jbp123/hello · Datasets at Hugging Face

instruction stringlengths 1 84	input stringlengths 1 85	output stringlengths 1 83
incorporated in Part III and the Directive Principles, which are non-	justiciable in nature, are incorporated in Part IV of the	Constitution.
Though the Directive Principles are non-justiciable, the	Constitution (Article 37) makes it clear that ‘these principles are	fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the
duty of the state to apply these principles in making laws’. Thus,	they impose a moral obligation on the state authorities for their	application, but the real force behind them is political, that is,
public opinion. As observed by Alladi Krishna Swamy Ayyar, ‘no	ministry responsible to the people can afford light-heartedly to	ignore the provisions in Part IV of the Constitution’. Similarly, Dr.
B.R. Ambedkar said in the Constituent Assembly that ‘a	government which rests on popular vote can hardly ignore the	Directive Principles while shaping its policy. If any government
ignores them, it will certainly have to answer for that before the	electorate at the election time’11 .	The framers of the Constitution made the Directive Principles
non-justiciable and legally non-enforceable because:	1. The country did not possess sufficient financial resources to	implement them.
2. The presence of vast diversity and backwardness in the	country would stand in the way of their implementation.	3. The newly born independent Indian State with its many
preoccupations might be crushed under the burden unless it	was free to decide the order, the time, the place and the	mode of fulfilling them.
CRITICISM OF THE DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES	The Directive Principles of State Policy have been criticised by	some members of the Constituent Assembly as well as other
constitutional and political experts on the following grounds:	1. No Legal Force	The Directives have been criticised mainly because of their non-
justiciable character. While K.T. Shah dubbed them as ‘pious	superfluities’ and compared them with ‘a cheque on a bank,	payable only when the resources of the bank permit’13 ,
Nasiruddin contended that these principles are ‘no better than the	new year’s resolutions, which are broken on the second of	January’. Even as T.T. Krishnamachari described the Directives as
‘a veritable dustbin of sentiments’, K C Wheare called them as a	‘manifesto of aims and aspirations’ and opined that they serve as	mere ‘moral homily’, and Sir Ivor Jennings thought they are only
as ‘pious aspirations’.	2. Illogically Arranged	Critics opine that the Directives are not arranged in a logical
manner based on a consistent philosophy. According to N	Srinivasan, ‘the Directives are neither properly classified nor	logically arranged. The declaration mixes up relatively unimportant
issues with the most vital economic and social questions. It	combines rather incongruously the modern with the old and	provisions suggested by the reason and science with provisions
based purely on sentiment and prejudice’14. Sir Ivor Jennings too	pointed out that these principles have no consistent philosophy.	3. Conservative
According to Sir Ivor Jennings, the Directives are based on the	political philosophy of the 19th century England. He remarked:	‘The ghosts of Sydney Webb and Beatrice Webb stalk through the
Socialism without the socialism’. He opined that the Directives ‘are	deemed to be suitable in India in the middle of the twentieth	century. The question whether they are suitable for the twenty-first
century cannot be answered; but it is quite probable that they will	be entirely out moded.15	4. Constitutional Conflict
K Santhanam has pointed out that the Directives lead to a	constitutional conflict (a) between the Centre and the states, (b)	between the President and the Prime Minister, and (c) between
the governor and the chief minister. According to him, the Centre	can give directions to the states with regard to the implementation	of these principles, and in case of non-compliance, can dismiss
the state government. Similarly, when the Prime Minister gets a	bill (which violates the Directive Principles) passed by the	Parliament, the president may reject the bill on the ground that
these principles are fundamental to the governance of the country	and hence, the ministry has no right to ignore them. The same	constitutional conflict may occur between the governor and the
UTILITY OF DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES	In spite of the above criticisms and shortcomings, the Directive	Principles are not an unnecessary appendage to the Constitution.
The Constitution itself declares that they are fundamental to the	governance of the country. According to L.M. Singhvi, an eminent	jurist and diplomat, ‘the Directives are the life giving provisions of
the Constitution. They constitute the stuff of the Constitution and	its philosophy of social justice’16. M.C. Chagla, former Chief	Justice of India, is of the opinion that, ‘if all these principles are
fully carried out, our country would indeed be a heaven on earth.	India would then be not only democracy in the political sense, but	also a welfare state looking after the welfare of its citizens’17. Dr.
B.R. Ambedkar had pointed out that the Directives have great	value because they lay down that the goal of Indian polity is	‘economic democracy’ as distinguished from ‘political democracy’.
Granville Austin opined that the Directive Principles are ‘aimed at	furthering the goals of the social revolution or to foster this	revolution by establishing the conditions necessary for its
