instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 3
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void CopyToOMX(const OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header) {
if (!mIsBackup) {
return;
}
memcpy(header->pBuffer + header->nOffset,
(const OMX_U8 *)mMem->pointer() + header->nOffset,
header->nFilledLen);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-11-01, and 7.0 before 2016-11-01 could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Android ID: A-29422020.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
| Medium | 174,128 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void handle_ld_nf(u32 insn, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int rd = ((insn >> 25) & 0x1f);
int from_kernel = (regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV) != 0;
unsigned long *reg;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, 0);
maybe_flush_windows(0, 0, rd, from_kernel);
reg = fetch_reg_addr(rd, regs);
if (from_kernel || rd < 16) {
reg[0] = 0;
if ((insn & 0x780000) == 0x180000)
reg[1] = 0;
} else if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT)) {
put_user(0, (int __user *) reg);
if ((insn & 0x780000) == 0x180000)
put_user(0, ((int __user *) reg) + 1);
} else {
put_user(0, (unsigned long __user *) reg);
if ((insn & 0x780000) == 0x180000)
put_user(0, (unsigned long __user *) reg + 1);
}
advance(regs);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,807 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int l2tp_ip6_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int noblock,
int flags, int *addr_len)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *lsa = (struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *)msg->msg_name;
size_t copied = 0;
int err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
struct sk_buff *skb;
if (flags & MSG_OOB)
goto out;
if (addr_len)
*addr_len = sizeof(*lsa);
if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE)
return ipv6_recv_error(sk, msg, len);
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb)
goto out;
copied = skb->len;
if (len < copied) {
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copied = len;
}
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (err)
goto done;
sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sk, skb);
/* Copy the address. */
if (lsa) {
lsa->l2tp_family = AF_INET6;
lsa->l2tp_unused = 0;
lsa->l2tp_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
lsa->l2tp_flowinfo = 0;
lsa->l2tp_scope_id = 0;
if (ipv6_addr_type(&lsa->l2tp_addr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL)
lsa->l2tp_scope_id = IP6CB(skb)->iif;
}
if (np->rxopt.all)
ip6_datagram_recv_ctl(sk, msg, skb);
if (flags & MSG_TRUNC)
copied = skb->len;
done:
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
out:
return err ? err : copied;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The l2tp_ip6_recvmsg function in net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9-rc7 does not initialize a certain structure member, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted recvmsg or recvfrom system call.
Commit Message: l2tp: fix info leak in l2tp_ip6_recvmsg()
The L2TP code for IPv6 fails to initialize the l2tp_conn_id member of
struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 and therefore leaks four bytes kernel stack
in l2tp_ip6_recvmsg() in case msg_name is set.
Initialize l2tp_conn_id with 0 to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,037 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: get_cred_handler(Service * /*service*/, int /*i*/, Stream *stream) {
char * name = NULL;
int rtnVal = FALSE;
bool found_cred=false;
CredentialWrapper * cred = NULL;
char * owner = NULL;
const char * user = NULL;
void * data = NULL;
ReliSock * socket = (ReliSock*)stream;
if (!socket->triedAuthentication()) {
CondorError errstack;
if( ! SecMan::authenticate_sock(socket, READ, &errstack) ) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Unable to authenticate, qutting\n");
goto EXIT;
}
}
socket->decode();
if (!socket->code(name)) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Error receiving credential name\n");
goto EXIT;
}
user = socket->getFullyQualifiedUser();
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Authenticated as %s\n", user);
if (strchr (name, ':')) {
owner = strdup (name);
char * pColon = strchr (owner, ':');
*pColon = '\0';
sprintf (name, (char*)(pColon+sizeof(char)));
if (strcmp (owner, user) != 0) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Requesting another user's (%s) credential %s\n", owner, name);
if (!isSuperUser (user)) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "User %s is NOT super user, request DENIED\n", user);
goto EXIT;
} else {
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "User %s is super user, request GRANTED\n", user);
}
}
} else {
owner = strdup (user);
}
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "sending cred %s for user %s\n", name, owner);
credentials.Rewind();
while (credentials.Next(cred)) {
if (cred->cred->GetType() == X509_CREDENTIAL_TYPE) {
if ((strcmp(cred->cred->GetName(), name) == 0) &&
(strcmp(cred->cred->GetOwner(), owner) == 0)) {
found_cred=true;
break; // found it
}
}
}
socket->encode();
if (found_cred) {
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "Found cred %s\n", cred->GetStorageName());
int data_size;
int rc = LoadData (cred->GetStorageName(), data, data_size);
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "Credential::LoadData returned %d\n", rc);
if (rc == 0) {
goto EXIT;
}
socket->code (data_size);
socket->code_bytes (data, data_size);
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Credential name %s for owner %s returned to user %s\n",
name, owner, user);
}
else {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Cannot find cred %s\n", name);
int rc = CREDD_CREDENTIAL_NOT_FOUND;
socket->code (rc);
}
rtnVal = TRUE;
EXIT:
if ( name != NULL) {
free (name);
}
if ( owner != NULL) {
free (owner);
}
if ( data != NULL) {
free (data);
}
return rtnVal;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-134
Summary: Multiple format string vulnerabilities in Condor 7.2.0 through 7.6.4, and possibly certain 7.7.x versions, as used in Red Hat MRG Grid and possibly other products, allow local users to cause a denial of service (condor_schedd daemon and failure to launch jobs) and possibly execute arbitrary code via format string specifiers in (1) the reason for a hold for a job that uses an XML user log, (2) the filename of a file to be transferred, and possibly other unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,371 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xmlParseEntityDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
const xmlChar *name = NULL;
xmlChar *value = NULL;
xmlChar *URI = NULL, *literal = NULL;
const xmlChar *ndata = NULL;
int isParameter = 0;
xmlChar *orig = NULL;
int skipped;
/* GROW; done in the caller */
if (CMP8(CUR_PTR, '<', '!', 'E', 'N', 'T', 'I', 'T', 'Y')) {
xmlParserInputPtr input = ctxt->input;
SHRINK;
SKIP(8);
skipped = SKIP_BLANKS;
if (skipped == 0) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"Space required after '<!ENTITY'\n");
}
if (RAW == '%') {
NEXT;
skipped = SKIP_BLANKS;
if (skipped == 0) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"Space required after '%'\n");
}
isParameter = 1;
}
name = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if (name == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_REQUIRED,
"xmlParseEntityDecl: no name\n");
return;
}
if (xmlStrchr(name, ':') != NULL) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_COLON,
"colon are forbidden from entities names '%s'\n",
name, NULL, NULL);
}
skipped = SKIP_BLANKS;
if (skipped == 0) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"Space required after the entity name\n");
}
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_ENTITY_DECL;
/*
* handle the various case of definitions...
*/
if (isParameter) {
if ((RAW == '"') || (RAW == '\'')) {
value = xmlParseEntityValue(ctxt, &orig);
if (value) {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX) && (ctxt->sax->entityDecl != NULL))
ctxt->sax->entityDecl(ctxt->userData, name,
XML_INTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY,
NULL, NULL, value);
}
} else {
URI = xmlParseExternalID(ctxt, &literal, 1);
if ((URI == NULL) && (literal == NULL)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_VALUE_REQUIRED, NULL);
}
if (URI) {
xmlURIPtr uri;
uri = xmlParseURI((const char *) URI);
if (uri == NULL) {
xmlErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INVALID_URI,
"Invalid URI: %s\n", URI);
/*
* This really ought to be a well formedness error
* but the XML Core WG decided otherwise c.f. issue
* E26 of the XML erratas.
*/
} else {
if (uri->fragment != NULL) {
/*
* Okay this is foolish to block those but not
* invalid URIs.
*/
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_URI_FRAGMENT, NULL);
} else {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX) &&
(ctxt->sax->entityDecl != NULL))
ctxt->sax->entityDecl(ctxt->userData, name,
XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY,
literal, URI, NULL);
}
xmlFreeURI(uri);
}
}
}
} else {
if ((RAW == '"') || (RAW == '\'')) {
value = xmlParseEntityValue(ctxt, &orig);
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX) && (ctxt->sax->entityDecl != NULL))
ctxt->sax->entityDecl(ctxt->userData, name,
XML_INTERNAL_GENERAL_ENTITY,
NULL, NULL, value);
/*
* For expat compatibility in SAX mode.
*/
if ((ctxt->myDoc == NULL) ||
(xmlStrEqual(ctxt->myDoc->version, SAX_COMPAT_MODE))) {
if (ctxt->myDoc == NULL) {
ctxt->myDoc = xmlNewDoc(SAX_COMPAT_MODE);
if (ctxt->myDoc == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, "New Doc failed");
return;
}
ctxt->myDoc->properties = XML_DOC_INTERNAL;
}
if (ctxt->myDoc->intSubset == NULL)
ctxt->myDoc->intSubset = xmlNewDtd(ctxt->myDoc,
BAD_CAST "fake", NULL, NULL);
xmlSAX2EntityDecl(ctxt, name, XML_INTERNAL_GENERAL_ENTITY,
NULL, NULL, value);
}
} else {
URI = xmlParseExternalID(ctxt, &literal, 1);
if ((URI == NULL) && (literal == NULL)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_VALUE_REQUIRED, NULL);
}
if (URI) {
xmlURIPtr uri;
uri = xmlParseURI((const char *)URI);
if (uri == NULL) {
xmlErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INVALID_URI,
"Invalid URI: %s\n", URI);
/*
* This really ought to be a well formedness error
* but the XML Core WG decided otherwise c.f. issue
* E26 of the XML erratas.
*/
} else {
if (uri->fragment != NULL) {
/*
* Okay this is foolish to block those but not
* invalid URIs.
*/
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_URI_FRAGMENT, NULL);
}
xmlFreeURI(uri);
}
}
if ((RAW != '>') && (!IS_BLANK_CH(CUR))) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"Space required before 'NDATA'\n");
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (CMP5(CUR_PTR, 'N', 'D', 'A', 'T', 'A')) {
SKIP(5);
if (!IS_BLANK_CH(CUR)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"Space required after 'NDATA'\n");
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
ndata = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (!ctxt->disableSAX) &&
(ctxt->sax->unparsedEntityDecl != NULL))
ctxt->sax->unparsedEntityDecl(ctxt->userData, name,
literal, URI, ndata);
} else {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX) && (ctxt->sax->entityDecl != NULL))
ctxt->sax->entityDecl(ctxt->userData, name,
XML_EXTERNAL_GENERAL_PARSED_ENTITY,
literal, URI, NULL);
/*
* For expat compatibility in SAX mode.
* assuming the entity repalcement was asked for
*/
if ((ctxt->replaceEntities != 0) &&
((ctxt->myDoc == NULL) ||
(xmlStrEqual(ctxt->myDoc->version, SAX_COMPAT_MODE)))) {
if (ctxt->myDoc == NULL) {
ctxt->myDoc = xmlNewDoc(SAX_COMPAT_MODE);
if (ctxt->myDoc == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, "New Doc failed");
return;
}
ctxt->myDoc->properties = XML_DOC_INTERNAL;
}
if (ctxt->myDoc->intSubset == NULL)
ctxt->myDoc->intSubset = xmlNewDtd(ctxt->myDoc,
BAD_CAST "fake", NULL, NULL);
xmlSAX2EntityDecl(ctxt, name,
XML_EXTERNAL_GENERAL_PARSED_ENTITY,
literal, URI, NULL);
}
}
}
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (RAW != '>') {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_NOT_FINISHED,
"xmlParseEntityDecl: entity %s not terminated\n", name);
} else {
if (input != ctxt->input) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_BOUNDARY,
"Entity declaration doesn't start and stop in the same entity\n");
}
NEXT;
}
if (orig != NULL) {
/*
* Ugly mechanism to save the raw entity value.
*/
xmlEntityPtr cur = NULL;
if (isParameter) {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->getParameterEntity != NULL))
cur = ctxt->sax->getParameterEntity(ctxt->userData, name);
} else {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->getEntity != NULL))
cur = ctxt->sax->getEntity(ctxt->userData, name);
if ((cur == NULL) && (ctxt->userData==ctxt)) {
cur = xmlSAX2GetEntity(ctxt, name);
}
}
if (cur != NULL) {
if (cur->orig != NULL)
xmlFree(orig);
else
cur->orig = orig;
} else
xmlFree(orig);
}
if (value != NULL) xmlFree(value);
if (URI != NULL) xmlFree(URI);
if (literal != NULL) xmlFree(literal);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,288 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t MPEG4Extractor::parseChunk(off64_t *offset, int depth) {
ALOGV("entering parseChunk %lld/%d", *offset, depth);
uint32_t hdr[2];
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, hdr, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t chunk_size = ntohl(hdr[0]);
uint32_t chunk_type = ntohl(hdr[1]);
off64_t data_offset = *offset + 8;
if (chunk_size == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset + 8, &chunk_size, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
chunk_size = ntoh64(chunk_size);
data_offset += 8;
if (chunk_size < 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else if (chunk_size == 0) {
if (depth == 0) {
off64_t sourceSize;
if (mDataSource->getSize(&sourceSize) == OK) {
chunk_size = (sourceSize - *offset);
} else {
ALOGE("atom size is 0, and data source has no size");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else {
*offset += 4;
return OK;
}
} else if (chunk_size < 8) {
ALOGE("invalid chunk size: %" PRIu64, chunk_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char chunk[5];
MakeFourCCString(chunk_type, chunk);
ALOGV("chunk: %s @ %lld, %d", chunk, *offset, depth);
#if 0
static const char kWhitespace[] = " ";
const char *indent = &kWhitespace[sizeof(kWhitespace) - 1 - 2 * depth];
printf("%sfound chunk '%s' of size %" PRIu64 "\n", indent, chunk, chunk_size);
char buffer[256];
size_t n = chunk_size;
if (n > sizeof(buffer)) {
n = sizeof(buffer);
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer, n)
< (ssize_t)n) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
hexdump(buffer, n);
#endif
PathAdder autoAdder(&mPath, chunk_type);
off64_t chunk_data_size = *offset + chunk_size - data_offset;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'p', 'r', 't')
&& chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r')
&& mPath.size() == 5 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return OK;
}
switch(chunk_type) {
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k'):
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'i', 'a'):
case FOURCC('m', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('d', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l'):
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'e', 'x'):
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'f'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'f'):
case FOURCC('m', 'f', 'r', 'a'):
case FOURCC('u', 'd', 't', 'a'):
case FOURCC('i', 'l', 's', 't'):
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 'c', 'h', 'i'):
case FOURCC('e', 'd', 't', 's'):
{
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l')) {
ALOGV("sampleTable chunk is %" PRIu64 " bytes long.", chunk_size);
if (mDataSource->flags()
& (DataSource::kWantsPrefetching
| DataSource::kIsCachingDataSource)) {
sp<MPEG4DataSource> cachedSource =
new MPEG4DataSource(mDataSource);
if (cachedSource->setCachedRange(*offset, chunk_size) == OK) {
mDataSource = cachedSource;
}
}
mLastTrack->sampleTable = new SampleTable(mDataSource);
}
bool isTrack = false;
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k')) {
isTrack = true;
Track *track = new Track;
track->next = NULL;
if (mLastTrack) {
mLastTrack->next = track;
} else {
mFirstTrack = track;
}
mLastTrack = track;
track->meta = new MetaData;
track->includes_expensive_metadata = false;
track->skipTrack = false;
track->timescale = 0;
track->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, "application/octet-stream");
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (isTrack) {
if (mLastTrack->skipTrack) {
Track *cur = mFirstTrack;
if (cur == mLastTrack) {
delete cur;
mFirstTrack = mLastTrack = NULL;
} else {
while (cur && cur->next != mLastTrack) {
cur = cur->next;
}
cur->next = NULL;
delete mLastTrack;
mLastTrack = cur;
}
return OK;
}
status_t err = verifyTrack(mLastTrack);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
} else if (chunk_type == FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v')) {
mInitCheck = OK;
if (!mIsDrm) {
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // Return a dummy error.
} else {
return OK;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 'l', 's', 't'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &version, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t entry_count;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &entry_count)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (entry_count != 1) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list with %d entries", entry_count);
} else if (mHeaderTimescale == 0) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list because timescale is 0");
} else {
off64_t entriesoffset = data_offset + 8;
uint64_t segment_duration;
int64_t media_time;
if (version == 1) {
if (!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset, &segment_duration) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset + 8, (uint64_t*)&media_time)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
} else if (version == 0) {
uint32_t sd;
int32_t mt;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset, &sd) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset + 4, (uint32_t*)&mt)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
segment_duration = sd;
media_time = mt;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t halfscale = mHeaderTimescale / 2;
segment_duration = (segment_duration * 1000000 + halfscale)/ mHeaderTimescale;
media_time = (media_time * 1000000 + halfscale) / mHeaderTimescale;
int64_t duration;
int32_t samplerate;
if (!mLastTrack) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &duration) &&
mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeySampleRate, &samplerate)) {
int64_t delay = (media_time * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderDelay, delay);
int64_t paddingus = duration - (segment_duration + media_time);
if (paddingus < 0) {
paddingus = 0;
}
int64_t paddingsamples = (paddingus * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderPadding, paddingsamples);
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('f', 'r', 'm', 'a'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint32_t original_fourcc;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &original_fourcc, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
original_fourcc = ntohl(original_fourcc);
ALOGV("read original format: %d", original_fourcc);
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(original_fourcc));
uint32_t num_channels = 0;
uint32_t sample_rate = 0;
if (AdjustChannelsAndRate(original_fourcc, &num_channels, &sample_rate)) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'e', 'n', 'c'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_size < 32) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buf[4];
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, buf + 1, 3) < 3) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultAlgorithmId = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if (defaultAlgorithmId > 1) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 7, buf + 3, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultIVSize = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if ((defaultAlgorithmId == 0 && defaultIVSize != 0) ||
(defaultAlgorithmId != 0 && defaultIVSize == 0)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else if (defaultIVSize != 0 &&
defaultIVSize != 8 &&
defaultIVSize != 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t defaultKeyId[16];
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 8, &defaultKeyId, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoMode, defaultAlgorithmId);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoDefaultIVSize, defaultIVSize);
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyCryptoKey, 'tenc', defaultKeyId, 16);
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'k', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err;
if ((err = parseTrackHeader(data_offset, chunk_data_size)) != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('p', 's', 's', 'h'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
PsshInfo pssh;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, &pssh.uuid, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t psshdatalen = 0;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 20, &psshdatalen, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
pssh.datalen = ntohl(psshdatalen);
ALOGV("pssh data size: %d", pssh.datalen);
if (pssh.datalen + 20 > chunk_size) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
pssh.data = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[pssh.datalen];
if (pssh.data == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
ALOGV("allocated pssh @ %p", pssh.data);
ssize_t requested = (ssize_t) pssh.datalen;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 24, pssh.data, requested) < requested) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mPssh.push_back(pssh);
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 4 || mLastTrack == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, &version, sizeof(version))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(version)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
off64_t timescale_offset;
if (version == 1) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 16;
} else if (version == 0) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 8;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t timescale;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset, ×cale, sizeof(timescale))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(timescale)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->timescale = ntohl(timescale);
int64_t duration = 0;
if (version == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration, sizeof(duration))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (duration != -1) {
duration = ntoh64(duration);
}
} else {
uint32_t duration32;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration32, sizeof(duration32))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration32)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (duration32 != 0xffffffff) {
duration = ntohl(duration32);
}
}
if (duration != 0) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt64(
kKeyDuration, (duration * 1000000) / mLastTrack->timescale);
}
uint8_t lang[2];
off64_t lang_offset;
if (version == 1) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 8;
} else if (version == 0) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 4;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(lang_offset, &lang, sizeof(lang))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(lang)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
char lang_code[4];
lang_code[0] = ((lang[0] >> 2) & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[1] = ((lang[0] & 0x3) << 3 | (lang[1] >> 5)) + 0x60;
lang_code[2] = (lang[1] & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[3] = '\0';
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(
kKeyMediaLanguage, lang_code);
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'd'):
{
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[8];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t entry_count = U32_AT(&buffer[4]);
if (entry_count > 1) {
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (strcasecmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP) &&
strcasecmp(mime, "application/octet-stream")) {
mLastTrack->skipTrack = true;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + 8;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < entry_count; ++i) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'm', 'r'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'w', 'b'):
{
uint8_t buffer[8 + 20];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint32_t num_channels = U16_AT(&buffer[16]);
uint16_t sample_size = U16_AT(&buffer[18]);
uint32_t sample_rate = U32_AT(&buffer[24]) >> 16;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
AdjustChannelsAndRate(chunk_type, &num_channels, &sample_rate);
}
ALOGV("*** coding='%s' %d channels, size %d, rate %d\n",
chunk, num_channels, sample_size, sample_rate);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'v'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v'):
case FOURCC('s', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('H', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('h', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', '1'):
case FOURCC('h', 'v', 'c', '1'):
case FOURCC('h', 'e', 'v', '1'):
{
mHasVideo = true;
uint8_t buffer[78];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint16_t width = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 18]);
uint16_t height = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 20]);
if (width == 0) width = 352;
if (height == 0) height = 288;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyWidth, width);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyHeight, height);
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'c', 'o'):
case FOURCC('c', 'o', '6', '4'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setChunkOffsetParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'c'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleToChunkParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'z'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'z', '2'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleSizeParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
size_t max_size;
err = mLastTrack->sampleTable->getMaxSampleSize(&max_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
if (max_size != 0) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size + 10 * 2);
} else {
int32_t width, height;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyWidth, &width) ||
!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyHeight, &height)) {
ALOGE("No width or height, assuming worst case 1080p");
width = 1920;
height = 1080;
}
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strcmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_AVC)) {
max_size = ((width + 15) / 16) * ((height + 15) / 16) * 192;
} else {
max_size = width * height * 3 / 2;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size);
}
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strncasecmp("video/", mime, 6)) {
size_t nSamples = mLastTrack->sampleTable->countSamples();
int64_t durationUs;
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &durationUs)) {
if (durationUs > 0) {
int32_t frameRate = (nSamples * 1000000LL +
(durationUs >> 1)) / durationUs;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyFrameRate, frameRate);
}
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 't', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 't', 't', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setCompositionTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSyncSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('\xA9', 'x', 'y', 'z'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buffer[18];
off64_t location_length = chunk_data_size - 5;
if (location_length >= (off64_t) sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 4, buffer, location_length) < location_length) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
buffer[location_length] = '\0';
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyLocation, buffer);
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 's', 'd', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 4) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[256];
if (chunk_data_size > (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyESDS, kTypeESDS, &buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (mPath.size() >= 2
&& mPath[mPath.size() - 2] == FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a')) {
status_t err = updateAudioTrackInfoFromESDS_MPEG4Audio(
&buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', 'C'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyAVCC, kTypeAVCC, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size);
break;
}
case FOURCC('h', 'v', 'c', 'C'):
{
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyHVCC, kTypeHVCC, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('d', '2', '6', '3'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
/*
* d263 contains a fixed 7 bytes part:
* vendor - 4 bytes
* version - 1 byte
* level - 1 byte
* profile - 1 byte
* optionally, "d263" box itself may contain a 16-byte
* bit rate box (bitr)
* average bit rate - 4 bytes
* max bit rate - 4 bytes
*/
char buffer[23];
if (chunk_data_size != 7 &&
chunk_data_size != 23) {
ALOGE("Incorrect D263 box size %lld", chunk_data_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyD263, kTypeD263, buffer, chunk_data_size);
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 't', 'a'):
{
uint8_t buffer[4];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 4) < 4) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return OK;
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 'a', 'n'):
case FOURCC('n', 'a', 'm', 'e'):
case FOURCC('d', 'a', 't', 'a'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mPath.size() == 6 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
status_t err = parseITunesMetaData(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 32) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[32];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t creationTime;
uint64_t duration = 0;
if (header[0] == 1) {
creationTime = U64_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[20]);
duration = U64_AT(&header[24]);
if (duration == 0xffffffffffffffff) {
duration = 0;
}
} else if (header[0] != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else {
creationTime = U32_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[12]);
uint32_t d32 = U32_AT(&header[16]);
if (d32 == 0xffffffff) {
d32 = 0;
}
duration = d32;
}
if (duration != 0) {
mFileMetaData->setInt64(kKeyDuration, duration * 1000000 / mHeaderTimescale);
}
String8 s;
convertTimeToDate(creationTime, &s);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyDate, s.string());
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t flags[4];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, flags, sizeof(flags))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t duration = 0;
if (flags[0] == 1) {
if (chunk_data_size < 12) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mDataSource->getUInt64(data_offset + 4, &duration);
if (duration == 0xffffffffffffffff) {
duration = 0;
}
} else if (flags[0] == 0) {
uint32_t d32;
mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &d32);
if (d32 == 0xffffffff) {
d32 = 0;
}
duration = d32;
} else {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (duration != 0) {
mFileMetaData->setInt64(kKeyDuration, duration * 1000000 / mHeaderTimescale);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'a', 't'):
{
ALOGV("mdat chunk, drm: %d", mIsDrm);
if (!mIsDrm) {
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
if (chunk_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return parseDrmSINF(offset, data_offset);
}
case FOURCC('h', 'd', 'l', 'r'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint32_t buffer;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 8, &buffer, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t type = ntohl(buffer);
if (type == FOURCC('t', 'e', 'x', 't') || type == FOURCC('s', 'b', 't', 'l')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'e', 'x'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 24) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t duration;
Trex trex;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &trex.track_ID) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 8, &trex.default_sample_description_index) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 12, &trex.default_sample_duration) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 16, &trex.default_sample_size) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 20, &trex.default_sample_flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mTrex.add(trex);
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'x', '3', 'g'):
{
uint32_t type;
const void *data;
size_t size = 0;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findData(
kKeyTextFormatData, &type, &data, &size)) {
size = 0;
}
if (SIZE_MAX - chunk_size <= size) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t *buffer = new uint8_t[size + chunk_size];
if (buffer == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (size > 0) {
memcpy(buffer, data, size);
}
if ((size_t)(mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer + size, chunk_size))
< chunk_size) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyTextFormatData, 0, buffer, size + chunk_size);
delete[] buffer;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mFileMetaData != NULL) {
ALOGV("chunk_data_size = %lld and data_offset = %lld",
chunk_data_size, data_offset);
if (chunk_data_size >= SIZE_MAX - 1) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size + 1);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) != (ssize_t)chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
const int kSkipBytesOfDataBox = 16;
if (chunk_data_size <= kSkipBytesOfDataBox) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mFileMetaData->setData(
kKeyAlbumArt, MetaData::TYPE_NONE,
buffer->data() + kSkipBytesOfDataBox, chunk_data_size - kSkipBytesOfDataBox);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'i', 't', 'l'):
case FOURCC('p', 'e', 'r', 'f'):
case FOURCC('a', 'u', 't', 'h'):
case FOURCC('g', 'n', 'r', 'e'):
case FOURCC('a', 'l', 'b', 'm'):
case FOURCC('y', 'r', 'r', 'c'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err = parse3GPPMetaData(data_offset, chunk_data_size, depth);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('I', 'D', '3', '2'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 6) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
parseID3v2MetaData(data_offset + 6);
break;
}
case FOURCC('-', '-', '-', '-'):
{
mLastCommentMean.clear();
mLastCommentName.clear();
mLastCommentData.clear();
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'd', 'x'):
{
parseSegmentIndex(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // stop parsing after sidx
}
default:
{
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer underflow in the MPEG4Extractor::parseChunk function in MPEG4Extractor.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48M allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via crafted MPEG-4 data, aka internal bug 23034759. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2015-3824.
