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18.
5. Johari, J.C., Reflections on Indian Politics, New Delhi,
1974, pp. 3–5.
76 Anti-Defection Law
T
he 52nd Amendment Act of 1985 provided for the
disqualification of the members of Parliament and the state
legislatures on the ground of defection from one political
party to another. For this purpose, it made changes in four
Articles1 of the Constitution and added a new Schedule (the Tenth
Schedule) to the Constitution. This act is often referred to as the
‘anti-defection law’.
Later, the 91st Amendment Act of 2003 made one change in the
provisions of the Tenth Schedule. It omitted an exception provision
i.e., disqualification on ground of defection not to apply in case of
PROVISIONS OF THE ACT
The Tenth Schedule contains the following provisions with respect
to the disqualification of members of Parliament and the state
legislatures on the ground of defection:
1. Disqualification
Members of Political Parties: A member of a House belonging
to any political party becomes disqualified for being a member of
the House, (a) if he voluntarily gives up his membership of such
political party; or (b) if he votes or abstains from voting in such
House contrary to any direction issued by his political party
without obtaining prior permission of such party and such act has
not been condoned by the party within 15 days.
From the above provision it is clear that a member elected on a
party ticket should continue in the party and obey the party
directions.
Independent Members: An independent member of a House
(elected without being set up as a candidate by any political party)
becomes disqualified to remain a member of the House if he joins
any political party after such election.
Nominated Members: A nominated member of a House
becomes disqualified for being a member of the House if he joins
any political party after the expiry of six months from the date on
which he takes his seat in the House. This means that he may join
any political party within six months of taking his seat in the House
without inviting this disqualification.
2. Exceptions
The above disqualification on the ground of defection does not
apply in the following two cases:
(a) If a member goes out of his party as a result of a merger of
the party with another party. A merger takes place when two-
(b) If a member, after being elected as the presiding officer of
the House, voluntarily gives up the membership of his party
or rejoins it after he ceases to hold that office. This
exemption has been provided in view of the dignity and
impartiality of this office.
It must be noted here that the provision of the Tenth Schedule
pertaining to exemption from disqualification in case of split by
one-third members of legislature party has been deleted by the
91st Amendment Act of 2003. It means that the defectors have no
more protection on grounds of splits.
3. Deciding Authority
Any question regarding disqualification arising out of defection is
to be decided by the presiding officer of the House. Originally, the
act provided that the decision of the presiding officer is final and
cannot be questioned in any court. However, in Kihoto Hollohan
case2 (1993), the Supreme Court declared this provision as
unconstitutional on the ground that it seeks to take away the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the high courts. It held that
the presiding officer, while deciding a question under the Tenth
Schedule, function as a tribunal. Hence, his decision like that of
any other tribunal, is subject to judicial review on the grounds of
mala fides, perversity, etc. But, the court rejected the contention
that the vesting of adjudicatory powers in the presiding officer is
by itself invalid on the ground of political bias3 .
4. Rule-Making Power
The presiding officer of a House is empowered to make rules to
give effect to the provisions of the Tenth Schedule. All such rules
must be placed before the House for 30 days. The House may
approve or modify or disapprove them. Further, he may direct that
any willful contravention by any member of such rules may be
dealt with in the same manner as a breach of privilege of the
House.
According to the rules made so, the presiding officer can take
give the member (against whom the complaint has been made) a
chance to submit his explanation. He may also refer the matter to
the committee of privileges for inquiry. Hence, defection has no
EVALUATION OF THE ACT
The Tenth Schedule of the Constitution (which embodies the anti-
defection law) is designed to prevent the evil or mischief of
political defections motivated by the lure of office or material
benefits or other similar considerations. It is intended to
strengthen the fabric of Indian parliamentary democracy by
curbing unprincipled and unethical political defections. Rajiv
Gandhi, the then Prime Minister, described it as the ‘first step
towards cleaning-up public life’. The then Central law minister
stated that the passing of the 52nd Amendment Bill (anti-defection
bill) by a unanimous vote by both the Houses of Parliament was ‘a
proof, if any, of the maturity and stability of Indian democracy’.
Advantages
The following can be cited as the advantages of the anti-defection
law:
(a) It provides for greater stability in the body politic by checking
the propensity of legislators to change parties.
(b) It facilitates democratic realignment of parties in the
legislature by way of merger of parties.