achivement’18. Sir B.N. Rau, the constitutional advisor to the	Constituent Assembly, stated that the Directive Principles are	intended as ‘moral precepts for the authorities of the state. They
have at least an educative value.’	According to M.C. Setalvad, the former Attorney General of	India, the Directive Principles, although confer no legal rights and
create no legal remedies, are significant and useful in the	following ways:	1. They are like an ‘Instrument of Instructions’ or general
recommendations addressed to all authorities in the Indian	Union. They remind them of the basic principles of the new	social and economic order, which the Constitution aims at
building.	2. They have served as useful beacon-lights to the courts.	They have helped the courts in exercising their power of
3. They form the dominating background to all State action,	legislative or executive and also a guide to the courts in	some respects.
4. They amplify the Preamble, which solemnly resolves to	secure to all citizens of India justice, liberty, equality and	fraternity.
The Directives also play the following roles:	1. They facilitate stability and continuity in domestic and foreign	policies in political, economic and social spheres in spite of
the changes of the party in power.	2. They are supplementary to the fundamental rights of the	citizens. They are intended to fill in the vacuum in Part III by
providing for social and economic rights.	3. Their implementation creates a favourable atmosphere for	the full and proper enjoyment of the fundamental rights by
the citizens. Political democracy, without economic	democracy, has no meaning.	4. They enable the opposition to exercise influence and control
over the operations of the government. The Opposition can	blame the ruling party on the ground that its activities are	opposed to the Directives.
5. They serve as a crucial test for the performance of the	government. The people can examine the policies and	programmes of the government in the light of these
constitutional declarations.	6. They serve as common political manifesto. ‘A ruling party,	irrespective of its political ideology, has to recognise the fact
that these principles are intended to be its guide,	philosopher and friend in its legislative and executive acts’19	.
CONFLICT BETWEEN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND	DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES	The justiciability of Fundamental Rights and non-justiciability of
Directive Principles on the one hand and the moral obligation of	State to implement Directive Principles (Article 37) on the other	hand have led to a conflict between the two since the
commencement of the Constitution. In the Champakam Dorairajan	case20 (1951), the Supreme Court ruled that in case of any	conflict between the Fundamental Rights and the Directive
Principles, the former would prevail. It declared that the Directive	Principles have to conform to and run as subsidiary to the	Fundamental Rights. But, it also held that the Fundamental Rights
could be amended by the Parliament by enacting constitutional	amendment acts. As a result, the Parliament made the First	Amendment Act (1951), the Fourth Amendment Act (1955) and
the Seventeenth Amendment Act (1964) to implement some of the	Directives.	The above situation underwent a major change in 1967
following the Supreme Court’s judgement in the Golaknath case21	(1967). In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that the Parliament	cannot take away or abridge any of the Fundamental Rights,
which are ‘sacrosanct’ in nature. In other words, the Court held	that the Fundamental Rights cannot be amended for the	implementation of the Directive Principles.
The Parliament reacted to the Supreme Court’s judgement in	the Golaknath Case (1967) by enacting the 24th Amendment Act	(1971) and the 25th Amendment Act (1971). The 24th
Amendment Act declared that the Parliament has the power to	abridge or take away any of the Fundamental Rights by enacting	Constitutional Amendment Acts. The 25th Amendment Act
inserted a new Article 31C which contained the following two	provisions:	1. No law which seeks to implement the socialistic Directive
Principles specified in Article 39 (b)22 and (c)23 shall be void	on the ground of contravention of the Fundamental Rights	conferred by Article 14 (equality before law and equal
protection of laws), Article 19 (protection of six rights in	respect of speech, assembly, movement, etc) or Article 31	(right to property).
2. No law containing a declaration for giving effect to such	policy shall be questioned in any court on the ground that it	does not give effect to such a policy.
In the Kesavananda Bharati case24 (1973), the Supreme Court	declared the above second provision of Article 31C as	unconstitutional and invalid on the ground that judicial review is a
basic feature of the Constitution and hence, cannot be taken	away. However, the above first provision of Article 31C was held	to be constitutional and valid.
Table 8.1 Distinction Between Fundamental Rights and Directive	Principles	Fundamental Rights Directive Principles
1. These are negative as they 1. These are positive as they	prohibit the State from require the State to do	doing certain things. certain things.
2. These are justiciable, that 2. These are non-justiciable,	is, they are legally that is, they are not legally	enforceable by the courts in enforceable by the courts
case of their violation. for their violation.	3. They aim at establishing 3. They aim at establishing	political democracy in the social and economic