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor.cpp: handle chunk_size > SIZE_MAX
chunk_size is a uint64_t, so it can legitimately be bigger
than SIZE_MAX, which would cause the subtraction to underflow.
https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=182251
Bug: 23034759
Change-Id: Ic1637fb26bf6edb0feb1bcf2876fd370db1ed547
| High | 173,340 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void AutofillManager::OnQueryFormFieldAutofillImpl(
int query_id,
const FormData& form,
const FormFieldData& field,
const gfx::RectF& transformed_box,
bool autoselect_first_suggestion) {
external_delegate_->OnQuery(query_id, form, field, transformed_box);
std::vector<Suggestion> suggestions;
SuggestionsContext context;
GetAvailableSuggestions(form, field, &suggestions, &context);
if (context.is_autofill_available) {
switch (context.suppress_reason) {
case SuppressReason::kNotSuppressed:
break;
case SuppressReason::kCreditCardsAblation:
enable_ablation_logging_ = true;
autocomplete_history_manager_->CancelPendingQuery();
external_delegate_->OnSuggestionsReturned(query_id, suggestions,
autoselect_first_suggestion);
return;
case SuppressReason::kAutocompleteOff:
return;
}
if (!suggestions.empty()) {
if (context.is_filling_credit_card) {
AutofillMetrics::LogIsQueriedCreditCardFormSecure(
context.is_context_secure);
}
if (!has_logged_address_suggestions_count_ &&
!context.section_has_autofilled_field) {
AutofillMetrics::LogAddressSuggestionsCount(suggestions.size());
has_logged_address_suggestions_count_ = true;
}
}
}
if (suggestions.empty() && !ShouldShowCreditCardSigninPromo(form, field) &&
field.should_autocomplete &&
!(context.focused_field &&
(IsCreditCardExpirationType(
context.focused_field->Type().GetStorableType()) ||
context.focused_field->Type().html_type() == HTML_TYPE_UNRECOGNIZED ||
context.focused_field->Type().GetStorableType() ==
CREDIT_CARD_NUMBER ||
context.focused_field->Type().GetStorableType() ==
CREDIT_CARD_VERIFICATION_CODE))) {
autocomplete_history_manager_->OnGetAutocompleteSuggestions(
query_id, field.name, field.value, field.form_control_type);
return;
}
autocomplete_history_manager_->CancelPendingQuery();
external_delegate_->OnSuggestionsReturned(query_id, suggestions,
autoselect_first_suggestion,
context.is_all_server_suggestions);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID:
Summary: Unsafe handling of credit card details in Autofill in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to obtain potentially sensitive information from process memory via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315} | Low | 173,200 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void HistoryController::UpdateForCommit(RenderFrameImpl* frame,
const WebHistoryItem& item,
WebHistoryCommitType commit_type,
bool navigation_within_page) {
switch (commit_type) {
case blink::WebBackForwardCommit:
if (!provisional_entry_)
return;
current_entry_.reset(provisional_entry_.release());
if (HistoryEntry::HistoryNode* node =
current_entry_->GetHistoryNodeForFrame(frame)) {
node->set_item(item);
}
break;
case blink::WebStandardCommit:
CreateNewBackForwardItem(frame, item, navigation_within_page);
break;
case blink::WebInitialCommitInChildFrame:
UpdateForInitialLoadInChildFrame(frame, item);
break;
case blink::WebHistoryInertCommit:
if (current_entry_) {
if (HistoryEntry::HistoryNode* node =
current_entry_->GetHistoryNodeForFrame(frame)) {
if (!navigation_within_page)
node->RemoveChildren();
node->set_item(item);
}
}
break;
default:
NOTREACHED() << "Invalid commit type: " << commit_type;
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: The HistoryController::UpdateForCommit function in content/renderer/history_controller.cc in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.94 mishandles the interaction between subframe forward navigations and other forward navigations, which allows remote attackers to spoof the address bar via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Fix HistoryEntry corruption when commit isn't for provisional entry.
BUG=597322
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1848103004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#384659} | Medium | 172,565 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int sysMapFile(const char* fn, MemMapping* pMap)
{
memset(pMap, 0, sizeof(*pMap));
if (fn && fn[0] == '@') {
FILE* mapf = fopen(fn+1, "r");
if (mapf == NULL) {
LOGV("Unable to open '%s': %s\n", fn+1, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (sysMapBlockFile(mapf, pMap) != 0) {
LOGW("Map of '%s' failed\n", fn);
return -1;
}
fclose(mapf);
} else {
int fd = open(fn, O_RDONLY, 0);
if (fd < 0) {
LOGE("Unable to open '%s': %s\n", fn, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (sysMapFD(fd, pMap) != 0) {
LOGE("Map of '%s' failed\n", fn);
close(fd);
return -1;
}
close(fd);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in minzip/SysUtil.c in the Recovery Procedure in Android 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 allow attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 26960931.
Commit Message: Fix integer overflows in recovery procedure.
Bug: 26960931
Change-Id: Ieae45caccfb4728fcf514f0d920976585d8e6caf
(cherry picked from commit 4f2df162c6ab4a71ca86e4b38735b681729c353b)
| High | 173,905 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::CheckFramebufferValid(
Framebuffer* framebuffer,
GLenum target, const char* func_name) {
if (!framebuffer) {
if (backbuffer_needs_clear_bits_) {
glClearColor(0, 0, 0, (GLES2Util::GetChannelsForFormat(
offscreen_target_color_format_) & 0x0008) != 0 ? 0 : 1);
state_.SetDeviceColorMask(GL_TRUE, GL_TRUE, GL_TRUE, GL_TRUE);
glClearStencil(0);
state_.SetDeviceStencilMaskSeparate(GL_FRONT, -1);
state_.SetDeviceStencilMaskSeparate(GL_BACK, -1);
glClearDepth(1.0f);
state_.SetDeviceDepthMask(GL_TRUE);
state_.SetDeviceCapabilityState(GL_SCISSOR_TEST, false);
glClear(backbuffer_needs_clear_bits_);
backbuffer_needs_clear_bits_ = 0;
RestoreClearState();
}
return true;
}
if (framebuffer_manager()->IsComplete(framebuffer)) {
return true;
}
GLenum completeness = framebuffer->IsPossiblyComplete();
if (completeness != GL_FRAMEBUFFER_COMPLETE) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_FRAMEBUFFER_OPERATION, func_name, "framebuffer incomplete");
return false;
}
if (renderbuffer_manager()->HaveUnclearedRenderbuffers() ||
texture_manager()->HaveUnclearedMips()) {
if (!framebuffer->IsCleared()) {
if (framebuffer->GetStatus(texture_manager(), target) !=
GL_FRAMEBUFFER_COMPLETE) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_FRAMEBUFFER_OPERATION, func_name,
"framebuffer incomplete (clear)");
return false;
}
ClearUnclearedAttachments(target, framebuffer);
}
}
if (!framebuffer_manager()->IsComplete(framebuffer)) {
if (framebuffer->GetStatus(texture_manager(), target) !=
GL_FRAMEBUFFER_COMPLETE) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_FRAMEBUFFER_OPERATION, func_name,
"framebuffer incomplete (check)");
return false;
}
framebuffer_manager()->MarkAsComplete(framebuffer);
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The WebGL implementation in Google Chrome before 37.0.2062.94 does not ensure that clear calls interact properly with the state of a draw buffer, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (read of uninitialized memory) via a crafted CANVAS element, related to gpu/command_buffer/service/framebuffer_manager.cc and gpu/command_buffer/service/gles2_cmd_decoder.cc.
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,657 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: dophn_exec(struct magic_set *ms, int clazz, int swap, int fd, off_t off,
int num, size_t size, off_t fsize, int *flags, int sh_num)
{
Elf32_Phdr ph32;
Elf64_Phdr ph64;
const char *linking_style = "statically";
const char *interp = "";
unsigned char nbuf[BUFSIZ];
char ibuf[BUFSIZ];
ssize_t bufsize;
size_t offset, align, len;
if (size != xph_sizeof) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", corrupted program header size") == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
for ( ; num; num--) {
if (pread(fd, xph_addr, xph_sizeof, off) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
off += size;
bufsize = 0;
align = 4;
/* Things we can determine before we seek */
switch (xph_type) {
case PT_DYNAMIC:
linking_style = "dynamically";
break;
case PT_NOTE:
if (sh_num) /* Did this through section headers */
continue;
if (((align = xph_align) & 0x80000000UL) != 0 ||
align < 4) {
if (file_printf(ms,
", invalid note alignment 0x%lx",
(unsigned long)align) == -1)
return -1;
align = 4;
}
/*FALLTHROUGH*/
case PT_INTERP:
len = xph_filesz < sizeof(nbuf) ? xph_filesz
: sizeof(nbuf);
bufsize = pread(fd, nbuf, len, xph_offset);
if (bufsize == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
break;
default:
if (fsize != SIZE_UNKNOWN && xph_offset > fsize) {
/* Maybe warn here? */
continue;
}
break;
}
/* Things we can determine when we seek */
switch (xph_type) {
case PT_INTERP:
if (bufsize && nbuf[0]) {
nbuf[bufsize - 1] = '\0';
interp = (const char *)nbuf;
} else
interp = "*empty*";
break;
case PT_NOTE:
/*
* This is a PT_NOTE section; loop through all the notes
* in the section.
*/
offset = 0;
for (;;) {
if (offset >= (size_t)bufsize)
break;
offset = donote(ms, nbuf, offset,
(size_t)bufsize, clazz, swap, align,
flags);
if (offset == 0)
break;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (file_printf(ms, ", %s linked", linking_style)
== -1)
return -1;
if (interp[0])
if (file_printf(ms, ", interpreter %s",
file_printable(ibuf, sizeof(ibuf), interp)) == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: readelf.c in file before 5.22, as used in the Fileinfo component in PHP before 5.4.37, 5.5.x before 5.5.21, and 5.6.x before 5.6.5, does not consider that pread calls sometimes read only a subset of the available data, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (uninitialized memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted ELF file.
Commit Message: Bail out on partial reads, from Alexander Cherepanov | High | 166,768 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
u_int padlen, need;
u_char *cp, macbuf[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
u_int maclen, aadlen = 0, authlen = 0, block_size;
struct sshenc *enc = NULL;
struct sshmac *mac = NULL;
struct sshcomp *comp = NULL;
int r;
*typep = SSH_MSG_NONE;
if (state->packet_discard)
return 0;
if (state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL) {
enc = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->enc;
mac = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->mac;
comp = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->comp;
/* disable mac for authenticated encryption */
if ((authlen = cipher_authlen(enc->cipher)) != 0)
mac = NULL;
}
maclen = mac && mac->enabled ? mac->mac_len : 0;
block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8;
aadlen = (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) || authlen ? 4 : 0;
if (aadlen && state->packlen == 0) {
if (cipher_get_length(&state->receive_context,
&state->packlen, state->p_read.seqnr,
sshbuf_ptr(state->input), sshbuf_len(state->input)) != 0)
return 0;
if (state->packlen < 1 + 4 ||
state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) {
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr);
#endif
logit("Bad packet length %u.", state->packlen);
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Packet corrupt")) != 0)
return r;
}
sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
} else if (state->packlen == 0) {
* check if input size is less than the cipher block size,
* decrypt first block and extract length of incoming packet
*/
if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < block_size)
return 0;
sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, block_size,
&cp)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = cipher_crypt(&state->receive_context,
state->p_send.seqnr, cp, sshbuf_ptr(state->input),
block_size, 0, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
state->packlen = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet));
if (state->packlen < 1 + 4 ||
state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) {
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "input: \n");
sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr);
fprintf(stderr, "incoming_packet: \n");
sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr);
#endif
logit("Bad packet length %u.", state->packlen);
return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac,
state->packlen, PACKET_MAX_SIZE);
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, block_size)) != 0)
goto out;
}
DBG(debug("input: packet len %u", state->packlen+4));
if (aadlen) {
/* only the payload is encrypted */
need = state->packlen;
} else {
/*
* the payload size and the payload are encrypted, but we
* have a partial packet of block_size bytes
*/
need = 4 + state->packlen - block_size;
}
DBG(debug("partial packet: block %d, need %d, maclen %d, authlen %d,"
" aadlen %d", block_size, need, maclen, authlen, aadlen));
if (need % block_size != 0) {
logit("padding error: need %d block %d mod %d",
need, block_size, need % block_size);
return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac,
state->packlen, PACKET_MAX_SIZE - block_size);
}
/*
* check if the entire packet has been received and
* decrypt into incoming_packet:
* 'aadlen' bytes are unencrypted, but authenticated.
* 'need' bytes are encrypted, followed by either
* 'authlen' bytes of authentication tag or
* 'maclen' bytes of message authentication code.
*/
if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < aadlen + need + authlen + maclen)
return 0;
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "read_poll enc/full: ");
sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr);
#endif
/* EtM: compute mac over encrypted input */
if (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) {
if ((r = mac_compute(mac, state->p_read.seqnr,
sshbuf_ptr(state->input), aadlen + need,
macbuf, sizeof(macbuf))) != 0)
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, aadlen + need,
&cp)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = cipher_crypt(&state->receive_context, state->p_read.seqnr, cp,
sshbuf_ptr(state->input), need, aadlen, authlen)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, aadlen + need + authlen)) != 0)
goto out;
/*
* compute MAC over seqnr and packet,
* increment sequence number for incoming packet
*/
if (mac && mac->enabled) {
if (!mac->etm)
if ((r = mac_compute(mac, state->p_read.seqnr,
sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet),
sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet),
macbuf, sizeof(macbuf))) != 0)
goto out;
if (timingsafe_bcmp(macbuf, sshbuf_ptr(state->input),
mac->mac_len) != 0) {
logit("Corrupted MAC on input.");
if (need > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac,
state->packlen, PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need);
}
DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", state->p_read.seqnr));
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, mac->mac_len)) != 0)
goto out;
}
if (seqnr_p != NULL)
*seqnr_p = state->p_read.seqnr;
if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0)
logit("incoming seqnr wraps around");
if (++state->p_read.packets == 0)
if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
state->p_read.blocks += (state->packlen + 4) / block_size;
state->p_read.bytes += state->packlen + 4;
/* get padlen */
padlen = sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet)[4];
DBG(debug("input: padlen %d", padlen));
if (padlen < 4) {
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
"Corrupted padlen %d on input.", padlen)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
}
/* skip packet size + padlen, discard padding */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->incoming_packet, 4 + 1)) != 0 ||
((r = sshbuf_consume_end(state->incoming_packet, padlen)) != 0))
goto out;
DBG(debug("input: len before de-compress %zd",
sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet)));
if (comp && comp->enabled) {
sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer);
if ((r = uncompress_buffer(ssh, state->incoming_packet,
state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
goto out;
sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->incoming_packet,
state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
goto out;
DBG(debug("input: len after de-compress %zd",
sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet)));
}
/*
* get packet type, implies consume.
* return length of payload (without type field)
*/
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, typep)) != 0)
goto out;
if (*typep < SSH2_MSG_MIN || *typep >= SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MIN) {
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
"Invalid ssh2 packet type: %d", *typep)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN);
else if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && !state->server_side)
r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh);
else
r = 0;
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "read/plain[%d]:\r\n", *typep);
sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr);
#endif
/* reset for next packet */
state->packlen = 0;
out:
return r;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The ssh_packet_read_poll2 function in packet.c in OpenSSH before 7.1p2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and application crash) via crafted network traffic.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,219 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: v8::Local<v8::Object> V8Console::createCommandLineAPI(InspectedContext* inspectedContext)
{
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = inspectedContext->context();
v8::Isolate* isolate = context->GetIsolate();
v8::MicrotasksScope microtasksScope(isolate, v8::MicrotasksScope::kDoNotRunMicrotasks);
v8::Local<v8::Object> commandLineAPI = v8::Object::New(isolate);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "dir", V8Console::dirCallback, "function dir(value) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "dirxml", V8Console::dirxmlCallback, "function dirxml(value) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "profile", V8Console::profileCallback, "function profile(title) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "profileEnd", V8Console::profileEndCallback, "function profileEnd(title) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "clear", V8Console::clearCallback, "function clear() { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "table", V8Console::tableCallback, "function table(data, [columns]) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "keys", V8Console::keysCallback, "function keys(object) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "values", V8Console::valuesCallback, "function values(object) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "debug", V8Console::debugFunctionCallback, "function debug(function) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "undebug", V8Console::undebugFunctionCallback, "function undebug(function) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "monitor", V8Console::monitorFunctionCallback, "function monitor(function) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "unmonitor", V8Console::unmonitorFunctionCallback, "function unmonitor(function) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "inspect", V8Console::inspectCallback, "function inspect(object) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "copy", V8Console::copyCallback, "function copy(value) { [Command Line API] }");
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "$_", V8Console::lastEvaluationResultCallback);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "$0", V8Console::inspectedObject0);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "$1", V8Console::inspectedObject1);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "$2", V8Console::inspectedObject2);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "$3", V8Console::inspectedObject3);
createBoundFunctionProperty(context, commandLineAPI, "$4", V8Console::inspectedObject4);
inspectedContext->inspector()->client()->installAdditionalCommandLineAPI(context, commandLineAPI);
commandLineAPI->SetPrivate(context, inspectedContextPrivateKey(isolate), v8::External::New(isolate, inspectedContext));
return commandLineAPI;
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in WebKit/Source/platform/v8_inspector/V8Debugger.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 53.0.2785.89 on Windows and OS X and before 53.0.2785.92 on Linux, allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML into the Developer Tools (aka DevTools) subsystem via a crafted web site, aka *Universal XSS (UXSS).*
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436} | Medium | 172,062 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PluginModule::InitAsProxiedNaCl(
scoped_ptr<PluginDelegate::OutOfProcessProxy> out_of_process_proxy,
PP_Instance instance) {
nacl_ipc_proxy_ = true;
InitAsProxied(out_of_process_proxy.release());
out_of_process_proxy_->AddInstance(instance);
PluginInstance* plugin_instance = host_globals->GetInstance(instance);
if (!plugin_instance)
return;
plugin_instance->ResetAsProxied();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving SVG text references.
