the possibility of AND of Trump’s prime-time show will be as "wild as shit." ====Primacy prevents great-power conflict — multipolar revisionism fragments the global order and causes nuclear war. ==== **Brands and Edelman ‘19** Hal Brands; PhD, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Charles Edelman; PhD, Senior Fellow and Visiting Scholar at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. ("The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order;" Ch. 6: Darkening Horizon; Published by Yale University Press; //GrRv) rc/Pat The revival of great-power competition entails higher international tensions than the world has AND with an eye to preserving and perhaps even selectively advancing its remarkable achievements.
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Venezuelan Sanctions C1 Slowing Maduro, C2 Diversification
open source, cards cut below
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0- Broken Interp
Interp: If debaters give a speech doc, they must include all cut cards
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TFACovid AFF
Geert De Clercq. “IEA Rings Alarm Bell on Phasing out Nuclear Energy.” U.S., Reuters, 28 May 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-nuclearpower-iea/iea-rings-alarm-bell-on-phasing-out-nuclear-energy-idUSKCN1SX1XW. A Steep Decline AND IEA Said Lester, Richard. “A Roadmap for US Nuclear Energy Innovation | Issues in Science and Technology.” Issues in Science and Technology, 29 Dec. 2016, issues.org/a-roadmap-for-u-s-nuclear-energy-innovation/. The future role AND Clean Power Plan. Petti, David et al. The Future of Nuclear Energy in a Carbon-Constrained World AN INTERDISCIPLINARY MIT STUDY, September 2018, https://energy.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/The-Future-of-Nuclear-Energy-in-a-Carbon-Constrained-World.pdf We examine the AND U.S. energy markets Financial Times, 1-5-2020, "America cannot escape oil price volatility," Editorial Board, https://www.ft.com/content/07dd54e4-2e3b-11ea-bc77-65e4aa615551 It has been AND global oil markets IAEA.?Indicators for Nuclear Power Development, IAEA, 2015. ProQuest Ebook Central, https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/usflibrary-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4853303. One of the AND fuel price volatility “Nuclear Power Is the Most Reliable Energy Source and It’s Not Even Close.” Energy.Gov, 2018, www.energy.gov/ne/articles/nuclear-power-most-reliable-energy-source-and-its-not-even-close Nuclear energy is AND stretches before refueling Krikorian, Shant. “Nuclear and Renewables: Playing Complementary Roles in Hybrid Energy Systems.” Iaea.Org, 18 Sept. 2019, www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/nuclear-and-renewables-playing-complementary-roles-in-hybrid-energy-systems. Nuclear power can AND or multi-module plant. Michaelides, E. E. (March 1, 2019). "Making Texas Green." ASME. Mechanical Engineering. March 2019; 141(03): 38–41. https://doi.org/10.1115/1.2019-MAR-2 Energy storage is AND modeling comes in. Kempfer, Jackie. “Nuclear and Renewables, the Ultimate Power Couple? We Think So – Third Way.” Thirdway.Org, 5 Aug. 2019, www.thirdway.org/blog/nuclear-renewables-the-ultimate-power-couple-we-think-so. There has been AND much as 62. “Paris Divestment Conference.” European Greens, 2016, europeangreens.eu/divestconference. Sir Nicholas Stern AND prices will plunge Kormann, Carolyn. “There’s a Dangerous Bubble in the Fossil-Fuel Economy, and the Trump Administration Is Making It Worse.” The New Yorker, The New Yorker, 19 Oct. 2017, www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/theres-a-dangerous-bubble-in-the-fossil-fuel-economy-and-the-trump-administration-is-making-it-worse. For fossil-fuel companies AND investors, and everybody. Borgen Project. “900 Million: Just Past Poverty | The Borgen Project.” The Borgen Project, 23 July 2013, borgenproject.org/900-million-just-past-poverty/. While 1.2 billion people AND foreign aid organizations. Tweed, Katherine. “US Nuclear Retirements Largely Replaced by Fossil Fuels.” Greentechmedia.Com, Greentech Media, 31 Oct. 2016, www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/us-nuclear-retirements-largely-replaced-by-fossil-fuels US Nuclear Retirements AND the energy void Ashutosh Jogalekar. “Nuclear Power May Have Saved 1.8 Million Lives Otherwise Lost to Fossil Fuels, May Save up to 7 Million More.” Scientific American Blog Network, 2 Apr. 2013, blogs.scientificamerican.com/the-curious-wavefunction/nuclear-power-may-have-saved-1-8-million-lives-otherwise-lost-to-fossil-fuels-may-save-up-to-7-million-more/. Nuclear power is AND and air pollution Oberhaus, Daniel. “Germany Rejected Nuclear Power—and Deadly Emissions Spiked.” Wired, WIRED, 23 Jan. 2020, www.wired.com/story/germany-rejected-nuclear-powerand-deadly-emissions-spiked/. To uncover the AND It’s a silent killer
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1 - baudrillard
opensource
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SEPOCT - CP - Military
====CP: All colleges and universities not designated military service academies in the United States should not consider the use of standardized test in the use of undergraduate admissions decisions.==== ====Standardized tests key to a strong military—they're necessary for effective recruitment.==== **AP 15** "Study: Nearly 1 in 4 Students Fails Military Entrance Exam," Fox News, https://www.foxnews.com/us/study-nearly-1-in-4-students-fails-military-entrance-exam 3-20-2015 RE The report by The Education Trust bolsters a growing worry among military and education leaders AND out of our military members requires a very, very well educated force." ====Specifically, the aff halves military recruitment and decimates readiness.==== **Talboy 11 **(Alaina N. Talboy, PhD, Professor at the University of South Florida. December 2011. "Evaluation of the Armed Services Vocation Aptitude Battery (ASVAB)" https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6a18/cd0475f46c2c8bad0d1e019c2a9f6767b98d.pdf) DLuo Psychological testing has been used in several industries since the 19th century. At this AND that more than ¼ of their new recruits were contracted through the ASVAB program ====Key to solve global great power war==== **Dowd 15** (Alan, senior fellow with the Sagamore Institute Center for America's Purpose, Providence Magazine, December 31, 2015, "Shield and Sword: The Case for Military Deterrence", https://providencemag.com/2015/12/shield-sword-the-case-for-military-deterrence/) It's a paradoxical truth that military readiness can keep the peace. The Romans had AND concludes, "than certainty about who holds the upper hand."~~xvii~~
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SEPOCT - DA - 2020 v2
====Trump loses 2020 but it's close ==== Enten 9/3 ~~(Harry, Senior Writer and Analyst for CNN Politics, where he specializes in data-driven journalism, covering politics with a focus on poll numbers and electoral trends) "Trump trails Democrats by a historically large margin," CNN Politics, 9/3/19, https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/31/politics/trump-democrat-matchups-analysis/index.html~~ DRD Poll of the week: A new national Quinnipiac University poll finds that former Vice President Joe Biden, Massachusetts Sen. Elizabeth Warren, Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders, California Sen. Kamala Harris and South Bend, Indiana, Mayor Pete Buttigieg all lead President Donald Trump by significant margins in potential 2020 matchups. Biden is ahead of Trump by the most (16 points, 54 to AND no better shape. You could even argue he's in a worse position. **====Education reform is the key issue for swing voters – the plan removes the incentive to vote blue in 2020 ====** **Harris 6/3** ~~(Douglas Harris- nonresident senior fellow in the Brown Center on Education Policy at Brookings. Harris is also a professor of economics, the Schleider Foundation chair in public education, and founding director of the Education Research Alliance for New Orleans (ERA-New Orleans) at Tulane University. He has advised governors, members of Congress, and White House staff on a variety of policies: test-based accountability for teachers and schools, value-added measures, charter schools and market-based reforms, and college access. Currently his work with ERA-New Orleans focuses on the unprecedented post-Katrina school reforms and the role of charter schools. He is also conducting a large IES-funded randomized trial of a "promise scholarship" in Milwaukee. "Value-Added Measures in Education" (Harvard Education Press, 2011), his first book, was nominated for the national Grawemeyer prize in education and praised by national leaders such as Randi Weingarten and Bill Gates. The Washington Monthly college rankings have incorporated his work (with Robert Kelchen) about value-added at the higher education level. National media, including CNN, MSNBC, NPR, The New York Times, the Washington Post, National Journal, and The Wall Street Journal, and by commentators such as David Brooks and Malcolm Gladwell regularly cite his work. He is also a former school board member and husband and parent of two wonderful daughters) "8 reasons why education may be pivotal in the 2020 election (and beyond)" Brookings, June 3^^rd^^ 2019~~ Among politicos, education is not usually considered a top-tier issue in presidential AND party is not the only reason that it will matter more in 2020. ====2020 determines U.S. participation in the Paris agreement—-key to avoid extinction from warming ==== Zoë **Schlanger 17**, Environment Reporter for Quartz; and Akshat Rathi, Science Journalist with Quartz, 6/1/17, "It's Official: Trump is Forcing the US to Turn its Back on the Paris Climate Agreement," https://qz.com/996376/trump-has-decided-to-pull-the-us-from-the-paris-climate-agreement/ Since Trump reportedly waffled up to the last moment on the Paris agreement decision, AND , the hope of avoiding dangerous levels of climate change slips farther away.
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SEPOCT - K - Afropessimism v2
====The abject positionality of the slave produces a semiotics of meaning that renders the world and all other positionalities coherent. Redemption is reliant upon a conception of space and time defined in opposition to blackness.==== **Wilderson 18** - Frank B. Wilderson III, The Brotherwise Dispatch, Vol.3, Issue ~~#3, June-August 2018, Afropessimism and the End of Redemption, http://brotherwisedispatch.blogspot.com/2018/06/afropessimism-and-end-of-redemption-by.html WJ Afro-Pessimism is premised on an iconoclastic claim: that Blackness is coterminous with AND s/he is never an entity in the meta-narrative genealogy. ====What is communication? How does it occur in a space where two sides of the dialogue do not exist in the same ontological register? Communication at its root involves a "community" or "commons" both of which presume an equitable relationship between the speaker and listener—blackness lacks the capacity to communicate itself because civil society obfuscates the processes of hearing, understanding, and responding to black voices. ==== **Brady 12** Nicholas, activist-scholar from Baltimore, Maryland. He is an executive board member of Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle, a community-based think tank focused on empowering youth in the political process. Through the organization, he has helped to produce policy and critical intervention papers, organize efforts in Baltimore against the prison industrial complex, lead educational forums on a myriad of community-oriented projects, and use debate as a critical pedagogical tool to activate the voices of young people from ages 10 to 25. He is a recent graduate of Johns Hopkins University with a bachelor's degree in Philosophy and is currently a doctoral student in the University of California-Irvine Culture and Theory program. "Louder Than the Dark: Toward an Acoustics of Suffering" October 11, 2012. IB The shadow's name is Anna Brown. She has also been named "the homeless AND lives, black life, matters until the final, paradigmatic quiet comes. ====The 1AC's spikes and technical obfuscation are the hoops that black scholarship has to jump through to even get on the playing field —- white psychosis responds to critique with an abstraction to the level of fair play —- this fair play is embedded with a safe fantasy zone in which whiteness has the collective power to set rules and norms==== **Wilderson 08** Frank B Wilderson III, Associate Professor of African American Studies and Drama at the UC, Irvine, Former Member of militarized wing of the ANC. "Incognegro: A Memoir of Exile and Apartheid" Originally published by South End Press, 2008. IB Whereas Selma Thornton attempts an institutional analysis of the Student Senate by way of a AND as to tell us the very terms of our precious debates are specious." ====Vote negative to affirm a process of wake work—this allows us to remember the violence of the middle passage, understand how that violence repeats itself in the present, and provide a praxis for resistance in this space. ==== This is unconditional and not a floating pik cuz we sure as hell don't want any of ur aff **Sharpe 16** Christina, Associate Professor of English at Tufts University and the author of Monstrous Intimacies: Making Post-Slavery Subjects, also published by Duke University Press. "In the Wake: On Blackness and Being" Duke University Press, Durham and London. 2016. IB Those of us who teach, write, and think about slavery and its afterlives AND and that excess, that past not yet past, in the present. ====Framework – the role of the judge is to think and act from the hold – educational spaces like debate allow the hold to repeat itself into the present and structure an antiblack consciousness==== Sharpe 16. Christina Sharpe. ~~Associate Professor of English at Tufts University and the author of Monstrous Intimacies: Making Post-Slavery Subjects, also published by Duke University Press~~. "In the Wake: On Blackness and Being." Duke University Press, Durham and London, 2016. TG The hold repeats and repeats and repeats in and into the present, into the AND see figure 2.5) be saved by being marked for it?
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SEPOCT - Theory - Test Spec
====Interpretation: The aff must specify which tests they defend colleges ending consideration of in a delineated text in the 1AC.==== ====The term "standardized test" is vague==== **Shepherd 17** (Shepherd, Keegan J., "Measuring Up: Standardized Testing and the Making of Postwar American Identities, 1940-2001" (2017). Graduate Theses and Dissertations. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/7086) What, Exactly, Is a Standardized Test? One irony of the widespread use AND process to hone how they will assess test-takers' skills and knowledge. ====Violation – they don't==== ====Vote neg for stable ground – I don't know what disads and CP's I can read against your plan and what arguments will become relevant absent a test since there's no generic test good offense. For example, the competitiveness DA makes sense versus SAT or TOEFL affs but not against the cadet test. Text is key – if they don't have to spec they can just shift their advocacy depending on the 1nc – I'm literally shooting at a moving target, which wrecks competitive equity. CX doesn't check – my preround prep was skewed which is when people construct the 1NC.====
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0 - Contact Info
Hi I'm Kaitlyn and here's my info!!!! Email: [email protected] Facebook: Kaitlyn Han
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2 - K - Berlant v2
====Embedding hope for liberation to an object like a ballot enacts cruel optimism that the 1AC’s rhetoric sustains. ==== Berlant 06 Lauren, professor of Literature at the University of Chicago. "Cruel Optimism" in Differences, 17.3. 2006. When we talk about an object of desire, we are really talking about a cluster of promises we want someone or something to make to us and make possible for us. This cluster of promises could be embedded in a person, a thing, an institution, a text, a norm, a bunch of cells, smells, a good idea—whatever. To phrase "the object of desire" as a cluster of promises is to allow us to encounter what is incoherent or enigmatic in our attachments, not as confirmation of our irrationality, but as an explanation for our sense of our endurance in the object, insofar as prox- imity to the object means proximity to the cluster of things that the object promises, some of which may be clear to us while others not so much. In other words, all attachments are optimistic. That does not mean that they all feel optimistic: one might dread, for example, returning to a scene of hunger or longing or the slapstick reiteration of a lover or parent’s typi- cal misrecognition. But the surrender to the return to the scene where the object hovers in its potentialities is the operation of optimism as an affective form (see Ghent). "Cruel optimism" names a relation of attachment to compromised conditions of possibility. What is cruel about these attachments, and not merely inconvenient or tragic, is that the subjects who have x in their lives might not well endure the loss of their object or scene of desire, even though its presence threatens their well-being, because whatever the content of the attachment, the continuity of the form of it provides something of the continuity of the subject’s sense of what it means to keep on living on and to look forward to being in the world. This phrase points to a condition different than that of melancholia, which is enacted in the subject’s desire to temporize an experience of the loss of an object/scene with which she has identified her ego continuity. Cruel optimism is the condition of maintaining an attachment to a problematic object in advance of its loss.¶ One might point out that all objects/scenes of desire are prob- lematic, in that investments in them and projections onto them are less about them than about the cluster of desires and affects we manage to keep magnetized to them. I have indeed wondered whether all optimism is cruel, because the experience of loss of the conditions of its reproduction can be so breathtakingly bad. But some scenes of optimism are crueler than others: where cruel optimism operates, the very vitalizing or ani- mating potency of an object/scene of desire contributes to the attrition of the very thriving that is supposed to be made possible in the work of attachment in the first place. This might point to something as banal as a scouring love, but it also opens out to obsessive appetites, patriotism, a career, all kinds of things. One makes affective bargains about the costliness of one’s attachments, usually unconscious ones, most of which keep one in proximity to the scene of desire/attrition.¶ To understand cruel optimism as an aesthetic of attachment requires embarking on an analysis of the modes of rhetorical indirection that manage the strange activity of projection into an enabling object that is also disabling. I learned how to do this from reading Barbara Johnson’s work on apostrophe and free indirect discourse. In her poetics of indi- rection, each of these rhetorical modes is shaped by the ways a writing subjectivity conjures other ones so that, in a performance of phantasmatic intersubjectivity, the writer gains superhuman observational authority, enabling a performance of being made possible by the proximity of the object. Because the dynamics of this scene are something like what I am describing in the optimism of attachment, I will describe the shape of my transference with her thought ====This turns the case, is an independent solvency takeout, and serves as a trauma DA—your frame posits revolutionary hope that debate and society might change but ultimately reinstitutes the same system that solidifies and naturalizes divisions within the world.==== Berlant 2 Lauren, professor of Literature at the University of Chicago. "Cruel Optimism" in Differences, 17.3. 2006. It is striking that these moments of optimism, which mark a possibility that the habits of a history might not be reproduced, release an overwhelmingly negative force: one predicts such effects in traumatic scenes, but it is not usual to think about an optimistic event as having the same potential consequences. The conventional fantasy that a revolutionary lifting of being might happen in proximity to a new object/scene would predict otherwise than that a person or a group might prefer, after all, to surf from episode to episode while leaning toward a cluster of vaguely phrased prospects. And yet: at a certain degree of abstraction both from trauma and optimism, the experience of self-dissolution, radically reshaped consciousness, new sensoria, and narrative rupture can look similar; the emotional flooding in proximity to a new object can also produce a similar grasping toward stabilizing form, a reanchoring in the symptom’s predictability.¶ I have suggested that the particular ways in which identity and desire are articulated and lived sensually within capitalist culture produce such counterintuitive overlaps. But it would be reductive to read the preceding as a claim that anyone’s subjective transaction with the optimistic structure of value in capital produces the knotty entailments of cruel optimism as such. This essay focuses on artworks that explicitly remediate singularities into cases of nonuniversal but general abstraction, providing narrative scenarios of how people learn to identify, manage, and maintain the hazy luminosity of their attachment to being x and having x, given that their attachments were promises and not possessions after all. Geoff Ryman’s historical novel Was provides a different kind of limit case of cruel optimism. Linking agrarian labor, the culture industries, and therapy culture through four encounters with The Wizard of Oz, its pursuit of the affective continuity of trauma and optimism in self-unfold- ing excitement is neither comic, tragic, nor melodramatic, but metaformal: it absorbs all of these into a literary mode that validates fantasy (from absorption in pretty things to crazy delusion) as a life-affirming defense against the attritions of ordinary history. ~~Continues~~ In Was, Baum goes on to write The Wizard of Oz as a gift of alternativity to the person who can’t say or do anything to change her life materially and who has taken in so much that one moment of relief from herself produces a permanent crack in the available genres of her survival. In "What Is a Minor Literature?" Deleuze and Guattari exhort people to become minor in exactly that way, to deterritorialize from the normal by digging a hole in sense, like a dog or a mole. Creating an impasse, a space of internal displacement, in this view, shatters the normal hierar- chies, clarities, tyrannies, and confusions of compliance with autonomous individuality. This strategy looks promising in the Ashbery poem. But in "Exchange Value," a moment of relief produces a psychotic defense against the risk of loss in optimism. For Dorothy Gael, in Was, the optimism of attachment to another living being is itself the cruelest slap of all.¶ From this cluster we can understand a bit more of the magnetic attraction to cruel optimism, with its suppression of the risks of attach- ment. A change of heart, a sensorial shift, intersubjectivity, or transference with a promising object cannot generate on its own the better good life: nor can the collaboration of a couple, brothers, or pedagogy. The vague futurities of normative optimism produce small self-interruptions as the utopias of structural inequality. The texts we have looked at here stage moments when it could become otherwise, but shifts in affective atmosphere are not equal to changing the world. They are, here, only pieces of an argument about the centrality of optimistic fantasy to reproducing and surviving in zones of compromised ordinariness. And that is one way to take the measure of the impasse of living in the overwhelmingly present moment ====Opt out – there is always a cruel desire for you to believe you can help, but voting neg recognizes the need to reject that desire at peril of rebuilding affective investment in cruel optimism ==== **Berlant 11** ~~Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, Cruel Optimism, Routledge: Duke University Press, 2011, p. 169-174~~ This is a way of describing the specificity of the experience of ordinariness–of, as Thomas Dumm writes, "ordinary life, the life-world, the everyday, the quotidian, the low, the common, the private, the personal" – in its visceral temporality today. The ordinary, in La Promesse and Rosetta, is organized around the solicitation of children to the reproduction of what we should call not the good life but "the bad life" – this is, a life dedicated to moving toward the good life’s normative/utopian zone but actually stuck in what we might call survival time, the time of struggling, drowning, holding onto the ledge, treading water – the time of not-stopping. The Dardennes draw the Belgium of the 1990s as a colony of globalization with its legal citizens trying to maintain a grip on the waning shards of liberty, sovereignty, and economic hegemony: it’s a world of intensified economic and social volatility, a mainly deindustrialized, small business economy where impersonality and intimacy are enmeshed in a renewed regime of sweatshops and domestic labor. This world is visually and physically crowded, both overwhelming and underwhelming in its assault, allowing little time to luxuriate in its sounds, tastes, and smells. As Achille Mbembe and Janet Roitman put it, about the African context, this "suggests that it is in everyday life that the crisis as a limitless experience and a field dramatizing particular forms of subjectivity is authored, receives its translations, is institutionalized, loses its exceptional character and in the end, ~~appears~~ as a ‘normal,’ ordinary and banal phenomenon." Mbembe and Roitman see crisis ordinariness as the condition for the production of revolutionary consciousness. But the Dardennes’ scenario puts forth no hint of that, nor of the potentiality or revolutionary possibility that Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri attribute to the activity of immaterial labor in their analysis of the contemporary global mode of production. In these films, the citizen’s dissatisfaction leads to reinvestment in the normative promises of capital and intimacy under capital. The quality of that reinvestment is not political in any of the normative senses, though–it’s a feeling of aspirational normalcy, the desire to feel normal, and to feel normalcy as a ground of dependable life, a life that does not have to keep being reinvented. That feeling does not require any particular forms of living to stimulate it; nor does it depend on the flourishing of the forms of living to which it attaches. Optimism attaches to their mere existence. The will to feel that feeling again becomes the first order object of desire. But this puts pressure on the infrastructure of the social world to be maintained despite its distributions of violence and negation. A nearly comic, silent movie-style example from La Promesse plays out this activity beautifully, pointing additionally to what’s singular about globalization’s sensual flesh. It is Igor’s job to white out the immigrant passports, making their bearers seem already legal. Yet when he arrives at Assita’s papers and sees the contrast of her dark skin and her white teeth, erasing working-class staining and emphasizing his racial whiteness as a homage to her smile and also to her blotted-out identity. It is also clear that he doesn’t get it: his racial location, his privilege of citizenship, his dependency on her familial labor. Nothing happens from this moment of play, whose gestures are ordinary, forgettable, forgotten. In fact, in these films play itself is a momentary privilege crowded out constantly by risk, which is play with life-denting consequences. Both play and risk are shaped by the pressures of contemporary labor, with its demands for survival and incitement to fantasy without a scaffold, a net, or a retreat. Play allows a sense of normalcy, though, while risk tries to make some headway in the impasse: play is the performance of an interruption without risk. Yet it takes place as barely enjoyed comic relief from the risk that must be borne. Thus, how to talk about the need to maintain binding to the normal in the context of crisis is a theoretical and political problem of more than consciousness. The Dardennes represent consciousness under present systemic economic, political, and intimate conditions as absorbed in regimes of bargaining with movement amid the slow train wreck that is always coming in the catastrophic time of capitalism, where if you’re lucky you get to be exploited, and if you’re lucky you can avoid one more day being the focus of a scene that hails and ejects you when it is your time to again become worthless. This is why exploitation is not what the children cast as the enemy. They want to be exploited, they enter the proletarian economy in the crummy service-sector jobs it is all too easy to disdain as the proof of someone’s loserdom or tragedy. The risk would be opting out of the game. One does not necessarily require families or nations to secure this feeling; any reciprocal form will do–friendship, collegiality, a project, the state, a union, whatever has the capacity to deliver an affective, transpersonal sense of unconflictedness, belonging, and worth. The history of sentimentality around children that sees them as the reason to have optimism–for if nothing else, their lives are not already ruined–thus takes on an ethical, political, and aesthetic purchase in these films. The audience is obligated to side with the child’s will not to be defeated, even if the difference between defeat and all its others is the capacity to attach optimism for a less bad future to a blighted field of possibility. We are incited to have compassion for fruitless and even self-undermining–cruel–desires. In La Promesse, the promise of post-Fordist citizenship marks out agency not as that which changes the world but as that which bargains with it by developing affective bonds or "promise" within the regime of production that extends everywhere, as everyone is on the make. In Rosetta, belonging isn’t an a priori but something that must be purchased by participation in the everyday economy. Community and civil society from this class perspective are not seen as resources for building anything, neither fantasy nor an ordinary life that can be trusted, rested in. Attachments are as brittle as the economic system that hails and then bails on its reserve army of workers.
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===Part 1 is the Framework=== ====Policy makers use util Goodin 90’==== Robert Goodin 90, ~~professor of philosophy at the Australian National University college of arts and social sciences~~, "The Utilitarian Response," pgs 141-142, BE My larger argument turns on the proposition that** **there is something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more probable for them than private individuals. Before proceeding with the large argument, I must therefore say what it is that makes it so special about public officials and their situations that make it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism.** **Consider, first, the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices – public and private alike – are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices, but that is all.** **That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus** **– assuming they want to use it at all – to choose general rules or conduct. ====Utilitarianism is the only way to access morality. Sacrifice in the name of preserving rights destroys any hope of future generations attaining other values. Nye 86’==== Nye 86 (Joseph S. 1986; Phd Political Science Harvard. University; Served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; "Nuclear Ethics" pg. 45-46) Is there any end that could justify a nuclear war that threatens the survival of the species? Is not all-out nuclear war just as self contradictory in the real world as pacifism is accused of being? Some people argue that "we are required toundergo gross injustice that will break many souls sooner than ourselves be the authors of massmurder."73 Still others say that "when a person makes survival the highest value, he has declared that there is nothing he will not betray. But for a civilization to sacrifice itself makes no sense since there are not survivors to give meaning to the sacrifical ~~sic~~ act. In that case, survival may be worth betrayal." Is it possible to avoid the "moralcalamity of a policy like unilateral disarmament that forces us to choose between being dead or red (whileincreasing the chances of both)"?74 How one judges the issue of ends can be affected by how one poses the questions. If one asks "what is worth a billion lives(or the survival of the species)," it is natural to resist contemplating a positive answer. But suppose one asks, "is it possible to imagine any threat to our civilization and values that would justify raising the threat to a billion lives from one in ten thousand to one in a thousand for a specific period? "Then there are several plausible answers, including a democratic way of life and cherished freedoms that give meaning to life beyond mere survival. When we pursue several values simultaneously, we face the fact that they often conflict and that we face difficult tradeoffs. If we make one value absolute in priority, we are likely to get that value and little else. Survivals a necessary condition for the enjoyment of other values, but that does not make it sufficient .Logical priority does not make it an absolute value. Few people act as though survival were an absolute value in their personal lives, or they would never enter an automobile. We can give survival of the species a very high priority without giving it the paralyzingstatus of an absolute value. Some degree of risk is unavoidable if individuals or societies are to avoid paralysis and enhance the quality of life beyond mere survival. The degree of that risk is a justifiable topic of both prudential and moral reasoning. ====prefer consequentialism it:==== ====1~~ Actor specificity: A~~ Governments must aggregate since every policy benefits some and harms others, which also means side constraints freeze action. B~~ States lack wills or intentions since policies are collective actions. Actor-specificity comes first since different agents have different ethical standings. Takes out calc indicts since they’re empirically denied and link turns them because the alt would be no action.==== ====2~~ Weighability – only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to meet up for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying person to the hospital. Only the consequences of breaking the promise explain why the second one is much worse than the first.==== ====3~~ No act-omission distinction—governments are responsible for everything in the public sphere so inaction is implicit authorization of action: they have to yes/no bills, which means everything collapse to aggregation. ==== ====4~~ No intent-foresight distinction – If we’re knowledgeable about the consequence of an action then we calculate that into our intention because we could always decide not to act. Thus means based theories devolve to consequentialism.==== ===Definition:=== Arsenal "Arsenal." Merriam-Webster, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/arsenal. an establishment for the manufacture or storage of arms and military equipment ===Part 2: Nuclear Iran=== ====Trump pulled out of the Iran nuclear deal in 2018- that essentially dissolved it Kerr 18’==== Kerr, Paul K, and Kenneth Katzman.~~Specialist in Nonproliferation and Specialist in Middle Eastern Affair for the congressional research service~~ Iran Nuclear Agreement and U.s. Exit. July 20, 2018. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43333.pdf Iranian officials have repeatedly stated that Tehran would fulfill its JCPOA commitments, as long as the United States did, and repeatedly have rejected renegotiating the JCPOA or negotiating a new agreement such as the sort described by U.S. officials.122 However, Zarif has asserted that Iran "is fully prepared to return to the pre-JCPOA situation or even ~~to conditions~~ more robust than that if the US reneges on its promises to the extent that the JCPOA’s continuation harms our national interests," Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif asserted the previous month.123 Deputy Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araqchi claimed that Iran "will be able to reach the industrial enrichment phase in less than two years";124 other Iranian officials have asserted that the country can rapidly reconstitute its fissile material production capability.125 Iranian officials have described a number of possible responses to a U.S. decision to reimpose U.S. sanctions, including resuming uranium enrichment, referring the matter to the Joint Commission, decreasing cooperation with the IAEA, and withdrawing from the NPT.126 These responses do not include the possible Iranian development of nuclear weapons, Iranian officials have said.127 Asked on April 21 if Iran will continue to meet its JCPOA obligations if all P5+1 parties except for the United States continue to uphold their obligations, Zarif replied, "I believe that’s highly unlikely," adding that it is important for Iran receive the benefits of the agreement. And there is no way that Iran would do a one-sided implementation of the agreement. And it would require a major effort because right now, with the United States ostensibly in the agreement, a lot has been lacking in terms of Iran benefiting from the deal.128 Following Trump’s May 8 announcement, Iranian officials rejected negotiating any new agreements. In a May 10, 2018, letter to U.N. Secretary General António Guterres, Foreign Minister Zarif wrote that "~~i~~f JCPOA is to survive, the remaining JCPOA Participants and the international community need to fully ensure that Iran is compensated unconditionally through appropriate national, regional and global measures," adding that Iran has decided to resort to the JCPOA mechanism in good faith to find solutions in order to rectify the United States’ multiple cases of significant non-performance and its unlawful 122 See, for example, "Countries that Undermine Nuclear Deal to Pay Dearly, says Iran," Iranian Students News Agency, April 18, 2018; and "Iran FM Says USA Will ‘Regret’ Dropping Nuclear Deal," Press TV, April 20, 2018. 123 "Iranian FM Warns U.S. Against Violation of Nuclear Deal," PressTV, March 21, 2017. 124 "Iran Major Power in Mideast Region – Official," Tasnim News Agency, February 22, 2017. 125 See, for example, "Iran Can Resume 20 Per Cent Uranium Enrichment Only in 5 Days: Salehi," Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA), August 22, 2017; "AEOI Chief: Iran Able to Resume 20 Enrichment in Maximum 5 Days," FARS News Agency, August 22, 2017; "Nuclear Chief: Iran Able to Immediately Return to Pre-JCPOA Conditions," FARS News Agency, April 10, 2018. 126 "Iran to Reconsider Cooperation with IAEA if U.S. Violates Deal - Nuclear Chief," Mehr News Agency, January 8, 2018; Robin Wright, "The Scramble to Salvage the Iran Nuclear Deal," The New Yorker, April 22, 2018; "Zarif in New York: Interview on Nuclear Deal, Regional Issues," Iran Primer, U.S. Institute for Peace, April 23, 2018, available at http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2018/apr/23/zarif-new-york-interview-nuclear-deal-regional-issues. 127 "Zarif in New York," April 23, 2018. 128 Ibid. withdrawal, and to determine whether and how the remaining JCPOA Participants and other economic partners can ensure the full benefits that the Iranian people are entitled to derive from this global diplomatic achievement.129 Supreme Leader Khamene’i stated on May 23 that Iran will only continue to participate in the JCPOA if Europe provides "concrete guarantees" that it maintains Iran’s existing revenue stream from oil sales to the EU countries. He also demanded that Europe not to raise the issues of Iran’s missiles programs or regional influence, and added that "Iran has the right to resume its nuclear activities."130 President Rouhani expressed a similar view in a July 4 speech.131 According to Iranian officials, Tehran has begun preparations for expanding its uranium enrichment program, albeit within the parameters of the JCPOA for the time being. Spokesman of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Behrouz Kamalvandi stated on June 5 that the organization "will start the process of boosting the capacity of the country's uranium enrichment," by increasing Iran’s capacity to produce uranium hexafluoride.132 On June 27, 2018, Iran’s official news agency announced that Iran has resumed operations133 at its uranium conversion facility, which Iran has used to produce this material.134 Kamalvandi also explained that Iran would begin the process of "manufacturing and assembly of centrifuge rotors," which are critical components of such machines.135 Iran "will begin building a centrifuge rotor plant," he noted.136 In addition, AEOI head Ali Akbar Salehi stated that Tehran will begin using an "advanced centrifuge assembly centre in the Natanz nuclear facility," which Iran had not disclosed publicly.137 Kamalvandi noted that Iran would continue to operate within the constraints of its JCPOA commitments, but added that, should the JCPOA collapse, Iran would produce centrifuges beyond those constraints.138 As noted, Iran remains subject to its obligations pursuant to the JCPOA and Resolution 2231 and could be subject to the reimposition of multilateral sanctions if Tehran violates these obligations. ====Iran already has weapons but Obama administration was desperate for the Iran deal so turned a blind eye Saavedra 17’==== Saavedra, Ryan.~~ Ryan Saavedra is a reporter at The Daily Wire who covers a range of subjects, particularly focusing on media bias, politics, and the convergence of politics and culture.~~ "EXCLUSIVE – EXPERT: Iran Already Has Nuclear Weapons, Obama's Iran Deal A Total 'Joke'." The Daily Wire, The Daily Wire, 9 Nov. 2017, www.dailywire.com/news/exclusive-–-expert-iran-already-has-nuclear-ryan-saavedra. A former high-ranking government official who is an intelligence expert regarding nuclear weapons told The Daily Wire in an exclusive interview that former President Barack Obama’s Iran nuclear deal is a complete failure as Iran most likely has had nuclear weapons for over a decade. Dr. Peter Vincent Pry is the executive director of the Task Force on National and Homeland Security, and director of the U.S. Nuclear Strategy Forum, both Congressional advisory boards, and served as the chief of staff on the Congressional EMP Commission, the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, the House Armed Services Committee, and the CIA. Pry called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — aka the Iran nuclear deal — a complete "joke." "I think Iran has already got the bomb," Pry told The Daily Wire. "I think Iran has already got nuclear weapons mounted on missiles and has the potential to do an EMP attack against the United States right now." Pry explained that the U.S. has no credible verification system setup with Iran, and hostile nations have fooled the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) multiple times. "Even the IAEA in their 2011 report, if people would read it, found things that were so alarming … there’s a virtual smoking gun that Iran already has the bomb," Pry continued. "The IAEA was reporting it found prior to 2003 that Iran was already manufacturing bridge wire detonators, neutron initiators, they had done an implosion test already, they had done 14 different designs correct for a nuclear warhead to see if they could fit the psychics package for a nuclear warhead into the reentry vehicle for the Shahab-3 high explosive warhead." Pry said it was blatantly obvious that Iran most likely already has nuclear weapons, saying that "anyone with half a brain" could see it. "Because when we were doing things like that back in the Manhattan project days when we were working with 1930s and 1940s aero technology," Pry continued. "When the United States was doing implosion tests and building bridge wire detonators, and neutron initiators, we were within 3-6 months of getting the bomb." "It’s just implausible that Iran before 2003 was at that stage and then never crossed the finish line," Pry concluded. The 2011 IAEA report that Pry referred to said the agency has expressed "deep and increasing concern" over Iran’s nuclear weapons program: Agreement, as Iran did not provide the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol, as required in the binding resolutions of the Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council, the Agency was unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran and, therefore, was unable to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran was in peaceful activities. The Director General decided that the time was right to provide the Board of Governors with the Secretariat’s detailed analysis of the information available to the Agency which had given rise to concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. This analysis was published in an Annex to the Director General’s November 2011 report to the Board. The Secretariat’s analysis indicates that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. It also indicates that prior to the end of 2003, these activities took place under a structured programme and that some activities may still be ongoing. Pry highlighted one of the most significant dangers of Obama’s Iran nuclear deal — a lack of oversight of Iran’s military facilities. "All the IAEA does is inspect the peaceful part of their nuclear program," Pry said. "They have no access to their military facilities where the military program would be going on." Pry also noted the complete ignorance of politicians and policy makers in the nation’s capital. "Most people in this town ~~Washington D.C.~~ believe ~~that Iran does not have nuclear weapons~~, because I think they are ignorant, the level of technological ignorance among Washington policy makers, who are mostly lawyers, is so astonishing that we can find ourselves in a treaty like this," Pry continued. "When Obama signed that thing, he let them off the hook, to prove that they didn’t have the bomb yet — and I think it was on purpose because he was so anxious to get that deal to set up his legacy and everything," Pry explained. "He didn’t want to be the president where Iran goes nuclear on his watch." ====Iran has been hiding their nuclear capabilities and claudistine operations Pry 19’==== Pry, Peter.~~ Dr. Peter V. Pry is Executive Director of the Task Force on National and Homeland Security and Director of the U.S. Nuclear Strategy Forum, served in the Congressional EMP Commission, the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, the House Armed Services Committee, and the CIA.~~ "We Assess...Iran Probably Already Has Nuclear Weapons." The Mackenzie Institute, 25 Sept. 2019, https://mackenzieinstitute.com/2019/09/we-assessiran-probably-already-has-nuclear-weapons/. Three years ago, senior Reagan and Clinton administration officials warned that Iran probably already has nuclear weapons. See "Underestimating Nuclear Missile Threats from North Korea and Iran" National Review February 12, 2016: "Iran is following North Korea’s example — as a strategic partner allied by treaty and pledged to share scientific and military technology. Iran sacrificed its overt civilian nuclear program to deceive the Obama administration, to lift international sanctions, to prevent Western military action, while a clandestine military nuclear program no doubt continues underground. That is why Iran, under the nuclear deal, will not allow inspection of its military facilities and prohibits interviewing scientists — it is concealing the dimensions and status of Iran’s nuclear-weapons program." "We assess, from U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency reports and other sources, that Iran probably already has nuclear weapons. Over 13 years ago, prior to 2003, Iran was manufacturing nuclear-weapon components, like bridge-wire detonators and neutron initiators, performing non-fissile explosive experiments of an implosion nuclear device, and working on the design of a nuclear warhead for the Shahab-III missile." "Thirteen years ago Iran was already a threshold nuclear-missile state. It is implausible that Iran suspended its program for over a decade for a nuclear deal with President Obama." The above assessment is by Ambassador R. James Woolsey, President Clinton’s Director of Central Intelligence; Dr. William Graham, President Reagan’s White House Science Advisor, leader of NASA, and recently Chairman of the Congressional EMP Commission; Fritz Ermarth, a national security advisor to President Reagan and Chairman of the National Intelligence Council; and Ambassador Henry Cooper, former Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative. These stellar intelligence officers, strategic thinkers, and scientists played major roles helping win the Cold War. Perhaps we should listen to them now about Iran: "Iran probably has nuclear warheads for the Shahab-III medium-range missile, which they tested for making EMP attacks…Iran already has the largest medium-range ballistic-missile force in the Middle East." "Iran could be building a nuclear-capable missile force, partly hidden in tunnels, as suggested by its dramatic revelation of a vast underground missile-basing system last year. Iran is building toward a large, deployable, survivable, war-fighting missile force — to which nuclear weapons can be swiftly added as they are manufactured." "And at a time of its choosing, Iran could launch a surprise EMP attack against the United States by satellite, as they have apparently practiced with help from North Korea." More recently, David Albright, former nuclear inspector for the UN International Atomic Energy Agency, and Ollie Heinonen, former Deputy Director General of IAEA, published an Institute for Science and International Security report based on Iran’s secret nuclear weapon archives clandestinely obtained by Israel’s Mossad: "The archive shows that the AMAD program intended to build five nuclear warhead systems for missile delivery and possible use in preparation for an underground nuclear test; an actual test would require a decision to proceed. The program was also partially designed to have its own independent uranium mining, conversion, and enrichment resources. The documentation indicates that Iran’s nuclear weaponization efforts did not stop after 2003…" "The United States incorrectly assessed with high confidence in a 2007 declassified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that ‘in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program.’ Based on the information in the archives, Iran’s nuclear weapons program continued after 2003…Moreover, the 2007 NIE also incorrectly asserted that Iran had not re-started its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007…However, there is no evidence that the program was ever fully halted, even up to today." "The information in the archive evaluated so far does not answer the question of what the current status of Iran’s nuclear weapons program is…" Assessments that Iran does not yet have nuclear weapons assume erroneously: our intelligence is perfect, Iran’s civilian nuclear program is all there is, no clandestine nuclear weapons program exists in Iran’s numerous underground military facilities—including unaccounted uranium and plutonium facilities for fueling nuclear weapons, as in North Korea. Where Iran is concerned, our Intelligence Community appears to have learned nothing from its spectacular failures grossly underestimating the nuclear threat from North Korea. Does the Intelligence Community even want to know the truth about Iran’s Islamic bomb? Reza Kahlili, the only CIA operative to successfully penetrate the scientific wing of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, claimed Iran does have nuclear weapons and offered to procure photographs. Obama’s Intelligence Community was not interested, and is still not interested. President Trump has inherited an Intelligence Community that disagrees with him about almost everything, including his decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal. According to the Intelligence Community, Iran is in technical compliance with the nuclear deal, officially the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA). But if Iran already has nuclear weapons, Iran was never in compliance with JCPOA, and the Intelligence Community can chalk-up another major intelligence failure, potentially far more consequential than Pearl Harbor or 9/11. If Iran has the bomb, why have they not yet attacked "the Great Satan" that is the United States? Radical Islamist cleric Nasir al-Fahd’s May 2003 fatwa "A Treatise On The Legal Status Of Using Weapons Of Mass Destruction Against Infidels" may provide a clue. Although al-Fahd is a Sunni sympathetic to al Qaeda, his rules for a nuclear holocaust against Infidels may well govern the thinking of the Shiite mullahs who run Iran too: –First, under Islam’s "Just War Doctrine" the Infidels have to be given an opportunity to convert to Islam, before they can be destroyed ====Escalation of Iran destabilizes the middle east and causes mass war Anti-Defamation League 19’==== "The Iranian Nuclear Threat: Why It Matters." Anti-Defamation League, 2019, https://www.adl.org/resources/fact-sheets/the-iranian-nuclear-threat-why-it-matters. A nuclear-armed Iran poses a direct threat to America's closest allies in the Middle East. Israel is most at risk as Iran's leaders have repeatedly declared that Israel should "be wiped from the map." America's Arab allies, such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and others are deeply alarmed at Iran's aggressive regional policy and would feel increasingly threatened by a nuclear-armed Iran. Indeed, Iran's military posture has led to increases in arms purchases by its neighbors, and a nuclear-armed Iran would likely spark a nuclear arms race in the Middle East that would further destabilize this volatile and vital region. The US and the international community have a vested interest in maintaining calm in the Middle East. Even as the United States has recently become a net oil exporter, its economy remains heavily dependent on the stability of international oil markets, which still require the continued steady export of oil from the Middle East. A nuclear-armed Iran would likely further embolden Iran's aggressive foreign policy, including its deep ongoing involvement in Syria, its attacks against Israel via proxies including Hezbollah, Hamas and other terrorist groups, and its sponsorship of rebel insurgents in Yemen. Having nuclear weapons would embolden this aggression and would likely result in greater confrontations with the international community. Iran already has a conventional weapons capability to hit U.S. and allied troops stationed in the Middle East and parts of Europe. If Tehran were allowed to develop nuclear weapons, the threat it poses would increase dramatically. Iran is generally considered the world's leading state sponsors of terrorism, through its financial and operational support for groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and others. Iran could even potentially share its nuclear technology and know-how with extremist groups hostile to the United States, Israel and the West. ====Nuclear war with Iran and Israel wipes out 95 of their population Dallas 13’==== Dallas, C. E., Bell, W. C., Stewart, D. J., Caruso, A., and Burkle, Jr, F. M. (2013). Nuclear war between Israel and Iran: lethality beyond the pale. Conflict and Health, 7(1), 10. doi:10.1186/1752-1505-7-10 The high cost of nuclear war is seen most vividly in the consideration of multiple detonations of moderately sized nuclear weapons in the Iranian capital of Tehran, one of the most ancient urban areas in the world, whose long and celebrated history could be suddenly termi- nated in less than an hour. The concentration of over 8 million residents in Tehran would result in a large number of both fatalities and injuries, unlike the other simulations which are dominated primarily by fatalities (Figures 20, 21 and 22). In a comparison of the relative destructive power of increasing nuclear yields, it is seen that the percent of fatalities in Tehran steadily increase from 44 to 67 to 86 of the city’s population with the use of multiple 100 Kt, 250 Kt, and 500 Kt devices, respectively (Table 4). The percentage of injured resi- dents of the capital, however, remain at about 20 of the population for 100 Kt and 250 Kt detonations, and actually decline by half for the 500 Kt strike. No real appreciation of the magnitude of this disaster for Iran can be achieved without looking at the fatality numbers: 6 to 7 million deaths that would result from either five 250 or five 500 Kt weapons with the selected targeting. From the point of view of the unimaginable medical response challenge, there would be 1.5 million victims of thermal burns from either the 100 Kt or 250 Kt multiple weapon attacks, and from 750,000 to 880,000 severely (300 rem) radiation-exposed patients. It is highly unlikely that the thermal burn victims that are immediately present after detonation will receive any care, and as the radiation victims begin presenting in the hours and days after the attack, they too are unlikely to be treated ~~33~~. The 1.5 million trauma patients can be expected to occupy the full effort of whatever surviving medical response is available in the capital city area. Patients presenting with combined injuries including either thermal burns or radiation poisoning are unlikely to have favorable outcomes ~~30,31~~. In the chaotic medical response of such a scenario, the best possible expectation is for a limited number of minor to mode- rate trauma victims to receive minimal care. Therefore, the already very high fatality rates could be expected to climb higher in the 24–72 hours immediately after a multiple nuclear weapon attack on Tehran. Nuclear war effects in Israel Relative to the broad expanses of Iran, Israel is very small and narrow, with its population constrained primarily in a few urban areas. In the nuclear age of warfare, this makes the Israelis particularly vulnerable, lending strongly to the tension between the two nations. Assuming that Iran is only able to deliver five 15 Kt devices through Israeli defenses, detonations on three urban targets using four 15 Kt devices, and one strategic site in the Negev Nuclear Research Center are displayed. This is a reasonable assumption, as the rate of uran- ium enrichment to nuclear weapons grade in Iran is progressing rapidly enough to result in more than five weapons in the next few years. It is acknowledged that Iran could develop the weapon detonation technology during this same period. Also, missile development is proceeding briskly in Iran, and there is always the option of smuggling a weapon into Israel. It is this prospect that makes war between Israel and Iran more and more likely in the near term (i.e. next decade), as the balance of nuclear power will begin to move away from the speculated current dominance by Israel. The devastating but relatively smaller casualty plumes (compared to Iran) from the Israeli targets are shown in Figure 23. Even these relatively small weapons result in significant destruction in the small confines of Israel. In the city of Beer-Sheva (Figure 24), half of the residents would be killed with a single weapon, with another sixth of the population being injured (Table 4). Nearly a fourth of the population would be in zones that would result in thermal injuries (if they survived the initial detonation). As in Iranian urban areas, the radiation plume primarily extends over uninhabited desert, largely negating radiation casualties (Figure 24). Similar fatality and injury ratios are seen in Haifa (Figure 25) (Table 4). Over 11,000 people would be radiation victims with serious radiation exposure (300 rem), as the fallout plume extends along the Mediterranean coast. There would be over 40,000 trauma victims in Haifa, with the great majority of these in the larger 0.6 psi zone (Tables 5 and 6). The location of Israel on the Mediterranean Sea allows for the possibility of the transport and even treatment of mass casualties onboard appropriately equipped vessels just off the coast. The proximity to European and American vessels that are virtually always in the Eastern Mediterranean means that especially with sufficient planning, these ships could be effectively utilized in the critical initial hours and days of a response to nuclear detonations in Israel (or in the surrounding countries, for that matter). Knowledge of the approximate location of trauma and burn victims, as depicted in this paper, could strategically direct the efforts of transport to selected vessels due to their location and relative ability to receive certain classes of patients. These same ap- proaches could be made with aeromedical transport, which could be particularly useful for thermal burn victims, as they are transported to available hospital facilities in surrounding nations with which sufficient memoranda of understanding, emergency planning, and response supplies are positioned in advance. In contrast to the 75-95 fatality outcomes for Iranian cities with the larger nuclear weapons, two 15 Kt devices used on Tel Aviv would result in 17 of the population being killed, though this still represents almost a quarter of a million people (Table 4). It is reasonable to assume that urban targeting in Tel Aviv would result in over- lapping fields of burn, trauma and radiation victims (Figure 26). This multiple targeting, even with the relatively small 15 Kt devices, could result in over 100,000 people receiving thermal burn injuries. Another hundred thousand could receive potentially fatal doses of radiation from the two fallout plumes. Over 20,000 Israelis in Tel Aviv could receive serious trauma injuries resulting from 3psi exposure, while another 115,000 would be in the 0.6 psi zone, still capable of sustaining significant trauma injuries. As in other nuclear attack scenarios, this means that a number of these victims will sustain combination injuries ~~31-34~~. Unlike most Iranian targets, the radiation plume extending from Tel Aviv would cover more populated areas in Israel, even reaching into populated areas of the West Bank. Conclusions It has often been said that there are no winners in nuclear war, and that is certainly the case in the Middle East. The significant technological advantage of the Israeli nuclear forces (as they are assumed to exist) will give them a significant edge over the next decade, as Iran has the opportunity to enter nuclear war capability but will be far behind in number, yield, and delivery of nuclear weapons. However, the baseline destructive power of nuclear weapons will result in unacceptable losses in both nations in a nuclear war in the near future. In addition to the stunning human toll focused on in this publication, likely targeting of compact urban areas in both nations will re- sult in devastating loss of critical industrial infrastructure and enormous economic decline. ====Resolved: The 30 Iranian States ought to eliminate their nuclear arsenals ==== ===Part 3: Solvency=== ====Only elimination of Irans nuclear powers an prevent middle eastern prolif Coughlin 19’==== Coughlin, Con.~~ Con Coughlin is the Telegraph's defence editor and chief foreign affairs columnist~~ "A Nuclear-Armed Iran Would Be Utterly Disastrous for the Region." The National, The National, 11 July 2019, https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/a-nuclear-armed-iran-would-be-utterly-disastrous-for-the-region-1.885100. Nor should too much credence be given to Iran’s insistence that its nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes, aimed at acquiring new energy sources and sophisticated medical equipment. If that was the case, then why did the regime try for years to conceal from the outside world the existence of key nuclear facilities, such as the Natanz enrichment facility, whose presence only became known as a result of revelations made by an Iranian dissident group? The key to Iran’s real nuclear ambitions is to be found in the CIA’s intelligence estimates that Iran was definitely working on building nuclear weapons until 2003 – the year of the US-led invasion of Iraq – and that it is still conducting secret tests on various designs for a nuclear warhead, which is not the normal activity of a country that says it has no interest in developing nuclear weapons. So, with Iran showing no sign of returning to the negotiating table to discuss an improved version of the JCPOA, one that covers all aspects of the regime’s nuclear activities rather than the specific area of uranium enrichment, it is fair to assume that Iran is now preparing to resume work on its nuclear programme in earnest. And if that is the case, then the rest of the world needs to start thinking seriously about how it is going to respond to the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran. There remains, of course, the possibility that, unlike what happened in North Korea, Iran’s nuclear programme would not be allowed to reach that level. Hawks in the Trump administration, such as National Security Adviser John Bolton, have made it clear they would favour launching military action against Tehran to prevent the regime acquiring nuclear weapons. Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has made similar threats, although there are questions about how much longer he will remain in office. Taking the military option, though, is not without its drawbacks. The main objection to previous plans to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities by force is that it would be virtually impossible to destroy them all just by using air strikes, and no country is prepared to deploy ground forces to achieve this objective. The other factor defence planners need to take on board is that any military attack on Iran would inevitably provoke a response from Tehran, one that could plunge the entire Gulf region into conflict, a prospect no serious Western politician is likely to countenance. The more likely alternative, therefore, is that the rest of the Middle East would seek to counter Iran’s nuclear power status by acquiring nuclear arsenals of their own, thereby sparking a nuclear arms race that would plunge the region into a Cold War-style nuclear standoff. Larger Arab powers, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, have already intimated that they would go down the nuclear route if Iran became a nuclear-armed power. Iraq, which fought a bitter eight-year battle with Iran in the 1980s, might be tempted to revive its own nuclear ambitions, which previously came to a premature end following Israel’s 1981 air strike on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor. Such measures, moreover, would be necessary to deter a nuclear-armed Tehran from adopting a more assertive posture in its dealings with the Arab world, especially with regard to long-standing territorial disputes in the region. The kingdom of Bahrain, for example, could find itself subject to renewed acts of Iranian aggression as Tehran attempted to exert its influence over the kingdom’s Shia population. ====Iran now has the capabilities to destroy Israel- The plan needs to happen now Pry 2’==== Pry, Peter. "Iran Has the Bomb." Israel National News, 26 Feb. 2014, www.israelnationalnews.com/Articles/Article.aspx/14580. Unreported by the mainstream media are warnings that Iran might already have the bomb by such experts as former Director of Central Intelligence R. James Woolsey; former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council Fritz Ermarth; President Reagan's Science Advisor Dr. William R. Graham; former Director of the Defense Nuclear Agency Vice Admiral Robert Monroe; former Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Ambassador Henry Cooper; and Israeli intelligence officers, the latter going public in the Israeli newspaper Maariv in September 2013. Historically, the U.S. intelligence community has underestimated and been surprised by foreign nuclear weapon programs. They were surprised by the first Soviet A-bomb test in 1949, by the Soviet H-bomb test in 1955, by China's first nuclear test in 1964, by discovery after the 1991 Persian Gulf War that Iraq under Saddam Hussein was within 6 months of developing an atomic bomb, by Pakistan and India's nuclear tests in 1998, and by North Korea's nuclear test in 2006. Nuclear Testing Not Necessary Nuclear testing is not necessary to develop a nuclear weapon deliverable by aircraft or missile. The U.S. Hiroshima bomb (a "gun-type" uranium bomb) was not tested before use — Hiroshima was the test. Israel, South Africa, and North Korea all developed nuclear weapons without nuclear testing. North Korea developed its first nuclear weapon by 1993, according to a declassified CIA report and Senate testimony by then Director of Central Intelligence R. James Woolsey. North Korea's first nuclear test years later, in 2006, was probably for political purposes — nuclear blackmail of the U.S. and its allies — and to develop more sophisticated nuclear weapons. Iran and North Korea are strategic partners and by treaty and in practice share science and technology. North Korean scientists are present in Iran helping its missile and nuclear programs. Iranian scientists reportedly have been present at all three North Korean nuclear tests. A prudent U.S. foreign and defense policy would assume that Iran's nuclear weapons program is probably on a par with North Korea's. See No Evil America has a bigger problem with its intelligence community than the inadequacy of national technical means to monitor rogue state and terrorist nuclear weapon programs. Intelligence community leaders General James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, and Michael Morrell, until recently the Deputy Director of CIA, are proven liars, willing to lie to Congress and the American people to cover up the failures and transgressions of the Obama Administration. Clapper lied about National Security Agency spying on the American people. He lied again in covering for President Obama's false assertion that North Korea does not have nuclear missiles — during the crisis over North Korea's threatened nuclear missile strikes in 2013 — belittling the Defense Intelligence Agency's accurate assessment that Pyongyang does, in fact, have nuclear armed missiles. Morrell lied when he altered CIA talking points on Benghazi to protect then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the Obama Administration. Clapper and Morrell are clear indicators that the Obama Administration has corrupted — the technical word is "politicized" — the intelligence community. How can Congress and the American people trust their intelligence leaders to tell the truth about anything that reflects badly on this White House? The fish rots from the head down. The biggest liar is in the White House. The Obama Administration's Geneva interim agreement with Iran is probably calculated to kick the can down the road so some future administration will get blamed if Iran eventually does a nuclear test. The model is the Clinton Administration's Agreed Framework with North Korea, which never had any realistic chance of denuclearizing North Korea, but kicked the can to the Bush Administration, so they got blamed for the North Korean bomb when Pyongyang tested in 2006. Nuclear Surprise If Iran already has the bomb, why have they not yet tested? Fritz Ermarth thinks Iran is following the example of North Korea, and probably wants to clandestinely build such robust capabilities so that its nuclear status will become irreversible. Israel and South Africa never tested because they elected to pursue a policy of deliberate ambiguity, to reap the deterrence benefits of being known nuclear weapon states while avoiding the international opprobrium of making their nuclear status official by testing. However, most of my colleagues and I conclude from analysis of Iranian and Jihadi statements and writings that Tehran is not interested in the bomb for status or deterrence. The word "deterrence" does not even appear in their military writings about the bomb. It is all about nuclear use, in particular a nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack that would cause a protracted national blackout, potentially killing millions of Americans through starvation and societal collapse. For example: "If the world's industrial countries fail to devise effective ways to defend themselves against dangerous electronic assaults, then they will disintegrate within a few years.... American soldiers would not be able to find food to eat nor would they be able to fire a single shot." (Tehran, Nashriyeh-e Siasi Nezami) The mullahs who run Iran want the bomb for reasons of religious eschatology having to do with the Shiite version of Apocalypse, the return of their 12th Imam, and the ultimate triumph of Islam in the secular and spiritual universe. In this vision, the Jews and Infidels (that's us) must convert or die. The Islamic Bomb has nothing to do with deterrence theory or geostrategic calculations familiar to Western nuclear strategists. The Mullahs have their own timetable for the Apocalypse. They hold a "12th Imam Conference" in Tehran every year to study signs and portents. Their development of nuclear weapons, and the failure of the West to stop them, is itself interpreted as one of the "miracles" indicating the Apocalypse is nigh. The possibility of nuclear EMP attack is another "miracle" as it destroys the high-tech society and weaponry that is the source of U.S. strength. In this view, Western materialism and worship of the False God that is Technology becomes our downfall. A Nuclear EMP attack would cause us to destroy ourselves by means of the corrupt lifestyles of an anti-spiritual civilization wholly focused and dependent upon high-tech materialism. We would die for our sins in the perfect act of divine retribution: "In the context of the final battle... all of the planes and satellites will fall, computers will fail, other equipment will be made useless and... the Earth will be shaken ... by nuclear war," prophesy Abdallah and Shayk Muhammed an-Naqshbandi, "Technology will stop or turn against the Americans." The Congressional EMP Commission warned that Iran has several times detonated its Shahab III missile at high altitudes, apparently simulating a nuclear EMP attack. Iran has also demonstrated the capability to launch a ballistic missile from a freighter and make a nuclear EMP strike anonymously, and so perhaps escape retaliation. Iran has also orbited several satellites on trajectories consistent with practicing a surprise nuclear EMP attack against the United States. Iran has not conducted a nuclear test because its theocracy is not interested in diplomatic "signaling" or Western theories of nuclear deterrence and arms control bargaining. When the mullahs are ready, they will make a surprise nuclear attack. The vaporization of New York City and an EMP attack that crashes American society will be their nuclear tests. The bottom line is that Iran is a nuclear truck bomb headed our way. ===U/V – K=== **====~~1~~ Aff gets 1AR theory and meta theory—deters neg from being infinitely abusive, otherwise they’ll always win. Meta theory ensures I can engage in theory and not lose on the highest layer.====** ====~~2~~ The aff deploys the state as a heuristic to learn scenario planning - even if politics is bad, scenario analysis of politics is pedagogically valuable — it enhances creativity, deconstructs biases and teaches advocacy skills ==== Barma et al. 16 ~~May 2016, ~~Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15~~, Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, "‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science," International Studies Perspectives 17 (2), pp. 1-19, http://www.naazneenbarma.com/uploads/2/9/6/9/29695681/using'scenarios'in'political'science'isp'2015.pdf~~ What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science? Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering "what if" questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created. The Art of Scenario Analysis We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures, often referred to as "alternative worlds." Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way. While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning "helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present" (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector. Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of "alternative worlds" approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.4 As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013). Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking.5 Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present. Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global politicaleconomic trends and dynamics. The notion of "exogeneity"—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation. Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance.6 The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to "simplify, then exaggerate" them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.7 Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases.8 An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the "funnel of choices" available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools. In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit "driving forces" which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas. The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for "puzzles" in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance. The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass, participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs.
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===Part 1 is the Framework=== ====Policy makers use util Goodin 90’==== Robert Goodin 90, ~~professor of philosophy at the Australian National University college of arts and social sciences~~, "The Utilitarian Response," pgs 141-142, BE My larger argument turns on the proposition that** **there is something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more probable for them than private individuals. Before proceeding with the large argument, I must therefore say what it is that makes it so special about public officials and their situations that make it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism.** **Consider, first, the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices – public and private alike – are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices, but that is all.** **That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus** **– assuming they want to use it at all – to choose general rules or conduct. ====Utilitarianism is the only way to access morality. Sacrifice in the name of preserving rights destroys any hope of future generations attaining other values. Nye 86’==== Nye 86 (Joseph S. 1986; Phd Political Science Harvard. University; Served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; "Nuclear Ethics" pg. 45-46) Is there any end that could justify a nuclear war that threatens the survival of the species? Is not all-out nuclear war just as self contradictory in the real world as pacifism is accused of being? Some people argue that "we are required toundergo gross injustice that will break many souls sooner than ourselves be the authors of massmurder."73 Still others say that "when a person makes survival the highest value, he has declared that there is nothing he will not betray. But for a civilization to sacrifice itself makes no sense since there are not survivors to give meaning to the sacrifical ~~sic~~ act. In that case, survival may be worth betrayal." Is it possible to avoid the "moralcalamity of a policy like unilateral disarmament that forces us to choose between being dead or red (whileincreasing the chances of both)"?74 How one judges the issue of ends can be affected by how one poses the questions. If one asks "what is worth a billion lives(or the survival of the species)," it is natural to resist contemplating a positive answer. But suppose one asks, "is it possible to imagine any threat to our civilization and values that would justify raising the threat to a billion lives from one in ten thousand to one in a thousand for a specific period? "Then there are several plausible answers, including a democratic way of life and cherished freedoms that give meaning to life beyond mere survival. When we pursue several values simultaneously, we face the fact that they often conflict and that we face difficult tradeoffs. If we make one value absolute in priority, we are likely to get that value and little else. Survivals a necessary condition for the enjoyment of other values, but that does not make it sufficient .Logical priority does not make it an absolute value. Few people act as though survival were an absolute value in their personal lives, or they would never enter an automobile. We can give survival of the species a very high priority without giving it the paralyzingstatus of an absolute value. Some degree of risk is unavoidable if individuals or societies are to avoid paralysis and enhance the quality of life beyond mere survival. The degree of that risk is a justifiable topic of both prudential and moral reasoning. ====prefer consequentialism it:==== ====1~~ Actor specificity: A~~ Governments must aggregate since every policy benefits some and harms others, which also means side constraints freeze action. B~~ States lack wills or intentions since policies are collective actions. Actor-specificity comes first since different agents have different ethical standings. Takes out calc indicts since they’re empirically denied and link turns them because the alt would be no action.==== ====2~~ Weighability – only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to meet up for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying person to the hospital. Only the consequences of breaking the promise explain why the second one is much worse than the first.==== ====3~~ No act-omission distinction—governments are responsible for everything in the public sphere so inaction is implicit authorization of action: they have to yes/no bills, which means everything collapse to aggregation. ==== ====4~~ No intent-foresight distinction – If we’re knowledgeable about the consequence of an action then we calculate that into our intention because we could always decide not to act. Thus means based theories devolve to consequentialism.==== ===Definition:=== Arsenal "Arsenal." Merriam-Webster, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/arsenal. an establishment for the manufacture or storage of arms and military equipment ===Part 2: Nuclear Iran=== ====Trump pulled out of the Iran nuclear deal in 2018- that essentially dissolved it Kerr 18’==== Kerr, Paul K, and Kenneth Katzman.~~Specialist in Nonproliferation and Specialist in Middle Eastern Affair for the congressional research service~~ Iran Nuclear Agreement and U.s. Exit. July 20, 2018. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43333.pdf Iranian officials have repeatedly stated that Tehran would fulfill its JCPOA commitments, as long as the United States did, and repeatedly have rejected renegotiating the JCPOA or negotiating a new agreement such as the sort described by U.S. officials.122 However, Zarif has asserted that Iran "is fully prepared to return to the pre-JCPOA situation or even ~~to conditions~~ more robust than that if the US reneges on its promises to the extent that the JCPOA’s continuation harms our national interests," Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif asserted the previous month.123 Deputy Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araqchi claimed that Iran "will be able to reach the industrial enrichment phase in less than two years";124 other Iranian officials have asserted that the country can rapidly reconstitute its fissile material production capability.125 Iranian officials have described a number of possible responses to a U.S. decision to reimpose U.S. sanctions, including resuming uranium enrichment, referring the matter to the Joint Commission, decreasing cooperation with the IAEA, and withdrawing from the NPT.126 These responses do not include the possible Iranian development of nuclear weapons, Iranian officials have said.127 Asked on April 21 if Iran will continue to meet its JCPOA obligations if all P5+1 parties except for the United States continue to uphold their obligations, Zarif replied, "I believe that’s highly unlikely," adding that it is important for Iran receive the benefits of the agreement. And there is no way that Iran would do a one-sided implementation of the agreement. And it would require a major effort because right now, with the United States ostensibly in the agreement, a lot has been lacking in terms of Iran benefiting from the deal.128 Following Trump’s May 8 announcement, Iranian officials rejected negotiating any new agreements. In a May 10, 2018, letter to U.N. Secretary General António Guterres, Foreign Minister Zarif wrote that "~~i~~f JCPOA is to survive, the remaining JCPOA Participants and the international community need to fully ensure that Iran is compensated unconditionally through appropriate national, regional and global measures," adding that Iran has decided to resort to the JCPOA mechanism in good faith to find solutions in order to rectify the United States’ multiple cases of significant non-performance and its unlawful 122 See, for example, "Countries that Undermine Nuclear Deal to Pay Dearly, says Iran," Iranian Students News Agency, April 18, 2018; and "Iran FM Says USA Will ‘Regret’ Dropping Nuclear Deal," Press TV, April 20, 2018. 123 "Iranian FM Warns U.S. Against Violation of Nuclear Deal," PressTV, March 21, 2017. 124 "Iran Major Power in Mideast Region – Official," Tasnim News Agency, February 22, 2017. 125 See, for example, "Iran Can Resume 20 Per Cent Uranium Enrichment Only in 5 Days: Salehi," Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA), August 22, 2017; "AEOI Chief: Iran Able to Resume 20 Enrichment in Maximum 5 Days," FARS News Agency, August 22, 2017; "Nuclear Chief: Iran Able to Immediately Return to Pre-JCPOA Conditions," FARS News Agency, April 10, 2018. 126 "Iran to Reconsider Cooperation with IAEA if U.S. Violates Deal - Nuclear Chief," Mehr News Agency, January 8, 2018; Robin Wright, "The Scramble to Salvage the Iran Nuclear Deal," The New Yorker, April 22, 2018; "Zarif in New York: Interview on Nuclear Deal, Regional Issues," Iran Primer, U.S. Institute for Peace, April 23, 2018, available at http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2018/apr/23/zarif-new-york-interview-nuclear-deal-regional-issues. 127 "Zarif in New York," April 23, 2018. 128 Ibid. withdrawal, and to determine whether and how the remaining JCPOA Participants and other economic partners can ensure the full benefits that the Iranian people are entitled to derive from this global diplomatic achievement.129 Supreme Leader Khamene’i stated on May 23 that Iran will only continue to participate in the JCPOA if Europe provides "concrete guarantees" that it maintains Iran’s existing revenue stream from oil sales to the EU countries. He also demanded that Europe not to raise the issues of Iran’s missiles programs or regional influence, and added that "Iran has the right to resume its nuclear activities."130 President Rouhani expressed a similar view in a July 4 speech.131 According to Iranian officials, Tehran has begun preparations for expanding its uranium enrichment program, albeit within the parameters of the JCPOA for the time being. Spokesman of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Behrouz Kamalvandi stated on June 5 that the organization "will start the process of boosting the capacity of the country's uranium enrichment," by increasing Iran’s capacity to produce uranium hexafluoride.132 On June 27, 2018, Iran’s official news agency announced that Iran has resumed operations133 at its uranium conversion facility, which Iran has used to produce this material.134 Kamalvandi also explained that Iran would begin the process of "manufacturing and assembly of centrifuge rotors," which are critical components of such machines.135 Iran "will begin building a centrifuge rotor plant," he noted.136 In addition, AEOI head Ali Akbar Salehi stated that Tehran will begin using an "advanced centrifuge assembly centre in the Natanz nuclear facility," which Iran had not disclosed publicly.137 Kamalvandi noted that Iran would continue to operate within the constraints of its JCPOA commitments, but added that, should the JCPOA collapse, Iran would produce centrifuges beyond those constraints.138 As noted, Iran remains subject to its obligations pursuant to the JCPOA and Resolution 2231 and could be subject to the reimposition of multilateral sanctions if Tehran violates these obligations. ====Iran already has weapons but Obama administration was desperate for the Iran deal so turned a blind eye Saavedra 17’==== Saavedra, Ryan.~~ Ryan Saavedra is a reporter at The Daily Wire who covers a range of subjects, particularly focusing on media bias, politics, and the convergence of politics and culture.~~ "EXCLUSIVE – EXPERT: Iran Already Has Nuclear Weapons, Obama's Iran Deal A Total 'Joke'." The Daily Wire, The Daily Wire, 9 Nov. 2017, www.dailywire.com/news/exclusive-–-expert-iran-already-has-nuclear-ryan-saavedra. A former high-ranking government official who is an intelligence expert regarding nuclear weapons told The Daily Wire in an exclusive interview that former President Barack Obama’s Iran nuclear deal is a complete failure as Iran most likely has had nuclear weapons for over a decade. Dr. Peter Vincent Pry is the executive director of the Task Force on National and Homeland Security, and director of the U.S. Nuclear Strategy Forum, both Congressional advisory boards, and served as the chief of staff on the Congressional EMP Commission, the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, the House Armed Services Committee, and the CIA. Pry called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — aka the Iran nuclear deal — a complete "joke." "I think Iran has already got the bomb," Pry told The Daily Wire. "I think Iran has already got nuclear weapons mounted on missiles and has the potential to do an EMP attack against the United States right now." Pry explained that the U.S. has no credible verification system setup with Iran, and hostile nations have fooled the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) multiple times. "Even the IAEA in their 2011 report, if people would read it, found things that were so alarming … there’s a virtual smoking gun that Iran already has the bomb," Pry continued. "The IAEA was reporting it found prior to 2003 that Iran was already manufacturing bridge wire detonators, neutron initiators, they had done an implosion test already, they had done 14 different designs correct for a nuclear warhead to see if they could fit the psychics package for a nuclear warhead into the reentry vehicle for the Shahab-3 high explosive warhead." Pry said it was blatantly obvious that Iran most likely already has nuclear weapons, saying that "anyone with half a brain" could see it. "Because when we were doing things like that back in the Manhattan project days when we were working with 1930s and 1940s aero technology," Pry continued. "When the United States was doing implosion tests and building bridge wire detonators, and neutron initiators, we were within 3-6 months of getting the bomb." "It’s just implausible that Iran before 2003 was at that stage and then never crossed the finish line," Pry concluded. The 2011 IAEA report that Pry referred to said the agency has expressed "deep and increasing concern" over Iran’s nuclear weapons program: Agreement, as Iran did not provide the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol, as required in the binding resolutions of the Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council, the Agency was unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran and, therefore, was unable to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran was in peaceful activities. The Director General decided that the time was right to provide the Board of Governors with the Secretariat’s detailed analysis of the information available to the Agency which had given rise to concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. This analysis was published in an Annex to the Director General’s November 2011 report to the Board. The Secretariat’s analysis indicates that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. It also indicates that prior to the end of 2003, these activities took place under a structured programme and that some activities may still be ongoing. Pry highlighted one of the most significant dangers of Obama’s Iran nuclear deal — a lack of oversight of Iran’s military facilities. "All the IAEA does is inspect the peaceful part of their nuclear program," Pry said. "They have no access to their military facilities where the military program would be going on." Pry also noted the complete ignorance of politicians and policy makers in the nation’s capital. "Most people in this town ~~Washington D.C.~~ believe ~~that Iran does not have nuclear weapons~~, because I think they are ignorant, the level of technological ignorance among Washington policy makers, who are mostly lawyers, is so astonishing that we can find ourselves in a treaty like this," Pry continued. "When Obama signed that thing, he let them off the hook, to prove that they didn’t have the bomb yet — and I think it was on purpose because he was so anxious to get that deal to set up his legacy and everything," Pry explained. "He didn’t want to be the president where Iran goes nuclear on his watch." ====Iran has been hiding their nuclear capabilities and claudistine operations Pry 19’==== Pry, Peter.~~ Dr. Peter V. Pry is Executive Director of the Task Force on National and Homeland Security and Director of the U.S. Nuclear Strategy Forum, served in the Congressional EMP Commission, the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, the House Armed Services Committee, and the CIA.~~ "We Assess...Iran Probably Already Has Nuclear Weapons." The Mackenzie Institute, 25 Sept. 2019, https://mackenzieinstitute.com/2019/09/we-assessiran-probably-already-has-nuclear-weapons/. Three years ago, senior Reagan and Clinton administration officials warned that Iran probably already has nuclear weapons. See "Underestimating Nuclear Missile Threats from North Korea and Iran" National Review February 12, 2016: "Iran is following North Korea’s example — as a strategic partner allied by treaty and pledged to share scientific and military technology. Iran sacrificed its overt civilian nuclear program to deceive the Obama administration, to lift international sanctions, to prevent Western military action, while a clandestine military nuclear program no doubt continues underground. That is why Iran, under the nuclear deal, will not allow inspection of its military facilities and prohibits interviewing scientists — it is concealing the dimensions and status of Iran’s nuclear-weapons program." "We assess, from U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency reports and other sources, that Iran probably already has nuclear weapons. Over 13 years ago, prior to 2003, Iran was manufacturing nuclear-weapon components, like bridge-wire detonators and neutron initiators, performing non-fissile explosive experiments of an implosion nuclear device, and working on the design of a nuclear warhead for the Shahab-III missile." "Thirteen years ago Iran was already a threshold nuclear-missile state. It is implausible that Iran suspended its program for over a decade for a nuclear deal with President Obama." The above assessment is by Ambassador R. James Woolsey, President Clinton’s Director of Central Intelligence; Dr. William Graham, President Reagan’s White House Science Advisor, leader of NASA, and recently Chairman of the Congressional EMP Commission; Fritz Ermarth, a national security advisor to President Reagan and Chairman of the National Intelligence Council; and Ambassador Henry Cooper, former Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative. These stellar intelligence officers, strategic thinkers, and scientists played major roles helping win the Cold War. Perhaps we should listen to them now about Iran: "Iran probably has nuclear warheads for the Shahab-III medium-range missile, which they tested for making EMP attacks…Iran already has the largest medium-range ballistic-missile force in the Middle East." "Iran could be building a nuclear-capable missile force, partly hidden in tunnels, as suggested by its dramatic revelation of a vast underground missile-basing system last year. Iran is building toward a large, deployable, survivable, war-fighting missile force — to which nuclear weapons can be swiftly added as they are manufactured." "And at a time of its choosing, Iran could launch a surprise EMP attack against the United States by satellite, as they have apparently practiced with help from North Korea." More recently, David Albright, former nuclear inspector for the UN International Atomic Energy Agency, and Ollie Heinonen, former Deputy Director General of IAEA, published an Institute for Science and International Security report based on Iran’s secret nuclear weapon archives clandestinely obtained by Israel’s Mossad: "The archive shows that the AMAD program intended to build five nuclear warhead systems for missile delivery and possible use in preparation for an underground nuclear test; an actual test would require a decision to proceed. The program was also partially designed to have its own independent uranium mining, conversion, and enrichment resources. The documentation indicates that Iran’s nuclear weaponization efforts did not stop after 2003…" "The United States incorrectly assessed with high confidence in a 2007 declassified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that ‘in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program.’ Based on the information in the archives, Iran’s nuclear weapons program continued after 2003…Moreover, the 2007 NIE also incorrectly asserted that Iran had not re-started its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007…However, there is no evidence that the program was ever fully halted, even up to today." "The information in the archive evaluated so far does not answer the question of what the current status of Iran’s nuclear weapons program is…" Assessments that Iran does not yet have nuclear weapons assume erroneously: our intelligence is perfect, Iran’s civilian nuclear program is all there is, no clandestine nuclear weapons program exists in Iran’s numerous underground military facilities—including unaccounted uranium and plutonium facilities for fueling nuclear weapons, as in North Korea. Where Iran is concerned, our Intelligence Community appears to have learned nothing from its spectacular failures grossly underestimating the nuclear threat from North Korea. Does the Intelligence Community even want to know the truth about Iran’s Islamic bomb? Reza Kahlili, the only CIA operative to successfully penetrate the scientific wing of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, claimed Iran does have nuclear weapons and offered to procure photographs. Obama’s Intelligence Community was not interested, and is still not interested. President Trump has inherited an Intelligence Community that disagrees with him about almost everything, including his decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal. According to the Intelligence Community, Iran is in technical compliance with the nuclear deal, officially the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA). But if Iran already has nuclear weapons, Iran was never in compliance with JCPOA, and the Intelligence Community can chalk-up another major intelligence failure, potentially far more consequential than Pearl Harbor or 9/11. If Iran has the bomb, why have they not yet attacked "the Great Satan" that is the United States? Radical Islamist cleric Nasir al-Fahd’s May 2003 fatwa "A Treatise On The Legal Status Of Using Weapons Of Mass Destruction Against Infidels" may provide a clue. Although al-Fahd is a Sunni sympathetic to al Qaeda, his rules for a nuclear holocaust against Infidels may well govern the thinking of the Shiite mullahs who run Iran too: –First, under Islam’s "Just War Doctrine" the Infidels have to be given an opportunity to convert to Islam, before they can be destroyed ====Escalation of Iran destabilizes the middle east and causes mass war Anti-Defamation League 19’==== "The Iranian Nuclear Threat: Why It Matters." Anti-Defamation League, 2019, https://www.adl.org/resources/fact-sheets/the-iranian-nuclear-threat-why-it-matters. A nuclear-armed Iran poses a direct threat to America's closest allies in the Middle East. Israel is most at risk as Iran's leaders have repeatedly declared that Israel should "be wiped from the map." America's Arab allies, such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and others are deeply alarmed at Iran's aggressive regional policy and would feel increasingly threatened by a nuclear-armed Iran. Indeed, Iran's military posture has led to increases in arms purchases by its neighbors, and a nuclear-armed Iran would likely spark a nuclear arms race in the Middle East that would further destabilize this volatile and vital region. The US and the international community have a vested interest in maintaining calm in the Middle East. Even as the United States has recently become a net oil exporter, its economy remains heavily dependent on the stability of international oil markets, which still require the continued steady export of oil from the Middle East. A nuclear-armed Iran would likely further embolden Iran's aggressive foreign policy, including its deep ongoing involvement in Syria, its attacks against Israel via proxies including Hezbollah, Hamas and other terrorist groups, and its sponsorship of rebel insurgents in Yemen. Having nuclear weapons would embolden this aggression and would likely result in greater confrontations with the international community. Iran already has a conventional weapons capability to hit U.S. and allied troops stationed in the Middle East and parts of Europe. If Tehran were allowed to develop nuclear weapons, the threat it poses would increase dramatically. Iran is generally considered the world's leading state sponsors of terrorism, through its financial and operational support for groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and others. Iran could even potentially share its nuclear technology and know-how with extremist groups hostile to the United States, Israel and the West. ====Prolif causes war – best research.==== **Brooks and Wohlforth, PhDs, 16** (Stephen, William, both PoliSci@Yale, ProfGov@Dartmouth, America Abroad, 107-110, Oxford University Press) General empirical findings thus lend support to the proposition that security alliances impede nuclear proliferation. But is this a net contributor to global security? Most practitioners and policy analysts would probably not even bring this up as a question and would automatically answer yes if it were raised. Yet a small but very prominent group of theorists within the academy reach a different answer: some of the same realist precepts that generate the theoretical prediction that retrenchment would increase demand for nuclear weapons also suggest that proliferation might increase security such that the net effect of retrenchment could be neutral. Most notably, "nuclear optimists" like Kenneth Waltz contend that deterrence essentially solves the security problem for all nuclear- armed states, largely eliminating the direct use of force among them.21 It follows that US retrenchment might generate an initial decrease in security followed by an increase as insecure states acquire nuclear capabilities, ultimately leaving no net effect on international security. This perspective is countered by "nuclear pessimists" such as Scott Sagan. Reaching outside realism to organization theory and other bodies of social science research, they see major security downsides from new nuclear states. Copious research produced by Sagan and others casts doubt on the expectation that governments can be relied upon to create secure and controlled nuclear forces.22 The more nuclear states there are, the higher the probability that the organizational, psychological, and civil- military pathologies Sagan identifies will turn an episode like one of the numerous "near misses" he uncovers into actual nuclear use. As Campbell Craig warns, "One day a warning system will fail, or an official will panic, or a terrorist attack will be misconstrued, and the missiles will fly."23 Looking beyond these kinds of factors, it is notable that powerful reasons to question the assessment of proliferation optimists also emerge even if one assumes, as they do, that states are rational and seek only to maximize their security. First, nuclear deterrence can only work by raising the risk of nuclear war. For deterrence to be credible, there has to be a nonzero chance of nuclear use.24 If nuclear use is impossible, deterrence cannot be credible. It follows that every nuclear deterrence relationship depends on some probability of nuclear use. The more such relationships there are, the greater the risk of nuclear war.i Proliferation therefore increases the chances of nuclear war even in a perfectly rationalist world. Proliferation optimists cannot logically deny that nuclear spread increases the risk of nuclear war. Their argument must be that the security gains of nuclear spread outweigh this enhanced risk. Estimating that risk is not simply a matter of pondering the conditions under which leaders will choose to unleash nuclear war. Rather, as Schelling established, the question is whether states will run the risk of using nuclear weapons. Nuclear crisis bargaining is about a "competition in risk taking."25 Kroenig counts some twenty cases in which states—including prominently the United States—ran real risks of nuclear war in order to prevail in crises.26 As Kroenig notes, "By asking whether states can be deterred or not … proliferation optimists are asking the wrong question. The right question to ask is: what risk of nuclear war is a specific state willing to run against a particular opponent in a given crisis?"27 The more nuclear- armed states there are, the more the opportunities for such risk- taking and the greater the probability of nuclear use. It is also the case that for nuclear weapons to deter a given level of conflict, there must be a real probability of their use at that level of conflict. For nuclear weapons to deter conventional attack, they must be configured in such a way as to make their use credible in response to a conventional attack. Highly controlled and reliable assured- retaliation postures might well be credible in response to a conventional attack that threatens a state’s existence. But as newer research shows, the farther the issue in question is from a state’s existential security, the harder it is to make nuclear threats credible with the type of ideally stable nuclear posture whose existence proliferation optimism presupposes.28 If a state wishes, for example, to deter a conventionally stronger neighbor from seizing a disputed piece of territory, it may face great challenges fashioning a nuclear force that is credible. Following Schelling’s logic about the "threat that leaves something to chance," it may face incentives to create a quasi- doomsday nuclear posture that virtually locks in escalation in response to its rival’s attempt to seize the territory conventionally. Key here is that nuclear spread cannot be treated as binary: "You have ‘em or you don’t." States can choose the kind of nuclear postures they build. Some states may choose to build dangerous and vulnerable nuclear postures. And because they lack the money or the technological capacity or both, many states may not be able to create truly survivable forces (that is, forces that can survive a nuclear first strike by a rival power) even if they wanted to. The links between nuclear possession and conflict are hard to assess empirically. Still, there are relevant findings that are probative for this debate: • Nuclear weapons are most credible at deterring the kind of conflict— threats to a state’s core territorial security— that is least relevant to the actual security concerns of most states most of the time. Both quantitative and case study research validates the claim that territorial conquest is rarely an issue in armed conflicts in the present era. Yet states that are bullish on their prospects for territorial survival as sovereign units still have plenty of security concerns and also often find plenty of reasons to use force and plenty of ways to use force other than by conquering other states.29 • Robust, secure nuclear postures do not stop states from engaging in intense security competition. Though the United States and Soviet Union did not fight each other during the Cold War, their nuclear arsenals did not prevent them from engaging in one of history’s most costly rivalries, complete with intense arms racing and dangerous crises that raised the specter of nuclear war. • Though they built massive arsenals, at various junctures the two superpowers adopted dangerously escalatory postures to attempt to deter various levels of conflict.30 • The mere possession of nuclear weapons does not deter conventional attack, as both India and Israel discovered. • In both statistical and case study tests, Vipin Narang finds that the only nuclear posture that has any effect on conventional conflict initiation and escalation is a destabilizing "asymmetrical escalatory" force, a doomsday posture designed to create intense incentives for early use, such as that constructed by Pakistan in the 1990s.31 In short, nuclear spread is a Hobson’s choice: it will inevitably increase the chances of nuclear use, and it will either not deter conventional war or will do so only by raising the risks of nuclear war even more. Add to this the risk that states in the real world may not behave in ways consistent with the assumptions underlying proliferation optimism. That is, some subset of new nuclear- armed states may not be led by rational leaders, may not prove able to overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, may not pursue security as the only major state preference, and may not be risk- averse. The scale of these risks rises as the world moves from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation— including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces (making them susceptible to a first- strike attack and thus creating incentives for early first use)— are prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. Moreover, the risk of unforeseen crisis dynamics that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage to dangerous, emerge independently of other reasons the United States is generally better off in a world with fewer nuclear states, notably increased US freedom of action. ====Nuclear war with Iran and Israel wipes out 95 of their population Dallas 13’==== Dallas, C. E., Bell, W. C., Stewart, D. J., Caruso, A., and Burkle, Jr, F. M. (2013). Nuclear war between Israel and Iran: lethality beyond the pale. Conflict and Health, 7(1), 10. doi:10.1186/1752-1505-7-10 The high cost of nuclear war is seen most vividly in the consideration of multiple detonations of moderately sized nuclear weapons in the Iranian capital of Tehran, one of the most ancient urban areas in the world, whose long and celebrated history could be suddenly termi- nated in less than an hour. The concentration of over 8 million residents in Tehran would result in a large number of both fatalities and injuries, unlike the other simulations which are dominated primarily by fatalities (Figures 20, 21 and 22). In a comparison of the relative destructive power of increasing nuclear yields, it is seen that the percent of fatalities in Tehran steadily increase from 44 to 67 to 86 of the city’s population with the use of multiple 100 Kt, 250 Kt, and 500 Kt devices, respectively (Table 4). The percentage of injured resi- dents of the capital, however, remain at about 20 of the population for 100 Kt and 250 Kt detonations, and actually decline by half for the 500 Kt strike. No real appreciation of the magnitude of this disaster for Iran can be achieved without looking at the fatality numbers: 6 to 7 million deaths that would result from either five 250 or five 500 Kt weapons with the selected targeting. From the point of view of the unimaginable medical response challenge, there would be 1.5 million victims of thermal burns from either the 100 Kt or 250 Kt multiple weapon attacks, and from 750,000 to 880,000 severely (300 rem) radiation-exposed patients. It is highly unlikely that the thermal burn victims that are immediately present after detonation will receive any care, and as the radiation victims begin presenting in the hours and days after the attack, they too are unlikely to be treated ~~33~~. The 1.5 million trauma patients can be expected to occupy the full effort of whatever surviving medical response is available in the capital city area. Patients presenting with combined injuries including either thermal burns or radiation poisoning are unlikely to have favorable outcomes ~~30,31~~. In the chaotic medical response of such a scenario, the best possible expectation is for a limited number of minor to mode- rate trauma victims to receive minimal care. Therefore, the already very high fatality rates could be expected to climb higher in the 24–72 hours immediately after a multiple nuclear weapon attack on Tehran. Nuclear war effects in Israel Relative to the broad expanses of Iran, Israel is very small and narrow, with its population constrained primarily in a few urban areas. In the nuclear age of warfare, this makes the Israelis particularly vulnerable, lending strongly to the tension between the two nations. Assuming that Iran is only able to deliver five 15 Kt devices through Israeli defenses, detonations on three urban targets using four 15 Kt devices, and one strategic site in the Negev Nuclear Research Center are displayed. This is a reasonable assumption, as the rate of uran- ium enrichment to nuclear weapons grade in Iran is progressing rapidly enough to result in more than five weapons in the next few years. It is acknowledged that Iran could develop the weapon detonation technology during this same period. Also, missile development is proceeding briskly in Iran, and there is always the option of smuggling a weapon into Israel. It is this prospect that makes war between Israel and Iran more and more likely in the near term (i.e. next decade), as the balance of nuclear power will begin to move away from the speculated current dominance by Israel. The devastating but relatively smaller casualty plumes (compared to Iran) from the Israeli targets are shown in Figure 23. Even these relatively small weapons result in significant destruction in the small confines of Israel. In the city of Beer-Sheva (Figure 24), half of the residents would be killed with a single weapon, with another sixth of the population being injured (Table 4). Nearly a fourth of the population would be in zones that would result in thermal injuries (if they survived the initial detonation). As in Iranian urban areas, the radiation plume primarily extends over uninhabited desert, largely negating radiation casualties (Figure 24). Similar fatality and injury ratios are seen in Haifa (Figure 25) (Table 4). Over 11,000 people would be radiation victims with serious radiation exposure (300 rem), as the fallout plume extends along the Mediterranean coast. There would be over 40,000 trauma victims in Haifa, with the great majority of these in the larger 0.6 psi zone (Tables 5 and 6). The location of Israel on the Mediterranean Sea allows for the possibility of the transport and even treatment of mass casualties onboard appropriately equipped vessels just off the coast. The proximity to European and American vessels that are virtually always in the Eastern Mediterranean means that especially with sufficient planning, these ships could be effectively utilized in the critical initial hours and days of a response to nuclear detonations in Israel (or in the surrounding countries, for that matter). Knowledge of the approximate location of trauma and burn victims, as depicted in this paper, could strategically direct the efforts of transport to selected vessels due to their location and relative ability to receive certain classes of patients. These same ap- proaches could be made with aeromedical transport, which could be particularly useful for thermal burn victims, as they are transported to available hospital facilities in surrounding nations with which sufficient memoranda of understanding, emergency planning, and response supplies are positioned in advance. In contrast to the 75-95 fatality outcomes for Iranian cities with the larger nuclear weapons, two 15 Kt devices used on Tel Aviv would result in 17 of the population being killed, though this still represents almost a quarter of a million people (Table 4). It is reasonable to assume that urban targeting in Tel Aviv would result in over- lapping fields of burn, trauma and radiation victims (Figure 26). This multiple targeting, even with the relatively small 15 Kt devices, could result in over 100,000 people receiving thermal burn injuries. Another hundred thousand could receive potentially fatal doses of radiation from the two fallout plumes. Over 20,000 Israelis in Tel Aviv could receive serious trauma injuries resulting from 3psi exposure, while another 115,000 would be in the 0.6 psi zone, still capable of sustaining significant trauma injuries. As in other nuclear attack scenarios, this means that a number of these victims will sustain combination injuries ~~31-34~~. Unlike most Iranian targets, the radiation plume extending from Tel Aviv would cover more populated areas in Israel, even reaching into populated areas of the West Bank. Conclusions It has often been said that there are no winners in nuclear war, and that is certainly the case in the Middle East. The significant technological advantage of the Israeli nuclear forces (as they are assumed to exist) will give them a significant edge over the next decade, as Iran has the opportunity to enter nuclear war capability but will be far behind in number, yield, and delivery of nuclear weapons. However, the baseline destructive power of nuclear weapons will result in unacceptable losses in both nations in a nuclear war in the near future. In addition to the stunning human toll focused on in this publication, likely targeting of compact urban areas in both nations will re- sult in devastating loss of critical industrial infrastructure and enormous economic decline. ====Resolved: The 30 Iranian providences ought to eliminate their nuclear arsenals ==== ===Part 3: Solvency=== ====Only elimination of Irans nuclear powers an prevent middle eastern prolif Coughlin 19’==== Coughlin, Con.~~ Con Coughlin is the Telegraph's defence editor and chief foreign affairs columnist~~ "A Nuclear-Armed Iran Would Be Utterly Disastrous for the Region." The National, The National, 11 July 2019, https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/a-nuclear-armed-iran-would-be-utterly-disastrous-for-the-region-1.885100. Nor should too much credence be given to Iran’s insistence that its nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes, aimed at acquiring new energy sources and sophisticated medical equipment. If that was the case, then why did the regime try for years to conceal from the outside world the existence of key nuclear facilities, such as the Natanz enrichment facility, whose presence only became known as a result of revelations made by an Iranian dissident group? The key to Iran’s real nuclear ambitions is to be found in the CIA’s intelligence estimates that Iran was definitely working on building nuclear weapons until 2003 – the year of the US-led invasion of Iraq – and that it is still conducting secret tests on various designs for a nuclear warhead, which is not the normal activity of a country that says it has no interest in developing nuclear weapons. So, with Iran showing no sign of returning to the negotiating table to discuss an improved version of the JCPOA, one that covers all aspects of the regime’s nuclear activities rather than the specific area of uranium enrichment, it is fair to assume that Iran is now preparing to resume work on its nuclear programme in earnest. And if that is the case, then the rest of the world needs to start thinking seriously about how it is going to respond to the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran. There remains, of course, the possibility that, unlike what happened in North Korea, Iran’s nuclear programme would not be allowed to reach that level. Hawks in the Trump administration, such as National Security Adviser John Bolton, have made it clear they would favour launching military action against Tehran to prevent the regime acquiring nuclear weapons. Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has made similar threats, although there are questions about how much longer he will remain in office. Taking the military option, though, is not without its drawbacks. The main objection to previous plans to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities by force is that it would be virtually impossible to destroy them all just by using air strikes, and no country is prepared to deploy ground forces to achieve this objective. The other factor defence planners need to take on board is that any military attack on Iran would inevitably provoke a response from Tehran, one that could plunge the entire Gulf region into conflict, a prospect no serious Western politician is likely to countenance. The more likely alternative, therefore, is that the rest of the Middle East would seek to counter Iran’s nuclear power status by acquiring nuclear arsenals of their own, thereby sparking a nuclear arms race that would plunge the region into a Cold War-style nuclear standoff. Larger Arab powers, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, have already intimated that they would go down the nuclear route if Iran became a nuclear-armed power. Iraq, which fought a bitter eight-year battle with Iran in the 1980s, might be tempted to revive its own nuclear ambitions, which previously came to a premature end following Israel’s 1981 air strike on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor. Such measures, moreover, would be necessary to deter a nuclear-armed Tehran from adopting a more assertive posture in its dealings with the Arab world, especially with regard to long-standing territorial disputes in the region. The kingdom of Bahrain, for example, could find itself subject to renewed acts of Iranian aggression as Tehran attempted to exert its influence over the kingdom’s Shia population. ====Iran now has the capabilities to harm U.S- The plan needs to happen now Pry 2’==== Pry, Peter. "Iran Has the Bomb." Israel National News, 26 Feb. 2014, www.israelnationalnews.com/Articles/Article.aspx/14580. Unreported by the mainstream media are warnings that Iran might already have the bomb by such experts as former Director of Central Intelligence R. James Woolsey; former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council Fritz Ermarth; President Reagan's Science Advisor Dr. William R. Graham; former Director of the Defense Nuclear Agency Vice Admiral Robert Monroe; former Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Ambassador Henry Cooper; and Israeli intelligence officers, the latter going public in the Israeli newspaper Maariv in September 2013. Historically, the U.S. intelligence community has underestimated and been surprised by foreign nuclear weapon programs. They were surprised by the first Soviet A-bomb test in 1949, by the Soviet H-bomb test in 1955, by China's first nuclear test in 1964, by discovery after the 1991 Persian Gulf War that Iraq under Saddam Hussein was within 6 months of developing an atomic bomb, by Pakistan and India's nuclear tests in 1998, and by North Korea's nuclear test in 2006. Nuclear Testing Not Necessary Nuclear testing is not necessary to develop a nuclear weapon deliverable by aircraft or missile. The U.S. Hiroshima bomb (a "gun-type" uranium bomb) was not tested before use — Hiroshima was the test. Israel, South Africa, and North Korea all developed nuclear weapons without nuclear testing. North Korea developed its first nuclear weapon by 1993, according to a declassified CIA report and Senate testimony by then Director of Central Intelligence R. James Woolsey. North Korea's first nuclear test years later, in 2006, was probably for political purposes — nuclear blackmail of the U.S. and its allies — and to develop more sophisticated nuclear weapons. Iran and North Korea are strategic partners and by treaty and in practice share science and technology. North Korean scientists are present in Iran helping its missile and nuclear programs. Iranian scientists reportedly have been present at all three North Korean nuclear tests. A prudent U.S. foreign and defense policy would assume that Iran's nuclear weapons program is probably on a par with North Korea's. See No Evil America has a bigger problem with its intelligence community than the inadequacy of national technical means to monitor rogue state and terrorist nuclear weapon programs. Intelligence community leaders General James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, and Michael Morrell, until recently the Deputy Director of CIA, are proven liars, willing to lie to Congress and the American people to cover up the failures and transgressions of the Obama Administration. Clapper lied about National Security Agency spying on the American people. He lied again in covering for President Obama's false assertion that North Korea does not have nuclear missiles — during the crisis over North Korea's threatened nuclear missile strikes in 2013 — belittling the Defense Intelligence Agency's accurate assessment that Pyongyang does, in fact, have nuclear armed missiles. Morrell lied when he altered CIA talking points on Benghazi to protect then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the Obama Administration. Clapper and Morrell are clear indicators that the Obama Administration has corrupted — the technical word is "politicized" — the intelligence community. How can Congress and the American people trust their intelligence leaders to tell the truth about anything that reflects badly on this White House? The fish rots from the head down. The biggest liar is in the White House. The Obama Administration's Geneva interim agreement with Iran is probably calculated to kick the can down the road so some future administration will get blamed if Iran eventually does a nuclear test. The model is the Clinton Administration's Agreed Framework with North Korea, which never had any realistic chance of denuclearizing North Korea, but kicked the can to the Bush Administration, so they got blamed for the North Korean bomb when Pyongyang tested in 2006. Nuclear Surprise If Iran already has the bomb, why have they not yet tested? Fritz Ermarth thinks Iran is following the example of North Korea, and probably wants to clandestinely build such robust capabilities so that its nuclear status will become irreversible. Israel and South Africa never tested because they elected to pursue a policy of deliberate ambiguity, to reap the deterrence benefits of being known nuclear weapon states while avoiding the international opprobrium of making their nuclear status official by testing. However, most of my colleagues and I conclude from analysis of Iranian and Jihadi statements and writings that Tehran is not interested in the bomb for status or deterrence. The word "deterrence" does not even appear in their military writings about the bomb. It is all about nuclear use, in particular a nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack that would cause a protracted national blackout, potentially killing millions of Americans through starvation and societal collapse. For example: "If the world's industrial countries fail to devise effective ways to defend themselves against dangerous electronic assaults, then they will disintegrate within a few years.... American soldiers would not be able to find food to eat nor would they be able to fire a single shot." (Tehran, Nashriyeh-e Siasi Nezami) The mullahs who run Iran want the bomb for reasons of religious eschatology having to do with the Shiite version of Apocalypse, the return of their 12th Imam, and the ultimate triumph of Islam in the secular and spiritual universe. In this vision, the Jews and Infidels (that's us) must convert or die. The Islamic Bomb has nothing to do with deterrence theory or geostrategic calculations familiar to Western nuclear strategists. The Mullahs have their own timetable for the Apocalypse. They hold a "12th Imam Conference" in Tehran every year to study signs and portents. Their development of nuclear weapons, and the failure of the West to stop them, is itself interpreted as one of the "miracles" indicating the Apocalypse is nigh. The possibility of nuclear EMP attack is another "miracle" as it destroys the high-tech society and weaponry that is the source of U.S. strength. In this view, Western materialism and worship of the False God that is Technology becomes our downfall. A Nuclear EMP attack would cause us to destroy ourselves by means of the corrupt lifestyles of an anti-spiritual civilization wholly focused and dependent upon high-tech materialism. We would die for our sins in the perfect act of divine retribution: "In the context of the final battle... all of the planes and satellites will fall, computers will fail, other equipment will be made useless and... the Earth will be shaken ... by nuclear war," prophesy Abdallah and Shayk Muhammed an-Naqshbandi, "Technology will stop or turn against the Americans." The Congressional EMP Commission warned that Iran has several times detonated its Shahab III missile at high altitudes, apparently simulating a nuclear EMP attack. Iran has also demonstrated the capability to launch a ballistic missile from a freighter and make a nuclear EMP strike anonymously, and so perhaps escape retaliation. Iran has also orbited several satellites on trajectories consistent with practicing a surprise nuclear EMP attack against the United States. Iran has not conducted a nuclear test because its theocracy is not interested in diplomatic "signaling" or Western theories of nuclear deterrence and arms control bargaining. When the mullahs are ready, they will make a surprise nuclear attack. The vaporization of New York City and an EMP attack that crashes American society will be their nuclear tests. The bottom line is that Iran is a nuclear truck bomb headed our way. ===U/V === **====~~1~~ Aff gets 1AR theory and meta theory—deters neg from being infinitely abusive, otherwise they’ll always win. Meta theory ensures I can engage in theory and not lose on the highest layer.====** ====~~2~~ Aff gets a reasonability- theory moots 6 minutes of AC offense because you shifted the debate to a preclusive layer that I couldn’t predict until the 1NC. That creates a 13-7 time skew on theory, creating a strategy skew which means the debate under competing interps will always be skewed in their favor. ==== ====~~3~~ The aff deploys the state as a heuristic to learn scenario planning - even if politics is bad, scenario analysis of politics is pedagogically valuable — it enhances creativity, deconstructs biases and teaches advocacy skills ==== Barma et al. 16 ~~May 2016, ~~Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15~~, Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, "‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science," International Studies Perspectives 17 (2), pp. 1-19, http://www.naazneenbarma.com/uploads/2/9/6/9/29695681/using'scenarios'in'political'science'isp'2015.pdf~~ What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science? Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering "what if" questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created. The Art of Scenario Analysis We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures, often referred to as "alternative worlds." Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way. While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning "helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present" (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector. Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of "alternative worlds" approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.4 As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013). Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking.5 Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present. Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global politicaleconomic trends and dynamics. The notion of "exogeneity"—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation. Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance.6 The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to "simplify, then exaggerate" them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.7 Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases.8 An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the "funnel of choices" available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools. In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit "driving forces" which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas. The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for "puzzles" in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance. The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass, participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs. ====~~4~~ Fairness – truth testing makes it impossible for the aff to affirm since the neg can frontload with blippy NIBS and aprioris – outweighs on reversability – the neg is already reactive and has the 2N to recover – an impossible 1AR has no ballot ====
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Interp – nuclear arsenal refers to the buildings where states store weapons Collins Dictionary n.d. “Arsenal” https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/arsenal TG An arsenal is a building where weapons and military equipment are stored. Violation – Vote neg: 1 Limits – their model explodes it to nuclear submarines, cruise missiles, tac nukes, and more – only our definition creates a reasonable caselist for nuclear arsenals while they make prep impossible and wreck engagement 2 Precision—they justify the aff arbitrarily doing away with words in the resolution – nothing stops them defending bioweapons or NFU next
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NOVDEC - DA - Price Regulation
1 in 5 households sacrifice basic necessities to pay for energy- they can’t afford another price hike. This is empirically proven Germany, U.K, E.U, all experienced energy poverty after a shift to renewables. Bailey, Ronald. “Renewable Energy Mandates Are Making Poor People Poorer.” Reason.com, Reason, June 2018, https://reason.com/2018/05/28/renewable-energy-mandates-are/. Escalating electricity prices are regressive—poorer people pay a higher proportion of their incomes heating and cooling their houses than do richer people. Low-income folks also tend to live in draftier dwellings and retain older, less energy-efficient appliances and climate-control systems. Consequently, anything that raises the price of power will impose bigger relative costs on the poor. As renewable energy mandates and rising "ecological" taxes have driven up electricity prices, an increase in energy poverty has become a problem in countries such as Germany and the United Kingdom. There are varying definitions for the term, but the newly launched European Union Energy Poverty Observatory defines energy poverty as not being able to afford adequate warmth, cooling, lighting, or the energy to power appliances that guarantee a decent standard of living and health. One shorthand rule is that a household is energy poor if it must spend more than 10 percent of its income on power. The Observatory estimates that 50 million European households now qualify. Due largely to Germany's Energiewende—a government-mandated transition from coal and nuclear to wind and solar power—German residential electricity rates have doubled since 2000. Today, households pay about 36 cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh). About 11 cents, or well over half the increase, comes from a renewable energy surcharge and an ecological tax. In Britain, the price of residential electricity has increased by 27 percent in just a decade. Households now pay nearly 22 cents per kWh, with energy and climate change policies accounting for about 10 percent of that amount. A 2017 study by Christian-Albrechts University energy economist Dragana Nikodinoska found that the proportion of households in Germany spending more than 10 percent of their incomes on energy tripled from 7.5 percent in 1998 to 22 percent in 2013. The U.K. changed the way it measures fuel poverty in 2012, but a rough calculation suggests that the proportion of households paying over 10 percent rose from 6 percent in 2003 to around 20 percent in 2015. In February, the National Energy Action nonprofit estimated that the U.K. experiences 32,000 "excess deaths" each winter and that 9,700 of them are attributable to living in cold homes. Meanwhile, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), the average real price of residential electricity in the United States fell by nearly half, from 22 cents in 1960 to 12 cents in 2005. Since then, the price has stalled at around 13 cents per kWh. "Despite increases in the number and the average size of homes plus increased use of electronics," the EIA noted in 2012, "improvements in efficiency for space heating, air conditioning, and major appliances have all led to decreased consumption per household." As a result, net electric power generation has been essentially flat since 2005. Still, the EIA's residential energy consumption survey found in 2015 that "about one in five households reported reducing or forgoing basic necessities like food and medicine to pay an energy bill." A 2014 white paper released by the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources calculated that for every 10 percent increase in home energy costs, 840,000 Americans would be pushed below the poverty line. Without the recent proliferation of state and federal renewable power mandates, it is likely that the price of electricity would have continued its decline and fewer American households would now be unduly burdened by their energy bills. On the other hand, electricity prices in Germany and the U.K., which are being driven up by such mandates, show that the situation could definitely be worse. Fossil Fuel subsidies keep prices low without them energy becomes unaffordable for the poor Meyer, Robinson. “The World Spends $400 Billion Propping Up Oil Companies. Is That Bad?” The Atlantic, Atlantic Media Company, 8 Feb. 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/02/maybe-cutting-fossil-fuel-subsidies-wouldnt-do-much-good/552668/. KH This finding is, she admits, diplomatically challenging. Countries in North America and Western Europe—except for the United States—have historically pushed for a more aggressive global climate policy. But it’s in the countries most resistant to reducing emissions—Russia, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and others near them—that slashing subsidies would have the biggest effect. The new paper provides a useful global context for arguments happening in many world capitals. Most governments spend most of their subsidy money on the consumption side—that is, they help poor and middle-class people buy fossil fuels. Cutting that support can be ethically and environmentally tricky. In India, for example, cutting the subsidies sometimes led to increases in greenhouse-gas emissions—because the country’s poorest citizens, unable to afford kerosene, started burning even dirtier fuels like firewood or charcoal. The situation isn’t any simpler in rich countries. Take the debate over subsidies in the United States. In America, it’s not clear how much the public pays to cushion oil, gas, and coal companies. The Council on Foreign Relations, a nonpartisan think tank, estimated in 2016 that the federal government spends about $4 billion every year on tax breaks for fossil fuels. But Oil Change International, a progressive environmental group, looked at a broader set of federal and state policies last year and put the cost to taxpayers at $20.5 billion. (And even this number leaves out some subsidies, like the federal program that helps families pay their heating bills.)
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Standardized testing is more equitable in combating institutional racism than alternatives like interviews or extracurricular activities. This means standardized tests are key to higher admission for people of color. (DYSKE. "Standardized Test Is the Best Tool We Have to Fight Racism - DYSKE." DYSKE.COM, 2018, dyske.com/paper/1295.)KH In this article, I’m going to argue that a standardized test, like SHSAT, is a better tool to combat racism than an interview, or any multi-factor selection process that includes subjective evaluation, because, as soon as subjectivity is involved, it becomes impossible to identify racist biases (both conscious and unconscious) and to hold anyone accountable. And, when we allow subjective evaluation, the dominant racial group, which is to say white people, would have unfair influences in the process. This is how institutional racism persists even if nobody has racist intentions. Just as nobody in this country is above the law, nobody, not even the school principals or chancellors, should be above the admission process for public schools. Let me start by defining what I mean by "objective" and "subjective." Let’s say you gave me a math test and scored it. I got 75 out of 100. Everyone, including myself, can review the result and agree with you. That is all I mean by "objective." What exactly this number is assessing is an entirely different matter. Many people will object to this and complain that a math test cannot fairly evaluate a whole person. I agree. It cannot. The people who design these tests are not claiming that it can either. A test can only evaluate a very small aspect of a person. What aspect a test can evaluate is a separate issue from what constitutes "objective." In contrast, let’s say you interviewed me and gave me 60 out of 100. I’m not going to agree with you. And, if someone else were to interview me, he might give me 80 out of 100. There is no way to establish the validity of your score. This is what I mean by "subjective." Here is a real-world example we can analyze. The chart below compares Beacon High School against the city-wide racial proportions. Beacon is the equivalent of Stuyvesant among the "Screened" schools. If you want to know what happens to elite schools if we allow subjective admissions criteria like interviews, here is the result. The people of color represent only half of their respective percentages while white students represent three and a half times the proportion of white students city-wide. Can you think of any fair, unbiased criteria that can select the proportions Beacon has? I can’t. It’s reasonable to suspect institutional racism but there is no way for us to audit their process to identify racist biases because their selection process includes subjective criteria. We cannot make any progress in fighting institutional racism if the process cannot be audited. "Subjective" means that certain people are given the power to use their own judgment to decide who is good enough for their schools. How do we make sure that these people are not abusing their power? Even though white students account for only 15 of the entire school system, those who hold power at the top are predominantly white. From Beacon, we can already see what happens if we introduced subjective admissions criteria. If white people actually cared about the plight of black and Hispanic students, they would have already let fair shares of them into Beacon as they have the power to choose anyone they want. In contrast, Asians do not have control of the SHSAT schools. Not even the principal of Stuyvesant can favor his/her own child. Nobody can use their connections on the inside. Nobody can leverage recommendations from rich and famous people. Not even the president of the United States can do anything about it. If you want to get in, you have to study hard to score high enough on SHSAT. That is the only way, and I would argue that it is the American way. The admissions process that is too complex and opaque for the average people creates uncertainty, which leads to fear and frustration for the parents and students. It also allows the administrators to unknowingly perpetuate institutional racism. It is the duty of the parents to do whatever they can to advocate for their own children, so when we give power to a specific group of people, the abuse is unavoidable. The admissions process needs to be like our legal system where nobody is above it. Complexity and subjectivity generally encourage abuse. The financial crisis of 2008 is a good example. Wall Street’s financial products are so complex that the government cannot hold anyone accountable even when a massive fraud takes place. Furthermore, why should the administrators of public schools have the power to use their own subjective values to judge our children? We the taxpayers are paying them. What gives them the right to subjectively judge some children to be better than ours? The common complaint about standardized tests is that they only measure a few small aspects of each student, but think about what interviews evaluate. The interviewers have all the power, and the candidates are completely powerless. It’s not like going out on a date where both sides are evaluating one another from the equal position of power. When there is a large power imbalance, it is impossible to evaluate anyone accurately, honestly, or fairly. The candidates have no choice but to guess what the interviewers want to hear. The interviewers would naturally say, "Just be honest," but that is easy for them to say. It’s not like there are hundreds of great schools to choose from. If someone is pointing a gun at you and telling you to relax and be honest, would you? Interviews select candidates who are great up sucking up to people in power. It is selecting for lack of integrity. It is true that all standardized tests are culturally biased to a degree but such biases are nothing compared to the degree of prejudice, ethnocentrism, and institutional racism in interviews. ====Going to college reduces poverty rates and unemployment ==== "Education: The Rising Cost of Not Going to College." Pew Research Center's Social and Demographic Trends Project, 22 Dec. 2014, www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/02/11/the-rising-cost-of-not-going-to-college/. The survey also finds that among employed Millennials, college graduates are significantly more likely than those without any college experience to say that their education has been "very useful" in preparing them for work and a career (46 vs. 31). And these better educated young adults are more likely to say they have the necessary education and training to advance in their careers (63 vs. 41). But do these benefits outweigh the financial burden imposed by four or more years of college? Among Millennials ages 25 to 32, the answer is clearly yes: About nine-in-ten with at least a bachelor’s degree say college has already paid off (72) or will pay off in the future (17). Even among the two-thirds of college-educated Millennials who borrowed money to pay for their schooling, about nine-in-ten (86) say their degrees have been worth it or expect that they will be in the future. Of course, the economic and career benefits of a college degree are not limited to Millennials. Overall, the survey and economic analysis consistently find that college graduates regardless of generation are doing better than those with less education.3 But the Pew Research study also finds that on some key measures, the largest and most striking disparities between college graduates and those with less education surface in the Millennial generation. For example, in 1979 when the first wave of Baby Boomers were the same age that Millennials are today, the typical high school graduate earned about three-quarters (77) of what a college graduate made. Today, Millennials with only a high school diploma earn 62 of what the typical college graduate earns. To be sure, the Great Recession and the subsequent slow recovery hit the Millennial generation particularly hard.4 Neither college graduates nor those with less education were spared. On some key measures such as the percentage who are unemployed or the share living in poverty, this generation of college-educated adults is faring worse than Gen Xers, Baby Boomers or members of the Silent generation when they were in their mid-20s and early 30s. But today’s high school graduates are doing even worse, both in comparison to their college-educated peers and when measured against other generations of high school graduates at a similar point in their lives. For example, among those ages 25 to 32, fully 22 with only a high school diploma are living in poverty, compared with 6 of today’s college-educated young adults. In contrast, only 7 of Baby Boomers who had only a high school diploma were in poverty in 1979 when they were in their late 20s and early 30s.
851,757
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SEPTOCT - T - Must spec
====Interpretation – The affirmative must specify which standardized tests colleges and universities ought not consider in undergraduate admissions in the United States in the 1AC.==== ====Standardized tests are flexible – there are too many interps of tests. US Department of State ‘19==== "Prepare For U.S. Standardized Tests, Undergraduate." U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, 22 Apr. 2019, educationusa.state.gov/your-5-steps-us-study/research-your-options/undergraduate/prepare-us-standardized-tests. // TC As part of the application process, most undergraduate programs require one or more U.S. standardized test scores. Your test scores, academic record, and other factors are used to predict how well you will do as a university student. The test scores are one way to compare students from the United States and international students from different educational systems. In the United States, there is no national college entrance examination administered by the government that students must pass to gain admission to higher education. Rather, different universities or schools establish their own admission requirements, including which third-party standardized test they accept. Standardized tests should be taken a year to 18 months before you plan on studying. Many students take the exams more then once to achieve higher scores. There are many websites, books, and tutors available to help you prepare. English Language Ability Tests Being able to communicate in English is a basic requirement for successful undergraduate study in the United States. If English is not your native language, U.S. colleges and universities will ask you to take an English Language proficiency test before admission. The most common tests for English language ability are the Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL), the International English Language Testing System (IELTS), and the Pearson Test of English (PTE), among others. Admissions Tests Most colleges and universities in the United States require standardized testing for undergraduate admissions. Admission requirements vary, so be sure to confirm which test(s) you need with the institutions that interest you. ACT: A curriculum-based multiple-choice assessment that tests reading, English, mathematics, and science, with an optional essay section. The ACT is widely accepted at accredited two and four-year colleges and universities in the United States, and hundreds of institutions around the world. SAT: A test that measures critical reading, writing, and mathematical abilities. The SAT Subject Tests measure knowledge in specific subject areas. The SAT is widely accepted at accredited two and four-year colleges and universities in the United States, and hundreds of institutions around the world. (Please note that an updated SAT made its debut in March 2016 and impacts students in the class of 2017 and younger.) ====Violation – You didn’t spec==== ====Standards - ==== ====1~~ Ground – not specifying which standardized test increases their ground by including every single test – I can’t link Ks and DAs to the aff since I don’t know what exceptions they’ll make in the 1AR. Ground is key to fairness since both debaters need equal access to the ballot. Impacts out to time skew – exceptions they make in the 1AR moots my 1N, means I’m at a structural disadvantage==== ====2~~ Vagueness- vague affs are undebatable because certain specifications would impact the desirability of your aff differently. For example, the SAT might be bad under your framework but TOEFL might not. This prevents us from engaging in the specificities of your aff. ==== ====Vote on fairness because debate is a competitive activity so we need to evaluate rounds fairly. Vote on education because that’s why schools fund debate and why debate was created. Drop the debater: A) we need to set norms for future rounds and punishment is key, B) time skew – time spent on theory is already lost and I couldn’t spend it on substance, so I need a route to the ballot on theory Competing interpretations over reasonability: A) reasonability is arbitrary – it invites arbitrary judge intervention since someone has to decide what’s reasonable, B) competing interps is key to setting norms for debate – that’s good since we stop future abuse. No RVIs: 1~~ Chilling effect: If I’m hitting a good theory debater and I know I can lose on theory I won’t run it. They’ll say that if I’m right I’ll win the original shell, but that’s utopian. A good theory debater will tend to win so I can never check abuse. 2~~ RVIs kill topical discussion – they turn every debate into theory since substance can no longer decide the round. The round comes down to theory, and we’re incentivized to jettison substance and just go all in since theory becomes everything. 3~~ Being fair or having a better interp is just a threshold, not a voting issue. Not being abusive just means he’s playing the game, not that he’s won 4~~ Meta theory solves back; they can uplayer against me and access higher level offense. I can’t deploy strategies like drop the arg so the balance tilts towards them then. This proves RVIs overcompensate. 5~~ It’s easy to prove no abuse even without an RVI. I have to win all parts of the shell, while he has a million ways to prove no abuse like an I meet, crafty counterinterp, or the standards debate====
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365,025
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MA - NC v2
==nc== ====Experts say predictive policing is both more effective and less biased than humans – means it is inherently just==== **New York University** School of Law, **2016**, "Tyranny of the Algorithm? Predictive Analytics and Human Rights," New York University School of Law, https://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/bernstein-institute/conference-2016 From predictive policing to the social media tracking of potential terrorists, governments worldwide rely AND at Data and Society, spoke about her work on building fair algorithms. ====Although current applications of predictive policing might be unjust, the underlying algorithmic technologies behind predictive policing are just – right now the only problem is the data being used==== Ezekiel Edwards,, 8-31-2016, "Predictive Policing Software Is More Accurate at Predicting Policing Than Predicting Crime," American Civil Liberties Union, https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/reforming-police/predictive-policing-software-more-accurate-predicting "Predictive policing" has an enticing ring to it. The idea is that AND tool, we can pretty much predict the ways things will turn out. ====Predictive policing actually counteracts bias – it's an unprecedented opportunity for racial justice that's a turn==== Eric **Siegel**, 2-19-**2018**, "How to Fight Bias with Predictive Policing," Scientific American Blog Network, https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/voices/how-to-fight-bias-with-predictive-policing/ Law enforcement's use of predictive analytics recently came under fire again. Dartmouth researchers made AND for racial bias to intentionally designing predictive policing to actively advance racial justice. ====Predictive policing has applications in fraud detection==== Robin **Austin**, 6-11-**2019**, "Can crime be predicted with AI/ML? ," CIO, https://www.cio.com/article/3401401/can-crime-be-predicted-with-ai-ml.html For many years, AI/ML has been used to establish the identity of AND detection and prevention, stopping crime in progress and even before it happens. ====Predictive policing is the only ethical allocation of finite resources – also helps police departments help people who are homeless==== Eidam 16, Eyragon Eidam, September 2016, "The Role of Data Analytics in Predictive Policing," https://www.govtech.com/data/Role-of-Data-Analytics-in-Predictive-Policing.html From the right vantage point, it is almost possible to watch the steady tide AND , is helping to usher in effective predictive policing programs across the country. ====Predictive policing can render justice more effectively and efficiently than standard reactive policing==== **Pearsall 10, **Beth Pearsall, "Predictive Policing: The Future of Law Enforcement?," June 22, 2010, https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/predictive-policing-future-law-enforcement For years, businesses have used data analysis to anticipate market conditions or industry trends AND reduce injuries, improve safety … It doesn't get any better than that."
851,816
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JANFEB - DA - Israel
open source
851,827
365,027
328,696
JANFEB - AC - Poseidon
open source
851,819
365,028
328,711
JANFEB - T - Arsenals
open source
851,828
365,029
328,702
MARAPR - DA - Cyber
open source
851,825
365,030
328,698
MARAPR - AC - ICE v2
open source
851,821
365,031
328,722
0 - contact
pronouns: she/her email: [email protected] FB: annalaine whitson
851,837
365,032
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MA - cp positive skew
open source
851,843
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REM DA
The US doesn’t have enough rare earth metals to cover a shift to renewables now Mosaddeq 18 Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed (British investigative journalist, author and academic. He is editor of the crowdfunded investigative journalism platform INSURGE intelligence. He is a former environment blogger for The Guardian) We Don't Mine Enough Rare Earth Metals to Replace Fossil Fuels With Renewable Energy, 12/12/2018, VICE, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/a3mavb/we-dont-mine-enough-rare-earth-metals-to-replace-fossil-fuels-with-renewable-energy A new scientific study supported by the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure warns that the renewable energy industry could be about to face a fundamental obstacle: shortages in the supply of rare metals. To meet greenhouse gas emission reduction targets under the Paris Agreement, renewable energy production has to scale up fast. This means that global production of several rare earth minerals used in solar panels and wind turbines—especially neodymium, terbium, indium, dysprosium, and praseodymium—must grow twelvefold by 2050. But according to the new study by Dutch energy systems company Metabolic, the “current global supply of several critical metals is insufficient to transition to a renewable energy system.” The study focuses on demand for rare metals in the Netherlands and extrapolates this to develop a picture of how global trends are likely to develop. “If the rest of the world would develop renewable electricity capacity at a comparable pace with the Netherlands, a considerable shortage would arise,” the study finds. This doesn’t include other applications of rare earth metals in other electronics industries (rare earth metals are widely used in smartphones, for example). “When other applications (such as electric vehicles) are also taken into consideration, the required amount of certain metals would further increase.” Demand for rare metals is pitched to rise exponentially across the world, and not just due to renewables. Demand is most evident in “consumer electronics, military applications, and other technical equipment in industrial applications. The growth of the global middle class from 1 billion to 3 billion people will only further accelerate this growth.” But the study did not account for those other industries. This means the actual problem could be far more intractable. In 2017, a study in Nature found that a range of minerals essential for smartphones, laptops, electric cars and even copper wiring could face supply shortages in coming decades. The other challenge is that rare metals mining is massively concentrated in just a few countries: particularly China, which dominates 80 percent of mining and nearly 95 percent of refining. Although Australia and Turkey are significant producers of specific metals (such as neodymium and boron respectively), Europe and the US are overwhelmingly dependent on China, which would be in a position to control global supply—a position that could be easily abused. Mining for renewable energy relies on mining that hurts the environment and uses child labor Leta Dickinson Jun 25, 2019 {Clean energy requires rare metals. Should we mine the ocean floor to get them?} https://grist.org/article/clean-energy-requires-rare-metals-should-we-mine-the-ocean-floor-to-get-them/ ( Undergraduate student studying Journalism and Environmental Science at Northwestern University, Class of 2019.) Accessed 11/13/19 Our need for metals runs deep. How deep, you might ask? Why, up to 16,000 feet deep, in the form of potato-sized lumps of metal lying on the seafloor in some of the deepest parts of the oceans. We’ve been making sci-fi movies and writing books about it for decades, but commercial deep-sea mining might soon become a reality. Here’s everything you need to know about this up-and-coming industry. It starts with our need for clean energy. We’re in the midst of an energy revolution: Cities and countries around the globe are switching to clean energy to curb their carbon emissions. It’s become a common government and company promise to say ‘net-zero carbon emissions by insert-year-here.’ With so many proposed transitions to renewables, the real lynchpin is keeping up with the demands for infrastructure. And this means metals. Battery storage, solar and wind power generation, and continued tech advancement require metals like neodymium, dysprosium, tellurium, cadmium, lithium, and cobalt, to name a few. A single Tesla Model S battery alone contains over 60 kilograms of lithium. And sure, maybe we can’t all afford a Tesla, but if you want a zero carbon-emitting solar power and electricity at night, batteries — and lithium — are still key. The unique properties of metals are at the foundation of renewable technologies, like magneticity and conductivity, and allow them to turn wind and sunlight into usable, storable, energy. Many of these metals can be quite rare, and their demand is expected to soar over the next decades. So where can we get all these metals? That’s where deep-sea mining could come in. Sounds pretty straightforward, right? That is, if we understood more about this mysterious terrain. We know more about the surface of the moon than we do about the depths of our oceans, but one thing we do know is that the oceans hold a lot of metals. We’re talking tellurium in concentrations 50,000 times higher than terrestrial deposits. Millions of tons of copper, zinc, gold, and silver. And only thousands of feet of water and a diverse and mostly unknown habitat in our way. Real interest in the resource extraction of the deep sea began in 1967, when geologist John Mero published a book that suggested these metals could be used to meet global demand for technology and electrification. Following this growing interest, the U.N. responded in 1982 with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a treaty that sought to regulate the high seas by declaring them the “common heritage of mankind.” It also created three institutions to govern the exploitation of the ocean, including the International Seabed Authority, or ISA. It’s clear that the U.N. intended the resources of the seas to be used, but also regulated. In the nearly 40 years since the treaty’s drafting, the treasure trove of the deep remains unmined. Yet the technology for mining is on the way. In September 2017, Japan became the first country to run a large-scale, deep-sea mining test, proving that it was indeed possible. Including one for Japan, the ISA has handed out 29 contracts for exploration to countries and companies, allowing them to develop equipment, run tests, and peruse the seabed for possible mining sites. The organization has been working toward creating international regulations governing deep-sea extraction. The ISA drafts a new set of rules every six months and invites consultation from member states, private companies, and organizations. The next session is in July with the final regulations due to be completed by 2020. The idea of deep-sea mining has long had a bad rap in the eyes of environmentalists — the ecosystem is only just beginning to be understood, and most scientists see some biodiversity loss as an unavoidable side effect. The more intensive types of deep-sea mining involve actually removing parts of the seabed or seamounts, which would kill any life living there and would take decades (at the very least) for the habitat to fully recover. The most common type of deep-sea mining, polymetallic nodule collection, is less intensive and more simple. The metal-containing nodules rest scattered across the large stretches of underwater plains. Prototypes involve harvesters on belted tracks rolling across the seabed, suctioning up the nodules and sending them via flexible pipe up to a surface boat. Anything else that’s collected, like water and sediment, is returned back to the seafloor. Even though polymetallic nodule collection tends to be less harmful than the other forms of mining, there are still many issues associated with the process. Scientists like Daniel Jones see serious consequences for the sensitive habitat. “Imagine a tractor or farm vehicle going over a field,” said Jones, a deep-sea biologist at the National Oceanography Center in South Hampton, in the U.K. “It disturbs everything, especially the sediments, which take a very long time to settle. In addition, they’re taking off the top few centimeters of sediment and the nodules, and that’s where the majority of the life lives in that environment.” Besides these “plumes” of displaced sediment and removal of nodules, other risks to sea life include heat, noise, and light emitted from mining vehicles. Right now, terrestrial mines are the status quo source for renewable technology metals. If you put solar panels on your roof, buy an electric car, or support your city or state’s offshore wind turbine initiatives, you’re supporting terrestrial mining. What does that really mean? If we revisit this wistful Tesla example, a lithium-ion battery contains lithium, nickel, and cobalt, two of which (lithium and cobalt) Tesla already says are in short supply. Most lithium comes from the “Lithium Triangle” — Argentina, Chile, and Bolivia — where the sought-after resource uses huge amounts of fresh water in an already arid region and pollutes the rest with toxic chemicals. Nickel mining often saturates nearby towns with heavy metals and thick, industrial pollution — rivers in Russia run red and NASA says you could mine the soil. Cobalt is no better; the Democratic Republic of the Congo is the main supplier of the world’s cobalt, where an unknown number of children work in hazardous mine conditions for meager pay. Basically, your hands might be dirty, even if your technology is “clean.” And, to put a cherry on top of this harrowing sundae, there’s evidence to support the fact that many terrestrial ore grades, or the quality of extracted metals, are falling. Recycling these metals isn’t viable yet — there isn’t much infrastructure in place yet. Plus, even if we built up the systems, it is expected that the new demand will exceed the existing supply within 20 years. We simply need more metals. As demand for these metals continues to climb, and the viability of traditional mining falls, some look to deep-sea mining as an unavoidable outcome. So, is it inevitable that we inflict some damage on the deep-sea in order to create green infrastructure? “Some people would speak of a devil’s bargain,” said Conn Nugent, the project director of the Pew Charitable Trust’s Seabed Mining Project and an observer of ISA meetings. This is why it has taken so long for the ISA to translate the cryptic meaning of the Law of the Sea treaty into mining regulations. In order to create a set of regulations and protections to preserve the deep sea while also providing enough leeway for mining industries to meet global metal demand, the ISA must take feedback from interested mining parties, as well as conservation-focused scientists. In terms of protection, the ISA has already designated large swathes of no-mining zones and has drafted regulations on the mining process to keep them minimally invasive. The organization has been collecting information about deep sea flora and fauna since its creation, and requires contractors to “assess potential effects of their activities.” If the ISA is careful to create conservative mining regulations, some scientists see potential for the industry to also create opportunities for further exploration and understanding of the deep sea. Andrew Thaler, a deep-sea biologist and frequent observer at ISA sessions, says that mining expeditions will be in the best position to study remote deep-sea life. They will have more access and equipment to study the deep than ever before. Plus, Thaler argues that all of the concerned parties have environmentalism in mind to some degree. “I talk to a lot of people at these different mining companies,” Thaler said. “I haven’t met anyone involved in this process that doesn’t genuinely care to some extent about the ecosystems they are working on. Unlike any other extractive industry in pretty much human history, this is really the first industry where science and environmentalism have had a 50-year head start.” If deep-sea mining is done with care, it could be a boon to our renewables industry and even our understanding of the fragile ecosystem of the deep sea. Maybe even something as intrinsically destructive as mining might have a silver lining. Pun intended. DEEP SEA MINING KILLS THE ENVIRONMENT Steiner 17 Richard Steiner (A marine conservation biologist in Anchorage Alaska, was a marine conservation professor with the University of Alaska)Deep Sea Mining a New Ocean Threat, HUFFINGTON POST, 12/6/2017 But here’s the problem. The deep ocean, where mining is proposed, constitutes the largest and least understood biological habitat on Earth. It’s an Alice-in-Wonderland world of extremes, extraordinary adaptions, bizarre organisms, beauty and mystery. The region is characterized by darkness (infused with sparkling bioluminescence), extreme pressure, cold temperatures, high biodiversity (perhaps millions of species, most yet to be identified), slow growth and reproductive rates, and high sensitivity to disturbance (low resilience). Given our poor understanding of deep sea ecosystems, growing industrial interest, rudimentary management, and insufficient protected areas, the risk of irreversible environmental damage here is real. Environmental risks and impacts of deep sea mining would be enormous and unavoidable, including seabed habitat degradation over vast ocean areas, species extinctions, reduced habitat complexity, slow and uncertain recovery, suspended sediment plumes, toxic plumes from surface ore dewatering, pelagic ecosystem impacts, undersea noise, ore and oil spills in transport, and more. Due to the global rarity of deep sea hydrothermal vent ecosystems, the impact of vent mining would be disproportionately high relative to terrestrial mining. Full-scale nodule mining on the abyssal plain would affect thousands of square miles of ocean floor, kill attached invertebrate communities, and create huge subsea sediment plumes that would flow and settle over thousands of square miles of seafloor. Such sedimentation would smother seabed habitat, reduce habitat complexity and biodiversity over vast areas, and post-mining recovery would be extremely slow. Mining of cobalt crusts on seamounts would cause enormous, possibly irreversible impacts to unique, productive seamount ecosystems.
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LIHEAP PIC Counterplan text: The United States ought to eliminate subsidies for fossil fuels except for the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP). LIHEAP is a fossil fuel subsidy. Coleman and Dietz 7/29 Coleman and Dietz., 19 - ("Fact Sheet: Fossil Fuel Subsidies: A Closer Look at Tax Breaks and Societal Costs," Environmental and Energy Study Institute, 7-29-2019, https://www.eesi.org/papers/view/fact-sheet-fossil-fuel-subsidies-a-closer-look-at-tax-breaks-and-societal-costs#1)//CL The federal government provides numerous subsidies, both direct and indirect, to the fossil fuel industry. Special provisions in the U.S. tax code designed to specifically support and reward domestic fossil fuel?related production are direct subsidies. Other provisions in the tax code aimed at businesses in general create indirect subsidies that are not exclusive to the fossil fuels industry. In certain cases, quantifying these subsidies is fairly simple. In the case of indirect subsidies, establishing an amount associated with these subsidies is more challenging. While not covered in this fact sheet, another source of federal aid to the fossil fuel industry is the discounted cost of leasing federal lands for fossil fuel extraction. Some fossil fuel subsidies provide public assistance, such as the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP), which assists low-income households with heating costs. AND LIHEAP helps many low-income families keep their homes at a safe temperature. Wein ‘17 Olivia Wein staff attorney in the Washington office of the National Consumer Law Center, on the board of the National Low-Income Energy Consortium, “The Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP),” National Low Income Housing Coalition, https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/AG-2017/2017AG_Ch05-S08_Low-Income-Home-Energy-Assistance-Program_LIHEAP.pdf. // CL LIHEAP is a targeted block grant program to help struggling families pay their heating and cooling bills. States have flexibility in setting eligibility criteria, benefit amounts, how much to direct to energy crisis situations where the health of the household is in jeopardy, as well as other program components. As more families struggle to pay their heating bills in the winter and afford air conditioning in the summer due to the high price of energy and the weak economy, the main challenge for LIHEAP is securing adequate annual appropriations. HISTORY LIHEAP was created in response to rising energy prices in the 1970s and the decreasing purchasing power of low income households. In 1980, low income energy assistance was part of the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Act, Public Law 96-223, and LIHEAP was authorized in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Public Law 97-35. Since then LIHEAP has been reauthorized several times, targeting the assistance within the pool of eligible households, adding new program components, and expanding authorization levels for funding. PROGRAM SUMMARY The regular LIHEAP program is a federal block grant program to the states to help low income families meet the costs of heating and cooling their homes. LIHEAP is intended to “assist low income households, particularly those with the lowest incomes, that pay a high proportion of household income for home energy, primarily in meeting their home energy needs” (42 U.S.C. § 8621(a)). States are to target assistance to households with the lowest incomes and highest energy needs (i.e., those who pay a large percentage of their income on home energy), and to households with populations vulnerable to extreme heat or cold. These are households with very young children, individuals with disabilities, and the frail elderly. The LIHEAP program focuses on home energy, which is defined as a source of heating or cooling in residential dwellings. In order to receive LIHEAP funds, states must submit an annual application (state plan) to the Secretary of HHS. All 50 states, the District of Columbia, numerous tribes, and the territories participate in the LIHEAP program. In the majority of states, LIHEAP is administered by the state social services agency. In many states, the state agency contracts with local providers, such as community action agencies, to handle intake. Although states have a great deal of flexibility in designing their programs each year, the vast majority of states’ LIHEAP grants are used to provide bill payment assistance to eligible low income households to help with heating and cooling costs. LIHEAP benefits cover all forms of residential heating or cooling fuels. This includes a range of fuels from natural gas and electricity for heating or cooling, to home heating oil, propane, kerosene, and wood. Assistance is often in the form of a vendor payment or two-party check (the customer and the utility). States also have the flexibility to set their program’s eligibility criteria in the annual state LIHEAP plan based on income eligibility. The maximum eligibility for LIHEAP is 150 of poverty or 60 of state median income. States are prohibited from setting income eligibility below 110 of the poverty level. States can also rely on participation in another means-tested program to determine eligibility. Low income households are also eligible for LIHEAP through participation in Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, Supplemental Security Income, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (also known as food stamps) and certain needs-tested veterans’ benefits. There are several additional components to LIHEAP: • Crisis grants. Each fiscal year, states must reserve a reasonable amount of their regular LIHEAP block grant until March 15 for individual crisis intervention grants. States have the discretion to define what constitutes a crisis for this component. Common definitions include an imminent shut-off, empty heating fuel tank, or broken furnace. The state crisis intervention funds must be made available to a household within 18 hours if the household is in a life-threatening situation, and within 48 hours in other circumstances. The state crisis intervention component is different from the LIHEAP emergency contingency funds that are at the discretion of the president to release. • Low-cost weatherization or other home energyrelated repairs. States may use up to 15 of their annual LIHEAP block grant (or 25 with a waiver) for low-cost residential weatherization or other home energy-related repair. In about 30 states, the same agency administers LIHEAP and the Department of Energy’s low income weatherization program. • Self-sufficiency. States can use up to 5 of their block grant to provide services to encourage and enable households to reduce their home energy needs through activities such as needs assessments, counseling, and assistance with energy vendors. • LIHEAP emergency contingency fund. The LIHEAP emergency contingency fund is subsidized separately from the regular LIHEAP block grant. The president can release LIHEAP emergency contingency funds to help meet low income home energy needs arising from a natural disaster, a significant increase in the cost of home energy, or other emergency. Unfortunately, Congress has not appropriated funds for the LIHEAP emergency contingency fund since FY11. According to the National Energy Assistance Director’s Association (NEADA), in FY16 LIHEAP provided essential heating assistance to 6.7 million households, and essential cooling assistance to about one million households. AND Cold exposure leads to physical limitations and death. Stocks et al ‘04 Stocks, Jodie M., et al. "Human physiological responses to cold exposure." Aviation, space, and environmental medicine 75.5 (2004): 444-457. CL Modern man has evolved within a temperate climate, yet through our behavioral and autonomic thermoregulatory responses, underpinned by a complex system of receptors, central integrators, afferent and efferent pathways, and effector organs, humans possess an ability to tolerate both hot and cold environments. The survivable fall in deep body temperature during cooling far exceeds the change accompanying heating, and gradual core cooling to 14.4°C has been survived successfully. Thermoregulatory responses vary among individuals, and are influenced by factors such as age, gender, body composition, exercise, and adaptation state. However, cold stress can rapidly overwhelm the human thermoregulatory system, and the sudden fall in skin temperature associated with cold-water immersion can elicit the extremely hazardous “cold shock” responses. With longer periods of cold exposure, the muscles, nerves, and deep tissues cool excessively, thereby impairing physical and thermoeffector performance, predisposing to hypothermia, incapacitation, and death.
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Contact Info and Interp
Hi I'm Deborah If you need to contact me, please do so by email at [email protected] If you need open sources to contact me 30 minutes before round or ask in round for an email chain. If not, I have auto I-MEETS. My Interp requires Disclosure only at TOC bid tournaments, so if it's not TOC, you can count on me NOT running Disclosure since I hate it. If you chose to, I need to know 30 minutes before round, or I run a heck of a ton of theory, which I also hate. I hope you have a wonderful day, and I'm excited to debate you!
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ND - Renewable Energy DA
OPEN SOURCE: DISADVANTAGES Renewables DA The US doesn’t have enough rare earth metals to cover a shift to renewables now Mosaddeq 18 Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed (British investigative journalist, author and academic. He is editor of the crowdfunded investigative journalism platform INSURGE intelligence. He is a former environment blogger for The Guardian) We Don't Mine Enough Rare Earth Metals to Replace Fossil Fuels With Renewable Energy, 12/12/2018, VICE, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/a3mavb/we-dont-mine-enough-rare-earth-metals-to-replace-fossil-fuels-with-renewable-energy A new scientific study supported by the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure warns that the renewable energy industry could be about to face a fundamental obstacle: shortages in the supply of rare metals. To meet greenhouse gas emission reduction targets under the Paris Agreement, renewable energy production has to scale up fast. This means that global production of several rare earth minerals used in solar panels and wind turbines—especially neodymium, terbium, indium, dysprosium, and praseodymium—must grow twelvefold by 2050. But according to the new study by Dutch energy systems company Metabolic, the “current global supply of several critical metals is insufficient to transition to a renewable energy system.” The study focuses on demand for rare metals in the Netherlands and extrapolates this to develop a picture of how global trends are likely to develop. “If the rest of the world would develop renewable electricity capacity at a comparable pace with the Netherlands, a considerable shortage would arise,” the study finds. This doesn’t include other applications of rare earth metals in other electronics industries (rare earth metals are widely used in smartphones, for example). “When other applications (such as electric vehicles) are also taken into consideration, the required amount of certain metals would further increase.” Demand for rare metals is pitched to rise exponentially across the world, and not just due to renewables. Demand is most evident in “consumer electronics, military applications, and other technical equipment in industrial applications. The growth of the global middle class from 1 billion to 3 billion people will only further accelerate this growth.” But the study did not account for those other industries. This means the actual problem could be far more intractable. In 2017, a study in Nature found that a range of minerals essential for smartphones, laptops, electric cars and even copper wiring could face supply shortages in coming decades. The other challenge is that rare metals mining is massively concentrated in just a few countries: particularly China, which dominates 80 percent of mining and nearly 95 percent of refining. Although Australia and Turkey are significant producers of specific metals (such as neodymium and boron respectively), Europe and the US are overwhelmingly dependent on China, which would be in a position to control global supply—a position that could be easily abused. The aff increases mining – leads to human rights abuses and ecological destruction Colagrossi 7/29 Mike Colagrossi (Freelance journalist) The dirty side of renewable energy, 7/29/2019, Big Think The Paris Agreement, for instance, set an ambitious global goal to limit global warming to 2.7 degrees Fahrenheit (1.5 degree Celsius) by transitioning away from fossil fuels into renewables. However, a new extensive research report by the environmental non-profit Earthworks has found that this shift into a fossil fuel-free economy comes with its own set of egregious societal and conservationist problems. The blind rush to get "100 percent" renewable energy usage will get us nowhere. It's the same industrialist mindset that got us into this pickle. We need to approach this next energy wave with caution and care. Renewable energy transition Clean technologies require a wide variety of rare earth metals and other minerals, mostly including cobalt, nickel, lithium, aluminum, and silver. Batteries for electric cars makeup the biggest driver of mineral acquisition. Study co-author, Elsa Dominish, remarks that, "A rapid increase in demand for metals for renewable energy. . . could lead to mining of marginal or unconventional resources, which are often in more remote or biodiverse places." Many of these areas rich in minerals are remote wilderness, which have yet to be touched by any commercial endeavor. "The transition toward a renewable energy and transport system requires a complex mix of metals — such as copper, cobalt, nickel, rare earths, lithium, and silver — many of which have only previously been mined in small amounts," states Earthworks' report, in reference to the supply chains of the 14 most important minerals used in renewable energy production. Payal Sampat, director of Earthworks' Mining Program, sees this as a crucial time to focus on the core aspects of what an environmental movement should be focusing on. "We have an opportunity, if we act now, to ensure that our emerging clean energy economy is truly clean–as well as just and equitable–and not dependent on dirty mining. As we scale up clean energy technologies in pursuit of our necessarily ambitious climate goals, we must protect community health, water, human rights, and the environment." Under the supposition that all of human society would use 100 percent renewable energy by 2050, researchers charted out what other aspects of the environment would be affected as we attempted to reach this goal. The study explores the impacts that mining has on human society and culture, as well as the potential for even greater losses of biodiversity. With a world running completely on renewables, the metal requirements would be astronomical. The only way you're going to feed this need is by opening up more mines worldwide. Combined with our unsustainable mining practices, we'll be doing more harm than good. Large scale commercial strip mining of forests, slave labor, and ecological destruction would all be necessary to feed our current "green dream." Industrialism is the problem Mineral extraction levies an incredible cost on the communities and ecological landscape of a place. Material mined for renewable energy fuels the violation of human rights, pollutes local water sources, and often destroys wildlife. Cobalt, which is the most important component of rechargeable batteries, is mined in the Democratic Republic of Congo; often by children in dangerous working conditions. The authors of the report found that cobalt is the "metal of most concern for supply risks," as 60 percent of its production occurs in Congo, a country with an abysmal record of human and environmental catastrophes. In 2016, Amnesty International found that more than two dozen major electronics and automotive companies were failing to ensure that their supply chains of cobalt didn't include child labor. Amnesty blamed both Congolese officials and Western tech companies for ignoring the problems endemic to their supply chain. Irresponsible and dangerous cobalt mining is a global problem. According to the report, China's Congo Dongfang International Mining (CDM) owns exclusive rights to one quarter of the cobalt ore, of which the mines it flows from all employ child labor. DEEP SEA MINING KILLS THE ENVIRONMENT Steiner 17 Richard Steiner (A marine conservation biologist in Anchorage Alaska, was a marine conservation professor with the University of Alaska)Deep Sea Mining a New Ocean Threat, HUFFINGTON POST, 12/6/2017 But here’s the problem. The deep ocean, where mining is proposed, constitutes the largest and least understood biological habitat on Earth. It’s an Alice-in-Wonderland world of extremes, extraordinary adaptions, bizarre organisms, beauty and mystery. The region is characterized by darkness (infused with sparkling bioluminescence), extreme pressure, cold temperatures, high biodiversity (perhaps millions of species, most yet to be identified), slow growth and reproductive rates, and high sensitivity to disturbance (low resilience). Given our poor understanding of deep sea ecosystems, growing industrial interest, rudimentary management, and insufficient protected areas, the risk of irreversible environmental damage here is real. Environmental risks and impacts of deep sea mining would be enormous and unavoidable, including seabed habitat degradation over vast ocean areas, species extinctions, reduced habitat complexity, slow and uncertain recovery, suspended sediment plumes, toxic plumes from surface ore dewatering, pelagic ecosystem impacts, undersea noise, ore and oil spills in transport, and more. Due to the global rarity of deep sea hydrothermal vent ecosystems, the impact of vent mining would be disproportionately high relative to terrestrial mining. Full-scale nodule mining on the abyssal plain would affect thousands of square miles of ocean floor, kill attached invertebrate communities, and create huge subsea sediment plumes that would flow and settle over thousands of square miles of seafloor. Such sedimentation would smother seabed habitat, reduce habitat complexity and biodiversity over vast areas, and post-mining recovery would be extremely slow. Mining of cobalt crusts on seamounts would cause enormous, possibly irreversible impacts to unique, productive seamount ecosystems. OCEAN HEALTH IS KEY TO HUMAN SURVIVAL Palmer 17 Cristiana Pa?ca Palmer (Executive Secretary of the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity.) Marine Biodiversity and Ecosystems Underpin a Healthy Planet and Social Well-Being, MAY/2017, https://unchronicle.un.org/article/marine-biodiversity-and-ecosystems-underpin-healthy-planet-and-social-well-being In no other realm is the importance of biodiversity for sustainable development more essential than in the ocean. Marine biodiversity, the variety of life in the ocean and seas, is a critical aspect of all three pillars of sustainable development—economic, social and environmental—supporting the healthy functioning of the planet and providing services that underpin the health, well¬-being and prosperity of humanity. The ocean is one of the main repositories of the world's biodiversity. It constitutes over 90 per cent of the habitable space on the planet and contains some 250,000 known species, with many more remaining to be discovered—at least two thirds of the world's marine species are still unidentified.1 The ocean, and the life therein, are critical to the healthy functioning of the planet, supplying half of the oxygen we breathe2 and absorbing annually about 26 per cent of the anthropogenic carbon dioxide emitted into the atmosphere.3 Evidence continues to emerge demonstrating the essential role of marine biodiversity in underpinning a healthy planet and social well-being. The fishery and aquaculture sectors are a source of income for hundreds of millions of people, especially in low-income families, and contribute directly and indirectly to their food security. Marine ecosystems provide innumerable services for coastal communities around the world. For example, mangrove ecosystems are an important source of food for more than 210 million people4 but they also deliver a range of other services, such as livelihoods, clean water, forest products, and protection against erosion and extreme weather events. Not surprisingly, given the resources that the ocean provides, human settlements have developed near the coast: 38 per cent of the world's population lives within 100 km of the coast, 44 per cent within 150 km, 50 per cent within 200 km, and 67 per cent within 400 km.5 Roughly 61 per cent of the world's total gross domestic product comes from the ocean and the coastal areas within 100 km of the coastline.6 Coastal population densities are 2.6 times larger than in inland areas and benefit directly and indirectly from the goods and services of coastal and marine ecosystems, which contribute to poverty eradication, sustained economic growth, food security and sustainable livelihoods and inclusive work, while hosting large biodiversity richness and mitigating the impacts of climate change.7 Thus, pressures that adversely impact marine biodiversity also undermine and compromise the healthy functioning of the planet and its ability to provide the services that we need to survive and thrive. Moreover, as demands on the ocean continue to rise, the continued provisioning of these services will be critical. The consequences of biodiversity loss are often most severe for the poor, who are extremely dependent on local ecosystem services for their livelihoods and are highly vulnerable to impacts on such services. Independently A rapid demand increase means China cuts us off from RERs Moss et al 11 (R.L.Moss1, E.Tzimas1, H.Kara2, P.Willis2 and J.Kooroshy3, Institute for Energy and Transport The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, “Critical Metals in Strategic Energy Technologies”, (http://www.google.com/url?sa=tandrct=jandq=andesrc=sandsource=webandcd=1andved=0CCIQFjAAandurl=http3A2F2Fsetis.ec.europa.eu2Fnewsroom-items-folder2Fjrc-report-on-criticalmetals-in-strategic-energy-technologies2Fat_download2FDocumentandei=9pJLUJivPILjrAH-0YGIAQandusg=AFQjCNFBM7mcUSAU32qKzIavrlOX_oPQegandsig2=s95qFovTbsP8mTqkFiAPqw)CD) Such bottlenecks could disrupt a timely and affordable supply of these metals to Europe in the future and potentially hinder the smooth deployment of SET Plan technologies and the realisation of the EU 2020 targets. In this context, it is important to note that significant SET Plan demands for a specific metal on itself do not necessarily constitute a problem. Demand for raw materials changes constantly as technologies and consumption patterns change over time. This creates incentives for adapting supply, so that the market balance is restored. However, such adaptation processes can be very time consuming, for example, when it takes many years to open new mines. If demand expands rapidly and supply is unable to keep pace in the short to medium term, bottlenecks in the form of price rises and supply shortages can be the consequence.a In cases where only a few countries control the production of an individual metal under tight market conditions, bottlenecks can also be exacerbated through political interventions by governments. Dominant producers may, for example, use their market power to gain political or commercial advantages through influencing supply and prices or imposing trade restrictions. A good example of how disruptive such bottlenecks can be is the case of rare earths. Given the challenging economic and technical obstacles involved in opening new rare earths mines, supply has struggled to grow considerably even though demand has been booming over the past decade.b In parallel, China has been systematically tightening export quotas that favour domestic rare earth consuming industries over competitors in the rest of the world, resulting in 2010, in a tight market and driving up prices. China implemented strict measures to consolidate a weakly regulated industry with many small scale operations that routinely ignore safety, environmental and export regulations; and a temporary halt of rare earth exports to Japan was imposed to exert political pressure in the context of a diplomatic dispute. Taken together, this combination of political and market factors have resulted in considerable supply shortages and price rises for rare earths over the course of 2010.c Indeed, even at the time of writing, there have been further substantial increases in the price of some rare earth oxides (especially dysprosium oxide) in 2011 alone RERs are key to heg- the impact is extinction Trigaux 12 (David, University Honors Program University of South Florida St. Petersburg, “The U.S., China and Rare Earth Metals” The Future Of Green Technology, Military Tech, and a Potential Achilles? Heel to American Hegemony.”,(http://dspace.nelson.usf.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10806/4632/David20Trigaux20Honors20Thesis5B15D.pdf?sequence=1)CD) The implications of a rare earth shortage aren?t strictly related to the environment, and energy dependence, but have distinct military implications as well that could threaten the position of the United States world?s strongest military. The United States place in the world was assured by powerful and decisive deployments in World War One and World War Two. Our military expansion was built upon a large, powerful industrial base that created more, better weapons of war for our soldiers. During the World Wars, a well-organized draft that sent millions of men into battle in a 19 short amount of time proved decisive, but as the war ended, and soldiers drafted into service returned to civilian life, the U.S. technological superiority over its opponents provided it with sustained dominance over its enemies, even as the numerical size of the army declined. New technologies, such as the use of the airplane in combat, rocket launched missiles, radar systems, and later, GPS, precision guided missiles, missile defense systems, high tech tanks, lasers, and other technologies now make the difference between victory and defeat. 66 The United States military now serves many important functions, deterring threats across the world. The United States projects its power internationally, through a network of bases and allied nations. Thus, the United States is a powerful player in all regions of the world, and often serves as a buffer against conflict in these regions. 67 US military presence serves as a buffer against Chinese military modernization in Eastern Asia, against an increasingly nationalist Russia in Europe, and smaller regional actors, such as Venezuela in South America and Iran in the Middle East. 68 The U.S. Navy is deployed all over the world, as the guarantor of international maritime trade routes. 69 The US Navy leads action against challenges to its maritime sovereignty on the other side of the globe, such as current action against Somali piracy. 70 Presence in regions across the world prevents escalation of potential crisis. 71 These could result in either a larger power fighting a smaller nation or nations (Russia and Georgia, Taiwan and China), religious opponents (Israel and Iran), or traditional foes (Ethiopia and Eretria, Venezuela and Colombia, India and Pakistan). 72 US projection is also key deterring emerging threats such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation. 73While not direct challenges to US primacy, both terrorism and nuclear proliferation can kill thousands.
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CP ~-~- Khamenei
===CP — Khamenei === ====Counterplan Text: The United States should end its use economic sanctions in regards to the Islamic Republic of Iran except for individual sanctions applied to Khamenei==== **Usher 19**, Plett Usher, 6-24-19, "Iran: New US sanctions target Supreme Leader Khamenei", BBC https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-48748544 SLHS-CG US President Donald Trump has said he is imposing hard-hitting new sanctions on AND say in Iran's politics and military - and he has enormous economic power. ====Individual sanction work.==== **Abdo 18**, Geneive Abdo, 8-4-19, Trump’s Right-Individual Sanctions Work", The Hill https://thehill.com/opinion/international/456114-trumps-right-individual-sanctions-actually-do-work Since President Donald Trump issued executive orders saying he was sanctioning individuals such as Iran’s AND before Trump leaves office and the results will be far more than symbolic.
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Heg DA
1 Sanctions are working ~-~- China and Russia pulling out of Venezuela right now – US gets access to phat oil reserves. Manning 19 ’19 Manning, Rick (President of Americans for Limited Government). “Venezuela, China, Russia – Oh My.” Real Clear Energy, 14 August 2019, https://www.realclearenergy.org/articles/2019/08/14/venezuela_china_russia__oh_my_110466.html. The world is a complicated place. Most people don’t associate the devastation of the Venezuela by communist leader Nicolas Maduro with China, yet Venezuelan oil lies at the heart of China’s interests and as a result, they have been propping up the murderous South American leader. Shockingly, Venezuela has the largest known reserves of oil in the world, and in 1950 had the fourth largest Gross Domestic Product in the world and second highest GDP per capita. Venezuela’s economy was six times the size of China, and as late as 1982, they were still the largest GDP in South America. However, by 2017 Venezuela’s per capita GDP had shrunk back to levels last seen at the turn of the century, and they continue to shrink in spite of its impressive oil reserves. In a couple of decades, the country has receded from relative affluence to scenes of desperate people eating their pets to stay alive, as Maduro’s repressive communist regime continues to destroy all capital investment in the country. With their eye on both Venezuela’s oil riches and the ability to project short-and medium range missile threats to the United States from the Caribbean country, China and Russia have been sending billions of dollars to prop up the Maduro madness. Into this mix, earlier this year, the national legislature of Venezuela declared that Juan Guaidó was the legitimate President of Venezuela and that Maduro was a usurper and the country has had street protests supporting Guaidó. The United States has recognized Guaidó along with sixty other countries, while China and Russia recognize their puppet Maduro in the hopes of getting their hands on the Venezuelan oil reserves. Now that President Trump has wisely imposed additional economic sanctions on Venezuela which pressures the Chinese and Russians to end their financing of the Maduro terror machine, the country hangs in the balance. While the sanctions impact the Venezuelan oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela, American companies which have been working in Venezuela since the 1920s developing the original fields, have a sanctions waiver in place until October. These U.S. based oil companies have used their expertise and capital to keep the flagging Venezuelan oil production alive and are essential to offsetting any move by Maduro to turn over his countries oil wealth to the Chinese in exchange for capital to keep his repressive regime in power. And while the temptation might exist in some quarters to let these waivers for U.S. oil interests to expire, the net effect would be to hand over a turnkey oil operation to the Chinese which would cement Maduro’s hold on power. This is why the United States should indefinitely extend these waivers so that there is certainty in this unstable region, allowing the hoped for Guaidó government to hit the ground running when they gain control over the levers of power without having to uproot entrenched Chinese interests. The world is a complicated place, but one lesson that America does not need to have to re-learn is that cutting off our own noses to spite our face is never a good policy. Keeping China and Russia from having a strategic and economic foothold in what is the most oil rich nation in the world which lies less than 3,000 miles from our Gulf Coast is what ultimately matters for our national and economic security, and extending the waivers for U.S. oil companies to operate in Venezuela serves that greater interest. President Trump has wisely issued the waivers, and now he should create regional certainty in this one area by extending them indefinitely. Control over energy resources is key to hegemony. IRENA, 19 (Global Commission of the Geopolitics of Energy Transformation, comprises a diverse group of distinguished leaders from the worlds of politics, energy, economics, trade, environment and development, International Renewable Energy Agency, 2019, “A New World: The Geopolitics of the Energy Transformation”, https://geopoliticsofrenewables.org/assets/geopolitics/Reports/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Global_commission_renewable_energy_2019.pdf) For two centuries, the geographic concentration of oil, natural gas and coal reserves has helped configure the international geopolitical landscape. Coal and steam power drove the Industrial Revolution which, in turn, shaped geopolitics in the 19th century. Since then, control over the production of and trade in oil has been a key feature of 20th century power politics. A transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy could transform global power relations no less than the historical shifts from wood to coal and from coal to oil. Repositioning of states A state’s relative position in the international system is influenced by a range of attributes, including its GDP, population, land size, natural resources, geostrategic location, military resources, and ‘soft power’. Having control over and access to significant energy resources and markets is an important asset because it enables states to protect vital national interests at home, and leverage economic and political influence abroad. States without such assets, by comparison, have less leverage and are more vulnerable. The rapid growth of renewable energy is therefore likely to alter the power and influence of some states and regions relative to others, and to redraw the geopolitical map in the 21st century. How different countries fare in the context of the energy transition depends in no small part on how exposed they are to changes in fossil fuel trade flows. Equally important is their position in the clean energy race, the commercial race to become a leader in renewable energy technology. Although the issue is highly complex, innovation will be a key determinant of the pace of change and its effect can be illustrated in Figure 4 US hedgymoney checks arms race, miscalc, revisionist conflict, and a litany of existential threats. Brands and Edelman ’19 Hal Brands; PhD, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Charles Edelman; PhD, Senior Fellow and Visiting Scholar at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. (“The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order;” Ch. 6: Darkening Horizon; Published by Yale University Press; //GrRv) rc/Pat The revival of great-power competition entails higher international tensions than the world has known for decades, and the revival of arms races, security dilemmas, and other artifacts of a more dangerous past. It entails sharper conflicts over the international rules of the road on issues ranging from freedom of navigation to the illegitimacy of altering borders by force, and intensifying competitions over states that reside at the intersection of rival powers’ areas of interest. It requires confronting the prospect that rival powers could overturn the favorable regional balances that have underpinned the U.S.-led order for decades, and that they might construct rival spheres of influence from which America and the liberal ideas it has long promoted would be excluded. Finally, it necessitates recognizing that great-power rivalry could lead to great-power war, a prospect that seemed to have followed the Soviet empire onto the ash heap of history. Both Beijing and Moscow are, after all, optimizing their forces and exercising aggressively in preparation for potential conflicts with the United States and its allies; Russian doctrine explicitly emphasizes the limited use of nuclear weapons to achieve escalation dominance in a war with Washington. In Syria, U.S. and Russian forces even came into deadly contact in early 2018. American airpower decimated a contingent of government-sponsored Russian mercenaries that was attacking a base at which U.S. troops were present, an incident demonstrating the increasing boldness of Russian operations and the corresponding potential for escalation. The world has not yet returned to the epic clashes for global dominance that characterized the twentieth century, but it has returned to the historical norm of great-power struggle, with all the associated dangers. Those dangers may be even greater than most observers appreciate, because if today’s great-power competitions are still most intense at the regional level, who is to say where these competitions will end? By all appearances, Russia does not simply want to be a “regional power” (as Obama cuttingly described it) that dominates South Ossetia and Crimea.37 It aspires to the deep European and extra-regional impact that previous incarnations of the Russian state enjoyed. Why else would Putin boast about how far his troops can drive into Eastern Europe? Why else would Moscow be deploying military power into the Middle East? Why else would it be continuing to cultivate intelligence and military relationships in regions as remote as Latin America? Likewise, China is today focused primarily on securing its own geopolitical neighborhood, but its ambitions for tomorrow are clearly much bolder. Beijing probably does not envision itself fully overthrowing the international order, simply because it has profited far too much from the U.S.-anchored global economy. Yet China has nonetheless positioned itself for a global challenge to U.S. influence. Chinese military forces are deploying ever farther from China’s immediate periphery; Beijing has projected power into the Arctic and established bases and logistical points in the Indian Ocean and Horn of Africa. Popular Chinese movies depict Beijing replacing Washington as the dominant actor in sub-Saharan Africa—a fictional representation of a real-life effort long under way. The Belt and Road Initiative bespeaks an aspiration to link China to countries throughout Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe; BRI, AIIB, and RCEP look like the beginning of an alternative institutional architecture to rival Washington’s. In 2017, Xi Jinping told the Nineteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party that Beijing could now “take center stage in the world” and act as an alternative to U.S. leadership.38 These ambitions may or may not be realistic. But they demonstrate just how significantly the world’s leading authoritarian powers desire to shift the global environment over time. The revisionism we are seeing today may therefore be only the beginning. As China’s power continues to grow, or if it is successful in dominating the Western Pacific, it will surely move on to grander endeavors. If Russia reconsolidates control over the former Soviet space, it may seek to bring parts of the former Warsaw Pact to heel. Historically, this has been a recurring pattern of great-power behavior—interests expand with power, the appetite grows with the eating, risk-taking increases as early gambles are seen to pay off.39 This pattern is precisely why the revival of great-power competition is so concerning—because geopolitical revisionism by unsatisfied major powers has so often presaged intensifying international conflict, confrontation, and even war. The great-power behavior occurring today represents the warning light flashing on the dashboard. It tells us there may be still-greater traumas to come. The threats today are compelling and urgent, and there may someday come a time when the balance of power has shifted so markedly that the postwar international system cannot be sustained. Yet that moment of failure has not yet arrived, and so the goal of U.S. strategy should be not to hasten it by giving up prematurely, but to push it off as far into the future as possible. Rather than simply acquiescing in the decline of a world it spent generations building, America should aggressively bolster its defenses, with an eye to preserving and perhaps even selectively advancing its remarkable achievements. Extinction outweighs. Bostrom 12 Nick Bostrom. Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School University of Oxford. “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.” Global Policy (2012) These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate.¶ Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving — and ideally improving — our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value. To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe.
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SO - Round 3
====The plan only shifts admissions to more subjective measures- the result is a heavy reliance on transcripts, essays, and lobbying, which turns case==== **Meltzer 18**, Erica Meltzer graduated from Brookline High School and earned her B.A., magna cum laude, from Wellesley College. (Eliminating standardized testing won't make college admissions fair) https://thecriticalreader.com/eliminating-testing-admissions-fair/ MP The University of Chicago's recent decision to go test-optional got me thinking: AND would inevitably creep into the process even more so than they already do. ====The aff just trades testing out for demonstrated interest which is infinitely worse.==== **Selingo 18** **(Jeffrey Selingo is a contributing editor to The Atlantic and the author of There Is Life After College., 5-25-2018, "The Two Most Important College-Admissions Criteria Now Mean Less," Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/05/college-admissions-gpa-sat-act/561167/, JKS)** Some colleges, however, are not waiting on their peers and instead are proactively AND a good amount of deciding who gets in is going to be arbitrary. ====Eliminating tests causes a shift to "soft" holistic assessments that increase inequality ==== **De Boer, PhD, 18** (Freddie, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2018/03/sat-class-race-inequality-college-admission 3-30) The Flaws of "Holistic Assessments" Let's look at the alternative metrics for student AND is straightforwardly beneficial to the more privileged at the expense of the less. ====Standardized tests are key to combat grade inflation- greater threat to equality ==== **De Boer, PhD, 18** (Freddie, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2018/03/sat-class-race-inequality-college-admission 3-30) There's another reason for people who believe in equality to champion standardized achievement tests: AND as the race to the top of the educational ladder gets more intense. ====Standardized testing is key to reliable scholarship decisions and also reduces inequality – objective criteria is key.==== **Jacobs et al. 18** (Jonathan Jacobs, Jim Brooks, Roger J. Thompson, Jack Buckley, Lynn Letukas, and Ben Wildavsky.. PhD Philosophy, Professor and Chair of Philosophy @ John Jay College of Criminal Justice/CUNY, Director, Institute for Criminal Justice @ John Jay College of Criminal Justice/CUNY. Director of Financial Aid and Scholarships @ Oregon. PhD Higher Education Policy and Administration from USC, Vice President for Student Services and Enrollment Management @ Oregon. PhD Political Science, Institute Fellow @ American Institutes for Research, Former Commissioner of the U.S. Department of Education's National Center for Education Statistics. PhD Sociology, Director of Global Academic Programs @ SAS. Senior Vice President @ Strada Education Network. "Merit-Based Scholarships in Student Recruitment and the Role of Standardized Tests," in "Measuring Success: Testing, Grades, and the Future of College Admissions". 2018. Johns Hopkins University Press. 2018 pp. 96-97) //TruLe The scholarship review project was launched in early 2012 with a goal of restructuring the AND course sequence Geometry, Algebra 2, Pre-Calculus, and Calculus. ====Tests are crucial to identify achievement gaps- abolishing them means we can't hold schools or politicians accountable. Consensus of civil rights groups votes Neg==== **The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights et al 15** (Signatories include: The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights The American Association of University Women (AAUW) Association of University Centers on Disabilities (AUCD) Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates, Inc. (COPAA) Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund (DREDF) League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) NAACP National Council of La Raza (NCLR) National Disability Rights Network (NDRN) National Urban League (NUL) Southeast Asia Resource Action Center (SEARAC) TASH https://civilrights.org/2015/05/05/civil-rights-groups-we-oppose-anti-testing-efforts/, 5-15 ) WASHINGTON – Today, 12 national civil and human rights groups announced their opposition to AND harder to identify and fix the deep-seated problems in our schools." ====Turns the case – scholarships are key to enrollment for low-income students on the fence.==== **Jackson 15** (Orville Jackson. Jackson is a writer for College Futures Foundation. "New Study Shows Scholarships Can Boost College Enrollment among Low-Income Students". 6-30-2015. College Futures Foundation. https://collegefutures.org/2015/06/study-shows-scholarships-boost-college-enrollment-for-low-income-students/) //TruLe The higher education world often distinguishes between need-based financial aid, which is AND -going and completion for low-income students, including the following: ====Holistic review without testing crushes school budgets – the aff shuts down small schools==== **Bergin 7/02** (Mike Bergin is the founder of Chariot Learning, a program for SAT and ACT prep. Bergin started his career in 1994 as a teacher for Kaplan. "THE FANTASY OF TEST-FREE ADMISSIONS," Chariot Learning. July 2, 2019. https://chariotlearning.com/the-fantasy-of-test-free-admissions/ ) //WWJA 9/6/19 SAT and ACT scores offer a simple, reliable, relevant, and inexpensive way AND over the campus, while the college seeks a more solvent partner institution. ====College budgets are on the brink now and increased costs get passed down to students – turns case.==== **Kovaci 19** (Klevisa Kovaçi is an international development consultant, with project engagements in Eastern Europe and Asia through the UN Kosovo Team, Permanent Mission of Albania to the UN, Dartmouth College, and non-governmental organizations. She holds a Master of International Affairs from Columbia University and Sciences Po (l'Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris). " Addressing higher education economics: Policy analysis for tuition," Georgetown Public Policy Review. April 17, 2019. http://www.gpprspring.com/addressing-higher-ed-economics ) //WWJA 9/6/19 Rising college tuition costs cause tremendous financial strain for students. Between 1987 and 2010 AND trade-off based on ability to pay especially harms socioeconomically disadvantaged students. ====The aff just trades testing out for demonstrated interest which is infinitely worse.==== **Selingo 18** **(Jeffrey Selingo is a contributing editor to The Atlantic and the author of There Is Life After College., 5-25-2018, "The Two Most Important College-Admissions Criteria Now Mean Less," Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/05/college-admissions-gpa-sat-act/561167/, JKS)** Some colleges, however, are not waiting on their peers and instead are proactively AND a good amount of deciding who gets in is going to be arbitrary.
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Queer Pessimism K AFF 1AC
=Queer Pessimism K AFF= =1ACs= ==1AC - Futurism== ====Everything begins before it ends, but this 1AC starts by questioning the goal of the educational system and its ability to constrain all in the name of a good future – but to who? Standardized testing is the tool that allows such individuals to be subject to this subjugation and students are easily picked and chosen just as easily as the circles they fill in, drumming on to the ticking of clocks and turning of pages as they await for the scantron to determine their future. The education system is structured around the idea of a good life "for our children", of populations that are to come. This futurism that's prevalent in the squo prioritizes a particular way of life that excludes those unable to orient towards the future – The queer. Queer bodies not only experience such discrimination within the academy but beyond, and the normative structures themselves are rooted deep within this system. The realm of the non-conforming is the realm of heteronormativity, of the status quo, a fundamentally reactive and spiteful response to the inherent flux of queer becoming. ==== ===Part One is the Inherency=== ====This is the concept of educational futurism - upholding of the Child as an emblem of the nation's future is the root cause of violence against non-normative bodies ==== **Greteman and Wojcikiewicz 14 (Adam J. Greteman, Department of Art Education, School of the Art Institute of Chicago, and Steven Wojcikiewicz, "The Problems with the Future: Educational Futurism and the Figural Child," Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 48, No. 4, PN)** 'I touch the future', Christa McAuliffe said, 'I teach'. AND engagement with Edelman. Complexity theory- 2,3 bad future really scary ====The rhetoric of doing it for the children frames children of color as objects of speculation and manipulation— futurism maintains itself through these practices on their bodies.==== Gill-Peterson 2015 **~~Julian, Assistant Professor of English and Children's Literature at the University of Pittsburgh ~| "The Value of the Future: The Child as Human Capital and the Neoliberal Labor of Race," Women's Studies Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 1/2, (Spring/Summer 2015)~~** "A mind is a terrible thing to waste. But a wonderful thing to AND that follow, another narrative seeks to make those children work for it. ===Part Two are the Impacts=== ====Impact One is educational futurism: Educational futurism maintains the figural Child as a weapon against individual children—this is the underpinning of violence against all excluded kids==== Greteman and Wojcikiewicz 14 **(Adam J. Greteman, Department of Art Education, School of the Art Institute of Chicago, and Steven Wojcikiewicz, "The Problems with the Future: Educational Futurism and the Figural Child," Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 48, No. 4)** McDonough (2007) noted the challenge a 'queer future' presents, particularly to AND the chance to be children, but also the chance to be adults. ====Impact Two is queer violence – any body in opposition to the figure of the Child is seen as a threat to the social order ==== **Edelman 04** **(Lee, professor of English at Tufts, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, p. 11-13, PN)** In its coercive universalization, however, the image of the Child, not to AND incised by the signifier, that "meaning," despite itself, means. ===Part Three is the Alt=== ====The alternative is to embrace the queer negativity of education—disconnecting learning from futurity inhabits the gaps within the social to explore queer possibilities and dismantles the foundations which standardized testing normatizes the queer body. ==== Greteman and Wojcikiewicz '14 **~~ Adam J., Adjunct Assistant Professor of Art Education at the School of the Art Institute of Chicago; Steven K., Assistant Professor in the College of Education at Western Oregon University ~| "The Problems with the Future: Educational Futurism and the Figural Child" Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 48, No. 4, 2014~~** This may seem to lay out a solution for educational futurism in the name of AND , as it must never cease its negation within any given normative framework. ===Part Four is the Framing=== ====The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who provides the best liberation method for the oppressed. Vote on the speech act before the flow - you are an adult and an educator far before you are a Judge.==== Vincent 13 **(Chris. "Re-Conceptualizing Our Performances: Accountability in Lincoln Douglas Debate." Victory Briefs. N.p., 23 Oct. 2013. Web.)** As a community we must re-conceptualize this distinction the performance by the body AND assurance that the educator with the ballot will protect them in those moments. ====The ballot is a performative act – the ballot is a discourse exercising binding power. Every ballot matters – repetition is what confers power onto the performative act. ==== Butler '93 **Butler, noted for her studies on gender and teaches composition and rhetoric at Berkeley, 93 (Dr. Judith, 'Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex') pp. 225 AJG** Performative acts are forms of authoritative speech: most performatives, for instance, are AND "act" emerges in the context of a chain of binding convention. ===Overview=== My argument is that when the we attempt to establish a "good future" for students by eliminating just standardized it does nothing to alleviate the root issue in the squo - that queer suffering and reproductive futurism is the price for small relief from subjugation. Reproductive futurism defines the category of human in the first place, and this discussion comes before material change. The education system is situated in a larger structure of heteronormativity that says only bodies that reproduce matter- that inherently excludes the queer. And, discourse of the future being ensured through small reforms in the education system do nothing for queer folks because we aren't situated towards the future. ===Impact Work=== ====Extend my educational futurism impact – This futurism is the foundation of politics - politics is fundamentally organized around preserving our current ways of life which inevitably forecloses the possibility of queer life. Even if they win that policymaking is good in the abstract we will win that their form of policymaking is bad which should sever the link to their extending arguments.==== **Davis 15** **~~Heather. "Toxic Progeny: The Plastisphere and Other Queer Futures."philoSOPHIA 5.2 (2015): 231-250.~~** Our increasingly nonreproductive future, one filled with the rearrangement of hormonal systems that are AND reduction in fossil fuels, we are confronted with the complete practical denial of ===1AR===
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00 - Contact Info
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C1 Cards Argus 19 Argus Media , "Maduro government eyes turning point", Fri Dec 20 2019, https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2038995-maduro-government-eyes-turning-point?backToResults=true / AandM SS Published date: 20 December 2019 Share: PdV is leaning on joint-venture partners as it looks to continue a nascent crude output revival and live up to an improved economic outlook for 2020 The US sanctions-hit government of Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro aims to turn a corner in its struggle to maintain power, as state-owned PdV tries a new strategy to revive output and dollarisation eases the country's financial woes. PdV is promoting new and revamped joint ventures — mainly with domestic partners — to restore oil output to 1.5mn-2mn b/d in 2020. Among the new ventures is PetroSur, in which PdV subsidiary CVP will partner Cyprus-based Inversiones Petroleras Iberoamericanas (IPI) to develop the Orinoco belt's Junin 10 block, which holds estimated extra-heavy crude reserves of 1.03bn bl. IPI's chief partners include former chairman and chief executive of Spanish firm Repsol, Alfonso Cortina, former Repsol legal affairs adviser Ramon Blanco Balin and Venezuelan investor Alejandro Betancourt, the senior partner at privately owned Venezuelan energy contractor Derwick Associates. The firm will make an initial payment of $400mn to PdV for Junin 10 rights. The block was assigned in 2010 to a PdV joint venture with Chinese state-owned CNPC, but CNPC withdrew in 2014 after PdV failed to meet its share of investment Valderama https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-shops/costco-in-caracas-how-florida-goods-flood-venezuelan-stores-idUSKBN1YK16X “Everything our customers want from the United States, we’ve managed to offer here!” enthused Hector Mambel, who runs a “bodegon” in Puerto Cabello port with a “Mini Walmart” sign outside using the same design as the U.S. giant he buys from. The shift shows how Venezuela’s economy is evolving to survive sanctions that have hit oil exports. The trade from Florida does not violate Trump’s sanctions because they target business with Maduro’s government not with private entrepreneurs. It has, however, bemused some Venezuelans used to constant “anti-imperialist” rhetoric. It was only last year, as the local bolivar currency depreciated precipitously amid hyperinflation, that Maduro lifted a longstanding prohibition on dollar transactions. Economist ‘19 The Economist, 12-18-2019, "More dollars and fewer protests in Venezuela," Economist, https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2019/12/18/more-dollars-and-fewer-protests-in-venezuela, accessed 12-20-2019 //LD Production by?pdvsa, Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, is showing signs of recovery after plunging by three-quarters since 2015. It has signed an agreement with an Indian company to help boost it further and repair refineries. Venezuela gets extra money from selling gold (both from illegal mines and from its reserves) and narcotics. The sanctions have had unintended consequences. Officials whose travel is restricted and whose foreign bank accounts are frozen spend more of their time and money at home, one explanation for the Humboldt blowout. More important, the oil sanctions were enough of a shock to force the government to retreat from socialism. Mr Maduro has lifted nearly all the economic controls first imposed by Hugo Chávez, the charismatic leader of the “Bolivarian revolution”, who died in 2013. Sanctions have “made the government more flexible”, says Luis Oliveros, an economist. It has stopped trying to dictate the exchange rate and control prices. Private firms can now import whatever they choose and set their own prices. Supermarkets in Caracas, nearly empty for much of 2017 and 2018, are again stocked with food. It is not just the rich who can afford it. Perhaps a third of Venezuelans have direct access to remittances from relatives living abroad. Since Mr Maduro took office in 2013 at least 4m people, 12 of the population, have left the country. Venezuelans abroad send back $4bn a year, roughly 3 of?gdp, according to Econoanalitica, a consultancy. This supplements the government’s distribution of food, disproportionately to its supporters, and a discreet aid programme managed by foreign?ngos. Dollars are elbowing aside Venezuela’s bolívar, the world’s most inflation-prone currency. Taxi drivers and cleaning ladies quote prices in dollars, even if they accept payment in bolívares. McDonald’s pays burger-flippers in Caracas a bonus of $20 a month, which is more than treble the minimum wage of 300,000 bolívares ($6). Prices at the Traki department store in central Caracas are in dollars, though the dollar sign itself does not appear on tags. Spaghetti (from Egypt) costs 50 cents for a 400-gram (14-ounce) pack. Queues at the tills suggest that ordinary shoppers can afford it. The value of dollar notes in circulation now exceeds that of bolívares. The Venezuelan currency itself, in which most people are still paid, is not depreciating quite as fast as it was. The government has tightened banks’ reserve requirements. According to the national assembly, the annual inflation rate has dropped from nearly 3m at the beginning of 2019 to 13,475 in November, which is still the highest in the world by far. “Things are a little better than they were last year,” says Héctor Márquez, a mechanic.? Karl A sudden influx of petrodollars are never easy to absorb productively, as Stanford University professor Dr. Terry Lynn Karl, in her landmark book, The Paradox of Plenty, found through her extensive research on petro-states like Venezuela: “Petro-states find themselves incapable of absorbing their surplus, even if they quickly generate new public-sector projects. But, facing the impending threat of massive inflation, worried about depletability, accustomed to seeing the state as the leader in development, and eager to put their new wealth to immediate use, oil governments rely on their standard operating procedures: they reach for large-scale, capital-intensive, long gestation projects, or if such projects are already underway, they increase their sale and accelerate their completion dates. These projects epitomize a resource-base industrialization strategy; they emphasize processing and refining, petrochemicals, and steel. Not surprisingly, in the face of a powerful push to absorb petrodollars rapidly and a general relaxation of fiscal discipline, they are often wasteful and poorly conceived. “The boom not only provokes a grander, oil-led economic model but also simultaneously generates new demands for resources from both the state and civil society. Policymakers, once torn between their twin preoccupations with diversification and equity, now think that they can do both. The military demands modernized weapons and improved living conditions; capitalists seek credit and subsidies; the middle class calls for increased social spending, labor for higher wages, and the unemployed for the creation of jobs. As demands rise, unwieldy and ineffective bureaucracies, suddenly thrust into new roles, find themselves incapable of scaling down expansionist public- sector programs or warding off private-sector requests. Thus they ultimately contribute to growing budget and trade deficits and foreign debt.”7 One of the crucial phrases of the above paragraphs is Dr. Karl’s reference to ‘accustomed to seeing the state as the leader in development’, which, of course, was not the case in Texas or Norway when they struck oil. Abrahams 11 Harlan Abrahams writes in his book Raul Castro and the New Cuba: A Close-Up View of Change in 2011 that the current policy of Gradualism in Cuba also means a transition that includes a definition of private property rights and an emphasis on creating creates social and political institutions—legal, social, and political—that are necessary to provide a positive environment for contracts in a mixed economy. In Cuba, these institutions and the political atmosphere, which are well established in the capitalist developed world, cannot be taken for granted. The experience of transition in the former Soviet Union shows how — without adequate institutions — the policies of rapid privatization and liberalization can become fertile ground for corruption, rent seeking, civil wars, and the growth of political mafias. In contrast, Vietnam and China have demonstrated the value of an incremental approach in the presence of great uncertainties. Hufbauer 14 Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Peterson Institute, 2014 https://books.google.com/books?hl=enandlr=andid=eK1oDQAAQBAJandoi=fndandpg=PP1anddq=economic+normalization+with+cubaandots=qyQOUnWyuXandsig=Wq4OeKXtmCTxUUe_ewct7r_ft50#v=snippetandq=monopolyandf=false C1 - IMPACT Cards Klein 07 Stats on Uruguay’s and Argentina’s liberalization/privatization **NEEDS MORE CUT** Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine, 2007 For a time, the next fix came from other countries in Latin America's Southern Cone, where the Chicago School counterrevolution quickly spread. Brazil was already under the control of a U.S.-supported junta, and several of Friedman's Brazilian students held key positions. Friedman traveled to Brazil in 1973, at the height of the regime's brutality, and declared the economic experiment "a miracle."54 In Uruguay the military had staged a coup in 1973 and the following year decided to go the Chicago route. Lacking sufficient numbers of Uruguayans who had graduated from the University of Chicago, the generals invited "Arnold Harberger and economics professor Larry Sjaastad from the University of Chicago and their team, which included former Chicago students from Argentina, Chile, and Brazil, to reform Uruguay's tax system and commercial policy."55 The effects on Uruguay's previously egalitarian society were immediate: real wages dropped by 28 percent, and hordes of scavengers appeared on the streets of Montevideo for the first time.5 6 Next to join the experiment was Argentina in 1976, when a junta seized power from Isabel Perôn. That meant that Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Brazil—the countries that had been showcases of developmentalism—were now all run by U.S.-backed military governments and were living laboratories of Chicago School economics. According to declassified Brazilian documents just released in March 2007, weeks before the Argentine generals seized power, they contacted Pinochet and the Brazilian junta and "outlined the main steps to be taken by the future regime."57 Despite this close collaboration, Argentina's military government did not go quite as far into neoliberal experimentation as Pinochet had; it did not privatize the country's oil reserves or social security, for instance (that would come later). However, when it came to attacking the policies and institutions that had lifted Argentina's poor into the middle class, the junta faithfully followed Pinochet, thanks in part to the abundance of Argentine economists who had gone through the Chicago program. Argentina's newly minted Chicago Boys landed key economic posts in the junta government—as secretary of finance, president of the central bank and research director for the Treasury Department of the Finance Ministry, as well as several other lower-level economic posts.58 But while the Argentine Chicago Boys were enthusiastic participants in the military government, the top economic job went not to one of them but to José Alfredo Martinez de Hoz. He was part of the landed gentry that belonged to the Sociedad Rural, the cattle-ranchers' association that had long controlled the country's export economy. These families, the closest thing to an aristocracy that Argentina possessed, had liked the feudal economic order just fine —a time when they didn't have to worry about their land being redistributed to peasants or the price of meat being lowered to make sure everyone could eat. Martinez de Hoz had been president of the Sociedad Rural, as had his father and grandfather before him; he also sat on the boards of several multinational corporations, including Pan American Airways and ITT. When he took up his post in the junta government, there was no mistaking the fact that the coup represented a revolt of the elites, a counterrevolution against forty years of gains by Argentina's workers. Martinez de Hoz's first act as minister of the economy was to ban strikes and allow employers to fire workers at will. He lifted price controls, sending the cost of food soaring. He was also determined to make Argentina once again a hospitable place for foreign multinationals. He lifted restrictions on foreign ownership and in the first few years sold off hundreds of state companies. 59 These measures earned him powerful fans in Washington. Declassified documents show William Rogers, assistant secretary of state for Latin America, telling his boss, Henry Kissinger, shortly after the coup that "Martinez de Hoz is a good man. We have been in close consultations throughout." Kissinger was so impressed that he arranged to have a highprofile meeting with Martinez de Hoz when he visited Washington "as a symbolic gesture." He also offered to make a couple of calls to help along Argentina's economic efforts: "I will call David Rockefeller/' Kissinger told the junta's foreign minister, a reference to the president of Chase Manhattan Bank. "And I will call his brother, the Vice President of the United States, Nelson Rockefeller."60 To attract investment, Argentina took out a thirty-one-page advertising supplement in BusinessWeek, produced by the PR giant Burson-Marsteller, declaring that "few governments in history have been as encouraging to private investment. . . . We are in a true social revolution, and we seek partners. We are unburdening ourselves of statism, and believe firmly in the allimportant role of the private sector."*61 Once again, the human impact was unmistakable: within a year, wages lost 40 percent of their value, factories closed, poverty spiraled. Before the junta took power, Argentina had fewer people living in poverty than France or the U.S. —just 9 percent—and an unemployment rate of only 4.2 percent.62 Now the country began to display signs of the underdevelopment thought to have been left behind. Poor neighborhoods were without water, and preventable diseases ran rampant. Gruenwald 19 Grunewald, Rob. “The Connection between Poverty and the Economy | Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.” Minneapolisfed.Org, 2019, www.minneapolisfed.org/article/2006/the-connection-between-poverty-and-the-economy. Accessed 28 Dec. 2019. //AandM SS An October 2005 National Bureau of Economic Research working paper by Hilary Hoynes, Marianne Page and Ann Stevens suggests that while the link has weakened, changes in the unemployment rate and median wages nevertheless predict changes in the poverty rate rather well. The researchers use the U.S. unemployment rate, median wages, a measure for income inequality and region of the country to predict annual changes in poverty rates from 1967 to 2003. Their results imply that an increase in the unemployment rate of 1 percentage point increases the poverty rate by between 0.4 and 0.7 percentage points, while a 1 percent increase in median wages is associated with about a 0.2 percentage point decrease in the poverty rate. The effects were somewhat larger for both variables from 1967 to 1979 and were somewhat smaller from 1990 to 2003, illustrating the weakened effect of macroeconomic variables on poverty rates. Meyer https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/new-poor-latin-america_1.pdf We call them “strugglers”, people living in households in which income per person falls between $4 and $10 per capita per day (at constant 2005 PPP dollar) – well above the international poverty line, but below what we would call the secure middle class. We also refer to them using the word vulnerable, because of evidence that they are at substantial risk of falling into poverty, for example if any household member falls ill or suffers a drop in income because of an economic downturn. We project that in Latin America the struggler group of about 200 million people today will peak at about 250 million in 2030, accounting for the next two to three decades for a steady one-third or so of the total population C2 Cards Wald 16 Wald, Ellen R. “Venezuela’s Melt Down Explained By The ‘Oil Curse.’” Forbes, 16 May 2017, www.forbes.com/sites/ellenrwald/2017/05/16/venezuelas-melt-down-explained-by-the-oil-curse/#25febfcf282b. Accessed 10 Jan. 2020. All of this hunger—for food and for freedom—is entirely unnecessary and is the result of socialism and the oil curse. The oil curse is a concept that economists, political scientists and sociologists use to explain the deleterious economic affects caused by overreliance on revenue from a single natural resource. In Venezuela, the failures of socialism were coupled with the government’s over-reliance on revenue from a single commodity. Venezuela once boasted the world’s largest proven oil reserves plus surplus agricultural production. There was no reason for Venezuela’s economy to collapse, but the government and its central planners became dependent on oil revenue at the expense of food production and other industries. As recently as 2014, West Texas Intermediate oil traded at $90 per barrel. Today it is trading below $50 per barrel. Today, with low oil prices and Venezuela’s inefficient oil production, the country so rich in energy resources has trouble keeping the lights on. Because Venezuela and its socialist government became dependent on oil, it actually destroyed its own food production capacity. The government expropriated farms and related industries, as socialist governments are want to do. Without private ownership and without a focus on food production, the country’s food dwindled. Crop farmers could not obtain pesticides from now-government-owned chemical companies, animal farmers could not obtain feed from crop farmers, and food ran short. The government stole the people’s incentive to produce when they nationalized their businesses, and then the government ignored food production because it thought it could rely on oil riches. In 2014, when oil prices were high, Venezuela’s GDP per capita was equivalent to 13,750 USD. One year later, with dropping oil prices, it had fallen 7. The concept of an oil curse is that a country—typically an autocratic country with centralized planning—becomes reliant on oil and ignores its other industries. The oil revenue feeds government coffers and secures the government’s position of power. Over time, according to the concept, the rest of the country’s economy atrophies and the government becomes entrenched at the expense of the people’s liberty. When oil prices inevitably fall, the economy is not positioned to survive. Most scholars saw the oil curse as a problem in the Middle East, but it has never been so clearly evidenced as it is now in Venezuela. Eaton 19 Eaton, Collin. “Explainer: U.S. Sanctions and Venezuela’s Trade and Oil Industry Partners.” U.S., Reuters, 14 Aug. 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-crude-sanctions-ex/explainer-u-s-sanctions-and-venezuelas-trade-and-oil-industry-partners-idUSKCN1V420P. Accessed 10 Jan. 2020. In January the United States imposed sanctions on Venezuela’s most important global business - producing and selling crude oil, which accounts for more than 95 percent of the country’s export revenue. U.S. refineries had been Venezuela’s top customer, and output has fallen by some 40 percent since then. The United States and many Western governments have recognized Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaido as the country’s rightful head of state. Oil industry sources warned that if Washington follows through on its threat to sanction non-U.S. companies that do business with state oil company PDVSA, production could collapse further - increasing the squeeze on Maduro. HOW MUCH CRUDE AND REFINED PRODUCTS IS IT EXPORTING? Venezuela exported nearly 933,000 bpd of crude and refined products in July, down 17.5 from June, according to data from PDVSA and Refinitiv Eikon. Exports sank 40 in February, the first full month after the sanctions were imposed. The January sanctions prevented U.S. companies from dealing with PDVSA, and a clause that became effective in April blocked PDVSA from operating in the U.S. financial system. The asset freeze announced in early August threatens sanctions against any company deemed by Washington to be “materially assisting” Venezuela’s government. While the January sanctions included similar language, U.S. national security adviser John Bolton last week said the new round gave companies a choice between doing business with Maduro or the United States. That has spooked PDVSA’s joint venture partners and customers, who are seeking clarity on the measure, sources said. Cohen 19 Cohen, Luc. “Exclusive: Weakened by Sanctions, Venezuela’s PDVSA Cedes Oilfield Operations to Foreign Firms.” U.S., Reuters, 4 Jan. 2020, www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-oil-ramirez/exclusive-weakened-by-sanctions-venezuelas-pdvsa-cedes-oilfield-operations-to-foreign-firms-idUSKBN1Z221R. Accessed 10 Jan. 2020. (Reuters) - Venezuelan state company PDVSA is letting some joint venture partners take over the day-to-day operation of oilfields as its own capacity dwindles due to sanctions and a lack of cash and staff, according to a former oil minister, an opposition lawmaker and industry sources. Crude production by PDVSA and its joint ventures has fallen to about a third of its peak 20 years ago. The steepest fall has occurred since military officials with no oil industry experience took over PDVSA’s management in late 2017 and Washington imposed sanctions on the state-run company in early 2019 in a bid to oust socialist President Nicolas Maduro. Maduro’s government and the opposition last year discussed allowing partners in PDVSA-led joint ventures to operate the oilfields, which would reverse a legal requirement that PDVSA control the operations. That could give Maduro more breathing room by encouraging fresh investment in PDVSA’s operations, potentially boosting oil revenues. However, it would be controversial after late President Hugo Chavez, an iconic figure to many Venezuelans, made nationalization a flagship policy. Rafael Ramirez, a former oil minister and PDVSA president who left office after clashing with Maduro in 2014, said the company had already effectively handed control to joint venture partners even though an agreement had not yet been formally reached. Ramirez, an adviser to some international energy firms that have recently worked in Venezuela, said PDVSA had been reduced to little more than an administrator of contracts with oil companies. “PDVSA is no longer producing. It’s signing contracts for others to produce in a de facto privatization,” Ramirez told Reuters during an interview at a location he requested not be disclosed. Slav 18 Slav, Irina. “Venezuela Plans to Return Oil Contracts with Private Companies - Business Insider.” Business Insider, Business Insider, 15 Sept. 2018, www.businessinsider.com/oil-price-venezuela-return-oil-contracts-with-private-company-2018-9. Accessed 10 Jan. 2020.? Venezuela is handing over oil fields to private companies for the first time since the 1990s. Venezuela has agreed to hand over at least seven oil fields to private companies to boost oil output, Reuters reported. Similar plans were last used in the 1990s before the Chavez era that made PDVSA the one and only operator of oil fields. Most companies, Reuters says, are oilfield service providers, which means they don’t necessarily have oil production experience. Caracas is preparing the return of oil contracts with private companies that were last used in the 1990s before the Chavez era that made PDVSA the one and only operator of oil fields. Reuters reported this week it had seen a draft of the contract stipulating the state oil company will give control over several fields to a set of local companies for a period of six years. The companies will have to commit to boosting production, funding field maintenance, and purchasing whatever equipment they need to do all this. In exchange, PDVSA will pay them a fee for the oil they extract. Erika Weinthal Weinthal, Erika, and Pauline Jones Luong. “Combating the Resource Curse: An Alternative Solution to Managing Mineral Wealth.” Perspectives on Politics, vol. 4, no. 01, 24 Feb. 2006, pdfs.semanticscholar.org/3a52/77ec03ba0f1afe594da2641366f900521105.pdf, 10.1017/s1537592706060051. Accessed 10 Jan. 2020. Despite the emerging consensus that robust political institutions are the determining factor in successful efforts to disrupt the link between mineral wealth and the aforementioned negative outcomes, we know little about how to build such institutions. We suggest one possible way— domestic private ownership. Domestic private ownership is rarely discussed in the literature and, when discussed, it often is maligned. Our research indicates, however, that it would foster institutions that more effectively constrain state leaders, encourage them to invest in institution building, and enable them to respond more successfully to commodity booms and busts. Mallett 17 Mallett-Outtrim, Ryan. “Venezuela’s ANC Calls for Economic Diversification.” Venezuelanalysis.Com, 10 Aug. 2017, venezuelanalysis.com/news/13301. Accessed 10 Jan. 2020. Venezuela’s national constituent assembly called Wednesday for an end to the country’s dependence on oil, and a diversification of the economy. The head of the constituent assembly (ANC) Delcy Rodriguez highlighted Venezuela’s dependence on oil as one of the biggest challenges facing the country, describing it as an economic “straight jacket”. “We are committed to the diversification of the economy to break with the rentier model,” Rodriguez said. She continued, “This is a cultural problem facing Venezuela and we must overcome it, that is why the role of the constituent assembly is fundamental.” The comments were made during the first joint meeting of the ANC with the National Council for a Productive Economy, which has been touted as an effort to reform the country's economy and boost productivity.Rodriguez didn’t go into details of how the ANC could promote economic diversification, but emphasised that oil cannot continue to be the basis of the economy. “The drop in oil prices is used as a tool of political attack,” she said, accusing the US of being behind an “economic war” to oust President Nicolas Maduro. Reiterating long-standing claims from Maduro, she said Venezuela had become the victim of economic sabotage, which creates "speculation that translates into un-productivity," to "annihilate the productive forces of Venezuela”. Orinoco Mail 19 “Venezuela Crea Instituto Marca País Para El Desarrollo Del Comercio y Turismo Internacional – Correo Del Orinoco.” Correodelorinoco.Gob.Ve, 2019, www.correodelorinoco.gob.ve/venezuela-crea-instituto-marca-pais-para-el-desarrollo-del-comercio-y-turismo-internacional/. Accessed 10 Jan. 2020. Venezuela creates the Country Brand Institute for the development of international trade and tourism. The president of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, on Monday launched the launch of the Country Brand Institute, which will aim to govern the process of promoting the Venezuelan brand and the development of diversified foreign trade, as well as international relations, within the framework of a strategy that will allow diversifying tourism, exports and investments. From the Hotel Alba Caracas, he explained that this new start-up must be new in its methods and communication capacity to direct the process of promoting the Country Brand, in the world. "It is a large agglutinating agency for investments, tourism development, diversified external trade and the development of international relations," he said on national radio and television broadcast. He said that this global promotion mechanism concentrates key elements such as the sum of the spiritual, cultural and natural beauties and riches as well as the patriotic and pacifist gentilicio that collapse lies and raise the truth about Venezuela. «I hope that newspapers and social networks boil with a little of the light that shines and emanates from the truth of Venezuela, let's do the work, work the way. Rivas 18 Rivas, Juan. “Economic Crisis in Venezuela Takes Toll on Agriculture Sector.” CGTN America, 20 Oct. 2018, america.cgtn.com/2018/10/19/economic-crisis-in-venezuela-takes-toll-on-agriculture-sector. Accessed 10 Jan. 2020.? Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro has unrolled a new plan to tackle the agricultural crisis. He said the government will invest 1.2 billion dollars toward agricultural projects. “ It is important to create a special and specific fund for the entire agricultural sector, a fund exclusively dedicated to the purchase of the necessary seeds, which will allow us to grow what we need from 2018 to 2019.” That plan will come too late for many of the farmers in this small community. Farfán said nearly a quarter of the families in the valley have given up farming and moved away… either to the big city or out of the country. But he said as long as he’s able, he’ll continue to go out to the fields to grow food to put on his family’s table. WTO 19 AID FOR TRADE AT A GLANCE 2019: ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION AND EMPOWERMENT - © OECD, WTO 2019/aid4trade19_chap5_e.pdf, 10.1787/888933953413. Accessed 10 Jan. 2020. link CTRL F ‘Venezuela’ for the chart Diversification helps to manage volatility and provide a more stable path for equitable growth and development. Successful diversification is all the more important now in the wake of slowing global growth and the imperative in many developing countries to increase the number and quality of jobs. Pettinger of Oxford Tejvan Pettinger. “Venezuela Economy and Oil Dependency - Economics Help.” Economicshelp.Org, 3 Mar. 2015, www.economicshelp.org/blog/13071/economics/venezuela-economy-and-oil-dependency/. Accessed 10 Jan. 2020. Firstly, Venezuela is not unique. Many countries specialise in oil and then later come to regret this specialisation. I have a Russian student who is asking exactly the same question – Why did Russia not take the opportunity to diversify away from gas and oil. (see: Russian economic crisis) The problem is that when oil prices are high, it’s tempting to take advantage of the high revenues. Anything else seems much less profitable. Secondly, people may make the assumption oil prices will remain high – so they have plenty of time before needing to diversify the economy. If you have vast reserves, then in the short term, oil production offers the quickest way to promote economic prosperity, higher tax revenues and higher government spending. By comparison, at the time, manufacturing and agriculture will offer much smaller returns and potential for exports. Why not diversify the economy? It is easy to say than do. If you have an economy that has a highly profitable oil industry, it is difficult to develop new manufacturing industries. This is for a few reasons. The profitable oil industry will be attracting most investment and skilled labour. Entrepreneurs will be reluctant to create new industries, where Venezuela doesn’t seem to have a comparative advantage; the prospect of profit is low and there is no guarantee they will be able to create new industries. Trying to work in the oil industry may seem more appealing and profitable. The government, in theory, could try to diversify the economy. They could tax the oil industry and use the proceeds to subsidise the creation of new manufacturing industry. However, around the world, governments don’t have a great track record of ‘setting up new industries’ – The government is not expert in manufacturing and so it may struggle to decide which industries to create and where to spend money. There is no guarantee the government efforts to subsidise new industries will bear any fruit. Many governments would prefer to take the easier option of benefiting from the boom in the oil industry and hope the oil price stays high. Eaton 19 Eaton, Collin. “Explainer: U.S. Sanctions and Venezuela’s Trade and Oil Industry Partners.” U.S., Reuters, 14 Aug. 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-crude-sanctions-ex/explainer-u-s-sanctions-and-venezuelas-trade-and-oil-industry-partners-idUSKCN1V420P. Accessed 10 Jan. 2020. Venezuela has stepped up shipments of gold to other countries, sending more than $900 million to Turkey in 2018, according to Turkish government data and trade reports. Caracas is using some proceeds from those sales to buy Turkish consumer goods, according to opposition legislator Carlos Paparoni. Turkish pasta and powdered milk are now staples in Maduro’s subsidized food program. Trade between the two nations grew eightfold last year.
903,879
365,043
378,988
NEG v1
Contention 1 is Medical Tourism Medical Tourism is big. Chantal Da Silva, Newsweek, "Thousands of Americans are Crossing the Border Into Mexico Every Year to Get Affordable Medical Treatment", 5/18/19, https://www.newsweek.com/thousands-americans-cross-border-mexico-affordable-medical-treatment-each-1426943#:~:text=Hundreds20of20thousands20of20Americans,as2022medical20tourism2220say Hundreds of thousands a private affair. The industry is boomin’ Legal Team Mexico, BizLatin Hub, "HOW US EXPATS AND MEDICAL TOURISM ARE MAKING THE MEXICAN MEDICAL ECONOMY BOOM", October 9, 2017, https://www.bizlatinhub.com/medical-tourism-boom/#:~:text=As20of20last20year2C20more,billion20USD20in20just202016. In the to grow further. Medicare for All removes this incentive and a crucial part of Mexico’s economy overnight. Medical Tourism is essential for poverty reduction and the economic stability of Mexico. Jorge Garza-Rodriguez, Sustainability, "Tourism and Poverty Reduction in Mexico: An ARDL Cointegration Approach", 5 January 2019, https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/11/3/845/pdf The objective of to this metric 15. This economic instability and downturn is devastating. Andrea Jones-Rooy, FiveThirtyEight, "How A Weakened Mexican Economy Could Threaten U.S. Security", February 28 2017, https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-a-weakened-mexican-economy-could-threaten-u-s-security/ But there’s a the Zika outbreak. C2 is Innovation . Unbalanced government negotiations through Medicare-for-All would lead to drastic price cuts for prescription drugs. Alex Lawson, CommonDreams, "Medicare for All Will Drastically Lower Prescription Drug Prices by Taking on Pharma’s Greed", March 1, 2019, https://www.commondreams.org/views/2019/03/01/medicare-all-will-drastically-lower-prescription-drug-prices-taking-pharmas-greed Rep. Pramila Jayapal’s a competitive license. Price controls ruin biomedical innovation which is especially crucial in solving the Coronavirus pandemic. John Stanford, Wall Street Journal, "Price Controls Would Throttle Biomedical Innovation", July 1, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/price-controls-would-throttle-biomedical-innovation-11593625880 The speed with dreaming up today. Coronavirus is deadly and rapidly spreading. Johannesburg, Boston Globe, "Virus deaths top 600,000 as pandemic finds fresh legs", July 19, 2020, https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2020/07/19/virus-deaths-top-pandemic-finds-fresh-legs/fGtGkuvo23mrqyeKoZFQJM/story.html Confirmed global deaths United States alone. COVID-19 impacts people outside of health. Oxfam, ReliefWeb, "12,000 people per day could die from Covid-19 linked hunger by end of year, potentially more than the disease, warns Oxfam", July 9, 2020, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/12000-people-day-could-die-covid-19-linked-hunger-end-year-potentially-more-disease As many as and declining aid. Contention 3 is Debt Medicare For All places all healthcare costs on the government thus, the budget would have to double to fund the plan Charles Blahous. “The Costs of a National Single-Payer Healthcare System.” Mercatus Working Paper, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Arlington, VA, July 2018.https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/blahous-costs-medicare-mercatus-working-paper-v1_1.pdf The cost of domestic discretionary spending. Medicare for All would be funded by debt, as taxes are politically unfeasible STEVE CHAPMAN, Chicago Tribune, "Column: Democrats and Republicans don’t disagree on everything: Both parties want to spend like there’s no tomorrow", NOV 01, 2019 AT 2:30 PM, https://www.chicagotribune.com/columns/steve-chapman/ct-column-medicare-warren-tax-cut-chapman-20191101-5gdv4wf7vjdqdjtey74p7lmrmu-story.html The bipartisan Committee like fiscal austerity. Rising debt leads to a rising number of bonds Hicks, Coryanne. “How the National Debt Affects You.” US News. Sept. 2018. https://money.usnews.com/investing/investing101/articles/how-the-national-debt-affects-you More government bonds only a burden More U.S. bonds on the market detracts investment from emerging market economies. James Capretta, RealClear Policy, "US Debt 'Double Whammy' Unsettles Emerging Markets", July 19, 2018, https://www.realclearpolicy.com/articles/2018/07/19/us_debt_double_whammy_unsettles_emerging_markets_110718.html Writing in the a course correction. Emerging markets borrow in dollars. Mayra Valladares, Forbes, "Emerging Market Borrowing Is Breaking Records", March 5 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/mayrarodriguezvalladares/2019/03/05/emerging-market-borrowing-is-breaking-records/#2b6f73893220 In early February and non-banks. This outflow of investment is devastating as emerging markets are now unable to finance spending as dollars leave their country. One debt default causes all emerging markets to follow. Turkey demonstrates the path emerging markets are following. Jim Edwards, Business Insider, "The crisis in Turkey is being caused by the US Fed, and we are only at the beginning", August 15, 2018, https://www.businessinsider.com/turkey-lira-crisis-caused-by-the-us-fed-2018-8 As the Fed countries like them. History proves as, Jeff Cox, CNBC, "That $22 trillion national debt number is huge, but here’s what it really means", February 13, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/13/that-22-trillion-national-debt-number-is-huge-but-heres-what-it-really-means.html Total debt compared quarter of 2001. While the U.S. increased their debt, the developing world suffered. Jubilee Debt Campaign JDC, "‘Don’t turn the clock back’: Analysing the risks of the lending boom to impoverished countries", October 2014, https://jubileedebt.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Lending-boom-research_10.14.pdf Large debt payment million by 1993.
903,924
365,044
328,430
SEPOCT - CP - SAT For All
====Counterplan Text: the 50 states and all relevant territories should:==== adopt a universal requirement that every high school student take a standardized college admissions test, free of charge and during school hours, require high schools to administer universal mandatory practice exams in preparation for such tests, ====Solves inequality==== **Wai et al 19 **(*Jonathan Wai, Prof of education policy at UArkansas, **Matt Brown, psychological scientist at Geisenger Health System, ***Christopher Chabris, psychological scientist at Geisenger Health System, "No one likes the SAT. It's still the fairest thing about admissions." Washington Post, Mar 22, 2019 https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/no-one-likes-the-sat-its-still-the-fairest-thing-about-admissions/2019/03/22/5fa67a16-4c00-11e9-b79a-961983b7e0cd_story.html) EE It remains true that white and Asian students score higher on average than those of AND testing in the college application and admission process, not throw it out. ====Solves better – empirics==== **Dynarski 18 **(Susan M. Dynarski, Prof of Public Policy, Education, and Economics @ UMich "ACT/SAT for all: A cheap, effective way to narrow income gaps in college" Brookings, 2-8-2018, https://www.brookings.edu/research/act-sat-for-all-a-cheap-effective-way-to-narrow-income-gaps-in-college/) EE Consider the ACT and SAT. These entrance exams are required for admission to virtually AND these tests is voluntary, many talented, disadvantaged students will go undetected.
851,676
365,045
328,454
SEPOCT - CP - USFG
====CP Text: the United States federal government should ban standardized tests considered in undergraduate admissions decisions by colleges and universities. It solves the aff since the tests can’t be considered if they don’t exist. It doesn’t link to antitrust since it’s the USFG. The perm links to antitrust since it still fiats colleges take the action uniformly at the same time.====
851,691
365,046
328,501
SEPOCT - T - Nebel Tests v2
====Interpretation: The aff must defend that colleges and universities in the United States ought to consider no standardized tests for undergraduate admissions. ==== ====The upward entailment test determines whether a bare plural is existential==== Leslie 16 ~~Sarah Jane Leslie, Ph.D., Princeton, 2007) is the dean of the Graduate School and Class of 1943 Professor of Philosophy. She has previously served as the vice dean for faculty development in the Office of the Dean of the Faculty, director of the Program in Linguistics, and founding director of the Program in Cognitive Science at Princeton University.~~"Generic Generalizations (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," No Publication, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/ 4-24-2016 RE There are some tests that are helpful in distinguishing these two readings. For example AND lawn (Lawler 1973; Laca 1990; Krifka et al. 1995). ====First, "Standardized tests" is existential because it passes the upward entailment test. The sentence "colleges ought to consider the SAT and ACT" passes the upward entailment test since it entails the sentence that "colleges ought to consider standardized tests."==== ====Second, the resolution saying "ought not" means that colleges ought to consider no standardized tests. For example, the sentence "unicycles have wheels" means that each unicycle has one wheel. The sentence "unicycles do not have wheels" means that each unicycle has no wheels. This is because the negation of an existential statement i.e. "it's not the case that some do" is a universal statement i.e. "all of them don't". ==== ====Violation – SAT ACT==== ====Vote neg:==== ====1~~ Limits and ground – they can spec any of 26 combos of tests including SAT, ACT, TOEFL, APs and Subject SATs – it wrecks neg prep since there's marginal differences in the advantage but it takes out ground like AP college credits or TOEFL English skills which are some of the few neg generics when affs spec colleges==== ====2~~ TVA solves: read your aff as an advantage under a whole res aff. We don't prevent new FWs, mechanisms, colleges, or advantages. PICs don't solve – it leads to absurd conclusions that since the neg could potentially be abusive the aff is justified in flat-out not being T, which leads to infinite abuse in justifying aff abuse.====
851,707
365,047
328,563
1 - Disclosure
Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all constructive positions on open source with highlighting on the 2019-20 NDCA LD wiki after the round in which they read them. Interpretation: For each position on their corresponding 2019-20 NDCA LD wiki page, debaters must disclose a summary of each analytic argument in their cases. Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all possible disclosure theory interps on the 2019-20 NDCA LD wiki at least 30 minutes before the round. Interpretation: Debaters must only read broken positions that are disclosed with tags, citations, and first and last three words of all cards on the 2019-2020 NDCA Wiki under their own name at least 30 minutes before the round. Interpretation: Debaters must disclose round reports on the 2019-20 NDCA LD wiki for every round they have debated this season. Round reports disclose which positions (AC, NC, K, T, Theory, etc.) were read/gone for in every speech.
851,738
365,048
328,578
2 - K - Berlant
====The aff’s commitment to attaching ourselves to structures outside of ourselves replicates the same affect of belonging that maintains liberalism. Their optimistic belief that merely changing the way that society is structured can lead to some change promotes the same obstacle to one’s desires. We should not try to confirm the system by trying to change the system but rather turn inwards to confirm of the centrality of our own desires. ==== **Berlant**, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, **‘11** ~~Lauren, Cruel Optimism, Duke University Press, pg. 223-228, 2011, RSR~~ Intensely political seasons spawn reveries of a different immediacy. People imagine alternative environments where authenticity trumps ideology, truths cannot be concealed, and communication feels intimate, face-to face. In these times, even politicians imagine occupying a post–public sphere public where they might just somehow make an unmediated transmission to the body politic. "Somehow you just got to go over the heads of the filter and speak directly to the people," then- President George W. Bush commented in October 2003, echoing a long tradition of sentimental political fantasies and soon followed by condemnations of the "filter" by the Republican National Committee and the presidential campaign of John McCain and Sarah Palin.1 What is "the filter" that demands circumnavigation? Bush seems to be inverting the meaning of his own, mixed, metaphor. A filter, after all, separates out noise from communication and, in so doing, makes communication possible. Jacques Attali and Michel Serres have both argued that there is no communication without noise, as noise interferes from within any utterance, threatening its tractability.2 The performance of distortion that constitutes communication therefore demands discernment, or filtering. However steadfast one’s commitment to truth, there is no avoiding the noise. Yet Bush’s wish to skirt the filter points to something profound in the desire for the political. He wants to transmit not the message but the noise. He wants the public to feel the funk, the live intensities and desires that make messages affectively immediate, seductive, and binding.3 In his head a public’s binding to the political is best achieved neither by policy nor ideology but the affect of feeling political together, an effect of having communicated true feeling without the distancing mediation of speech.4 The transmission of noise performs political attachment as a sustaining intimate relation, without which great dramas of betrayal are felt and staged. In The Ethical Soundscape, Charles Hirschkind talks about the role of "maieutic listening" in constructing the intimate political publics of Egypt.5 There, the feeling tones of the affective soundscape produce attachments to and investments in a sense of political and social mutuality that is performed in moments of collective audition. This process involves taking on listening together as itself an object/scene of desire. The attainment of that attunement produces a sense of shared worldness, apart from whatever aim or claim the listening public might later bring to a particular political world because of what they have heard. From Hirschkind’s perspective the social circulation of noise, of affective binding, converts the world to a space of moral action that seems juxtapolitical— proximate to, without being compromised by, the instrumentalities of power that govern social life.6 Speaking above the filter would confirm to Bush’s whole listening audience that they already share an affective environment; mobilizing "the ethical and therapeutic virtues of the ear"7 would accomplish the visceral transmission of his assurance not only that he has made a better good life possible for Americans and humans around the globe, but that, affectively speaking, there is already a better sensorial world right here, right now, more intimate and secure and just as real as the world made by the media’s anxiogenic sensationalist analysis. This vision locates the desire for the political in an alternative commons in the present that the senses confirm and circulate as though without mediation. What exactly is the problem with "the filter"? The contemporary filtered or mediated political sphere in the United States transmits news 24/7 from a new ordinary created by crisis, in which life seems reduced to discussions about tactics for survival and who is to blame. The filter tells you that the public has entered a historical situation whose contours it does not know. It impresses itself upon mass consciousness as an epochal crisis, unfolding like a disaster film made up of human- interest stories and stories about institutions that have lost their way.8 It is a moment on the verge of a postnormative phase, in which fantasmatic clarities about the conditions for enduring collectivity, historical continuity, and infrastructural stability have melted away, along with predictable relations between event and effect. Living amidst war and environmental disaster, people are shown constantly being surprised at what does and does not seem to have a transformative impact. Living amid economic crisis, people are shown constantly being surprised at the amount, location, and enormity of moral and affective irregulation that come from fading rules of accountability and recognition. What will govern the terms and relations of reliable reciprocity among governments, intimates, workers, owners, churches, citizens, political parties, or strangers? What forms of life will secure the sense of affective democracy that people have been educated to expect from their publics? Nobody knows. The news about the recent past and the pressures of the near future demand constant emergency cleanup and hyperspeculation about what it means to live in the ongoing present among piles of cases where things didn’t work out or seem to make sense, at least not yet. There are vigils; there is witnessing, testimony, and yelling. But there is not yet a consensual rubric that would shape these matters into an event. The affective structure of the situation is therefore anxious and the political emotions attached to it veer wildly from recognition of the enigma that is clearly there to explanations that make sense, the kind of satisfying sense that enables enduring. Uncertainty is the material that Bush wished to bracket. His desire for a politics of ambient noise, prepropositional transmission, and intuitive reciprocity sought to displace the filtered story of instability and contradiction from the center of sociality. He also wishfully banished self- reflexive, cultivated opinion and judgment from their central public- sphere function. In short, as Jacques Rancière would put it, Bush’s wishful feeling was to separate the political from politics as such.9 In so doing he would cast the ongoing activity of social antagonism to the realm of the epiphenomenal, in contrast to which the affective feedback loop of the political would make stronger the true soul- to- soul continuity between politicians and their public. Foucault used to call "sexuality" that noisy affectivity that Bush wanted to transmit from mouth to ear, heart to heart, gut to gut.10 From his perspective, at least, the political is best lodged in the appetites. These are not politically tendentious observations. Perhaps when Bush uttered his desire for affective communication to be the medium of the political, he was trying cynically to distract the public gaze from some of his particular actions. But the wish to inhabit a vaguely warm sense of alreadyestablished, autonomic, and atmospheric solidarity with the body politic is hardly his special desire. Indeed, in his preference for the noise of immediacy, he has many bedfellows in the body politic with whom he shares little else politically, namely, the ones who prefer political meetings in town halls, caucuses, demonstrations, and other intimate assemblies to the pleasure of disembodied migratory identification that constitutes mass publics. He also joins his antagonists in the nondominant classes who have long produced intimate publics to provide the feeling of immediacy and solidarity by establishing in the public sphere an affective register of belonging to inhabit when there are few adequate normative institutions to fall back on, rest in, or return to. Public spheres are always affect worlds, worlds to which people are bound, when they are, by affective projections of a constantly negotiated common interestedness. But an intimate public is more specific. In an intimate public one senses that matters of survival are at stake and that collective mediation through narration and audition might provide some routes out of the impasse and the struggle of the present, or at least some sense that there would be recognition were the participants in the room together.11 An intimate public promises the sense of being held in its penumbra. You do not need to audition for membership in it. Minimally, you need just to perform audition, to listen and to be interested in the scene’s visceral impact.12 You might have been drawn to it because of a curiosity about something minor, unassociated with catastrophe, like knitting or collecting something, or having a certain kind of sexuality, only after which it became a community of support, offering tones of suffering, humor, and cheerleading. Perhaps an illness led to seeking out a community of survival tacticians. In either case, any person can contribute to an intimate public a personal story about not being defeated by what is overwhelming. More likely, though, participants take things in and sometimes circulate what they hear, captioning them with opinion or wonder. But they do not have to do anything to belong. They can be passive and lurk, deciding when to appear and disappear, and consider the freedom to come and go the exercise of sovereign freedom. Indeed, in liberal societies, freedom includes freedom from the obligation to pay attention to much, whether personal or political—no- one is obliged to be conscious or socially active in their modes and scenes of belonging. For many this means that political attention is usually something delegated and politics is something overheard, encountered indirectly and unsystematically, through a kind of communication more akin to gossip than to cultivated rationality.13 But there is nothing fundamentally passive or superficial in overhearing the political. What hits a person encountering the dissemination of news about power has nothing to do with how thorough or cultivated their knowledge is or how they integrate the impact into living. Amidst all of the chaos, crisis, and injustice in front of us, the desire for alternative filters that produce the sense—if not the scene—of a more livable and intimate sociality is another name for the desire for the political. This is why an intimate attachment to the political can amount to a relation of cruel optimism. I have argued throughout this book that an optimistic attachment is cruel when the object/scene of desire is itself an obstacle to fulfilling the very wants that bring people to it: but its life- organizing status can trump interfering with the damage it provokes. It may be a relation of cruel optimism, when, despite an awareness that the normative political sphere appears as a shrunken, broken, or distant place of activity among elites, members of the body politic return periodically to its recommitment ceremonies and scenes. Voting is one thing; collective caring, listening, and scanning the airwaves, are others. All of these modes of orientation and having a feeling about it confirm our attachment to the system and thereby confirm the system and the legitimacy of the affects that make one feel bound to it, even if the manifest content of the binding has the negative force of cynicism or the dark attenuation of political depression. How and why does this attachment persist? Is it out of habit? Is it in hopes of the potentiality embedded in the political as such? Or, from a stance of critical engagement, an investment in the possibility of its repair? The exhausting repetition of the politically depressed position that seeks repair of what may be constitutively broken can eventually split the activity of optimism from expectation and demand.14 Maintaining this split enables one to sustain one’s attachment to the political as such and to one’s sense of membership in the idea of the polity, which is a virtual—but sensual, not abstract—space of the commons. And so, detaching from it could induce many potential losses along with new freedoms. Grant Farred calls fidelity to the political without expectation of recognition, representation, or return a profoundly ethical act.15 His exemplary case derives from voting patterns of African Americans in the 2004 presidential election, but the anxiety about the costs of this ethical commitment has only increased with the election of Barack Obama as the President of the emotional infrastructure of the United States as well as of its governing and administrative ones.16 What is the relation between the "Yes We Can!" optimism for the political and how politics actually works? What is the effect of Obama’s optimization of political optimism against the political depression of the historically disappointed, especially given any President’s limited sovereignty as a transformative agent in ordinary life? How can we track the divergences between politically orchestrated emotions and their affective environments? Traditionally, political solidarity is a more of a structure than a feeling—an identification with other people who are similarly committed to a project that does not require affective continuity or warm personal feeling to sustain itself. But maintaining solidarity requires skills for adjudicating incommensurate visions of the better good life. The atrophy of these skills is at risk when politics is reduced to the demand for affective attunement, insofar as the sense of belonging is threatened by the inconvenience of antagonistic aims. Add to this the possibility that "the political" as we know it in mass democracy requires such a splitting of attachment and expectation. Splitting off political optimism from the way things are can sustain many kinds of the cruelest optimism. ====whether they know it or not, the aff is performing to satisfy white subconscious fantasies of black abjection – this puts white people at a comfortable distance from suffering and satisfies their hidden desire to see blacks in pain==== **Hook 13 ** (Derek, prof @ birkbeck college, university of London, The racist bodily imaginary: The image of the body-in-pieces in (post)apartheid culture, Subjectivity Vol. 6, No. 3, 254–271) One of the great strengths of Fanon’s (1952/1986) Black Skin White Masks lies precisely in its apparent exaggerations, which show how adept the young Fanon was, amidst his early enthusiasm for psychoanalysis, in reading white fantasy. Fanon uses the imagery of the black body being broken apart, burnt, cut, exploded, eviscerated, describing such scenes with the notion of ‘corporeal malediction’.3 He was obviously deeply affected by accounts of lynching and related forms of physical racist violence, but his disturbingly eloquent descriptions, articulated in the vocabulary of phenomenology and psychoanalysis, go further than this. He taps into the just ‘beneath the surface’ imaginary quality of racist fantasy. Fantasy of this sort is not readily assumed or ‘owned’ by the subject. It is not openly spoken of, or effectively ‘subjectivized’; quite the contrary, the experiencing subject might be surprised, even repelled by the fantasy if it is rendered too clearly, in overly explicit forms. Nor for that matter is the fantasy wholly unconscious; it is more like a latent schema of understanding, a subliminal frame of apprehension through which black otherness comes to be understood.¶ Fanon (1952/1986) is also profoundly aware of the idealizing aspect of such fantasies. These idealizations are entwined with stereotyping caricatures, so that apparently admirable qualities become reduced to racial vices: the perception of economic industriousness is thus transformed into ‘the Jew’s love of money’ (for detailed elaboration of Fanon’s argument, see Hook, 2011). What this postulate brings to light is the possibility that the (post)apartheid preoccupation with the black body-in-pieces maintains a ‘co-representative’, an additional fantasmatic component. I have in mind here the notion of the black body as strong, impervious, possessed of a formidable and superior physicality. This stereotypical trait, which might be recognized variously in irrational attributions of athleticism, bodily strength, vitality and natural physical endowment, is of course a well-known trope of racism also in British and US contexts (St Louis, 2005; Stuart, 2005). The black body here becomes – perhaps unexpectedly – ‘phallic’: an emblem of strength, of power, of what the white subject has lost, or stands to lose.¶ Our tentative analysis thus points to a twofold schema, an antinomy of fantasy. On the one hand: the phallic corporeality of black corporeality, the black body as epitome of physicality, as icon of vitality, as body in apotheosis. Yet, in contrast to such (distorted) idealizations, these bodies remain in perpetual proximity to death, to suffering; they are pictured in terrible states of duress, of dismemberment and violence that the white subject can never quite imagine for themselves. The fantasmatic black body exists thus in two irreconcilable scenes: as site of destruction (the body-in-pieces), and as image of physical perfection, bodily exultation, site of exaggerated vitality. Body in extremis coincides thus with the body in excelsis.¶ Such a complex of coinciding images makes for fertile terrain within the racist (or racialized) imaginary, and affords a variety of dynamic explanations. One may understand the alternating components of this complex, this racist ‘archetype’, along the lines suggested by Mbembe’s (2001) discussion of the body of the colonized, in which an exaggerated physicality eradicates properties of agency, spiritual elevation and humanity:¶ ~~I~~n the colony the body of the colonized individual is considered, in its profanity, one object among others. Indeed, being no more than a ‘body- thing’, it is neither the substrate nor the affirmation of any mind or spirit ... His cadaver remains lying on the earth in a sort of unshakable rigidity, a material mass and a simple, inert object, condemned in the position of that which plays no role at all. (Mbembe, 2001, pp. 26–27)¶ What is particularly useful about Mbembe’s contribution is that it links many of the above psychoanalytic theorizations of the body to a more overtly political dimension, that of key notions within the philosophy of colonial subjugation.4 These ideas link back to a longstanding Fanonian theme: the delegation of the bodily. This is the idea that the crass corporeality of the body that a particular (racial/class) group disavows is projected upon another group, who is thus consigned to the position of abject racial other.¶ Fanon’s concern is primarily with white attributions of the hyper-sexuality of blacks, but we may extrapolate his idea to include the facet of excess corporeality, the dimension of the abject body. The factor of racialization here is impossible to ignore: the broken body, the suffering body, the repulsive body-in- pieces is always, certainly within apartheid culture, the black body. We can go one step further and link this conceptualization to Lacan’s (2006) formulations regarding the corps morcelé. In his seminal essay on the mirror-stage, Lacan notes that the ‘fragmented body ... is regularly manifested in dreams’, particularly so under experiences of ‘the aggressive disintegration of the individual’ (p. 78). Of course, given the predominance of the social fantasy with which we are concerned here, it is apparent that such schemas of fragmentation are not equally distributed throughout all social groups. One would expect, in situations of radical social asymmetry, that such imagery would be delegated to racial/cultural/ class others who are then given the burden of acting as depository for all such values and all related anxieties of fragmentation. This would be to say that the white body-in-pieces in racist or (post)colonial culture is elided; it never comes into view; it is never present except in the displaced form of the abjected black body-in-pieces.¶ On the basis of the above theorizations we can offer at least two accounts of the dynamic relationship between the facets of the fantasy we are examining. Doing so enables us to speculate on the libidinal economy, that is, the distribution of affects, in these related scenes. We might begin by emphasizing the priority placed on the imagining of the black body-in-pieces in racist contexts, and stress the need for white subjects to revisit or visualize this image precisely as the displacement of the fragmentary experiences of the white body-in-pieces. Odd as it may sound, such images here would have a placatory function, soothing anxieties of dissolution by locating them in a site of pronounced dis-identifica- tion. A societal fixation with such images, their incessant repetition within various forms of popular culture, can thus be understood along affective lines: such images glow with the gratification of respite, with the alleviation of anxiety, they make a tacit pronouncement: ‘White bodies are not destined for this fate’.¶ There is also an argument that such scenes visit upon their victims exactly the violence they are thought to deserve. One relies here on the notion of projection, the idea that the other comes to be the carrier of the repellant values that the racist subject has themselves discarded. One thus attacks the other, blames them, with vigour proportionate to the need to expel these attributes from the self. To this we may add the Lacanian thesis that such depictions play the part of a scene of (dis) identification. Lacan’s (2006) notion of the mirror stage specified that a double relation obtained between the subject and potential image of identification: the image is both jubilantly loved as a narcissistically gratifying object, and yet also hated inasmuch as it proves a destabilizing or rivalrous influence. Such images of black body-in-pieces are, as such, a pure imagining of hate. There is a wishfulness about them, as if they visualize a desire, perhaps like the picturing of a wish in a dream, albeit in a literal and unusually undisguised manner. ====Debate exacerbates cruel optimism; the ballot writes structures into our identity and institutionalizes politics’ dependence on it. The ballot then becomes a vehicle for revenge in belonging to it. ==== **Brown 1995** ~~Wendy, Professor of Political Science at Berkeley, States of Injury, pp. 66-74~~ Liberalism contains from its inception a generalized incitement to what Nietzsche terms ressentiment, the moralizing revenge of the powerless, "the triumph of the weak as weak. "22 This incitement to ressentiment inheres in two related constitutive paradoxes of liberalism: that between individual liberty and social egalitarianism, a paradox which produces failure turned to recrimination by the subordinated, and guilt turned to resentment by the "successful"; and that between the individualism that legitimates liberalism and the cultural homogeneity required by its commitment to political universality, a paradox which stimulates the articulation of politically significant differences on the one hand, and the suppression of them on the other, and which offers a form of articulation that presses against the limits of universalist discourse even while that which is being articulated seeks to be harbored within-included in-the terms of that universalism. Premising itself on the natural equality of human beings, liberalism makes a political promise of universal individual freedom in order to arrive at social equality, or achieve a civilized retrieval of the equality postulated in the state of nature. It is the tension between the promises of individualistic liberty and the requisites of equality that yields ressentiment in one of two directions, depending on the way in which the paradox is brokered. A strong commitment to freedom vitiates the fulfillment of the equality promise and breeds ressentiment as welfare state liberalism—attenuations of the unmitigated license of the rich and powerful on behalf of the "disadvantaged." Conversely, a strong commitment to equality, requiring heavy state interventionism and economic redistribution, attenuates the commitment to freedom and breeds ressentiment expressed as neoconservative anti-statism, racism, charges of reverse racism, and so forth. However, it is not only the tension between freedom and equality but the prior presumption of the self-reliant and self-made capacities of liberal subjects, conjoined with their unavowed dependence on and construction by a variety of social relations and forces, that makes all liberal subjects, and not only markedly disenfranchised ones, vulnerable to ressentiment: it is their situatedness within power, their production by power, and liberal discourse's denial of this situatedness and production that cast the liberal subject into failure, the failure to make itself in the context of a discourse in which its self-making is assumed, indeed, is its assumed nature. This failure, which Nietzsche calls suffering, must either find a reason within itself (which redoubles the failure) or a site of external blame upon which to avenge its hurt and redistribute its pain. Here is Nietzsche's account of this moment in the production of ressentiment: For every sufferer instinctively seeks a cause for his suffering, more exactly, an agent; still more specifically, a guilty agent who is susceptible to suffering—in short, some living thing upon which he can, on some pretext or other, vent his affects, actually or in effigy .... This ... constitutes the actual physiological cause of ressentiment, vengefulness, and the like: a desire to deaden pain by means of affects... to deaden, by means of a more violent emotion of any kind, a tormenting, secret pain that is becoming unendurable, and to drive it out of consciousness at least for the moment: for that one requires an affect, as savage an affect as possible, and, in order to excite that, any pretext at all.23 Ressentiment in this context is a triple achievement: it produces an affect (rage, righteousness) that overwhelms the hurt; it produces a culprit responsible for the hurt; and it produces a site of revenge to displace the hurt (a place to inflict hurt as the sufferer has been hurt). Together these operations both ameliorate (in Nietzsche's term, "anaesthetize") and externalize what is otherwise "unendurable." In a culture already streaked with the pathos of ressentiment for the reasons just discussed, there are several distinctive characteristics of late modern postindustrial societies that accelerate and expand the conditions of its production. My listing will necessarily be highly schematic: First, the phenomenon William Connolly names "increased global contingency" combines with the expanding pervasiveness and complexity of domination by capital and bureaucratic state and social networks to create an unparalleled individual powerlessness over the fate and direction of one's own life, intensifying the experiences of impotence, dependence, and gratitude inherent in liberal capitalist orders and constitutive of ressellfiment.24 Second, the steady desacralization of all regions of life—what Weber called disenchantment, what Nietzsche called the death of god-would seem to add yet another reversal to Nietzsche's genealogy of ressentiment as perpetually available to "alternation of direction." In Nietzsche's account, the ascetic priest deployed notions of "guilt, sin, sinfulness, depravity, damnation" to "direct the ressentiment of the less severely afflicted sternly back upon themselves ... and in this way exploited the bad instincts of all sufferers for the purpose of self-discipline, self-surveillance, and self-overcoming. "25 However, the desacralizing tendencies of late modernity undermine the efficacy of this deployment and turn suffering's need for exculpation back toward a site of external agency26 Third, the increased fragmentation, if not disintegration, of all forms of association not organized until recently by the commodities market-communities, churches, families-and the ubiquitousness of the classificatory, individuating schemes of disciplinary society, combine to produce an utterly unrelieved individual, one without insulation from the inevitable failure entailed in liberalism's individualistic construction. 27 ln short, the characteristics of late modern secular society, in which individuals are buffeted and controlled by global configurations of disciplinary and capitalist power of extraordinary proportions, and are at the same time nakedly individuated, stripped of reprieve from relentless exposure and accountability for themselves, together add up to an incitement to ressentiment that might have stunned even the finest philosopher of its occasions and logics. Starkly accountable yet dramatically impotent, the late modern liberal subject quite literally seethes with ressentiment11. Enter politicized identity, now conceivable in part as both product of and reaction to this condition, where "reaction" acquires the meaning Nietzsche ascribed to it: namely, an effect of domination that reiterates impotence, a substitute for action, for power, for self-affirmation that reinscribes incapacity, powerlessness, and rejection. For Nietzsche, ressentiment itself is rooted in reaction-the substitution of reasons, norms, and ethics for deeds-and he suggests that not only moral systems but identities themselves take their bearings in this reaction. As Tracy Strong reads this element of Nietzsche's thought: Identity ... does not consist of an active component, but is reaction to something outside; action in itself, with its inevitable self-assertive qualities, must then become something evil, since it is identified with that against which one is reacting. The will to power of slave morality must constantly reassert that which gives definition to the slave: the pain he suffers by being in the world. Hence any attempt to escape that pain will merely result in the reaffirmation of painful structures. 28 If the "cause" of ressentiment is suffering, its "creative deed" is the reworking of this pain into a negative form of action, the "imaginary revenge" of what Nietzsche terms "natures denied the true reaction, that of deeds. "29 This revenge is achieved through the imposition of suffering "on whatever does not feel wrath and displeasure as he does"30 (accomplished especially through the production of guilt), through the establishment of suffering as the measure of social virtue, and through casting strength and good fortune ("privilege,·· as we say today) as self-recriminating, as its own indictment in a culture of suffering: "it is disgraceful to be fortunate, there is too much misery. "'1 But in its attempt to displace its suffering, identity structured by ressentiment at the same time becomes invested in its own subjection. This investment lies not only in its discovery of a site of blame for its hurt will, not only in its acquisition of recognition through its history of subjection (a recognition predicated on injury, now righteously revalued), but also in the satisfactions of revenge, which ceaselessly reenact even as they redistribute the injuries of marginalization and subordination in a liberal discursive order that alternately denies the very possibility of these things and blames those who experience them for their own condition. Identity politics structured by ressentiment reverse without subverting this blaming structure: they do not subject to critique the sovereign subject of accountability that liberal individualism presupposes, nor the economy of inclusion and exclusion that liberal universalism establishes. Thus, politicized identity that presents itself as a self-affirmation now appears as the opposite, as predicated on and requiring its sustained rejection by a "hostile external world." Insofar as what Nietzsche calls slave morality produces identity in reaction to power, insofar as identity rooted in this reaction achieves its moral superiority by reproaching power and action themselves as evil, identity structured by this ethos becomes deeply invested in its own impotence, even while it seeks to assuage the pain of its powerlessness through its vengeful moralizing, through its wide distribution of suffer-through its reproach of power as such. Politicized identity, premised on exclusion and fueled by the humiliation and suffering imposed by its historically structured impotence in the context of a discourse of sover- eign individuals, is as likely to seek generalized political paralysis, to feast on generalized political impotence, as it is to seek its own or collective liberation through empowerment. Indeed, it is more likely to punish and reproach-"punishment is what revenge calls itself; with a hypocritical lie it creates a good conscience for itself"33'than to find venues of self- affirming action.¶ But contemporary politicized identity's desire is not only shaped by the extent to which the sovereign will of the liberal subject, articulated ever more nakedly by disciplinary individuation and capitalist disinternments, is dominated by late-twentieth-century configurations of political and economic powers. It is shaped as well by the contemporary problematic of history itself, by the late modern rupture of history as a narrative, as ended because it has lost its end-a rupture that paradoxically gives history an immeasurable weight. As the grim experience of reading Discipline and Punish makes clear, there is a sense in which the gravitational force of history is multiplied at precisely the moment that history's narrative coherence and objectivist foundation is refuted. As the problematic of power in history is resituated from subject positioning to subject construction; as power is seen to operate spatially, infiltrationally, "microphysically" rather than only temporally, permeating every heretofore designated "interior" space in social lives and individuals; as eroding historical metanarratives take with them both laws of history and the futurity such laws purported to assure; as the presumed continuity of history is replaced with a sense of its violent, contingent, and ubiquitous force -history becomes that which has weight but no trajectory, mass but no coherence, force but no direction: it is war without ends or end. Thus, the extent to which "the tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living" is today unparalleled, even as history itself disintegrates as a coherent category or practice. We know ourselves to be saturated by history, we feel the extraordinary force of its and determinations; we are also steeped in a discourse of its insignificance, above all, we know that history will no longer (always already did not) act as our redeemer.¶ I raise the question of history because in thinking about late modern politicized identity's structuring by ressentiment, I have thus far focused on its foundation in the sufferings of a subordinated sovereign subject. Bur Nietzsche's account of the logic of ressentiment is also linked to that feature of the will that is stricken by history, that rails against time itself, that cannot "will backwards," that cannot exert its power over the past- either as a specific set of events or as time itself.¶ Willing liberates; but what is it that puts even the liberator himself in fetters? "It was"-that is the name of the will's gnashing of teeth and most secret melancholy. Powerless against what has been done, he is an angry spectator of all that is past. . . . He cannot break time and time's covetousness, that is the will's loneliest melancholy.¶ Although Nietzsche appears here to be speaking of the will as such, Zarathustra's own relationship to the will as a "redeemer of history" makes clear that this "angry spectatorship" can with great difficulty be reworked as a perverse kind of mastery, a mastery that triumphs over the past by reducing its power, by remaking the present against the terms of the past-in short, by a project of self-transformation that arrays itself against its own genealogical consciousness. In contrast with the human ruin he sees everywhere around him-"fragments and limbs and dreadful accidents"-it is Zarathustra's own capacity to discern and to make a future that spares him from a rancorous sensibility, from crushing disappointment in the liberatory promise of his will:¶ The now and the past on earth-alas, my friends, that is what I find most unendurable; and l should not know how to live if I were not also a seer of that which must come. A seer, a willer, a creator, a future himself and a bridge to the future-and alas, also, as it were, a cripple at this bridge: all this is Zarathustra. ¶ Nietzsche here discerns both the necessity and the near impossibility- the extraordinary and fragile achievement-of formulating oneself as a creator of the future and a bridge to the future in order to appease the otherwise inevitable rancor of the will against time, in order to redeem the past by lifting the weight of it, by reducing the scope of its determinations. "And how could I bear to be a man if man were not also a creator and guesser of riddles and redeemer of accidents'" Of course, Zarathustra's exceptionality in what he is willing to confront and bear, in his capacities to overcome in order to create, is Nietzsche's device for revealing us to ourselves. The ordinary will, steeped in the economy of slave morality, devises means "to get rid of his melancholy and to mock his dungeon," means that reiterate the cause of the melancholy, that continually reinfect the narcissistic wound to its capaciousness inflicted by the past. "Alas," says Nietzsche, "every prisoner becomes a fool; and the imprisoned will redeems himself foolishly. "3" From this foolish redemption-foolish because it does not resolve the will's rancor but only makes a world in its image-is born the wrath of revenge: "that which was" is the name of the stone ~~the will~~ cannot move. And so he moves stones out of wrath and displeasure, and he wreaks revenge on whatever does not feel wrath and displeasure as he does. Thus the will, the liberator, took to hurting; and on all who can suffer he wreaks revenge for his inability to go backwards. This . . is what revenge is: the will's ill will against time and its ‘it was’. "?•9 Revenge as a "reaction," a substitute for the capacity to act, produces identity as both bound to the history that produced it and as a reproach to the present which embodies that history. The will that "took to hurting'' in its own impotence against its past becomes (in the form of an identity whose very existence is due to heightened consciousness of the immovability of its "it was," its history of subordination) a will that makes not only a psychological but a political practice of revenge, a practice that reiterates the existence of an identity whose present past is one of insistently irredeemable injury. This past cannot be redeemed unless the identity ceases to be invested in it, and it cannot cease to be invested in it without giving up its identity as such, thus giving up its economy of avenging and at the same time perpetuating its hurt-"when he then stills the pain of the wound he at the same time infects that wound. "40 In its emergence as a protest against marginalization or subordination, politicized identity thus becomes attached to its own exclusion both because it is premised on this exclusion for its very existence as identity and because the formation of identity at the site of exclusion, as exclusion, augments or "alters the direction of the suffering" entailed in subordination or marginalization by finding a site of blame for it. But in so doing, it installs its pain over its unredeemed history in the very foundation of its political claim, in its demand for recognition as identity. In locating a site of blame for its powerlessness over its past-a past of injury, a past as a hurt will-and locating a "reason" for the "unendurable pain" of social powerlessness in the present, it converts this reasoning into an ethicizing politics, a politics of recrimination that seeks to avenge the hurt even while it reaffirms it, discursively codifies it. Politicized identity thus enunciates itself, makes claims for itself, only by entrenching, restating, dramatizing, and inscribing its pain in politics; it can hold out no future-for itself or others-that triumphs over this pain. The loss of historical direction, and with it the loss of futurity characteristic of the late modern age, is thus homologically refigured in the structure of desire of the dominant political expression of the age: identity politics. In the same way, the generalized political impotence produced by the ubiquitous yet discontinuous networks of late modern political and economic power is reiterated in the investments of late modern democracy’s primary oppositional political formations. ====We can describe this condition as cruel optimism, an attachment to a possibility that is ultimately impossible or harmful. Sustaining these fantasies of social transformation requires an intimate, proximate affective attachment, which debate conveniently provides to judges in the form of teams, but only at the cost of the detached apathy that explains how easily we pack up and do it all over again next round. ==== Berlant 06 Lauren, professor of Literature at the University of Chicago. "Cruel Optimism" in Differences, 17.3. 2006. When we talk about an object of desire, we are really talking about a cluster of promises we want someone or something to make to us and make possible for us. This cluster of promises could be embedded in a person, a thing, an institution, a text, a norm, a bunch of cells, smells, a good idea—whatever. To phrase "the object of desire" as a cluster of promises is to allow us to encounter what is incoherent or enigmatic in our attachments, not as confirmation of our irrationality, but as an explanation for our sense of our endurance in the object, insofar as prox- imity to the object means proximity to the cluster of things that the object promises, some of which may be clear to us while others not so much. In other words, all attachments are optimistic. That does not mean that they all feel optimistic: one might dread, for example, returning to a scene of hunger or longing or the slapstick reiteration of a lover or parent’s typi- cal misrecognition. But the surrender to the return to the scene where the object hovers in its potentialities is the operation of optimism as an affective form (see Ghent). "Cruel optimism" names a relation of attachment to compromised conditions of possibility. What is cruel about these attachments, and not merely inconvenient or tragic, is that the subjects who have x in their lives might not well endure the loss of their object or scene of desire, even though its presence threatens their well-being, because whatever the content of the attachment, the continuity of the form of it provides something of the continuity of the subject’s sense of what it means to keep on living on and to look forward to being in the world. This phrase points to a condition different than that of melancholia, which is enacted in the subject’s desire to temporize an experience of the loss of an object/scene with which she has identified her ego continuity. Cruel optimism is the condition of maintaining an attachment to a problematic object in advance of its loss.¶ One might point out that all objects/scenes of desire are prob- lematic, in that investments in them and projections onto them are less about them than about the cluster of desires and affects we manage to keep magnetized to them. I have indeed wondered whether all optimism is cruel, because the experience of loss of the conditions of its reproduction can be so breathtakingly bad. But some scenes of optimism are crueler than others: where cruel optimism operates, the very vitalizing or ani- mating potency of an object/scene of desire contributes to the attrition of the very thriving that is supposed to be made possible in the work of attachment in the first place. This might point to something as banal as a scouring love, but it also opens out to obsessive appetites, patriotism, a career, all kinds of things. One makes affective bargains about the costliness of one’s attachments, usually unconscious ones, most of which keep one in proximity to the scene of desire/attrition.¶ To understand cruel optimism as an aesthetic of attachment requires embarking on an analysis of the modes of rhetorical indirection that manage the strange activity of projection into an enabling object that is also disabling. I learned how to do this from reading Barbara Johnson’s work on apostrophe and free indirect discourse. In her poetics of indi- rection, each of these rhetorical modes is shaped by the ways a writing subjectivity conjures other ones so that, in a performance of phantasmatic intersubjectivity, the writer gains superhuman observational authority, enabling a performance of being made possible by the proximity of the object. Because the dynamics of this scene are something like what I am describing in the optimism of attachment, I will describe the shape of my transference with her thought ====We muse refuse liberalism’s economization of suffering. Our alternative does not ignore the violence of the world but rather changes how frame represent it. It opens us up to a multiplicity of understandings of what suffering can mean. Only this can open us to experiencing the world, not as vampiric subjects of liberalism, but as creatures of sensuous life. ==== **Abbas**, Professor and Division Head in Social Studies, Political Science, Philosophy at the Liebowitz Center for International Studies at Bard College at Simon’s Rock, **‘10** ~~Asma, Liberalism and Human Suffering: Materialist Reflections on Politics, Ethics, and Aesthetics, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pg. Pg. 183-187, RSR~~ In Martha Nussbaum’s celebration of cosmopolitanism, the familiar move of the invocation of the worst sufferings of mankind is bound to shut up and line everyone else in submission, not to the pain of others (as it may appear), but more fundamentally to iterations of who I am as one who suffers, as one who responds to suffering, and as one troubled by each of those questions rather than having settled them.47 Nussbaum or Shklar, in their philosophical commitments to different metaphysics (even in explicit noncommitments to metaphysics), do not even consider that their invocation of events of unimaginable suffering as cautionary tales for all of humanity is beholden to the sublime in ways complicit with liberalism’s political economy of suffering. In being so, they inadvertently evacuate the political in favor of some formalistic ethical certitude that may carry its own violent obliterations, dysfunctionalizing political judgment in submission to ethical judgments already made for us. The ethicization of discourse on suffering, and the submission to the violence of violence, is a parallel to the death of the political. Similarly, as long as the aesthetic follows this logic—that representation is unethical and violent in nature and that we must somehow leave it behind—it will be limited in its vision, unable to see the deep and necessary ontological connection between suffering and representation. Beyond considering aesthetics at play in the artistry of rights and interests that privileges the Western scopic and rhetoricist regimes, the aesthetic must be seen as more closely derived from aisthesis (perception from the senses). The resulting essential, ontic, and experiential proximity to suffering may allow us to radically reimagine our subjection to injuries, interests, and rights. The elements of a historical materialism of suffering introduced over the course of this chapter—necessity, hope, and a materialist sensuous ethos—reconsider woundedness and victimhood in order to illuminate the multiplicity of relations that are, and can be, had to our own and others’ suffering. They expose the presumptions and certainties regarding the imperatives suffering poses for sufferers that codify a basic distance from suffering and an inability to insinuate the question of suffering in our comportments, orientations, and internal relations of simultaneity to the world. A righteous or tolerant pluralism of sufferings, enacted wounds, and relations to our own and others’ suffering is not my objective here. One only has to consider, to build to a different end, how the judgments, actions, and reactions of many among us cannot help but reject consolations that come from codified knowledges and certitudes, such as those pertaining to what suffering is, how we must despise it, and how we must fix it. Then, one only has to question the imperatives these knowledges and certitudes pose for all of us, and examine the utilitarian charm of the beguiling tragedy of "powerless" institutions and other conscriptions of sympathy, empathy, voice, and desire for a markedly different world. This may involve not giving liberal institutions or fervent recruiters of various marginalities the power to set the terms of honoring the suffering and hope of others, and not giving them the power to corner our pathos, in a moment of ethical noblesse, by emphasizing how another’s suffering is impenetrable and unknowable. As much as this ethical noblesse upholds the letting be of the other, it is a preservation, first and foremost, of oneself—perversely reminiscent of the confusing touch-me-not of the Christ back from the dead, a Christ whose triumph over death ironically inspires entire cultures built on surplus fear, suffering, and death as offerings for those with terminal senses but endless lives (often the courtesy of the same historical cryogenics). It is imperative to reject both the righteous or tolerant pluralism of sufferings and the touch-me-not version of seemingly other-centered politics in favor of seeing our sufferings and our labors as coconstitutive of the world we inhabit. What would it mean, as Louis puts it to the Rabbi, to "incorporate sickness into one’s sense of how things are supposed to go," to convoke a politics that is "good with death" but asks for "more life"? Perhaps the sufferer not be incidental to the suffering when suffering is defined as a problem only in the terms we can pretend to solve, only to fail at that, too. Perhaps liberal politics should accept that statistics of diseases, mortalities, and morbidities, calculated in terms of the loss in human productivity, on the one hand, and those of prison populations and philanthropic gifts, on the other, are not graceful confessions of its mastery of suffering or death. It is not that there are no sufferings to be named, interpreted, and tended to. However, it is important to remember that this is not a random, altruistic, or unmediated process, and it benefits those with the agency and position to act on another’s suffering. Perhaps politics should be able to speak to, and for, the reserve army of those with abject, yet-to-be-interpreted- and-recompensed sufferings, and those who have no ability to be injured outside of the terms native to liberal capitalist discourse. Perhaps politics can diverge from its reliance on certain frames of suffering in order to address the ubiquity and ordinariness of human tragedy and suffering. Perhaps, still, if politics is concerned with the creation and maintenance of forms of life, then the activities of this making, when they negotiate with the past, present, and future, necessitate a look at the way old and new wounds are enacted in order to yield forms that are different. Ultimately, perhaps liberalism’s colonization of suffering, and its moral dominion over it, needs to be resisted and loosened. Questioning the forms in which we suffer and are told to do so is not the same as altogether questioning the reality or centrality of suffering and our responsibility to it. The ways in which we suffer tell us what we need and do not need, what our bodies can and cannot bear. Politics must be pushed to engineer the passing of certain forms of suffering, not the passing of suffering altogether. The claim to having nailed the problem of suffering becomes suspect when politics learns from suffering not via the question of justice but, more immediately, as it responds to the suffering that is life; when it is urgent to understand those ways of suffering that do not follow liberal logics; when attending to bodies who suffer, remember, and act out of their wounds differently is extremely necessary; when the question of the suffering of action is inseparable from the actions of the suffering; when our experience of the world and its ethical, political, and aesthetic moments is not prior to or outside of justice, but constitutive of it; and when the need to understand necessity, the lack of choice, and the ordinariness of tragedy is part of the same story as the clumsiness of our responses to grand disaster. This is an offering toward a politics that is not modeled on the liberal, capitalist, and colonizing ideals of healthy agents who are asked to live diametrically across from the pole of victimhood. Such an approach would factor in the material experiences of destruction, tragedy, violence, defeat, wounds, memory, hope, and survival that risk obliteration even by many well-meaning victim-centered politics. The imagining of such a politics is not merely premised on suffering as something to be undone. Rather, it holds on to the ability to suffer as something to be striven for, grasped anew, and salvaged from the arbitrary dissipations imposed on it by global powers who not only refuse to take responsibility for the plight that they have every role in creating and locating but also shamelessly arbitrate how the wounded can make their suffering matter. Modern schemes for solving the problem of human suffering succumb to their own hubris, even as they set the terms of joy and sorrow, love and death, life and hope, salvation and freedom, that those subject to these schemes ought to have a role in determining. Maybe these schemes have no relevance to those who suffer abjectly, or maybe the latter have lost their senses living among the dead who tyrannize us and the dead who beseech us. It is time that we confront the nauseating exploitations and self-affirming decrepitude of Western liberal capitalist arbitrations of where suffering must live and where it must die—these moralities keep themselves alive and ascendant by always invoking their choice exceptions, fixating on those marginal relations to suffering and life signified in the savage acts of, say blowing up one’s own and others’ bodies, often regarded as savage for no other reason than their violation of some silly rational choice maxim. There are many other exceptions that confront these dominations, not the least of which are the forms of acculturations, past and present, that see the realm of ethics as deeper and richer than the space of individual moralities acted out. Similarly, some of these exceptions to learn from hold and honor suffering as an inherently social act, as a welcome burden to carry with and for each other. If it is indeed the case that the world is so because the colonized have not stopped regurgitating, then the incipient fascisms in the metropoles today ought to make us wonder whether our problem as people of this world is not that there is not enough liberalism, but that, at best, liberalism is insufficient, and, at worst, it is complicit. Perhaps the majority of the world needs a politics that is material enough to speak to, and with, their silences, their pain, their losses, their defeats, their victories, their dispensabilities, their mutilations, their self-injuries, their fidelities, their betrayals, their memories, their justice, their humor, and their hope. At stake in such an imagining is nothing less than the possibility of newer forms of joy, desire, hope, and life itself. ====The role of the ballot should be to decide who has the best relationship to affect. The Bush administration’s creation of an affective community through a direct appeal to the moral sentiments of the people founds the attachment to rage and anger that make the tea party possible. This commitment to relationality is the biggest affective force that defines us.==== **Watkins**, Associate Professor in the School of Education at the University of Western Sydney, ’**10** ~~Megan, "Desiring Recognition, Accumulating Affect", The Affect Theory Reader, Duke University Press, 2010, RSR~~ Winnicott's intention is to explain the process of differentiation. His focus is the move from what he views as complete union with the mother hence his famous declaration that there is no such thing as an infant-to a position of independence as a separate self with his notion of transitional object mediating the process (Winnicott 1965 39). In doing this, however, Winnicott gives emphasis to the interaction between mother and child with the development of self premised on intersubjective engagement.• Recognition is central to this process. As Kojeve points out, "The establishment of one's self-understanding is inextricably dependent on recognition or affirmation on the part of others" (1969, n).ln explaining the development of a sense of self, the issue for Winnicott is not simply how we become independent of the other but, as Jessica Benjamin explains, "how we actively engage and make ourselves known in relationship to the other" (1988, 18). Winnicott stresses that independence is premised on initial periods of dependence and that this dependence has actually grown out of what he terms "double dependence" (2oo6, 5). His reasoning here has much to offer pedagogic theory as it typifies the mutual recognition underpinning a productive conceptualization of the pedagogic relation of teacher and student. Another dinJension to how such a connection with the other frames our notion of self is discussed by Honneth (1995, 99). Drawing on Winnicott, he refers to the ways in which infants gain a sense of bodily schema through the process of being held. Intercorporeality, skin acting on skin, the sense of touch, and the affective realm allows one to know one's body. A similar perspective is evident in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the body: understanding our somatic selves through engagement with the world (1999). In more recent work in the area of child development from the 1l)Sos, Stern gives a similar emphasis to the role of intersubjectivity in the formation of the self. Yet his starting point and the way in which he maps development are quite different to those of Winnicott. To Stern there is no point at which the infant is confused in relation to a sense of self and other where development entails a process of differentiation. To Stern infants are "predesigned to be aware of self-organising processes" ( 1985, 10 ) . He is interested in how different senses of the self manifest -an emergent self, a core self, a subjective self, and a verbal self-which, to Stern, are not successive phases of development. He explains that once acquired each of these aspects of self continues to function and remain active throughout one's life. These different senses of self are each a product of increasingly complex forms of relatedness beginning with the mother/child dyad as the primary relation of intersubjective engagement. This is an accumulation of self that seems dependent upon an accumulation of affect, which Stern alludes to in his account of mother I child interaction. In discussion of this dyadic interaction and the ways in which infants engage with the world psychologists make reference to what is termed "contingent responsiveness," that is, the sense of pleasure an infant feels in response to a reaction of which he or she is the cause (Benjamin 1!)88, 21). This could involve pushing a ball or other toy and the joy that ensues in making it move. While the infant expresses joy in the response of the inartirnate object, it proves to be more pleasurable if this is accompanied by a reaction from the mother or significant other. What becomes important in the repeated performance of this activity is not so much the action itself but the reaction of another subject and the sense of recognition it generates. This acknowledgment acts as a spur for further action; the desire for recognition on the part of the infant instills a form of agency in the successful completion of the process involved in making an object move. In this instance the desire for recognition is not one-sided; it is mutual The mother likewise desires the recognition of her child and gains fulfillment in his or her responsive play. So, despite the differential power relationship between mother and child, there is both a need to recognize the other and in tum to be recognized. In discussing this dialogic play between mother and child Jessica Benjamin refers to studies that provide a frame by frame analysis of the facial, gestural, and vocal actions and reactions of both parties that reveal a kind of"dance of interaction" (1988, 27). Benjantin explains that "the partners are so attuned that they move together in unison" with this play of mutual recognition seemingly fueled by affect ( 27 ). This interaffectivity is a key concern of Stem. He points out that "the sharing of affective states is the most pervasive and clinically germane feature of intersubjective relatedness" (Stern 1985, 138). Elsewhere he stresses that it is only througlt the intensity of this form of interaction that infants are able to attain high levels offeeling (Stem 1993, 207). What the infant experiences, however, is not simply joy-this amplification of feeling has direct links with cognition. Prior to the work of Tomkins it was thought that affect and cognition were separate and unrelated functions, yet while affect can operate independently, Tomkins was able to demonstrate its impact on both thought and behavior, in a sense confirming the psychophysical parallelism expounded by Spinoza and also the relationality of affect (Angel and Gibbs wo6).• The interrelationship between affect and cognition and the difficulty in identifying the former's effect on the latter is perhaps best demonstrated by an examination of the affect of interest Tomkins explains how in his work on the emotions Darwin overlooked interest altogether, confusing it with the function of thinking (1962, 338). To Tomkins, however, "the absence of the affective support of interest would jeopardize intellectual development no less than destruction of brain tissue" (343). The relationship between affect and cognition and the heightening of affect that recognition can evoke are of particular importance to pedagogic theory in terms of what they suggest about the significance of the pedagogic relation of teacher and student the ways in which a teacher's support influences a student's learning. While the focus of Stern's work is the interpersonal world of the infant, and so his argument about the relationship between affect amplification and interpersonal engagement relates to the early years of life, he is also of the view that while adults can reach higlt levels of joy when alone, this is largely dependent on an imagined other. Intensification of positive affects-as in interest-seems a function of engagement with others and, pedagogically, a significant other. The techniques teachers utilize in classrooms can act as a force promoting interest, which over time may accumulate as cognitive capacity providing its own stimulus for learning, a point I will return to below.
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JANFEB - CP - Fracking
====Counterplan: The Republic of India should eliminate their nuclear arsenals, except those used in nuclear fracking and replace all feasible instances of hydraulic fracking with nuclear fracking. All other states should eliminate their nuclear arsenals.==== ====Eliminate means complete removal ==== **Patent Trial and Appeal Board 18 **(2018 Pat. App. LEXIS 6128 (P.T.A.B. August 2, 2018)) Claim 1 requires, inter alia, that the glass sheet comprise "less than 10 imperfections per cm3." The Examiner found this limitation to be met by the secondary reference, Pedeboscq, which teaches a method of producing glass so that gaseous inclusions and bubbles are minimized. Final Act. 3. In the Answer, the Examiner found as follows: Pedeboscq defines the refining step as eliminating bubbles from the glass (~~0009~~). Pedeboscq teaches to perform an additional refining step in order to eliminate bubbles, if the presence of bubbles is undesirable (~~0014~~). The Examiner interprets these teachings (that is, the word "eliminate") to mean the complete removal of bubbles from the glass. ====Nuclear fracking is better because it doesn’t contaminate groundwater – also solves nuclear waste disposal.==== **McMahon 14 **~~Jeff McMahon, (I've covered the energy and environment beat since 1985, when I discovered my college was discarding radioactive waste in a dumpster. That story ran in the Arizona Republic, and I have chased electrons and pollutants ever since, for dailies in Arizona and California, for alternative weeklies including New Times and Newcity, for online innovators such as The Weather Channel's Forecast Earth project, The New York Times Company's LifeWire syndicate, and True/Slant—the prototype for the new Forbes. I've wandered far afield—to cover the counterrevolutionary war in Nicaragua, the World Series Earthquake in San Francisco, the UN Climate Change Conferences in Copenhagen and Paris. I also teach journalism, argument and scientific writing at the University of Chicago.) "U.S. Experimented With Nuclear Fracking" Forbes, 1-29-2014, https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/2014/01/29/u-s-experimented-with-nuclear-fracking/~~#68e863f5c9c7, DOA:1-12-2020 // WWBW~~ At the annual meeting of the American Geophysical Union in San Francisco, Leonid Germanovich of the Georgia Institute of Technology suggested that nuclear wastes deposited in shale rock would never return to the surface. "It's basic physics here — if it's heavier than rock, the fracture will propagate down," said the physicist and civil and environmental engineer. Jens Birkholzer, head of the Nuclear Energy and Waste Program at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, told Livescience the idea is impractical, largely for safety reasons, but in fact, the government has already disposed of nuclear wastes this way, as you'll read below. Jon Abel's questions had me wondering whether these two explosive forms of energy extraction had ever been combined. And indeed they have. In December, 1967, scientists from the Atomic Energy Commission and officials from the U.S. Bureau of Mines and El Paso Natural Gas Company gathered at a gas well in northern New Mexico, near Farmington. They lowered a 29-kiloton nuclear device more than 4,000 feet down the shaft and set it off. It worked. "The 4,042-foot-deep detonation created a molten glass-lined cavern about 160 feet in diameter and 333 feet tall," according to the American Oil and Gas Historical Society. "It collapsed within seconds. Subsequent measurements indicated fractures extended more than 200 feet in all directions – and significantly increased natural gas production." The Atomic Energy Commission tried twice more. In 1969 they set off a 43-kiloton nuclear bomb in an 8,500-foot deep well near Rulison, Colorado. In 1973 they set off three 33-kiloton bombs in a single well near Rifle, Colorado. In all three tests, they collaborated with the local gas utilities. The tests were part of the Plowshare Program—a government initiative to find peaceful uses for nuclear explosions—which was discontinued in 1975. Nuclear fracking never became a common practice because of safety concerns, public opposition and the growth of hydraulic fracturing, according to a report from the Department of Energy's Office of Scientific and Technical Information: Although the technology was demonstrated to be technically feasible, it could not be proved that national energy needs justified the elaborate procedures that would be required. Concerns about the potential of the tritium contamination of the gas that would result from nuclear explosive stimulation were raised by Colorado and western alliance agencies. These concerns and the lack of public support for the program made it unlikely that Congress would ever approve a commercial joint government-industry venture. By 1974, approximately 82 million dollars had been invested in the nuclear gas stimulation technology program .... It was estimated that even after 25 years of gas production of all the natural gas deemed recoverable, that only 15 to 40 percent of the investment could be recovered. At the same time, alternative, non-nuclear technologies were being developed, such as hydrofracturing. Consequently, under the pressure of economic and environmental concerns, the Plowshare Program was discontinued at the end of FY 1975. The three sites—the Gasbuggy site in New Mexico and the Rulison and Rio Blanco sites in Colorado—remain under the watch of DOE's Office of Legacy Management. When DOE cleaned up the Gasbuggy site in 2004, it used the well just as Jon Abel suggested it might: "liquid radioactive waste was injected into the cavity formed by the nuclear explosion; solid radioactive waste was removed to the Nevada Test Site," according to a DOE fact sheet (pdf). When Rio Blanco was cleaned up, radioactive materials were injected into the earth using one of the test wells. DOE and EPA officials conduct regular tests to determine whether radioactive liquids are migrating from these sites into adjacent groundwater. So far, they say, no leaks. ====Hydraulic fracking contaminates drinking water.==== **Vaidyanathan 16 **~~Gayathri Vaidyanathan, () "Fracking Can Contaminate Drinking Water" Scientific American, 4-4-2016, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/fracking-can-contaminate-drinking-water/, DOA:1-12-2020 // WWBW~~ Former EPA scientist Dominic DiGiulio never gave up. Eight years ago, people in Pavillion, Wyo., living in the middle of a natural gas basin, complained of a bad taste and smell in their drinking water. U.S. EPA launched an inquiry, helmed by DiGiulio, and preliminary testing suggested that the groundwater contained toxic chemicals. Then, in 2013, the agency suddenly transferred the investigation to state regulators without publishing a final report. Now, DiGiulio has done it for them. He published a comprehensive, peer-reviewed study last week in Environmental Science and Technology that suggests that people’s water wells in Pavillion were contaminated with fracking wastes that are typically stored in unlined pits dug into the ground. The study also suggests that the entire groundwater resource in the Wind River Basin is contaminated with chemicals linked to hydraulic fracturing, or fracking. This production technique, which involves cracking shale rock deep underground to extract oil and gas, is popular in the United States. It’s also controversial. There are thousands of wells across the American West and in California that are vulnerable to the kind of threat documented in the study, DiGiulio said. He is now a research scholar at Stanford University. "We showed that groundwater contamination occurred as a result of hydraulic fracturing," DiGiulio said in an interview. "It contaminated the Wind River formation." The findings underscore the tension at the heart of the Obama administration’s climate change policy, which is based on replacing many coal-fired power plants with facilities that burn cleaner natural gas. That reliance on natural gas has sometimes blinded agencies to local pollution and health impacts associated with the resource, said Rob Jackson, an earth scientist at Stanford and co-author of the study. In 2015, EPA said in a controversial draft study that hydraulic fracturing has not had "widespread, systemic impacts on drinking water resources in the United States" (Greenwire, June 4, 2015). "The national office of EPA has tended to downplay concerns of their own investigators, in part because the Obama administration has promoted natural gas," Jackson said. "Natural gas is here to stay. It behooves us to make it as safe and environmentally friendly as possible." EPA spokeswoman Julia Valentine said the agency hasn’t yet finalized its assessment that natural gas has no "widespread, systemic impacts." As part of that process, the agency will evaluate all recent research, including DiGiulio’s study, she said. Encana Corp., the company that operated in the Pavillion basin, said repeated testing has shown people’s water wells are safe for consumption. "After numerous rounds of testing by both the state of Wyoming and EPA, there is no evidence that the water quality in domestic wells in the Pavillion Field has changed as a result of oil and gas operations; no oil and gas constituents were found to exceed drinking water standards in any samples taken," said Doug Hock, an Encana spokesman. Water testing began in 2009 when the local EPA office responded to complaints from residents. EPA headquarters, and DiGiulio, got involved in January 2010. "Conducting a groundwater investigation related to fracking is extremely complicated," DiGiulio said. "It is difficult because a lot of the compounds used for hydraulic fracturing are not commonly analyzed for in commercial labs." These labs were originally set up for the Superfund program, under which EPA cleans up the most contaminated sites in the nation. They are great at detecting chemicals found at Superfund sites but not as good at detecting chemicals used in fracking, DiGiulio said. "You have some of these very water-soluble exotic compounds in hydraulic fracturing, which were not amenable to routine lab-type analysis," he said. One such chemical was methanol. The simplest alcohol, it can trigger permanent nerve damage and blindness in humans when consumed in sufficient quantities. It was used in fracking in Pavillion as workers pumped thousands of gallons of water and chemicals at high pressure into the wells they were drilling. About 10 percent of the mixture contained methanol, DiGiulio said. So the presence of methanol in the Pavillion aquifer would indicate that fracking fluid may have contaminated it. But methanol degrades rapidly and is reduced within days to trace amounts. Commercial labs did not have the protocol to detect such small traces, so DiGiulio and his colleagues devised new procedures, using high-performance liquid chromatography, to detect it. They devised techniques for detecting other chemicals, as well. By then, Pavillion was roiling in controversy as EPA and residents collided with industry. EPA had drilled two monitoring wells, MW01 and MW02, in 2011, and its testing had found benzene, diesel and other toxic chemicals. But these results were contested by oil and gas industry representatives, who criticized EPA’s sampling techniques (EnergyWire, Oct. 12, 2012). They pointed to a technical disagreement between EPA and the U.S. Geological Survey on the best methods to cast doubt on EPA’s overall findings. EPA realized it needed a consensus on its water testing methodology. In February 2012, it assembled a technical team from the USGS, Wyoming state regulators and tribal representatives from the Wind River Indian Reservation. They retested the monitoring wells in April 2012. This time, they also tested for methanol. But EPA never released those results to the public. In 2013, the agency backed out of its investigation in Pavillion, handing it over to state regulators, who moved forward using a $1.5 million grant from Encana (EnergyWire, June 21, 2013). DiGiulio said the decision had come from EPA’s senior management. Industry representatives repeatedly pointed out that EPA had not published a peer-reviewed study on its findings. "If the EPA had any confidence in its draft report, which has been intensely criticized by state regulators and other federal agencies, it would proceed with the peer review process," Steve Everley, a spokesman for Energy in Depth, an industry group, said at the time. "But it’s not, which says pretty clearly that the agency is finally acknowledging the severity of those flaws and leaning once again on the expertise of state regulators." In December 2015, state regulators published a draft of their findings. It stated that fracking had not contributed to pollution in Pavillion, according to the Casper Star Tribune. The report said the groundwater is generally suitable for people to use. When DiGiulio retired from EPA in 2014, he trained his sights on Pavillion. He felt he had to finish his work. "EPA had basically handed the case over and a peer-reviewed document was never finalized," he said. "If it is not in the peer-reviewed literature, then it presents a problem with credibility in terms of findings. It is important that the work be seen by other scientists and enter the peer review realm so that other scientists will have access to virtually everything." Since 2012, a trove of new data had accumulated from USGS, EPA and state regulators. He obtained EPA’s methanol testing results through a Freedom of Information Act request and downloaded the rest of the information from the Wyoming oil and gas regulator’s website. All of it was publicly available, waiting for the right person to spend a year crunching the information. The end result: a peer-reviewed study that reaffirms EPA’s findings that there was something suspicious going on in Pavillion. More research is needed. The sampling wells contained methanol. They also contained high levels of diesel compounds, suggesting they may have been contaminated by open pits where operators had stored chemicals, DiGiulio said. The deep groundwater in the region contained high levels of salt and anomalous ions that are found in fracking fluid, DiGiulio said. The chemical composition suggests that fracking fluids may have migrated directly into the aquifer through fractures, he said. Encana had drilled shallow wells at Pavillion, at depths of less than 2,000 feet and within reach of the aquifer zone, said Jackson of Stanford University. "The shallow hydraulic fracturing is a potential problem because you don’t need a problem with well integrity to have chemicals migrate into drinking water," he said. The study also shows that there is a strong upward flow of groundwater in the basin, which means contamination that is deep underground could migrate closer to the surface over time. "Right now, we are saying the data suggests impacts, which is a different statement than a definitive impact," DiGiulio said. "We are saying the dots need to be connected here, monitoring wells need to be installed." ====Indian fracking now==== **Rosencranz and Janghu 18** (Armin and Shubham, The Hindu Times, The Risks in Fracking https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/the-risks-in-fracking/article23650260.ece) Many scholars believe that fossil fuel energy will decline markedly by 2050. Such conclusions have been challenged by others who say that the earth has enough resources to quench humankind’s thirst for development for many centuries to come. Among other energy supplies, shale gas and oil are likely to be abundant and available. Shale gas and oil are unconventional natural resources found at 2,500-5,000 m below the earth’s surface, as compared to conventional crude oil found at 1,500 m. The process of extracting shale oil and gas requires deep vertical drilling followed by horizontal drilling. The most common way to extract shale gas is ‘hydraulic fracturing’ (fracking), where high volumes of water mixed with certain chemicals are pushed down to break the rocks and release the trapped energy minerals. Because of its benefits, shale gas is being perceived by some as a ‘saviour’ of humanity. Fracking seems an attractive tool, both politically and economically. To gain such benefits, the government introduced a policy on shale gas and oil in 2013, permitting national oil companies to engage in fracking. Under the first phase, shale gas blocks were identified in Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Gujarat, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu. However, environmental groups have strongly criticised this move, which they say will have adverse environmental impacts. Countries like Germany and France and subnational governments like Scotland have banned fracking.
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JANFEB - DA - Modi
====Modi broadly popular in status quo due to "strong leader image"==== **India Today, 19 **(India Today (Indian newspaper and broadcast network). "NaMo, uninterrupted: India stands firmly behind Narendra Modi, finds Mood of the Nation," India Today, August 14, 2019. https://www.indiatoday.in/mood-of-the-nation/story/narendra-modi-popularity-bjp-congress-kashmir-economy-mood-of-the-nation-august-1580907-2019-08-14//SHL) The country is firmly behind Narendra Modi whose popularity** as a leader **stands unrivaled in recent times**. In fact, **Narendra Modi's 'strong leader' image was the primary driving force behind the B**haratiya **J**anata **P**arty's staggering victory in the 2019 Lok Sabha polls. And, if elections were to be held again today, the BJP would not only win but would improve on the tally it registered in the Lok Sabha polls, the results of which were declared in May. **All this, according to the August edition of the Mood of the Nation poll.** The bi-annual survey was conducted across 97 parliamentary constituencies and 194 assembly constituencies in 19 states. A total of 12,126 interviews were conducted between July 22, 2019 and July 30, 2019 to gauge the nation's mood. And the Mood of the Nation is pretty clear: Narendra **Modi is miles ahead of his contemporaries and stands on the cusp of going down in history as one of India's strongest political leaders**. PM Modi's **approval ratings currently stand at 71 per cent**, a sharp rise compared to the 54 per cent approval he enjoyed in the January 2019 edition of the Mood of the Nation. If elections were held today, Narendra Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party would once again emerge victorious. The findings of the Mood of the Nation poll show that the BJP would win 308 seats — five more than what the party won in the 2019 Lok Sabha polls — while the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) would win 357. Meanwhile for the Congress, it is all doom and gloom with a majority of the respondents saying that the Grand Old Party is in terminal decline and that the party risks losing two of the only four states where it is currently in power — Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. Here are the top takeaways from the August 2019 Mood of the Nation poll: **MODI MOST POPULAR**: PM Narendra **Modi remains the most popular leader in the country**, according to the Mood of the Nation poll. 30 per cent of the respondents rated his performance as outstanding while 41 per cent rated it as good. His approval ratings as prime minister are at 71 per cent. He is also rated as the best prime minister India has had. Indira Gandhi follows in the second spot while Atal Bihari Vajpayee ranks third. Modi's predecessor, Manmohan Singh ranks seventh of the list of best Indian prime ministers. BJP ALL THE WAY: If elections were to be held today, the Bharatiya Janata Party would win 308 seats — five more than what it won in the Lok Sabha election. The Congress would win 49 — three fewer than its 2019 Lok Sabha polls tally. In terms of alliances, the National Democratic Alliance would win 357 seats while the United Progressive Alliance would win 92. VICTORY MYSTERY: According to the Mood of the Nation poll, Narendra **Modi's image of a 'strong leader' was the primary driving force behind the** Bharatiya Janata Party's **victory in the 2019 Lok Sabha polls**. 35 per cent of respondents said Modi's image was the top reason for the BJP's victory. 16 per cent said it was the Balakot airstrike while 11 per cent credited it to the Modi government's achievements. Five per cent of respondents said Amit Shah's election management was the top reason for the victory.** ====The plan tanks Modi’s approval – perception of nuclear strength is k2 support==== **Panda, 19 **(Panda, Ankit (Adjunct Snr. Fellow@Defense Posture Project and Federation of American Scientists, Snr. Editor@Diplomat, Director of Research@Diplomat Risk Intelligence, Contributing Editor@War on the Rocks, BA Wilson School of Public Affairs@Princeton University). "At Indian General Election Rallies, Modi Beats the Nuclear Drums," The Diplomat, April 23, 2019. https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/at-indian-general-election-rallies-modi-beats-the-nuclear-drums//SHL) At Indian General Election Rallies, Modi Beats the Nuclear Drums **Less than two months after India’s worst crisis with Pakistan since 2002, Indian Prime Minister Narendra **Modi has made repeated references to nuclear dynamics** between the two countries **at election rally addresses. India’s general elections began earlier this month** and will run into mid-May, **with Modi’s** nationally dominant Bharatiya Janata Party (**BJP**) **hoping seize on its stewardship of India’s national security to maintain a dominant position** in the Lok Sabha (the lower house of India’s bicameral parliament). On April 17, at a campaign rally, **Modi touted that India had called Pakistan’s nuclear bluff**. It’s unclear if the prime minister was referring to a specific weapon. "Earlier, terrorists from Pakistan would come here and go back after conducting an attack. Pakistan would threaten us, saying it has the nuclear bomb and will press the button," Modi said, underscoring what had long been a dilemma for India, whose conventionally superiority was undermined by Pakistan’s development of low-yield nuclear weapons in particular. "We have nuclear of nuclear bombs," Modi said, intending to highlight India’s capabilities. "**I decided to tell them, do whatever you want to do," Modi added, promising that India would retaliate**. On April 20, at a separate rally, Modi returned to the theme: "Every other day, they used to say ‘we have nuclear button, we have nuclear button.’ What do we have then? Have we kept it for Diwali? (A Hindu holiday traditionally involving lights and firecrackers.)" Modi also discussed the events of February 26 and 27, when India and Pakistan nearly went to war. Referring to the capture of the Indian pilot whose MiG-21 Bison was shot down by Pakistan, Modi offered the first on-record Indian statement regarding a possible conventional missile strike on Pakistan by India. Describing what a "senior American official" had said in the third person, he said: "Modi has kept ready 12 missiles and might attack and the situation will deteriorate… Pakistan announced they would return the pilot on the second day." In doing so, Modi provided the first on-record Indian confirmation of reports citing Pakistani officials of possible conventional missile strikes as retaliation after the Pakistan Air Force retaliated on February 27. Indian official sources had denied those reports. **These utterances** are unusual from an Indian prime minister, but **underscore the extent to which the nationalist BJP is leaning on its national security credentials and India’s military capabilities to appeal to voters** seeking to reconstitute a government after the general elections. Immediately after its nuclear tests in 1998, India embarked on a two-decade campaign to underscore its status as a "responsible" nuclear power. It released a draft nuclear doctrine in 1999, which was finalized in 2003 and included the articulation of a conditional no first-use policy. Meanwhile, as India pursued the normalization of its nuclear status, even as it remains a nonsignatory to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, senior Indian officials and diplomats would point to India’s relative restraint with nuclear weapons—a comparison that was all-the-starker in South Asia given Pakistan’s rapidly growing arsenal, aggressive nuclear strategy predicated on first-use, and development of low-yield nuclear weapons. **Modi**, of course, isn’t the first Indian prime minister to make public remarks **touting India’s nuclear capabilities**. His BJP predecessor Atal Behari Vajpayee, the prime minister who directed India’s nuclear tests in 1998, said in 2000 that India was "being threatened ~~by Pakistan~~ with a nuclear attack." "Do they understand what it means? If they think we would wait for them to drop a bomb and face destruction, they are mistaken," he said in remarks that were at odds with India’s 1999 draft nuclear doctrine, which noted that "India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike." The context of Modi’s remarks on nuclear weapons — election rallies — matter, of course. With a poor economic track record since 2014, **the BJP has rightly decided to focus on what much of the Indian public perceives as a strength: its management of national security and defense.** Within India, the decision by Modi to retaliate using conventional air power into Pakistani territory after the February 14 Pulwama attack was widely popular. But utterances on nuclear weapons do not take place in a vacuum and Modi’s remarks will be heard across the world. Pakistan has already seized on the opportunity to chide India for Modi’s comments. A Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman released a statement on Monday noting that "Pakistan considers these remarks as highly unfortunate and irresponsible." "Such rhetoric for short-term political and electoral gains, with complete disregard to its effects on strategic stability in South Asia is regrettable and against norms of responsible nuclear behaviour," the statement added.**
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NOVDEC - DA - 2020
====Trump loses 2020 but it’s close ==== Enten 9/3 ~~(Harry, Senior Writer and Analyst for CNN Politics, where he specializes in data-driven journalism, covering politics with a focus on poll numbers and electoral trends) "Trump trails Democrats by a historically large margin," CNN Politics, 9/3/19, https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/31/politics/trump-democrat-matchups-analysis/index.html~~ DRD Poll of the week: A new national Quinnipiac University poll finds that former Vice President Joe Biden, Massachusetts Sen. Elizabeth Warren, Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders, California Sen. Kamala Harris and South Bend, Indiana, Mayor Pete Buttigieg all lead President Donald Trump by significant margins in potential 2020 matchups. Biden is ahead of Trump by the most (16 points, 54 to 38), while Buttigeg is up by the least (9 points, 49 to 40). What's the point: The Quinnipiac poll was the second probability poll that meets CNN standards and was conducted in August which found Trump down by at least 5 points against all his most likely challengers. In both the Fox News poll out earlier this month and Quinnipiac's latest, he trailed his most likely challenger, Biden, by double-digits. In fact, in an average of all the August polls (those that meet CNN standards and not), Biden was up by a 49 to 39 margin. We're still over a year away from the 2020 general election, so don't take these polls to the bank. Still, it's worth pointing out the historically bad position Trump is in. No incumbent president has ever polled this poorly against his likely challengers at this point in the campaign. I went all the way back to World War II era in the Roper Center archive to see how presidents were polling at this point against their eventual challengers. I selected the worst poll for the incumbent if there was more than one poll taken in order to give Trump the most generous comparison. In years in which no polls were taken in August the year before the election (i.e. when the last poll for 2020 was conducted), I chose the poll taken closest to this point. What's clear is the vast majority of incumbents were ahead at this point in the campaign: nine of the 11 were ahead. And for the average incumbent, they led their eventual challenger by 12 points at this point. Again, Trump trails Biden by 10 points in the average August poll. Trump has not been ahead of Biden in a single national poll taken this entire cycle. Only two of 11 incumbents in past years, Jimmy Carter in 1979 and Barack Obama in 2011, were behind at this point. They were down by 4 points and 1 point respectively to their eventual challengers (Ronald Reagan and Mitt Romney). Carter went on to lose reelection. Obama went on to win with a small reelection margin — and there were many polls at this point that had him ahead. (Remember, I'm looking at the worst poll for past incumbents.) Put another way, Trump's worst poll against any of the top five Democrats at this point is 5 points worse than the worst poll for any incumbent since World War II against his eventual challenger. It's 12 points worse against his most likely challenger, Biden. As I've already mentioned, we don't know if these polls will hold. What is notable, though, is that Trump is not punching above his approval rating right now. Trump's approval rating has been consistently below his disapproval rating, just like he has been consistently been polling behind Biden. That lines up with what occurred in the 2018 midterms: Republican House candidates got the same share of the votes as Trump's approval rating, 45. Trump has time to turn his reelection ship in the right direction. But in the 10 months since the Republicans lost the House in 2018, he's in no better shape. You could even argue he's in a worse position. ====The plan consolidates centrist Dems in his favor==== Nuccitelli 18 ~~Dana Nuccitelli is an environmental scientist and risk assessor with many published climate papers. He writes for Yale Climate Connections. BS from UC Berkeley in astrophysics. Master’s in physics from UC Davis.~~ "97 of House Republicans foolishly reject carbon taxes." Guardian. July 20, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2018/jul/20/97-of-house-republicans-foolishly-reject-carbon-taxes TG Yesterday, the House of Representatives voted on an anti-carbon tax Resolution. The Resolution was introduced by Steve Scalise (R-LA) with essentially the same language as he introduced in 2013 and 2016. On those past versions, every Republican House member voted against carbon taxes. This time, six Republicans rejected the Resolution and one abstained, voting ‘Present.’ However, 97 of the House Republicans on the floor voted against carbon taxes. House Democrats have been fairly consistent in their votes on these Resolutions as well. In 2013, 94 voted against the Resolution, and in 2016 and 2018, 96 voted ‘Nay,’ with six to seven pro-fossil fuel Democrats voting ‘Yes.’ ====2020 determines U.S. participation in the Paris agreement—-key to avoid extinction from warming ==== Zoë **Schlanger 17**, Environment Reporter for Quartz; and Akshat Rathi, Science Journalist with Quartz, 6/1/17, "It’s Official: Trump is Forcing the US to Turn its Back on the Paris Climate Agreement," https://qz.com/996376/trump-has-decided-to-pull-the-us-from-the-paris-climate-agreement/ Since Trump reportedly waffled up to the last moment on the Paris agreement decision, we decided to show you what almost could have been. Here’s our story, written both ways. US president Donald Trump announced today (June 1) he’s decided to withdraw the country from the Paris climate agreement. The US emits about one-sixth of the planet’s total greenhouse gas emissions, making it the second-largest emitter in the world. The decision removes the US from its commitments to international efforts to reduce fossil-fuel emissions and thereby avoid levels of global temperature rise that imperil the future viability of human life on Earth. The US joins Nicaragua and Syria as the only countries to reject the Paris agreement. Notably, Nicaragua refused to join because its leadership felt the agreement did not go far enough. Syria, meanwhile, has since 2011 been mired in one of the globe’s most violent civil conflicts. Not leaving means Trump will have to respect the US’s commitments to reduce emissions. Trump will abide by the structure laid out in the agreement, which means it could take the US up to four years to actually leave. So the real question of whether the country stays in the Paris climate agreement may be decided by voters in 2020 the presidential election. Trump, who reportedly was undecided as recently as last evening, ultimately listened to ignored the voices of energy industry giants like ExxonMobil and Shell, coal company Cloud Peak, and Rex Tillerson, his own secretary of state, not to mention some of his most trusted advisors, daughter Ivanka Trump and son-in-law Jared Kushner. He thus ignored instead listened to the climate-denying faction of his inner-circle, including Environmental Protection Agency administrator Scott Pruitt, chief strategist Steve Bannon, and a coterie of 22 Republican senators who sent a letter to the president urging him to back out. (Those senators have collectively received $10 million in campaign contributions from the oil and gas industry since 2012.) The pledge made by the Obama administration to the Paris agreement is was not legally binding, but symbolically important. It offers offered an assurance to other nations that the country would take responsibility for its own share of global emissions. Within weeks of Trump taking office, however, his administration began the process of rolling back key federal emissions standards, making clear that it had no intention of working towards meeting the US’s commitment to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 2025 to about a third of the country’s 2005 emission levels. Without the US, the total number of countries that have formally pledged emissions reductions remains 147 drops to 146, in total accounting for roughly 80 65 of the planet’s emissions. As the US vacates its seat at the bargaining table, it cedes climate leadership to India, China, and the EU, all of which have publicly pledged to strengthen their commitments to mutually reduce emissions. Still, without US participation during what scientists agree are critical years, the hope of avoiding dangerous levels of climate change slips farther away.
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SEPTOCT - DA - Essentialism
==== You and I may both be Asian, but we don’t view the world the same way. Don’t speak for me. The 1AC’s attempts to use the voice of some Asian Americans to speak for all is a form of essentialism that precludes understanding of individual forms of oppression faced by other Asian Americans.==== Joan W. Scott 92 Professor of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study, Summer 92, October, Vol. 61, "The Identity in Question," p. 12-19, JStor There is nothing wrong, on the face of it, with teaching individuals about how to behave decently in relation to others and about how to empathize with each other's pain. The problem is that difficult analyses of how history and social standing, privilege, and subordination are involved in personal behavior entirely drop out. Chandra Mohanty puts it this way: There has been an erosion of the politics of collectivity through the reformulation of race and difference in individualistic terms. The 1960s and '70s slogan "the personal is political" has been recrafted in the 1980s as "the political is personal." In other words, all politics is collapsed into the personal, and questions of individual behaviors, attitudes, and life-styles stand in for political analysis of the social. Individual political struggles are seen as the only relevant and legit- imate form of political struggle.5 Paradoxically, individuals then generalize their perceptions and claim to speak for a whole group, but the groups are also conceived as unitary and autonomous. This individualizing, personalizing conception has also been be- hind some of the recent identity politics of minorities; indeed it gave rise to the intolerant, doctrinaire behavior that was dubbed, initially by its internal critics, "political correctness." It is particularly in the notion of "experience" that one sees this operating. In much current usage of "experience," references to structure and history are implied but not made explicit; instead, personal testimony of oppression re-places analysis, and this testimony comes to stand for the experience of the whole group. The fact of belonging to an identity group is taken as authority enough for one's speech; the direct experience of a group or culture-that is, membership in it-becomes the only test of true knowledge. The exclusionary implications of this are twofold: all those not of the group are denied even intellectual access to it, and those within the group whose experiences or interpretations do not conform to the established terms of identity must either suppress their views or drop out. An appeal to "experience" of this kind forecloses discussion and criticism and turns politics into a policing operation: the borders of identity are patrolled for signs of nonconformity; the test of membership in a group becomes less one's willingness to endorse certain principles and engage in specific political actions, less one's positioning in specific relationships of power, than one's ability to use the prescribed languages that are taken as signs that one is inherently "of" the group. That all of this isn't recognized as a highly political process that produces identities is troubling indeed, especially because it so closely mimics the politics of the powerful, naturalizing and deeming as discernably objective facts the prerequisites for inclusion in any group. ====Narratives of suffering permanently relate subjectivity to victimhood which relates identity to trauma and turns the case.==== Wendy Brown 96 * Wendy Brown is Professor of Women's Studies and Legal Studies, and is Co-Director of the Center for Cultural Studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz. The University of Chicago Law School Roundtable 1996 If, taken together, the two passages from Foucault we have been consider- ing call feminists to account in our compulsion to put everything about women into discourse, they do not yet exhaust the phenomenon of being ensnared 'in the folds of our own discourses.' For if the problem I have been discussing is easy enough to see—indeed, largely familiar to those who track techniques of co-optation—at the level of legal and bureaucratic discourse, it is altogether more disquieting when it takes the form of regulatory discourse in our own sub- and counter-cultures of resistance . . . when confessing injury becomes that which attaches us to the injury, paralyzes us within it, and prevents us from seeking or even desiring a status other than injured. In an age of social identification through attributes marked as culturally significant—gender, race, sexuality, and so forth—confessional discourse, with its truth-bearing status in a post-epistemological universe, not only regulates the confessor in the name of freeing her as Foucault described that logic, but extends beyond the confess- ing individual to constitute a regulatory truth about the identity group. Confessed truths are assembled and deployed as "knowledge" about the group. This phenomenon would seem to undergird a range of recurring troubles in feminism, from the "real woman" rejoinder to post-structuralist deconstructions of her, to totalizing descriptions of women's experience that are the inadvertent effects of various kinds of survivor stories. Thus, for example, the porn star who feels miserably exploited, violated and humiliated in her work invariably monopolizes the truth about sex work; as the girl with math anxieties constitutes the truth about women and math; as eating disor- ders have become the truth about women and food; as sexual abuse and viola- tion occupy the knowledge terrain of women and sexuality. In other words, even as feminism aims to affirm diversity among women and women's ex- periences, confession as the site of production of truth and its convergence with feminist suspicion and deauthorization of truth from other sources tends to reinstate a unified discourse in which the story of greatest suffering becomes the true story of woman. (I think this constitutes part of the rhetorical power of MacKinnon's work; analytically, the epistemological superiority of confes- sion substitutes for the older, largely discredited charge of false consciousness). Thus, the adult who does not suffer from her or his childhood sexual experi- ence, the lesbian who does not feel shame, the woman of color who does not primarily or "correctly" identify with her marking as such—these figures are excluded as bonafide members of the categories which also claim them. Their status within these discourses is that of being "in denial," "passing" or being a "race traitor." This is the norm-making process in feminist traditions of "breaking silence" which, ironically, silence and exclude~~~~~~s~~~~~~ th~~~~~~ose~~~~~~e very women these traditions mean to empower. (Is it surprising, when we think in this vein, that there is so little feminist writing on heterosexual pleasure?) But if these practices tacitly silence those whose experiences do not parallel those whose suffering is most marked (or whom the discourse produces as suffering markedly), they also condemn those whose sufferings they record~~~~~~ed~~~~~~ to a permanent identification with that suffering.
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JANFEB - DA - Shift
====The aff causes a shift to chemical and biological weapons – empirics and economic theory prove.==== **Narang '16** (Neil Narang; Neil Narang is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and Co-Director of the Global Security hub in the Orfalea Center at the University of California, Santa Barbara. In 2015-2016, he served as a Senior Advisor in the Office of the Secretary of Defense on a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship. He is currently a research scholar and steering committee member at the University of California Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC), faculty affiliate at the Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), affiliated researcher at the Centre for Conflict Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP) at the Graduate Institute, Geneva, and Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Narang specializes in international relations, with a focus on issues of international security and conflict management. Specifically, his research explores the role of signaling under uncertainty in situations of bargaining and cooperation, particularly as it applies to two substantive domains: (1) crisis bargaining in both interstate and civil war, and (2) cooperation through nuclear and conventional military alliances. His articles have appeared in the Journal of Politics, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, among others. He received his PhD in Political Science from UCSD and he holds a BA in Molecular Cell Biology and Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley. He has previously been a fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Browne Center for International Politics, a nonproliferation policy fellow at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and a junior faculty fellow and visiting professor at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation; 4-1-2016; "All Together Now? Questioning WMDs as a Useful Analytical Unit for Understanding Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation"; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10736700.2016.1153184, Taylor andamp; Francis, accessed 12-8-2019; JPark) NBC = Nuclear/Bio/Chemical weapons Rather than engage in a theoretical debate comparing the ease of acquisition and destructive potential across NBC weapons, we chose an empirical and inductive approach of observing historical patterns in states’ pursuit and acquisition of different WMDs to determine whether states appeared to behave as if these weapons were substitutes or compliments. To do this, we estimated something akin to a cross-elasticity of demand across WMDs by measuring the impact of pursuing and possessing any one type of WMD on the risk a state will eventually pursue another type, holding that state’s underlying ‘‘willingness’’ to pursue a WMD (demand) constant. In other words, at any given level of demand—which we approximate using a set of control variables that previous research has shown to be correlated with states’ willingness to pursue a nuclear weapon—we tried to estimate the independent effect that acquiring one type of weapon would have on the probability that a state will pursue another. To begin, this approach required accurate historical data on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons pursuit and acquisition across time and space. And although there is some emerging consensus around which states pursued and possessed nuclear weapons over time, there was no previously established data on chemical and biological weapons proliferation.15 To compile this data, we relied on six different sources: (1) the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, (2) the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, (3) Arms Control Association, the (4) Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (5) the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, and (6) the Stimson Center.16 Fortunately for us, the coding in these six sources were highly correlated. However, they did not always agree on which states pursed or acquired chemical and biological weapons in any given year. Nevertheless, we were able to confirm the robustness of our results to different sampling rules that required either unanimity across sources, agreement across a majority of sources, or any single source reporting pursuit or possession of a chemical or biological weapon by a state in any particular year. The results of our analyses were telling. Specifically, we found that the underlying demand for NBC weapons appears to be correlated. That is, many of the same factors that cause states to "go nuclear" also appear to systematically influence the risk that states will seek chemical and biological weapons. With respect to the relationship between different weapons of mass destruction, we found that NBC weapons generally appear to function as complements at the pursuit stage: simply initiating pursuit of any one WMD appears to independently increase the risk that a state will seek all three simultaneously, controlling for other factors. Finally, and perhaps most interesting, we found some evidence that WMDs do function as substitutes in one important fashion: once states acquire nuclear weapons, they appear far less likely to pursue or possess chemical and biological weapons. That is, the data appears to support the popular notion that chemical and biological weapons function as a "poor man’s atomic bomb," since acquiring a nuclear weapon appears to satisfy demand and reduce the risk of chemical and biological weapons pursuit, but not vice-versa. This last finding is also remarkably consistent with the idea that nuclear weapons acquisition may uniquely entail some prestige. Of course, these results are not without their limitations. First, these are systematic empirical regularities estimated across states in the international system over time. There certainly are, however, important historical cases that do not fit these general patterns well. For example, both the United States and the Soviet Union maintained chemical weapons programs for decades after they acquired nuclear weapons. Second, the pursuit and acquisition of WMDs are relatively rare events, particularly with respect to nuclear weapons. For this reason, some of our findings may be driven by the behavior of only a handful of states, which could limit the applicability of the findings. Finally, our results are only instructive if the historical data under analysis are accurate. However, because WMD programs are notoriously secret, determining which states actively pursue or possess a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon in any given year is a non-trivial measurement challenge. We were careful to check the robustness of our findings to different datasets and different sampling rules, but this still assumes some independence across measurements. In the end, we emphasized these limitations and encouraged caution in making strong policy inferences based on our results. Misleading Inferences So what inferences—if any—from this research can we draw to the likely impact of deep nuclear reductions on the risk of chemical and biological weapons proliferation? Might policies that limit the supply of nuclear weapons simply shift proliferation risk elsewhere? Even more to the point, could actors increasingly view chemical and biological weapons as the "poor man’s atomic bomb," in inverse relationship to declining global nuclear stockpiles? The short answer to these questions is that we cannot yet know the likely impact of deep nuclear reductions on chemical and biological weapons proliferation. This is because existing research—including our own study—does not provide the type of empirical evidence needed to forecast these outcomes with any real confidence. To illustrate this, I anticipate four mechanisms through which restrictions in the global supply of nuclear weapons might be posited to increase the risk of chemical and biological weapons proliferation. I then show that each of these inferences is nevertheless unsustainable based on the findings described above. The first inference that one may be tempted to draw from past findings is that a policy focused on achieving reductions in the global nuclear stockpile could cause a rise in chemical and biological weapons proliferation as more states view them as a "poor man’s atomic bomb." As noted above, our findings suggested that states appear to seek chemical and biological weapons for many of the same reasons as they pursue nuclear weapons. Furthermore, our findings also indicate that states that do not possess nuclear weapons appear to be systematically more likely to pursue chemical and biological weapons than states that do possess them. When combined, it may seem reasonable to suppose that, conditional on some level of demand for one of these types of weapons, reductions in the global supply of nuclear weapons could cause some states to pursue chemical and biological weapons as "imperfect substitutes" for the deterrence and compellence benefits of nuclear weapons. ====That causes extinction==== **Millett and Snyder-Beattie ‘17**. Millett, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford; and Snyder-Beattie, M.S., Director of Research, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford. 08-01-2017. "Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity," Health Security, 15(4), PubMed In the decades to come, advanced bioweapons could threaten human existence. Although the probability of human extinction from bioweapons may be low, the expected value of reducing the risk could still be large, since such risks jeopardize the existence of all future generations. We provide an overview of biotechnological extinction risk, make some rough initial estimates for how severe the risks might be, and compare the cost-effectiveness of reducing these extinction-level risks with existing biosecurity work. We find that reducing human extinction risk can be more cost-effective than reducing smaller-scale risks, even when using conservative estimates. This suggests that the risks are not low enough to ignore and that more ought to be done to prevent the worst-case scenarios. How worthwhile is it spending resources to study and mitigate the chance of human extinction from biological risks? The risks of such a catastrophe are presumably low, so a skeptic might argue that addressing such risks would be a waste of scarce resources. In this article, we investigate this position using a cost-effectiveness approach and ultimately conclude that the expected value of reducing these risks is large, especially since such risks jeopardize the existence of all future human lives. Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone.2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25 of the European population,3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10 of the world's population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization. A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations, overcome rare genetic resistances, and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures. Even evolution itself may work in humanity's favor: Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6 While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they do not rule the possibility out entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of species going extinct due to disease—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86 loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95 loss of population), and the Western Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98 loss of population).9 In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be realized independently. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100 case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95 of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. But advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of diseases that combine such traits. Recent controversy has already emerged over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics.13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100 case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-21 Although these experiments had scientific merit and were not conducted with malicious intent, their implications are still worrying. This is especially true given that there is also a long historical track record ofstate-run bioweapon research applying cutting-edge science and technology to design agents not previously seen in nature. The Soviet bioweapons program developed agents with traits such as enhanced virulence, resistance to therapies, greater environmental resilience, increased difficulty to diagnose or treat, and which caused unexpected disease presentations and outcomes.22 Delivery capabilities have also been subject to the cutting edge of technical development, with Canadian, US, and UK bioweapon efforts playing a critical role in developing the discipline of aerobiology.23,24 While there is no evidence of state-run bioweapons programs directly attempting to develop or deploy bioweapons that would pose an existential risk, the logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction could create such incentives in more unstable political environments or following a breakdown of the Biological Weapons Convention.25 The possibility of a war between great powers could also increase the pressure to use such weapons—during the World Wars, bioweapons were used across multiple continents, with Germany targeting animals in WWI,26 and Japan using plague to cause an epidemic in China during WWII.27
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Contact info
HI!!! my name is Jackson and my pronouns are he/him Hit me up if you have any questions bout disclosure, or any other concerns -Email: [email protected] -phone: 201-501-3177
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contact info
HI!!! my name is Jackson and my pronouns are he/him Hit me up if you have any questions bout disclosure, or any other concerns -Email: [email protected] -phone: 201-501-3177
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MA - Aff v1
=1ac= ==resolution== ====I affirm the resolution – predictive policing is unjust==== ==framing== ====a system is just if all self-interested, rational people living under it would agree that the system is equitable, fair and favorable from an initial condition of equality. a system is unjust if self-interested rational people living under it would not consent to the conditions of the system.==== Thomas **Rawls**, **1971**, A Theory of Justice, https://www.csus.edu/indiv/c/chalmersk/econ184sp09/johnrawls.pdf My aim is to present a conception of justice which generalizes and carries to a AND sense its members are autonomous and the obligations they recognize self-imposed. ====Under the resolution, the value is therefore liberty – violating rights in the name of survival causes social paralysis and destroys the value to life – multiple examples==== Daniel **Callahan**, institute of Society and Ethics, **1973**, The Tyranny of Survival, pp. 91-93) The value of survival could not be so readily abused were it not for its AND survival. It would be the Pyrrhic victory to end all Pyrrhic victories. ====The criterion is minimizing structural violence. Structural violence is the biggest cause of social inequity. It causes certain groups of people to be invisible from our perspective. Structural violence is invisible, so revealing it forces us to reevaluate our perceptions. This means a structural violence framework is the only way to confront injustice, and therefore minimizing structural violence precludes all other ethical evaluation. Multiple warrants.==== **Winter and Leighton '07:** (Deborah Du Nann Winter and Dana C. Leighton, professors of psychology, STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE, Peace, Conflict, and Violence: Peace Psychology for the 21st Century, Ohio State University, 2007, http://academic.marion.ohio-state.edu/dchristie/Peace20Psychology20Book_files/Section20II20-20Structural20Violence20(Winter202620Leighton).pdf) Direct violence is horrific, but its brutality usually gets our attention: we notice AND thinking can be fostered by relationships, communication, and appreciation of diversity. ====the role of the judge is to evaluate the debate based on which framework wins off the flow from an offense/defense paradigm and use that to evaluate the rest of the impacts of the debate==== ====drop the debater on all aff theory arguments – otherwise they have every reason to load up the 1nc with abusive arguments – key to maintain fairness==== ==case== ====Predictive policing is a convenient way to obfuscate and tech-wash problems with policing behind a façade of objective algorithms==== Vincent **Southerland**, American Civil Liberties Union, ~~Vincent Southerland is the executive director of the Center on Race, Inequality, and the Law at NYU School of Law. He previously served as a senior counsel with the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, where he focused on race and criminal justice, and as a public defender with The Bronx Defenders and the Federal Defenders of New York.~~ 4-9-**2018**, "With AI and Criminal Justice, the Devil Is in the Data," https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/ai-and-criminal-justice-devil-data If we have learned anything in the last decade about our criminal justice system, AND intended reformers ensure that these new tools are used for the public good. ====By using data sets from current policing information like arrest rates, predictive policing perpetuates the same biases as regular policing==== Dave **Collins**, 7-5-**2018**, "Should police use computers to predict crimes and criminals?," AP NEWS, https://apnews.com/14bb35110b644edc8798365ade767bd2/Should-police-use-computers-to-predict-crimes-and-criminals HARTFORD, Conn. (AP) — Years of secrecy by America's police departments AND from the program were used in his case. The case remains pending. ====Leading artificial intelligence experts say AI should not be in charge of criminal justice==== Randy **Rieland**, 3-5-**2018**, "Artificial Intelligence Is Now Used to Predict Crime. But Is It Biased?," Smithsonian Magazine, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/artificial-intelligence-is-now-used-predict-crime-is-it-biased-180968337/ What is fair? It seems a simple question, but it's one without simple AND that, in practice, that's not something that happens all the time." ====Experts say predictive policing is both racist and doesn't even work, and predictive policing hides biases by claiming they are scientifically legitimate==== Mara **Hvistendahl**, 9-28-**2016**, "Can 'predictive policing' prevent crime before it happens?," Science ~| AAAS, https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/09/can-predictive-policing-prevent-crime-it-happens Riding high in their squad car, officers Jamie Pascucci and Joe Kania are cruising AND ? That's the challenge that policing in this country is facing right now." ====The algorithms are secretive, non-transparent, and susceptible to biased outcomes ==== Andrew Guthrie **Ferguson**, 10-3-**2017**, "The Police Are Using Computer Algorithms to Tell if You're a Threat," Time, https://time.com/4966125/police-departments-algorithms-chicago/ Can a computer predict violence? In Chicago, Illinois, an algorithm rates every AND and that local communities must debate before they enact new predictive policing strategies.
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MA - Speed v1
==speed== ====the spreading of the 1ac is exclusionary and prevents me from actively engaging the aff==== ====reject the debater – the damage is done, I can't follow – destroys my education==== ====speech doc doesn't solve – speech doc is a courtesy and I shouldn't need to follow the speech doc to know what's going on====
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JANFEB - AC - Space Force
open source
851,818
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328,707
JANFEB - DA - South Asia
open source
851,827
365,060
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MARAPR - Theory - CW
open source
851,826
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MARAPR - CP - Uighurs
open source
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0 - contact
pronouns: she/her email: [email protected] FB: annalaine whitson if u want me to do anything specific for disclosure just lmk
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nuclear weapons
open source
851,834
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Jan feb - CP thorium, DA nuclear umbrella
open source
851,842
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328,748
Dont read Disclosure
Please don't be the person that reads Disclosure Theory on a novice. Our coach doesn't believe in Debating in the Novice circuit so most of our novices will be debating in Varsity after their first tournament. Please be nice, they probably don't even know that this wiki exists yet. All our novices build their own cases, so it's unlikely your going to find them running the same thing as a varsity member, but it's all pretty traditional. Thank you for your consideration, and I hope that the round they have with you will be constructive.
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Contact Info and Interp
Hi I'm Deborah If you need to contact me do so by email at [email protected] Look at aff for detailed interp
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3 - Paradoxes
Paradoxes – a) Meno's – in order to discover something, it must not be known, but in order to know to discover something, it must already be known – this makes the quest for knowledge incomprehensible and thus impossible, b) Good Samaritan – affirming negates – it ought to be the case that we eliminate nuclear arsenals if we provide it now, however that can only be the case if we provide nuclear arsenals now, THUS it is obligatory that we provide nuclear arsenals, c) Xeno's – to go anywhere, you must go halfway first, and then you must go half of the remaining distance, and half of the remaining distance, and so forth to infinity – thus, motion is impossible because it necessitates traversing an infinite number of spaces in a finite amount of time, d) Lottery paradox - Premise 1 – If I were to buy a lottery ticket and upon buying the ticket, I would think that it was very unlikely for me to win. Premise 2 – If I universalize premise 1, I'd also see everyone's tickets as also not winning. This can't be true, since we all know intuitively that the lottery has at least 1 winning ticket. This means we can deduce certain things and universalize them, but it doesn't mean that it can be universally coherent. Squo solves since we take no chance at making things incoherent by trying to apply universality
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2 - K - Settler Colonialism v6
====Portraying nuclear conflict as a final armageddon between first world nations depoliticizes the ongoing nuclear violence of mining, dumping, and testing against Indigenous peoples.==== Kato 93 (Masahide, Professor in Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii, Honolulu; "Nuclear Globalism: Traversing Rockets, Satellites, and Nuclear War via the Strategic Gaze," Alternatives, Volume 18, Number 3, Summer 1993, pg. 347-349, ISSN 0304-3754.) The vigorous invasion of the logic of capitalist accumulation into the last vestige of relatively AND happening in the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations almost on a daily basis. ====It's really not a thought experiment - their assumption that the state is the legitimate actor and polices solve - undermines indigenous people and only redefines settler colonialism. King '17==== King, Hayden. "The Erasure of Indigenous Thought in Foreign Policy." OpenCanada, 31 July 2017, www.opencanada.org/features/erasure-indigenous-thought-foreign-policy/. TC I spent some of the best days of my childhood on the West Beach of AND state in the community of nations, but rather a violent settler colony. ====Colonialism causes indigenous peoples to be structurally placed in a space of social death where agency is separate from their existence. ==== **Byrd**^^ ^^** Bracketed for language** But what seems to me to be further disavowed, even in Lowe's important figuration AND because they are the transit through which the dialectic of subject and object occurs ====The root cause from problems of class, sexism, and more on non-indians stems from settler colonialism– a model that has obstructed modern day view upon the indigenous. Churchill '96==== WARD CHURCHILL, FORMER PROFESSOR OF ETHNIC STUDIES AT UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO, BOULDER 1996 "I AM INDIGENIST," FROM A NATIVE SON PGS 520-30 To frame things clearly in this regard, let's hypothesize for a moment that all AND our ultimate genocidal obliteration as self-defining and self-determining peoples. ====The ROB is to endorse the debater who best methodologically deconstructs settler colonial violence. ==== ====Discourse in round provides educational tools we need to challenge colonialist structures – failure to challenge colonialist contradictions means pedagogical spaces are socially unsustainable and sidelines important discussions of colonialism. Grande '05==== Grande, Sandy. Red Pedagogy. 2005. Page 65-67. *brackets in original text* TC This chapter thus aims to reframe the discourse on Indians and the environment, regrounding AND stands in greater opposition to the reflexivity of modernity (1990, 38). ====The alternative is an act of decolonization – one that gives back land to indigenous people – and allows natives to embrace a state free from settler colonialism. Only through the alt can we reevaluate our orientation in scholarship and control the epistemic starting point of the 1AC. Tuck and Yang '12==== Tuck, Eve. ~~State University of New York at New Paltz~~. Yang, K Wayne. ~~University of California San Diego~~. "Decolonization is not a metaphor." Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education, and Society. Vol 1, No 1, pgs 7, 35-36. 2012. https://www.latrobe.edu.au/staff-profiles/data/docs/fjcollins.pdf *original text in brackets* TC Decolonization as metaphor allows people to equivocate these contradictory decolonial desires because it turns decolonization AND p. 36). Settler colonialism and its decolonization implicates and unsettles everyone. ====They continue==== An ethic of incommensurability, which guides moves that unsettle innocence, stands in contrast to aims of reconciliation, which motivate settler moves to innocence. Reconciliation is about rescuing settler normalcy, about rescuing a settler future. Reconciliation is concerned with questions of what will decolonization look like? What will happen after abolition? What will be the consequences of decolonization for the settler? Incommensurability acknowledges that these questions need not, and perhaps cannot, be answered in order for decolonization to exist as a framework. We want to say, first, that decolonization is not obliged to answer those questions - decolonization is not accountable to settlers, or settler futurity. Decolonization is accountable to Indigenous sovereignty and futurity. Still, we acknowledge the questions of those wary participants in Occupy Oakland and other settlers who want to know what decolonization will require of them. The answers are not fully in view and can't be as long as decolonization remains punctuated by metaphor. The answers will not emerge from friendly understanding, and indeed require a dangerous understanding of uncommonality that un-coalesces coalition politics - moves that may feel very unfriendly. But we will find out the answers as we get there, "in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give ~~decolonization~~ historical form and content" (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). To fully enact an ethic of incommensurability means relinquishing settler futurity, abandoning the hope that settlers may one day be commensurable to Native peoples. It means removing the asterisks, periods, commas, apostrophes, the whereas's, buts, and conditional clauses that punctuate decolonization and underwrite settler innocence. The Native futures, the lives to be lived once the settler nation is gone - these are the unwritten possibilities made possible by an ethic of incommensurability.
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2 - K - Kant Ableist
====Kantianism requires rationality that constructs a perfect subject – this form of rationality isn't accessible to all people, reifying ableism==== Ryan: Ryan ~~Philosophy student~~ "Cognitive Disability, Misfortunate, and Justice." Introduction to Ethics, Binghamton University. 2011. RP In Kant's deontological ethics, one has a duty to treat humanity not as a AND endowed, not because they have any value as moral agents in themselves. ====THAT'S A VOTING ISSUE - Ableism is a tactic of oppression that permeates all forms of discrimination - categorization based on normative biological standards justifies every form of discrimination and violence. Turns case and o/w – you don't get to weigh case – ______==== Siebers 9: Siebers, Tobin ~~Professor of Literary and Cultural Criticism @ University of Michigan~~, "The Aesthetics of Human Disqualification". October 2009. Oppression is the systematic victimization of one group by another. It is a form AND represents at this moment in time the final frontier of justifiable human inferiority.
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1 - Spikes on Top
====Interpretation – The affirmative debater must read theory preempts or objections at the top of their speech in the 1AC. ==== ====Violation – ***extemp*==== ====1~~ Strat Skew – The interp disincentivizes debaters from bad theory practices IE hiding theory preempts on case. Otherwise can extend any spike that you extempted in the underview with your extra time, in which you can win off of. This puts me at a structural disadvantage and kills fairness. ====
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1 - Multi-Actor Fiat Bad
====Interpretation – The affirmative debater must not specify multiple actors for the 1AC plan, unless cited by the resolution in the 1AC.==== ====Violation – They literally said in CX that all individuals==== ====Standards:==== ====1~~ Strat Skew – specifying multiple actors lets the 1AR cherrypick exceptions they'll make IE the 1AR can choose and weigh one individual actor that comes before all other actors, mooting the entirety of the 1NC and killing fairness. ==== ====2~~ Depth – specifying multiple actors doesn't let us debate the nuances of a specific actor and its processes – which avoids core topic ed arguments like process CPs and certain politics DAs. Kills education since you force us to debate surface level arguments that don't actually dig into the literature.==== ====3~~ Resolvability – If two specifications came up in later speeches and each debater went for a different one, the round would be irresolvable. IE: I win that Harvard fiat is good, but you win that Yale fiat is bad. Independent voter since judges need to resolve rounds for us to debate====
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0 - Trigger Warnings
If there are any parts of my 1AC or 1NC strategies that you'd prefer I didn't read, please feel free to let me know before the round so I can adjust accordingly.
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0 - Contact Info
Hi! I'm Tej (he/him). Feel free to contact me with any questions/comments/etc. that you have. Email: [email protected] Facebook: Tej Gedela
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NOVDEC - CP - Black Lung Disability Trust Fund
====CP: The United States should:==== eliminate subsidies for coal except for funding of the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund substantially increase funding of the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund eliminate all other subsidies for fossil fuels ====It's a subsidy to the coal industry of over 1 Billion, but the aff can't stop the deficit==== **Adeyeye et al 9** Adenike Adeyeye (Chief of Staff to Commissioner of California Public Utilities Commission), James Barrett (partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Latham and Watkins, Leadership council of Environmental Law Institute, specializes in cases concerning the Clean Air Act and various solid and hazardous waste laws, including CERCLA), Jordan Diamond (Co-Director of Ocean Project at Environmental Law Institute), Lisa Goldman (Acting Assistant General Counsel at Environmental Protection Agency), John Pendergrass (Vice President, Programs and Publications at ELI, JD Case Western University), and Daniel Schramm, Report produced on behalf of the Environmental Law Institute, Estimating U.S. Government Subsidies to Energy Sources: 2002-2008, September 2009, https://www.eli.org/research-report/estimating-us-government-subsidies-energy-sources-2002-2008 WJ The Black Lung Disability Trust Fund (BLDTF) pays health benefits to coal miners AND , or, adjusted for inflation, about $1.035 billion. ====Federal funding is essential - depletion of funds threatens tens of thousands of lives and beneficiaries are ballooning. protect their lives not the deficit==== **Lovan 19** Dylan Lovan, "APNewsBreak: Congress' inaction endangers black lung fund," AP News, 3-20-2019, https://apnews.com/07c68ddd6a304e7ca6b020c2b9deb052 WJ COEBURN, Va. (AP) — Former coal miner John Robinson's bills for AND put more pressure on the fund, as the industry continues to shrink.
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NOVDEC - DA - Land Grab
====Aff causes a shift to renewable energy. Renewables drive up African land grab ==== Schneider and Sorman 12, "Energy Transitions and the Global Land Rush: Ultimate Drivers and Persistent Consequences," Elsevier Vol. 22 Issue 3, August 2012. Re-cut KH While the recent emergence of a global land rush has initiated large debates and conflicts over the use and access to land, further investigation into the underlying drivers is required to enhance the understanding of the potential trajectories of the land grab phenomenon. This paper takes a biophysical perspective and explores how declining fossil stocks and a global transition towards renewable energies ultimately drive the land rush. The paper addresses, in qualitative terms, how societal needs for land change with different patterns of societal energy metabolism. The potential spatial expansions of renewables are illustrated in quantitative terms, based on the power density concept and energy provision forecasts for the year 2020. The transition from an energy system based on fossils stocks, with high power densities, to one based on renewables, with low power densities, drastically boosts societal demand for land. This drives the land rush directly through land acquisitions for the expansion of energy systems. The energy transition also drives the land rush indirectly, in particular through food security threats motivated by the growing competition over farmland uses and changes in crop supply. Although currently fossil stocks are still relatively abundant, future declines are expected to trigger the demand for land to even greater extents. ====Large Multinational companies are grabbing land for renewables through corruption and exploitation==== Carroccio, A., Crescimanno, M., Galati, A. et al. Agric Econ (2016) 4: 12. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40100-016-0056-7 KH The phenomenon stems largely from world population growth, today approximately 7 billion and estimated to be 9 billion in 2050 (FAO 2013), with consequent need of food and energy consumption (including renewable energy) and growth of insecurity. This is true, in particular, in many African countries where in the last few years was registered a growing food insecurity in cereals due to rapid increase of population and urbanisation process (Galati et al. 2014). In the last few decades, the need to achieve food and energy security has been among the reasons that pushed governments and multinational corporations to search for land in which to invest. Other reasons are: the need to exert more control on the global market, especially for scarce resources such as water and soil; ensure economic viability and social stability of their own governments; expand and diversify company and investment funds (Buxton et al. 2012; Deininger and Byerlee 2011). However, according to De Castro (2011) the problem of the ‘new scarcity’ of food cannot be explained only by analyzing the demographics and production, but rather looking at the unequal distribution of basic resources such as land, livelihoods and ‘know-how’. Land grabbing takes place mainly in underdeveloped and developing countries that are, thus, exploited and become further impoverished and robbed of not only of their environment but also of human capital. As asserted by Zagema (2011), the populations of the areas affected by land grabbing are frequently forced into exile without being able to claim the right of ownership of their land. In general, the contracts provide acquisitions or leases of vast fertile areas for periods between 25 and 99 years, with rents that can range from €0.60 to €16 per hectare and per year (Liberti 2011). On the other hand, the recipient governments consent is mainly due to opportunities to benefit from transnational capital to start processes of growth and modernization through the creation of jobs, the production of cash crops and the construction of infrastructure (Cotula et al. 2009; Lavers 2012). As suggested by Longhitano (2010) the negotiations exploit the particularly favourable conditions of the land market in developing countries, on account of the lack of certainty regarding property rights, and appeal to local governments for potential returns in terms of infrastructure and increase in GDP and employment rates. ====These land grabs are awful- they reduce economic growth, threaten food security, and kill small famers==== Roy Laishley 14, Africa Renewal, Kenya, "Is Africa’s land up for grabs?" Africa Renewal: Special Edition on Agriculture 2014. Re-cut KH The outcries reflect the continuing impact of the continent’s history, when as recently as the last century colonial powers and foreign settler populations arbitrarily seized African land and displaced those who lived on it, lending considerable emotion to the current volatile issue. Some agricultural experts have wondered whether such land deals could lead to a form of "neo-colonialism". But immediate, practical concerns are also prominent. "This is a worrisome trend," noted Akinwumi Adesina, the then vice president of the advocacy group Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA). Such foreign land acquisitions, he argued, have the potential to hurt domestic efforts to raise food production and could limit broad-based economic growth. Many deals have little oversight, transparency or regulation, have no environmental safeguards and fail to protect smallholder farmers from losing their customary rights to use land, added Mr. Adesina, now Nigeria’s minister for agriculture. The sheer size of some of the land agreements has added to the alarm. A deal to allow South Korea’s Daewoo Corporation to lease 1.3 million hectares was a key factor in building support for the ouster of Madagascar’s President Marc Ravalomanana in March 2009. In Kenya the government struggled to overcome local opposition to a proposal to give Qatar and others rights over some 40,000 hectares in the Tana River Valley in return for building a deep-sea port. A number of international organizations reacted to this development. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Bank commissioned studies into so-called "land grabs." At the 2009 summit of the Group of Eight (G-8) industrialized countries in Italy, Japan pushed for a code of conduct to govern such schemes. Any code of conduct is going to be difficult to negotiate, and it will be even more difficult for industrialized countries to apply to deals that are primarily worked out between countries in the South, the UN’s Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, told Africa Renewal. This outweighs on scope since it’s a inetrnational issue andoutweighs on cyclicality. As long as renwables are being used and the aff furthers our attention form fossil fuels the vilence enacted on he people in africn will compile over and over again. Cyclyicality outweighs their clinate change imact since it cycles over and over again comppouding
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SEPTOCT - T - Defend the topic
===T=== Interpretation: The affirmative must defend the desirability of hypothetical action by colleges to ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions. ====Undergraduates are students who attend a college or university who haven’t received a bachelor’s degree==== Cambridge ND ~~Cambridge Dictionary, "Undergraduate"~~ ~~DS~~ ~~https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/undergraduate~~ undergraduate noun ~~ C ~~ US /??n·d?r??ræd?·u·?t/ a student at a college or university who has not yet received a bachelor’s degree (= the first degree given) ====Universities are legally institutions of higher learning that offer instruction in arts and sciences.==== Black’s Law Dictionary ND ~~"What is University?"~~ ~~DS~~ ~~https://thelawdictionary.org/university/~~ An institution of higher learning, consisting of an assemblage of col- leges united under one corporate organization and government, affording instruction in the arts and sciences and the learned professions. and conferring degrees. See Com. v. Banks, 198 Pa. 397. 48 Atl. 277. ====Standardized tests have certain standards qualify==== Perrone PhD 77 ~~Vito, former Director of Teacher Education at the Harvard University Graduate School of Education~~ "The Abuses of Standardized Testing" Fastback Series No. 92. 1977 re-cut KH The author takes the position that standardized tests, as presently developed and marketed, do have potentially positive uses. However, these advantages are outweighed by the tests' deleterious effects on children and programs. Standardized tests refer to published, norm referenced, achievement and intelligence tests which contain specific instructions for administration. This discussion includes a historical background of standardized testing, an explanation of the tests themselves, a proposed moratorium on testing and suggested alternatives to standardized testing. A bibliography is appended. ====Admissions decisions determine whether someone is accepted to a school==== University of Sheffield 16 "Appeals and Complaints Procedure for Applicants" RE *doesn’t give a date but June 2016 is the last one mentioned* This procedure concerns admissions decisions only. Admissions decisions are defined as decisions relating to the academic selection of candidates for entry to the University and the terms on which candidates are selected, including the assignation of fee status and tuition fee. Admissions decisions do not involve setting the level of the tuition fee, determining arrangements for paying the tuition fee, awarding funding or allocating University accommodation. ====Resolved denotes a proposal to be enacted by implementation or policy==== Words and Phrases 1964 Permanent Edition Definition of the word "resolve," given by Webster is "to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;" It is of similar force to the word "enact," which is defined by Bouvier as meaning "to establish by law". ====Violation – they do not defend a world with a policy that deceases military aid==== ====FIRST IS ENGAGEMENT — Debate requires a specific point of difference in order to promote effective exchange—stasis and limits are key to engagement.==== Steinberg and Freeley 13: David, Lecturer in Communicatio22n studies and rhetoric. Advisor to Miami Urban Debate League. Director of Debate at U Miami, Former President of CEDA. And ** Austin, attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, JD, Suffolk University, Argumentation and Debate, Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, 121-4 Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a controversy, a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a feet or value or policy, there is no need or opportunity for debate; the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions of issues, there is no debate. Controversy invites decisive choice between competing positions. Debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants live in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity to gain citizenship? Does illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? How are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies are best understood when seated clearly such that all parties to the debate share an understanding about the objective of the debate. This enables focus on substantive and objectively identifiable issues facilitating comparison of competing argumentation leading to effective decisions. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, general feelings of tension without opportunity for resolution, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the U.S. Congress to make substantial progress on the immigration debate. Of course, arguments may be presented without disagreement. For example, claims are presented and supported within speeches, editorials, and advertisements even without opposing or refutational response. Argumentation occurs in a range of settings from informal to formal, and may not call upon an audience or judge to make a forced choice among competing claims. Informal discourse occurs as conversation or panel discussion without demanding a decision about a dichotomous or yes/no question. However, by definition, debate requires "reasoned judgment on a proposition. The proposition is a statement about which competing advocates will offer alternative (pro or con) argumentation calling upon their audience or adjudicator to decide. The proposition provides focus for the discourse and guides the decision process. Even when a decision will be made through a process of compromise, it is important to identify the beginning positions of competing advocates to begin negotiation and movement toward a center, or consensus position. It is frustrating and usually unproductive to attempt to make a decision when deciders are unclear as to what the decision is about. The proposition may be implicit in some applied debates ("Vote for me!"); however, when a vote or consequential decision is called for (as in the courtroom or in applied parliamentary debate) ~~I~~t is essential that the proposition be explicitly expressed ("the defendant is guilty!"). In academic debate, the proposition provides essential guidance for the preparation of the debaters prior to the debate, the case building and discourse presented during the debate, and the decision to be made by the debate judge after the debate. Someone disturbed by the problem of a growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They' are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or, worse, "It’s too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies, The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved; That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. This focus contributes to better and more informed decision making with the potential for better results. In academic debate, it provides better depth of argumentation and enhanced opportunity for reaping the educational benefits of participation. In the next section, we will consider the challenge of framing the proposition for debate, and its role in the debate. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. ====First is fairness—their interp destroys competitive debate:==== ====A~~ Ground: they get to pick the topic ex post facto which incentivizes vague argumentation that’s not grounded in a consistent, stable mechanism – they’re playing dodgeball with hand grenades – that causes a race to the margins where they’re incentivized to defend uncontestable statements like "racism bad" or "2+2=4." Caselists are concessionary, unpredictable, beaten by perms, and don’t justify their model. ==== ====B~~ Limits: their model has no resolutional bound and creates the possibility for literally an infinite number of 1ACs. Not debating the topic allows someone to specialize in one area of the library for 4 years giving them a huge edge over people who switch research focus ever 2 months, which means their arguments are presumptively false because they haven’t been subject to well-researched scrutiny. Cutting negs to every possible aff wrecks small schools, which has a disparate impact on under-resourced and minority debaters. Counter-interpretations are arbitrary, unpredictable, and don’t solve the world of neg prep because there’s no grounding in the resolution==== ====C~~ Causality- debating the resolution forces the affirmative to defend a cause and effect relationship, the state doing x results in y. Non topical affs establish their own barometer "I think x is good for me" that aren’t negateable.==== ====D~~ Vote neg to preserve fairness—-debate requires effective competition in order to motivate in-depth research and give meaning to the work we do, and the only way to actualize any benefit of the activity is if the judge can make a decision between two sides who have had a relatively equal chance to prepare.==== ====Second, switch-side debate – solves all your offense==== ====You can still read your arguments and include discussions like the aff in the space==== ====Not defending the topic means negatives lose access to engaging positions and other nuanced forms of scholarship and have to resort to broad, unspecific strategies like cap and framework==== ====TVA – ==== ====Defend a policy where you stop funding regimes through the use of your method==== ====Fairness is a voter because unfair arguments arbitrarily skew your evaluation of the round and it precedes substance because it frames its evaluation. Drop the debater a) to set a precedent for the best norms of debate, b) to deter future abuse, c) to rectify time lost running theory, Use competing interps because a) what is reasonably fair is arbitrary and b) reasonability encourages debaters to get away with increasingly unfair strategies through defense on theory. ==== ====No RVIs:==== ====1~~ it’s an aff burden—same reason you don’t win for putting defense on a disad or answering inherency==== ====2~~ chilling effect—debaters will be scared to go for theory for fear of losing to a prepped out counter-interp, proliferating abuse==== ====3~~ substantive education—no rvis ensures we can return to substance if the aff wins their topical, whereas rvis make every debate all about theory==== ====4~~ both debaters have the burden of being fair, and no one deserves to win for just meeting that burden==== ====5~~ Neg flex— they know their plan infinitely far in advance and should have T frontlined; T being no-risk is key to neg strat since 1AR frontline dumps would wreck me and I’d have no other out in the 2N since it’s the highest layer.====
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0-Read Me
Hi if u are reading this you are probably hitting one of our 5th graders. U can contact me for disclosure if you really need it. All my contact info is on Marvin Baker-Mahir Bansal.