country. democracy in the country.	4. These have legal 4. These have moral and	sanctions. political sanctions.
5. They promote the welfare 5. They promote the welfare	of the individual. Hence, of the community. Hence,	they are personal and they are societarian and
individualistic. socialistic.	6. They do not require any 6. They require legislation for	legislation for their their implementation. They
implementation. They are are not automatically	automatically enforced. enforced.	7. The courts are bound to 7. The courts cannot declare
declare a law violative of a law violative of any of the	any of the Fundamental Directive Principles as	Rights as unconstitutional unconstitutional and invalid.
and invalid. However, they can uphold	the validity of a law on the	ground that it was enacted
to give effect to a directive.	Later, the 42nd Amendment Act (1976) extended the scope of	the above first provision of Article 31C by including within its
protection any law to implement any of the Directive Principles	and not merely those specified in Article 39 (b) and (c). In other	words, the 42nd Amendment Act accorded the position of legal
primacy and supremacy to the Directive Principles over the	Fundamental Rights conferred by Articles 14, 19 and 31.	However, this extension was declared as unconstitutional and
invalid by the Supreme Court in the Minerva Mills case25 (1980). It	means that the Directive Principles were once again made	subordinate to the Fundamental Rights. But the Fundamental
Rights conferred by Article 14 and Article 19 were accepted as	subordinate to the Directive Principles specified in Article 39 (b)	and (c). Further, Article 31 (right to property) was abolished by the
44th Amendment Act (1978).	In the Minerva Mills case (1980), the Supreme Court also held	that ‘the Indian Constitution is founded on the bedrock of the
balance between the Fundamental Rights and the Directive	Principles. They together constitute the core of commitment to	social revolution. They are like two wheels of a chariot, one no
less than the other. To give absolute primacy to one over the other	is to disturb the harmony of the Constitution. This harmony and	balance between the two is an essential feature of the basic
structure of the Constitution. The goals set out by the Directive	Principles have to be achieved without the abrogation of the	means provided by the Fundamental Rights’.
Therefore, the present position is that the Fundamental Rights	enjoy supremacy over the Directive Principles. Yet, this does not	mean that the Directive Principles cannot be implemented. The
Parliament can amend the Fundamental Rights for implementing	the Directive Principles, so long as the amendment does not	damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution.
IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES	Since 1950, the successive governments at the Centre and in the	states have made several laws and formulated various
programmes for implementing the Directive Principles. These are	mentioned below:	1. The Planning Commission was established in 1950 to take
up the development of the country in a planned manner. The	successive Five Year Plans aimed at securing socio-	economic justice and reducing inequalities of income, status
and opportunities. In 2015, the Planning Commission was	replaced by a new body called NITI Aayog (National	Institution for Transforming India).
2. Almost all the states have passed land reform laws to bring	changes in the agrarian society and to improve the	conditions of the rural masses. These measures include (a)
abolition of intermediaries like zamindars, jagirdars,	inamdars, etc; (b) tenancy reforms like security of tenure, fair	rents, etc; (c) imposition of ceilings on land holdings; (d)
distribution of surplus land among the landless labourers;	and (e) cooperative farming.	3. The Minimum Wages Act (1948), the Payment of Wages Act
(1936), the Payment of Bonus Act (1965), the Contract	Labour Regulation and Abolition Act (1970), the Child	Labour Prohibition and Regulation Act (1986), the Bonded
Labour System Abolition Act (1976), the Trade Unions Act	(1926), the Factories Act (1948), the Mines Act (1952), the	Industrial Disputes Act (1947), the Workmen’s
Compensation Act (1923) and so on have been enacted to	protect the interests of the labour sections. In 2006, the	government banned the child labour. In 2016, the Child
Labour Prohibition and Regulation Act (1986) was renamed	as the Child and Adolescent Labour Prohibition and	Regulation Act, 1986.
4. The Maternity Benefit Act (1961) and the Equal	Remuneration Act (1976) have been made to protect the	interests of women workers.
5. Various measures have been taken to utilise the financial	resources for promoting the common good.These include	nationalisation of life insurance (1956), the nationalisation of
fourteen leading commercial banks (1969), nationalisation of	general insurance (1971), abolition of Privy Purses (1971)	and so on.
6. The Legal Services Authorities Act (1987) has established a	nation-wide network to provide free and competent legal aid	to the poor and to organise lok adalat for promoting equal
justice. Lok adalat is a statutory forum for conciliatory	settlement of legal disputes. It has been given the status of a	civil court. Its awards are enforceable, binding on the parties
and final as no appeal lies before any court against them.	7. Khadi and Village Industries Board, Khadi and Village	Industries Commission, Small-Scale Industries Board,