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,745 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ssize_t socket_bytes_available(const socket_t *socket) {
assert(socket != NULL);
int size = 0;
if (ioctl(socket->fd, FIONREAD, &size) == -1)
return -1;
return size;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 173,485 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: virtual void TearDown() {
content::GetContentClient()->set_browser(old_browser_client_);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 does not use a dedicated process for the loading of links found on an internal page, which might allow attackers to bypass intended sandbox restrictions via a crafted page.
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,012 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void InputEngine::ProcessText(const std::string& message,
ProcessTextCallback callback) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED(); // Text message not used in the rulebased engine.
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: A use after free in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.133 for Linux, Windows, and Mac, and 57.0.2987.132 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: ime-service: Delete InputEngine.ProcessText.
It is deprecated and no longer used.
Bug: 1009903
Change-Id: I6774a4506bd0bb41a5d1a5909a40a2a781564b16
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1833029
Auto-Submit: Darren Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Chris Palmer <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Keith Lee <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Shu Chen <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Darren Shen <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#705445} | Medium | 172,406 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int mem_cgroup_count_precharge_pte_range(pmd_t *pmd,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
struct mm_walk *walk)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma = walk->private;
pte_t *pte;
spinlock_t *ptl;
split_huge_page_pmd(walk->mm, pmd);
pte = pte_offset_map_lock(vma->vm_mm, pmd, addr, &ptl);
for (; addr != end; pte++, addr += PAGE_SIZE)
if (is_target_pte_for_mc(vma, addr, *pte, NULL))
mc.precharge++; /* increment precharge temporarily */
pte_unmap_unlock(pte - 1, ptl);
cond_resched();
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Linux kernel before 3.3.1, when KVM is used, allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (host OS crash) by leveraging administrative access to the guest OS, related to the pmd_none_or_clear_bad function and page faults for huge pages.
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[[email protected]: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Salter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,631 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void LogoService::GetLogo(search_provider_logos::LogoObserver* observer) {
LogoCallbacks callbacks;
callbacks.on_cached_decoded_logo_available =
base::BindOnce(ObserverOnLogoAvailable, observer, true);
callbacks.on_fresh_decoded_logo_available =
base::BindOnce(ObserverOnLogoAvailable, observer, false);
GetLogo(std::move(callbacks));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The Google V8 engine, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 and QtWebEngineCore in Qt before 5.5.1, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or execute arbitrary code via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Local NTP: add smoke tests for doodles
Split LogoService into LogoService interface and LogoServiceImpl to make
it easier to provide fake data to the test.
Bug: 768419
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I84639189d2db1b24a2e139936c99369352bab587
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/690198
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Marc Treib <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Chris Pickel <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#505374} | High | 171,951 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void jpc_undo_roi(jas_matrix_t *x, int roishift, int bgshift, int numbps)
{
int i;
int j;
int thresh;
jpc_fix_t val;
jpc_fix_t mag;
bool warn;
uint_fast32_t mask;
if (roishift == 0 && bgshift == 0) {
return;
}
thresh = 1 << roishift;
warn = false;
for (i = 0; i < jas_matrix_numrows(x); ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < jas_matrix_numcols(x); ++j) {
val = jas_matrix_get(x, i, j);
mag = JAS_ABS(val);
if (mag >= thresh) {
/* We are dealing with ROI data. */
mag >>= roishift;
val = (val < 0) ? (-mag) : mag;
jas_matrix_set(x, i, j, val);
} else {
/* We are dealing with non-ROI (i.e., background) data. */
mag <<= bgshift;
mask = (1 << numbps) - 1;
/* Perform a basic sanity check on the sample value. */
/* Some implementations write garbage in the unused
most-significant bit planes introduced by ROI shifting.
Here we ensure that any such bits are masked off. */
if (mag & (~mask)) {
if (!warn) {
jas_eprintf("warning: possibly corrupt code stream\n");
warn = true;
}
mag &= mask;
}
val = (val < 0) ? (-mag) : mag;
jas_matrix_set(x, i, j, val);
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The jpc_tsfb_synthesize function in jpc_tsfb.c in JasPer before 1.900.9 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) via vectors involving an empty sequence.
Commit Message: Fixed an integral type promotion problem by adding a JAS_CAST.
Modified the jpc_tsfb_synthesize function so that it will be a noop for
an empty sequence (in order to avoid dereferencing a null pointer). | Medium | 168,477 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: mojom::AppPtr AppControllerImpl::CreateAppPtr(const apps::AppUpdate& update) {
auto app = chromeos::kiosk_next_home::mojom::App::New();
app->app_id = update.AppId();
app->type = update.AppType();
app->display_name = update.Name();
app->readiness = update.Readiness();
if (app->type == apps::mojom::AppType::kArc) {
app->android_package_name = MaybeGetAndroidPackageName(app->app_id);
}
return app;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A heap use after free in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.59 for Windows, Mac, and Linux; 54.0.2840.85 for Android allows a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via crafted PDF files.
Commit Message: Refactor the AppController implementation into a KeyedService.
This is necessary to guarantee that the AppController will not outlive
the AppServiceProxy, which could happen before during Profile destruction.
Bug: 945427
Change-Id: I9e2089799e38d5a70a4a9aa66df5319113e7809e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1542336
Reviewed-by: Michael Giuffrida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Lucas Tenório <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#645122} | Medium | 172,081 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: AP_CORE_DECLARE_NONSTD(const char *) ap_limit_section(cmd_parms *cmd,
void *dummy,
const char *arg)
{
const char *endp = ap_strrchr_c(arg, '>');
const char *limited_methods;
void *tog = cmd->cmd->cmd_data;
apr_int64_t limited = 0;
apr_int64_t old_limited = cmd->limited;
const char *errmsg;
if (endp == NULL) {
return unclosed_directive(cmd);
}
limited_methods = apr_pstrmemdup(cmd->temp_pool, arg, endp - arg);
if (!limited_methods[0]) {
return missing_container_arg(cmd);
}
while (limited_methods[0]) {
char *method = ap_getword_conf(cmd->temp_pool, &limited_methods);
int methnum;
/* check for builtin or module registered method number */
methnum = ap_method_number_of(method);
if (methnum == M_TRACE && !tog) {
return "TRACE cannot be controlled by <Limit>, see TraceEnable";
}
else if (methnum == M_INVALID) {
/* method has not been registered yet, but resource restriction
* is always checked before method handling, so register it.
*/
methnum = ap_method_register(cmd->pool,
apr_pstrdup(cmd->pool, method));
}
limited |= (AP_METHOD_BIT << methnum);
}
/* Killing two features with one function,
* if (tog == NULL) <Limit>, else <LimitExcept>
*/
limited = tog ? ~limited : limited;
if (!(old_limited & limited)) {
return apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool, cmd->cmd->name,
"> directive excludes all methods", NULL);
}
else if ((old_limited & limited) == old_limited) {
return apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool, cmd->cmd->name,
"> directive specifies methods already excluded",
NULL);
}
cmd->limited &= limited;
errmsg = ap_walk_config(cmd->directive->first_child, cmd, cmd->context);
cmd->limited = old_limited;
return errmsg;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Apache httpd allows remote attackers to read secret data from process memory if the Limit directive can be set in a user's .htaccess file, or if httpd.conf has certain misconfigurations, aka Optionsbleed. This affects the Apache HTTP Server through 2.2.34 and 2.4.x through 2.4.27. The attacker sends an unauthenticated OPTIONS HTTP request when attempting to read secret data. This is a use-after-free issue and thus secret data is not always sent, and the specific data depends on many factors including configuration. Exploitation with .htaccess can be blocked with a patch to the ap_limit_section function in server/core.c.
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68 | Medium | 168,085 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: fpAcc(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
tmsize_t stride = PredictorState(tif)->stride;
uint32 bps = tif->tif_dir.td_bitspersample / 8;
tmsize_t wc = cc / bps;
tmsize_t count = cc;
uint8 *cp = (uint8 *) cp0;
uint8 *tmp = (uint8 *)_TIFFmalloc(cc);
if(cc%(bps*stride)!=0)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, "fpAcc",
"%s", "cc%(bps*stride))!=0");
return 0;
}
if (!tmp)
return 0;
while (count > stride) {
REPEAT4(stride, cp[stride] =
(unsigned char) ((cp[stride] + cp[0]) & 0xff); cp++)
count -= stride;
}
_TIFFmemcpy(tmp, cp0, cc);
cp = (uint8 *) cp0;
for (count = 0; count < wc; count++) {
uint32 byte;
for (byte = 0; byte < bps; byte++) {
#if WORDS_BIGENDIAN
cp[bps * count + byte] = tmp[byte * wc + count];
#else
cp[bps * count + byte] =
tmp[(bps - byte - 1) * wc + count];
#endif
}
}
_TIFFfree(tmp);
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: tif_predict.h and tif_predict.c in libtiff 4.0.6 have assertions that can lead to assertion failures in debug mode, or buffer overflows in release mode, when dealing with unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105, aka *Predictor heap-buffer-overflow.*
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predic.c: fix memory leaks in error code paths added in
previous commit (fix for MSVR 35105) | High | 169,938 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int64 GetReceivedListPrefValue(size_t index) {
return ListPrefInt64Value(*received_update_, index);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the HTML5 Audio implementation in Google Chrome before 27.0.1453.110 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,324 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void file_sb_list_del(struct file *file)
{
if (!list_empty(&file->f_u.fu_list)) {
lg_local_lock_cpu(&files_lglock, file_list_cpu(file));
list_del_init(&file->f_u.fu_list);
lg_local_unlock_cpu(&files_lglock, file_list_cpu(file));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-17
Summary: The filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.13 performs certain operations on lists of files with an inappropriate locking approach, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (soft lockup or system crash) via unspecified use of Asynchronous I/O (AIO) operations.
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,799 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: poly_path(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
POLYGON *poly = PG_GETARG_POLYGON_P(0);
PATH *path;
int size;
int i;
size = offsetof(PATH, p[0]) +sizeof(path->p[0]) * poly->npts;
path = (PATH *) palloc(size);
SET_VARSIZE(path, size);
path->npts = poly->npts;
path->closed = TRUE;
/* prevent instability in unused pad bytes */
path->dummy = 0;
for (i = 0; i < poly->npts; i++)
{
path->p[i].x = poly->p[i].x;
path->p[i].y = poly->p[i].y;
}
PG_RETURN_PATH_P(path);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in contrib/hstore/hstore_io.c in PostgreSQL 9.0.x before 9.0.16, 9.1.x before 9.1.12, 9.2.x before 9.2.7, and 9.3.x before 9.3.3 allow remote authenticated users to have unspecified impact via vectors related to the (1) hstore_recv, (2) hstore_from_arrays, and (3) hstore_from_array functions in contrib/hstore/hstore_io.c; and the (4) hstoreArrayToPairs function in contrib/hstore/hstore_op.c, which triggers a buffer overflow. NOTE: this issue was SPLIT from CVE-2014-0064 because it has a different set of affected versions.
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064 | Medium | 166,412 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int v9fs_device_realize_common(V9fsState *s, Error **errp)
{
V9fsVirtioState *v = container_of(s, V9fsVirtioState, state);
int i, len;
struct stat stat;
FsDriverEntry *fse;
V9fsPath path;
int rc = 1;
/* initialize pdu allocator */
QLIST_INIT(&s->free_list);
QLIST_INIT(&s->active_list);
for (i = 0; i < (MAX_REQ - 1); i++) {
QLIST_INSERT_HEAD(&s->free_list, &v->pdus[i], next);
v->pdus[i].s = s;
v->pdus[i].idx = i;
}
v9fs_path_init(&path);
fse = get_fsdev_fsentry(s->fsconf.fsdev_id);
if (!fse) {
/* We don't have a fsdev identified by fsdev_id */
error_setg(errp, "9pfs device couldn't find fsdev with the "
"id = %s",
s->fsconf.fsdev_id ? s->fsconf.fsdev_id : "NULL");
goto out;
}
if (!s->fsconf.tag) {
/* we haven't specified a mount_tag */
error_setg(errp, "fsdev with id %s needs mount_tag arguments",
s->fsconf.fsdev_id);
goto out;
}
s->ctx.export_flags = fse->export_flags;
s->ctx.fs_root = g_strdup(fse->path);
s->ctx.exops.get_st_gen = NULL;
len = strlen(s->fsconf.tag);
if (len > MAX_TAG_LEN - 1) {
error_setg(errp, "mount tag '%s' (%d bytes) is longer than "
"maximum (%d bytes)", s->fsconf.tag, len, MAX_TAG_LEN - 1);
goto out;
}
s->tag = g_strdup(s->fsconf.tag);
s->ctx.uid = -1;
s->ops = fse->ops;
s->fid_list = NULL;
qemu_co_rwlock_init(&s->rename_lock);
if (s->ops->init(&s->ctx) < 0) {
error_setg(errp, "9pfs Failed to initialize fs-driver with id:%s"
" and export path:%s", s->fsconf.fsdev_id, s->ctx.fs_root);
goto out;
}
/*
* Check details of export path, We need to use fs driver
* call back to do that. Since we are in the init path, we don't
* use co-routines here.
*/
if (s->ops->name_to_path(&s->ctx, NULL, "/", &path) < 0) {
error_setg(errp,
"error in converting name to path %s", strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
if (s->ops->lstat(&s->ctx, &path, &stat)) {
error_setg(errp, "share path %s does not exist", fse->path);
goto out;
} else if (!S_ISDIR(stat.st_mode)) {
error_setg(errp, "share path %s is not a directory", fse->path);
goto out;
}
v9fs_path_free(&path);
rc = 0;
out:
if (rc) {
g_free(s->ctx.fs_root);
g_free(s->tag);
v9fs_path_free(&path);
}
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: Memory leak in the v9fs_device_unrealize_common function in hw/9pfs/9p.c in QEMU (aka Quick Emulator) allows local privileged guest OS users to cause a denial of service (host memory consumption and possibly QEMU process crash) via vectors involving the order of resource cleanup.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,895 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int i8042_start(struct serio *serio)
{
struct i8042_port *port = serio->port_data;
port->exists = true;
mb();
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: drivers/input/serio/i8042.c in the Linux kernel before 4.12.4 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact because the port->exists value can change after it is validated.
Commit Message: Input: i8042 - fix crash at boot time
The driver checks port->exists twice in i8042_interrupt(), first when
trying to assign temporary "serio" variable, and second time when deciding
whether it should call serio_interrupt(). The value of port->exists may
change between the 2 checks, and we may end up calling serio_interrupt()
with a NULL pointer:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000050
IP: [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
PGD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file:
CPU 0
Modules linked in:
Pid: 1, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-358.el6.x86_64 #1 QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8150feaf>] [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
RSP: 0018:ffff880028203cc0 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 0000000000010000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000282 RSI: 0000000000000098 RDI: 0000000000000050
RBP: ffff880028203cc0 R08: ffff88013e79c000 R09: ffff880028203ee0
R10: 0000000000000298 R11: 0000000000000282 R12: 0000000000000050
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000098
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 0000000000000050 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000001407f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 1, threadinfo ffff88013e79c000, task ffff88013e79b500)
Stack:
ffff880028203d00 ffffffff813de186 ffffffffffffff02 0000000000000000
<d> 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000098
<d> ffff880028203d70 ffffffff813e0162 ffff880028203d20 ffffffff8103b8ac
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff813de186>] serio_interrupt+0x36/0xa0
[<ffffffff813e0162>] i8042_interrupt+0x132/0x3a0
[<ffffffff8103b8ac>] ? kvm_clock_read+0x1c/0x20
[<ffffffff8103b8b9>] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff810e1640>] handle_IRQ_event+0x60/0x170
[<ffffffff8103b154>] ? kvm_guest_apic_eoi_write+0x44/0x50
[<ffffffff810e3d8e>] handle_edge_irq+0xde/0x180
[<ffffffff8100de89>] handle_irq+0x49/0xa0
[<ffffffff81516c8c>] do_IRQ+0x6c/0xf0
[<ffffffff8100b9d3>] ret_from_intr+0x0/0x11
[<ffffffff81076f63>] ? __do_softirq+0x73/0x1e0
[<ffffffff8109b75b>] ? hrtimer_interrupt+0x14b/0x260
[<ffffffff8100c1cc>] ? call_softirq+0x1c/0x30
[<ffffffff8100de05>] ? do_softirq+0x65/0xa0
[<ffffffff81076d95>] ? irq_exit+0x85/0x90
[<ffffffff81516d80>] ? smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x9b
[<ffffffff8100bb93>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0x13/0x20
To avoid the issue let's change the second check to test whether serio is
NULL or not.
Also, let's take i8042_lock in i8042_start() and i8042_stop() instead of
trying to be overly smart and using memory barriers.
Signed-off-by: Chen Hong <[email protected]>
[dtor: take lock in i8042_start()/i8042_stop()]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]> | High | 169,422 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int cp2112_gpio_get_all(struct gpio_chip *chip)
{
struct cp2112_device *dev = gpiochip_get_data(chip);
struct hid_device *hdev = dev->hdev;
u8 *buf = dev->in_out_buffer;
unsigned long flags;
int ret;
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->lock, flags);
ret = hid_hw_raw_request(hdev, CP2112_GPIO_GET, buf,
CP2112_GPIO_GET_LENGTH, HID_FEATURE_REPORT,
HID_REQ_GET_REPORT);
if (ret != CP2112_GPIO_GET_LENGTH) {
hid_err(hdev, "error requesting GPIO values: %d\n", ret);
ret = ret < 0 ? ret : -EIO;
goto exit;
}
ret = buf[1];
exit:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: drivers/hid/hid-cp2112.c in the Linux kernel 4.9.x before 4.9.9 uses a spinlock without considering that sleeping is possible in a USB HID request callback, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (deadlock) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: HID: cp2112: fix sleep-while-atomic
A recent commit fixing DMA-buffers on stack added a shared transfer
buffer protected by a spinlock. This is broken as the USB HID request
callbacks can sleep. Fix this up by replacing the spinlock with a mutex.