(c) It reduces corruption at the political level as well as non-
developmental expenditure incurred on irregular elections.
(d) It gives, for the first time, a clear-cut constitutional
recognition to the existence of political parties.
Criticism
Though the anti-defection law been hailed as a bold step towards
cleansing our political life and started as new epoch in the political
life of the country, it has revealed may lacunae in its operation and
failed to prevent defections in toto. It came to be criticised on the
following grounds:
1. It does not make a differentiation between dissent and
on a pedestal and sanctions tyranny of the party in the name
of the party discipline’4 .
2. Its distinction between individual defection and group
defection is irrational. In other words, ‘it banned only retail
defections and legalised wholesale defections’5 .
3. It does not provide for the expulsion of a legislator from his
party for his activities outside the legislature.
4. Its discrimination between an independent member and a
nominated member is illogical. If the former joins a party, he
is disqualified while the latter is allowed to do the same.
5. Its vesting of decision-making authority in the presiding
officer is criticised on two grounds. Firstly, he may not
exercise this authority in an impartial and objective manner
due to political exigencies. Secondly, he lacks the legal
knowledge and experience to adjudicate upon the cases. In
fact, two Speakers of the Lok Sabha (Rabi Ray–1991 and
Shivraj Patil–1993) have themselves expressed doubts on
their suitability to adjudicate upon the cases related to
91ST AMENDMENT ACT (2003)
Reasons
The reasons for enacting the 91st Amendment Act (2003) are as
follows:
1. Demands have been made from time to time in certain
quarters for strengthening and amending the Anti-defection
Law as contained in the Tenth Schedule, on the ground that
these provisions have not been able to achieve the desired
goal of checking defections. The Tenth Schedule has also
been criticised on the ground that it allows bulk defections
while declaring individual defections as illegal. The provision
for exemption from disqualification in case of splits as
provided in the Tenth Schedule has, in particular, come
under severe criticism on account of its destabilising effect
on the Government.
2. The Committee on Electoral Reforms (Dinesh Goswami
Committee) in its report of 1990, the Law Commission of
India in its 170th Report on “Reform of Electoral Laws”
(1999) and the National Commission to Review the Working
of the Constitution (NCRWC) in its report of 2002 have, inter
alia, recommended omission of the provision of the Tenth
Schedule pertaining to exemption from disqualification in
case of splits.
3. The NCRWC was also of the view that a defector should be
penalised for his action by debarring him from holding any
public office as a minister or any other remunerative political
post for at least the duration of the remaining term of the
existing Legislature or until, the next fresh elections
whichever is earlier.
4. The NCRWC has also observed that abnormally large
Councils of Ministers were being constituted by various
Governments at Centre and states and this practice had to
be prohibited by law and that a ceiling on the number of
maximum of 10% of the total strength of the popular House
of the Legislature.
Provisions
The 91st Amendment Act of 2003 has made the following
provisions to limit the size of Council of Ministers, to debar
defectors from holding public offices, and to strengthen the anti-
defection law:
1. The total number of ministers, including the Prime Minister,
in the Central Council of Ministers shall not exceed 15 per
cent of the total strength of the Lok Sabha.
2. A member of either House of Parliament belonging to any
political party who is disqualified on the ground of defection
shall also be disqualified to be appointed as a minister.
3. The total number of ministers, including the Chief Minister, in
the Council of Ministers in a state shall not exceed 15 per
cent of the total strength of the Legislative Assembly of that
state. But, the number of ministers, including the Chief
Minister, in a state shall not be less than 12.
4. A member of either House of a state legislature belonging to
any political party who is disqualified on the ground of
defection shall also be disqualified to be appointed as a
minister.
5. A member of either House of Parliament or either House of
a State Legislature belonging to any political party who is
disqualified on the ground of defection shall also be
disqualified to hold any remunerative political post. The
expression “remunerative political post” means (i) any office
under the Central Government or a state government where
the salary or remuneration for such office is paid out of the
public revenue of the concerned government; or (ii) any
office under a body, whether incorporated or not, which is
wholly or partially owned by the Central Government or a
state government and the salary or remuneration for such
office is paid by such body, except where such salary or
remuneration paid is compensatory in nature.
6. The provision of the Tenth Schedule (anti-defection law)
by one-third members of legislature party has been deleted.
It means that the defectors have no more protection on
grounds of splits.