incorporated in Part III and the Directive Principles, which are non-

justiciable in nature, are incorporated in Part IV of the

Constitution.

Though the Directive Principles are non-justiciable, the

Constitution (Article 37) makes it clear that ‘these principles are

fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the

duty of the state to apply these principles in making laws’. Thus,

they impose a moral obligation on the state authorities for their

application, but the real force behind them is political, that is,

public opinion. As observed by Alladi Krishna Swamy Ayyar, ‘no

ministry responsible to the people can afford light-heartedly to

ignore the provisions in Part IV of the Constitution’. Similarly, Dr.

B.R. Ambedkar said in the Constituent Assembly that ‘a

government which rests on popular vote can hardly ignore the

Directive Principles while shaping its policy. If any government

ignores them, it will certainly have to answer for that before the

electorate at the election time’11 .

The framers of the Constitution made the Directive Principles

non-justiciable and legally non-enforceable because:

1. The country did not possess sufficient financial resources to

implement them.

2. The presence of vast diversity and backwardness in the

country would stand in the way of their implementation.

3. The newly born independent Indian State with its many

preoccupations might be crushed under the burden unless it

was free to decide the order, the time, the place and the

mode of fulfilling them.

CRITICISM OF THE DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES

The Directive Principles of State Policy have been criticised by

some members of the Constituent Assembly as well as other

constitutional and political experts on the following grounds:

1. No Legal Force

The Directives have been criticised mainly because of their non-

justiciable character. While K.T. Shah dubbed them as ‘pious

superfluities’ and compared them with ‘a cheque on a bank,

payable only when the resources of the bank permit’13 ,

Nasiruddin contended that these principles are ‘no better than the

new year’s resolutions, which are broken on the second of

January’. Even as T.T. Krishnamachari described the Directives as

‘a veritable dustbin of sentiments’, K C Wheare called them as a

‘manifesto of aims and aspirations’ and opined that they serve as

mere ‘moral homily’, and Sir Ivor Jennings thought they are only

as ‘pious aspirations’.