Fixes: 1ffb3c40ffb5 ("HID: cp2112: make transfer buffers DMA capable")
Cc: stable <[email protected]> # 4.9
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> | Low | 168,210 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_parse_inter_slice_data_cavlc(dec_struct_t * ps_dec,
dec_slice_params_t * ps_slice,
UWORD16 u2_first_mb_in_slice)
{
UWORD32 uc_more_data_flag;
WORD32 i2_cur_mb_addr;
UWORD32 u1_num_mbs, u1_num_mbsNby2, u1_mb_idx;
UWORD32 i2_mb_skip_run;
UWORD32 u1_read_mb_type;
UWORD32 u1_mbaff;
UWORD32 u1_num_mbs_next, u1_end_of_row;
const UWORD32 i2_pic_wdin_mbs = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
UWORD32 u1_slice_end = 0;
UWORD32 u1_tfr_n_mb = 0;
UWORD32 u1_decode_nmb = 0;
dec_bit_stream_t * const ps_bitstrm = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_ofst = &ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
deblk_mb_t *ps_cur_deblk_mb;
dec_mb_info_t *ps_cur_mb_info;
parse_pmbarams_t *ps_parse_mb_data = ps_dec->ps_parse_mb_data;
UWORD32 u1_inter_mb_type;
UWORD32 u1_deblk_mb_type;
UWORD32 u1_mb_threshold;
WORD32 ret = OK;
/******************************************************/
/* Initialisations specific to B or P slice */
/******************************************************/
if(ps_slice->u1_slice_type == P_SLICE)
{
u1_inter_mb_type = P_MB;
u1_deblk_mb_type = D_INTER_MB;
u1_mb_threshold = 5;
}
else // B_SLICE
{
u1_inter_mb_type = B_MB;
u1_deblk_mb_type = D_B_SLICE;
u1_mb_threshold = 23;
}
/******************************************************/
/* Slice Level Initialisations */
/******************************************************/
ps_dec->u1_qp = ps_slice->u1_slice_qp;
ih264d_update_qp(ps_dec, 0);
u1_mb_idx = ps_dec->u1_mb_idx;
u1_num_mbs = u1_mb_idx;
u1_num_mbsNby2 = 0;
u1_mbaff = ps_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
i2_cur_mb_addr = u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff;
i2_mb_skip_run = 0;
uc_more_data_flag = 1;
u1_read_mb_type = 0;
while(!u1_slice_end)
{
UWORD8 u1_mb_type;
ps_dec->pv_prev_mb_parse_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
if(i2_cur_mb_addr > ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr)
{
ret = ERROR_MB_ADDRESS_T;
break;
}
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info + u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = u1_num_mbs;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_Mux = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_pmbair = (u1_num_mbs >> u1_mbaff);
ps_cur_deblk_mb = ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn + u1_num_mbs;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = 0;
/* Storing Default partition info */
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_num_part = 1;
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_isI_mb = 0;
if((!i2_mb_skip_run) && (!u1_read_mb_type))
{
UWORD32 u4_bitstream_offset = *pu4_bitstrm_ofst;
UWORD32 u4_word, u4_ldz;
/***************************************************************/
/* Find leading zeros in next 32 bits */
/***************************************************************/
NEXTBITS_32(u4_word, u4_bitstream_offset, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
u4_ldz = CLZ(u4_word);
/* Flush the ps_bitstrm */
u4_bitstream_offset += (u4_ldz + 1);
/* Read the suffix from the ps_bitstrm */
u4_word = 0;
if(u4_ldz)
{
GETBITS(u4_word, u4_bitstream_offset, pu4_bitstrm_buf,
u4_ldz);
}
*pu4_bitstrm_ofst = u4_bitstream_offset;
i2_mb_skip_run = ((1 << u4_ldz) + u4_word - 1);
COPYTHECONTEXT("mb_skip_run", i2_mb_skip_run);
uc_more_data_flag = MORE_RBSP_DATA(ps_bitstrm);
u1_read_mb_type = uc_more_data_flag;
}
/***************************************************************/
/* Get the required information for decoding of MB */
/* mb_x, mb_y , neighbour availablity, */
/***************************************************************/
ps_dec->pf_get_mb_info(ps_dec, i2_cur_mb_addr, ps_cur_mb_info, i2_mb_skip_run);
/***************************************************************/
/* Set the deblocking parameters for this MB */
/***************************************************************/
if(ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0)
ih264d_set_deblocking_parameters(ps_cur_deblk_mb, ps_slice,
ps_dec->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity,
ps_dec->u1_cur_mb_fld_dec_flag);
if(i2_mb_skip_run)
{
/* Set appropriate flags in ps_cur_mb_info and ps_dec */
ps_dec->i1_prev_mb_qp_delta = 0;
ps_dec->u1_sub_mb_num = 0;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_type = MB_SKIP;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_mc_mode = PRED_16x16;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_cbp = 0;
{
/* Storing Skip partition info */
parse_part_params_t *ps_part_info = ps_dec->ps_part;
ps_part_info->u1_is_direct = PART_DIRECT_16x16;
ps_part_info->u1_sub_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->ps_part++;
}
/* Update Nnzs */
ih264d_update_nnz_for_skipmb(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info, CAVLC);
ps_cur_mb_info->ps_curmb->u1_mb_type = u1_inter_mb_type;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_type |= u1_deblk_mb_type;
i2_mb_skip_run--;
}
else
{
u1_read_mb_type = 0;
/**************************************************************/
/* Macroblock Layer Begins, Decode the u1_mb_type */
/**************************************************************/
{
UWORD32 u4_bitstream_offset = *pu4_bitstrm_ofst;
UWORD32 u4_word, u4_ldz, u4_temp;
/***************************************************************/
/* Find leading zeros in next 32 bits */
/***************************************************************/
NEXTBITS_32(u4_word, u4_bitstream_offset, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
u4_ldz = CLZ(u4_word);
/* Flush the ps_bitstrm */
u4_bitstream_offset += (u4_ldz + 1);
/* Read the suffix from the ps_bitstrm */
u4_word = 0;
if(u4_ldz)
GETBITS(u4_word, u4_bitstream_offset, pu4_bitstrm_buf,
u4_ldz);
*pu4_bitstrm_ofst = u4_bitstream_offset;
u4_temp = ((1 << u4_ldz) + u4_word - 1);
if(u4_temp > (UWORD32)(25 + u1_mb_threshold))
return ERROR_MB_TYPE;
u1_mb_type = u4_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("u1_mb_type", u1_mb_type);
}
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_type = u1_mb_type;
/**************************************************************/
/* Parse Macroblock data */
/**************************************************************/
if(u1_mb_type < u1_mb_threshold)
{
ps_cur_mb_info->ps_curmb->u1_mb_type = u1_inter_mb_type;
ret = ps_dec->pf_parse_inter_mb(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbsNby2);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_type |= u1_deblk_mb_type;
}
else
{
/* Storing Intra partition info */
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_num_part = 0;
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_isI_mb = 1;
if((25 + u1_mb_threshold) == u1_mb_type)
{
/* I_PCM_MB */
ps_cur_mb_info->ps_curmb->u1_mb_type = I_PCM_MB;
ret = ih264d_parse_ipcm_mb(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info, u1_num_mbs);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ps_dec->u1_qp = 0;
}
else
{
ret = ih264d_parse_imb_cavlc(
ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info, u1_num_mbs,
(UWORD8)(u1_mb_type - u1_mb_threshold));
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_type |= D_INTRA_MB;
}
uc_more_data_flag = MORE_RBSP_DATA(ps_bitstrm);
}
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_qp = ps_dec->u1_qp;
if(u1_mbaff)
{
ih264d_update_mbaff_left_nnz(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info);
}
/**************************************************************/
/* Get next Macroblock address */
/**************************************************************/
i2_cur_mb_addr++;
u1_num_mbs++;
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded++;
u1_num_mbsNby2++;
ps_parse_mb_data++;
/****************************************************************/
/* Check for End Of Row and other flags that determine when to */
/* do DMA setup for N/2-Mb, Decode for N-Mb, and Transfer for */
/* N-Mb */
/****************************************************************/
u1_num_mbs_next = i2_pic_wdin_mbs - ps_dec->u2_mbx - 1;
u1_end_of_row = (!u1_num_mbs_next) && (!(u1_mbaff && (u1_num_mbs & 0x01)));
u1_slice_end = (!(uc_more_data_flag || i2_mb_skip_run));
u1_tfr_n_mb = (u1_num_mbs == ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp) || u1_end_of_row
|| u1_slice_end;
u1_decode_nmb = u1_tfr_n_mb || u1_slice_end;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = u1_slice_end;
/*u1_dma_nby2mb = u1_decode_nmb ||
(u1_num_mbsNby2 == ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp_pair);*/
if(u1_decode_nmb)
{
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs);
u1_num_mbsNby2 = 0;
{
ps_parse_mb_data = ps_dec->ps_parse_mb_data;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
}
}
/*H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("Pic: %d Mb_X=%d Mb_Y=%d",
ps_slice->i4_poc >> ps_slice->u1_field_pic_flag,
ps_dec->u2_mbx,ps_dec->u2_mby + (1 - ps_cur_mb_info->u1_topmb));
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("u1_decode_nmb: %d", u1_decode_nmb);*/
if(u1_decode_nmb)
{
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ih264d_parse_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info += u1_num_mbs;
}
else
{
ih264d_decode_recon_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb,
u1_end_of_row);
}
if(u1_tfr_n_mb)
u1_num_mbs = 0;
u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
}
}
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u4_mbs_in_slice = i2_cur_mb_addr
- (u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to decoder/ih264d_parse_islice.c and decoder/ih264d_parse_pslice.c, aka internal bug 25928803.
Commit Message: Decoder Update mb count after mb map is set.
Bug: 25928803
Change-Id: Iccc58a7dd1c5c6ea656dfca332cfb8dddba4de37
| High | 173,957 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: virtual void SetUp() {
fwd_txfm_ = GET_PARAM(0);
inv_txfm_ = GET_PARAM(1);
tx_type_ = GET_PARAM(2);
pitch_ = 8;
fwd_txfm_ref = fht8x8_ref;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,563 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long Chapters::Display::Parse(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long pos,
long long size)
{
const long long stop = pos + size;
while (pos < stop)
{
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(
pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x05) // ChapterString ID
{
status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_string);
if (status)
return status;
}
else if (id == 0x037C) // ChapterLanguage ID
{
status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_language);
if (status)
return status;
}
else if (id == 0x037E) // ChapterCountry ID
{
status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_country);
if (status)
return status;
}
pos += size;
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,403 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: mcs_recv_connect_response(STREAM mcs_data)
{
UNUSED(mcs_data);
uint8 result;
int length;
STREAM s;
RD_BOOL is_fastpath;
uint8 fastpath_hdr;
logger(Protocol, Debug, "%s()", __func__);
s = iso_recv(&is_fastpath, &fastpath_hdr);
if (s == NULL)
return False;
ber_parse_header(s, MCS_CONNECT_RESPONSE, &length);
ber_parse_header(s, BER_TAG_RESULT, &length);
in_uint8(s, result);
if (result != 0)
{
logger(Protocol, Error, "mcs_recv_connect_response(), result=%d", result);
return False;
}
ber_parse_header(s, BER_TAG_INTEGER, &length);
in_uint8s(s, length); /* connect id */
mcs_parse_domain_params(s);
ber_parse_header(s, BER_TAG_OCTET_STRING, &length);
sec_process_mcs_data(s);
/*
if (length > mcs_data->size)
{
logger(Protocol, Error, "mcs_recv_connect_response(), expected length=%d, got %d",length, mcs_data->size);
length = mcs_data->size;
}
in_uint8a(s, mcs_data->data, length);
mcs_data->p = mcs_data->data;
mcs_data->end = mcs_data->data + length;
*/
return s_check_end(s);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: rdesktop versions up to and including v1.8.3 contain a Buffer Overflow over the global variables in the function seamless_process_line() that results in memory corruption and probably even a remote code execution.
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182 | High | 169,800 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long long Chapters::Atom::GetStartTime(const Chapters* pChapters) const
{
return GetTime(pChapters, m_start_timecode);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,355 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void unset_active_map(const vpx_codec_enc_cfg_t *cfg,
vpx_codec_ctx_t *codec) {
vpx_active_map_t map = {0};
map.rows = (cfg->g_h + 15) / 16;
map.cols = (cfg->g_w + 15) / 16;
map.active_map = NULL;
if (vpx_codec_control(codec, VP8E_SET_ACTIVEMAP, &map))
die_codec(codec, "Failed to set active map");
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,485 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: get_policy_2_svc(gpol_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static gpol_ret ret;
kadm5_ret_t ret2;
char *prime_arg, *funcname;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_principal_ent_rec caller_ent;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_gpol_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
funcname = "kadm5_get_policy";
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
prime_arg = arg->name;
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_GET;
if (!CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) && kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_INQUIRE, NULL, NULL))
ret.code = KADM5_OK;
else {
ret.code = kadm5_get_principal(handle->lhandle,
handle->current_caller,
&caller_ent,
KADM5_PRINCIPAL_NORMAL_MASK);
if (ret.code == KADM5_OK) {
if (caller_ent.aux_attributes & KADM5_POLICY &&
strcmp(caller_ent.policy, arg->name) == 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_OK;
} else ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_GET;
ret2 = kadm5_free_principal_ent(handle->lhandle,
&caller_ent);
ret.code = ret.code ? ret.code : ret2;
}
}
if (ret.code == KADM5_OK) {
ret.code = kadm5_get_policy(handle, arg->name, &ret.rec);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done(funcname,
((prime_arg == NULL) ? "(null)" : prime_arg), errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
} else {
log_unauth(funcname, prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
}
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple memory leaks in kadmin/server/server_stubs.c in kadmind in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.13.4 and 1.14.x before 1.14.1 allow remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a request specifying a NULL principal name.
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup | Medium | 167,513 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
DOMStringList* arrayArg(toDOMStringList(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->overloadedMethod(arrayArg);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,606 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BlobURLRequestJob::CountSize() {
error_ = false;
pending_get_file_info_count_ = 0;
total_size_ = 0;
item_length_list_.resize(blob_data_->items().size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < blob_data_->items().size(); ++i) {
const BlobData::Item& item = blob_data_->items().at(i);
if (IsFileType(item.type())) {
++pending_get_file_info_count_;
GetFileStreamReader(i)->GetLength(
base::Bind(&BlobURLRequestJob::DidGetFileItemLength,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), i));
continue;
}
int64 item_length = static_cast<int64>(item.length());
item_length_list_[i] = item_length;
total_size_ += item_length;
}
if (pending_get_file_info_count_ == 0)
DidCountSize(net::OK);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.97 on Windows and Linux, and before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a blob.
Commit Message: Avoid integer overflows in BlobURLRequestJob.
BUG=169685
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12047012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@179154 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,398 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void AwFeatureListCreator::SetUpFieldTrials() {
auto* metrics_client = AwMetricsServiceClient::GetInstance();
DCHECK(!field_trial_list_);
field_trial_list_ = std::make_unique<base::FieldTrialList>(
metrics_client->CreateLowEntropyProvider());
std::unique_ptr<variations::SeedResponse> seed = GetAndClearJavaSeed();
base::Time null_time;
base::Time seed_date =
seed ? base::Time::FromJavaTime(seed->date) : null_time;
variations::UIStringOverrider ui_string_overrider;
client_ = std::make_unique<AwVariationsServiceClient>();
auto seed_store = std::make_unique<variations::VariationsSeedStore>(
local_state_.get(), /*initial_seed=*/std::move(seed),
/*on_initial_seed_stored=*/base::DoNothing());
if (!seed_date.is_null())
seed_store->RecordLastFetchTime(seed_date);
variations_field_trial_creator_ =
std::make_unique<variations::VariationsFieldTrialCreator>(
local_state_.get(), client_.get(), std::move(seed_store),
ui_string_overrider);
variations_field_trial_creator_->OverrideVariationsPlatform(
variations::Study::PLATFORM_ANDROID_WEBVIEW);
std::set<std::string> unforceable_field_trials;
variations::SafeSeedManager ignored_safe_seed_manager(true,
local_state_.get());
variations_field_trial_creator_->SetupFieldTrials(
cc::switches::kEnableGpuBenchmarking, switches::kEnableFeatures,
switches::kDisableFeatures, unforceable_field_trials,
std::vector<std::string>(),
content::GetSwitchDependentFeatureOverrides(
*base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()),
/*low_entropy_provider=*/nullptr, std::make_unique<base::FeatureList>(),
aw_field_trials_.get(), &ignored_safe_seed_manager);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in Omnibox in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.92 for Android allowed a remote attacker to perform domain spoofing with RTL characters via a crafted URL page.
Commit Message: [AW] Add Variations.RestartsWithStaleSeed metric.
This metric records the number of consecutive times the WebView browser
process starts with a stale seed. It's written when a fresh seed is
loaded after previously loading a stale seed.
Test: Manually verified with logging that the metric was written.
Bug: 1010625
Change-Id: Iadedb45af08d59ecd6662472670f848e8e99a8d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1851126
Commit-Queue: Robbie McElrath <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nate Fischer <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Changwan Ryu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#709417} | Medium | 172,360 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static struct ip_options *ip_options_get_alloc(const int optlen)
{
return kzalloc(sizeof(struct ip_options) + ((optlen + 3) & ~3),
GFP_KERNEL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the IP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.0 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (slab corruption and system crash) by sending packets to an application that sets socket options during the handling of network traffic.
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,559 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int ext2_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
{
struct buffer_head * bh;
struct ext2_sb_info * sbi;
struct ext2_super_block * es;
struct inode *root;
unsigned long block;
unsigned long sb_block = get_sb_block(&data);
unsigned long logic_sb_block;
unsigned long offset = 0;
unsigned long def_mount_opts;
long ret = -EINVAL;
int blocksize = BLOCK_SIZE;
int db_count;
int i, j;
__le32 features;
int err;
err = -ENOMEM;
sbi = kzalloc(sizeof(*sbi), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbi)
goto failed;
sbi->s_blockgroup_lock =
kzalloc(sizeof(struct blockgroup_lock), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbi->s_blockgroup_lock) {
kfree(sbi);
goto failed;
}
sb->s_fs_info = sbi;
sbi->s_sb_block = sb_block;
spin_lock_init(&sbi->s_lock);
/*
* See what the current blocksize for the device is, and
* use that as the blocksize. Otherwise (or if the blocksize
* is smaller than the default) use the default.
* This is important for devices that have a hardware
* sectorsize that is larger than the default.
*/
blocksize = sb_min_blocksize(sb, BLOCK_SIZE);
if (!blocksize) {
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "error: unable to set blocksize");
goto failed_sbi;
}
/*
* If the superblock doesn't start on a hardware sector boundary,
* calculate the offset.
*/
if (blocksize != BLOCK_SIZE) {
logic_sb_block = (sb_block*BLOCK_SIZE) / blocksize;
offset = (sb_block*BLOCK_SIZE) % blocksize;
} else {
logic_sb_block = sb_block;
}
if (!(bh = sb_bread(sb, logic_sb_block))) {
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "error: unable to read superblock");
goto failed_sbi;
}
/*
* Note: s_es must be initialized as soon as possible because
* some ext2 macro-instructions depend on its value
*/
es = (struct ext2_super_block *) (((char *)bh->b_data) + offset);
sbi->s_es = es;
sb->s_magic = le16_to_cpu(es->s_magic);
if (sb->s_magic != EXT2_SUPER_MAGIC)
goto cantfind_ext2;
/* Set defaults before we parse the mount options */
def_mount_opts = le32_to_cpu(es->s_default_mount_opts);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT2_DEFM_DEBUG)
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, DEBUG);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT2_DEFM_BSDGROUPS)
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, GRPID);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT2_DEFM_UID16)
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, NO_UID32);
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT2_FS_XATTR
if (def_mount_opts & EXT2_DEFM_XATTR_USER)
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, XATTR_USER);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT2_FS_POSIX_ACL
if (def_mount_opts & EXT2_DEFM_ACL)
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, POSIX_ACL);
#endif
if (le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_errors) == EXT2_ERRORS_PANIC)
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, ERRORS_PANIC);
else if (le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_errors) == EXT2_ERRORS_CONTINUE)
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, ERRORS_CONT);
else
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, ERRORS_RO);
sbi->s_resuid = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resuid));
sbi->s_resgid = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resgid));
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, RESERVATION);
if (!parse_options((char *) data, sb))
goto failed_mount;
sb->s_flags = (sb->s_flags & ~MS_POSIXACL) |
((EXT2_SB(sb)->s_mount_opt & EXT2_MOUNT_POSIX_ACL) ?
MS_POSIXACL : 0);
sb->s_iflags |= SB_I_CGROUPWB;
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_rev_level) == EXT2_GOOD_OLD_REV &&
(EXT2_HAS_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, ~0U) ||
EXT2_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, ~0U) ||
EXT2_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, ~0U)))
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"warning: feature flags set on rev 0 fs, "
"running e2fsck is recommended");
/*
* Check feature flags regardless of the revision level, since we
* previously didn't change the revision level when setting the flags,
* so there is a chance incompat flags are set on a rev 0 filesystem.
*/
features = EXT2_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, ~EXT2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_SUPP);
if (features) {
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "error: couldn't mount because of "
"unsupported optional features (%x)",
le32_to_cpu(features));
goto failed_mount;
}
if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) &&
(features = EXT2_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, ~EXT2_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_SUPP))){
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "error: couldn't mount RDWR because of "
"unsupported optional features (%x)",
le32_to_cpu(features));
goto failed_mount;
}
blocksize = BLOCK_SIZE << le32_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_log_block_size);
if (sbi->s_mount_opt & EXT2_MOUNT_DAX) {
if (blocksize != PAGE_SIZE) {
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"error: unsupported blocksize for dax");
goto failed_mount;
}
if (!sb->s_bdev->bd_disk->fops->direct_access) {
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"error: device does not support dax");
goto failed_mount;
}
}
/* If the blocksize doesn't match, re-read the thing.. */
if (sb->s_blocksize != blocksize) {
brelse(bh);
if (!sb_set_blocksize(sb, blocksize)) {
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"error: bad blocksize %d", blocksize);
goto failed_sbi;
}
logic_sb_block = (sb_block*BLOCK_SIZE) / blocksize;
offset = (sb_block*BLOCK_SIZE) % blocksize;
bh = sb_bread(sb, logic_sb_block);
if(!bh) {
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "error: couldn't read"
"superblock on 2nd try");
goto failed_sbi;
}
es = (struct ext2_super_block *) (((char *)bh->b_data) + offset);
sbi->s_es = es;
if (es->s_magic != cpu_to_le16(EXT2_SUPER_MAGIC)) {
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "error: magic mismatch");
goto failed_mount;
}
}
sb->s_maxbytes = ext2_max_size(sb->s_blocksize_bits);
sb->s_max_links = EXT2_LINK_MAX;
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_rev_level) == EXT2_GOOD_OLD_REV) {
sbi->s_inode_size = EXT2_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
sbi->s_first_ino = EXT2_GOOD_OLD_FIRST_INO;
} else {
sbi->s_inode_size = le16_to_cpu(es->s_inode_size);
sbi->s_first_ino = le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_ino);
if ((sbi->s_inode_size < EXT2_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE) ||
!is_power_of_2(sbi->s_inode_size) ||
(sbi->s_inode_size > blocksize)) {
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"error: unsupported inode size: %d",
sbi->s_inode_size);
goto failed_mount;
}
}
sbi->s_frag_size = EXT2_MIN_FRAG_SIZE <<
le32_to_cpu(es->s_log_frag_size);
if (sbi->s_frag_size == 0)
goto cantfind_ext2;
sbi->s_frags_per_block = sb->s_blocksize / sbi->s_frag_size;
sbi->s_blocks_per_group = le32_to_cpu(es->s_blocks_per_group);
sbi->s_frags_per_group = le32_to_cpu(es->s_frags_per_group);
sbi->s_inodes_per_group = le32_to_cpu(es->s_inodes_per_group);
if (EXT2_INODE_SIZE(sb) == 0)
goto cantfind_ext2;
sbi->s_inodes_per_block = sb->s_blocksize / EXT2_INODE_SIZE(sb);
if (sbi->s_inodes_per_block == 0 || sbi->s_inodes_per_group == 0)
goto cantfind_ext2;
sbi->s_itb_per_group = sbi->s_inodes_per_group /
sbi->s_inodes_per_block;
sbi->s_desc_per_block = sb->s_blocksize /
sizeof (struct ext2_group_desc);
sbi->s_sbh = bh;
sbi->s_mount_state = le16_to_cpu(es->s_state);
sbi->s_addr_per_block_bits =
ilog2 (EXT2_ADDR_PER_BLOCK(sb));
sbi->s_desc_per_block_bits =
ilog2 (EXT2_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb));
if (sb->s_magic != EXT2_SUPER_MAGIC)
goto cantfind_ext2;
if (sb->s_blocksize != bh->b_size) {
if (!silent)
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "error: unsupported blocksize");
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sb->s_blocksize != sbi->s_frag_size) {
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"error: fragsize %lu != blocksize %lu"
"(not supported yet)",
sbi->s_frag_size, sb->s_blocksize);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sbi->s_blocks_per_group > sb->s_blocksize * 8) {
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"error: #blocks per group too big: %lu",
sbi->s_blocks_per_group);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sbi->s_frags_per_group > sb->s_blocksize * 8) {
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"error: #fragments per group too big: %lu",
sbi->s_frags_per_group);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sbi->s_inodes_per_group > sb->s_blocksize * 8) {
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"error: #inodes per group too big: %lu",
sbi->s_inodes_per_group);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (EXT2_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb) == 0)
goto cantfind_ext2;
sbi->s_groups_count = ((le32_to_cpu(es->s_blocks_count) -
le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block) - 1)
/ EXT2_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb)) + 1;
db_count = (sbi->s_groups_count + EXT2_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb) - 1) /
EXT2_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb);
sbi->s_group_desc = kmalloc (db_count * sizeof (struct buffer_head *), GFP_KERNEL);
if (sbi->s_group_desc == NULL) {
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "error: not enough memory");
goto failed_mount;
}
bgl_lock_init(sbi->s_blockgroup_lock);
sbi->s_debts = kcalloc(sbi->s_groups_count, sizeof(*sbi->s_debts), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbi->s_debts) {
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "error: not enough memory");
goto failed_mount_group_desc;
}
for (i = 0; i < db_count; i++) {
block = descriptor_loc(sb, logic_sb_block, i);
sbi->s_group_desc[i] = sb_bread(sb, block);
if (!sbi->s_group_desc[i]) {
for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
brelse (sbi->s_group_desc[j]);
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"error: unable to read group descriptors");
goto failed_mount_group_desc;
}
}
if (!ext2_check_descriptors (sb)) {
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "group descriptors corrupted");
goto failed_mount2;
}
sbi->s_gdb_count = db_count;
get_random_bytes(&sbi->s_next_generation, sizeof(u32));
spin_lock_init(&sbi->s_next_gen_lock);
/* per fileystem reservation list head & lock */
spin_lock_init(&sbi->s_rsv_window_lock);
sbi->s_rsv_window_root = RB_ROOT;
/*
* Add a single, static dummy reservation to the start of the
* reservation window list --- it gives us a placeholder for
* append-at-start-of-list which makes the allocation logic
* _much_ simpler.