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MA - Terror v1
terror== **====The plan wrecks counter terror ops – AI is key to prevent attacks====** **McKendrick 19** ~~Kathleen McKendrick, August 2019, "Artificial Intelligence Prediction and Counterterrorism," Chatman House International Security Department, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/artificial-intelligence-prediction-and-counterterrorism~~/Kankee 2. Prediction in Counterterrorism and Relevant AI Technologies This section describes the role of AND , and its uptake for counterterrorism use is likely to increase. ? ====Even one crude nuke could lead to extinction ==== **Hayes 18** ~~Peter Hayes, PhD from Berkeley, Director of the Nautilus Institute and Honorary Professor at the Centre for International Security Studies at the University of Sydney, 1-18-2018, "NON-STATE TERRORISM AND INADVERTENT NUCLEAR WAR," Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/non-state-terrorism-and-inadvertent-nuclear-war/~~/Kankee Nuclear terrorism post-cold war: trigger for inadvertent nuclear war? The possible catalytic effect of nuclear terrorism on the risk of state-based nuclear war is not a simple linkage. The multiple types and scales of nuclear terrorism may affect state-nuclear use decisions along multiple pathways that lead to inadvertent nuclear war. These include: Early warning systems fail or are "tripped" in ways that lead to launch-on-warning Accidental nuclear detonation, including sub-critical explosions. Strategic miscalculation in crisis, show of force Decision-making failure (such as irrational, misperception, bias, degraded, group, and time-compressed decision-making) Allied or enemy choices (to seek revenge, to exploit nuclear risk, to act out of desperation) Organizational cybernetics whereby a nuclear command-control-and communications (NC3) system generates error, including the interplay of national NC3 systems in what may be termed the meta-NC3 system. Synchronous and coincident combinations of above.~~4~~ Exactly how, where, and when nuclear terrorism may "ambush" nuclear armed states already heading for or on such a path to inadvertent nuclear war depends on who is targeting whom at a given time, either immediately due to high tension, or generally due to a structural conflict between states. Nuclear armed states today form a complex set of global threat relationships that are not distributed uniformly across the face of Earth. Rather, based on sheer firepower and reach, the nine nuclear weapons states form a global hierarchy with at least four tiers, viz: Tier 1: United States, clear technological supremacy and qualitative edge. Tier 2: Russia, China, global nuclear powers and peers with the United States due to the unique destructive power of even relatively small nuclear arsenals, combined with global reach of missile and bomber delivery systems, thereby constituting a two-tiered global "nuclear triangle" with the United States. Tier 3: France, UK, NATO nuclear sharing and delivery NATO members (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey) and the NATO and Pacific nuclear umbrella states (Japan, South Korea, Australia) that depend on American nuclear extended deterrence and directly and indirectly support US and US-allied nuclear operations even though they do not host nor deliver nuclear weapons themselves. Tier 4: India, Pakistan, Israel, DPRK. The first two tiers constitute the global nuclear threat triangle that exists between the United States, Russia, and China, forming a global nuclear "truel." Each of these states targets the others; each represents an existential threat to the other; and each has a long history of mutual nuclear threat that is now a core element of their strategic identity. Tier three consists of states with their own nuclear force but integrated with that of the United States (even France!) that expand the zone of mutual nuclear threat over much of the northern and even parts of the southern hemisphere; and states that host American nuclear command, control, communications, and intelligence systems that support US nuclear operations and to whom nuclear deterrence is "extended" (if, for example, Australia's claim to having an American nuclear umbrella is believed). The fourth tier is composed of smaller nuclear forces with a primarily regional reach and focus. Between most of these nuclear armed states and across the tiers, there are few shared "rules of the road." The more of these states that are engaged in a specific conflict and location, the more unpredictable and unstable this global nuclear threat system becomes, with the potential for cascading and concatenating effects. Indeed, as the number of nuclear states projecting nuclear threat against each other increases, the notion of strategic stability may lose all meaning. The emergence of a fifth tier—of non-state actors with the capacity to project nuclear threat against nuclear-armed and nuclear umbrella states (although not only these states)—is a critically important possible catalytic actor in the new conditions of nuclear threat complexity that already exist today. Such a layer represents an "edge of chaos" where the attempts by nuclear armed states to exert absolute "vertical" control over the use of nuclear weapons confront the potential of non-state entities and even individuals (insiders) to engage in "horizontal" nuclear terrorism, presenting radically different control imperatives to the standard paradigm of organizational procedures, technical measures, and safeguards of various kinds. This tier is like the waves and tides on a beach that quickly surrounds and then causes sand castles to collapse. In 2010, Robert Ayson reviewed the potential linkages between inter-state nuclear war and non-state terrorism. He concluded: "…~~T~~hese two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them."~~5~~ How this linkage might unfold is the subject of the next sections of this essay. Are non-state actors motivated and able to attempt nuclear terrorism? A diverse set of non-state actors have engaged in terrorist activities—for which there is no simple or consensual definition. In 2011, there were more than 6,900 known extremist, terrorist and other organizations associated with guerrilla warfare, political violence, protest, organized crime and cyber-crime. Of these, about 120 terrorist and extremist groups had been blacklisted by the United Nations, the European Union and six major countries.~~6~~ Some have argued that the technical, organizational, and funding demanded for a successful nuclear attack, especially involving nuclear weapons, exceeds the capacity of most of the non-state actors with terrorist proclivities. Unfortunately, this assertion is not true, especially at lower levels of impact as shown in Figure 1; but even at the highest levels of obtaining authentic nuclear weapons capabilities, a small number of non-state actors already exhibit the motivation and possible capacity to become nuclear-armed. Ellingsen suggests a useful distinction that nuclear terrorists may be impelled by two divergent motivations, as shown in Figure 2, creating "opportunistic" and "patient" profiles.~~7~~ The requirements for an opportunist non-state nuclear terrorist tend towards immediate use and the search for short-term payoffs with only tactical levels of commitment; whereas the patient non-state nuclear terrorist is able and willing to sustain a long-term acquisition effort to deal a strategic blow to an adversary in a manner that could be achieved only with nuclear weapons. In turn, many factors will drive how a potential nuclear terrorist non-state organization that obtains nuclear weapons or materials may seek to employ them, especially in its nuclear command-and-control orientations. Blair and Ackerman suggest that the goals, conditions, and capacity limitations that shape a possible nuclear terrorist's posture lead logically to three types of nuclear terrorist nuclear command-and-control postures, viz: pre-determined (in which the leadership sends a fire order to a nuclear-armed subordinate and no change is entertained and no capacity to effect change is established in the field, that is, the order is fire-and-forget); assertive (in which only the central command can issue a nuclear fire order, central control is maintained at all times, with resulting demanding communications systems to support such control); and delegative (in which lower level commanders control nuclear weapons and have pre-delegated authority to use them in defined circumstances, for example, evidence of nuclear explosions combined with loss-of-connectivity with their central command).~~8~~ An example of such delegative control system was the November 26, 2008 attack on Mumbai that used social media reporting to enable the attacking terrorists to respond to distant controller direction and to adapt to counter-terrorist attacks—a connectivity tactic that the authorities were too slow to shut down before mayhem was achieved.~~9~~ Logically, one might expect nuclear terrorists oriented toward short-term, tactical goals to employ pre-determined nuclear command-and-control strategies in the hope that the speed of attack and minimum field communications avoids discovery and interdiction before the attack is complete; whereas nuclear terrorists oriented toward long-term, strategic goals might employ more pre-delegative command-and-control systems that would support a bargaining use and therefore a field capacity to deploy nuclear weapons or materials that can calibrate actual attack based on communications with the central leadership with the risk of interdiction through surveillance and counter-attack. These differing strategic motivations, timelines, and strategies in many respects invert those of nuclear weapons states that rely on large organizations, procedures, and technical controls, to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used without legitimate authorization; and if they are used, to minimize needless civilian casualties (at least some nuclear armed states aspire to this outcome). The repertoire of state-based practices that presents other states with credible nuclear threat and reassures them that nuclear weapons are secure and controlled is likely to be completely mismatched with the strengths and strategies of non-state nuclear terrorists that may seek to maximize civilian terror, are not always concerned about their own survival or even that of their families and communities-of-origin, and may be willing to take extraordinary risk combined with creativity to exploit the opportunities for attack presented by nuclear weapons, umbrella, and non-nuclear states, or their private adversaries. For non-state actors to succeed at complex engineering project such as acqui ring a nuclear weapons or nuclear threat capacity demands substantial effort. Gary Ackerman specifies that to have a chance of succeeding, non-state actors with nuclear weapons aspirations must be able to demonstrate that they control substantial resources, have a safe haven in which to conduct research and development, have their own or procured expertise, are able to learn from failing and have the stamina and strategic commitment to do so, and manifest long-term planning and ability to make rational choices on decadal timelines. He identified five such violent non-state actors who already conducted such engineering projects (see Figure 3), and also noted the important facilitating condition of a global network of expertize and hardware. Thus, although the skill, financial, and material requirements of a non-state nuclear weapons project present a high bar, they are certainly reachable. Figure 3: Complex engineering projects by five violent non-state actors and Khan network Source: G. Ackerman, "Comparative Analysis of VNSA Complex Engineering Efforts," Journal of Strategic Security, 9:1, 2016, at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss1/10/
851,816
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328,712
JANFEB - DA - IndoPak
open source
851,829
365,080
328,713
JANFEB - K - Queer
opne source
851,830
365,081
328,694
NOVDEC - AC - FF
open source
851,817
365,082
328,723
Nocember neg
Whole res - open source
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SO - T
THEORY T Plans and PICS are non-topical under this resolution Nebel 19, Jake Nebel an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs August 12,2019 “Genericity on the Standardized Tests Resolution” Victory Briefs https://www.vbriefly.com/2019/08/12/genericity-on-the-standardized-tests-resolution/ ________________________________________ The September–October resolution is “Resolved: In the United States, colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions.” As usual, some debaters will try to affirm this resolution by arguing that some particular colleges and universities ought not consider particular standardized tests in particular admissions decisions. As usual, I don’t think such advocacies affirm the resolution. Let me be clear, once again: my argument is not that plans are bad. I do not hate plans; I really like them, and I wish that all resolutions, including this one, were worded to allow for a reasonable array of topical plans. For example, if the resolution said something like, “The United States ought to prohibit some or all public universities from considering standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions,” then it would allow the affirmative to propose a plan to prohibit particular public universities from considering standardized tests. But that’s not the resolution. And I think debaters should debate the actual resolution. Plans are good, but plans should be topical. My argument is simple. First, on this topic, the affirmative should have to argue that, in the United States, colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions. This is the topicality rule. Second, even if some particular colleges and universities ought not consider particular tests in particular decisions, that doesn’t mean that colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions. Therefore, showing that some particular colleges and universities ought not consider particular tests in particular decisions fails to meet the affirmative burden. This two-premise argument strikes me as eminently reasonable, and I don’t think it should require much more explanation in order to win a debate. But many debaters and judges appear to think that the argument is not just unsound but obviously or embarrassingly so. This response puzzles me, given the intuitive plausibility of the premises. Many of those who reject the argument are reluctant to identify which premise of the argument they reject, and they should have to do that in order to reject the conclusion. But, once again, I will try to defend the premises of the argument in the context of the new topic. Let’s start with the second premise. 1 Bare Plurals: “Colleges and universities,” “standardized tests,” and “undergraduate admissions decisions” are bare plural noun phrases. A bare plural is a noun phrase that lacks an overt determiner. Determiners include articles like the, possessives like my, demonstratives like these, and quantifiers like some. “Colleges and universities,” “standardized tests,” and “undergraduate admissions decisions” are plural, and they lack determiners, so they are bare plurals. (“Colleges” and “universities” are also bare plurals, but it doesn’t matter for our purposes whether we consider them separately or just consider the conjunctive noun phrase.) Bare plurals are typically used to express generic generalizations. Generic generalizations include sentences like, “Dogs bark,” “Bees sting,” and “Birds fly.” It is helpful to understand generic generalizations by contrasting them with two other kinds of generalizations. Existential statements say that there exist some things that satisfy a certain property. For example, “Some bees don’t sting” is an existential statement. It is true because there are indeed some bees that don’t sting. Existential statements can be affirmed by pointing to particular examples—e.g., mason bees. Universal statements say that all things satisfy a certain property. For example, “All bees sting” is a universal statement. It is false because, as we just saw, some bees don’t sting—so it’s not the case that all of them do. Universal statements cannot be affirmed by pointing to particular examples, but they can be negated by pointing to particular counterexamples—again, e.g., mason bees. Generic generalizations are neither existential nor universal. Generics are distinct from existential statements because they cannot be affirmed by particular instances. For example, “Birds swim” is a generic. It’s false even though there are some birds that do swim: namely, penguins. You can’t affirm that birds swim by observing that penguins swim. Generics are distinct from universal statements because they can tolerate exceptions. For example, “Birds fly” is a generic. It’s true even though there are some birds that don’t fly: namely, penguins. You can’t negate that birds fly by observing that penguins don’t. Both distinctions are important. Generic resolutions can’t be affirmed by specifying particular instances. But, since generics tolerate exceptions, plan-inclusive counterplans (PICs) do not negate generic resolutions. Bare plurals are typically used to express generic generalizations. But there are two important things to keep in mind. First, generic generalizations are also often expressed via other means (e.g., definite singulars, indefinite singulars, and bare singulars). Second, and more importantly for present purposes, bare plurals can also be used to express existential generalizations. For example, “Birds are singing outside my window” is true just in case there are some birds singing outside my window; it doesn’t require birds in general to be singing outside my window. So, what about “colleges and universities,” “standardized tests,” and “undergraduate admissions decisions”? Are they generic or existential bare plurals? On other topics I have taken great pains to point out that their bare plurals are generic—because, well, they are. On this topic, though, I think the answer is a bit more nuanced. Let’s see why. 1.3 Summary: We have seen that “colleges and universities” is generic in the context of the resolution. So, even if some colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions, that doesn’t mean that colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions. (And, since generics tolerate exceptions, PICs that exclude particular colleges or universities do not negate.) I have also suggested that “standardized tests” is likely an existential (possibly dependent) bare plural. If it is, then, since the resolution says “ought not,” it requires that colleges and universities not consider any such tests. I am unsure whether “undergraduate admissions decisions” is existential or not, but the same argument would apply if it is. So, on any reading of the bare plurals in the resolution, specifying particular colleges and universities, particular tests, or particular decisions could not show that colleges and universities ought not use standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions. Affirmative Needs to be Topical- A. Interpretation: The affirmative must defend a topical advocacy B. Violation: The affirmative does not defend a topical advocacy C. Standards: 1) Research Burdens- when the affirmative defends a non-topical advocacy they only have to research one hyper-specific topic area, while the negative has the burden to develop and research responses to all of the potential random topic areas the affirmative may choose. There is no predictability of what the affirmative will be running. Exploding the negative burden while lessening the affirmative burden destroys fairness because the ballot is not equally accessible if one side is required to do infinitely more work than the other, while keeping research burdens balanced gives both debaters an equal chance to win. Research burdens are key to education because having equal requirements to research the topic as a whole encourages detailed understanding of a topic area instead of requiring a negative’s superficially un-educational knowledge of all potential topics. Pics bad Interpretation: Counter Plans must be entirely exclusive of the affirmative advocacy Violation: My opponent runs a plan inclusive counterplan which includes part of the affirmative advocacy. Standards 1. Time skew: PICs waste the 1AC speech time, because they render substantive advantages non-unique by focusing on a slight distinction. If the neg can agree with 99 of the aff, only 1 of my 6 minutes matters in the 1AR. Also, it explodes the effectiveness of Negative speech time because he can spend almost all of his time attacking the small portions of the AC that he doesn’t agree with. Skewing time is unfair because the speech times are designed to give each debater an equal chance at winning the round; that’s why both sides add up to 13 minutes. If I don’t get an equal opportunity to speak, I don’t have a fair chance at winning. Also, this standard doesn’t just say he can’t agree with any of my arguments, a PIC steals a huge portion of AFF ground and renders it useless. That’s different from him conceding an argument or saying that one contention is non-unique. 2. Turn Ground: PICs steal key AFF turn ground because there is only a tiny section of the debate that separates the AFF from the NEG and I can’t debate against my own advocacy. As such, there is only a miniscule piece of offense that the AFF can contest. This is a severe rupture of competitive equity because the AFF cannot generate reciprocal offense. Disads and plan exclusive CP’s check opponent’s ground loss, if they find a problem with a part of a plan they can run a DA or a plan exclusive counter plan not a PIC. Since ground is the only way to generate offense towards the ballot, destroying ground, prevents AFF ability to win the round. 3. Predictability: The PIC is unpredictable because they could PIC out of any part of the plan making it impossible to predict how my opponent will modify the aff advocacy. There is no way for me to prepare before round against the infinite number of minute modifications to the aff advocacy, making the round unfair because the negative will always be more prepared to defend the PIC than I will be to debate against it. This also destroys in round clash making the round highly uneducational as we do not actually engage each others’ arguments. Additionally, focusing on only a portion of the plan destroys our learning because we never test the merits of the actual plan but a small portion, destroying education. Impacts: Fairness and education
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1AC ~-~- Cuba
US refusal to work with Cuba delegitimizes the OAS and decks US-Latin American relations. Suver 4/24/12 (Roman, research associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Looking back on the Cuba distraction at Cartagena and the Failure of the US Latin America Policy”, www.coha.org/looking-back-on-the-cuba-distraction-at-cartagena-and-the-failure-of-the-u-s-latin-america-policy/ JN This pronouncement and the U.S.’ opposition to Cuba’s future involvement in OAS-related hemispheric gatherings effectively acted as a unilateral veto, as Canada was the only other summit attendee to oppose Cuba’s reintegration, though Prime Minister Stephen Harper reportedly considered supporting the majority position on Cuba’s unconditional readmittance. This stubborn and clearly ideologically-based U.S. move served to do nothing but further alienated the U.S. from the region at a time when it is actively attempting to build both economic and political alliances. Furthermore, by exacerbating the divide between traditional U.S. pan-American policy and the Latin American position through his comments, Obama ensured that the topic of Cuba would continue to dominate the discussion throughout the summit, instead of allowing for a unified hemispheric discourse on other important and pressing regional matters to command media attention. Not surprisingly, amidst the polarizing environment in Cartagena, the Sixth Summit of the Americas concluded without a joint declaration on the agenda’s subjects, further accentuating the dysfunctional nature of current hemispheric politics.¶ Ahead of the Summit, Ecuador’s President, Rafael Correa, wrote a letter to the summit’s host, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, in which he declared his intention to boycott the meeting in protest of Cuba’s ongoing exile. He further pledged that Ecuador would boycott any future gatherings that excluded Cuba as long as he remains in office, and urged fellow ALBA members to do the same. While it appeared last week that no other nation would take similar steps, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega abstained from attending at the last minute, boycotting the event on the same grounds as Correa, despite his government’s presence in Cartagena. There had been speculation prior to the meeting that some Latin American countries, especially those with memberships in ALBA, would decline to join Ecuador in boycotting the event in hopes that the U.S. would soften its position on Cuba during the weekend’s meeting, making a gesture that could worsen trade relations with the U.S. unnecessary. However, after Obama’s steadfast reiteration of the U.S.’ stance, all eight ALBA members moved swiftly to decry the Cuban situation, vowing to boycott all subsequent Summits of the Americas if Cuba is not granted unconditional participation. Perhaps not so surprisingly, this same sentiment was echoed by some of South America’s most influential nations, including Mercosur members Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay.¶ The increasingly vocal and adamant calls for Cuba’s inclusion by Latin America, and the growing number of provocative comments being made by Latin American leaders about ending North American hegemony in the region, are ominous signs for the abiding strength of the U.S.’ influence in the region. With the prospect of the majority of the next Summit’s attendees boycotting the event under the current status quo, the future of the OAS and North American participation in Latin American affairs appears noticeably bleak. There are already a number of regional organizations which exclude the U.S. and Canada, CELAC and UNASUR among them, and their increasing relevance to international cooperation in the Americas does not bode well for North America. If the U.S. continues to persistently adhere to its current stance on Cuba through to the 2015 Seventh Summit of the Americas in Panama, there is a distinct possibility that the OAS could lose all legitimacy as well as its influence as exasperated Latin American countries refuse to participate. This could lead to both a rethinking of U.S. policy towards Cuba, and greater cooperation and concessions by the U.S., pursuant to a more unified and egalitarian Western Hemisphere dynamic. Conversely, if the U.S. continues its archaic and neo-imperialistic stance, bodies like CELAC would stand to gain considerable influence, and could perhaps even replace the OAS as the hemisphere’s primary pan-American body and standard-bearer for regional cooperation.¶ In either scenario, the inescapable reality becomes quite clear; no matter how U.S. policy towards Latin America evolves in the near future, the U.S.’ longstanding and powerful influence in Central and South America is beginning to wane. Newly developing export markets and swift economic growth in Latin America are bolstering the region’s ability to function independently of more developed powers like the U.S., and the more the region continues to develop, the stronger its thirst for self-determinism will become. As Central and South America continue to modernize in their quest to join the ranks of developed world powers, the U.S. will continue to watch its previously formidable regional will diminish. The more Washington is willing to proactively amend its foreign policy towards Latin America to promote a more respectful and reciprocal partnership arrangement, the better its prospects will become in forging long-term amicable alliances and beneficial economic partnerships with a rapidly upsurging region. Trump-era policies have destroyed Latin American relations and pushed OAS cohesion to the brink. Lee and Renwick 20, 3-10-2020, "The Organization of American States," Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/organization-american-states JN What is the organization's history with Cuba? The only country in the Western Hemisphere that is not a member of the OAS is Cuba, which has long been a wedge between member states. At the urging of the United States, the OAS suspended Cuba in 1962 on the grounds that its self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist government was “incompatible with the principles and objectives of the inter-American system.” In 2009, the OAS voted unanimously to lift the suspension on the condition that Cuba submit to a “process of dialogue” on OAS principles. In 2015, U.S. President Barack Obama met with Cuban President Raul Castro on the sidelines of the Summit of the Americas—it was the first time a Cuban leader attended the summit—part of a rapprochement many observers said could warm ties between Washington and much of Latin America. However, Trump’s partial reversal of the détente introduced by Obama and Castro’s stated lack of interest in rejoining the OAS threw doubt on any such reconciliation. The OAS has remained critical of Cuba, denouncing the installation of Castro’s successor, Miguel Diaz-Canel and condemning the government’s human rights record. In October 2019, Diaz-Canel rebuked the “troop of mediocre and duplicitous politicians pulled together in the OAS.” What is the Trump administration's relationship with the OAS? In an April 2017 statement, Trump called the OAS an “enduring organization for the promotion of democracy, security, human rights, and economic development.” His administration led OAS efforts to suspend Maduro’s Venezuelan delegation and recognize Guaido’s envoy. However, the U.S. ambassador to the OAS received criticism in June 2019 from groups including Haiti’s opposition for attempting to intervene in the country’s volatile political situation. Some observers also allege that U.S. policymakers pressured the OAS to interfere in the Bolivian election and topple Morales, who has called the United States a “great conspirator” in his fall from power. OAS officials have feared that deep budget cuts at the U.S. State Department proposed by Trump could affect funding for the bloc. In 2018, his administration requested $8.75 million less than PDF the United States’ required contribution to the OAS budget for that year, though it ultimately did meet its $50.75 million quota PDF. And in March 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the Trump administration would cut funding to the OAS due to the organization’s support for legalizing abortion. Many Latin American leaders have expressed concerns over Trump’s stances on immigration, trade, and Cuba. Trump’s policies toward Latin America risk alienating an increasingly pro-trade, U.S.-friendly region, wrote Javier Corrales, a professor of political science at Amherst College. U.S. protectionism, including tariffs on Chinese imports and threats to withdraw from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), could encourage Latin American countries to go the other way and be more open to trade with one another, analysts say. Lifting the embargo improves Latin American Relations. Meyer 4/8/13 (Peter, CRS Analyst in Latin America Affairs, “Organization of American States: Background and Issues for Congress”, https://www.google.com/url?sa=tandrct=jandq=andesrc=sandsource=webandcd=12andved=0CDgQFjABOAoandurl=https3A2F2Fwww.hsdl.org2F3Fview26did3D735022andei=6RcaUsTSDMqT2QWrvYFIandusg=AFQjCNEJiXMS8Gf1AQ19Y_PlL5Nj_fXEGAandsig2=qNsFfyBS3N6r0sCguR_JAw) JN Policy Considerations ¶ Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the country through sanctions while providing support to the Cuban people. Although Members of Congress generally have agreed on the overall goals of U.S. policy—to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the island—they have disagreed about how best to achieve those objectives. Some argue that maintaining strict sanctions is the only way to produce change in Cuba. Others argue that the United States is more likely to encourage reforms in the country by gradually increasing engagement or even swiftly normalizing relations. ¶ Congressional debate surrounding the potential reintegration of Cuba into the inter-American system has largely reflected the disagreements over broader U.S. policy toward the island. Members of Congress who support efforts to isolate Cuba have opposed any attempt to reintegrate the country into the inter-American system. Some Members have called for the United States to boycott the Summit of the Americas if Cuba is allowed to participate.81 They also introduced bills during the 112th Congress that would have prohibited U.S. contributions to the OAS if Cuba is allowed to participate in the organization or the Summits of the Americas before transitioning to democracy. Conversely, some Members who support greater U.S. engagement with Cuba have celebrated efforts that could pave the way to the country’s inclusion in hemispheric institutions.82 ¶ Congressional actions related to Cuba’s reintegration into the inter-American system could have broader implications for U.S. interests in the hemisphere. Congressional pressure designed to keep Cuba out of hemispheric institutions until it embraces democracy may continue to be successful given the desire of most countries in the region to maintain close relations with the United States and the OAS’s reliance on consensus decision-making. However, such a policy also sets the United States against a nearly hemispheric-wide consensus to allow Cuban participation in the Summits of the Americas, and could continue to be a distraction at regional meetings and an obstacle to more cohesive hemispheric relations. If Cuba is allowed to participate in the Summits of the Americas, the United States and the rest of the region could use the meetings to engage Cuba while still maintaining democracy and human rights as requirements for participation in the OAS itself. At the same time, by removing democratic governance as a precondition for participation in the summits, the nations of the hemisphere could send a signal that their commitment to democracy is less than absolute. It’s the only viable option. Lee and Renwick 20, 3-10-2020, "The Organization of American States," Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/organization-american-states JN Are there regional alternatives to the OAS? A handful of other regional groupings have emerged over the last two decades with different goals. Some sought to counter Washington’s perceived influence over the OAS, while others aimed to streamline decision-making. CELAC: The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States is an organization that excludes the United States and Canada and was widely seen as a potential alternative to the OAS when it was founded in 2010. Its achievements have included securing a 2015 pledge from Chinese President Xi Jinping to invest $500 billion in the region. In January 2020, Brazil announced it would withdraw from CELAC, arguing that the group is controlled by authoritarian regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. UNASUR: The Union of South American Nations was founded in 2008 and regarded by many observers as a means for Brazil to assert its power in the region. The organization mediated a diplomatic crisis between Ecuador and Colombia in 2008, and participated in Vatican-led talks between Venezuela’s government and opposition leaders in 2016. However, it fell apart after more than half its member states suspended their involvement in 2018. Prosur: The Forum for the Progress of South America was formed in March 2019 by UNASUR’s defecting countries—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Peru—plus Guyana. Venezuela was the only South American state not invited to join. Conveners envision it as a UNASUR substitute focused on socioeconomic cooperation, though analysts have questioned the bloc’s usefulness and staying power. ALBA: The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America was founded in 2004 by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and Cuban President Fidel Castro. It comprises ten governments from the region (Ecuador withdrew in 2018) and seeks economic and political integration based on leftist ideals. Experts say its influence has diminished amid Venezuela’s economic and political disintegration. U.S.-Latin American ties key to deal with climate change, proliferation, economy and democracy O’Neil, 13 ~-~-- Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies at CFR (7/16/2013, Shannon K., “Latin America’s Secret Success Story,” http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2013/07/16/latin-americas-secret-success-story/, NGo) JN For the start of the Biennial of the Americas conference, I wrote an article for the Daily Beast on why Latin America is steadily growing in global importance. You can read the piece here or below. Latin America rarely looms large on the global scene, overshadowed by Europe, the Middle East, and Asia on the agendas and in the imagination of policymakers, business leaders, and the global chattering classes. But under cover of this benign neglect, the region has dramatically changed, mostly for the better. Its economies have flourished. Once known for hyperinflation and economic booms and busts, Latin America is now a place of sound finances and financial systems. Exports—ranging from soy, flowers, copper, and iron ore to computers, appliances, and jets—have boomed. GDP growth has doubled from 1980s levels to an annual average of 4 percent over the past two decades, as has the region’s share of global GDP, increasing from 5 percent in 2004 to nearly 8 percent in 2011. Many of the countries have embraced globalization, opening up their economies and searching for innovative ways to climb the value-added chain and diversify their production. Trading relations too have changed: U.S. trade has expanded at a fast clip even as these nations diversified their flows across the Atlantic and Pacific. These steps have lured some $170 billion in foreign direct investment in 2012 alone (roughly 12 percent of global flows). Led by Brazil and Mexico, much of this investment is going into manufacturing and services. Already the second largest holder of oil reserves in the world (behind only the Middle East), the hemisphere has become one of the most dynamic places for new energy finds and sources. From the off shore “pre-salt” oil basins of Brazil to the immense shale gas fields of Argentina and Mexico, from new hydrodams on South America’s plentiful rivers to wind farms in Brazil and Mexico, the Americas’ diversified energy mix has the potential to reshape global energy geopolitics. Democracy, too, has spread, now embraced by almost all of the countries in the region. And with this expanded representation has come greater social inclusion in many nations. Latin America is by all accounts a crucible of innovative social policies, a global leader in conditional cash transfers that provide stipends for families that keep kids in school and get basic healthcare, as well as other programs to reduce extreme poverty. Combined with stable economic growth, those in poverty fell from roughly two in five to one in four Latin Americans in just a decade. These and other changes have helped transform the basic nature of Latin American societies. Alongside the many still poor is a growing middle class. Its ranks swelled by 75 million people over the last 10 years, now reaching a third of the total population. The World Bank now classifies the majority of Latin American countries as “upper middle income,” with Chile and Uruguay now considered “high income.” Brazil’s and Mexico’s household consumption levels now outpace other global giants, including China and Russia, as today nearly every Latin American has a cell phone and television, and many families own their cars and houses. The region still has its serious problems. Latin America holds the bloody distinction of being the world’s most violent region. Eight of the ten countries with the world’s highest homicide rates are in Latin America or the Caribbean. And non-lethal crimes, such as assault, extortion, and theft are also high. A 2012 study by the pollster Latino Barometro found that one in every four Latin American citizens reported that they or a family member had been a victim of a crime during the past year. Latin America also remains the most unequal region in the world, despite some recent improvements. Studies show this uneven playing field affects everything from economic growth to teenage pregnancy and crime rates. These countries as a whole need to invest more in education, infrastructure, and basic rule of law to better compete in a globalizing world. Of course, nations also differ—while some countries have leaped ahead others have lagged, buffeted by everything from world markets to internal divisions. Nevertheless, with so much potential, and many countries on a promising path, it is time to recognize and engage with these increasingly global players. And while important for the world stage, the nations of the hemisphere are doubly so for the United States. Tied by geographic proximity, commerce, communities, and security, the Americas are indelibly linked. As the United States looks to increase exports, promote democratic values, and find partners to address major issues, such as climate change, financial stability, nuclear non-proliferation, global security, democracy, and persistent poverty, it could do no better than to look toward its hemispheric neighbors, who have much to impart. Independently, US Hegemony is on the brink now ~-~- checks arms race, miscalc, revisionist conflict, and a litany of existential threats. Brands and Edelman ’19 Hal Brands; PhD, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Charles Edelman; PhD, Senior Fellow and Visiting Scholar at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. (“The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order;” Ch. 6: Darkening Horizon; Published by Yale University Press; //GrRv) rc/Pat The revival of great-power competition entails higher international tensions than the world has known for decades, and the revival of arms races, security dilemmas, and other artifacts of a more dangerous past. It entails sharper conflicts over the international rules of the road on issues ranging from freedom of navigation to the illegitimacy of altering borders by force, and intensifying competitions over states that reside at the intersection of rival powers’ areas of interest. It requires confronting the prospect that rival powers could overturn the favorable regional balances that have underpinned the U.S.-led order for decades, and that they might construct rival spheres of influence from which America and the liberal ideas it has long promoted would be excluded. Finally, it necessitates recognizing that great-power rivalry could lead to great-power war, a prospect that seemed to have followed the Soviet empire onto the ash heap of history. Both Beijing and Moscow are, after all, optimizing their forces and exercising aggressively in preparation for potential conflicts with the United States and its allies; Russian doctrine explicitly emphasizes the limited use of nuclear weapons to achieve escalation dominance in a war with Washington. In Syria, U.S. and Russian forces even came into deadly contact in early 2018. American airpower decimated a contingent of government-sponsored Russian mercenaries that was attacking a base at which U.S. troops were present, an incident demonstrating the increasing boldness of Russian operations and the corresponding potential for escalation. The world has not yet returned to the epic clashes for global dominance that characterized the twentieth century, but it has returned to the historical norm of great-power struggle, with all the associated dangers. Those dangers may be even greater than most observers appreciate, because if today’s great-power competitions are still most intense at the regional level, who is to say where these competitions will end? By all appearances, Russia does not simply want to be a “regional power” (as Obama cuttingly described it) that dominates South Ossetia and Crimea.37 It aspires to the deep European and extra-regional impact that previous incarnations of the Russian state enjoyed. Why else would Putin boast about how far his troops can drive into Eastern Europe? Why else would Moscow be deploying military power into the Middle East? Why else would it be continuing to cultivate intelligence and military relationships in regions as remote as Latin America? Likewise, China is today focused primarily on securing its own geopolitical neighborhood, but its ambitions for tomorrow are clearly much bolder. Beijing probably does not envision itself fully overthrowing the international order, simply because it has profited far too much from the U.S.-anchored global economy. Yet China has nonetheless positioned itself for a global challenge to U.S. influence. Chinese military forces are deploying ever farther from China’s immediate periphery; Beijing has projected power into the Arctic and established bases and logistical points in the Indian Ocean and Horn of Africa. Popular Chinese movies depict Beijing replacing Washington as the dominant actor in sub-Saharan Africa—a fictional representation of a real-life effort long under way. The Belt and Road Initiative bespeaks an aspiration to link China to countries throughout Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe; BRI, AIIB, and RCEP look like the beginning of an alternative institutional architecture to rival Washington’s. In 2017, Xi Jinping told the Nineteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party that Beijing could now “take center stage in the world” and act as an alternative to U.S. leadership.38 These ambitions may or may not be realistic. But they demonstrate just how significantly the world’s leading authoritarian powers desire to shift the global environment over time. The revisionism we are seeing today may therefore be only the beginning. As China’s power continues to grow, or if it is successful in dominating the Western Pacific, it will surely move on to grander endeavors. If Russia reconsolidates control over the former Soviet space, it may seek to bring parts of the former Warsaw Pact to heel. Historically, this has been a recurring pattern of great-power behavior—interests expand with power, the appetite grows with the eating, risk-taking increases as early gambles are seen to pay off.39 This pattern is precisely why the revival of great-power competition is so concerning—because geopolitical revisionism by unsatisfied major powers has so often presaged intensifying international conflict, confrontation, and even war. The great-power behavior occurring today represents the warning light flashing on the dashboard. It tells us there may be still-greater traumas to come. The threats today are compelling and urgent, and there may someday come a time when the balance of power has shifted so markedly that the postwar international system cannot be sustained. Yet that moment of failure has not yet arrived, and so the goal of U.S. strategy should be not to hasten it by giving up prematurely, but to push it off as far into the future as possible. Rather than simply acquiescing in the decline of a world it spent generations building, America should aggressively bolster its defenses, with an eye to preserving and perhaps even selectively advancing its remarkable achievements. Plan: The United States Federal Government ought to end economic sanctions to Cuba. Ian Vásquez 12-26-2014 "Now Let’s End the Embargo on Cuba" https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/now-lets-end-embargo-cuba (Ian Vásquez is the director of the Cato Institute’s Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity. His articles have appeared in newspapers throughout the United States and Latin America, and he is a columnist at El Comercio (Peru). Vásquez has appeared on CNBC, NBC, C-SPAN, CNN, Telemundo, Univisión, and Canadian Television, as well as National Public Radio and Voice of America, discussing foreign policy and development issues.)//Elmer Obama, however, has only partially eased sanctions. It is up to Congress to fully lift the embargo, which Cuban leader Raul Castro continues to blame for Cuba’s suffering. Unlike in the past, when Cuba has said it wanted to improve relations only to sabotage the relationship on the various occasions when that possibility grew, Castro’s willingness to re?engage with the United States represents a significant change. As Cuban dissident Yoani Sanchez observed, under “Fidel Castro we would have never even reached an outline of an agreement of this nature. Because the Cuban system is supported by — as one of its main pillars — the existence of a permanent rival. David can’t live without Goliath and the ideological apparatus has depended too long on this dispute.” So Sanchez may be right in describing the agreement between the United States and Cuba as on balance a “political defeat” for the Castro regime. But we should be under no illusion about Castro’s goal to maintain control over the Cuban population and to do as little reform as possible to achieve that end. With or without sanctions, that’s the regime’s goal. Fully ending the embargo is a strategy more likely to increase freedom and to discourage the delusion that the United States can determine Cuba’s fate. Fwk The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing. 1. Pleasure is an intrinsic good. Moen, 16 – (Ole Martin, PhD, Research Fellow in Philosophy @ University of Oslo, "An Argument for Hedonism." Journal of Value Inquiry 50.2 (2016): 267). Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative. 2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good. 3 As Aristotle observes: “We never ask a man what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value. Although pleasure and pain thus seem to be good candidates for intrinsic value and disvalue, several objections have been raised against this suggestion: (1) that pleasure and pain have instrumental but not intrinsic value/disvalue; (2) that pleasure and pain gain their value/disvalue derivatively, in virtue of satisfying/frustrating our desires; (3) that there is a subset of pleasures that are not intrinsically valuable (so-called “evil pleasures”) and a subset of pains that are not intrinsically disvaluable (so-called “noble pains”), and (4) that pain asymbolia, masochism, and practices such as wiggling a loose tooth render it implausible that pain is intrinsically disvaluable. I shall argue that these objections fail. Prefer: A. Ground – all impacts are impacts under util, even freedom violations. Ground outweighs – it’s the basis of accessing the ballot. B. Topic literature – most topic arguments, be them warming on the aff or econ/politics on the neg are talking about the consequences of nuclear arsenals. Topic lit outweighs – it’s the basis for prep and allows us to learn something new about the world around us. Underview 1ar theory is legit – otherwise the neg gets to be infinitely abusive which outweighs on magnitude. Its drop the debater – the 1ARs too short to have a fair shot at both theory and substance. Competing Interps on aff theory – offense defense paradigm checks the neg dumping a slew of 2NR generic defense so winning a shell is impossible. No 2NR rvis – they can dump on it for 6 minutes and I can never answer the args in half the time, which destroys all check on neg abuse. Outweighs neg theory because they start out ahead because of the 7-4-6 time skew and the 2AR needs to be able to collapse to one flow because its too short to cover both shells. And, evaluate the debate after the 1AR because of time skew and neg win bias – sends a signal to NSDA that causes them to restructure the activity. No overview answers to aff arguments – they can uplayer all aff arguments for 7 minutes and the 1ar has to shift through it all. Presumption and permissibility affirms – 7-4-6 time skew and empirical side bias means I’m always behind. Reasonability on neg theory – A. Strat skew – competing interps forces the 1AR to overinvest in theory because I need a counterinterp, whereas reasonability gives the 1AR variability to brush off theory or go for a CI and rvi if it needs to. Outweighs – 1NC reactivity mandates the 1AR to employ different strats. Specific instances prove generics – birds lay eggs is a true statement but not all birds lay eggs and Cimpian et al, PhDs, 10 (Andrei, Amanda C. Brandone, Susan A. Gelman, Generic statements require little evidence for acceptance but have powerful implications, Cogn Sci. 2010 Nov 1; 34(8): 1452–1482) Generic statements (e.g., “Birds lay eggs”) express generalizations about categories. In this paper, we hypothesized that there is a paradoxical asymmetry at the core of generic meaning, such that these sentences have extremely strong implications but require little evidence to be judged true. Four experiments confirmed the hypothesized asymmetry: Participants interpreted novel generics such as “Lorches have purple feathers” as referring to nearly all lorches, but they judged the same novel generics to be true given a wide range of prevalence levels (e.g., even when only 10 or 30 of lorches had purple feathers). A second hypothesis, also confirmed by the results, was that novel generic sentences about dangerous or distinctive properties would be more acceptable than generic sentences that were similar but did not have these connotations. In addition to clarifying important aspects of generics’ meaning, these findings are applicable to a range of real-world processes such as stereotyping and political discourse. Keywords: generic language, concepts, truth conditions, prevalence implications, quantifiers, semantics Go to: 1. Introduction A statement is generic if it expresses a generalization about the members of a kind, as in “Mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus” or “Birds lay eggs” (e.g., Carlson, 1977; Carlson and Pelletier, 1995; Leslie, 2008). Such generalizations are commonplace in everyday conversation and child-directed speech (Gelman, Coley, Rosengren, Hartman, and Pappas, 1998; Gelman, Taylor, and Nguyen, 2004; Gelman, Goetz, Sarnecka, and Flukes, 2008), and are likely to foster the growth of children’s conceptual knowledge (Cimpian and Markman, 2009; Gelman, 2004, 2009). Here, however, we explore the semantics of generic sentences—and, in particular, the relationship between generic meaning and the statistical prevalence of the relevant properties (e.g., what proportion of birds lay eggs). Consider, first, generics’ truth conditions: Generic sentences are often judged true despite weak statistical evidence. Few people would dispute the truth of “Mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus”, yet only about 1 of mosquitoes are actually carriers (Cox, 2004). Similarly, only a minority of birds lays eggs (the healthy, mature females), but “Birds lay eggs” is uncontroversial. This loose, almost negligible relationship between the prevalence of a property within a category and the acceptance of the corresponding generic sentence has long puzzled linguists and philosophers, and has led to many attempts to describe the truth conditions of generic statements (for reviews, see Carlson, 1995; Leslie, 2008). Though generics’ truth conditions may be unrelated to property prevalence (cf. Prasada and Dillingham, 2006), the same cannot be said about the implications of generic statements. When provided with a novel generic sentence, one often has the impression that the property talked about is widespread. For example, if we were unfamiliar with the West Nile virus and were told (generically) that mosquitoes carry it, it would not be unreasonable to assume that all, or at least a majority of, mosquitoes are carriers (Gelman, Star, and Flukes, 2002). It is this paradoxical combination of flexible, almost prevalence-independent truth conditions, on the one hand, and widespread prevalence implications, on the other, that is the main focus of this article. We will attempt to demonstrate empirically that the prevalence level that is sufficient to judge a generic sentence as true is indeed significantly lower than the prevalence level implied by that very same sentence. If told that, say, “Lorches have purple feathers,” people might expect almost all lorches to have these feathers (illustrating generics’ high implied prevalence), but they may still agree that the sentence is true even if the actual prevalence of purple feathers among lorches turned out to be much lower (illustrating generics’ flexible truth conditions). Additionally, we propose that this asymmetry is peculiar to generic statements and does not extend to sentences with quantified noun phrases as subjects. That is, the prevalence implied by a sentence such as “Most lorches have purple feathers” may be more closely aligned with the prevalence that would be needed to judge it as true. Before describing our studies, we provide a brief overview of previous research on the truth conditions and the prevalence implications of generic statements. 1.1. Generics’ truth conditions Some of the first experimental evidence for the idea that the truth of a generic statement does not depend on the underlying statistics was provided by Gilson and Abelson (1965; Abelson and Kanouse, 1966) in their studies of “the psychology of audience reaction” to “persuasive communication” in the form of generic assertions (Abelson and Kanouse, 1966, p. 171). Participants were presented with novel items such as the following: Altogether there are three kinds of tribes—Southern, Northern, Central. Southern tribes have sports magazines. Northern tribes do not have sports magazines. Central tribes do not have sports magazines. Do tribes have sports magazines? All items had the same critical feature: only one third of the target category possessed the relevant property. Despite the low prevalence, participants answered “yes” approximately 70 of the time to “Do tribes have sports magazines?” and other generic questions similar to it. Thus, people’s acceptance of the generics did not seem contingent on strong statistical evidence, leaving the door open for persuasion, and perhaps manipulation, by ill-intentioned communicators. A similar conclusion about the relationship between statistical prevalence and generics’ truth conditions emerged from the linguistics literature on this topic (e.g., Carlson, 1977; Carlson and Pelletier, 1995; Dahl, 1975; Declerck, 1986, 1991; Lawler, 1973). For example, Carlson (1977) writes that “there are many cases where … less than half of the individuals under consideration have some certain property, yet we still can truly predicate that property of the appropriate bare plural” (p. 67), as is the case with “Birds lay eggs” and “Mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus” but also with “Lions have manes” (only males do), “Cardinals are red” (only males are), and others. He points out, moreover, that there are many properties that, although present in a majority of a kind, nevertheless cannot be predicated truthfully of that kind (e.g., more than 50 of books are paperbacks but “Books are paperbacks” is false). Thus, acceptance of a generic sentence is doubly dissociated from the prevalence of the property it refers to—not only can true generics refer to low-prevalence properties, but high-prevalence properties are also not guaranteed to be true in generic form. 2 Technical literacy about nuclear policy spills up – especially necessary in a generation of nuclear ignorance Foradori et al. 18 (Paolo Foradori is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the School of International Studies of the University of Trento, Giampiero Giacomello is Assistant Professor at the School of Political Science, University of Bologna, where he teaches strategic studies, Alessandro Pascolini is professor of theoretical physics, arms and disarmament and science communication at Padua University, Conclusion: ISODARCO as an Epistemic Community, chapter in Arms Control and Disarmament: 50 Years of Experience in Nuclear Education, Palgrave, 2018 – brackets in original) **DNPE = disarmament and non-proliferation education Second, none of the authors downplays the fact that nuclear weapons strategies inherently imply a very dangerous “gamble.” If disarmament is, in the best possible scenario, a difficult and long-term objective, Dr. Strangelove’s “stop worrying and love the Bomb” attitude cannot be an option. Despite the best intentions and calculations, human beings make mistakes and things go wrong for a variety of unintentional and unplanned reasons. Deterrence is not foolproof and failure is always possible. There is no “fail safe” device. The (tragic) trouble is that if something goes wrong in the nuclear realm, consequences can be catastrophic, and there is no going back. Third, even if the world has profoundly changed during the 50-year period covered in this volume, the threat of nuclear weapons has not waned. While the spectre of a nuclear holocaust war obviously surfaces as a major concern in the chapters of the first two parts of the book dedicated to the years of East-West nuclear confrontation, the third part of the post-Cold War era appears to be equally frightening. Contrary to expectations, the “nuclear peace-dividend” at the end of the bipolar system turned out to be very meagre and nuclear threats have persisted. Despite significant reductions in nuclear arsenals since the height of the superpower rivalry in the mid-eighties, it is not possible to lower our guard. As a reading of the preceding chapters clearly shows, the “second-nuclear age” is as dangerous as the first. If this is the case, the fourth and final teaching that can be inferred from reading this volume is that only complete and irreversible disarmament represents a definitive solution to the dangers posed by nuclear weapons. However, there is no consensus among the contributors regarding the feasibility of nuclear disarmament, and for many this goal remains mere wishful thinking given current and near-future circumstances. However, all contributors consider it to be of the utmost importance to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons. Favouring Scott Sagan’s arguments to Kenneth Waltz in the famous debate between nuclear pessimists and optimists, the volume’s contributors clearly subscribe to the view that “more can only be worse.” While waiting and actively working for the conditions of nuclear disarmament to become ripe, international efforts towards non-proliferation must be strongly supported. As the reading of this book suggests, and the history of ISODARCO shows, this objective can be promoted by being an active member of an epistemic community and by engaging in disarmament and non-proliferation education. An Actual Epistemic Community Long before Francis Bacon’s “knowledge is power” aphorism, control over knowledge and information was a key ingredient of power. In fact, the emergence and diffusion of new ideas and data may lead to new patterns of behaviour that disrupt the status quo. However, if fear of altering the present order is overcome, these patterns may prove to be a game changer for international policy coordination in the most diverse circumstances, including arms control and nuclear proliferation, as the chapters in this volume demonstrate. Equally essential for appreciating the value of the contributions presented here is the notion of epistemic communities—networks of knowledge-based experts—that will be briefly discussed in this section. Strictly speaking, this collection of contributions by prominent researchers is not about these informal groups of professionals with authoritative and policy relevant expertise. Nonetheless, the chapters represent the efforts of many scientists and scholars to expose their ideas and policy solutions to the appraisal of their peers. Their ultimate goal was to develop viable solutions to various nuclear problems that could be adopted by adversarial governments (first and foremost, the United States and Russia) and increase confidence, reduce tension and tame risks of nuclear escalation. In so doing, these scientists and scholars created a close and vibrant epistemic community. This outcome was unplanned; it was a by-product of many interactions and international meetings, including the ISODARCO courses. Incidentally, “the quality and frequency of meetings point toward the nature of interaction among members of an epistemic community,”1 which is also one of the indicators of success; and, in this respect, the record of ISODARCO is remarkable. Epistemic communities have become a recent and successful concept in International Relations theory over the last 20 years. The most quoted reference is the 1992 special issue of International Organization (IO) entitled Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination. In that issue, Peter Haas defined epistemic communities according to four criteria that are shared amongst members2 : (1) normative and principled values; (2) causal beliefs; (3) tools to validate or refute causal claims and (4) the tools (or practices) utilized to prescribe policy solutions. Restricted by international and national constraints, Haas continues,3 epistemic communities are called upon by decision makers, who are being confronted with public policy issues of increasing complexity, to help reduce the uncertainty and provide clarification. It is the prestige, training and reputation of the community that breed the type of expertise valued by political elites. . In the same issue of IO, an article by Emanuel Adler4 recalls a national group of experts selected by the American government as the basis for negotiations with the Soviets, ultimately becoming the seed of the antiballistic missile (ABM) regime. Paraphrasing Adler, an American epistemic community played a key role in creating the international shared understanding and practice of nuclear arms control. In the absence of nuclear war, leaders’ expectations of nuclear war and of its control were affected by causal theories, abstract propositions and models that, given their “scientific” and technical nature, were developed by an epistemic community. The theoretical and practical ideas from the arms control epistemic community turned into political expectations, which were also shared by Soviet leadership. This commonality of interests then became embodied in the 1972 ABM treaty. The very same process of generating workable policy ideas that subsequently percolated into the policy-making arena is exemplified in many of the contributions included in the present volume. Why is the relationship between international networks of experts and policy-makers so fundamental? Because how decision makers define state interests and formulate policies to address complex and technical issues can be a function of the manner in which the issues are presented by those specialists to whom they turn for advice in the face of uncertainty. This is where epistemic communities thrive: identifying the cause-and-effect relationships of complex problems; helping governments define their interests; framing the issues for collective debate; and proposing specific policies or identifying salient points for negotiation. A policy problem of a technical nature is an essential ingredient to appreciate the level of influence an epistemic community is likely to have.5 When a policy problem is highly technical, experts may dominate the policy process, thus limiting other actors’ ability to influence politics.6 Natural scientists have a tendency to adopt a far more technocratic and sciencebased view of government, which is also evident in some of the contributions in this volume. Nonetheless, as policy issues “are seldom purely technical or purely political,” as Giandomenico Majone puts it,7 scientists cannot really avoid a certain degree of politicization of science. Social scientists, by training and nature, are more amenable to the latter phenomenon, and this too is palpable in other chapters of this work.8 In addition to Adler, other scholars (most notably Matthew Evangelista9 but also Neil Mitchell et al.10) have applied the concept of epistemic communities to explain why superpowers cooperated on nuclear issues during the Cold War. Indeed, what is surprising about this state of affairs is not the modest results, compared to the enormity of a potential nuclear Armageddon, but, given the animosity and the leeway of the competing ideologies, that there were any results at all. Cooperation was not “by default” and networks of nuclear scientists did contribute to “the long peace.”11 This volume traces the development of that process of influence and indicates how many political obstacles (most notably mutual suspicion) had to be overcome. Today, epistemic communities are recognized tools of international governance.12 They not only advise states but also non-state actors (NSAs) with decision-making powers.13 As a testimony of the concept’s success, epistemic communities have been at the centre of a variety of studies, from water management,14 to control of the bureaucracy,15 to pension reform.16 Their most remarkable feature, however, as confirmed by this volume, is that they have been crucial in the analysis of nuclear proliferation and disarmament, topics strongly associated with the realm of the “high politics” dear to realists. In that domain, realists find transnational cooperation to be an oxymoron, as states tend to be quite distrustful of each other. Robert Jervis concluded that, short of an individualistic security policy leading to disaster, “it may be doubted whether there will ever be strong political pressure in favour of a security regime.”17 However, with nuclear proliferation, that is exactly what happened. Most importantly, it was not an isolated case, as it also happened, for example, with chemical weapons18 and other security matters.19 There is a final point worth considering. The literature on epistemic communities is quite clear in admitting one fundamental failure, namely the dissemination/diffusion of knowledge. At times, their access to highlevel knowledge and information may make scientists and scholars akin to “mandarins,” who have no incentives to communicate their knowledge to the public. Indeed, if everyone knew about something, how important would the experts be? In a sense, we are back to Bacon’s “knowledge is power:” if information is controlled by, or restricted to, even well-meaning epistemic communities, there will always be substantial room for distortion and manipulation. If, however, information is shared, distributed, and passed on to the next generations, the influential power of epistemic communities, almost paradoxically, will be extended thanks to the enlarged number of informed citizensThis is why education, in this case disarmament and non-proliferation education, and teaching by networks of professionals are essential. The chapters in this volume were all delivered as lectures to students and fellow experts, and this is the main mission of ISODARCO, as illustrated in the next section. Contributing to Disarmament and Non-proliferation Education Indeed, the core mission of ISODARCO has always been in the realm of disarmament and non-proliferation education (DNPE). If, as recalled, “knowledge is power,” then—in the words of former United Nations (UN) Secretary General Kofi Annan—“education is quite simply, peace building by another name.”20 The relevance of DNPE as a fundamental tool in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons, with a view to their elimination, has been recognized since the first special session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on disarmament issues in 1978. Since then, the sense of urgency has been increasing, prompting the UNGA in resolution 55/33/E of 20 November 2000 to request that the UN Secretary General prepare, with the assistance of a group of qualified experts, a detailed study on the matter. After two years of preparation, the United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education21 was submitted to the First Committee of the General Assembly at its 57th session on 9 October 2002, and endorsed in General Assembly Resolution 57/60. The Study builds upon and seeks to revitalize past efforts concerned directly with disarmament education, which it considers to be an integral part of peace education. It starts from the recognition that the need for DNPE has never been greater and urges new thinking to pursue and achieve disarmament and non-proliferation goals. The overall purpose of DNPE is described as, “imparting knowledge and skills to empower individuals to make their contribution, as national and world citizens, to the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.”22 The Study emphasizes the continued and growing significance of the non-proliferation of WMDs and the need for new thinking to address the security challenges of the post-Cold War environment. It tackles new elements such as the great potential of innovative pedagogical methods in connection with new information and communication technologies, particularly the Internet; and the importance of introducing DNPE into post-conflict situations as a contribution to peace-building; the great need to introduce gender perspectives into security issues, and specifically, into non-proliferation. Most importantly, the Study contains 34 specific recommendations for action to be undertaken by governments, regional organizations, the UN, and other international organizations as well as municipal and religious leaders.23 It also seeks to establish close collaboration between the experts and civil society, practitioners, and scholars, including educators and academic institutions primarily at the secondary and tertiary levels of education.24 While the UN initiative has received wide support its implementation has lagged behind, with DNPE continuing to be a largely underutilized (and underfinanced) tool for promoting peace, disarmament and non-proliferation. 25 The trouble is, in the words of William C. Potter—founder and director of the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, one of the world’s leading institutions engaged in non-proliferation and disarmament education and training—that the two emerging post-Cold War disarmament challenges are ignorance and complacency. With the end of the Cold War and the diminution of the traditional danger of superpower nuclear conflict, there is the widespread (mistaken) perception that there are no longer any real nuclear dangers.26 This reading of the current security situation is dangerously flawed. Although we have likely escaped the danger of a nuclear annihilation, the presence and proliferation of WMDs continue to pose a serious threat to global security today. Currently, WMDs and their delivery vehicles are still perceived by many countries as necessary or highly desirable weapons for a variety of reasons, including serving as a deterrent to security threats, as a force equalizer complementing conventional military capabilities, as prestige and status enhancers, or for bolstering regime security.27 The fight against nuclear proliferation is still long and uncertain, and disarmament remains a very long-term objective. Meanwhile, the risk of actual use continues to be high. Notwithstanding deep cuts in the US and Russian (former Soviet) arsenals since the end of the Cold War, the 16,000 nuclear weapons still in existence, some of which are mounted on ballistic missiles ready to be launched on very short notice, are a potent reminder of the immediate ability to enact world annihilation. Despite rhetorical commitment to “a world free of nuclear weapons,” hardly any devaluation of those weapons has occurred within nuclear weapons countries, while sophisticated and extremely expensive modernization programs are ongoing to maintain the efficiency and reliability of these weapons for the foreseeable future. In the meantime, the nuclear club has welcomed three new members with the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan in 1998 and North Korea in 2006. If, with a bit of luck, we survived the Cold War and deterrence helped to save the world from total destruction, there is no guarantee that the same doctrines will perform at all in a multipolar nuclear world, which is likely to grow more nervous and unstable over time. Moreover, the scenarios in which NSAs acquire nuclear capabilities and mount a catastrophic attack are real and urgent, especially since 9/11. In this respect, securing nuclear materials has become a top priority for many governments and nongovernmental institutions alike. The legitimate spread of nuclear energy in troubled regions, particularly the Middle East, might represent a profound proliferation challenge, as the Iranian case shows. Verifying compliance in a changing technological setting will become an ever more daunting task. In this volatile and evolving “nuclear context,” combating ignorance, complacency, and a culture of violence through DNPE continues to be a task of critical relevance. As the UN Secretary-General has rightly highlighted, “what we know little about, we care little to do anything about.”28 The very limited awareness of the risks of nuclear proliferation applies to not only the general public but also otherwise well-educated citizens. If DNPE concerns all stages of education, ISODARCO’s specific target lies at the university, specifically the postgraduate, level. Experts in arms control and disarmament are in short supply in both developing and developed countries, including nuclear weapons states. The earlier generation of scholars and practitioners increasingly complains that very few younger experts are available to replace them.29 An entire new generation is growing up without a clear perception of the risks posed by nuclear weapons, wrongly perceived as relics of the Cold War, while non-proliferation studies have become a marginal and neglected field of research and teaching in most colleges and universities. With each passing year, there are also fewer opportunities to access the living memory of the hibakusha (the surviving victims of the 1945 atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki), who are able to provide fundamental testimony of the catastrophic and inhumane consequences of nuclear weapon usage. The scant interest in disarmament also concerns policy makers, an overwhelming majority of whom are not only relatively uninterested in international matters as such but also woefully uneducated about non-proliferation and disarmament issues. To aggravate the matter, looking for quick solutions to immediate crises, governments tend not to invest adequately in long-term training programs.30 DNPE is not only about educating and cultivating critical thinking on nuclear weapons-related issues, it is also a form of advocacy: a way of building a social movement of action towards achieving enhanced national and international security with lower levels of arms and ultimately general and complete disarmament under effective international control. As the 2002 UN Study notes, development of global DNPE and culture cannot be accomplished easily, cheaply or quickly, and hence a major effort is required to build communities of independent disarmament and non-proliferation specialists.31 As highlighted, to be effective, community-building must be sustained over an extended period of time. The 50 year-long engagement of ISODARCO in DNPE and training represents, as the outstanding authors of this book have shown, a very significant contribution to this long-term objective. Policy debates are necessary for rewriting political sovereignty – anything else leaves us without the necessary analytic tools to implement the alternative. Bryant 12 – (9/15, Levi, professor of Philosophy at Collin College and Chair of the Critical Philosophy program at the New Centre for Research and Practice, “War Machines and Military Logistics: Some Cards on the Table,” https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/09/15/war-machines-and-military-logistics-some-cards-on-the-table/) We need answers to these questions to intervene effectively. We can call them questions of “military logistics”. We are, after all, constructing war machines to combat these intolerable conditions. Military logistics asks two questions: first, it asks what things the opposing force, the opposing war machine captured by the state apparatus, relies on in order to deploy its war machine: supply lines, communications networks, people willing to fight, propaganda or ideology, people believing in the cause, etc. Military logistics maps all of these things. Second, military logistics asks how to best deploy its own resources in fighting that state war machine. In what way should we deploy our war machine to defeat war machines like racism, sexism, capitalism, neoliberalism, etc? What are the things upon which these state based war machines are based, what are the privileged nodes within these state based war machines that allows them to function? These nodes are the things upon which we want our nomadic war machines to intervene. If we are to be effective in producing change we better know what the supply lines are so that we might make them our target. What I’ve heard in these discussions is a complete indifference to military logistics. It’s as if people like to wave their hands and say “this is horrible and unjust!” and believe that hand waving is a politically efficacious act. Yeah, you’re right, it is horrible but saying so doesn’t go very far and changing it. It’s also as if people are horrified when anyone discusses anything besides how horribly unjust everything is. Confronted with an analysis why the social functions in the horrible way, the next response is to say “you’re justifying that system and saying it’s a-okay!” This misses the point that the entire point is to map the “supply lines” of the opposing war machine so you can strategically intervene in them to destroy them and create alternative forms of life. You see, we already took for granted your analysis of how horrible things are. You’re preaching to the choir. We wanted to get to work determining how to change that and believed for that we needed good maps of the opposing state based war machine so we can decide how to intervene. We then look at your actual practices and see that your sole strategy seems to be ideological critique or debunking. Your idea seems to be that if you just prove that other people’s beliefs are incoherent, they’ll change and things will be different. But we’ve noticed a couple things about your strategy: 1) there have been a number of bang-on critiques of state based war machines, without things changing too much, and 2) we’ve noticed that we might even persuade others that labor under these ideologies that their position is incoherent, yet they still adhere to it as if the grounds of their ideology didn’t matter much. This leads us to suspect that there are other causal factors that undergird these social assemblages and cause them to endure is they do. We thought to ourselves, there are two reasons that an ideological critique can be successful and still fail to produce change: a) the problem can be one of “distribution”. The critique is right but fails to reach the people who need to hear it and even if they did receive the message they couldn’t receive it because it’s expressed in the foreign language of “academese” which they’ve never been substantially exposed to (academics seem to enjoy only speaking to other academics even as they say their aim is to change the world). Or b) there are other causal factors involved in why social worlds take the form they do that are not of the discursive, propositional, or semiotic order. My view is that it is a combination of both. I don’t deny that ideology is one component of why societies take the form they do and why people tolerate intolerable conditions. I merely deny that this is the only causal factor. I don’t reject your political aims, but merely wonder how to get there. Meanwhile, you guys behave like a war machine that believes it’s sufficient to drop pamphlets out of an airplane debunking the ideological reasons that persuade the opposing force’s soldiers to fight this war on behalf of the state apparatus, forgetting supply lines, that there are other soldiers behind them with guns to their back, that they have obligations to their fellows, that they have families to feed or debt to pay off, etc. When I point out these other things it’s not to reject your political aims, but to say that perhaps these are also good things to intervene in if we wish to change the world. In other words, I’m objecting to your tendency to use a hammer to solve all problems and to see all things as a nail (discursive problems), ignoring the role that material nonhuman entities play in the form that social assemblages take. This is the basic idea behind what I’ve called “terraism”. Terraism has three components: 1) “Cartography” or the mapping of assemblages to understand why they take the form they take and why they endure. This includes the mapping of both semiotic and material components of social assemblages. 2) “Deconstruction” Deconstruction is a practice. It includes both traditional modes of discursive deconstruction (Derridean deconstruction, post-structuralist feminist critique, Foucaultian genealogy, Cultural Marxist critique, etc), but also far more literal deconstruction in the sense of intervening in material or thingly orders upon which social assemblages are reliant. It is not simply beliefs, signs, and ideologies that cause oppressive social orders to endure or persist, but also material arrangements upon which people depend to live as they do. Part of changing a social order thus necessarily involves intervening in those material networks to undermine their ability to maintain their relations or feedback mechanisms that allow them to perpetuate certain dependencies for people. Finally, 3) there is “Terraformation”. Terraformation is the hardest thing of all, as it requires the activist to be something more than a critic, something more than someone who simply denounces how bad things are, someone more than someone who simply sneers, producing instead other material and semiotic arrangements rendering new forms of life and social relation possible. Terraformation consists in building alternative forms of life. None of this, however, is possible without good mapping of the terrain so as to know what to deconstruct and what resources are available for building new worlds. Sure, I care about ontology for political reasons because I believe this world sucks and is profoundly unjust. But rather than waving my hands and cursing because of how unjust and horrible it is so as to feel superior to all those about me who don’t agree, rather than playing the part of the beautiful soul who refuses to get his hands dirty, I think we need good maps so we can blow up the right bridges, power lines, and communications networks, and so we can engage in effective terraformation.
851,869
365,085
328,765
Stanford Round 2 NEG Yerba Buena JG
1AC Link Case links: Extend all their extinction claims Extinction first Pummer 15 — (Theron Pummer, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford, "Moral Agreement on Saving the World", Practical Ethics University of Oxford, 5-18-2015, Available Online at http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/, accessed 7-2-2018, HKR-AM) we do not endorse ableist language= Extinction Nickolas Roth 17 and Matthew Bunn, research associate at the Belfer Center's Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University, professor of practice at the Harvard Kennedy School, 9/28/17, "The effects of a single terrorist nuclear bomb", https://thebulletin.org/2017/09/the-effects-of-a-single-terrorist-nuclear-bomb/ K The discourse of nuclearism is based in a reproductive futurism that finds the value of humanity on the basis of their capacity for biological reproduction. The question is not whether nuclear weapons are good or bad, but how we have those debates. Only a reframing of nuclear temporalities and a rejection of reproductive futurity can escape the logic of elimination that grounds the use of nuclear weapons in the first place. Saint-Amour 13 Paul K. "Queer Temporalities of the Nuclear Condition.”." Silence of Fallout: Nuclear Criticism in a Post-Cold War World: 59-80. 2013 When Jonathan Schell's The Fate of the Earth first appeared in 1982, its most AND it is figured, licensed, and imbued with or emptied of affect. Impact Civilization and politics are fundamentally oriented towards the nuclear family. The reproduction of capital, social cultures and knowledge are only possible through that structure. Queerness is defined against this as all those desires that cannot be limited or fit neatly within that family. This turns case. Baedan 12 "Baedan." The Anarchist Library. N.p., Summer 2012. Web. “Capitalism, the Family, and the Anus” is the first chapter AND effort to regain social control in a world tending toward disorder and decoding. Alt: Our alternative is to embrace all that is nuclear as an act of the queer death drive. The alternative is an ideological break from the 1AC – They say nuclear arsenals bad because it endangers the future whereas our alternative is an embracement of the inherent insecurity of the present. Only a complete embrace disrupts the global order — Our refusal to embrace futurity and resolve the conflict of sexuality exposes the value that sutures structural antagonisms in building multiple modes of violence. Agathangelou ’13 Anna M. Agathangelou, teaches in Political Science and Social and Political Thought at York University, Toronto, and is co-director of Global Change Institute, Nicosia. “Neoliberal Geopolitical Order and Value: Queerness as Speculative Economy and Anti-Blackness as Terror.” International Feminist Journal of Politics, 15:4, 453-476, 2013. Both libidinal and global economies’ sexual expression is ordered as a form of value. AND temporality of a present sense of political possibility’ (Keeling 2009: 569). Solvency Nuclear enframing reproduces the law of social and political order. The radical potential of queerness is trapped by reliance on specific productions, only a complete end of the world moves beyond into an anti-political burning down of civilization. Baedan ’12 Baedan et. al., “The Anti-Social Turn.” Baedan— Journal of Queer Nihilism. Issue 1. Summer 2012. https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/baedan-baedan. No Future, Edelman’s magnum opus of queer negativity, offers a series of crucial AND crucial points of the text sharpened into weapons for anti-social projects. The aff’s miscalc claims are a form of nuclear hysteria – the last 70 years disprove every harm they isolate. John Mueller 18 PhD Political Science, Political Science @ THE Ohio State University, Woody Hayes Senior Research Scientist @ Mershon Center for International, Security Studies @ OSU, "Nuclear Weapons Don’t Matter," Foreign Affairs, 10-15-2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-10-15/nuclear-weapons-dont-matterVC Over the decades, the atomic obsession has taken various forms, focusing on an AND they haven’t been borne out by the lived record of the nuclear era. Offense Case Turn: Cross-apply Baedan 12 Their dedication to protect the future masks those that don’t fall under the conception of a standard, child-bearing family. – Also means link is airtight Defend the alternative. Bio-chem DA What is replaced when nuclear arsenals are eliminated? Biological and chemical weapons fills in for nukes post-fiat. Neil Narang 16, UC Santa Barbara political science professor, 4-6-2016, “All Together Now? Questioning WMDs as a Useful Analytical Unit for Understanding Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation,” Nonproliferation Review, 22.3-4, Taylor and Francis The first inference that one may be tempted to draw from past findings is that AND the demand to other coercive instruments such as chemical or biological weapons.18 Biological and chemical weapons cause mass death. Bryan R Schneider 17, 11-27-2017, "Biological weapon," Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/technology/biological-weaponLynbrook KD Biological weapons, like chemical weapons, radiological weapons, and nuclear weapons, are AND or terrorist organization will manufacture or steal biological weapons is a growing security concern Bioweapons don’t deter and they are unreliable, that’s a reason to prefer the neg. Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley 2015 eSonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley is an associate professor in the School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs at George Mason University. She is the author of Barriers to Bioweapons: The Challenges of Expertise and Organization for Weapons Development (Cornell University Press, 2014). Currently, Ben Ouagrham-Gormley is working on a book that provides testimonies of former US and Soviet bioweapons scientists, technicians, and administrative personnel, collected under a four-year oral history project funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The book will be accompanied by a documentary on bioweapons and bioethics, featuring former bioweapons scientists. A website under construction will also contain transcripts of interviews conducted under the oral history project and serve as an online bilingual forum to educate US and international scientists, engineers, and publics about the complicated ethical dilemmas underpinning scientific work. https://thebulletin.org/roundtable_entry/bioweapons-not-an-alternative-to-nuclear-weapons/ Lynbrook YM Further, biological weapons are poor deterrents. In addition to the fact that states AND that could effectively protect fragile bioagents against the stress of re-entry.
851,881
365,086
328,755
Saudi Prolif DA
===Saudi Prolif DA=== ====Weak U.S. stance on Iranian aggression causes Saudi Prolif through Pakistan. ==== **Rezaei 19** – Dr. Rezaei, member of the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa (ASMEA), specialist on Iran’s foreign policy, its nuclear and ballistic-missile programs, counterproliferation, and nuclear and radiological terrorism, Middle East Policy Council, Volume XXVI, Number 2, Summer 2019, "JCPOA Collapse: Will Proliferation Follow?" https://mepc.org/journal/jcpoa-collapse-will-proliferation-follow Nevin Like Israel, Saudi Arabia has had a long history of strife with Iran. AND domestic covert nuclear programs to create the wherewithal to build nuclear weapons."30 ====BUT the Trump Administration has reversed that perception via economic sanctions—recent actions prove. ==== **Reuters 6/8** – Reuters, June 8^^th^^, 2020, "U.S. sanctions imposed on Iranian shipping network over proliferation take effect," https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-sanctions/u-s-sanctions-imposed-on-iranian-shipping-network-over-proliferation-take-effect-idUSKBN23F2PP Nevin WASHINGTON (Reuters) - U.S. sanctions imposed on Iran’s shipping network AND and has worked with Iranian organizations subject to U.N. sanctions. ====Nuclear Saudi is feasible given sufficient motivation AND causes wildfire prolif—creates multiple scenarios for escalation. ==== Eric **Edelman 11**, Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and Former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr-and-evan-braden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support AND Middle East could lead to a new Great Game, with unpredictable consequences.
851,871
365,087
328,764
SepOct - Trad NC
====Disclosure==== ====We Meet: We disclosed our previous postions right before the round began. That should give them enough procedural ground for fair debate.==== ====Counter Interpretation: Small schools are allowed to disclose before the round begins.==== Standards Accessibility DA – I am the only Lincoln-Douglas debater on my team. My school's actual debate team just began last year, and as a small school we only had access to digital documents starting this year. The neg's interpretation locks any small school/team out of the activity based off of the privileged assumption that all debaters have access to the resources they need; Decks their claims about procedural fairness. Structural Equity DA – Voting on this means they continue to actively shut out small AND aff is given an unfair advantage to abuse limits by calling for fairness. ====Disclosure should not be a voter. Prefer additionally – ==== Make them prove in round abuse. There are structural advantages for the neg that extend beyond this debate round that already provides the neg more resources to actively shut out small schools. ====CP text: Schools in the United States should implement problem-based learning initiatives – solves racial, economic, and gender gaps in education and is empirically effective in improving educational quality and closing the achievement gap.==== **Hanover Research Institute '14**(Hanover Research Institute, "Improving Student Achievement and Closing the Achievement Gap", December 2014, https://www.rcoe.us/educational-services/files/2015/12/10c-Hanover_Improving_Student_Achievement_and_Closing_the_Achievement_Gap__12-2014.pdf) Project?based learning (PBL), also known as inquiry?based learning or AND 65 as well as to imbue students with higher motivation and confidence.66 ===Case=== ====The plan only shifts admissions to more subjective measures- the result is a heavy reliance on transcripts, essays, and lobbying, which turns case==== **Meltzer 18**, Erica Meltzer graduated from Brookline High School and earned her B.A., magna cum laude, from Wellesley College. (Eliminating standardized testing won't make college admissions fair) https://thecriticalreader.com/eliminating-testing-admissions-fair/ MP The University of Chicago's recent decision to go test-optional got me thinking: AND would inevitably creep into the process even more so than they already do. ====The aff just trades testing out for demonstrated interest which is infinitely worse.==== **Selingo 18** **(Jeffrey Selingo is a contributing editor to The Atlantic and the author of There Is Life After College., 5-25-2018, "The Two Most Important College-Admissions Criteria Now Mean Less," Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/05/college-admissions-gpa-sat-act/561167/, JKS)** Some colleges, however, are not waiting on their peers and instead are proactively AND a good amount of deciding who gets in is going to be arbitrary. ====It's empirically proven – tests get switched out for more unequal alternatives like AP and IB.==== **Camera 18 ** **(Lauren Camera, 10-26-18, education reporter at U.S. News and World Report. She's covered education policy and politics for nearly a decade and has written for Education Week, The Hechinger Report, Congressional Quarterly, Roll Call, and the Chronicle of Higher Education. She was a 2013 Spencer Education Fellow at Columbia University's School of Journalism, "The Future of College Entrance Exams," US News and World Report, https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2018-10-26/the-new-opt-out-movement-colleges-make-entrance-exams-optional, JKS)** Buckley says he's wary of a world without college entrance exams. "What jumps AND shooting ourselves in the foot in trying to make the world more fair." ====Eliminating tests causes a shift to "soft" holistic assessments that increase inequality ==== **De Boer, PhD, 18** (Freddie, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2018/03/sat-class-race-inequality-college-admission 3-30) The Flaws of "Holistic Assessments" Let's look at the alternative metrics for student AND is straightforwardly beneficial to the more privileged at the expense of the less. ====Standardized tests are key to combat grade inflation- greater threat to equality ==== **De Boer, PhD, 18** (Freddie, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2018/03/sat-class-race-inequality-college-admission 3-30) There's another reason for people who believe in equality to champion standardized achievement tests: AND as the race to the top of the educational ladder gets more intense. ====Standardized testing is key to reliable scholarship decisions and also reduces inequality – objective criteria is key.==== **Jacobs et al. 18** (Jonathan Jacobs, Jim Brooks, Roger J. Thompson, Jack Buckley, Lynn Letukas, and Ben Wildavsky.. PhD Philosophy, Professor and Chair of Philosophy @ John Jay College of Criminal Justice/CUNY, Director, Institute for Criminal Justice @ John Jay College of Criminal Justice/CUNY. Director of Financial Aid and Scholarships @ Oregon. PhD Higher Education Policy and Administration from USC, Vice President for Student Services and Enrollment Management @ Oregon. PhD Political Science, Institute Fellow @ American Institutes for Research, Former Commissioner of the U.S. Department of Education's National Center for Education Statistics. PhD Sociology, Director of Global Academic Programs @ SAS. Senior Vice President @ Strada Education Network. "Merit-Based Scholarships in Student Recruitment and the Role of Standardized Tests," in "Measuring Success: Testing, Grades, and the Future of College Admissions". 2018. Johns Hopkins University Press. 2018 pp. 96-97) //TruLe The scholarship review project was launched in early 2012 with a goal of restructuring the AND course sequence Geometry, Algebra 2, Pre-Calculus, and Calculus. ====Tests are crucial to identify achievement gaps- abolishing them means we can't hold schools or politicians accountable. Consensus of civil rights groups votes Neg==== **The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights et al 15** (Signatories include: The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights The American Association of University Women (AAUW) Association of University Centers on Disabilities (AUCD) Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates, Inc. (COPAA) Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund (DREDF) League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) NAACP National Council of La Raza (NCLR) National Disability Rights Network (NDRN) National Urban League (NUL) Southeast Asia Resource Action Center (SEARAC) TASH https://civilrights.org/2015/05/05/civil-rights-groups-we-oppose-anti-testing-efforts/, 5-15 ) WASHINGTON – Today, 12 national civil and human rights groups announced their opposition to AND harder to identify and fix the deep-seated problems in our schools." ====Turns the case – scholarships are key to enrollment for low-income students on the fence.==== **Jackson 15** (Orville Jackson. Jackson is a writer for College Futures Foundation. "New Study Shows Scholarships Can Boost College Enrollment among Low-Income Students". 6-30-2015. College Futures Foundation. https://collegefutures.org/2015/06/study-shows-scholarships-boost-college-enrollment-for-low-income-students/) //TruLe The higher education world often distinguishes between need-based financial aid, which is AND -going and completion for low-income students, including the following: ====Holistic review without testing crushes school budgets – the aff shuts down small schools==== **Bergin 7/02** (Mike Bergin is the founder of Chariot Learning, a program for SAT and ACT prep. Bergin started his career in 1994 as a teacher for Kaplan. "THE FANTASY OF TEST-FREE ADMISSIONS," Chariot Learning. July 2, 2019. https://chariotlearning.com/the-fantasy-of-test-free-admissions/ ) //WWJA 9/6/19 SAT and ACT scores offer a simple, reliable, relevant, and inexpensive way AND over the campus, while the college seeks a more solvent partner institution. ====College budgets are on the brink now and increased costs get passed down to students – turns case.==== **Kovaci 19** (Klevisa Kovaçi is an international development consultant, with project engagements in Eastern Europe and Asia through the UN Kosovo Team, Permanent Mission of Albania to the UN, Dartmouth College, and non-governmental organizations. She holds a Master of International Affairs from Columbia University and Sciences Po (l'Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris). " Addressing higher education economics: Policy analysis for tuition," Georgetown Public Policy Review. April 17, 2019. http://www.gpprspring.com/addressing-higher-ed-economics ) //WWJA 9/6/19 Rising college tuition costs cause tremendous financial strain for students. Between 1987 and 2010 AND trade-off based on ability to pay especially harms socioeconomically disadvantaged students. ====The aff just trades testing out for demonstrated interest which is infinitely worse.==== **Selingo 18** **(Jeffrey Selingo is a contributing editor to The Atlantic and the author of There Is Life After College., 5-25-2018, "The Two Most Important College-Admissions Criteria Now Mean Less," Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/05/college-admissions-gpa-sat-act/561167/, JKS)** Some colleges, however, are not waiting on their peers and instead are proactively AND a good amount of deciding who gets in is going to be arbitrary.
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Wilson Center, 12-11-2019, "Report: Terrorism on Decline in Middle East and North Africa," https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/report-terrorism-decline-middle-east-and-north-africa, accessed 4-17-2020, AZ, JR Bahrain recorded one AND attack in 2017. Polluck, 1-9-2020, "Eight Reasons Why the United States and Iraq Still Need Each Other," No Publication, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/eight-reasons-why-the-united-states-and-iraq-still-need-each-other, accessed 4-18-2020, AZ, JR The assassination of AND the first place. Rebecca Kheel, 2-4-2020, "Pentagon watchdog: US withdrawal from Iraq would 'likely' mean ISIS resurgence," TheHill, https://thehill.com/policy/defense/481451-pentagon-watchdog-us-withdrawal-from-iraq-would-likely-mean-isis-resurgence, accessed 4-18-2020, AZ, JR Meanwhile, in Syria AND on ‘known facts.’ ” Alastair Jamieson, 1-19-2016, "ISIS Death Toll: 18,800 Civilians Killed in Iraq in 2 Years: U.N.," NBC News, https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/isis-death-toll-2018-800-killed-iraq-2-years-u-n499426, accessed 4-18-2020, AZ, JR U.N. monitors recorded AND forced into sexual
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Sergie- https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/energy/the-saudi-qatari-breach-explained/2019/07/09/96ec69de-a260-11e9-a767-d7ab84aef3e9_story.html When four Arab AND to isolate Iran. Perry Shealah Craighead), 5-20-2019, "Why Tiny Qatar May Be Our Greatest Hope in the Iran Crisis," American Conservative, https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/why-tiny-qatar-may-be-our-greatest-hope-in-this-iran-crisis/, accessed 4-17-2020, AZ, JR America’s 18-year war AND UAE, and Jordan. AL Jazeera No Author, 8-1-2018, "Rex Tillerson stopped Saudi and UAE from 'attacking' Qatar," No Publication, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/rex-tillerson-stopped-saudi-uae-attacking-qatar-180801125651449.html, accessed 4-17-2020, AZ, JR Saudi Arabia and AND with the US. Thompson- https://mepc.org/us-power-middle-east-not-declining These disagreements must AND of oil markets. Wagner, xx-xx-xxxx, "," No Publication, https://www.psr.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/body-count.pdf, accessed 4-18-2020, AZ,JR This investigation comes AND is extremely unlikely
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Imports
No Author, xx-xx-xxxx, "," MIT, http://web.mit.edu/14.02/www/S05/Ch19.pdf, accessed 2-14-2020, AZ,JR Imports are the AND this point shortly.) Daniel Liberto, 2-5-2020, "Marginal Propensity To Import (MPM) Definition," Investopedia, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marginal-propensity-import-mpm.asp, accessed 2-14-2020, AZ,JR Marginal propensity to AND the goods imported. No Author, xx-xx-xxxx, "Africa," Office of the Trade Representative, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa, accessed 2-14-2020, AZ,JR U.S. goods exports AND iron and steel ($807 million). No Author, xx-xx-xxxx, "," United States International Trade Commission, https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4780.pdf, accessed 2-14-2020, AZ,JR AGOA preferences were AND cocoa beans in No Author, xx-xx-xxxx, ""Trade Is Key to Africa’s Economic Growth"," Office of the Trade Representative, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/blog/trade-key-africaE28099s-economic-growth, accessed 2-14-2020, AZ,JR Because trade is AND any product globally." World Bank, 03-xx-2016, "While Poverty in Africa Has Declined, Number of Poor Has Increased," https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/publication/poverty-rising-africa-poverty-report, accessed 2-14-2020, AZ,JR Poverty across the AND gap has narrowed.
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1 - Septober Bellaire Nato Tariffs Neg
Cavanna ‘17// the BRI poses a challenge to US hegemony Thomas P. Cavanna, The Diplomat, 4-28-2017, "What Does China’s Belt and Road Initiative Mean for US Grand Strategy?," Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/what-does-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-mean-for-us-grand-strategy/, accessed 9-11-2019 //TP The United States’ response to a rising China has largely focused on bolstering military capabilities, doctrines, and partnerships in the Asia-Pacific (or, more recently, the Indo-Pacific). This approach misconstrues the problem: it overstates the security threat and understates (or ignores) the economic challenge. To maintain its dominant position globally in the long-term, the United States must reckon with the ambitious geoeconomic endeavor Beijing has launched to project strategic influence across the Eurasian continent, which hosts most of the world’s economic centers and natural resources. The nascent Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) illustrates the transformative geopolitical implications of China’s rise. Despite its changing contours and the fact that it partly recycles preexisting plans, this series of major infrastructure and development projects designed to connect Eurasian regions together is a coherent enterprise of unprecedented scale: $4 trillion of promised investments in 65 countries representing 70 percent of the world’s population, 55 percent of its GNP, and 75 percent of its energy reserves. The BRI aims to stabilize China’s western peripheries, rekindle its economy, propel non-Western international economic institutions, gain influence in other countries, and diversify trade suppliers/routes while circumventing the U.S. pivot to Asia. Of course, the BRI’s prospects of success are subject to many unknowns, including the possibility of foreign resistance, China’s domestic economic travails, political turbulence, aging population, and environmental problems. On the other hand, the U.S. still possesses enormous assets to maintain its predominance, including military primacy, multiple alliances, powerful Western-led international organizations, and an unmatched soft power. Yet over time the BRI could threaten the very foundations of Washington’s post-WWII hegemony. A similar phenomenon is visible in Europe. For all of the United States’ efforts NATO’s post-Cold War expansion to former countries of the Soviet bloc and the launching of the global war on terror did not substitute for the foundational Soviet security threat that once undergirded the transatlantic alliance. The European states’ reluctance to increase military budgets and to participate in misguided U.S.-led interventions caused tensions, especially following the invasion of Iraq. Meanwhile China made important strides. Its regional trade and investments skyrocketed. Beijing acquired strategic assets to amass local advanced technologies and know-how, using Europe’s economic distress in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the EU’s political divisions and lack of an investment vetting process, and the mesmerizing appeal of China’s national market. Chinese leaders use their growing geoeconomic leverage to discipline their new partners and cultivate local proxies. The United States has tried to counter these efforts, as illustrated by the unsuccessful negotiation of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and continuous attempts to harness European militaries and defense industries to U.S. strategic goals. Yet Beijing’s rise has started to corrode the depth and scope of transatlantic relations. Despite frustrations with its economic practices, European countries have been willing to develop bilateral ties further and further. Moreover, they have only very timidly endorsed the U.S. position that China’s growing assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific poses a major threat to the international order. Trump’s rejection of the Iran nuclear deal, economic multilateralism, and the Paris climate agreement make things worse, but the problems are deeper. Barkin ‘19// hardline EU stance is holding together US-EU alliance, and US hegemony competition with China hinges on “what happens in Europe” Noah Barkin, 6-4-2019, "The U.S. Is Losing Europe in Its Battle With China," Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/06/united-states-needs-europe-against-china/590887/, accessed 9-11-2019 //TP At the meeting in Washington, D.C., they pressed their allies to sign on to a joint statement condemning the Chinese plan. But it soon became clear that neither the Europeans nor a small group of other countries from Asia and Latin America were ready to fall in line. “No one was willing to go along with it,” one European diplomat familiar with the details of the meeting, who requested anonymity to discuss sensitive negotiations, told me. “We may agree that China is a strategic threat, but you can’t just put them in a corner.” For the Europeans, the meeting at the State Department was another sign of what they see as the White House’s misguided zero-sum approach to dealing with China, and its mistaken belief that it can employ an à la carte approach with its partners, denouncing them publicly on some issues while expecting cooperation on others. For the Americans, the talks were the latest sign of Europe’s reluctance to stand up to China. “Europe,” one person close to the Trump administration who declined to be named told me, “is almost on a different planet.” After two years of escalating tensions between the United States and Europe over issues ranging from trade and Iran to defense spending and Russian gas pipelines, China should be the issue that unites them two sides, or at least eases some of the transatlantic strain. The European Union—with Germany and France leading the way—has adopted a much tougher stance on China over the past year, introducing new rules allowing for closer scrutiny of Chinese investments in European countries, exploring changes to the EU’s industrial, competition, and procurement policies to ensure Beijing is not unfairly advantaged, and, after years of avoiding clashes with Beijing, declaring China a “strategic rival.” This shift mirrors the harder line adopted by Washington under President Donald Trump, who has dialed up his two-year confrontation with Beijing several notches over the past month by raising tariffs on Chinese goods and putting the Chinese telecommunications group Huawei and scores of its affiliates on an export blacklist that could severely restrict their access to vital U.S. technology. But conversations I had with dozens of officials on both sides of the Atlantic—many of whom requested anonymity to talk about on diplomaticcy and intelligence issues—suggest that instead of coming together, Europe and the U.S. might be in the early stages of a damaging divergence on the China challenge. Trump’s latest moves, which raise the specter of a prolonged economic Cold War between Washington and Beijing, are likely to deepen the divide, taking the U.S. down a path that is unpalatable for even the hardest of European hard-liners. “If you listen to the people in the Trump administration, who view China as an existential threat, they are not in a place most Europeans can get to,” says Evan Feigenbaum, who held senior Asia-focused roles in the State Department during George W. Bush’s presidency and is now at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The dissonance raises the prospect of a Western split on what both sides agree is likely to be the biggest geopolitical challenge of the 21st century—responding to the rise of an authoritarian China. A series of meetings in recent months, and the disparate ways in which they were interpreted by either side, illustrate the widening chasm. The European diplomat who discussed the April meeting likened Washington’s uncompromising stance on Belt and Road to its position on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) a few years prior. Back then, the United States, under President Barack Obama, failed to convince allies to join a boycott of the new China-led development bank, leaving the Americans embarrassed and isolated. U.S. officials, by contrast, point to talks months before the meeting in Foggy Bottom, when Washington was pushing for a joint declaration denouncing human-rights abuses in Xinjiang, the western Chinese region where more than a million members of the Muslim minority have been detained in reeducation camps. That effort was also abandoned after what U.S. officials described as an exasperating back-and-forth with the European Union and individual member states. Among the American officials I spoke with, there was an air of what felt like panic—over what they saw as the global spread of Chinese influence through Xi’s Belt and Road initiative, the lack of an American alternative to Huawei, and the persistent failure of the World Trade Organization to tackle China’s unfair trade practices. One senior administration official likened discussions of China policy to the period after the 9/11 attacks. Inevitably, this person said, there will be an “overreaction” from Washington, with “collateral damage” for other countries, before U.S. policy settles down. In Brussels, senior officials are comparing the Trump administration’s China policy to Brexit. Both, they say, are based on the deluded notion that a fading great power can reverse the course of history and return to its glorious past. The irony is that senior U.S. administration officials acknowledge in private that American success in its competition with China might ultimately hinge on what happens in Europe. Yet many U.S. officials have no patience, at least in the highest ranks of the Trump administration, when it comes to working with European allies. Nor do they have much appreciation for the steps Europe has taken over the past year to push back against China. Several U.S. officials described the EU’s recent measures as baby steps that fall far short of what is needed. “The Americans are out to beat, contain, confront China,” a senior EU official who asked not to be identified told me. “They have a much more belligerent attitude. We believe they will waste a lot of energy and not be successful.” This does not mean that transatlantic channels of communication on China have broken down. A group of hawkish pragmatists including Matt Pottinger, who oversees Asia policy at the National Security Council, and Randall Schriver, a senior Pentagon official, have been trying to reach out to Europe for months, U.S. and European officials confirm. Last year, discussions focused on measures to protect against Chinese acquisitions. More recently, they have shifted to talks on next-generation 5G mobile networks, as well as joint responses to Belt and Road, an issue about which Washington and Brussels agreed last month to hold quarterly coordination meetings, according to EU officials. And last month, an American delegation traveled to Berlin for talks with German officials on China as part of a biannual get-together that began under the Obama administration and has continued, without a hitch, under Trump. Other changes are under way too: Last year, according to U.S. and European officials, the State Department appointed China point people in many of their European embassies, with officials estimating that roughly 150 U.S. diplomats on both sides of the Atlantic now spend at least part of their time focusing on China in Europe; at a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Washington in late March, China was on the agenda for the first time; and Belt and Road could be a discussion point when France hosts a G7 summit in Biarritz in August, European officials have suggested. Amaro ‘19// EU US trade war won't happen now because it's unpopular- the reason it's unpopular is because Europe is viewed as an ally Silvia Amaro, 04-16-2019, “A trade war between the US and Europe is unlikely to happen. Here’s why,” CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/16/analysts-say-why-a-us-eu-trade-war-is-unlikely-to-happen.html Trump has challenged China over trade since taking power as well, imposing increasing rounds of tariffs on the country. At the moment, however, media reports and comments from the U.S. and Chinese administrations suggest they could be close to a trade agreement. According to Schmieding, a deal between Beijing and Washington would make an agreement with Brussels even more likely. “After all, the EU is no geostrategic rival of the U.S.,” he said. Both analysts are also confident that the U.S. and Europe will avoid a trade war because political support in the United States for a trade war with the EU is much weaker than backing for a tough stance on China. Trigkas ‘18// if China-EU make a bilateral investment deal the US will launch a trade war against the EU Vasilis Trigkas, July 6, 2018, "Nato, China summits a chance for Europe to assert itself," South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2153948/nato-and-china-summits-give-europe-chance, accessed 9-11-2019 //TP In Beijing, EU leaders may have a seemingly easier task negotiating with the Chinese on trade but caution is always a wise counsellor. According to reports from the meeting of the vice-president of the European Commission, Jyrki Katainen, and Chinese Vice-Premier Liu He in June, the two sides are ready to present their detailed market access conditions by mid-July and reboot the dormant discussions on a bilateral investment treaty. If negotiations accelerate and China and the EU reach a final accord by the end of the year or early 2019, this would complicate US efforts to rebalance its economic relations with China. It could push trigger-happy Trump to unleash tariffs against European exporters at a moment when the EU has just found its economic pace. Any benefits from a bilateral investment treaty with China may be undone by a full-scale transatlantic trade war and an utterly divided West. Bown ‘19// auto tariffs from the US would definitively cause a European retaliation More From, 6-26-2019, "Transatlantic Policy Impacts of the US-EU Trade Conflict," PIIE, https://www.piie.com/commentary/testimonies/transatlantic-policy-impacts-us-eu-trade-conflict Three reasons demonstrate why imposing trade restrictions on European automobiles and parts would disrupt the American economy. First, American consumers would be hit by price hikes. Fiats, Volkswagens, and Volvos, among other brands, would become more expensive. The reduced competition would inevitably raise prices of all cars, regardless of the make and model. Second, the American manufacturing base would lose access to imported auto parts it needs to produce cars for both domestic consumption and export. Imported parts are vital for American-based auto plants to keep costs low for high-quality cars made in states like Alabama, Tennessee, and South Carolina. The facilities in these and other states make some of America's most successful exports. Restricting trade in parts would hurt these factories and their workers. Third, Europe will retaliate. The European Union has announced it would impose counter tariffs on US exports—a credible threat because it did so last year when President Trump imposed tariffs on their exports of steel and aluminum, also under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Ivana ‘18//EU retaliation in tariffs Kottasová, Ivana. “EU Warns Trump’s Car Tariffs Threaten $300 Billion of US Exports.” CNNMoney, 2 July 2018, money.cnn.com/2018/07/02/news/economy/car-tariffs-europe-warning/index.html. Accessed 13 Sept. 2019. Nearly $300 billion of US exports could be hit by retaliatory tariffs if the Trump administration decides to penalize automobile imports from around the world, the European Union says.The stark warning was included in the European Commission's written response to the Trump administration's investigation into imports of cars and car parts. The comments were sent to the US Department of Commerce on Friday and published on Monday.The Commission said global retaliation against US tariffs on auto imports would have a much bigger impact on the American economy than the backlash provoked by the Trump administration's steel and aluminum tariffs this year.It estimated that $294 billion, or around 19 of total US exports last year, could be affected. President Donald Trump has threatened to place a 20 tariff on all European cars coming to the United States if the European Union doesn't remove its own trade barriers. Heeb, Gina. “Trump's proposed car tariffs could trigger a global growth recession, BAML says.” Markets Insider. 2/21/19//SSK While that could benefit some American automakers and reduce bilateral trade deficits, it would also risk adding thousands of dollars to the price of vehicles, and raises the threat of retaliatory duties that could worsen global trade tensions. "In a worst case scenario, full­blown tit­for­tat auto tariffs could trigger a global recession," analysts at Bank of America Merrill Lynch wrote in a research note out this week, adding they would expect growth in the world economy to fall nearly a percentage point to 1.2. By increasing the price of vehicles and imported materials, they could threaten jobs, consumer spending, and investment. The analysts estimated that they would add $2,000 to $7,000 to price tags of both imported and American-made vehicles, posing even greater risks than the global trade tensions that emerged last year. Harry Bradford, 4-5-2013, "Three Times The Population Of The U.S. Is At Risk Of Falling Into Poverty," HuffPost, span class="skimlinks-unlinked"https://www.huffpost.com/entry/global-poverty-900-million-economic-shock_n_3022420/span Hundreds of millions of people worldwide are on the brink of poverty. A recent study by the International Monetary Fund warns that as many as 900 million people could fall back into poverty in the event of an economic shock like the Great Recession. That figure is three times the size of the U.S. population. According to the World Bank, 1.2 billion people are currently living on less than $1.25 a day. While the report acknowledges that progress has been to made to reduce global poverty and strengthen the world economy following the financial crisis, the world is still in a vulnerable situation. Global unemployment, for example, is the highest it’s been in two decades with 40 percent of the world’s population out of work, according to the report. And things could get much worse in the event of a macroeconomic shock, of which the Europe and U.S. are dangerously close. The recent bailout of Cyprus threw the eurozone into chaos, igniting fears that the situation could lead to the next financial crisis. Here in the U.S., a series of automatic spending cuts know as the sequester could cost the economy hundreds of thousands of jobs. The cuts have already threatened the stability of safety nets designed to aid the nation’s poorest..
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Matt Schrader, 8-10-2018, "Domestic Criticism May Signal Shrunken Belt and Road Ambitions," Jamestown, https://jamestown.org/program/domestic-criticism-may-signal-china-scaling-back-its-bri-ambitions/ In the past two weeks, obvious signs of discontent with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping’s ambitious policy agenda have emerged into public view. (Willy Lam explores these signs and their policy implications in “Xi’s Grip on Authority Loosens Amid Trade War Policy Paralysis”, also in this issue.) Intellectuals have launched brave attacks on Xi on a number of fronts, from his unprecedented assault on intellectual freedom, to his decision to name himself president for life by amending the PRC constitution to remove presidential term limits (China Brief, March 5). One of these criticisms is Xi’s excessive ‘foreign aid’ to countries in Africa and elsewhere. This is an obvious reference to Xi Jinping’s ambitious, globe-spanning Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI is the hallmark of Xi Jinping’s foreign policy—indeed, as the scope of the BRI has expanded, the two have become increasingly difficult to distinguish. Although a Western observer might dismiss a few professors’ unhappiness with the BRI as ivory tower grumbling, PRC academic critiques are worth noting, since outspoken academics are often the channel through which other PRC societal elites communicate their dissatisfaction with the CCP. In the past, these channels have also served to telegraph important shifts in CCP policy. The public airing of such criticisms could indicate the existence of a emerging consensus that Beijing should scale back its BRI ambitions. And in fact, BRI lending has already begun to shrink, decreasingly dramatically since 2015. Were it to decrease further, it would have important strategic repercussions throughout the Eurasian landmass and Africa. “Flashy” Spending Abroad On July 20, Sun Wenguang, a retired professor of physics at Shandong University, penned an open letter criticizing China for “offering almost CNY 400 billion in aid to 166 countries, and sending 600,000 aid workers” (Canyuwang, July 20). On August 1, as he expanded on his concerns in an interview with the US-based Voice of America, police forced their way into Sun’s apartment. As he was taken away, Sun could be heard saying, “Listen to what I say, is it wrong? Regular people are poor, let’s not throw our money away in Africa … throwing money around like this doesn’t do any good for our country or our society.” (VOA Youtube, August 2) Although Sun has long been a government gadfly, he is also long retired, and resides far from the center of power in Beijing. But similar criticisms have found voice much closer to the corridors of power. On July 24, Xu Zhangrun (???), a professor at Beijing’s elite Tsinghua University, published an extraordinary essay entitled “Imminent Fears, Imminent Hopes” (??????????). Among many other criticisms, Xu excoriates Xi’s government for its profligacy abroad, saying: At the recent China-Arab States Cooperation Forum on 10 July 2018, Xi Jinping announced that twenty billion US dollars would be made available for ‘Dedicated Reconstruction Projects’ in the Arab world, adding that China will investigate offering a further one billion yuan to support social stability efforts in the Persian Gulf. Everyone knows full well that the Gulf States are literally oozing with wealth. Why is China, a country with over one hundred million people who are still living below the poverty line, playing at being the flashy big-spender? (China Heritage, August 1) Observers steeped in Western coverage of Belt and Road might find these criticisms surprising. Western press outlets have tended to cover the BRI as a triumphant PRC bid to remake global trade in its image. Only very recently has Western coverage turned skeptical. But the political sensitivity of the BRI means that information related to it is tightly controlled inside China; as a result, Western analysis of BRI is largely irrelevant to the debate inside China. Domestic criticism of Belt and Road is drawn from a very different, distinctly Chinese context. In the BRI, domestic critics see an extension of the CCP’s predilection for grand spending that disproportionately benefits connected insiders. As they see it, these loss-making “face projects” (????) are conducted with limited transparency and oversight, and are primarily meant to reflect glory upon one’s superiors (and help underlings curry favor). The braver of Xi’s critics have thus taken to describing his foreign policy as dasabi (???), or “throwing money around” (China Digital Times). The phrase, which censors have largely erased from China’s internet, is also a homonym for an extremely vulgar term used to insult someone’s intelligence. Criticism vs. Reality This jaundiced view of official spending may be why domestic critics of BRI sometimes categorize BRI investment—which is supposed to be primarily of a commercial nature—as “foreign aid” (????). In reality, the “dedicated reconstruction projects” Xu Zhangrun referenced in his diatribe are not aid; they will be probably be financed by concessional loans meant to “drive economies by reviving industry” (?????????; FinanceWorld, July 11). BRI loans are intended to be paid back, and despite numerous articles in Western publications about BRI-induced ‘debt traps’, analysts who track the initiative’s progress have found that only about 14 of BRI projects to date have run into problems (RWR Advisory, July 9). This is not a point that domestic critics of BRI typically cite. Censorship may again be the culprit. Although an 86 success rate for BRI projects is certainly better than some Western observers might guess, the PRC government may not eager for it to be widely known at home that China’s banks have tens of billions of dollars tied up in problematic projects abroad. Indeed, the PRC’s policymaking apparatus appears to have already responded to concerns of BRI overreach by adjusting the scale of lending to limit possible financial risk. BRI lending by major PRC banks has dropped by 89 since 2015, and lending by commercial banks—who are dealing with their own financial issues domestically—has ceased almost entirely. Policy banks have also scaled back, despite their status as arms of PRC government policy. Source: RWR Consulting 1 Criticism has still emerged despite the government’s attempts to scale back risk. In this sense, the PRC government appears to be fighting the information and trust deficits engendered by its own censorship apparatus among intellectuals and other critics. Fed a steady diet of information trumpeting BRI moving from triumph to triumph, leery intellectuals remain skeptical. A Less Ambitious BRI? A sustained downturn in BRI lending at the same time that domestic criticism of the initiative emerges into China’s tightly controlled public discourse may indicate the existence of a emerging—and potentially enduring—consensus that Beijing should keep its overseas lending ambitions modest. In Beijing’s chilly intellectual climate, an academic brave enough to plainly state their criticisms typically speaks for many others. In pondering the future of the BRI, it might be instructive to recall a 2012 essay by Deng Yuwen (???), a commentary writer and deputy editor of the Central Party School’s journal, enumerating the ten biggest problems of the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao administration 2. Nikkei Asian Review, 2-15-2019, "Will China let Belt and Road die quietly?," https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Will-China-let-Belt-and-Road-die-quietly The news for China's ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been unrelentingly bad. Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia has canceled two mega BRI projects, including a $20 billion railway, citing high costs. Pakistan's new government has called for a review of the crown jewel of BRI ~-~- China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), to which China has committed more than $60 billion in funding. Myanmar's government has just told Beijing that construction of a suspended China-funded hydropower dam would not be allowed to resume. The Maldives, the tiny island nation in the Indian Ocean, is trying to renegotiate down the $3 billion debt ~-~- equal to two thirds of its gross domestic product ~-~- it has borrowed from China to fund BRI projects. But, inside China, it is hard to detect overt signs of any wavering in support for BRI the pronouncements from top Chinese leaders, especially President Xi Jinping. For Xi, BRI's architect, this vast project spanning half the globe with infrastructure links connected to Beijing represents his vision to project Chinese power and influence. But beneath the surface there is growing unease in China about BRI. And rightly so. With the country feeling an economic squeeze, fighting a trade war with the U.S. and facing criticism from nations receiving BRI funds, Chinese skeptics, including academics, economists and business people, of BRI are quietly asking if their government is putting its scarce resources to the right use. To be sure, there are no official announcements that Beijing is about to pare back Xi's BRI dreams. Tight censorship has removed any direct criticisms of BRI from the media. Yet, one can detect tantalizing signs that Beijing is already curtailing BRI, at least rhetorically. The official propaganda machine, cranked to full steam to tout BRI's achievements not too long ago, has turned down the volume these days. In January 2018, the People's Daily, the Communist Party's mouthpiece, carried 20 stories on BRI. In January this year, there were only seven. If we keep track of BRI stories in the official Chinese media in 2019 and compare the coverage with previous years, we should have a clearer picture about where BRI is headed. In all likelihood, we will see a significant decline in the hype Chinese official media outlets devote to BRI. It is also a safe bet that Beijing's funding for BRI will decline measurably this year ~-~- and in the coming years. The economic headwinds against BRI are obvious. For starters, China's external environment has changed almost beyond recognition since Xi rolled out BRI in 2013. At that time, China foreign exchange reserves were approaching $4 trillion. It seemed a brilliant idea to use some of the foreign exchanges to invest in infrastructure. Coupled with the use of Chinese contractors and materials, BRI could also help solve China's problem of excess capacity in its steel, cement, and construction industries. But the world has changed in the last five years. China's economic slowdown has triggered a capital flight, draining more than $1 trillion from its foreign exchange reserves. If we factor in the trade war's impact on Chinese balance of payments in the future, China will unlikely generate sufficient foreign exchange surpluses to finance BRI on the same scale. The tariffs imposed by the U.S. and the uncertainty about U.S.-China commercial relations will significantly reduce Chinese exports to the U.S. and, to a lesser extent, other developed markets. Since China's trade surplus with the U.S. accounts for nearly all its overall current account surplus, a substantial fall in Chinese exports to the U.S. will result in a current-account deficit for China if it cannot offset the shortfall with increased exports to other markets (an impossible feat). China's deteriorating balance of payments will force Beijing to use it foreign exchange reserves mainly to defend its currency, the yuan, and maintain investors' confidence in China's macroeconomic stability. As a result, Beijing will have to review its external commitments carefully. Grandiose projects conceived and launched when it was flush with foreign exchange will be reassessed. Some will have to be curtailed or even abandoned altogether. But the trouble for BRI does not just stem from the near-certainty of China's declining foreign exchange earnings in coming years. On the domestic front, Beijing faces a perfect storm of rising pension costs, slowing economic growth and dwindling tax revenues. The grim fiscal outlook was conveyed with unusual bluntness by the Chinese Minister of Finance at the annual finance conference at the end of December last year. Minister Liu Kun warned, "All levels of the government must lead by tightening their belts and do their utmost to reduce administrative expenses." Shortly after the meeting, Shanghai, the richest city in China, ordered a 5 cut for most departments in 2019. This bout of austerity fever was precipitated by declining fiscal revenue growth and Beijing's decision to cut taxes to stimulate faltering growth. In 2018, the growth of fiscal revenues fell 1.2 percentage points compared with 2017. The fiscal outlook is expected to worsen this year due to tax cuts and slower growth. The biggest hole in Beijing's budget is spending on pensions for a rapidly aging population. The province of Heilongjiang had a net deficit of 23 billion yuan in its pension account as of 2016, and six other provinces, with a combined population of 236 million, were taking in less pension contributions than outlays in 2016. The pension picture for the entire country looks equally grim. According to the Ministry of Finance, the government had to contribute 1.2 trillion yuan in 2017 to fund the shortfalls in pension spending. Some may argue that BRI would be safe from Beijing's budget cutters because it is Xi's top foreign policy priority. But harsh economic reality will present Chinese leaders increasingly unpalatable choices as various demands compete for limited resources. President Xi and his supporters may continue to back BRI. But they must also know that BRI has few domestic supporters and taking money away from Chinese pensioners to build a road to nowhere in a distant land will be a tough sell politically. In what might be an early sign of newfound Chinese parsimony abroad, Beijing has granted cash-strapped Pakistan just $2.5 billion in new loans ~-~- compared to the $6 billion Islamabad reportedly sought. What appears to be happening in Beijing is that while its leaders continue to stand by BRI, Xi's original ambitions are being rolled back out of public view. We should not be surprised if Beijing eventually lets BRI, at least BRI 1.0, die quietly. Chinese President, xx-xx-xxxx, "“This could be a watershed moment for Italy's China policy”," No Publication, https://www.merics.org/en/china-flash/xi-jinping-heads-to-Europe “This could be a watershed moment for Italy's China policy” Xi Jinping heads to Europe 2019-03-19 Chinese President Xi Jinping is expected in Europe from March 21 to 26. He will first travel to Italy and then head to Monaco and France. His visit to Italy in particular (March 21 to 24) – the first Chinese state visit to that country in ten years – is causing a stir as the Italian government appears ready to make major concessions to China. According to media reports, the Italian government is set to endorse China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a move that would make Italy the first G7 state to join Xi Jinping’s key foreign policy project. Questions to Lucrezia Poggetti, research associate at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS). Lucrezia Poggetti Analyst The Italian government has sought closer ties with Beijing from the start. Do you consider it likely that Italy will join China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – and if so, what is Rome hoping to get out of such a move? The current Italian government has, indeed, adopted a very China-friendly line since it took office at the end of May 2018. This was spearheaded by the Undersecretary of State for Economic Development, Michele Geraci, who set up a “China Task Force” under the Ministry of Economic Development in August last year to seek closer political relations with China in the hope of getting economic opportunities in return. Geraci argues that the signature of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on BRI would help Italian companies increase exports to the Chinese market. In 2018, Italy registered a USD 12.13 billion trade deficit with China. However, the MoU is unlikely to change that. European countries whose trade relations with the Asian giant are more balanced, such as France and Germany, have not signed any BRI endorsements. Those EU member states that have signed up to the BRI in the past, such as Poland and other Eastern European countries, have complained that Beijing’s promises of economic opportunities have largely failed to materialize. Yet despite heated debates within Italian politics, it is very likely that the Italian government will sign the controversial MoU. Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte confirmed on Friday March 15 the government’s plans to go ahead with the signature. How important would it be for Beijing if Italy were to sign the BRI MoU? Italy’s signature would give the BRI project a huge boost in legitimacy. Beyond the economics, an Italian endorsement would be politically symbolic for China. Italy would be the first G7 member state and the first EU founding country to sign up to BRI. An endorsement by the third largest economy in the Eurozone would allow Xi Jinping to show domestic audiences that his initiative enjoys a great reputation in Europe and the world, while in fact the BRI faces criticism that it has created debt traps, political dependencies and has failed to meet international standards. Cecilia Joy-Perez,, 3-28-2018, "The Chinese state funds Belt and Road but does not have trillions to spare," AEI, http://www.aei.org/publication/the-chinese-state-funds-belt-and-road-but-does-not-have-trillions-to-spare/ The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been primarily about construction rather than investment. State-owned enterprises account for more than 95 percent of the $208 billion in construction projects since 2014. With the BRI focused on developing countries, there is considerable commercial risk. Private Chinese firms have thus been hesitant to take on BRI projects, including investments. Much BRI construction and investment is ultimately financed by China’s foreign exchange reserves. China no longer has money to spare, and the BRI will not hit $1 trillion in value until well into the 2020s. Read the PDF. Introduction The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is characterized as an explosion of Chinese investment in Eurasian and African countries promising deals worth trillions of dollars. This is largely wrong. The BRI is better understood as construction projects worth hundreds of billions of dollars taken on by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Belief in endless Chinese money notwithstanding, SOEs cannot by themselves deliver a multi-trillion-dollar BRI.1 China Belt and Road Initiative A cargo train is launched to operate on the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) line constructed by the China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) and financed by Chinese government in Kenya’s coastal city of Mombasa, May 30, 2017. Reuters Is the private sector willing to help? Probably not. Private investment in the BRI is rising, but it is still outpaced by SOE investment. BRI construction activity by private Chinese firms is almost nonexistent. With the BRI focused on developing countries, there is considerable com­mercial risk. SOEs can ignore much of this risk because they do not go bankrupt and usually have access to cheap financing; private firms are not as fortunate. The evidence to date indicates private firms are hesitant to participate, at least using their own funds. If that continues, the BRI will not be nearly as large as some anticipate.2 BRI won’t solve overcapacity and hurts China econ in the LT Zhou, Jiayi. “The Trouble With China’s One Belt One Road Strategy.” The Diplomat. 2015 https://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-trouble-with-the-chinese-marshall-plan-strategy/ That OBOR is seen as a quick solution to the problem of overcapacity in China is no secret. Chinese analysts have been very openly discussing the OBOR in these terms. For example, He Yafei, currently vice minister for foreign affairs, penned an opinion article last year in which he explicitly mentioned the opportunity to use China’s excess steel and iron for OBOR infrastructure building. For now, though, it is still not entirely clear to what degree domestic low-end industrial production will be used to support the initiative. Challenges in that regard include the difficulties and expenses of transporting bulky and heavy materials abroad. Furthermore, the newly released Action Plan for the OBOR states that “efforts should be made to promote green and low-carbon infrastructure construction.” China’s war on pollution, if it is taken seriously, still commits the country to painful domestic readjustments no matter what companies operating overseas may be involved in. However, a large part of the OBOR will in fact be internally focused. Major infrastructure projects are being planned to connect some of the China’s more remote regions to the wider national and international markets. And while positive in some respects, this again amounts to yet another massive stimulus package for hard industry, and which will only delay the shift to a balanced economy that still needs to take place. Domestic Restructuring and Social Implications Economic restructuring away from export-oriented production and manufacturing would (or will) be painful. Years of artificially supported and credit-fueled growth have entrenched local government interests, revenue channels, jobs, and industries in a way that could be very destabilizing to remedy. Cutting down overcapacity would involve slashing jobs, shutting down plants, and closing factories. And for a country renowned for its long-term thinking, social stability is always the foremost and immediate priority. Statements that slower growth (the “new normal”) is acceptable may largely be about managing expectations; to the extent that it impacts jobs, boosting growth is still of paramount concern to Chinese leaders. And, to be clear, it does impact jobs: the China Labor Bulletin reported earlier this year that worker strikes and labor unrest increased significantly in 2014 compared to the previous year, with the increase linked to the economic slowdown. Given the vast amount of people employed in export-related industries, as well as in hard industrial and infrastructural production (the construction sector alone accounts for over 30 million jobs), boosting export figures and/or buying crucial time for these jobs and livelihoods to be transferred is still of paramount concern to Chinese leaders. In detailing the OBOR, China has in fact clearly stated that it is buying time for domestic consumption to increase at a natural pace. Consumer-led growth will be a long time coming; progress on that front remains “too little and too slow” for China’s economy to depend on it anytime soon. More than kicking the can down the road, though, the OBOR could make problems worse. That is, while it may buy time, this would be at the cost of further subsidizing inefficient (and energy-intensive, high-polluting) SOEs and companies that should have either shrunk or gone under long ago under normal market conditions. Alice De Jonge, 9-17-2015, "China's grip still tight on state-owned enterprises," Conversation, https://theconversation.com/chinas-grip-still-tight-on-state-owned-enterprises-47478 The words typically used to describe the SOE sector in China are “inefficient”, “bloated”, and “bulky”. The sector has been slimmed down a lot over the past decades, but still comprises 110 conglomerates. SOEs accounting for around 60 of total revenue are overseen by the central government’s State Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission. And between 25,000 – 150,000 SOEs (depending on which definition of “state-ownership” is used) are controlled and managed by provincial, municipal and lower levels of government. The larger SOEs maintain monopolies over key sectors of the economy (energy, mining, infrastructure) and smaller SOEs are characterised by low productivity and high debt levels. A lot of the problems and inefficiencies stem from the fact that the interests controlling SOE behaviour are not necessarily aligned with those of the wider economy or society. Time for a clean out Authorities have been consolidating and “cleaning up” SOEs for better resource allocation for a while now. China’s two major bullet train makers completed consolidation in the first half of 2015, while China Railway Corporation recently announced an asset-reorganisation with one of its subsidiaries. Central authorities indicated earlier this year that Beijing would like mergers and acquisitions to result in a figure of around 40 conglomerates under the SASAC. The real challenge will be in getting the Provinces to cooperate in cross-border mergers of provincial and municipal SOE assets. The ambitious Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei regional integration blueprint provides an important testing ground for getting different localities to cooperate, share and consolidate economic and social planning and resources. Commercial vs ‘social’ Schools, universities, medical goods and service providers, and operators of public utilities (water, sanitation, energy, transport and communications) together form a huge and important part of the Chinese economy. It is important that they be run efficiently, but also important that they fulfil the social purposes for which they exist. Providing equitable access to essential public goods and services means these firms cannot be expected to run on purely commercial considerations. And so the SOE guidelines indicate that SOEs will be categorised as either “commercial” or “public goods and services”, and dealt with accordingly. Commercial SOEs will be encouraged to become leaner, more efficient, and more market-oriented, while “social” SOEs will be encouraged to focus more on the quality of service provision. Wu 19 (Wendy Wu, 2-13-2019 "China ‘puts economy at risk’ by spurning own market reforms", South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2185905/china-puts-its-economy-risk-spurning-market-oriented-reforms-it) //PSR 7-17-2019 “The fundamental obstacles to implementing far-reaching economic reforms in China is the top leadership’s view that, while state-owned firms may be a drag on China’s economic growth, they are essential to maintaining the position and control of the Community Party and achieving the party’s strategic objects,” Lardy said. Lardy estimated that the deteriorating productivity of state-owned enterprises and the decrease in private investment reduced China’s growth by an estimated 1.6 to 2.0 percentage points annually. “More than two-fifths of state firms persistently lose money,” he noted in the book, adding that China’s official data understates the losses of poorly performing state firms and non-performing loans, while overstating the profits of the successful state firms. Global impact “The global impact of weaker demand growth in China.” OECD. 2018 https://medium.com/@OECD/the-global-impact-of-weaker-demand-growth-in-china-6ac707116cb6 Changes in trade patterns and also in the intensity of trade (trade openness) have implications for the strength of the spillovers from any shocks in the EMEs. One particular example — the size of spillovers from a negative demand shock in China — is discussed below, using simulations on the global macroeconomic model NiGEM. The scenario considered is a 2-percentage point decline in Chinese domestic demand growth that persists for two years. The trade-related spillovers from this shock are considered using versions of the model with different sets of trade patterns and different levels of trade openness (the share of trade in GDP). In a first scenario, the shock is simulated at a single point in time with two different sets of bilateral trade linkages in the model — the linkages that existed in 1995 and those that existed in 2016. The share of China in total global trade rose by close to 8 percentage points between these years. In a second scenario, the shock is simulated using a single set of bilateral trade linkages — those for 2016 — but with the shock occurring at two different starting periods with very different levels of trade openness. On average across economies, trade openness is 11 percentage points higher in the second starting point for the shock than in the first. This change is broadly comparable to the rise in trade openness in the decade or so prior to the financial crisis. The adverse effects of the China shock on GDP growth in other countries increase as China becomes more integrated into global markets and as each country becomes more open to trade (figure below). In the scenarios considered, negative spillovers increase by more when trade openness is changed than from the stronger role of China in global trade, thus indicating that the general rise in cross-border trade over recent history contributes more extensively to changing transmission of shocks than the increase in the weight of single countries. GDP growth in most major OECD economies is reduced modestly, by 0.1–0.2 percentage points per annum, with a stronger impact in Japan. Negative output spillovers are larger in open economies more exposed to China via tighter GVC linkages, such as East Asia or commodity exporters. Lack of access to private credit creates a debt Taplin, Nathaniel. “China Risks Real Hard Landing This Time.” Wall Street Journal. 2019//SK https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-risks-real-hard-landing-this-time-11548241946?mod=article_inline China’s economy is at risk of its long-feared “hard landing”—a rapid slowdown in growth that would hit employment hard and could trigger big problems in global debt and currency markets. The reason isn’t, as the Trump administration would like to believe, the U.S.’s trade offensive. Instead, Beijing has overdone its own crackdown on nonbank “shadow finance”—without opening alternative channels for private-sector borrowers, who often struggle to obtain bank credit. As a result, Chinese credit growth has continued to decelerate, despite nine months of significant central bank easing. If it doesn’t turn back up soon, producer-price inflation could turn negative—causing big problems in the heavily indebted industrial sector. The mushrooming of Chinese shadow banking was an unfortunate, but necessary, byproduct of a banking system that has grown more state dominated since 2010. Private companies account for about two-thirds of the economy but receive only about a third of net new lending. It’s little wonder they have turned increasingly to unofficial channels to get loans. Tanner Greer. "One Belt, One Road, One Big Mistake." Foreign Policy. 18. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/06/bri-china-belt-road-initiative-blunder/. Investment decisions often seem to be driven by geopolitical needs instead of sound financial sense. In South and Southeast Asia expensive port development is an excellent case study. A 2016 CSIS report judged that none of the Indian Ocean port projects funded through the BRI have much hope of financial success. They were likely prioritized for their geopolitical utility. Projects less clearly connected to China’s security needs have more difficulty getting off the ground: the research firm RWR Advisory Group notes that 270 BRI infrastructure projects in the region (or 32 percent of the total value of the whole) have been put on hold because of problems with practicality or financial viability. There is a vast gap between what the Chinese have declared they will spend and what they have actually spent. Ansar 2019, Oxford University, https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1609/1609.00415.pdf Generalizing from our sample, evidence suggests that over half the infrastructure investments in China made in the last three decades have been NPV negative. Far from being an engine of economic growth, a typical infrastructure investment has destroyed economic value in China due to poor management of risks that impact cost, time, and benefits.5 We advance: Hypothesis 1. Due to a propensity to cost overruns and benefit shortfalls, the typical infrastructure investment destroys economic value. Policy Proposition 1. Less is more. Policy-makers should only commit scarce public resources to infrastructure alternatives that, even after accounting for potential cost overruns and benefit shortfalls, produce positive economic value. Proponents of infrastructure investments often argue that, even if individual projects such as the YuanMo expressway yield negative NPVs, the benefits of a network will outweigh the cost of building the network. Although an appealing argument, this is unlikely to hold in the real world. First, the business cases of individual infrastructure projects are justified on the basis of their NPV being positive. When the NPV becomes negative in reality, planners go to some length to obfuscate the inconvenient truth—a persistent and insidious feature of infrastructure investments (Wachs, 1989). Second, construction cost or time and traffic volumes are tangible and quantifiable indicators. Given the systematic biases in these simple metrics, more complex Figure 6: Proportions of projects by ex post estimates of BCRs (n = 65) Source: Authors’ database. 5 Only six out of 66 projects can be considered outright successes where benefits greatly exceeded costs— this suggests a composite success rate of less than 10 per cent. Venture capital investors, not governments, are meant to take on endeavours with such risky pay-offs. Does infrastructure investment lead to economic growth or economic fragility? 377 by guest on July 29, 2016 http://oxrep.oxfordjournals.org/ Downloaded from metrics, such as network and spillover effects, will be prone to a greater degree of delusion and deception. How ought policy-makers then account for the benefits of infrastructure projects? In the case of transport infrastructure, benefits of projects are typically enumerated across many dimensions. Promoters claim that a new project will create new jobs, or cause the value of land adjacent to a project to appreciate, or provide value of time savings for potential end-users. Our broader evidence from China and the deeper case studies, of which the YuanMo expressway is an example, suggest that the wider the net of benefits policy-makers attempt to cast, the weaker the business case of the proposed infrastructure. Benefits, such as value of time savings or increased land values, do not come about unless the forecast traffic volumes materialize. Actual traffic is thus the most concrete and fool-proof gauge of the actual benefits of a transport project. If the basic traffic does not materialize, the rest of the benefits are also unlikely to emerge. Wider benefits are a poor guide to infrastructure investment decision-making. Vickerman (forthcoming, pp. 22–3) concludes that, (i) wide benefits where they exist, typically account for 10–20 per cent, in addition to direct benefits, (ii) often wider impacts do not exist or are negative, and (iii) where wider positive impacts exist in some regions they could be offset by negative impacts in other regions, reducing the aggregate effect. In formal terms: Hypothesis 2. Direct benefits, e.g. financial cash flows, at the project-level will be a more robust measure of the actual benefits of infrastructure investments than wider economic benefits or network effects. Policy Proposition 2: Instead of enumerating many, potentially obscure, dimensions of future benefits, policy-makers should focus on one simple metric—such as the actual Annual Average Daily Traffic (AADT) or revenues—for infrastructure investments. Does China’s high-octane investment programme in infrastructure explain its high economic growth rate? The conventional wisdom in economics has tended to present the seemingly obvious answer, which Röller and Waverman (2001, p. 909), using telecommunication networks as an example, neatly summarize: ‘investing in telecommunications infrastructure does itself lead to growth because its products—cable, switches, and so forth—lead to increases in the demand for the goods and services used in their production.’ In contrast, the implication of our research is that economists have tended to overstress the need for infrastructure in the economy by dwelling on the link between infrastructure investment and short-term economic growth. It is a given that increased physical capital accumulation (irrespective of whether the investment has a positive or negative NPV) will increase the GDP in the short run as a natural accounting consequence of piling investments (productive or not) into fixed capital. In fuelling economic growth today by excessive capital accumulation, policy-makers risk suffocating the possibility of steadier and more resilient future economic growth that comes from greater efficiency and productivity of using scarce factors of production. Banister and Berechman, (2000, pp. 149–50) corroborate our observation: ‘The nature of the causality between transport infrastructure development with economic growth is rather equivocal with respect to direction, functional relationships, and effect of intervening variables’. With respect to China, Huang and Khanna (2003) and Huang (2006, 2008) also stress the direction of this causality. Huang (2006) argues: 378 Atif Ansar, Bent Flyvbjerg, Alexander Budzier, and Daniel Lunn by guest on July 29, 2016 http://oxrep.oxfordjournals.org/ Downloaded from This is a ‘China myth’—that the country grew thanks largely to its heavy investment in infrastructure. This is a fundamentally flawed reading of its growth story. In the 1980s, China had poor infrastructure but turned in a superb economic performance. China built its infrastructure after—rather than before— many years of economic growth and accumulation of financial resources. The ‘China miracle’ happened not because it had glittering skyscrapers and modern highways but because bold economic liberalization and institutional reforms— especially agricultural reforms in the early 1980s—created competition and nurtured private entrepreneurship. China’s case carries generalizable policy lessons. A massive infrastructure investment programme is not a viable development strategy in other developing countries such as Pakistan, Nigeria, or Brazil. Policy-makers should place their attention on software and orgware issues (deep institutional reforms) and exercise far greater caution in diverting scare resources to new hardware (physical infrastructure) Apr 30, 2019, 4-30-2019, "China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Why the Price Is Too High," Knowledge@Wharton, https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-why-the-price-is-too-high/ Along with the debt piling up at BRI beneficiary countries, China, too, is facing constraints in investing in the projects. China’s plan was to use at least $400 billion in funding from government-run banks, but the program has ballooned beyond infrastructure construction. “BRI lending by major Chinesebanks has dropped by 89 since 2015, and lending by commercial banks — who are dealing with their own financial issues domestically — has ceased almost entirely,” according to a report last August by The Jamestown Foundation. “Policy banks have also scaled back, despite their status as arms of government policy.” China can’t fund the whole BRI on its own Bruno Macaes, 2019, Belt and Road: A Chinese World Order, Kindle Edit, page number at the end of the card. Bruno Maçães is a Portuguese politician, political scientist, business strategist, and author. He studied at the University of Lisbon and Harvard University, where he wrote his doctoral dissertation under Harvey Mansfield. He is currently a Nonresident Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute in Washington As the Belt and Road initiative gains speed, China is increasingly finding that it cannot provide the required financial resources all on its own. To attempt to fill these needs at home—using Chinese banks—at a time when its economy is slowing down and its banks are saddled with bad loans would expose the financial system to unmanageable risks. Therefore, it is essential for China to gain access to global financial markets to complement its domestic resources. World financial hubs such as Dubai, Singapore, Zurich or even London could play a role. Maçães, Bruno. Belt and Road (p. 160). Hurst. Kindle Edition. Karen Gilchrist, xx-xx-xxxx, “China’s ‘Belt and Road’ initiative could be the next risk to the global financial system,” CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/24/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-could-be-the-next-risk-to-the-global-financial-system.html China has pitched its mammoth, pan-Eurasian “Belt and Road” infrastructure initiative as a means of promoting economic prosperity and fostering diplomatic ties on a global scale. That rhetoric may win plaudits at a time when other global powers are voicing increasingly protectionist agendas, but it also comes with risks, and increasing levels of state-backed funding have raised concerns about just how safe of a gamble it is. Reports on Tuesday claimed that some of China’s biggest state-owned commercial banks will begin raising capital to fund investments into the initiative, also known as “One Belt, One Road,” which aims to connect more than 60 countries across Asia, Europe and Africa with physical and digital infrastructure. China Construction Bank, the country’s second-largest bank by assets, has been conducting roadshows to raise at least 100 billion yuan ($15 billion) from on- and offshore investors, sources familiar with the matter told Reuters. Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and Agricultural Bank of China are also said to be raising tens of billions of dollars, though none of the banks responded to Reuters’ request for comment. The news highlights the risk that the state could amass hundreds of billions of dollars in nonperforming loans if the projects fail. For Xu Chenggang, professor of economics at Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business in Beijing, it was not a surprise. A risk to China’s banking system is, by default, a risk to the global banking system “It supports my concerns,” Xu told CNBC over the phone. “The impact could be damaging not just for China, but for the global financial system.” “These loans are being extended to governments in risky countries to fund risky infrastructure projects. If the projects were launched by private firms we wouldn’t have to worry because they would know they had to bear the consequences. But here we are talking about government-to-government lending and, ultimately, intergovernmental relations.” Xu attributed that issue to a phenomenon known as soft budget constraints. Soft budget constraints refer to the idea that state-owned firms will not be allowed to go bankrupt if they go insolvent because the state has vested interests in keeping them afloat. A country with high soft budget constraints and a large number of insolvent firms may then struggle for financing, which could have global financial implications. For a country like China, where state-ownership has historically been high, this is a matter of particular concern. It took decades of economic reforms and loss-making firms before it succeeded in what Xu termed a process of “quiet privatization” at the turn of the 21st century. However, the process has lost momentum over the past 10 years, and the state remains burdened with issues of overcapacity and myriad “zombie firms,” especially within the metals and construction and materials sectors. Xu said that has partially been the motivation for the “Belt and Road” initiative: “Instead of solving the overcapacity problems, they are expanding the problem to projects overseas.” “They (China) are proposing lending money to foreign governments, who will then use the Chinese funds to pay the Chinese companies,” he explained. China’s debt to gross domestic product (GDP) ratio surpassed 300 percent in June, according to the Institute for International Finance. And that’s before the extension of further loans. “Expansion of these soft budget constraints at such an unprecedented rate and in such a large scale is going to generate unprecedented consequences,” Xu noted. Crucially, the countries tied to the “Belt and Road” initiative are some of the riskiest developing countries in the world. A number of research bodies are now risk assessing the political, economic and business landscapes of the involved nations. “There is no doubt in my mind that there will be a large number of projects that will have unforeseen problems,” Bjorn Conrad, vice president at the Mercator Institute for China Studies, told CNBC. “There are considerable risks of nonperforming credit in many of these projects and high risks of default.” “A risk to China’s banking system is, by default, a risk to the global banking system,” he continued. However, he noted that the government would be working hard to assess risks after it was badly burned by lending to volatile countries such as Venezuela. China’s National Development and Reform Commission announced last week that it would strengthen regulation to reduce risk for domestic firms investing overseas and prevent “irrational” investment in the “Belt and Road” initiative. “There will be an enormous amount of loans to give out, on a different scale to ever before, but also an awareness that they (the Chinese government) have to keep these at a manageable scale,” Conrad said. “There will still be risks, but an understanding that they have to be managed with more scrutiny.” Chinese infra doesn't lead to growth, actually financial instability Atif Ansar, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, "Sci-Hub | Does infrastructure investment lead to economic growth or economic fragility? Evidence from China. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 32(3), 360–390 | 10.1093/oxrep/grw022", July 2016, http://sci-hub.tw/https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grw022 Because many corporations and financial institutions in China are state-owned, our revised calculation of China’s implicit government debt as a proportion of GDP suggests that China’s is the second-most indebted government in the world. Extraordinary monetary expansion has accompanied China’s piling debts: China’s M2 broad money grew by US$12.9 trillion in 2007–13, greater than the rest of the world combined. The result is increased financial and economic fragility. We conclude that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, infrastructure investments do not typically lead to economic growth. Overinvesting in underperforming projects instead leads to economic and financial fragility. For China, we find that poorly managed infrastructure investments are a main explanation of surfacing economic and financial problems. We predict that, unless China shifts to a lower level of higher-quality infrastructure investments, the country is headed for an infrastructure-led national financial and economic crisis, which—due to China’s prominent role in the world economy—is likely to also become a crisis internationally. China is not a model to follow for other economies—emerging or developed—as regards infrastructure investing, but a model to avoid. Zia Weise, 9-29-2019, "Europe braces for Trump trade war," POLITICO, https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-braces-for-trump-trade-war/ "Putting tariffs on imports of autos and auto parts would have a very negative impact on the U.S. economy, which is why the U.S. auto sector is united in opposition," said Marjorie Chorlins, vice president of European affairs at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. "The auto manufactures don’t want it. The auto partmakers don’t want. And consumers certainly don’t want to pay more for cars," she said, adding: "Senior officials would certainly gauge this economic harm as well as the potential political consequences before delivering this kind of blow to the economy in November, just weeks before the presidential primaries get underway.” Republican Senate finance committee chair Chuck Grassley has expressed "serious questions about the legitimacy" of the possible car tariffs and introduced legislation that could curb the president's power to unilaterally impose them. Jürgen Matthes from the German Economy Institute said, however, that Trump's trade war with China demonstrated that "when in doubt, Trump goes the way of confrontation." "Economic calculation is not very present," he added. "This thus increases the probability of car tariffs." Amaro ‘19// EU US trade war won't happen now because it's unpopular- the reason it's unpopular is because Europe is viewed as an ally Silvia Amaro, 04-16-2019, “A trade war between the US and Europe is unlikely to happen. Here’s why,” CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/16/analysts-say-why-a-us-eu-trade-war-is-unlikely-to-happen.html Trump has challenged China over trade since taking power as well, imposing increasing rounds of tariffs on the country. At the moment, however, media reports and comments from the U.S. and Chinese administrations suggest they could be close to a trade agreement. According to Schmieding, a deal between Beijing and Washington would make an agreement with Brussels even more likely. “After all, the EU is no geostrategic rival of the U.S.,” he said. Both analysts are also confident that the U.S. and Europe will avoid a trade war because political support in the United States for a trade war with the EU is much weaker than backing for a tough stance on China. Cavanna ‘17// the BRI poses a challenge to US hegemony Thomas P. Cavanna, The Diplomat, 4-28-2017, "What Does China’s Belt and Road Initiative Mean for US Grand Strategy?," Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/what-does-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-mean-for-us-grand-strategy/, accessed 9-11-2019 //TP The United States’ response to a rising China has largely focused on bolstering military capabilities, doctrines, and partnerships in the Asia-Pacific (or, more recently, the Indo-Pacific). This approach misconstrues the problem: it overstates the security threat and understates (or ignores) the economic challenge. To maintain its dominant position globally in the long-term, the United States must reckon with the ambitious geoeconomic endeavor Beijing has launched to project strategic influence across the Eurasian continent, which hosts most of the world’s economic centers and natural resources. The nascent Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) illustrates the transformative geopolitical implications of China’s rise. Despite its changing contours and the fact that it partly recycles preexisting plans, this series of major infrastructure and development projects designed to connect Eurasian regions together is a coherent enterprise of unprecedented scale: $4 trillion of promised investments in 65 countries representing 70 percent of the world’s population, 55 percent of its GNP, and 75 percent of its energy reserves. The BRI aims to stabilize China’s western peripheries, rekindle its economy, propel non-Western international economic institutions, gain influence in other countries, and diversify trade suppliers/routes while circumventing the U.S. pivot to Asia. Of course, the BRI’s prospects of success are subject to many unknowns, including the possibility of foreign resistance, China’s domestic economic travails, political turbulence, aging population, and environmental problems. On the other hand, the U.S. still possesses enormous assets to maintain its predominance, including military primacy, multiple alliances, powerful Western-led international organizations, and an unmatched soft power. Yet over time the BRI could threaten the very foundations of Washington’s post-WWII hegemony. A similar phenomenon is visible in Europe. For all of the United States’ efforts NATO’s post-Cold War expansion to former countries of the Soviet bloc and the launching of the global war on terror did not substitute for the foundational Soviet security threat that once undergirded the transatlantic alliance. The European states’ reluctance to increase military budgets and to participate in misguided U.S.-led interventions caused tensions, especially following the invasion of Iraq. Meanwhile China made important strides. Its regional trade and investments skyrocketed. Beijing acquired strategic assets to amass local advanced technologies and know-how, using Europe’s economic distress in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the EU’s political divisions and lack of an investment vetting process, and the mesmerizing appeal of China’s national market. Chinese leaders use their growing geoeconomic leverage to discipline their new partners and cultivate local proxies. The United States has tried to counter these efforts, as illustrated by the unsuccessful negotiation of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and continuous attempts to harness European militaries and defense industries to U.S. strategic goals. Yet Beijing’s rise has started to corrode the depth and scope of transatlantic relations. Despite frustrations with its economic practices, European countries have been willing to develop bilateral ties further and further. Moreover, they have only very timidly endorsed the U.S. position that China’s growing assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific poses a major threat to the international order. Trump’s rejection of the Iran nuclear deal, economic multilateralism, and the Paris climate agreement make things worse, but the problems are deeper. Barkin ‘19// hardline EU stance is holding together US-EU alliance, and US hegemony competition with China hinges on “what happens in Europe” Noah Barkin, 6-4-2019, "The U.S. Is Losing Europe in Its Battle With China," Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/06/united-states-needs-europe-against-china/590887/, accessed 9-11-2019 //TP At the meeting in Washington, D.C., they pressed their allies to sign on to a joint statement condemning the Chinese plan. But it soon became clear that neither the Europeans nor a small group of other countries from Asia and Latin America were ready to fall in line. “No one was willing to go along with it,” one European diplomat familiar with the details of the meeting, who requested anonymity to discuss sensitive negotiations, told me. “We may agree that China is a strategic threat, but you can’t just put them in a corner.” For the Europeans, the meeting at the State Department was another sign of what they see as the White House’s misguided zero-sum approach to dealing with China, and its mistaken belief that it can employ an à la carte approach with its partners, denouncing them publicly on some issues while expecting cooperation on others. For the Americans, the talks were the latest sign of Europe’s reluctance to stand up to China. “Europe,” one person close to the Trump administration who declined to be named told me, “is almost on a different planet.” After two years of escalating tensions between the United States and Europe over issues ranging from trade and Iran to defense spending and Russian gas pipelines, China should be the issue that unites them two sides, or at least eases some of the transatlantic strain. The European Union—with Germany and France leading the way—has adopted a much tougher stance on China over the past year, introducing new rules allowing for closer scrutiny of Chinese investments in European countries, exploring changes to the EU’s industrial, competition, and procurement policies to ensure Beijing is not unfairly advantaged, and, after years of avoiding clashes with Beijing, declaring China a “strategic rival.” This shift mirrors the harder line adopted by Washington under President Donald Trump, who has dialed up his two-year confrontation with Beijing several notches over the past month by raising tariffs on Chinese goods and putting the Chinese telecommunications group Huawei and scores of its affiliates on an export blacklist that could severely restrict their access to vital U.S. technology. But conversations I had with dozens of officials on both sides of the Atlantic—many of whom requested anonymity to talk about on diplomaticcy and intelligence issues—suggest that instead of coming together, Europe and the U.S. might be in the early stages of a damaging divergence on the China challenge. Trump’s latest moves, which raise the specter of a prolonged economic Cold War between Washington and Beijing, are likely to deepen the divide, taking the U.S. down a path that is unpalatable for even the hardest of European hard-liners. “If you listen to the people in the Trump administration, who view China as an existential threat, they are not in a place most Europeans can get to,” says Evan Feigenbaum, who held senior Asia-focused roles in the State Department during George W. Bush’s presidency and is now at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The dissonance raises the prospect of a Western split on what both sides agree is likely to be the biggest geopolitical challenge of the 21st century—responding to the rise of an authoritarian China. A series of meetings in recent months, and the disparate ways in which they were interpreted by either side, illustrate the widening chasm. The European diplomat who discussed the April meeting likened Washington’s uncompromising stance on Belt and Road to its position on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) a few years prior. Back then, the United States, under President Barack Obama, failed to convince allies to join a boycott of the new China-led development bank, leaving the Americans embarrassed and isolated. U.S. officials, by contrast, point to talks months before the meeting in Foggy Bottom, when Washington was pushing for a joint declaration denouncing human-rights abuses in Xinjiang, the western Chinese region where more than a million members of the Muslim minority have been detained in reeducation camps. That effort was also abandoned after what U.S. officials described as an exasperating back-and-forth with the European Union and individual member states. Among the American officials I spoke with, there was an air of what felt like panic—over what they saw as the global spread of Chinese influence through Xi’s Belt and Road initiative, the lack of an American alternative to Huawei, and the persistent failure of the World Trade Organization to tackle China’s unfair trade practices. One senior administration official likened discussions of China policy to the period after the 9/11 attacks. Inevitably, this person said, there will be an “overreaction” from Washington, with “collateral damage” for other countries, before U.S. policy settles down. In Brussels, senior officials are comparing the Trump administration’s China policy to Brexit. Both, they say, are based on the deluded notion that a fading great power can reverse the course of history and return to its glorious past. The irony is that senior U.S. administration officials acknowledge in private that American success in its competition with China might ultimately hinge on what happens in Europe. Yet many U.S. officials have no patience, at least in the highest ranks of the Trump administration, when it comes to working with European allies. Nor do they have much appreciation for the steps Europe has taken over the past year to push back against China. Several U.S. officials described the EU’s recent measures as baby steps that fall far short of what is needed. “The Americans are out to beat, contain, confront China,” a senior EU official who asked not to be identified told me. “They have a much more belligerent attitude. We believe they will waste a lot of energy and not be successful.” This does not mean that transatlantic channels of communication on China have broken down. A group of hawkish pragmatists including Matt Pottinger, who oversees Asia policy at the National Security Council, and Randall Schriver, a senior Pentagon official, have been trying to reach out to Europe for months, U.S. and European officials confirm. Last year, discussions focused on measures to protect against Chinese acquisitions. More recently, they have shifted to talks on next-generation 5G mobile networks, as well as joint responses to Belt and Road, an issue about which Washington and Brussels agreed last month to hold quarterly coordination meetings, according to EU officials. And last month, an American delegation traveled to Berlin for talks with German officials on China as part of a biannual get-together that began under the Obama administration and has continued, without a hitch, under Trump. Other changes are under way too: Last year, according to U.S. and European officials, the State Department appointed China point people in many of their European embassies, with officials estimating that roughly 150 U.S. diplomats on both sides of the Atlantic now spend at least part of their time focusing on China in Europe; at a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Washington in late March, China was on the agenda for the first time; and Belt and Road could be a discussion point when France hosts a G7 summit in Biarritz in August, European officials have suggested. Trigkas ‘18// if China-EU make a bilateral investment deal the US will launch a trade war against the EU Vasilis Trigkas, July 6, 2018, "Nato, China summits a chance for Europe to assert itself," South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2153948/nato-and-china-summits-give-europe-chance, accessed 9-11-2019 //TP In Beijing, EU leaders may have a seemingly easier task negotiating with the Chinese on trade but caution is always a wise counsellor. According to reports from the meeting of the vice-president of the European Commission, Jyrki Katainen, and Chinese Vice-Premier Liu He in June, the two sides are ready to present their detailed market access conditions by mid-July and reboot the dormant discussions on a bilateral investment treaty. If negotiations accelerate and China and the EU reach a final accord by the end of the year or early 2019, this would complicate US efforts to rebalance its economic relations with China. It could push trigger-happy Trump to unleash tariffs against European exporters at a moment when the EU has just found its economic pace. Any benefits from a bilateral investment treaty with China may be undone by a full-scale transatlantic trade war and an utterly divided West. Bown ‘19// auto tariffs from the US would definitively cause a European retaliation More From, 6-26-2019, "Transatlantic Policy Impacts of the US-EU Trade Conflict," PIIE, https://www.piie.com/commentary/testimonies/transatlantic-policy-impacts-us-eu-trade-conflict Three reasons demonstrate why imposing trade restrictions on European automobiles and parts would disrupt the American economy. First, American consumers would be hit by price hikes. Fiats, Volkswagens, and Volvos, among other brands, would become more expensive. The reduced competition would inevitably raise prices of all cars, regardless of the make and model. Second, the American manufacturing base would lose access to imported auto parts it needs to produce cars for both domestic consumption and export. Imported parts are vital for American-based auto plants to keep costs low for high-quality cars made in states like Alabama, Tennessee, and South Carolina. The facilities in these and other states make some of America's most successful exports. Restricting trade in parts would hurt these factories and their workers. Third, Europe will retaliate. The European Union has announced it would impose counter tariffs on US exports—a credible threat because it did so last year when President Trump imposed tariffs on their exports of steel and aluminum, also under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Heeb, Gina. “Trump's proposed car tariffs could trigger a global growth recession, BAML says.” Markets Insider. 2/21/19//SSK While that could benefit some American automakers and reduce bilateral trade deficits, it would also risk adding thousands of dollars to the price of vehicles, and raises the threat of retaliatory duties that could worsen global trade tensions. "In a worst case scenario, full­blown tit­for­tat auto tariffs could trigger a global recession," analysts at Bank of America Merrill Lynch wrote in a research note out this week, adding they would expect growth in the world economy to fall nearly a percentage point to 1.2. By increasing the price of vehicles and imported materials, they could threaten jobs, consumer spending, and investment. The analysts estimated that they would add $2,000 to $7,000 to price tags of both imported and American-made vehicles, posing even greater risks than the global trade tensions that emerged last year. Allowing China to continue decreasing slow global econ Heeb, Gina. “China is slowing and could drag the world economy down with it.” Business Insider. 2019//SK https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/china-slowing-could-drag-world-economy-down-with-it-2019-1-1027906201 The second-largest economy is slowing, and it could take global growth down with it. Weaker than expected data has been pouring out of China left and right in recent months, with the economy growing at its slowest pace in nearly three decades in 2018. And many suspect things could be even worse than officials have led on. "The Chinese slowdown could have serious negative consequences for world growth if it intensifies," economists at Oxford Economics said in a research note out Tuesday. They said global economic growth could slow to 2.3 in 2019 if conditions worsen, marking the lowest level in more than a decade and a pace not seen since the financial crisis. Chen, S. and Ravallion, M. (2009). “The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on the World?s Poorest”, World Bank Development Research Group. 2 The World Bank estimates that a 1 percent decline in developing country growth rates traps an additional 20 million people in poverty. It follows therefore that the economic growth slowdown arising from the recession has adverse implication for poverty reduction. See for instance Dollar and Kraay, 2000 and Hasan et al, (2009). Hunag 15// success in solving middle-income can lift the living standards of 1.4 billion people Huang, Yiping. “The Questions About China’s Steady Climb Towards High Income.” East Asia Forum. Oct. 2015. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/10/11/the-questions-about-chinas-steady-climb-towards-high-income/ //RJ When its GDP per capita hit almost US$7500 in 2014, China entered the middle income stage of economic development. Relatively few countries that have made middle income status in the past three or four decades have graduated to high-income status, or achieved per capita incomes over US$16,000. Now the Chinese economic slowdown has raised questions about whether China will be able to continue its steady economic growth to avoid this middle income trap in the coming decade. Whether China makes the transition to high income status is probably one of the most important economic questions facing the world today. Success can lift the living standards of 1.4 billion people. Failure may lead to economic and social instability in China and the world could lose one-third of its global economic growth engine. Economic growth key to effective poverty reduction No Author, xx-xx-2007, " BUILDING JOBS AND PROSPERITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES," Department for International Development (OECD), https://www.oecd.org/derec/unitedkingdom/40700982.pd ‘Historically nothing has worked better than economic growth in enabling societies to improve the life chances of their members, including those at the very bottom.’ Dani Rodrik, Harvard University One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions and Economic Growth (2007) The central lesson from the past 50 years of development research and policy is that economic growth is the most effective way to pull people out of poverty and deliver on their wider objectives for a better life. Growth helps people move out of poverty Research that compares the experiences of a wide range of developing countries finds consistently strong evidence that rapid and sustained growth is the single most important way to reduce poverty. A typical estimate from these cross-country studies is that a 10 per cent increase in a country’s average income will reduce the poverty rate by b
904,004
365,093
379,051
2 - Nocember Blue Key Iran Neg
First on framing extinction first. **Sánchez ’17 **(David; 2/8/17; BA in Public Policy, BA in Economics and Philosophy, expert at the Kenan Institute for Ethics, citing Nick Bostrom, PhD in Philosophy; Duke’s The Chronicle; "Existential risks"; http://www.dukechronicle.com/article/2017/02/existential-risks-questions-and-considerations; DOA: 4/21/17) How often do you think about the end of the world? Some people think about it quite a bit. Within Effective Altruism circles, many people share a concern for the future of humanity. Effective Altruists attempt to combine good intentions with science and reasoning to find the best ways to do good, whether for humans or non-human animals. Mitigation of so-called "existential risks" is a huge priority for some of their more risk-seeking members. An existential risk, put simply, is some class of possible event that presents a risk of extinction to humanity. Nick Bostrom, Oxford philosopher and existential risk extraordinaire, defines it this way: "One where an adverse outcome would either annihilate Earth-originating intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential." Some main classes of existential risk include catastrophic climate change, malicious artificial superintelligence, the emergence of malicious nanotechnology, nuclear war and malicious bio-tech, among others. When considering the threats posed by so-called "x-risks," there are at least three factors to keep in mind. First, bear in mind that if humanity continues for the foreseeable future, then the number of potential people in the future will be significantly higher than the number who exist today or have existed in the past. Additionally, the expected disutility of extinction-level events is massive, meaning that even a small mitigation of those probabilities results in a huge positive. Per one interpretation of the evidence, "even if we use the most conservative of these estimates… we find that the expected loss of an existential catastrophe is greater than the value of 1016 human lives. This implies that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at least a hundred times the value of a million human lives." If this holds even remotely true, then surely we should keep listening. Second, consider that some experts believe the probability of extinction-level events is somewhat high. In a report released by Oxford’s Future of Humanity Institute, a survey of experts found the likelihood of extinction by the year 2100 to be a whopping 19 percent. While this number should be taken with a grain of salt, it is unsettling that people in the know are so pessimistic about our odds. Third, bear in mind that there are very, very few people dedicated to mitigating these existential risks. Some limited efforts exist, but they are low-staffed and underfunded. As Nick Bostrom has noted, even "a million dollars could currently make a vast difference to the amount of research done on existential risks; the same amount spent on furthering world peace would be like a drop in the ocean." If you’re looking for a cause with a funding gap, this might be just the ticket. Looking throughout history, we can find plenty of examples of near-nuclear war; the Future of Life Institute compiled a nice list of the most notable. What this might show us is that our planet has almost faced near-extinction level events in the past. One reason we are all still here is because people worked to craft systems that would avoid careless mistakes or oversights. In other words, we built systems that attempted to mitigate these risks. If these systems had not been in place, and lazy fail-safes failed to prevent disaster, then what would have happened? Perhaps not outright extinction, but disaster indeed. During the Cold War, the notion of "mutually assured destruction" was not some abstract; it was a working possibility, one that humanity had to take seriously. So today, in a world with ever-advancing technology and geopolitical uncertainty, we lack a compelling reason not to take these sorts of risks seriously. The need to mitigate existential risk stands or falls with free will—if it does not exist, then there is little or no case to be made. But if it does—even to an extent—then we have every reason to at least listen to the experts. So, perhaps my thesis is that insofar as a person believes humans have free will (i.e. a degree of autonomy over their destinies), he or she likely will have reason to support causes that mitigate the risks imposed by disaster scenarios. This is not meant to take a stand on cause prioritization. It might be more worthwhile still to donate to groups that fight global health problems or empower people economically. However, excluding opportunity cost, donating time or money to mitigating these threats is likely net positive, depending on the efficacy of the organization or project. Given that we have not observed an existential threat play out in the past, ~~although~~ we might be biased towards believing that one might never emerge. Accordingly, this is an area where rational thinking is absolutely essential. In my view, whether or not to support or donate to these causes is an open question. But if the whole of humanity is at stake, it is at least a conversation worth having. Our sole contention is war with Iran CYBER RISKOCTOBER 16, 2019 / 12:03 AM / 14 DAYS AGO Exclusive: U.S. carried out secret cyber strike on Iran in wake of Saudi oil attack: officials Idrees Ali, Phil Stewart 4 MIN READ https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-military-cyber-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-carried-out-secret-cyber-strike-on-iran-in-wake-of-saudi-oil-attack-officials-idUSKBN1WV0EK WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The United States carried out a secret cyber operation against Iran in the wake of the Sept. 14 attacks on Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities, which Washington and Riyadh blame on Tehran, two U.S. officials have told Reuters. The officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the operation took place in late September and took aim at Tehran’s ability to spread "propaganda." One of the officials said the strike affected physical hardware, but did not provide further details. The attack highlights how President Donald Trump’s administration has been trying to counter what it sees as Iranian aggression without spiraling into a broader conflict. Asked about Reuters reporting on Wednesday, Iran’s Minister of Communications and Information Technology Mohammad Javad Azari-Jahromi said: "They must have dreamt it," Fars news agency reported. ^^ ^^ Kennedy, David. "How Iran Would Wage Cyber War Against The United States." National Interest. 10/5/19. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/how-iran-would-wage- cyber-war-against-united-states-85841 The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) offers this assessment of Iran: "Iranian ~~cyber~~ attacks are likely to be retaliatory, intending to make the point that the United States is not invulnerable but without going too far." It goes on to say that, "Attacking major targets in the American homeland would be escalatory, something Iran wishes to avoid." This is a fair assessment of Iran, but there is a lot of wiggle room in terms of what is considered "retaliatory"—as well as what Iran deems to be instigative and the timeframe for a response—and what constitutes "major targets" in the United States. Remember, Iran has already shown itself to be brazen in its attacks on U.S. homeland targets—and some describe the early 2010s cyber skirmishes with Iran as America’s first known cyberwar. Iran is likely to carry out the bulk of any attacks on Gulf state rivals, with a particular focus on the royals, government assets and oil and gas industry infrastructure. But we should not underestimate its ability or willingness to attack important targets within the United States. Whether it limits these attacks to soft targets, like media companies, think tanks, outspoken critics of Iran, etc., or instead goes after hard targets like the U.S. financial system, energy industry and government assets depends entirely on how escalatory the regime considers U.S. actions to be. What Trump calls "maximum pressure," the Iranians view as "economic terrorism." To Iran’s leaders, any cyber offensive action taken at any time during the current standoff and destabilizing economic sanctions may be deemed justified as a retaliatory measure. ^^ ^^ Baldor, Lolita. "US prepared to strike back against cyberattacks amid report of naval systems breaches." Military Times. 3/14/19. https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2019/03/14/us-prepared-to-strike-back-against-cyberattacks-amid-report-of-naval-systems-breaches/ WASHINGTON — Cyberattacks from Russia, China, North Korea and Iran are increasingly sophisticated and, until recently, were done with little concern for the consequences, the top Pentagon cyber leaders told a congressional committee on Wednesday. Army Gen. Paul Nakasone, head of U.S. Cyber Command, laid out the escalating threats, following a Navy review released this week that described significant breaches of naval systems and concluded that the service is losing the cyber war. Speaking during a subcommittee hearing, Nakasone said the U.S. is now prepared to use cyber operations more aggressively to strike back, as the nation faces growing cyberattacks and threats of interference in the 2020 presidential elections. He said the military learned a lot working with other government agencies to thwart Russian interference in the 2018 midterm elections, and the focus now has turned to the next election cycle. ^^ ^^ Kennedy 19 October 5, 2019 Topic: Security Region: Middle East Blog Brand: The Buzz Tags: IranCyber AttackCyber WarfareSaudi ArabiaUAE How Iran Would Wage Cyber War Against the United States Who would win? How bad could it get? Could it lead to a larger war? by David Kennedy https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/how-iran-would-wage-cyber-war-against-united-states-85841 Iran is a potent force in the cyber domain and the threats it poses should be taken seriously. The chances are high that we will see an extended cyber conflict between the United States and Iran, which will likely spill over into other regional players. The key uncertainty is "how far will it go"—but what we can be sure of is Iran’s unpredictability. This nation has shown itself to be one of the most aggressive actors in cyber warfare, and it hasn’t shied away from attacking the United States on its own soil. ^^ ^^ Cyber attacks are cause of escalation Security firms see spike in Iranian cyberattacks By TIM STARKS 06/21/2019 05:52 PM EDT https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/21/us-iran-cyberattacks-3469447 Top cybersecurity firms say Iranian hackers have revved up attempts to breach computer systems in the U.S. as hostilities have spiked between Washington and Tehran — and they warn that further escalation could be near. CrowdStrike and FireEye are among the companies that have reported seeing an uptick in recent weeks for the exploits, which use deceptive emails to try to trick victims into installing malicious software on their systems. "Any intrusion can be the first step" toward a broader attack, Ben Read, senior cyber-espionage analyst for FireEye, told POLITICO on Friday. Read added that the leader of the latest campaign — an Iranian government-connected hacker group known as APT33 or Refined Kitten — has been linked to destructive attacks using that have wiped computers at targets like the giant oil and gas company Saudi Aramco. ^^ ^^ Turak 19 https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/25/iranian-attacks-on-us-interests-in-the-gulf-more-likely-than-ever.html Iranian attacks on US interests in the Gulf more likely than ever after hostile tweets PUBLISHED WED, JUL 25 20189:59 AM EDTUPDATED WED, JUL 25 201810:19 AM EDT Natasha Turak @NATASHATURAK The U.S. intelligence community has already called attention to the vulnerability of America’s critical infrastructure, revealing detailed reports of penetration by Russian hackers. Director of National Intelligence Dan Coates said that the signs of an impending cyberattack were "blinking red" — and though he was referring to Moscow as perpetrator, his warning highlighted the threat of cyber warfare more broadly. Despite the tough talk, neither Iran nor the U.S. appear willing to engage in direct military confrontation. But through the various means Iran can hit back at Washington, opportunities for nasty escalation are rife. Croft’s RBC report summed up the fears of many regional experts. "While neither may want a war, a miscalculation and a potentially uncontrolled escalation could bring them to the brink." ^^ ^^ Cyber War Between Iran and United States Could Have Far-Reaching Implications NICOLE LINDSEY·OCTOBER 14, 2019 https://www.cpomagazine.com/cyber-security/cyber-war-between-iran-and-united-states-could-have-far-reaching-implications/ The biggest concern, of course, is that cyber war will eventually lead to a shooting war. We may already be seeing signs of this in the Middle East. Military attacks against drones, shipping vessels and oil facilities are tantamount to a declaration of war, so it’s not out of the question that the U.S. will respond in kind. Add in the fact that the U.S. Cyber Command has transitioned from cyber defense to a more aggressive cyber posture, thanks to a new strategic philosophy known as "persistent engagement," and you can begin to grasp the enormity of the situation. Growing possibility that the tensions between Iran and the U.S. will lead to the militarization of cyberspace. It might be possible in today’s modern warfare arena to carry out missile strikes with lethal precision, but that still is not possible with today’s cyber weapons. If the world doesn’t want to wait around for a catastrophic event (such as a cyber Hiroshima) to take place involving the digital equivalent of nuclear weapons, then it’s now time to implement international norms and rules of engagement for reducing the risk of a cyber war becoming a full-fledged kinetic conflict with unimaginable loss of life. ^^ ^^ Cybersecurity of our nuclear systems needs to be a top priority BY MORGAN WRIGHT, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR — 01/17/19 09:30 AM EST 13THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY CONTRIBUTORS ARE THEIR OWN AND NOT THE VIEW OF THE HILL https://thehill.com/opinion/cybersecurity/425757-cybersecurity-of-our-nuclear-systems-needs-to-be-a-top-priority These concerns about our aging NC3 system and inadequate cybersecurity in general threaten to dilute the most effective weapon we have—deterrence. Here’s why. The 2018 NPR addresses the modernization of the NC3 system. Two paragraphs from that report should make us shudder. "Today’s NC3 system is a legacy of the Cold War, last comprehensively updated almost three decades ago. It includes interconnected elements composed of warning satellites and radars; communications satellites, aircraft, and ground stations; fixed and mobile command posts; and the control centers for nuclear systems.While once state-of-the-art, the NC3 system is now subject to challenges from both aging system components and new, growing 21st century threats. Of particular concern are expanding threats in space and cyber space, adversary strategies of limited nuclear escalation, and the broad diffusion within DoD of authority and responsibility for governance of the NC3 system, a function which, by its nature, must be integrated." This means North Korea and Iran now have the ability to impact the potent, and usually unspoken, threat of nuclear attack or retaliation. If they can compromise our aging NC3 networks, and plant the seeds of doubt, then they will have successfully turned a credible threat into a bluff. This also means North Korea and Iran will be able to join Russia and China in a club once limited to nations that were great powers. The 2018 NPR addresses an "evolving and uncertain international security environment." This environment was eloquently captured by Admiral J.M. Richardson, Chief of Naval Operations, in the report "A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority" released in January of 2016. "For the first time in 25 years, the United States is facing a return to great power competition. Russia and China have both advanced their military capabilities to act as a global power… Others are now pursuing advanced technology, including military technologies that were once the exclusive province of great powers – this trend will only continue." ^^ ^^ Thermonuclear cyberwar Erik Gartzke, Jon R. Lindsay Journal of Cybersecurity, Volume 3, Issue 1, March 2017, Pages 37–48, https://doi.org/10.1093/cybsec/tyw017 Published: 14 February 2017 Article history https://academic.oup.com/cybersecurity/article/3/1/37/2996537 n the other direction, the unstable cyber domain can undermine the stability of nuclear deterrence. Most analysts who argue that the cyber–nuclear combination is a recipe for danger focus on the fog of crisis decision making ~~85–87~~. Stephen Cimbala points out that today’s relatively smaller nuclear arsenals may perversely magnify the attractiveness of NC3 exploitation in a crisis: "Ironically, the downsizing of U.S. and post-Soviet Russian strategic nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War, while a positive development from the perspectives of nuclear arms control and nonproliferation, makes the concurrence of cyber and nuclear attack capabilities more alarming" ~~88~~. Cimbala focuses mainly on the risks of misperception and miscalculation that emerge when a cyber attack muddies the transparent communication required for opponents to understand one another’s interests, redlines, and willingness to use force, and to ensure reliable control over subordinate commanders. Thus a nuclear actor "faced with a sudden burst of holes in its vital warning and response systems might, for example, press the preemption button instead of waiting to ride out the attack and then retaliate" The outcome of fog of decision scenarios such as these depend on how humans react to risk and uncertainty, which in turn depends on bounded rationality and organizational frameworks that might confuse rational decision making ~~89, 90~~. These factors exacerbate a hard problem. Yet within a rationalist framework, cyber attacks that have already created their effects need not trigger an escalatory spiral. While being handed a fait accompli may trigger an aggressive reaction, it is also plausible that the target’s awareness that its NC3 has been compromised in some way would help to convey new information that the balance of power is not as favorable as previously thought. This in turn could encourage the target to accommodate, rather than escalate. While defects in rational decision making are a serious concern in any cyber–nuclear scenario, the situation becomes even more hazardous when there are rational incentives to escalate. Although "known unknowns" can create confusion, to paraphrase Donald Rumsfeld, the "unknown unknowns" are perhaps more dangerous. A successful clandestine penetration of NC3 can defeat the informational symmetry that stabilizes nuclear relationships. Nuclear weapons are useful for deterrence because they impose a degree of consensus about the distribution of power; each side knows the other can inflict prohibitive levels of damage, even if they may disagree about the precise extent of this damage. Cyber operations are attractive precisely because they can secretly revise the distribution of power. NC3 neutralization may be an expensive and rarified capability in the reach of only a few states with mature signals intelligence agencies, but it is much cheaper than nuclear attack. Yet the very usefulness of cyber operations for nuclear warfighting ensure that deterrence failure during brinksmanship crises is more likely. Nuclear states may initiate crises of risk and resolve to see who will back down first, which is not always clear in advance. Chicken appears viable, ironically, because each player understands that a nuclear war would be a disaster for all, and thus all can agree that someone can be expected swerve. Nuclear deterrence should ultimately make dealing with an adversary diplomatically more attractive than fighting, provided that fighting is costly—as would seem evident for the prospect of nuclear war—and assuming that bargains are available to states willing to accept compromise rather than annihilation. If, however, one side knows, but the other does not, that the attacker has disabled the target’s ability to perceive an impending military attack, or to react to one when it is underway, then they will not have a shared understanding of the probable outcome of war, even in broad terms. Consider a brinksmanship crisis between two nuclear states where only one has realized a successful penetration of the rival’s NC3. The cyber attacker knows that it has a military advantage, but it cannot reveal the advantage to the target, lest the advantage be lost. The target does not know that it is at a disadvantage, and it cannot be told by the attacker for the same reason. The attacker perceives an imbalance of power while the target perceives a balance. A dangerous competition in risk taking ensues. The first side knows that it does not need to back down. The second side feels confident that it can stand fast and raise the stakes far beyond what it would be willing to if it understood the true balance of power. Each side is willing to escalate to create more risk for the other side, making it more likely that one or the other will conclude that deterrence has failed and move into warfighting mode to attempt to limit the damage the other can inflict. The targeted nature and uncertain effects of offensive cyber operations put additional pressure on decision makers. An intrusion will probably disable only part of the enemy’s NC3 architecture, not all of it (which is not only operationally formidable to achieve but also more likely to be noticed by the target). Thus the target may retain control over some nuclear forces, or conventional forces. The target may be tempted to use some of them piecemeal to signal a willingness to escalate further, even though it cannot actually escalate because of the cyber operation. The cyber attacker knows that it has escalation dominance, but when even a minor demonstration by the target can cause great damage, it is tempting to preempt this move or others like it. This situation would be especially unstable if only second strike but not primary strike NC3 was incapacitated. Uncertainty in the efficacy of the clandestine penetration would discount the attacker’s confidence in its escalation dominance, with a range of possible outcomes. Enough uncertainty would discount the cyber attack to nothing, which would have a stabilizing effect by returning the crisis to the pure nuclear domain. A little bit of uncertainty about cyber effectiveness would heighten risk acceptance while also raising the incentives to preempt as an insurance measure. ^^ ^^ **Avery, 13 **- John Avery received a B.Sc. in theoretical physics from MIT and an M.Sc. from the University of Chicago. He later studied theoretical chemistry at the University of London, and was awarded a Ph.D. there in 1965. He is now Lektor Emeritus, Associate Professor, at the Department of Chemistry, University of Copenhagen. Fellowships, memberships in societies: Since 1990 he has been the Contact Person in Denmark for Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. In 1995, this group received the Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts. He was the Member of the Danish Peace Commission of 1998. Technical Advisor, World Health Organization, Regional Office for Europe (1988- 1997). Chairman of the Danish Peace Academy, April 2004 ("An Attack On Iran Could Escalate Into Global Nuclear War" Countercurrents, 11/6, https://www.countercurrents.org/avery061113.htm Despite the willingness of Iran's new President, Hassan Rouhani to make all reasonable concessions to US demands, Israeli pressure groups in Washington continue to demand an attack on Iran. But such an attack might escalate into a global nuclear war, with catastrophic consequences. As we approach the 100th anniversary World War I, we should remember that this colossal disaster escalated uncontrollably from what was intended to be a minor conflict. There is a danger that an attack on Iran would escalate into a large-scale war in the Middle East, entirely destabilizing a region that is already deep in problems. The unstable government of Pakistan might be overthrown, and the revolutionary Pakistani government might enter the war on the side of Iran, thus introducing nuclear weapons into the conflict. Russia and China, firm allies of Iran, might also be drawn into a general war in the Middle East. Since much of the world's oil comes from the region, such a war would certainly cause the price of oil to reach unheard-of heights, with catastrophic effects on the global economy. In the dangerous situation that could potentially result from an attack on Iran, there is a risk that nuclear weapons would be used, either intentionally, or by accident or miscalculation. Recent research has shown that besides making large areas of the world uninhabitable through long-lasting radioactive contamination, a nuclear war would damage global agriculture to such a extent that a global famine of previously unknown proportions would result. Thus, nuclear war is the ultimate ecological catastrophe. It could destroy human civilization and much of the biosphere. To risk such a war would be an unforgivable offense against the lives and future of all the peoples of the world, US citizens included. ====^^ ^^ Iran war goes nuclear – the barrier is low==== Kaveh L. **Afrasiabi 19**, Iranian-American political scientist, has taught political science at the University of Tehran, Boston University, and Bentley University and was a visiting scholar at Harvard University, University of California-Berkeley, Binghamton University, and the Center for Strategic Research, Tehran; and Nader Entessar, professor and chair of the department of political science and criminal justice at the University of South Alabama, 7/2/19, "A nuclear war in the Persian Gulf?," https://thebulletin.org/2019/07/a-nuclear-war-in-the-persian-gulf/ Tensions between the United States and Iran are spiraling toward a military confrontation that carries AND to world peace, requiring the mobilization of the international community to intervene.
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=1AC= ==TRIGGER WARNING: Contains Descriptions of Intimate Partner Violence/Abuse== LMK if you would like any reasonable requests or modifications that would reduce stress ==Framing== The framework is structural violence ====Cognitive processes lead us to neglect the suffering of people we deem irrelevant which results in real and direct violence. It is key we target marginalization in discourse to fight its desensitizing effects.==== Winter and Leighton 01 **Christie, D. J., Wagner, R. V., and Winter, D. A. (Eds.). (2001). Peace, Conflict, and Violence: Peace Psychology for the 21st Century. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.** While structural violence often leads to direct violence, the reverse is also true, as brutality terrorizes bystanders, who then become unwilling or unable to confront social injustice. Increasingly, civilians pay enormous costs of war, not only through death, but through devastation of neighborhoods and ecosystems. Ruling elites rarely suffer from armed conflict as much as civilian populations do, who endure decades of poverty and disease in war-tom societies. Recognizing the operation of structural violence forces us to ask questions about how and why we tolerate it, questions that often have painful answers. The first chapter in this section, "Social Injustice," by Susan Opotow, argues that our normal perceptual/cognitive processes lead us to care about people inside our scope of justice, but rarely care about those people outside. Injustice that would be ~~instantly~~ instantaneously confronted if it occurred to someone we love or know is barely noticed if it occurs to strangers or those who are invisible or irrelevant to us. We do not seem to be able to open our minds and our hearts to everyone; ~~thus,~~ moral exclusion is a product of our normal cognitive processes. But Opotow argues convincingly that we can reduce its nefarious effects by becoming aware of our distorted perceptions. Inclusionary thinking can be fostered by relationships, communication, and appreciation of diversity. One outcome of exclusionary thinking is the belief that victims of violence must in some way deserve their plight. But certainly it is easy to see that young children do not deserve to be victims. The next two chapters in this section address the violence experienced by children. In the first, "The War Close to Home: Children and Violence in the United States," Kathleen Kostelny and James Garbarino describe the direct and structural violence which children in Chicago and other urban areas of the United States endure, paralleling that experienced by children who live in countries at war. Children who endure these environments often become battle weary, numb, hopeless, and/or morally impaired. But children not only suffer directly from violence, they also suffer from the impaired parenting and communities which poverty inflicts. The authors describe how community and family support mechanisms can mitigate these effects. For example, home visitation and early childhood education programs provide crucial family and community support. While Kostelny and Garbarino focus on community intervention techniques, Milton Schwebel and Daniel Christie, in their article "Children and Structural Violence," extend the analysis of structural violence by examining how economic and psychological deprivation impairs at-risk children. Children living in poverty experience diminished intellectual development because parents are too overwhelmed to be able to provide crucial linguistic experiences. Schwebel and Christie's discussion concludes that economic structures must provide parents with living-wage employment, good prenatal medical care, and high-quality child-care ifwe are to see the next generation develop into the intelligent and caring citizens needed to create a peaceful world. ====Women are common targets of structural issues - society is constructed to harm women and violence against women is structural.==== Sihna Et Al 17 **Parul Sinha and Uma Gupta and Jyotsna Singh and Anand Srivastava1, 8-xx-2017, "Structural Violence on Women: An Impediment to Women Empowerment," PubMed Central (PMC), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5561688/?report=classic ~~AK~~** Violence on women has been present in our society since times immemorial. The ethics, the values, the morals, the culture of the society has been framed in such a way or we can say structured in such a way so as to promote exploitation of this segment which is in reality the root of the society. The concept of STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE was introduced by Johan Galtung in 1969. It refers to a form of violence wherein some social institution may harm people by preventing them from meeting their basic needs. Violence against women has taken the form of a global epidemic which has taken its toll on the physical, psychological, sexual and economic life of the female. Johan Galtung in "Violence, Peace and Peace Studies", 1969 has rightly remarked "when one husband beats his wife, there is a clear case of personal violence, but when one million husbands keep one million wives in ignorance, there is structural violence". India has been slow in its pace for action against violence on women, but the brutal gang- rape of a 23 year old Delhi girl on December 2012 aroused the Indians from their deep slumber on this issue. Structural violence is a demon against women that is devouring the society. The combined efforts of Government NGO's and most important, the sufferers of this violence, the women have to take a major step to fight this dragon. Keywords: Patriarchy, structural violence, women empowerment Go to: Introduction The Canadian Panel~~1~~ on Violence Against Women, 1993 stated, "Women will not be free from violence until there is equality, and equality cannot be achieved until the violence and threat of violence are eliminated from women's lives." Violence on women has been present in our society since times immemorial. The ethics, the values, the morals, and the culture of the society have been framed in such a way or we can say structured in such a way so as to promote exploitation of this segment. Which is in reality, the root of the society. There is ample evidence to suggest that women have been subordinated, subjugated, and exploited since the beginning of the civilization and is still facing the trauma of the day. Go to: What is Structural Violence? This concept was introduced by Johan Galtung in 1969. It refers to a form of violence wherein some social structure or social institution may harm people by preventing them from meeting their basic needs; according to Galtung, rather than conveying a physical image, structural violence is an "avoidable impairment of fundamental human needs." This new term was coined to bring to the limelight the degree of damage and harm it may cause to the lives of people which is many fold greater than that caused by inter- and intra-nation wars and armed conflicts. Structural inequalities are especially harmful for women because of the intersection of gender with existing conditions such as poor health, inadequate education, and care.~~2,3,4~~ Lack of good data on violence against women~~5,6,7~~ and on the prevalence of the public/private divide leads to relative reversibility of structural violence. This encourages researchers to focus more on public, political violence rather than violence that occurs in the private sphere~~8,9,10~~ where it is more prevalent. Violence against women has taken the form of a global epidemic which has taken its toll on the physical, psychological, sexual, and economic life of the female. A woman has to face violence in one form or the other throughout her entire lifespan, be it from her parents, her husband, later in life by her son and other relatives. Considering an alarming growth in the cases of violence against women all over the world, the General Assembly of UNO designated November 25th as the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against women, by resolution no 54/134 of December 199. Article of the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women states that "violence against women means any act of gender-based violence that results in or is likely to result in physical or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion, or arbitrary deprivation of liberty whether occurring in public or private life." Violence inter alia is gendered, embodied, and institutionalized. Women are subjected to "structural violence" which results from sexism, rape, domestic violence, psychological violence, and other acts of violence resulting from the social structure. Johan Galtung in "Violence, Peace and Peace Studies," 1969, has rightly remarked "when one husband beats his wife, there is a clear case of personal violence, but when one million husbands keep one million wives in ignorance, there is structural violence." ==Advantage 1: Gendered violence== ====IPV is incredibly widespread and the survivors are overwhelmingly female-identifying.==== Marques 15 **Luana Marques,, xx-xx-2015, "Intimate Partner Violence – What Is It and What Does It Look Like?," Anxiety and Depression Association of America, https://adaa.org/learn-from-us/from-the-experts/blog-posts/consumer/intimate-partner-violence-what-it-and-what-does ~~AK~~ (Marques: Phd and Associate Professor of Psychology @ Harvard)** Intimate partner violence (IPV) … abuse by their partner (Black et al., 2011). ====UBI gives women more options which decreases IPV and mental illness- Canada proves==== Moore 15 **Dr. Kieran Moore, xx-xx-2015, "National Support for a Basic Income Guarantee," Canadian Medical Association, https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/bicn/pages/164/attachments/original/1444323422/National'Support'for'a'Basic'Income'Guarantee'28CDN'Medical'Association29.pdf?1444323422 ~~AK~~** In the 1970s, the federal government launched … with health professionals (Forget, 2011). ===Solvency=== ====UBI equalizes power dynamics in abusive relationships and provides more autonomy==== Huws 17 Ursula Huws is Professor of Labour and Globalisation at the University of Hertfordshire in the UK, and founder of Analytica Social and Economic Research. She is the author of The Making of a Cybertariat: Virtual Work in a Real World., "Universal Basic Income and Women’s Liberation," No Publication, 1-13-2017, https://www.compassonline.org.uk/universal-basic-income-and-womens-liberation/, ghsBZ More than forty years later, …ctually lead to better relationships as well as a more equitable society, providing a genuine basis for liberation. ==Advantage 2: Welfare== ====Conditional welfare creates unreachable quotas for work and puts women of color into jobs where they have zero bargaining power - the plan solves by eliminating means tested welfare==== Burnham **No date Linda Burnham, "Racism in United States Welfare Policy" Reimagine!Race Poverty and the EnvironmentRadioRPE http://www.reimaginerpe.org/node/858 ** The complex interplay of race and … above the poverty line.12 ====Conditional support sustains poverty and create a permanent underclass that is based on race - UBI solves because it distributes the same amount to everybody. Welfare programs like this also disincentivize political participation because it creates a terrible perception of government.==== Santens 16 **Scott Santens (Writer and advocate of basic income for all; Citizen of Earth and New Orleans; Bachelor of Science in Psychology; Moderator of the /r/BasicIncome community on Reddit; Founder of the BIG Patreon Creator Pledge), 9-9-2016, "The progressive case for replacing the welfare state with basic income," TechCrunch,https://techcrunch.com/2016/09/09/the-progressive-case-for-replacing-the-welfare-state-with-basic-income/hs ** But again, those numbers cannot be compared … instead, whichever is cheaper.
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~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-- ~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-- - KEY - OB = Observation - C1/2/3 = Contention 1/2/3 - SUB A/B/C = Subpoint - MDR = Multi-drug Resistant - TB = Tuberculosis ~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-- ~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-- - - OB: EU needed to fund - EU is the only actor who can fully fund the BRI Horia Ciurtin, 12-xx-2017, " A PIVOT TO EUROPE: CHINA’S BELT-AND-ROAD BALANCING ACT," European Institute of Romania, http://ier.gov.ro/wp-content/uploads/publicatii/Final_Policy-Brief-5_Horia-Ciurtin-A-Pivot-to-Europe_web.pdf Qualifications: Amsterdam Center for International Law; European Federation for Investment Law and Arbitration; VERSO Journal Cluj-Napoca/Bucharest: For attaining these … with its marginal areas. -Investment dropped 40 last year and investment is drying up Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, 4-27-2019, "China cannot afford the Silk Road, and that is a blessing," Sydney Morning Herald, https://www.smh.com.au/business/markets/china-cannot-afford-the-silk-road-and-that-is-a-blessing-20190427-p51hqq.html The global economic system … to recoup toll revenue. C1: Health SUB A: Direct Development - The BRI provides 267 billion to healthcare development which eliminates malaria and controls TB Jin Chen, Robert Bergquist , Xiao-Nong Jing-Bo Xue, MenBao Qian, 4-18-2019, "Combating infectious disease epidemics through China’s Belt and Road Initiative," PLOS, https://journals.plos.org/plosntds/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pntd.0007107andamp;type=printable Qualifications: PLOS ONE is a peer reviewed scientific journal with a rigorous editorial screening and assessment process made up of several stages. PLOS ONE considers original research articles from all disciplines within the natural sciences, medical research, engineering, as well as the related social sciences and humanities. The editors make decisions on submissions based on scientific rigor, regardless of novelty. Financial and human resource … infectious disease epidemics. IMPACT - Tuberculosis - 1.3 million TB related deaths in 2017 No Author, 3-28-2019, "Data andamp; Statistics," Center for Disease Control, https://www.cdc.gov/tb/statistics/default.htm Tuberculosis (TB) is one of the world’s deadliest diseases: … public health interventions. SUB B: Nanotechnology - Nanotech stuck in early stages Tanisha Bassan, 1-25-2019, "Understanding Nanotechnology and How it Will Disrupt Our Future," Medium, https://medium.com/@Tanisha.Bassan/understanding-nanotechnology-and-how-it-will-disrupt-our-future-52df7d9ec57d It’s 2019 and the ... the early-stages of nanotech. - Start-ups are dying for 2 reasons listed as sub-sub points Peter Marius and Etienne Lewin, 9-12-2014, “Technology Transfer: The Case of Nanotechnology”, The European InterUniversity Association on Society, Science and Technology, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/a06c/f759eb33362f51c3ee648cb6d81eb1b89416.pdf innovation needs to ... markets through organisational learning 1. Lack of Scientists for nanotech - Nanotech is suffering massive personnel shortage (MARIUS ABOVE) - Inadequate interest and incentives have caused shortages in trained workers Alena Zukersteinova, xx-xx-2017, “Skill needs in emerging technologies: nanotechnology”, European Center for the Development of Vocational Training, https://www.cedefop.europa.eu/files/nanotechnology_proceedings_unedited.pdf It is clear that ... EU priority research. - Shortage in workers leads to bottle in nanotech innovation Amarendra Swarupsep, 9-21-2007, "How Will Nanotech Fare in Europe?," Science, https://www.sciencemag.org/careers/2007/09/how-will-nanotech-fare-europe According to a 2004 ... study nanotechnology in Europe. - BRI hires 5,000 scientists and 50 joint laboratories Dennis Normille, 5-16-2017, “China’s belt and road infrastructure plan also includes science”, Science, https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/05/china-s-belt-and-road-infrastructure-plan-also-includes-science The belt and road initiative—originally ... prior to the summit. 2. High Development Costs - Nanotech needs more money (MARIUS ABOVE) - BRI provides funding By Emanuel Pastreich, American Academic June 24, 2019. China’s Belt and Road of Science Forieign Policy In Focus https://fpif.org/chinas-belt-and-road-of-science/ Nature magazine recently ... recent scientific initiatives. 3. The United States Competition - The U.S will parallel investment out of competition with China. No Author, 4-1-2016, "The nanotechnology race between China and USA," Materials Today, https://www.materialstoday.com/nanomaterials/comment/the-nanotechnology-race-between-china-and-usa/ The geopolitical differences ...worldwide community as well. SOLVES DISEASE - Nano has the potential to create a hyper-accurate diagnosis of TB for only $1 that will thus reduce Multi-Drug-Resistant TB Donald Maclurcan, 6-28-2005, "Nanotechnology and Developing Countries," Penn State University, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.545.6624andamp;rep=rep1andamp;type=pdf Many believe nanotechnology ... firm, Biosante, in 2002 50. IMPACT- MDR TB - 480,000 new cases of MDR TB every year Mario Raviglione and Giorgia Sulis, 4-29-2015, " Tuberculosis 2015: burden, challenges and strategy for control and elimination," Public Library of Medicine, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4927938/pdf/idr-2016-2-6570.pdf Multidrug resistant tuberculosis ... in absolute terms. C2: Nonperforming Loans - Unfinished BRI projects make no money Yasheng Huang, 3-24-2019, "Why China is most at risk of a belt and road debt trap," South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/3011546/its-belt-and-road-projects-china-risks-falling-biggest-debt Qualifications: Yasheng Huang is international programme professor in Chinese economy and business, and professor of global economics and management at the MIT Sloan School of Management. But, as John Maynard Keynes … borne by Chinese savers. - Nonperforming loans create debt crisis for China Karen Gilchrist, 8-24-2017, “China’s ‘Belt and Road’ initiative could be the next risk to the global financial system,” CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/24/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-could-be-the-next-risk-to-the-global-financial-system.html China has pitched its mammoth, … managed with more scrutiny. IMPACT- Global Recession - Ties to global market means Chinese recession causes global recession Grace Blakeley, xx-xx-xxxx, "The next crash: why the world is unprepared for the economic dangers ahead," No Publication, https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/economy/2019/03/next-crash-why-world-unprepared-economic-dangers-ahead In the trade-off between … world and QE is unwound. - IMF predicts 900M people pushed into poverty in next global recession Harry Bradford, 4-5-2013, "Three Times The Population Of The U.S. Is At Risk Of Falling Into Poverty," HuffPost, span class="skimlinks-unlinked"https://www.huffpost.com/entry/global-poverty-900-million-economic-shock_n_3022420/span Hundreds of millions … to aid the nation’s poorest.. AFFIRM
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=1NC= ==DA: Inflation== ====UBI triggers inflation by overloading consumption velocity==== Boyce 19 **Paul Boyce, 5-5-2019, "Universal Basic Income Is a Pandora’s Box," Foundation for Economic Education, **https://fee.org/articles/universal-basic-income-is-a-pandora-s-box/ Higher Prices and Inflation A UBI would essentially transfer wealth away from higher earners toward AND is in his interest to increase prices until there is no excess demand. ====These new wealth baselines force inflationary spirals==== Archetto 18 **Greg Archetto, 7-16-2018, "Implementation of a 'universal basic income' program would be a disaster", The Hill, https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/397192-implementation-of-a-universal-basic-income-program-would-be-a-disaster. (JL)** If everyone suddenly had an extra $10K a year, and everyone knew that AND inflationary spiral. This is essentially Milton Friedman's "helicopter money" analogy. ===MPX: Recession=== ====Inflation undermines economic growth by eliminating spending capacity==== Morah 20 **Chizoba Morah, 1-29-2020, "What Causes a Recession?," Investopedia, **https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/08/cause-of-recession.asp The nature and causes of recessions are simultaneously obvious and uncertain. Recessions can result AND and a natural downward pressure on prices may occur as aggregate demand slumps. ====Inflation spirals trigger run on the dollar recessions==== Cochrane 11 **John Cochrane, xx-xx-2011, "Inflation and Debt" University of Chicago National Affairs, http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/john.cochrane/research/papers/Cochrane'Inflation'and'Debt'National'Affairs.pdf (professor of Finance at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, AQR Capital Management Distinguished Service Professor of Finance at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research, adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute)** But these questions miss a grave danger. As a result of the federal government’s AND there would be essentially nothing the Federal Reserve could do to stop it. ====Global interconnectedness creates a spillover effect and global recession. Prior recessions pushed over 100 million people into poverty==== World Bank 10 **World Bank, 11-18-2010, "New Study Reviews the World Bank Group’s Response to The Global Financial Crisis," http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2010/11/18/new-study-reviews-the-world-bank-groups-response-to-the-global-financial-crisis** Increased poverty resulting from the financial crisis will be a major challenge in the foreseeable AND other development partners during response initiatives will continue to be of paramount importance. ==DA: Stabilizers== ====Welfare programs act as automatic stabilizers that expand during times of recession ending the vicious degradation of human capital==== Spross 19 **Jeff Spross, 10-7-2019, "America needs to put recession-fighting on autopilot," The Week, https://theweek.com/articles/869684/america-needs-recessionfighting-autopilot** More than that, our policymakers are ignoring one of the most sensible and straightforward AND you something about the quality of the work the labor market is offering them ====By replacing welfare with a UBI, you prevent welfare spending that is essential to recovery==== Winningham 16 **Ellis Winningham ~~Economist~~. "Universal Basic Income: An Economic "Destabilizer." May 23, 2016. Accessed February 25, 2018. http://elliswinningham.net/index.php/2016/05/23/universal-basic-income-an-economic-destabilizer/** Spending can go into a free fall and when it does, unemployment can rise AND . I hope this explanation provides further clarity to yesterday’s article and to my ====Automatic stabilizers are uniquely important in fighting this recession and futures ones due to structural constrains on the federal reserve==== Estep 19 **Sara Estep, Center for American Progress, "The Importance of Automatic Stabilizers in the Next Recession - Center for American Progress", 6/17/2019, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2019/06/17/471120/importance-automatic-stabilizers-next-recession/** Although the United States currently has automatic stabilizers in place, there is room for AND time lag—so long as triggers are effectively tied to economic indicators. ====Automatic stabilizers buy critical time to legislative fiscal stimulus==== Estep 19 **Sara Estep and Olugbenga Ajilore and Michael Madowitz, 6-17-2019, "The Importance of Automatic Stabilizers in the Next Recession," Center for American Progress, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2019/06/17/471120/importance-automatic-stabilizers-next-recession/** A recession response should generally have a two-pronged fiscal policy approach: automatic AND conjunction with a temporary fiscal stimulus, half the battle will be lost. ===MPX: Recession Severity=== ====The fiscal response during the last recession reduced its length by half and prevented the loss of over 10 million jobs==== Blinder 15 **Alan S. Blinder and Mark Zandi, "The Financial Crisis: Lessons for the Next One", Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 10-15-2015, https://www.cbpp.org/research/economy/the-financial-crisis-lessons-for-the-next-one, DOA-12-30-2018 ** The massive and multifaceted policy responses to the financial crisis and Great Recession — ranging AND it would have been, with about 10 million more jobs ~~lost~~.
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==Framework== The framework is structural violence ====Cognitive processes lead us to neglect the suffering of people we deem irrelevant which results in direct violence. It is key we target marginalization in discourse to fight its desensitizing effects.==== Winter and Leighton 01 **Christie, D. J., Wagner, R. V., and Winter, D. A. (Eds.). (2001). Peace, Conflict, and Violence: Peace Psychology for the 21st Century. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.** While structural violence often … to create a peaceful world. ====The role of the ballot is to construct value in those marginalized. Classroom style pedagogy forms our realities and allows us to acknowledge oppression.==== Espinoza 02 **Carlos Tejada and Manuel Espinoza, "Toward a Decolonializing Pedagogy: Social Justice Reconsidered" (PDF in Off-case folder)** Critical pedagogy has … the ends of schooling. ==C1: ISIS== ====ISIS is entirely reliant on its financing, online propaganda, and its military prowess.==== Taneja 17 **Kabir Taneja, 8-31-2017, "Understanding ISIS: From conception to operations," ORF, https://www.orfonline.org/research/understanding-isis-from-conception-to-operations/** The following sections … the caliph is killed.~~xlv~~ OCO’s undermine all three of these key "pillars". ===Link – Internet Recruitment=== ====Almost all of ISIS recruitment is online==== Bashar 19 **Iftekharul Bashar, 9-3-2019, "Islamic State Ideology Continues to Resonate in Bangladesh," Middle East Institute, https://www.mei.edu/publications/islamic-state-ideology-continues-resonate-bangladesh** ISIS in Bangladesh has … a more direct role. ====ISIS is and was heavily reliant on the internet ==== Carter 16 **Ash Carter, 12-11-2016, "A Lasting Defeat: The Campaign to Destroy ISIS," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/LastingDefeat** The Islamic State, … have been too limited, ====U.S cyber operations have undermined ISIS and may be the only available tool in the future==== Vavra 19 **Shannon Vavra, 8-3-2019, "U.S. cyber-offensive against ISIS continues, and eyes are now on Afghanistan, general says," CyberScoop, **https://www.cyberscoop.com/isis-jtf-ares-cyber-offensive-afghanistan/ As loyalties among Afghanistan’s … Pakistan; in 2015, a bus. ====OCO’s have denied ISIS online propaganda and contracted their recruitment==== ASP 17 **No Author, 6-16-2017, "Fighting ISIS in Cyberspace," American Security Project, https://www.americansecurityproject.org/fighting-isis-in-cyberspace/** To better understand … capacity for propaganda. ===Link – Financial Attacks=== ====Cyber operations have been able to target specific domains and financial sectors of ISIS==== Raston 19 **Dina Temple-Raston, 9-26-2019, "How The U.S. Hacked ISIS," NPR, https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26/763545811/how-the-u-s-hacked-isis** Neil is a Marine … ISIS's media operation. ====The cyber coalition, Joint-Task-Force Ares, cuts off ISIS as they attempt to gather finances==== Temple 19 **Dina Temple-Raston, 9-26-2019, "How The U.S. Hacked ISIS," NPR, https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26/763545811/how-the-u-s-hacked-isis** "Within the first … to be right there." ===Link – Kinetic Strikes=== ====Cyber operations further increased the capabilities of current physical strikes==== Duffey 17 **Ryan Duffy, 6-3-2017, "The U.S. military combined cyber and kinetic operations to hunt down ISIS last year, general says," CyberScoop, **https://www.cyberscoop.com/u-s-official-reveals-military-combined-cyber-kinetic-operations-hunt-isis/ The military used … discuss such operations. ====The intel from offensive cyber operations is key to military strikes==== Pomerleau 19 Mark Pomerleau, 9-17-2019, "How Cyber Command can limit the reach of ISIS," C4ISRNET, https://www.c4isrnet.com/dod/cybercom/2019/09/17/how-cyber-command-can-limit-the-reach-of-isis/ Joint Task Force-Ares is the U.S. … non-kinetic means or through Joint Task Force-Ares," he said. ===Impact – Stabilization=== ====ISIS occupation keeps them in slavery==== Jamieson 16 **Alastair Jamieson, 1-19-2016, "ISIS Death Toll: 18,800 Civilians Killed in Iraq in 2 Years: U.N.," NBC News, **https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/isis-death-toll-18-800-killed-iraq-2-years-u-n499426 LONDON — At least 18,802 civilians have … been forced into sexual slavery. ====ISIS is being defeated and its freed millions from oppressive rule.==== Rogers 18 **Michael S Rogers, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, "EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE", April 11 2018, **https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS26/20180411/108076/HHRG-115-AS26-Wstate-RogersM-20180411.pdf A significant story in … against violent extremists. ====The international community has taken up the mantel for assisting those freed.==== IMF 17 **Phil de Imus, 12-xx-2017, "The Cost of Conflict - Finance and Development, December 2017", IMF, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2017/12/imus.htm** Prioritizing public spending to … and inflation fell to single digits.
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