2. Illogically Arranged

Critics opine that the Directives are not arranged in a logical

manner based on a consistent philosophy. According to N

Srinivasan, ‘the Directives are neither properly classified nor

logically arranged. The declaration mixes up relatively unimportant

issues with the most vital economic and social questions. It

combines rather incongruously the modern with the old and

provisions suggested by the reason and science with provisions

based purely on sentiment and prejudice’14. Sir Ivor Jennings too

pointed out that these principles have no consistent philosophy.

3. Conservative

According to Sir Ivor Jennings, the Directives are based on the

political philosophy of the 19th century England. He remarked:

‘The ghosts of Sydney Webb and Beatrice Webb stalk through the

Socialism without the socialism’. He opined that the Directives ‘are

deemed to be suitable in India in the middle of the twentieth

century. The question whether they are suitable for the twenty-first

century cannot be answered; but it is quite probable that they will

be entirely out moded.15

4. Constitutional Conflict

K Santhanam has pointed out that the Directives lead to a

constitutional conflict (a) between the Centre and the states, (b)

between the President and the Prime Minister, and (c) between

the governor and the chief minister. According to him, the Centre

can give directions to the states with regard to the implementation

of these principles, and in case of non-compliance, can dismiss

the state government. Similarly, when the Prime Minister gets a

bill (which violates the Directive Principles) passed by the

Parliament, the president may reject the bill on the ground that

these principles are fundamental to the governance of the country

and hence, the ministry has no right to ignore them. The same

constitutional conflict may occur between the governor and the

UTILITY OF DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES

In spite of the above criticisms and shortcomings, the Directive

Principles are not an unnecessary appendage to the Constitution.

The Constitution itself declares that they are fundamental to the

governance of the country. According to L.M. Singhvi, an eminent

jurist and diplomat, ‘the Directives are the life giving provisions of

the Constitution. They constitute the stuff of the Constitution and

its philosophy of social justice’16. M.C. Chagla, former Chief

Justice of India, is of the opinion that, ‘if all these principles are

fully carried out, our country would indeed be a heaven on earth.

India would then be not only democracy in the political sense, but

also a welfare state looking after the welfare of its citizens’17. Dr.

B.R. Ambedkar had pointed out that the Directives have great

value because they lay down that the goal of Indian polity is

‘economic democracy’ as distinguished from ‘political democracy’.

Granville Austin opined that the Directive Principles are ‘aimed at

furthering the goals of the social revolution or to foster this

revolution by establishing the conditions necessary for its

achivement’18. Sir B.N. Rau, the constitutional advisor to the

Constituent Assembly, stated that the Directive Principles are

intended as ‘moral precepts for the authorities of the state. They

have at least an educative value.’

According to M.C. Setalvad, the former Attorney General of

India, the Directive Principles, although confer no legal rights and

create no legal remedies, are significant and useful in the

following ways:

1. They are like an ‘Instrument of Instructions’ or general

recommendations addressed to all authorities in the Indian

Union. They remind them of the basic principles of the new

social and economic order, which the Constitution aims at

building.

2. They have served as useful beacon-lights to the courts.

They have helped the courts in exercising their power of

3. They form the dominating background to all State action,

legislative or executive and also a guide to the courts in

some respects.

4. They amplify the Preamble, which solemnly resolves to

secure to all citizens of India justice, liberty, equality and

fraternity.

The Directives also play the following roles:

1. They facilitate stability and continuity in domestic and foreign

policies in political, economic and social spheres in spite of

the changes of the party in power.

2. They are supplementary to the fundamental rights of the

citizens. They are intended to fill in the vacuum in Part III by

providing for social and economic rights.

3. Their implementation creates a favourable atmosphere for

the full and proper enjoyment of the fundamental rights by

the citizens. Political democracy, without economic

democracy, has no meaning.

4. They enable the opposition to exercise influence and control

over the operations of the government. The Opposition can

blame the ruling party on the ground that its activities are

opposed to the Directives.

5. They serve as a crucial test for the performance of the

government. The people can examine the policies and

programmes of the government in the light of these

constitutional declarations.

6. They serve as common political manifesto. ‘A ruling party,

irrespective of its political ideology, has to recognise the fact

that these principles are intended to be its guide,

philosopher and friend in its legislative and executive acts’19

.

CONFLICT BETWEEN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND

DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES

The justiciability of Fundamental Rights and non-justiciability of

Directive Principles on the one hand and the moral obligation of

State to implement Directive Principles (Article 37) on the other

hand have led to a conflict between the two since the

commencement of the Constitution. In the Champakam Dorairajan

case20 (1951), the Supreme Court ruled that in case of any

conflict between the Fundamental Rights and the Directive

Principles, the former would prevail. It declared that the Directive

Principles have to conform to and run as subsidiary to the

Fundamental Rights. But, it also held that the Fundamental Rights

could be amended by the Parliament by enacting constitutional

amendment acts. As a result, the Parliament made the First

Amendment Act (1951), the Fourth Amendment Act (1955) and

the Seventeenth Amendment Act (1964) to implement some of the

Directives.

The above situation underwent a major change in 1967

following the Supreme Court’s judgement in the Golaknath case21

(1967). In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that the Parliament

cannot take away or abridge any of the Fundamental Rights,

which are ‘sacrosanct’ in nature. In other words, the Court held

that the Fundamental Rights cannot be amended for the

implementation of the Directive Principles.

The Parliament reacted to the Supreme Court’s judgement in

the Golaknath Case (1967) by enacting the 24th Amendment Act

(1971) and the 25th Amendment Act (1971). The 24th

Amendment Act declared that the Parliament has the power to

abridge or take away any of the Fundamental Rights by enacting

Constitutional Amendment Acts. The 25th Amendment Act

inserted a new Article 31C which contained the following two

provisions:

1. No law which seeks to implement the socialistic Directive

Principles specified in Article 39 (b)22 and (c)23 shall be void

on the ground of contravention of the Fundamental Rights

conferred by Article 14 (equality before law and equal

protection of laws), Article 19 (protection of six rights in

respect of speech, assembly, movement, etc) or Article 31

(right to property).

2. No law containing a declaration for giving effect to such

policy shall be questioned in any court on the ground that it

does not give effect to such a policy.

In the Kesavananda Bharati case24 (1973), the Supreme Court

declared the above second provision of Article 31C as

unconstitutional and invalid on the ground that judicial review is a

basic feature of the Constitution and hence, cannot be taken

away. However, the above first provision of Article 31C was held

to be constitutional and valid.

Table 8.1 Distinction Between Fundamental Rights and Directive

Principles

Fundamental Rights Directive Principles

1. These are negative as they 1. These are positive as they

prohibit the State from require the State to do

doing certain things. certain things.

2. These are justiciable, that 2. These are non-justiciable,

is, they are legally that is, they are not legally

enforceable by the courts in enforceable by the courts

case of their violation. for their violation.

3. They aim at establishing 3. They aim at establishing

political democracy in the social and economic

country. democracy in the country.

4. These have legal 4. These have moral and

sanctions. political sanctions.

5. They promote the welfare 5. They promote the welfare

of the individual. Hence, of the community. Hence,

they are personal and they are societarian and

individualistic. socialistic.

6. They do not require any 6. They require legislation for

legislation for their their implementation. They

implementation. They are are not automatically

automatically enforced. enforced.

7. The courts are bound to 7. The courts cannot declare

declare a law violative of a law violative of any of the

any of the Fundamental Directive Principles as

Rights as unconstitutional unconstitutional and invalid.

and invalid. However, they can uphold

the validity of a law on the

ground that it was enacted

to give effect to a directive.

Later, the 42nd Amendment Act (1976) extended the scope of

the above first provision of Article 31C by including within its

protection any law to implement any of the Directive Principles

and not merely those specified in Article 39 (b) and (c). In other

words, the 42nd Amendment Act accorded the position of legal

primacy and supremacy to the Directive Principles over the

Fundamental Rights conferred by Articles 14, 19 and 31.

However, this extension was declared as unconstitutional and

invalid by the Supreme Court in the Minerva Mills case25 (1980). It

means that the Directive Principles were once again made

subordinate to the Fundamental Rights. But the Fundamental

Rights conferred by Article 14 and Article 19 were accepted as

subordinate to the Directive Principles specified in Article 39 (b)

and (c). Further, Article 31 (right to property) was abolished by the

44th Amendment Act (1978).

In the Minerva Mills case (1980), the Supreme Court also held

that ‘the Indian Constitution is founded on the bedrock of the

balance between the Fundamental Rights and the Directive

Principles. They together constitute the core of commitment to

social revolution. They are like two wheels of a chariot, one no

less than the other. To give absolute primacy to one over the other

is to disturb the harmony of the Constitution. This harmony and

balance between the two is an essential feature of the basic

structure of the Constitution. The goals set out by the Directive

Principles have to be achieved without the abrogation of the

means provided by the Fundamental Rights’.

Therefore, the present position is that the Fundamental Rights

enjoy supremacy over the Directive Principles. Yet, this does not

mean that the Directive Principles cannot be implemented. The

Parliament can amend the Fundamental Rights for implementing

the Directive Principles, so long as the amendment does not

damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution.

IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES

Since 1950, the successive governments at the Centre and in the

states have made several laws and formulated various

programmes for implementing the Directive Principles. These are

mentioned below:

1. The Planning Commission was established in 1950 to take

up the development of the country in a planned manner. The

successive Five Year Plans aimed at securing socio-

economic justice and reducing inequalities of income, status

and opportunities. In 2015, the Planning Commission was

replaced by a new body called NITI Aayog (National

Institution for Transforming India).

2. Almost all the states have passed land reform laws to bring

changes in the agrarian society and to improve the

conditions of the rural masses. These measures include (a)

abolition of intermediaries like zamindars, jagirdars,

inamdars, etc; (b) tenancy reforms like security of tenure, fair

rents, etc; (c) imposition of ceilings on land holdings; (d)

distribution of surplus land among the landless labourers;

and (e) cooperative farming.

3. The Minimum Wages Act (1948), the Payment of Wages Act

(1936), the Payment of Bonus Act (1965), the Contract

Labour Regulation and Abolition Act (1970), the Child

Labour Prohibition and Regulation Act (1986), the Bonded

Labour System Abolition Act (1976), the Trade Unions Act

(1926), the Factories Act (1948), the Mines Act (1952), the

Industrial Disputes Act (1947), the Workmen’s

Compensation Act (1923) and so on have been enacted to

protect the interests of the labour sections. In 2006, the

government banned the child labour. In 2016, the Child

Labour Prohibition and Regulation Act (1986) was renamed

as the Child and Adolescent Labour Prohibition and

Regulation Act, 1986.

4. The Maternity Benefit Act (1961) and the Equal

Remuneration Act (1976) have been made to protect the

interests of women workers.

5. Various measures have been taken to utilise the financial

resources for promoting the common good.These include

nationalisation of life insurance (1956), the nationalisation of

fourteen leading commercial banks (1969), nationalisation of

general insurance (1971), abolition of Privy Purses (1971)

and so on.

6. The Legal Services Authorities Act (1987) has established a

nation-wide network to provide free and competent legal aid

to the poor and to organise lok adalat for promoting equal

justice. Lok adalat is a statutory forum for conciliatory

settlement of legal disputes. It has been given the status of a

civil court. Its awards are enforceable, binding on the parties

and final as no appeal lies before any court against them.

7. Khadi and Village Industries Board, Khadi and Village

Industries Commission, Small-Scale Industries Board,