*/
sbi->s_rsv_window_head.rsv_start = EXT2_RESERVE_WINDOW_NOT_ALLOCATED;
sbi->s_rsv_window_head.rsv_end = EXT2_RESERVE_WINDOW_NOT_ALLOCATED;
sbi->s_rsv_window_head.rsv_alloc_hit = 0;
sbi->s_rsv_window_head.rsv_goal_size = 0;
ext2_rsv_window_add(sb, &sbi->s_rsv_window_head);
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_freeblocks_counter,
ext2_count_free_blocks(sb), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!err) {
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_freeinodes_counter,
ext2_count_free_inodes(sb), GFP_KERNEL);
}
if (!err) {
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_dirs_counter,
ext2_count_dirs(sb), GFP_KERNEL);
}
if (err) {
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "error: insufficient memory");
goto failed_mount3;
}
/*
* set up enough so that it can read an inode
*/
sb->s_op = &ext2_sops;
sb->s_export_op = &ext2_export_ops;
sb->s_xattr = ext2_xattr_handlers;
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
sb->dq_op = &dquot_operations;
sb->s_qcop = &dquot_quotactl_ops;
sb->s_quota_types = QTYPE_MASK_USR | QTYPE_MASK_GRP;
#endif
root = ext2_iget(sb, EXT2_ROOT_INO);
if (IS_ERR(root)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(root);
goto failed_mount3;
}
if (!S_ISDIR(root->i_mode) || !root->i_blocks || !root->i_size) {
iput(root);
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "error: corrupt root inode, run e2fsck");
goto failed_mount3;
}
sb->s_root = d_make_root(root);
if (!sb->s_root) {
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "error: get root inode failed");
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto failed_mount3;
}
if (EXT2_HAS_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT3_FEATURE_COMPAT_HAS_JOURNAL))
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"warning: mounting ext3 filesystem as ext2");
if (ext2_setup_super (sb, es, sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
sb->s_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
ext2_write_super(sb);
return 0;
cantfind_ext2:
if (!silent)
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"error: can't find an ext2 filesystem on dev %s.",
sb->s_id);
goto failed_mount;
failed_mount3:
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_freeblocks_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_freeinodes_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_dirs_counter);
failed_mount2:
for (i = 0; i < db_count; i++)
brelse(sbi->s_group_desc[i]);
failed_mount_group_desc:
kfree(sbi->s_group_desc);
kfree(sbi->s_debts);
failed_mount:
brelse(bh);
failed_sbi:
sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
kfree(sbi->s_blockgroup_lock);
kfree(sbi);
failed:
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: The mbcache feature in the ext2 and ext4 filesystem implementations in the Linux kernel before 4.6 mishandles xattr block caching, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (soft lockup) via filesystem operations in environments that use many attributes, as demonstrated by Ceph and Samba.
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> | Low | 169,973 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: EntrySync* EntrySync::moveTo(DirectoryEntrySync* parent, const String& name, ExceptionState& exceptionState) const
{
RefPtr<EntrySyncCallbackHelper> helper = EntrySyncCallbackHelper::create();
m_fileSystem->move(this, parent, name, helper->successCallback(), helper->errorCallback(), DOMFileSystemBase::Synchronous);
return helper->getResult(exceptionState);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The URL loader in Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,422 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: zend_object_iterator *spl_filesystem_tree_get_iterator(zend_class_entry *ce, zval *object, int by_ref TSRMLS_DC)
{
spl_filesystem_iterator *iterator;
spl_filesystem_object *dir_object;
if (by_ref) {
zend_error(E_ERROR, "An iterator cannot be used with foreach by reference");
}
dir_object = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
iterator = spl_filesystem_object_to_iterator(dir_object);
/* initialize iterator if wasn't gotten before */
if (iterator->intern.data == NULL) {
iterator->intern.data = object;
iterator->intern.funcs = &spl_filesystem_tree_it_funcs;
}
zval_add_ref(&object);
return (zend_object_iterator*)iterator;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int | High | 167,086 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void phar_add_virtual_dirs(phar_archive_data *phar, char *filename, int filename_len TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
const char *s;
while ((s = zend_memrchr(filename, '/', filename_len))) {
filename_len = s - filename;
if (FAILURE == zend_hash_add_empty_element(&phar->virtual_dirs, filename, filename_len)) {
break;
}
}
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Off-by-one error in the phar_parse_zipfile function in ext/phar/zip.c in PHP before 5.5.30 and 5.6.x before 5.6.14 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (uninitialized pointer dereference and application crash) by including the / filename in a .zip PHAR archive.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,572 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void GM2TabStyle::PaintInactiveTabBackground(gfx::Canvas* canvas,
const SkPath& clip) const {
bool has_custom_image;
int fill_id = tab_->controller()->GetBackgroundResourceId(&has_custom_image);
if (!has_custom_image)
fill_id = 0;
PaintTabBackground(canvas, false /* active */, fill_id, 0,
tab_->controller()->MaySetClip() ? &clip : nullptr);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The extensions API in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android incorrectly handled navigation within PDFs, which allowed a remote attacker to temporarily spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted HTML page containing PDF data.
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498} | Medium | 172,523 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: struct r_bin_dyldcache_lib_t *r_bin_dyldcache_extract(struct r_bin_dyldcache_obj_t* bin, int idx, int *nlib) {
ut64 liboff, linkedit_offset;
ut64 dyld_vmbase;
ut32 addend = 0;
struct r_bin_dyldcache_lib_t *ret = NULL;
struct dyld_cache_image_info* image_infos = NULL;
struct mach_header *mh;
ut8 *data, *cmdptr;
int cmd, libsz = 0;
RBuffer* dbuf;
char *libname;
if (!bin) {
return NULL;
}
if (bin->size < 1) {
eprintf ("Empty file? (%s)\n", bin->file? bin->file: "(null)");
return NULL;
}
if (bin->nlibs < 0 || idx < 0 || idx >= bin->nlibs) {
return NULL;
}
*nlib = bin->nlibs;
ret = R_NEW0 (struct r_bin_dyldcache_lib_t);
if (!ret) {
perror ("malloc (ret)");
return NULL;
}
if (bin->hdr.startaddr > bin->size) {
eprintf ("corrupted dyldcache");
free (ret);
return NULL;
}
if (bin->hdr.startaddr > bin->size || bin->hdr.baseaddroff > bin->size) {
eprintf ("corrupted dyldcache");
free (ret);
return NULL;
}
image_infos = (struct dyld_cache_image_info*) (bin->b->buf + bin->hdr.startaddr);
dyld_vmbase = *(ut64 *)(bin->b->buf + bin->hdr.baseaddroff);
liboff = image_infos[idx].address - dyld_vmbase;
if (liboff > bin->size) {
eprintf ("Corrupted file\n");
free (ret);
return NULL;
}
ret->offset = liboff;
if (image_infos[idx].pathFileOffset > bin->size) {
eprintf ("corrupted file\n");
free (ret);
return NULL;
}
libname = (char *)(bin->b->buf + image_infos[idx].pathFileOffset);
/* Locate lib hdr in cache */
data = bin->b->buf + liboff;
mh = (struct mach_header *)data;
/* Check it is mach-o */
if (mh->magic != MH_MAGIC && mh->magic != MH_MAGIC_64) {
if (mh->magic == 0xbebafeca) { //FAT binary
eprintf ("FAT Binary\n");
}
eprintf ("Not mach-o\n");
free (ret);
return NULL;
}
/* Write mach-o hdr */
if (!(dbuf = r_buf_new ())) {
eprintf ("new (dbuf)\n");
free (ret);
return NULL;
}
addend = mh->magic == MH_MAGIC? sizeof (struct mach_header) : sizeof (struct mach_header_64);
r_buf_set_bytes (dbuf, data, addend);
cmdptr = data + addend;
/* Write load commands */
for (cmd = 0; cmd < mh->ncmds; cmd++) {
struct load_command *lc = (struct load_command *)cmdptr;
r_buf_append_bytes (dbuf, (ut8*)lc, lc->cmdsize);
cmdptr += lc->cmdsize;
}
cmdptr = data + addend;
/* Write segments */
for (cmd = linkedit_offset = 0; cmd < mh->ncmds; cmd++) {
struct load_command *lc = (struct load_command *)cmdptr;
cmdptr += lc->cmdsize;
switch (lc->cmd) {
case LC_SEGMENT:
{
/* Write segment and patch offset */
struct segment_command *seg = (struct segment_command *)lc;
int t = seg->filesize;
if (seg->fileoff + seg->filesize > bin->size || seg->fileoff > bin->size) {
eprintf ("malformed dyldcache\n");
free (ret);
r_buf_free (dbuf);
return NULL;
}
r_buf_append_bytes (dbuf, bin->b->buf+seg->fileoff, t);
r_bin_dyldcache_apply_patch (dbuf, dbuf->length, (ut64)((size_t)&seg->fileoff - (size_t)data));
/* Patch section offsets */
int sect_offset = seg->fileoff - libsz;
libsz = dbuf->length;
if (!strcmp (seg->segname, "__LINKEDIT")) {
linkedit_offset = sect_offset;
}
if (seg->nsects > 0) {
struct section *sects = (struct section *)((ut8 *)seg + sizeof(struct segment_command));
int nsect;
for (nsect = 0; nsect < seg->nsects; nsect++) {
if (sects[nsect].offset > libsz) {
r_bin_dyldcache_apply_patch (dbuf, sects[nsect].offset - sect_offset,
(ut64)((size_t)§s[nsect].offset - (size_t)data));
}
}
}
}
break;
case LC_SYMTAB:
{
struct symtab_command *st = (struct symtab_command *)lc;
NZ_OFFSET (st->symoff);
NZ_OFFSET (st->stroff);
}
break;
case LC_DYSYMTAB:
{
struct dysymtab_command *st = (struct dysymtab_command *)lc;
NZ_OFFSET (st->tocoff);
NZ_OFFSET (st->modtaboff);
NZ_OFFSET (st->extrefsymoff);
NZ_OFFSET (st->indirectsymoff);
NZ_OFFSET (st->extreloff);
NZ_OFFSET (st->locreloff);
}
break;
case LC_DYLD_INFO:
case LC_DYLD_INFO_ONLY:
{
struct dyld_info_command *st = (struct dyld_info_command *)lc;
NZ_OFFSET (st->rebase_off);
NZ_OFFSET (st->bind_off);
NZ_OFFSET (st->weak_bind_off);
NZ_OFFSET (st->lazy_bind_off);
NZ_OFFSET (st->export_off);
}
break;
}
}
/* Fill r_bin_dyldcache_lib_t ret */
ret->b = dbuf;
strncpy (ret->path, libname, sizeof (ret->path) - 1);
ret->size = libsz;
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: In radare2 prior to 3.1.1, r_bin_dyldcache_extract in libr/bin/format/mach0/dyldcache.c may allow attackers to cause a denial-of-service (application crash caused by out-of-bounds read) by crafting an input file.
Commit Message: Fix #12374 - oobread crash in truncated dyldcache ##bin | Medium | 168,954 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: plan_a (char const *filename)
{
char const *s;
char const *lim;
char const **ptr;
char *buffer;
lin iline;
size_t size = instat.st_size;
/* Fail if the file size doesn't fit in a size_t,
or if storage isn't available. */
if (! (size == instat.st_size
&& (buffer = malloc (size ? size : (size_t) 1))))
return false;
/* Read the input file, but don't bother reading it if it's empty.
When creating files, the files do not actually exist. */
if (size)
{
if (S_ISREG (instat.st_mode))
{
int ifd = safe_open (filename, O_RDONLY|binary_transput, 0);
size_t buffered = 0, n;
if (ifd < 0)
pfatal ("can't open file %s", quotearg (filename));
/* Some non-POSIX hosts exaggerate st_size in text mode;
or the file may have shrunk! */
size = buffered;
break;
}
if (n == (size_t) -1)
{
/* Perhaps size is too large for this host. */
close (ifd);
free (buffer);
return false;
}
buffered += n;
}
if (close (ifd) != 0)
read_fatal ();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: In GNU patch through 2.7.6, the following of symlinks is mishandled in certain cases other than input files. This affects inp.c and util.c.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,685 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xps_load_sfnt_name(xps_font_t *font, char *namep)
{
byte *namedata;
int offset, length;
/*int format;*/
int count, stringoffset;
int found;
int i, k;
found = 0;
strcpy(namep, "Unknown");
offset = xps_find_sfnt_table(font, "name", &length);
if (offset < 0 || length < 6)
{
gs_warn("cannot find name table");
return;
}
namedata = font->data + offset;
/*format = u16(namedata + 0);*/
count = u16(namedata + 2);
stringoffset = u16(namedata + 4);
if (length < 6 + (count * 12))
{
gs_warn("name table too short");
{
if (pid == 1 && eid == 0 && langid == 0) /* mac roman, english */
{
if (found < 3)
{
memcpy(namep, namedata + stringoffset + offset, length);
namep[length] = 0;
found = 3;
}
}
if (pid == 3 && eid == 1 && langid == 0x409) /* windows unicode ucs-2, US */
{
if (found < 2)
{
unsigned char *s = namedata + stringoffset + offset;
int n = length / 2;
for (k = 0; k < n; k ++)
{
int c = u16(s + k * 2);
namep[k] = isprint(c) ? c : '?';
}
namep[k] = 0;
found = 2;
}
}
if (pid == 3 && eid == 10 && langid == 0x409) /* windows unicode ucs-4, US */
{
if (found < 1)
{
unsigned char *s = namedata + stringoffset + offset;
int n = length / 4;
for (k = 0; k < n; k ++)
{
int c = u32(s + k * 4);
namep[k] = isprint(c) ? c : '?';
}
namep[k] = 0;
found = 1;
}
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The xps_load_sfnt_name function in xps/xpsfont.c in Artifex Ghostscript GhostXPS 9.21 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,787 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void DiscardTest(DiscardReason reason) {
const base::TimeTicks kDummyLastActiveTime =
base::TimeTicks() + kShortDelay;
LifecycleUnit* background_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
LifecycleUnit* foreground_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
CreateTwoTabs(true /* focus_tab_strip */, &background_lifecycle_unit,
&foreground_lifecycle_unit);
content::WebContents* initial_web_contents =
tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0);
content::WebContentsTester::For(initial_web_contents)
->SetLastActiveTime(kDummyLastActiveTime);
EXPECT_EQ(LifecycleUnitState::ACTIVE,
background_lifecycle_unit->GetState());
EXPECT_CALL(tab_observer_, OnDiscardedStateChange(testing::_, true));
background_lifecycle_unit->Discard(reason);
testing::Mock::VerifyAndClear(&tab_observer_);
TransitionFromPendingDiscardToDiscardedIfNeeded(reason,
background_lifecycle_unit);
EXPECT_NE(initial_web_contents, tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0));
EXPECT_FALSE(tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)
->GetController()
.GetPendingEntry());
EXPECT_EQ(kDummyLastActiveTime,
tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)->GetLastActiveTime());
source_->SetFocusedTabStripModelForTesting(nullptr);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple use-after-free vulnerabilities in the formfiller implementation in PDFium, as used in Google Chrome before 48.0.2564.82, allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted PDF document, related to improper tracking of the destruction of (1) IPWL_FocusHandler and (2) IPWL_Provider objects.
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871} | Medium | 172,226 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: RenderThread::~RenderThread() {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(
RenderProcessObserver, observers_, OnRenderProcessShutdown());
if (web_database_observer_impl_.get())
web_database_observer_impl_->WaitForAllDatabasesToClose();
RemoveFilter(audio_input_message_filter_.get());
audio_input_message_filter_ = NULL;
RemoveFilter(audio_message_filter_.get());
audio_message_filter_ = NULL;
RemoveFilter(vc_manager_->video_capture_message_filter());
RemoveFilter(db_message_filter_.get());
db_message_filter_ = NULL;
if (file_thread_.get())
file_thread_->Stop();
if (webkit_client_.get())
WebKit::shutdown();
lazy_tls.Pointer()->Set(NULL);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
PluginChannelBase::CleanupChannels();
if (RenderProcessImpl::InProcessPlugins())
CoUninitialize();
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163 does not properly handle strings in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted document that triggers an incorrect read operation.
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,327 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: user_change_icon_file_authorized_cb (Daemon *daemon,
User *user,
GDBusMethodInvocation *context,
gpointer data)
{
g_autofree gchar *filename = NULL;
g_autoptr(GFile) file = NULL;
g_autoptr(GFileInfo) info = NULL;
guint32 mode;
GFileType type;
guint64 size;
filename = g_strdup (data);
if (filename == NULL ||
*filename == '\0') {
g_autofree gchar *dest_path = NULL;
g_autoptr(GFile) dest = NULL;
g_autoptr(GError) error = NULL;
g_clear_pointer (&filename, g_free);
dest_path = g_build_filename (ICONDIR, accounts_user_get_user_name (ACCOUNTS_USER (user)), NULL);
dest = g_file_new_for_path (dest_path);
if (!g_file_delete (dest, NULL, &error) &&
!g_error_matches (error, G_IO_ERROR, G_IO_ERROR_NOT_FOUND)) {
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "failed to remove user icon, %s", error->message);
return;
}
goto icon_saved;
}
file = g_file_new_for_path (filename);
info = g_file_query_info (file, G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_UNIX_MODE ","
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_TYPE ","
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_SIZE,
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: Dir. Trav.
CWE ID: CWE-22
Summary: Directory Traversal with ../ sequences occurs in AccountsService before 0.6.50 because of an insufficient path check in user_change_icon_file_authorized_cb() in user.c.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,759 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadDCMImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
explicit_vr[MagickPathExtent],
implicit_vr[MagickPathExtent],
magick[MagickPathExtent],
photometric[MagickPathExtent];
DCMStreamInfo
*stream_info;
Image
*image;
int
*bluemap,
datum,
*greenmap,
*graymap,
index,
*redmap;
MagickBooleanType
explicit_file,
explicit_retry,
polarity,
sequence,
use_explicit;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
Quantum
*scale;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register Quantum
*q;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bits_allocated,
bytes_per_pixel,
colors,
depth,
height,
length,
mask,
max_value,
number_scenes,
quantum,
samples_per_pixel,
signed_data,
significant_bits,
status,
width,
window_width;
ssize_t
count,
rescale_intercept,
rescale_slope,
scene,
window_center,
y;
unsigned char
*data;
unsigned short
group,
element;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image->depth=8UL;
image->endian=LSBEndian;
/*
Read DCM preamble.
*/
stream_info=(DCMStreamInfo *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*stream_info));
if (stream_info == (DCMStreamInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ResetMagickMemory(stream_info,0,sizeof(*stream_info));
count=ReadBlob(image,128,(unsigned char *) magick);
if (count != 128)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) magick);
if ((count != 4) || (LocaleNCompare(magick,"DICM",4) != 0))
{
offset=SeekBlob(image,0L,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
/*
Read DCM Medical image.
*/
(void) CopyMagickString(photometric,"MONOCHROME1 ",MagickPathExtent);
bits_allocated=8;
bytes_per_pixel=1;
polarity=MagickFalse;
data=(unsigned char *) NULL;
depth=8;
element=0;
explicit_vr[2]='\0';
explicit_file=MagickFalse;
colors=0;
redmap=(int *) NULL;
greenmap=(int *) NULL;
bluemap=(int *) NULL;
graymap=(int *) NULL;
height=0;
max_value=255UL;
mask=0xffff;
number_scenes=1;
rescale_intercept=0;
rescale_slope=1;
samples_per_pixel=1;
scale=(Quantum *) NULL;
sequence=MagickFalse;
signed_data=(~0UL);
significant_bits=0;
use_explicit=MagickFalse;
explicit_retry = MagickFalse;
width=0;
window_center=0;
window_width=0;
for (group=0; (group != 0x7FE0) || (element != 0x0010) ||
(sequence != MagickFalse); )
{
/*
Read a group.
*/
image->offset=(ssize_t) TellBlob(image);
group=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
element=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((group != 0x0002) && (image->endian == MSBEndian))
{
group=(unsigned short) ((group << 8) | ((group >> 8) & 0xFF));
element=(unsigned short) ((element << 8) | ((element >> 8) & 0xFF));
}
quantum=0;
/*
Find corresponding VR for this group and element.
*/
for (i=0; dicom_info[i].group < 0xffff; i++)
if ((group == dicom_info[i].group) && (element == dicom_info[i].element))
break;
(void) CopyMagickString(implicit_vr,dicom_info[i].vr,MagickPathExtent);
count=ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) explicit_vr);
if (count != 2)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*
Check for "explicitness", but meta-file headers always explicit.
*/
if ((explicit_file == MagickFalse) && (group != 0x0002))
explicit_file=(isupper((unsigned char) *explicit_vr) != MagickFalse) &&
(isupper((unsigned char) *(explicit_vr+1)) != MagickFalse) ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
use_explicit=((group == 0x0002) && (explicit_retry == MagickFalse)) ||
(explicit_file != MagickFalse) ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if ((use_explicit != MagickFalse) && (strncmp(implicit_vr,"xs",2) == 0))
(void) CopyMagickString(implicit_vr,explicit_vr,MagickPathExtent);
if ((use_explicit == MagickFalse) || (strncmp(implicit_vr,"!!",2) == 0))
{
offset=SeekBlob(image,(MagickOffsetType) -2,SEEK_CUR);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
quantum=4;
}
else
{
/*
Assume explicit type.
*/
quantum=2;
if ((strncmp(explicit_vr,"OB",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(explicit_vr,"UN",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(explicit_vr,"OW",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(explicit_vr,"SQ",2) == 0))
{
(void) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
quantum=4;
}
}
datum=0;
if (quantum == 4)
{
if (group == 0x0002)
datum=ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
else
datum=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
}
else
if (quantum == 2)
{
if (group == 0x0002)
datum=ReadBlobLSBSignedShort(image);
else
datum=ReadBlobSignedShort(image);
}
quantum=0;
length=1;
if (datum != 0)
{
if ((strncmp(implicit_vr,"SS",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(implicit_vr,"US",2) == 0))
quantum=2;
else
if ((strncmp(implicit_vr,"UL",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(implicit_vr,"SL",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(implicit_vr,"FL",2) == 0))
quantum=4;
else
if (strncmp(implicit_vr,"FD",2) != 0)
quantum=1;
else
quantum=8;
if (datum != ~0)
length=(size_t) datum/quantum;
else
{
/*
Sequence and item of undefined length.
*/
quantum=0;
length=0;
}
}
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Display Dicom info.
*/
if (use_explicit == MagickFalse)
explicit_vr[0]='\0';
for (i=0; dicom_info[i].description != (char *) NULL; i++)
if ((group == dicom_info[i].group) &&
(element == dicom_info[i].element))
break;
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"0x%04lX %4ld %s-%s (0x%04lx,0x%04lx)",
(unsigned long) image->offset,(long) length,implicit_vr,explicit_vr,
(unsigned long) group,(unsigned long) element);
if (dicom_info[i].description != (char *) NULL)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout," %s",dicom_info[i].description);
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,": ");
}
if ((sequence == MagickFalse) && (group == 0x7FE0) && (element == 0x0010))
{
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"\n");
break;
}
/*
Allocate space and read an array.
*/
data=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if ((length == 1) && (quantum == 1))
datum=ReadBlobByte(image);
else
if ((length == 1) && (quantum == 2))
{
if (group == 0x0002)
datum=ReadBlobLSBSignedShort(image);
else
datum=ReadBlobSignedShort(image);
}
else
if ((length == 1) && (quantum == 4))
{
if (group == 0x0002)
datum=ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
else
datum=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
}
else
if ((quantum != 0) && (length != 0))
{
if (~length >= 1)
data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+1,quantum*
sizeof(*data));
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) quantum*length,data);
if (count != (ssize_t) (quantum*length))
{
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"count=%d quantum=%d "
"length=%d group=%d\n",(int) count,(int) quantum,(int)
length,(int) group);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
}
data[length*quantum]='\0';
}
else
if ((unsigned int) datum == 0xFFFFFFFFU)
{
sequence=MagickTrue;
continue;
}
if ((unsigned int) ((group << 16) | element) == 0xFFFEE0DD)
{
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data);
sequence=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
if (sequence != MagickFalse)
{
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data);
continue;
}
switch (group)
{
case 0x0002:
{
switch (element)
{
case 0x0010:
{
char
transfer_syntax[MagickPathExtent];
/*
Transfer Syntax.
*/
if ((datum == 0) && (explicit_retry == MagickFalse))
{
explicit_retry=MagickTrue;
(void) SeekBlob(image,(MagickOffsetType) 0,SEEK_SET);
group=0;
element=0;
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,
"Corrupted image - trying explicit format\n");
break;
}
*transfer_syntax='\0';
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
(void) CopyMagickString(transfer_syntax,(char *) data,
MagickPathExtent);
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"transfer_syntax=%s\n",
(const char *) transfer_syntax);
if (strncmp(transfer_syntax,"1.2.840.10008.1.2",17) == 0)
{
int
count,
subtype,
type;
type=1;
subtype=0;
if (strlen(transfer_syntax) > 17)
{
count=sscanf(transfer_syntax+17,".%d.%d",&type,&subtype);
if (count < 1)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"ImproperImageHeader");
}
switch (type)
{
case 1:
{
image->endian=LSBEndian;
break;
}
case 2:
{
image->endian=MSBEndian;
break;
}
case 4:
{
if ((subtype >= 80) && (subtype <= 81))
image->compression=JPEGCompression;
else
if ((subtype >= 90) && (subtype <= 93))
image->compression=JPEG2000Compression;
else
image->compression=JPEGCompression;
break;
}
case 5:
{
image->compression=RLECompression;
break;
}
}
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
break;
}
case 0x0028:
{
switch (element)
{
case 0x0002:
{
/*
Samples per pixel.
*/
samples_per_pixel=(size_t) datum;
break;
}
case 0x0004:
{
/*
Photometric interpretation.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) MagickMin(length,MagickPathExtent-1); i++)
photometric[i]=(char) data[i];
photometric[i]='\0';
polarity=LocaleCompare(photometric,"MONOCHROME1 ") == 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
break;
}
case 0x0006:
{
/*
Planar configuration.
*/
if (datum == 1)
image->interlace=PlaneInterlace;
break;
}
case 0x0008:
{
/*
Number of frames.
*/
number_scenes=StringToUnsignedLong((char *) data);
break;
}
case 0x0010:
{
/*
Image rows.
*/
height=(size_t) datum;
break;
}
case 0x0011:
{
/*
Image columns.
*/
width=(size_t) datum;
break;
}
case 0x0100:
{
/*
Bits allocated.
*/
bits_allocated=(size_t) datum;
bytes_per_pixel=1;
if (datum > 8)
bytes_per_pixel=2;
depth=bits_allocated;
if (depth > 32)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
max_value=(1UL << bits_allocated)-1;
break;
}
case 0x0101:
{
/*
Bits stored.
*/
significant_bits=(size_t) datum;
bytes_per_pixel=1;
if (significant_bits > 8)
bytes_per_pixel=2;
depth=significant_bits;
if (depth > 32)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
max_value=(1UL << significant_bits)-1;
mask=(size_t) GetQuantumRange(significant_bits);
break;
}
case 0x0102:
{
/*
High bit.
*/
break;
}
case 0x0103:
{
/*
Pixel representation.
*/
signed_data=(size_t) datum;
break;
}
case 0x1050:
{
/*
Visible pixel range: center.
*/
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
window_center=(ssize_t) StringToLong((char *) data);
break;
}
case 0x1051:
{
/*
Visible pixel range: width.
*/
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
window_width=StringToUnsignedLong((char *) data);
break;
}
case 0x1052:
{
/*
Rescale intercept
*/
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
rescale_intercept=(ssize_t) StringToLong((char *) data);
break;
}
case 0x1053:
{
/*
Rescale slope
*/
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
rescale_slope=(ssize_t) StringToLong((char *) data);
break;
}
case 0x1200:
case 0x3006:
{
/*
Populate graymap.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
colors=(size_t) (length/bytes_per_pixel);
datum=(int) colors;
graymap=(int *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) colors,
sizeof(*graymap));
if (graymap == (int *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
if (bytes_per_pixel == 1)
graymap[i]=(int) data[i];
else
graymap[i]=(int) ((short *) data)[i];
break;
}
case 0x1201:
{
unsigned short
index;
/*
Populate redmap.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
colors=(size_t) (length/2);
datum=(int) colors;
redmap=(int *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) colors,
sizeof(*redmap));
if (redmap == (int *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
p=data;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
if (image->endian == MSBEndian)
index=(unsigned short) ((*p << 8) | *(p+1));
else
index=(unsigned short) (*p | (*(p+1) << 8));
redmap[i]=(int) index;
p+=2;
}
break;
}
case 0x1202:
{
unsigned short
index;
/*
Populate greenmap.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
colors=(size_t) (length/2);
datum=(int) colors;
greenmap=(int *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) colors,
sizeof(*greenmap));
if (greenmap == (int *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
p=data;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
if (image->endian == MSBEndian)
index=(unsigned short) ((*p << 8) | *(p+1));
else
index=(unsigned short) (*p | (*(p+1) << 8));
greenmap[i]=(int) index;
p+=2;
}
break;
}
case 0x1203:
{
unsigned short
index;
/*
Populate bluemap.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
colors=(size_t) (length/2);
datum=(int) colors;
bluemap=(int *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) colors,
sizeof(*bluemap));
if (bluemap == (int *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
p=data;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
if (image->endian == MSBEndian)
index=(unsigned short) ((*p << 8) | *(p+1));
else
index=(unsigned short) (*p | (*(p+1) << 8));
bluemap[i]=(int) index;
p+=2;
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
break;
}
case 0x2050:
{
switch (element)
{
case 0x0020:
{
if ((data != (unsigned char *) NULL) &&
(strncmp((char *) data,"INVERSE",7) == 0))
polarity=MagickTrue;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
char
*attribute;
for (i=0; dicom_info[i].description != (char *) NULL; i++)
if ((group == dicom_info[i].group) &&
(element == dicom_info[i].element))
break;
if (dicom_info[i].description != (char *) NULL)
{
attribute=AcquireString("dcm:");
(void) ConcatenateString(&attribute,dicom_info[i].description);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) MagickMax(length,4); i++)
if (isprint((int) data[i]) == MagickFalse)
break;
if ((i == (ssize_t) length) || (length > 4))
{
(void) SubstituteString(&attribute," ","");
(void) SetImageProperty(image,attribute,(char *) data,exception);
}
attribute=DestroyString(attribute);
}
}
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
{
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%d\n",datum);
else
{
/*
Display group data.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) MagickMax(length,4); i++)
if (isprint((int) data[i]) == MagickFalse)
break;
if ((i != (ssize_t) length) && (length <= 4))
{
ssize_t
j;
datum=0;
for (j=(ssize_t) length-1; j >= 0; j--)
datum=(256*datum+data[j]);
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%d",datum);
}
else
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
if (isprint((int) data[i]) != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%c",data[i]);
else
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%c",'.');
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"\n");
}
}
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
}
if ((width == 0) || (height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
image->columns=(size_t) width;
image->rows=(size_t) height;
if (signed_data == 0xffff)
signed_data=(size_t) (significant_bits == 16 ? 1 : 0);
if ((image->compression == JPEGCompression) ||
(image->compression == JPEG2000Compression))
{
Image
*images;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
int
c;
size_t
length;
unsigned int
tag;
/*
Read offset table.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->remaining; i++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
tag=(ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 16) | ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
(void) tag;
length=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
stream_info->offset_count=length >> 2;
if (stream_info->offset_count != 0)
{
MagickOffsetType
offset;
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *) AcquireQuantumMemory(
stream_info->offset_count,sizeof(*stream_info->offsets));
if (stream_info->offsets == (ssize_t *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->offset_count; i++)
stream_info->offsets[i]=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
offset=TellBlob(image);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->offset_count; i++)
stream_info->offsets[i]+=offset;
}
/*
Handle non-native image formats.
*/
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
SetImageInfoBlob(read_info,(void *) NULL,0);
images=NewImageList();
for (scene=0; scene < (ssize_t) number_scenes; scene++)
{
char
filename[MagickPathExtent];
const char
*property;
FILE
*file;
Image
*jpeg_image;
int
unique_file;
unsigned int
tag;
tag=(ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 16) | ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
length=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (tag == 0xFFFEE0DD)
break; /* sequence delimiter tag */
if (tag != 0xFFFEE000)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
file=(FILE *) NULL;
unique_file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(filename);
if (unique_file != -1)
file=fdopen(unique_file,"wb");
if (file == (FILE *) NULL)
{
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
ThrowFileException(exception,FileOpenError,
"UnableToCreateTemporaryFile",filename);
break;
}
for ( ; length != 0; length--)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
(void) fputc(c,file);
}
(void) fclose(file);
(void) FormatLocaleString(read_info->filename,MagickPathExtent,
"jpeg:%s",filename);
if (image->compression == JPEG2000Compression)
(void) FormatLocaleString(read_info->filename,MagickPathExtent,
"j2k:%s",filename);
jpeg_image=ReadImage(read_info,exception);
if (jpeg_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
ResetImagePropertyIterator(image);
property=GetNextImageProperty(image);
while (property != (const char *) NULL)
{
(void) SetImageProperty(jpeg_image,property,
GetImageProperty(image,property,exception),exception);
property=GetNextImageProperty(image);
}
AppendImageToList(&images,jpeg_image);
}
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
}
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
image=DestroyImage(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(images));
}
if (depth != (1UL*MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH))
{
QuantumAny
range;
size_t
length;
/*
Compute pixel scaling table.
*/
length=(size_t) (GetQuantumRange(depth)+1);
scale=(Quantum *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*scale));
if (scale == (Quantum *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
range=GetQuantumRange(depth);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (GetQuantumRange(depth)+1); i++)
scale[i]=ScaleAnyToQuantum((size_t) i,range);
}
if (image->compression == RLECompression)
{
size_t
length;
unsigned int
tag;
/*
Read RLE offset table.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->remaining; i++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
tag=(ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 16) | ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
(void) tag;
length=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
stream_info->offset_count=length >> 2;
if (stream_info->offset_count != 0)
{
MagickOffsetType
offset;
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *) AcquireQuantumMemory(
stream_info->offset_count,sizeof(*stream_info->offsets));
if (stream_info->offsets == (ssize_t *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->offset_count; i++)
stream_info->offsets[i]=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
offset=TellBlob(image);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->offset_count; i++)
stream_info->offsets[i]+=offset;
}
}
for (scene=0; scene < (ssize_t) number_scenes; scene++)
{
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
break;
image->columns=(size_t) width;
image->rows=(size_t) height;
image->depth=depth;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
image->colorspace=RGBColorspace;
if ((image->colormap == (PixelInfo *) NULL) && (samples_per_pixel == 1))
{
size_t
one;
one=1;
if (colors == 0)
colors=one << depth;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,one << depth,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (redmap != (int *) NULL)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
index=redmap[i];
if ((scale != (Quantum *) NULL) && (index <= (int) max_value))
index=(int) scale[index];
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType) index;
}
if (greenmap != (int *) NULL)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
index=greenmap[i];
if ((scale != (Quantum *) NULL) && (index <= (int) max_value))
index=(int) scale[index];
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType) index;
}
if (bluemap != (int *) NULL)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
index=bluemap[i];
if ((scale != (Quantum *) NULL) && (index <= (int) max_value))
index=(int) scale[index];
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType) index;
}
if (graymap != (int *) NULL)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
index=graymap[i];
if ((scale != (Quantum *) NULL) && (index <= (int) max_value))
index=(int) scale[index];
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType) index;
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType) index;
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType) index;
}
}
if (image->compression == RLECompression)
{
unsigned int
tag;
/*
Read RLE segment table.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->remaining; i++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
tag=(ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 16) | ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
stream_info->remaining=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if ((tag != 0xFFFEE000) || (stream_info->remaining <= 64) ||
(EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
stream_info->count=0;
stream_info->segment_count=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (stream_info->segment_count > 1)
{
bytes_per_pixel=1;
depth=8;
}
for (i=0; i < 15; i++)
stream_info->segments[i]=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
stream_info->remaining-=64;
}
if ((samples_per_pixel > 1) && (image->interlace == PlaneInterlace))
{
/*
Convert Planar RGB DCM Medical image to pixel packets.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) samples_per_pixel; i++)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
switch ((int) i)
{
case 0:
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)),q);
break;
}
case 1:
{
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)),q);
break;
}
case 2:
{
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)),q);
break;
}
case 3:
{
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)),q);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
}
else
{
const char
*option;
int
byte;
PixelPacket
pixel;
/*
Convert DCM Medical image to pixel packets.
*/
byte=0;
i=0;
if ((window_center != 0) && (window_width == 0))
window_width=(size_t) window_center;
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"dcm:display-range");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleCompare(option,"reset") == 0)
window_width=0;
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&pixel,0,sizeof(pixel));
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (samples_per_pixel == 1)
{
int
pixel_value;
if (bytes_per_pixel == 1)
pixel_value=polarity != MagickFalse ?
((int) max_value-ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)) :
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image);
else
if ((bits_allocated != 12) || (significant_bits != 12))
{
if (signed_data)
pixel_value=ReadDCMSignedShort(stream_info,image);
else
pixel_value=ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image);
if (polarity != MagickFalse)
pixel_value=(int)max_value-pixel_value;
}
else
{
if ((i & 0x01) != 0)
pixel_value=(ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image) << 8) |
byte;
else
{
pixel_value=ReadDCMSignedShort(stream_info,image);
byte=(int) (pixel_value & 0x0f);
pixel_value>>=4;
}
i++;
}
index=(pixel_value*rescale_slope)+rescale_intercept;
if (window_width == 0)
{
if (signed_data == 1)
index-=32767;
}
else
{
ssize_t
window_max,
window_min;
window_min=(ssize_t) ceil((double) window_center-
(window_width-1.0)/2.0-0.5);
window_max=(ssize_t) floor((double) window_center+
(window_width-1.0)/2.0+0.5);
if ((ssize_t)index <= window_min)
index=0;
else
if ((ssize_t)index > window_max)
index=(int) max_value;
else
index=(int) (max_value*(((index-window_center-
0.5)/(window_width-1))+0.5));
}
index&=mask;
index=(int) ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(size_t) index,
exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) index,q);
pixel.red=(unsigned int) image->colormap[index].red;
pixel.green=(unsigned int) image->colormap[index].green;
pixel.blue=(unsigned int) image->colormap[index].blue;
}
else
{
if (bytes_per_pixel == 1)
{
pixel.red=(unsigned int) ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image);
pixel.green=(unsigned int) ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image);
pixel.blue=(unsigned int) ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image);
}
else
{
pixel.red=ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image);
pixel.green=ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image);
pixel.blue=ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image);
}
pixel.red&=mask;
pixel.green&=mask;
pixel.blue&=mask;
if (scale != (Quantum *) NULL)
{
pixel.red=scale[pixel.red];
pixel.green=scale[pixel.green];
pixel.blue=scale[pixel.blue];
}
}
SetPixelRed(image,(Quantum) pixel.red,q);
SetPixelGreen(image,(Quantum) pixel.green,q);
SetPixelBlue(image,(Quantum) pixel.blue,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (stream_info->segment_count > 1)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (samples_per_pixel == 1)
{
int
pixel_value;
if (bytes_per_pixel == 1)
pixel_value=polarity != MagickFalse ?
((int) max_value-ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)) :
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image);
else
if ((bits_allocated != 12) || (significant_bits != 12))
{
pixel_value=(int) (polarity != MagickFalse ?
(max_value-ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image)) :
ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image));
if (signed_data == 1)
pixel_value=((signed short) pixel_value);
}
else
{
if ((i & 0x01) != 0)
pixel_value=(ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image) << 8) |
byte;
else
{
pixel_value=ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image);
byte=(int) (pixel_value & 0x0f);
pixel_value>>=4;
}
i++;
}
index=(pixel_value*rescale_slope)+rescale_intercept;
if (window_width == 0)
{
if (signed_data == 1)
index-=32767;
}
else
{
ssize_t
window_max,
window_min;
window_min=(ssize_t) ceil((double) window_center-
(window_width-1.0)/2.0-0.5);
window_max=(ssize_t) floor((double) window_center+
(window_width-1.0)/2.0+0.5);
if ((ssize_t)index <= window_min)
index=0;
else
if ((ssize_t)index > window_max)
index=(int) max_value;
else
index=(int) (max_value*(((index-window_center-
0.5)/(window_width-1))+0.5));
}
index&=mask;
index=(int) ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(size_t) index,
exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) (((size_t)
GetPixelIndex(image,q)) | (((size_t) index) << 8)),q);
pixel.red=(unsigned int) image->colormap[index].red;
pixel.green=(unsigned int) image->colormap[index].green;
pixel.blue=(unsigned int) image->colormap[index].blue;
}
else
{
if (bytes_per_pixel == 1)
{
pixel.red=(unsigned int) ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image);
pixel.green=(unsigned int) ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image);
pixel.blue=(unsigned int) ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image);
}
else
{
pixel.red=ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image);
pixel.green=ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image);
pixel.blue=ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image);
}
pixel.red&=mask;
pixel.green&=mask;
pixel.blue&=mask;
if (scale != (Quantum *) NULL)
{
pixel.red=scale[pixel.red];
pixel.green=scale[pixel.green];
pixel.blue=scale[pixel.blue];
}
}
SetPixelRed(image,(Quantum) (((size_t) GetPixelRed(image,q)) |
(((size_t) pixel.red) << 8)),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,(Quantum) (((size_t) GetPixelGreen(image,q)) |
(((size_t) pixel.green) << 8)),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,(Quantum) (((size_t) GetPixelBlue(image,q)) |
(((size_t) pixel.blue) << 8)),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
if (SetImageGray(image,exception) != MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if (scene < (ssize_t) (number_scenes-1))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
/*
Free resources.
*/
if (stream_info->offsets != (ssize_t *) NULL)
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *)
RelinquishMagickMemory(stream_info->offsets);
stream_info=(DCMStreamInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(stream_info);
if (scale != (Quantum *) NULL)
scale=(Quantum *) RelinquishMagickMemory(scale);
if (graymap != (int *) NULL)
graymap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(graymap);
if (bluemap != (int *) NULL)
bluemap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bluemap);
if (greenmap != (int *) NULL)
greenmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(greenmap);
if (redmap != (int *) NULL)
redmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(redmap);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The DCM reader in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 and 7.x before 7.0.1-7 allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact by leveraging lack of validation of (1) pixel.red, (2) pixel.green, and (3) pixel.blue.
Commit Message: Add additional checks to DCM reader to prevent data-driven faults (bug report from Hanno Böck | High | 167,134 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t bat_socket_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct socket_client *socket_client = file->private_data;
struct socket_packet *socket_packet;
size_t packet_len;
int error;
if ((file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) && (socket_client->queue_len == 0))
return -EAGAIN;
if ((!buf) || (count < sizeof(struct icmp_packet)))
return -EINVAL;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, buf, count))
return -EFAULT;
error = wait_event_interruptible(socket_client->queue_wait,
socket_client->queue_len);
if (error)
return error;
spin_lock_bh(&socket_client->lock);
socket_packet = list_first_entry(&socket_client->queue_list,
struct socket_packet, list);
list_del(&socket_packet->list);
socket_client->queue_len--;
spin_unlock_bh(&socket_client->lock);
error = copy_to_user(buf, &socket_packet->icmp_packet,
socket_packet->icmp_len);
packet_len = socket_packet->icmp_len;
kfree(socket_packet);
if (error)
return -EFAULT;
return packet_len;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The bat_socket_read function in net/batman-adv/icmp_socket.c in the Linux kernel before 3.3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted batman-adv ICMP packet.
Commit Message: batman-adv: Only write requested number of byte to user buffer
Don't write more than the requested number of bytes of an batman-adv icmp
packet to the userspace buffer. Otherwise unrelated userspace memory might get
overridden by the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,207 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: TEE_Result syscall_cryp_derive_key(unsigned long state,
const struct utee_attribute *usr_params,
unsigned long param_count, unsigned long derived_key)
{
TEE_Result res = TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
struct tee_ta_session *sess;
struct tee_obj *ko;
struct tee_obj *so;
struct tee_cryp_state *cs;
struct tee_cryp_obj_secret *sk;
const struct tee_cryp_obj_type_props *type_props;
TEE_Attribute *params = NULL;
struct user_ta_ctx *utc;
res = tee_ta_get_current_session(&sess);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
utc = to_user_ta_ctx(sess->ctx);
res = tee_svc_cryp_get_state(sess, tee_svc_uref_to_vaddr(state), &cs);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
params = malloc(sizeof(TEE_Attribute) * param_count);
if (!params)
return TEE_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
res = copy_in_attrs(utc, usr_params, param_count, params);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
/* Get key set in operation */
res = tee_obj_get(utc, cs->key1, &ko);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
res = tee_obj_get(utc, tee_svc_uref_to_vaddr(derived_key), &so);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
/* Find information needed about the object to initialize */
sk = so->attr;
/* Find description of object */
type_props = tee_svc_find_type_props(so->info.objectType);
if (!type_props) {
res = TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
goto out;
}
if (cs->algo == TEE_ALG_DH_DERIVE_SHARED_SECRET) {
size_t alloc_size;
struct bignum *pub;
struct bignum *ss;
if (param_count != 1 ||
params[0].attributeID != TEE_ATTR_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
goto out;
}
alloc_size = params[0].content.ref.length * 8;
pub = crypto_bignum_allocate(alloc_size);
ss = crypto_bignum_allocate(alloc_size);
if (pub && ss) {
crypto_bignum_bin2bn(params[0].content.ref.buffer,
params[0].content.ref.length, pub);
res = crypto_acipher_dh_shared_secret(ko->attr,
pub, ss);
if (res == TEE_SUCCESS) {
sk->key_size = crypto_bignum_num_bytes(ss);
crypto_bignum_bn2bin(ss, (uint8_t *)(sk + 1));
so->info.handleFlags |=
TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED;
set_attribute(so, type_props,
TEE_ATTR_SECRET_VALUE);
}
} else {
res = TEE_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
crypto_bignum_free(pub);
crypto_bignum_free(ss);
} else if (TEE_ALG_GET_MAIN_ALG(cs->algo) == TEE_MAIN_ALGO_ECDH) {
size_t alloc_size;
struct ecc_public_key key_public;
uint8_t *pt_secret;
unsigned long pt_secret_len;
if (param_count != 2 ||
params[0].attributeID != TEE_ATTR_ECC_PUBLIC_VALUE_X ||
params[1].attributeID != TEE_ATTR_ECC_PUBLIC_VALUE_Y) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
goto out;
}
switch (cs->algo) {
case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P192:
alloc_size = 192;
break;
case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P224:
alloc_size = 224;
break;
case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P256:
alloc_size = 256;
break;
case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P384:
alloc_size = 384;
break;
case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P521:
alloc_size = 521;
break;
default:
res = TEE_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
goto out;
}
/* Create the public key */
res = crypto_acipher_alloc_ecc_public_key(&key_public,
alloc_size);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
key_public.curve = ((struct ecc_keypair *)ko->attr)->curve;
crypto_bignum_bin2bn(params[0].content.ref.buffer,
params[0].content.ref.length,
key_public.x);
crypto_bignum_bin2bn(params[1].content.ref.buffer,
params[1].content.ref.length,
key_public.y);
pt_secret = (uint8_t *)(sk + 1);
pt_secret_len = sk->alloc_size;
res = crypto_acipher_ecc_shared_secret(ko->attr, &key_public,
pt_secret,
&pt_secret_len);
if (res == TEE_SUCCESS) {
sk->key_size = pt_secret_len;
so->info.handleFlags |= TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED;
set_attribute(so, type_props, TEE_ATTR_SECRET_VALUE);
}
/* free the public key */
crypto_acipher_free_ecc_public_key(&key_public);
}
#if defined(CFG_CRYPTO_HKDF)
else if (TEE_ALG_GET_MAIN_ALG(cs->algo) == TEE_MAIN_ALGO_HKDF) {
void *salt, *info;
size_t salt_len, info_len, okm_len;
uint32_t hash_id = TEE_ALG_GET_DIGEST_HASH(cs->algo);
struct tee_cryp_obj_secret *ik = ko->attr;
const uint8_t *ikm = (const uint8_t *)(ik + 1);
res = get_hkdf_params(params, param_count, &salt, &salt_len,
&info, &info_len, &okm_len);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
/* Requested size must fit into the output object's buffer */
if (okm_len > ik->alloc_size) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
goto out;
}
res = tee_cryp_hkdf(hash_id, ikm, ik->key_size, salt, salt_len,
info, info_len, (uint8_t *)(sk + 1),
okm_len);
if (res == TEE_SUCCESS) {
sk->key_size = okm_len;
so->info.handleFlags |= TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED;
set_attribute(so, type_props, TEE_ATTR_SECRET_VALUE);
}
}
#endif
#if defined(CFG_CRYPTO_CONCAT_KDF)
else if (TEE_ALG_GET_MAIN_ALG(cs->algo) == TEE_MAIN_ALGO_CONCAT_KDF) {
void *info;
size_t info_len, derived_key_len;
uint32_t hash_id = TEE_ALG_GET_DIGEST_HASH(cs->algo);
struct tee_cryp_obj_secret *ss = ko->attr;
const uint8_t *shared_secret = (const uint8_t *)(ss + 1);
res = get_concat_kdf_params(params, param_count, &info,
&info_len, &derived_key_len);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
/* Requested size must fit into the output object's buffer */
if (derived_key_len > ss->alloc_size) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
goto out;
}
res = tee_cryp_concat_kdf(hash_id, shared_secret, ss->key_size,
info, info_len, (uint8_t *)(sk + 1),
derived_key_len);
if (res == TEE_SUCCESS) {
sk->key_size = derived_key_len;
so->info.handleFlags |= TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED;
set_attribute(so, type_props, TEE_ATTR_SECRET_VALUE);
}
}
#endif
#if defined(CFG_CRYPTO_PBKDF2)
else if (TEE_ALG_GET_MAIN_ALG(cs->algo) == TEE_MAIN_ALGO_PBKDF2) {
void *salt;
size_t salt_len, iteration_count, derived_key_len;
uint32_t hash_id = TEE_ALG_GET_DIGEST_HASH(cs->algo);
struct tee_cryp_obj_secret *ss = ko->attr;
const uint8_t *password = (const uint8_t *)(ss + 1);
res = get_pbkdf2_params(params, param_count, &salt, &salt_len,
&derived_key_len, &iteration_count);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
/* Requested size must fit into the output object's buffer */
if (derived_key_len > ss->alloc_size) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
goto out;
}
res = tee_cryp_pbkdf2(hash_id, password, ss->key_size, salt,
salt_len, iteration_count,
(uint8_t *)(sk + 1), derived_key_len);
if (res == TEE_SUCCESS) {
sk->key_size = derived_key_len;
so->info.handleFlags |= TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED;
set_attribute(so, type_props, TEE_ATTR_SECRET_VALUE);
}
}
#endif
else
res = TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
out:
free(params);
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Linaro/OP-TEE OP-TEE 3.3.0 and earlier is affected by: Buffer Overflow. The impact is: Execution of code in TEE core (kernel) context. The component is: optee_os. The fixed version is: 3.4.0 and later.
Commit Message: svc: check for allocation overflow in crypto calls
Without checking for overflow there is a risk of allocating a buffer
with size smaller than anticipated and as a consequence of that it might
lead to a heap based overflow with attacker controlled data written
outside the boundaries of the buffer.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0010: "Integer overflow in crypto system calls (x2)"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Riscure <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <[email protected]> | High | 169,467 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void dex_parse_debug_item(RBinFile *binfile, RBinDexObj *bin,
RBinDexClass *c, int MI, int MA, int paddr, int ins_size,
int insns_size, char *class_name, int regsz,
int debug_info_off) {
struct r_bin_t *rbin = binfile->rbin;
const ut8 *p4 = r_buf_get_at (binfile->buf, debug_info_off, NULL);
const ut8 *p4_end = p4 + binfile->buf->length - debug_info_off;
ut64 line_start;
ut64 parameters_size;
ut64 param_type_idx;
ut16 argReg = regsz - ins_size;
ut64 source_file_idx = c->source_file;
RList *params, *debug_positions, *emitted_debug_locals = NULL;
bool keep = true;
if (argReg >= regsz) {
}
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, &line_start);
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, ¶meters_size);
ut32 address = 0;
ut32 line = line_start;
if (!(debug_positions = r_list_newf ((RListFree)free))) {
return;
}
if (!(emitted_debug_locals = r_list_newf ((RListFree)free))) {
r_list_free (debug_positions);
return;
}
struct dex_debug_local_t debug_locals[regsz];
memset (debug_locals, 0, sizeof (struct dex_debug_local_t) * regsz);
if (!(MA & 0x0008)) {
debug_locals[argReg].name = "this";
debug_locals[argReg].descriptor = r_str_newf("%s;", class_name);
debug_locals[argReg].startAddress = 0;
debug_locals[argReg].signature = NULL;
debug_locals[argReg].live = true;
argReg++;
}
if (!(params = dex_method_signature2 (bin, MI))) {
r_list_free (debug_positions);
r_list_free (emitted_debug_locals);
return;
}
RListIter *iter = r_list_iterator (params);
char *name;
char *type;
int reg;
r_list_foreach (params, iter, type) {
if ((argReg >= regsz) || !type || parameters_size <= 0) {
r_list_free (debug_positions);
r_list_free (params);
r_list_free (emitted_debug_locals);
return;
}
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, ¶m_type_idx); // read uleb128p1
param_type_idx -= 1;
name = getstr (bin, param_type_idx);
reg = argReg;
switch (type[0]) {
case 'D':
case 'J':
argReg += 2;
break;
default:
argReg += 1;
break;
}
if (name) {
debug_locals[reg].name = name;
debug_locals[reg].descriptor = type;
debug_locals[reg].signature = NULL;
debug_locals[reg].startAddress = address;
debug_locals[reg].live = true;
}
--parameters_size;
}
ut8 opcode = *(p4++) & 0xff;
while (keep) {
switch (opcode) {
case 0x0: // DBG_END_SEQUENCE
keep = false;
break;
case 0x1: // DBG_ADVANCE_PC
{
ut64 addr_diff;
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, &addr_diff);
address += addr_diff;
}
break;
case 0x2: // DBG_ADVANCE_LINE
{
st64 line_diff = r_sleb128 (&p4, p4_end);
line += line_diff;
}
break;
case 0x3: // DBG_START_LOCAL
{
ut64 register_num;
ut64 name_idx;
ut64 type_idx;
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, ®ister_num);
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, &name_idx);
name_idx -= 1;
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, &type_idx);
type_idx -= 1;
if (register_num >= regsz) {
r_list_free (debug_positions);
r_list_free (params);
return;
}
if (debug_locals[register_num].live) {
struct dex_debug_local_t *local = malloc (
sizeof (struct dex_debug_local_t));
if (!local) {
keep = false;
break;
}
local->name = debug_locals[register_num].name;
local->descriptor = debug_locals[register_num].descriptor;
local->startAddress = debug_locals[register_num].startAddress;
local->signature = debug_locals[register_num].signature;
local->live = true;
local->reg = register_num;
local->endAddress = address;
r_list_append (emitted_debug_locals, local);
}
debug_locals[register_num].name = getstr (bin, name_idx);
debug_locals[register_num].descriptor = dex_type_descriptor (bin, type_idx);
debug_locals[register_num].startAddress = address;
debug_locals[register_num].signature = NULL;
debug_locals[register_num].live = true;
}
break;
case 0x4: //DBG_START_LOCAL_EXTENDED
{
ut64 register_num;
ut64 name_idx;
ut64 type_idx;
ut64 sig_idx;
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, ®ister_num);
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, &name_idx);
name_idx -= 1;
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, &type_idx);
type_idx -= 1;
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, &sig_idx);
sig_idx -= 1;
if (register_num >= regsz) {
r_list_free (debug_positions);
r_list_free (params);
return;
}
if (debug_locals[register_num].live) {
struct dex_debug_local_t *local = malloc (
sizeof (struct dex_debug_local_t));
if (!local) {
keep = false;
break;
}
local->name = debug_locals[register_num].name;
local->descriptor = debug_locals[register_num].descriptor;
local->startAddress = debug_locals[register_num].startAddress;
local->signature = debug_locals[register_num].signature;
local->live = true;
local->reg = register_num;
local->endAddress = address;
r_list_append (emitted_debug_locals, local);
}
debug_locals[register_num].name = getstr (bin, name_idx);
debug_locals[register_num].descriptor = dex_type_descriptor (bin, type_idx);
debug_locals[register_num].startAddress = address;
debug_locals[register_num].signature = getstr (bin, sig_idx);
debug_locals[register_num].live = true;
}
break;
case 0x5: // DBG_END_LOCAL
{
ut64 register_num;
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, ®ister_num);
if (debug_locals[register_num].live) {
struct dex_debug_local_t *local = malloc (
sizeof (struct dex_debug_local_t));
if (!local) {
keep = false;
break;
}
local->name = debug_locals[register_num].name;
local->descriptor = debug_locals[register_num].descriptor;
local->startAddress = debug_locals[register_num].startAddress;
local->signature = debug_locals[register_num].signature;
local->live = true;
local->reg = register_num;
local->endAddress = address;
r_list_append (emitted_debug_locals, local);
}
debug_locals[register_num].live = false;
}
break;
case 0x6: // DBG_RESTART_LOCAL
{
ut64 register_num;
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, ®ister_num);
if (!debug_locals[register_num].live) {
debug_locals[register_num].startAddress = address;
debug_locals[register_num].live = true;
}
}
break;
case 0x7: //DBG_SET_PROLOGUE_END
break;
case 0x8: //DBG_SET_PROLOGUE_BEGIN
break;
case 0x9:
{
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, &source_file_idx);
source_file_idx--;
}
break;
default:
{
int adjusted_opcode = opcode - 0x0a;
address += (adjusted_opcode / 15);
line += -4 + (adjusted_opcode % 15);
struct dex_debug_position_t *position =
malloc (sizeof (struct dex_debug_position_t));
if (!position) {
keep = false;
break;
}
position->source_file_idx = source_file_idx;
position->address = address;
position->line = line;
r_list_append (debug_positions, position);
}
break;
}
opcode = *(p4++) & 0xff;
}
if (!binfile->sdb_addrinfo) {
binfile->sdb_addrinfo = sdb_new0 ();
}
char *fileline;
char offset[64];
char *offset_ptr;
RListIter *iter1;
struct dex_debug_position_t *pos;
r_list_foreach (debug_positions, iter1, pos) {
fileline = r_str_newf ("%s|%"PFMT64d, getstr (bin, pos->source_file_idx), pos->line);
offset_ptr = sdb_itoa (pos->address + paddr, offset, 16);
sdb_set (binfile->sdb_addrinfo, offset_ptr, fileline, 0);
sdb_set (binfile->sdb_addrinfo, fileline, offset_ptr, 0);
}
if (!dexdump) {
r_list_free (debug_positions);
r_list_free (emitted_debug_locals);
r_list_free (params);
return;
}
RListIter *iter2;
struct dex_debug_position_t *position;
rbin->cb_printf (" positions :\n");
r_list_foreach (debug_positions, iter2, position) {
rbin->cb_printf (" 0x%04llx line=%llu\n",
position->address, position->line);
}
rbin->cb_printf (" locals :\n");
RListIter *iter3;
struct dex_debug_local_t *local;
r_list_foreach (emitted_debug_locals, iter3, local) {
if (local->signature) {
rbin->cb_printf (
" 0x%04x - 0x%04x reg=%d %s %s %s\n",
local->startAddress, local->endAddress,
local->reg, local->name, local->descriptor,
local->signature);
} else {
rbin->cb_printf (
" 0x%04x - 0x%04x reg=%d %s %s\n",
local->startAddress, local->endAddress,
local->reg, local->name, local->descriptor);
}
}
for (reg = 0; reg < regsz; reg++) {
if (debug_locals[reg].live) {
if (debug_locals[reg].signature) {
rbin->cb_printf (
" 0x%04x - 0x%04x reg=%d %s %s "
"%s\n",
debug_locals[reg].startAddress,
insns_size, reg, debug_locals[reg].name,
debug_locals[reg].descriptor,
debug_locals[reg].signature);
} else {
rbin->cb_printf (
" 0x%04x - 0x%04x reg=%d %s %s"
"\n",
debug_locals[reg].startAddress,
insns_size, reg, debug_locals[reg].name,
debug_locals[reg].descriptor);
}
}
}
r_list_free (debug_positions);
r_list_free (emitted_debug_locals);
r_list_free (params);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The dex_parse_debug_item function in libr/bin/p/bin_dex.c in radare2 1.2.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted DEX file.
Commit Message: Fix #6836 - oob write in dex | Medium | 168,350 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void perf_log_throttle(struct perf_event *event, int enable)
{
struct perf_output_handle handle;
struct perf_sample_data sample;
int ret;
struct {
struct perf_event_header header;
u64 time;
u64 id;
u64 stream_id;
} throttle_event = {
.header = {
.type = PERF_RECORD_THROTTLE,
.misc = 0,
.size = sizeof(throttle_event),
},
.time = perf_clock(),
.id = primary_event_id(event),
.stream_id = event->id,
};
if (enable)
throttle_event.header.type = PERF_RECORD_UNTHROTTLE;
perf_event_header__init_id(&throttle_event.header, &sample, event);
ret = perf_output_begin(&handle, event,
throttle_event.header.size, 1, 0);
if (ret)
return;
perf_output_put(&handle, throttle_event);
perf_event__output_id_sample(event, &handle, &sample);
perf_output_end(&handle);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,836 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int fpm_unix_resolve_socket_premissions(struct fpm_worker_pool_s *wp) /* {{{ */
{
struct fpm_worker_pool_config_s *c = wp->config;
/* uninitialized */
wp->socket_uid = -1;
wp->socket_gid = -1;
wp->socket_mode = 0666;
if (!c) {
return 0;
}
if (c->listen_owner && *c->listen_owner) {
struct passwd *pwd;
pwd = getpwnam(c->listen_owner);
if (!pwd) {
zlog(ZLOG_SYSERROR, "[pool %s] cannot get uid for user '%s'", wp->config->name, c->listen_owner);
return -1;
}
wp->socket_uid = pwd->pw_uid;
wp->socket_gid = pwd->pw_gid;
}
if (c->listen_group && *c->listen_group) {
struct group *grp;
grp = getgrnam(c->listen_group);
if (!grp) {
zlog(ZLOG_SYSERROR, "[pool %s] cannot get gid for group '%s'", wp->config->name, c->listen_group);
return -1;
}
wp->socket_gid = grp->gr_gid;
}
if (c->listen_mode && *c->listen_mode) {
wp->socket_mode = strtoul(c->listen_mode, 0, 8);
}
return 0;
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: sapi/fpm/fpm/fpm_unix.c in the FastCGI Process Manager (FPM) in PHP before 5.4.28 and 5.5.x before 5.5.12 uses 0666 permissions for the UNIX socket, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted FastCGI client.