NOTES AND REFERENCES
1. These are Articles 101, 102, 190 and 191 which relate
to the vacation of seats and disqualification from
membership of Parliament and the state legislatures.
2. Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachilhu, (1993).
3. The court observed: ‘The Chairman or Speakers hold a
pivotal position in the scheme of parliamentary
democracy and are guardians of the rights and
privileges of the House. They are expected to and do
take far-reaching decisions in the functioning of
parliamentary democracy. Vestiture of power to
adjudicate questions under the Tenth Schedule in such
constitutional functionaries should not be considered
unexceptionable’.
4. Soli J. Sorabjee, ‘The Remedy should not be worse
than the Disease’, The Times of India (Sunday Review),
February 1, 1985, p. 1.
5. Madhu Limaye, Contemporary Indian Politics, 1989, p.
190.
6. Speaker Shivraj Patil stated: ‘The advantages in giving
these cases to the judiciary are many. The Speaker or
the Chairman may or may not be endowed with legal
acumen and proficiency in law. It is more apt to have the
cases decided by the Supreme Court or high court
77 Pressure Groups
MEANING AND TECHNIQUES
The term ‘pressure group’ originated in the USA. A pressure
group is a group of people who are organised actively for
promoting and defending their common interest. It is so called as
it attempts to bring a change in the public policy by exerting
pressure on the government. It acts as a liaison between the
government and its members.
The pressure groups are also called interest groups or vested
groups. They are different from the political parties in that they
neither contest elections nor try to capture political power. They
are concerned with specific programmes and issues and their
activities are confined to the protection and promotion of the
interests of their members by influencing the government.
The pressure groups influence the policymaking and policy-
implementation in the government through legal and legitimate
methods like lobbying, correspondence, publicity, propagandising,
petitioning, public debating, maintaining contacts with their
legislators and so forth. However, some times they resort to
illegitimate and illegal methods like strikes, violent activities and
corruption which damages public interest and administrative
integrity.
According to Odegard, pressure groups resort to three different
techniques in securing their purposes. First, they can try to place
in public office persons who are favourably disposed towards the
interests they seeks to promote. This technique may be labelled
electioneering. Second, they can try to persuade public officers,
whether they are initially favourably disposed toward them or not,
to adopt and enforce the policies that they think will prove most
beneficial to their interests. This technique may be labelled
PRESSURE GROUPS IN INDIA
A large number of pressure groups exist in India. But, they are not
developed to the same extent as in the US or the western
countries like Britain, France, Germany and so on. The pressure
groups in India can be broadly classified into the following
categories:
1. Business Groups
The business groups include a large number of industrial and
commercial bodies. They are the most sophisticated, the most
powerful and the largest of all pressure groups in India. They
include:
(i) Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
(FICCI); major constituents are the Indian Merchants
Chamber of Bombay, Indian Merchants Chamber of Calcutta
and South Indian Chamber of Commerce of Madras. It
broadly represents major industrial and trading interests.
(ii) Associated Chamber of Commerce and Industry of India
(ASSOCHAM); major constituents are the Bengal Chamber of
Commerce of Calcutta and Central Commercial Organisation
of Delhi. ASSOCHAM represents foreign British capital.
(iii) Federation of All India Foodgrain Dealers Association
(FAIFDA). FAIFDA is the sole representative of the grain
dealers.
(iv) All-India Manufacturers Organisation (AIMO). AIMO raises
the concerns of the medium-sized industry.
2. Trade Unions
The trade unions voice the demands of the industrial workers.
They are also known as labour groups. A peculiar feature of trade
unions in India is that they are associated either directly or
indirectly with different political parties. They include:
(i) All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC)–affiliated to CPI
(ii) Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC)–affiliated to
the Congress
(iii) Hind Mazdoor Sabha (HMS)–affiliated to the Socialists
(iv) Centre of Indian Trade Unions (CITU)– affiliated to the CPM
(v) Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS)– affiliated to the BJP
First Trade Union in India: All India Trade Union Congress
(AITUC) was founded in 1920 with Lala Lajpat Rai as its first
president. Upto 1945, Congressmen, Socialists and Communists
worked in the AITUC which was the central trade union
organisation of workers of India. Subsequently, the trade union
movement got split on political lines.
3. Agrarian Groups
The agrarian groups represent the farmers and the agricultural
labour class. They include: