jbp123/hello · Datasets at Hugging Face

instruction stringlengths 1 84	input stringlengths 1 85	output stringlengths 1 83
cannot by its own will alter the boundary of this partition. Nor can	the judiciary”.15	In Bommai case16 (1994), the Supreme Court laid down that the
Constitution is federal and characterised federalism as its ‘basic	feature’. It observed: “The fact that under the scheme of our	Constitution, greater power is conferred upon the Centre vis-a-vis
the states does not mean that the states are mere appendages of	the Centre. The states have an independent constitutional	existence. They are not satellites or agents of the Centre. Within the
sphere allotted to them, the states are supreme. The fact that	during emergency and in certain other eventualities their powers	are overridden or invaded by the Centre is not destructive of the
essential federal feature of the Constitution. They are exceptions	and the exceptions are not a rule. Let it be said that the federalism	in the Indian Constitution is not a matter of administrative
convenience, but one of principle–the outcome of our own process	and a recognition of the ground realities”.	In fact, the federalism in India represents a compromise between
the following two conflicting considerations17 :	(i) normal division of powers under which states enjoy autonom	within their own spheres; and
(ii) need for national integrity and a strong Union government unde	exceptional circumstances.	The following trends in the working of Indian political system
reflects its federal spirit: (i) Territorial disputes between states, for	example, between Maharashtra and Karnataka over Belgaum; (ii)	Disputes between states over sharing of river water, for example,
between Karnataka and Tamil Nadu over Cauvery Water; (iii) The	emergence of regional parties and their coming to power in states	like Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, etc.; (iv) The creation of new
states to fulfil the regional aspirations, for example, Mizoram or	Jharkhand; (v) Demand of the states for more financial grants from	the Centre to meet their developmental needs; (vi) Assertion of
autonomy by the states and their resistance to the interference from	the Centre; (vii) Supreme Court’s imposition of several procedural	limitations on the use of Article 356 (President’s Rule in the States)
by the Centre.18	NOTES AND REFERENCES	1. Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume VII, P. 43.
2. The American Constitution originally consisted only 7	Articles, the Australian 128 and the Canadian 147.	3. The various amendments carried out since 1951 have
deleted about 20 Articles and one Part (VII) and added	about 95 Articles, four Parts (IVA, IXA, IXB and XIVA) and	four Schedules (9,10,11 and 12).
4. A majority of 2/3 of the members of each House present	and voting and a majority of the total membership of each	House.
5. Till 2019, the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir	enjoyed a special status by virtue of Article 370 of the	Constitution of India.
6. K.C. Wheare: Federal Government, 1951, P. 28.	6a. In 2015, the Planning Commission was replaced by a	new body called NITI Aayog (National Institution for
Transforming India).	7. K. Santhanam: Union-State Relations in India, 1960, PP.	50–70.
8. Paul Appleby: Public Administration in India, 1953, P. 51.	9. Morris Jones: The Government and Politics in India,	1960, P. 14.
10. Ivor Jennings: Some Characteristics of the Indian	Constitution, 1953, P. 1.	11. C.H. Alexandrowicz: Constitutional Development in India,
1957, PP. 157–70.	12. Granville Austin: The Indian Constitution–Cornerstone of	a Nation, Oxford, 1966, PP. 186–88.
13. Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VIII, P. 33.	14. Ibid, Vol.VII, PP. 33–34.	15. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s speech in the Constituent Assembly
on 25.11.1949 reproduced in The Constitution and the	Constituent Assembly; Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1990, P.	176.
16. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994).	17. Subash C. Kashyap: Our Parliament, National Book	Trust, 1999 Edition, P. 40.
14 Centre-State Relations	T	he Constitution of India, being federal in structure, divides all
powers (legislative, executive and financial) between the	Centre and the states. However, there is no division of judicial	power as the Constitution has established an integrated judicial
system to enforce both the Central laws as well as state laws.	Though the Centre and the states are supreme in their respective	fields, the maximum harmony and coordination between them is
essential for the effective operation of the federal system. Hence, the	Constitution contains elaborate provisions to regulate the various	dimensions of the relations between the Centre and the states.
The Centre-state relations can be studied under three heads:	• Legislative relations.	• Administrative relations.
LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS	Articles 245 to 255 in Part XI of the Constitution deal with the	legislative relations between the Centre and the states. Besides these,
there are some other articles dealing with the same subject.	Like any other Federal Constitution, the Indian Constitution also	divides the legislative powers between the Centre and the states with
respect to both the territory and the subjects of legislation. Further, the	Constitution provides for the parliamentary legislation in the state field	under five extraordinary situations as well as the centre’s control over
state legislation in certain cases. Thus, there are four aspects in the	Centre-states legislative relations, viz.,	• Territorial extent of Central and state legislation;
• Distribution of legislative subjects;	• Parliamentary legislation in the state field; and	• Centre’s control over state legislation.
1. Territorial Extent of Central and State Legislation	The Constitution defines the territorial limits of the legislative powers	vested in the Centre and the states in the following way:
(i) The Parliament can make laws for the whole or any part of the	territory of India. The territory of India includes the states, the	union territories, and any other area for the time being included in
the territory of India.	(ii) A state legislature can make laws for the whole or any part of the	state. The laws made by a state legislature are not applicable
outside the state, except when there is a sufficient nexus between	the state and the object.	(iii) The Parliament alone can make ‘extraterritorial legislation’. Thus,
the laws of the Parliament are also applicable to the Indian	citizens and their property in any part of the world.	However, the Constitution places certain restrictions on the plenary
territorial jurisdiction of the Parliament. In other words, the laws of	Parliament are not applicable in the following areas:	(i) The President can make regulations for the peace, progress and
good government of the five Union Territories– the Andaman and	Nicobar Islands, Lakshadweep, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Daman	and Diu and Ladakh. A regulation so made has the same force
and effect as an act of Parliament. It may also repeal or amend	any act of Parliament in relation to these union territories.	(ii) The governor is empowered to direct that an act of Parliament
does not apply to a scheduled area in the state or apply with	specified modifications and exceptions.	(iii) The Governor of Assam may likewise direct that an act of
Parliament does not apply to a tribal area (autonomous district) in	the state or apply with specified modifications and exceptions.	The President enjoys the same power with respect to tribal areas
(autonomous districts) in Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram.	2. Distribution of Legislative Subjects	The Constitution provides for a three-fold distribution of legislative
subjects between the Centre and the states, viz., List-I (the Union	List), List-II (the State List) and List-III (the Concurrent List) in the	Seventh Schedule:
(i) The Parliament has exclusive powers to make laws with respect	to any of the matters enumerated in the Union List. This list has at	present 98 subjects (originally 971 subjects) like defence,
banking, foreign affairs, currency, atomic energy, insurance,	communication, inter-state trade and commerce, census, audit	and so on.
(ii) The state legislature has “in normal circumstances” exclusive	powers to make laws with respect to any of the matters	enumerated in the State List. This has at present 59 subjects
(originally 662 subjects) like public order, police, public health and	sanitation, agriculture, prisons, local government, fisheries,	markets, theaters, gambling and so on.
(iii) Both, the Parliament and state legislature can make laws with	respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List.	This list has at present 52 subjects (originally 473 subjects) like
criminal law and procedure, civil procedure, marriage and divorce,	population control and family planning, electricity, labour welfare,	economic and social planning, drugs, newspapers, books and
printing press, and others. The 42nd Amendment Act of 1976	transferred five subjects to Concurrent List from State List, that is,	(a) education, (b) forests, (c) weights and measures, (d)
protection of wild animals and birds, and (e) administration of	justice; constitution and organisation of all courts except the	Supreme Court and the high courts.
(iv) Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for	any part of the territory of India not included in a state even	though that matter is one which is enumerated in the State List.
This provision has reference to the Union Territories or the	Acquired Territories (if any).	(v) The 101st Amendment Act of 2016 has made a special provision
with respect to goods and services tax. Accordingly, the	Parliament and the state legislature have power to make laws	with respect to goods and services tax imposed by the Union or
by the State. Further, the parliament has exclusive power to make	laws with respect to goods and services tax where the supply of	goods or services or both takes place in the course of inter-state
trade or commerce.	(vi) The power to make laws with respect to residuary subjects (i.e.,	the matters which are not enumerated in any of the three lists) is
vested in the Parliament. This residuary power of legislation	includes the power to levy residuary taxes.	From the above scheme, it is clear that the matters of national
importance and the matters which require uniformity of legislation	nationwide are included in the Union List. The matters of regional and	local importance and the matters which permit diversity of interest are
specified in the State List. The matters on which uniformity of	legislation throughout the country is desirable but not essential are	enumerated in the concurrent list. Thus, it permits diversity along with
uniformity.	In US, only the powers of the Federal Government are enumerated	in the Constitution and the residuary powers are left to the states. The
Australian Constitution followed the American pattern of single	enumeration of powers. In Canada, on the other hand, there is a	double enumeration– Federal and Provincial, and the residuary
powers are vested in the Centre.	The Government of India Act of 1935 provided for a three-fold	enumeration, viz., federal, provincial and concurrent. The present
Constitution follows the scheme of this act but with one difference, that	is, under this act, the residuary powers were given neither to the	federal legislature nor to the provincial legislature but to the governor-
general of India. In this respect, India follows the Canadian precedent.	The Constitution expressly secures the predominance of the Union	List over the State List and the Concurrent List and that of the
between the Union List and the State List, the former should prevail. In	case of overlapping between the Union List and the Concurrent List, it	is again the former which should prevail. Where there is a conflict
between the Concurrent List and the State List, it is the former that	should prevail.	In case of a conflict between the Central law and the state law on a
subject enumerated in the Concurrent List, the Central law prevails	over the state law. But, there is an exception. If the state law has been	reserved for the consideration of the president and has received his
assent, then the state law prevails in that state. But, it would still be	competent for the Parliament to override such a law by subsequently	making a law on the same matter.
3. Parliamentary Legislation in the State Field	The above scheme of distribution of legislative powers between the	Centre and the states is to be maintained in normal times. But, in
abnormal times, the scheme of distribution is either modified or	suspended. In other words, the Constitution empowers the Parliament	to make laws on any matter enumerated in the State List under the
following five extraordinary circumstances:	When Rajya Sabha Passes a Resolution	If the Rajya Sabha declares that it is necessary in the national interest
that Parliament should make laws with respect to goods and services	tax3a or a matter in the State List, then the Parliament becomes	competent to make laws on that matter. Such a resolution must be
supported by two-thirds of the members present and voting. The	resolution remains in force for one year; it can be renewed any	number of times but not exceeding one year at a time. The laws cease
to have effect on the expiration of six months after the resolution has	ceased to be in force.	This provision does not restrict the power of a state legislature to
make laws on the same matter. But, in case of inconsistency between	a state law and a parliamentary law, the latter is to prevail.	During a National Emergency
The Parliament acquires the power to legislate with respect to goods	and services tax3b or matters in the State List, while a proclamation of	national emergency is in operation. The laws become inoperative on
the expiration of six months after the emergency has ceased to	operate.	Here also, the power of a state legislature to make laws on the
same matter is not restricted. But, in case of repugnancy between a	state law and a parliamentary law, the latter is to prevail.	When States Make a Request
When the legislatures of two or more states pass resolutions	requesting the Parliament to enact laws on a matter in the State List,	then the Parliament can make laws for regulating that matter. A law so
enacted applies only to those states which have passed the	resolutions. However, any other state may adopt it afterwards by	passing a resolution to that effect in its legislature. Such a law can be
amended or repealed only by the Parliament and not by the	legislatures of the concerned states.	The effect of passing a resolution under the above provision is that
the Parliament becomes entitled to legislate with respect to a matter	for which it has no power to make a law. On the other hand, the state	legislature ceases to have the power to make a law with respect to
that matter. The resolution operates as abdication or surrender of the	power of the state legislature with respect to that matter and it is	placed entirely in the hands of Parliament which alone can then
legislate with respect to it.	Some examples of laws passed under the above provision are	Prize Competition Act, 1955; Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972; Water
(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974; Urban Land (Ceiling	and Regulation) Act, 1976; and Transplantation of Human Organs Act,	1994.
To Implement International Agreements	The Parliament can make laws on any matter in the State List for	implementing the international treaties, agreements or conventions.
This provision enables the Central government to fulfil its international	obligations and commitments.	Some examples of laws enacted under the above provision are
United Nations (Privileges and Immunities) Act, 1947; Geneva	Convention Act, 1960; Anti-Hijacking Act, 1982 and legislations	relating to environment and TRIPS.
When the President’s rule is imposed in a state, the Parliament	becomes empowered to make laws with respect to any matter in the	State List in relation to that state. A law made so by the Parliament
continues to be operative even after the president’s rule. This means	that the period for which such a law remains in force is not	coterminous with the duration of the President’s rule. But, such a law
can be repealed or altered or re-enacted by the state legislature.	4. Centre’s Control Over State Legislation	Besides the Parliament’s power to legislate directly on the state
subjects under the exceptional situations, the Constitution empowers	the Centre to exercise control over the state’s legislative matters in the	following ways:
(i) The governor can reserve certain types of bills passed by the	state legislature for the consideration of the President. The	president enjoys absolute veto over them.
(ii) Bills on certain matters enumerated in the State List can be	introduced in the state legislature only with the previous sanction	of the president. (For example, the bills imposing restrictions on
the freedom of trade and commerce).	(iii) The Centre can direct the states to reserve money bills and other	financial bills passed by the state legislature for the President’s
consideration during a financial emergency.	From the above, it is clear that the Constitution has assigned a	position of superiority to the Centre in the legislative sphere. In this

cannot by its own will alter the boundary of this partition. Nor can

the judiciary”.15

In Bommai case16 (1994), the Supreme Court laid down that the

Constitution is federal and characterised federalism as its ‘basic

feature’. It observed: “The fact that under the scheme of our

Constitution, greater power is conferred upon the Centre vis-a-vis

the states does not mean that the states are mere appendages of

the Centre. The states have an independent constitutional

existence. They are not satellites or agents of the Centre. Within the

sphere allotted to them, the states are supreme. The fact that

during emergency and in certain other eventualities their powers

are overridden or invaded by the Centre is not destructive of the

essential federal feature of the Constitution. They are exceptions

and the exceptions are not a rule. Let it be said that the federalism

in the Indian Constitution is not a matter of administrative

convenience, but one of principle–the outcome of our own process

and a recognition of the ground realities”.

In fact, the federalism in India represents a compromise between

the following two conflicting considerations17 :

(i) normal division of powers under which states enjoy autonom

within their own spheres; and

(ii) need for national integrity and a strong Union government unde

exceptional circumstances.

The following trends in the working of Indian political system

reflects its federal spirit: (i) Territorial disputes between states, for

example, between Maharashtra and Karnataka over Belgaum; (ii)

Disputes between states over sharing of river water, for example,

between Karnataka and Tamil Nadu over Cauvery Water; (iii) The

emergence of regional parties and their coming to power in states

like Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, etc.; (iv) The creation of new

states to fulfil the regional aspirations, for example, Mizoram or

Jharkhand; (v) Demand of the states for more financial grants from

the Centre to meet their developmental needs; (vi) Assertion of

autonomy by the states and their resistance to the interference from

the Centre; (vii) Supreme Court’s imposition of several procedural

limitations on the use of Article 356 (President’s Rule in the States)

by the Centre.18

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume VII, P. 43.

2. The American Constitution originally consisted only 7

Articles, the Australian 128 and the Canadian 147.

3. The various amendments carried out since 1951 have

deleted about 20 Articles and one Part (VII) and added

about 95 Articles, four Parts (IVA, IXA, IXB and XIVA) and

four Schedules (9,10,11 and 12).

4. A majority of 2/3 of the members of each House present

and voting and a majority of the total membership of each

House.

5. Till 2019, the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir

enjoyed a special status by virtue of Article 370 of the

Constitution of India.

6. K.C. Wheare: Federal Government, 1951, P. 28.

6a. In 2015, the Planning Commission was replaced by a

new body called NITI Aayog (National Institution for

Transforming India).

7. K. Santhanam: Union-State Relations in India, 1960, PP.

50–70.

8. Paul Appleby: Public Administration in India, 1953, P. 51.

9. Morris Jones: The Government and Politics in India,

1960, P. 14.

10. Ivor Jennings: Some Characteristics of the Indian

Constitution, 1953, P. 1.

11. C.H. Alexandrowicz: Constitutional Development in India,

1957, PP. 157–70.

12. Granville Austin: The Indian Constitution–Cornerstone of

a Nation, Oxford, 1966, PP. 186–88.

13. Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VIII, P. 33.

14. Ibid, Vol.VII, PP. 33–34.

15. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s speech in the Constituent Assembly

on 25.11.1949 reproduced in The Constitution and the

Constituent Assembly; Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1990, P.

176.

16. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994).

17. Subash C. Kashyap: Our Parliament, National Book

Trust, 1999 Edition, P. 40.

14 Centre-State Relations

T

he Constitution of India, being federal in structure, divides all

powers (legislative, executive and financial) between the

Centre and the states. However, there is no division of judicial

power as the Constitution has established an integrated judicial

system to enforce both the Central laws as well as state laws.

Though the Centre and the states are supreme in their respective

fields, the maximum harmony and coordination between them is

essential for the effective operation of the federal system. Hence, the

Constitution contains elaborate provisions to regulate the various

dimensions of the relations between the Centre and the states.

The Centre-state relations can be studied under three heads:

• Legislative relations.

• Administrative relations.

LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS

Articles 245 to 255 in Part XI of the Constitution deal with the

legislative relations between the Centre and the states. Besides these,

there are some other articles dealing with the same subject.

Like any other Federal Constitution, the Indian Constitution also

divides the legislative powers between the Centre and the states with

respect to both the territory and the subjects of legislation. Further, the

Constitution provides for the parliamentary legislation in the state field

under five extraordinary situations as well as the centre’s control over

state legislation in certain cases. Thus, there are four aspects in the

Centre-states legislative relations, viz.,

• Territorial extent of Central and state legislation;

• Distribution of legislative subjects;

• Parliamentary legislation in the state field; and

• Centre’s control over state legislation.

1. Territorial Extent of Central and State Legislation

The Constitution defines the territorial limits of the legislative powers

vested in the Centre and the states in the following way:

(i) The Parliament can make laws for the whole or any part of the

territory of India. The territory of India includes the states, the

union territories, and any other area for the time being included in

the territory of India.

(ii) A state legislature can make laws for the whole or any part of the

state. The laws made by a state legislature are not applicable

outside the state, except when there is a sufficient nexus between

the state and the object.

(iii) The Parliament alone can make ‘extraterritorial legislation’. Thus,

the laws of the Parliament are also applicable to the Indian

citizens and their property in any part of the world.

However, the Constitution places certain restrictions on the plenary

territorial jurisdiction of the Parliament. In other words, the laws of

Parliament are not applicable in the following areas:

(i) The President can make regulations for the peace, progress and

good government of the five Union Territories– the Andaman and

Nicobar Islands, Lakshadweep, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Daman

and Diu and Ladakh. A regulation so made has the same force

and effect as an act of Parliament. It may also repeal or amend

any act of Parliament in relation to these union territories.

(ii) The governor is empowered to direct that an act of Parliament

does not apply to a scheduled area in the state or apply with

specified modifications and exceptions.

(iii) The Governor of Assam may likewise direct that an act of

Parliament does not apply to a tribal area (autonomous district) in

the state or apply with specified modifications and exceptions.

The President enjoys the same power with respect to tribal areas

(autonomous districts) in Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram.

2. Distribution of Legislative Subjects

The Constitution provides for a three-fold distribution of legislative

subjects between the Centre and the states, viz., List-I (the Union

List), List-II (the State List) and List-III (the Concurrent List) in the

Seventh Schedule:

(i) The Parliament has exclusive powers to make laws with respect

to any of the matters enumerated in the Union List. This list has at

present 98 subjects (originally 971 subjects) like defence,

banking, foreign affairs, currency, atomic energy, insurance,

communication, inter-state trade and commerce, census, audit

and so on.

(ii) The state legislature has “in normal circumstances” exclusive

powers to make laws with respect to any of the matters

enumerated in the State List. This has at present 59 subjects

(originally 662 subjects) like public order, police, public health and

sanitation, agriculture, prisons, local government, fisheries,

markets, theaters, gambling and so on.

(iii) Both, the Parliament and state legislature can make laws with

respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List.

This list has at present 52 subjects (originally 473 subjects) like

criminal law and procedure, civil procedure, marriage and divorce,

population control and family planning, electricity, labour welfare,

economic and social planning, drugs, newspapers, books and

printing press, and others. The 42nd Amendment Act of 1976

transferred five subjects to Concurrent List from State List, that is,

(a) education, (b) forests, (c) weights and measures, (d)

protection of wild animals and birds, and (e) administration of

justice; constitution and organisation of all courts except the

Supreme Court and the high courts.

(iv) Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for

any part of the territory of India not included in a state even

though that matter is one which is enumerated in the State List.

This provision has reference to the Union Territories or the

Acquired Territories (if any).

(v) The 101st Amendment Act of 2016 has made a special provision

with respect to goods and services tax. Accordingly, the

Parliament and the state legislature have power to make laws

with respect to goods and services tax imposed by the Union or

by the State. Further, the parliament has exclusive power to make

laws with respect to goods and services tax where the supply of

goods or services or both takes place in the course of inter-state

trade or commerce.

(vi) The power to make laws with respect to residuary subjects (i.e.,

the matters which are not enumerated in any of the three lists) is

vested in the Parliament. This residuary power of legislation

includes the power to levy residuary taxes.

From the above scheme, it is clear that the matters of national

importance and the matters which require uniformity of legislation

nationwide are included in the Union List. The matters of regional and

local importance and the matters which permit diversity of interest are

specified in the State List. The matters on which uniformity of

legislation throughout the country is desirable but not essential are

enumerated in the concurrent list. Thus, it permits diversity along with

uniformity.

In US, only the powers of the Federal Government are enumerated

in the Constitution and the residuary powers are left to the states. The

Australian Constitution followed the American pattern of single

enumeration of powers. In Canada, on the other hand, there is a

double enumeration– Federal and Provincial, and the residuary

powers are vested in the Centre.

The Government of India Act of 1935 provided for a three-fold

enumeration, viz., federal, provincial and concurrent. The present

Constitution follows the scheme of this act but with one difference, that

is, under this act, the residuary powers were given neither to the

federal legislature nor to the provincial legislature but to the governor-

general of India. In this respect, India follows the Canadian precedent.

The Constitution expressly secures the predominance of the Union

List over the State List and the Concurrent List and that of the

between the Union List and the State List, the former should prevail. In

case of overlapping between the Union List and the Concurrent List, it

is again the former which should prevail. Where there is a conflict

between the Concurrent List and the State List, it is the former that

should prevail.

In case of a conflict between the Central law and the state law on a

subject enumerated in the Concurrent List, the Central law prevails

over the state law. But, there is an exception. If the state law has been

reserved for the consideration of the president and has received his

assent, then the state law prevails in that state. But, it would still be

competent for the Parliament to override such a law by subsequently

making a law on the same matter.

3. Parliamentary Legislation in the State Field

The above scheme of distribution of legislative powers between the

Centre and the states is to be maintained in normal times. But, in

abnormal times, the scheme of distribution is either modified or

suspended. In other words, the Constitution empowers the Parliament

to make laws on any matter enumerated in the State List under the

following five extraordinary circumstances:

When Rajya Sabha Passes a Resolution

If the Rajya Sabha declares that it is necessary in the national interest

that Parliament should make laws with respect to goods and services

tax3a or a matter in the State List, then the Parliament becomes

competent to make laws on that matter. Such a resolution must be

supported by two-thirds of the members present and voting. The

resolution remains in force for one year; it can be renewed any

number of times but not exceeding one year at a time. The laws cease

to have effect on the expiration of six months after the resolution has

ceased to be in force.

This provision does not restrict the power of a state legislature to

make laws on the same matter. But, in case of inconsistency between

a state law and a parliamentary law, the latter is to prevail.

During a National Emergency

The Parliament acquires the power to legislate with respect to goods

and services tax3b or matters in the State List, while a proclamation of

national emergency is in operation. The laws become inoperative on

the expiration of six months after the emergency has ceased to

operate.

Here also, the power of a state legislature to make laws on the

same matter is not restricted. But, in case of repugnancy between a

state law and a parliamentary law, the latter is to prevail.

When States Make a Request

When the legislatures of two or more states pass resolutions

requesting the Parliament to enact laws on a matter in the State List,

then the Parliament can make laws for regulating that matter. A law so

enacted applies only to those states which have passed the

resolutions. However, any other state may adopt it afterwards by

passing a resolution to that effect in its legislature. Such a law can be

amended or repealed only by the Parliament and not by the

legislatures of the concerned states.

The effect of passing a resolution under the above provision is that

the Parliament becomes entitled to legislate with respect to a matter

for which it has no power to make a law. On the other hand, the state

legislature ceases to have the power to make a law with respect to

that matter. The resolution operates as abdication or surrender of the

power of the state legislature with respect to that matter and it is

placed entirely in the hands of Parliament which alone can then

legislate with respect to it.

Some examples of laws passed under the above provision are

Prize Competition Act, 1955; Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972; Water

(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974; Urban Land (Ceiling

and Regulation) Act, 1976; and Transplantation of Human Organs Act,

1994.

To Implement International Agreements

The Parliament can make laws on any matter in the State List for

implementing the international treaties, agreements or conventions.

This provision enables the Central government to fulfil its international

obligations and commitments.

Some examples of laws enacted under the above provision are

United Nations (Privileges and Immunities) Act, 1947; Geneva

Convention Act, 1960; Anti-Hijacking Act, 1982 and legislations

relating to environment and TRIPS.

When the President’s rule is imposed in a state, the Parliament

becomes empowered to make laws with respect to any matter in the

State List in relation to that state. A law made so by the Parliament

continues to be operative even after the president’s rule. This means

that the period for which such a law remains in force is not

coterminous with the duration of the President’s rule. But, such a law

can be repealed or altered or re-enacted by the state legislature.

4. Centre’s Control Over State Legislation

Besides the Parliament’s power to legislate directly on the state

subjects under the exceptional situations, the Constitution empowers

the Centre to exercise control over the state’s legislative matters in the

following ways:

(i) The governor can reserve certain types of bills passed by the

state legislature for the consideration of the President. The

president enjoys absolute veto over them.

(ii) Bills on certain matters enumerated in the State List can be

introduced in the state legislature only with the previous sanction

of the president. (For example, the bills imposing restrictions on

the freedom of trade and commerce).

(iii) The Centre can direct the states to reserve money bills and other

financial bills passed by the state legislature for the President’s

consideration during a financial emergency.

From the above, it is clear that the Constitution has assigned a

position of superiority to the Centre in the legislative sphere. In this