Commit Message: Fix bug #67060: use default mode of 660 | High | 166,457 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: struct _mdi *_WM_ParseNewXmi(uint8_t *xmi_data, uint32_t xmi_size) {
struct _mdi *xmi_mdi = NULL;
uint32_t xmi_tmpdata = 0;
uint8_t xmi_formcnt = 0;
uint32_t xmi_catlen = 0;
uint32_t xmi_subformlen = 0;
uint32_t i = 0;
uint32_t j = 0;
uint32_t xmi_evntlen = 0;
uint32_t xmi_divisions = 60;
uint32_t xmi_tempo = 500000;
uint32_t xmi_sample_count = 0;
float xmi_sample_count_f = 0.0;
float xmi_sample_remainder = 0.0;
float xmi_samples_per_delta_f = 0.0;
uint8_t xmi_ch = 0;
uint8_t xmi_note = 0;
uint32_t *xmi_notelen = NULL;
uint32_t setup_ret = 0;
uint32_t xmi_delta = 0;
uint32_t xmi_lowestdelta = 0;
uint32_t xmi_evnt_cnt = 0;
if (memcmp(xmi_data,"FORM",4)) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_XMI, NULL, 0);
return NULL;
}
xmi_data += 4;
xmi_size -= 4;
xmi_tmpdata = *xmi_data++ << 24;
xmi_tmpdata |= *xmi_data++ << 16;
xmi_tmpdata |= *xmi_data++ << 8;
xmi_tmpdata |= *xmi_data++;
xmi_size -= 4;
if (memcmp(xmi_data,"XDIRINFO",8)) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_XMI, NULL, 0);
return NULL;
}
xmi_data += 8;
xmi_size -= 8;
/*
0x00 0x00 0x00 0x02 at this point are unknown
so skip over them
*/
xmi_data += 4;
xmi_size -= 4;
xmi_formcnt = *xmi_data++;
if (xmi_formcnt == 0) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_XMI, NULL, 0);
return NULL;
}
xmi_size--;
/*
at this stage unsure if remaining data in
this section means anything
*/
xmi_tmpdata -= 13;
xmi_data += xmi_tmpdata;
xmi_size -= xmi_tmpdata;
/* FIXME: Check: may not even need to process CAT information */
if (memcmp(xmi_data,"CAT ",4)) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_XMI, NULL, 0);
return NULL;
}
xmi_data += 4;
xmi_size -= 4;
xmi_catlen = *xmi_data++ << 24;
xmi_catlen |= *xmi_data++ << 16;
xmi_catlen |= *xmi_data++ << 8;
xmi_catlen |= *xmi_data++;
xmi_size -= 4;
UNUSED(xmi_catlen);
if (memcmp(xmi_data,"XMID",4)) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_XMI, NULL, 0);
return NULL;
}
xmi_data += 4;
xmi_size -= 4;
xmi_mdi = _WM_initMDI();
_WM_midi_setup_divisions(xmi_mdi, xmi_divisions);
_WM_midi_setup_tempo(xmi_mdi, xmi_tempo);
xmi_samples_per_delta_f = _WM_GetSamplesPerTick(xmi_divisions, xmi_tempo);
xmi_notelen = malloc(sizeof(uint32_t) * 16 * 128);
memset(xmi_notelen, 0, (sizeof(uint32_t) * 16 * 128));
for (i = 0; i < xmi_formcnt; i++) {
if (memcmp(xmi_data,"FORM",4)) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_XMI, NULL, 0);
goto _xmi_end;
}
xmi_data += 4;
xmi_size -= 4;
xmi_subformlen = *xmi_data++ << 24;
xmi_subformlen |= *xmi_data++ << 16;
xmi_subformlen |= *xmi_data++ << 8;
xmi_subformlen |= *xmi_data++;
xmi_size -= 4;
if (memcmp(xmi_data,"XMID",4)) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_XMI, NULL, 0);
goto _xmi_end;
}
xmi_data += 4;
xmi_size -= 4;
xmi_subformlen -= 4;
do {
if (!memcmp(xmi_data,"TIMB",4)) {
xmi_data += 4;
xmi_tmpdata = *xmi_data++ << 24;
xmi_tmpdata |= *xmi_data++ << 16;
xmi_tmpdata |= *xmi_data++ << 8;
xmi_tmpdata |= *xmi_data++;
xmi_data += xmi_tmpdata;
xmi_size -= (8 + xmi_tmpdata);
xmi_subformlen -= (8 + xmi_tmpdata);
} else if (!memcmp(xmi_data,"RBRN",4)) {
xmi_data += 4;
xmi_tmpdata = *xmi_data++ << 24;
xmi_tmpdata |= *xmi_data++ << 16;
xmi_tmpdata |= *xmi_data++ << 8;
xmi_tmpdata |= *xmi_data++;
xmi_data += xmi_tmpdata;
xmi_size -= (8 + xmi_tmpdata);
xmi_subformlen -= (8 + xmi_tmpdata);
} else if (!memcmp(xmi_data,"EVNT",4)) {
xmi_data += 4;
xmi_evnt_cnt++;
xmi_evntlen = *xmi_data++ << 24;
xmi_evntlen |= *xmi_data++ << 16;
xmi_evntlen |= *xmi_data++ << 8;
xmi_evntlen |= *xmi_data++;
xmi_size -= 8;
xmi_subformlen -= 8;
do {
if (*xmi_data < 0x80) {
xmi_delta = 0;
if (*xmi_data > 0x7f) {
while (*xmi_data > 0x7f) {
xmi_delta = (xmi_delta << 7) | (*xmi_data++ & 0x7f);
xmi_size--;
xmi_evntlen--;
xmi_subformlen--;
}
}
xmi_delta = (xmi_delta << 7) | (*xmi_data++ & 0x7f);
xmi_size--;
xmi_evntlen--;
xmi_subformlen--;
do {
if ((xmi_lowestdelta != 0) && (xmi_lowestdelta <= xmi_delta)) {
xmi_tmpdata = xmi_lowestdelta;
} else {
xmi_tmpdata = xmi_delta;
}
xmi_sample_count_f= (((float) xmi_tmpdata * xmi_samples_per_delta_f) + xmi_sample_remainder);
xmi_sample_count = (uint32_t) xmi_sample_count_f;
xmi_sample_remainder = xmi_sample_count_f - (float) xmi_sample_count;
xmi_mdi->events[xmi_mdi->event_count - 1].samples_to_next += xmi_sample_count;
xmi_mdi->extra_info.approx_total_samples += xmi_sample_count;
xmi_lowestdelta = 0;
for (j = 0; j < (16*128); j++) {
if (xmi_notelen[j] == 0) continue;
xmi_notelen[j] -= xmi_tmpdata;
if (xmi_notelen[j] == 0) {
xmi_ch = j / 128;
xmi_note = j - (xmi_ch * 128);
_WM_midi_setup_noteoff(xmi_mdi, xmi_ch, xmi_note, 0);
} else {
if ((xmi_lowestdelta == 0) || (xmi_lowestdelta > xmi_notelen[j])) {
xmi_lowestdelta = xmi_notelen[j];
}
}
}
xmi_delta -= xmi_tmpdata;
} while (xmi_delta);
} else {
if ((xmi_data[0] == 0xff) && (xmi_data[1] == 0x51) && (xmi_data[2] == 0x03)) {
setup_ret = 6;
goto _XMI_Next_Event;
}
if ((setup_ret = _WM_SetupMidiEvent(xmi_mdi,xmi_data,0)) == 0) {
goto _xmi_end;
}
if ((*xmi_data & 0xf0) == 0x90) {
xmi_ch = *xmi_data & 0x0f;
xmi_note = xmi_data[1];
xmi_data += setup_ret;
xmi_size -= setup_ret;
xmi_evntlen -= setup_ret;
xmi_subformlen -= setup_ret;
xmi_tmpdata = 0;
if (*xmi_data > 0x7f) {
while (*xmi_data > 0x7f) {
xmi_tmpdata = (xmi_tmpdata << 7) | (*xmi_data++ & 0x7f);
xmi_size--;
xmi_evntlen--;
xmi_subformlen--;
}
}
xmi_tmpdata = (xmi_tmpdata << 7) | (*xmi_data++ & 0x7f);
xmi_size--;
xmi_evntlen--;
xmi_subformlen--;
xmi_notelen[128 * xmi_ch + xmi_note] = xmi_tmpdata;
if ((xmi_tmpdata > 0) && ((xmi_lowestdelta == 0) || (xmi_tmpdata < xmi_lowestdelta))) {
xmi_lowestdelta = xmi_tmpdata;
}
} else {
_XMI_Next_Event:
xmi_data += setup_ret;
xmi_size -= setup_ret;
xmi_evntlen -= setup_ret;
xmi_subformlen -= setup_ret;
}
}
} while (xmi_evntlen);
} else {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_XMI, NULL, 0);
goto _xmi_end;
}
} while (xmi_subformlen);
}
if ((xmi_mdi->reverb = _WM_init_reverb(_WM_SampleRate, _WM_reverb_room_width, _WM_reverb_room_length, _WM_reverb_listen_posx, _WM_reverb_listen_posy)) == NULL) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_MEM, "to init reverb", 0);
goto _xmi_end;
}
xmi_mdi->extra_info.current_sample = 0;
xmi_mdi->current_event = &xmi_mdi->events[0];
xmi_mdi->samples_to_mix = 0;
xmi_mdi->note = NULL;
/* More than 1 event form in XMI means treat as type 2 */
if (xmi_evnt_cnt > 1) {
xmi_mdi->is_type2 = 1;
}
_WM_ResetToStart(xmi_mdi);
_xmi_end:
if (xmi_notelen != NULL) free(xmi_notelen);
if (xmi_mdi->reverb) return (xmi_mdi);
_WM_freeMDI(xmi_mdi);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The _WM_SetupMidiEvent function in internal_midi.c:2122 in WildMIDI 0.4.2 can cause a denial of service (invalid memory read and application crash) via a crafted mid file.
Commit Message: Add a new size parameter to _WM_SetupMidiEvent() so that it knows
where to stop reading, and adjust its users properly. Fixes bug #175
(CVE-2017-11661, CVE-2017-11662, CVE-2017-11663, CVE-2017-11664.) | Medium | 168,006 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t BnGraphicBufferProducer::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel& data, Parcel* reply, uint32_t flags)
{
switch(code) {
case REQUEST_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int bufferIdx = data.readInt32();
sp<GraphicBuffer> buffer;
int result = requestBuffer(bufferIdx, &buffer);
reply->writeInt32(buffer != 0);
if (buffer != 0) {
reply->write(*buffer);
}
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case SET_BUFFER_COUNT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int bufferCount = data.readInt32();
int result = setBufferCount(bufferCount);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case DEQUEUE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
bool async = data.readInt32();
uint32_t w = data.readInt32();
uint32_t h = data.readInt32();
uint32_t format = data.readInt32();
uint32_t usage = data.readInt32();
int buf = 0;
sp<Fence> fence;
int result = dequeueBuffer(&buf, &fence, async, w, h, format, usage);
reply->writeInt32(buf);
reply->writeInt32(fence != NULL);
if (fence != NULL) {
reply->write(*fence);
}
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case QUEUE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int buf = data.readInt32();
QueueBufferInput input(data);
QueueBufferOutput* const output =
reinterpret_cast<QueueBufferOutput *>(
reply->writeInplace(sizeof(QueueBufferOutput)));
status_t result = queueBuffer(buf, input, output);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case CANCEL_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int buf = data.readInt32();
sp<Fence> fence = new Fence();
data.read(*fence.get());
cancelBuffer(buf, fence);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case QUERY: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int value = 0;
int what = data.readInt32();
int res = query(what, &value);
reply->writeInt32(value);
reply->writeInt32(res);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case CONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
sp<IBinder> token = data.readStrongBinder();
int api = data.readInt32();
bool producerControlledByApp = data.readInt32();
QueueBufferOutput* const output =
reinterpret_cast<QueueBufferOutput *>(
reply->writeInplace(sizeof(QueueBufferOutput)));
status_t res = connect(token, api, producerControlledByApp, output);
reply->writeInt32(res);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case DISCONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int api = data.readInt32();
status_t res = disconnect(api);
reply->writeInt32(res);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
}
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: The BnGraphicBufferProducer::onTransact function in libs/gui/IGraphicBufferConsumer.cpp in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.x before 2016-03-01 does not initialize a certain output data structure, which allows attackers to obtain sensitive information, and consequently bypass an unspecified protection mechanism, by triggering a QUEUE_BUFFER action, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 26338109.
Commit Message: IGraphicBufferProducer: fix QUEUE_BUFFER info leak
Bug: 26338109
Change-Id: I8a979469bfe1e317ebdefa43685e19f9302baea8
| Medium | 173,932 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateMediaStreamDispatcherHost(
MediaStreamManager* media_stream_manager,
mojom::MediaStreamDispatcherHostRequest request) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
if (!media_stream_dispatcher_host_) {
media_stream_dispatcher_host_.reset(new MediaStreamDispatcherHost(
GetProcess()->GetID(), GetRoutingID(), media_stream_manager));
}
media_stream_dispatcher_host_->BindRequest(std::move(request));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Incorrect handling of negative zero in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to perform arbitrary read/write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347} | Medium | 173,089 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int sas_discover_end_dev(struct domain_device *dev)
{
int res;
res = sas_notify_lldd_dev_found(dev);
if (res)
return res;
sas_discover_event(dev->port, DISCE_PROBE);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The Serial Attached SCSI (SAS) implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.15.9 mishandles a mutex within libsas, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (deadlock) by triggering certain error-handling code.
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: direct call probe and destruct
In commit 87c8331fcf72 ("[SCSI] libsas: prevent domain rediscovery
competing with ata error handling") introduced disco mutex to prevent
rediscovery competing with ata error handling and put the whole
revalidation in the mutex. But the rphy add/remove needs to wait for the
error handling which also grabs the disco mutex. This may leads to dead
lock.So the probe and destruct event were introduce to do the rphy
add/remove asynchronously and out of the lock.
The asynchronously processed workers makes the whole discovery process
not atomic, the other events may interrupt the process. For example,
if a loss of signal event inserted before the probe event, the
sas_deform_port() is called and the port will be deleted.
And sas_port_delete() may run before the destruct event, but the
port-x:x is the top parent of end device or expander. This leads to
a kernel WARNING such as:
[ 82.042979] sysfs group 'power' not found for kobject 'phy-1:0:22'
[ 82.042983] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 82.042986] WARNING: CPU: 54 PID: 1714 at fs/sysfs/group.c:237
sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043059] Call trace:
[ 82.043082] [<ffff0000082e7624>] sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043085] [<ffff00000864e320>] dpm_sysfs_remove+0x60/0x70
[ 82.043086] [<ffff00000863ee10>] device_del+0x138/0x308
[ 82.043089] [<ffff00000869a2d0>] sas_phy_delete+0x38/0x60
[ 82.043091] [<ffff00000869a86c>] do_sas_phy_delete+0x6c/0x80
[ 82.043093] [<ffff00000863dc20>] device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
[ 82.043095] [<ffff000008696f80>] sas_remove_children+0x40/0x50
[ 82.043100] [<ffff00000869d1bc>] sas_destruct_devices+0x64/0xa0
[ 82.043102] [<ffff0000080e93bc>] process_one_work+0x1fc/0x4b0
[ 82.043104] [<ffff0000080e96c0>] worker_thread+0x50/0x490
[ 82.043105] [<ffff0000080f0364>] kthread+0xfc/0x128
[ 82.043107] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Make probe and destruct a direct call in the disco and revalidate function,
but put them outside the lock. The whole discovery or revalidate won't
be interrupted by other events. And the DISCE_PROBE and DISCE_DESTRUCT
event are deleted as a result of the direct call.
Introduce a new list to destruct the sas_port and put the port delete after
the destruct. This makes sure the right order of destroying the sysfs
kobject and fix the warning above.
In sas_ex_revalidate_domain() have a loop to find all broadcasted
device, and sometimes we have a chance to find the same expander twice.
Because the sas_port will be deleted at the end of the whole revalidate
process, sas_port with the same name cannot be added before this.
Otherwise the sysfs will complain of creating duplicate filename. Since
the LLDD will send broadcast for every device change, we can only
process one expander's revalidation.
[mkp: kbuild test robot warning]
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <[email protected]>
CC: John Garry <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
CC: Ewan Milne <[email protected]>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
CC: Tomas Henzl <[email protected]>
CC: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> | Low | 169,386 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void DelegatedFrameHost::CopyFromCompositingSurface(
const gfx::Rect& src_subrect,
const gfx::Size& dst_size,
const base::Callback<void(bool, const SkBitmap&)>& callback,
const SkColorType color_type) {
bool format_support = ((color_type == kRGB_565_SkColorType) ||
(color_type == kN32_SkColorType));
DCHECK(format_support);
if (!CanCopyToBitmap()) {
callback.Run(false, SkBitmap());
return;
}
const gfx::Size& dst_size_in_pixel =
client_->ConvertViewSizeToPixel(dst_size);
scoped_ptr<cc::CopyOutputRequest> request =
cc::CopyOutputRequest::CreateRequest(base::Bind(
&DelegatedFrameHost::CopyFromCompositingSurfaceHasResult,
dst_size_in_pixel,
color_type,
callback));
gfx::Rect src_subrect_in_pixel =
ConvertRectToPixel(client_->CurrentDeviceScaleFactor(), src_subrect);
request->set_area(src_subrect_in_pixel);
client_->RequestCopyOfOutput(request.Pass());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Double free vulnerability in the ResourceFetcher::didLoadResource function in core/fetch/ResourceFetcher.cpp in the resource loader in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 30.0.1599.66, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering certain callback processing during the reporting of a resource entry.
Commit Message: repairs CopyFromCompositingSurface in HighDPI
This CL removes the DIP=>Pixel transform in
DelegatedFrameHost::CopyFromCompositingSurface(), because said
transformation seems to be happening later in the copy logic
and is currently being applied twice.
BUG=397708
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/421293002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@286414 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,193 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ChromeClientImpl::Focus() {
if (web_view_->Client())
web_view_->Client()->DidFocus();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: A JavaScript focused window could overlap the fullscreen notification in Fullscreen in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to obscure the full screen warning via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790} | Low | 172,724 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int sco_sock_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sco_pinfo *pi = sco_pi(sk);
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state == BT_CONNECT2 &&
test_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(sk)->flags)) {
sco_conn_defer_accept(pi->conn->hcon, pi->setting);
sk->sk_state = BT_CONFIG;
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
release_sock(sk);
return 0;
}
release_sock(sk);
return bt_sock_recvmsg(iocb, sock, msg, len, flags);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The x25_recvmsg function in net/x25/af_x25.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,495 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::allocate_output_buffer(
OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_INOUT OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE** bufferHdr,
OMX_IN OMX_U32 port,
OMX_IN OMX_PTR appData,
OMX_IN OMX_U32 bytes)
{
(void)hComp, (void)port;
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *bufHdr= NULL; // buffer header
unsigned i= 0; // Temporary counter
#ifdef _MSM8974_
int align_size;
#endif
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("allocate_output_buffer()for %u bytes", (unsigned int)bytes);
if (!m_out_mem_ptr) {
int nBufHdrSize = 0;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("%s: size = %u, actual cnt %u", __FUNCTION__,
(unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize, (unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
nBufHdrSize = m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual * sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE);
/*
* Memory for output side involves the following:
* 1. Array of Buffer Headers
* 2. Bitmask array to hold the buffer allocation details
* In order to minimize the memory management entire allocation
* is done in one step.
*/
m_out_mem_ptr = (OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *)calloc(nBufHdrSize,1);
#ifdef USE_ION
m_pOutput_ion = (struct venc_ion *) calloc(sizeof (struct venc_ion), m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
if (m_pOutput_ion == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: calloc() Failed for m_pOutput_ion");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
#endif
m_pOutput_pmem = (struct pmem *) calloc(sizeof(struct pmem), m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
if (m_pOutput_pmem == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: calloc() Failed for m_pOutput_pmem");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
if (m_out_mem_ptr && m_pOutput_pmem) {
bufHdr = m_out_mem_ptr;
for (i=0; i < m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual ; i++) {
bufHdr->nSize = sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE);
bufHdr->nVersion.nVersion = OMX_SPEC_VERSION;
bufHdr->nAllocLen = bytes;
bufHdr->nFilledLen = 0;
bufHdr->pAppPrivate = appData;
bufHdr->nOutputPortIndex = PORT_INDEX_OUT;
bufHdr->pOutputPortPrivate = (OMX_PTR)&m_pOutput_pmem[i];
bufHdr->pBuffer = NULL;
bufHdr++;
m_pOutput_pmem[i].fd = -1;
#ifdef USE_ION
m_pOutput_ion[i].ion_device_fd =-1;
m_pOutput_ion[i].fd_ion_data.fd=-1;
m_pOutput_ion[i].ion_alloc_data.handle = 0;
#endif
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: calloc() failed for m_out_mem_ptr/m_pOutput_pmem");
eRet = OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
}
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("actual cnt = %u", (unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
for (i=0; i< m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual; i++) {
if (BITMASK_ABSENT(&m_out_bm_count,i)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Found a Free Output Buffer %d",i);
break;
}
}
if (eRet == OMX_ErrorNone) {
if (i < m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual) {
#ifdef USE_ION
#ifdef _MSM8974_
align_size = ((m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize + 4095)/4096) * 4096;
m_pOutput_ion[i].ion_device_fd = alloc_map_ion_memory(align_size,
&m_pOutput_ion[i].ion_alloc_data,
&m_pOutput_ion[i].fd_ion_data, ION_FLAG_CACHED);
#else
m_pOutput_ion[i].ion_device_fd = alloc_map_ion_memory(m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize,
&m_pOutput_ion[i].ion_alloc_data,
&m_pOutput_ion[i].fd_ion_data,ION_FLAG_CACHED);
#endif
if (m_pOutput_ion[i].ion_device_fd < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:ION device open() Failed");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
m_pOutput_pmem[i].fd = m_pOutput_ion[i].fd_ion_data.fd;
#else
m_pOutput_pmem[i].fd = open (MEM_DEVICE,O_RDWR);
if (m_pOutput_pmem[i].fd == 0) {
m_pOutput_pmem[i].fd = open (MEM_DEVICE,O_RDWR);
}
if (m_pOutput_pmem[i].fd < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: /dev/pmem_adsp open() failed");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
#endif
m_pOutput_pmem[i].size = m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize;
m_pOutput_pmem[i].offset = 0;
m_pOutput_pmem[i].buffer = (OMX_U8 *)SECURE_BUFPTR;
if(!secure_session) {
#ifdef _MSM8974_
m_pOutput_pmem[i].buffer = (unsigned char *)mmap(NULL,
align_size,PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
MAP_SHARED,m_pOutput_pmem[i].fd,0);
#else
m_pOutput_pmem[i].buffer = (unsigned char *)mmap(NULL,
m_pOutput_pmem[i].size,PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
MAP_SHARED,m_pOutput_pmem[i].fd,0);
#endif
if (m_pOutput_pmem[i].buffer == MAP_FAILED) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: MMAP_FAILED in o/p alloc buffer");
close (m_pOutput_pmem[i].fd);
#ifdef USE_ION
free_ion_memory(&m_pOutput_ion[i]);
#endif
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
}
else {
m_pOutput_pmem[i].buffer = malloc(sizeof(OMX_U32) + sizeof(native_handle_t*));
native_handle_t *handle = native_handle_create(1, 0);
handle->data[0] = m_pOutput_pmem[i].fd;
char *data = (char*) m_pOutput_pmem[i].buffer;
OMX_U32 type = 1;
memcpy(data, &type, sizeof(OMX_U32));
memcpy(data + sizeof(OMX_U32), &handle, sizeof(native_handle_t*));
}
*bufferHdr = (m_out_mem_ptr + i );
(*bufferHdr)->pBuffer = (OMX_U8 *)m_pOutput_pmem[i].buffer;
(*bufferHdr)->pAppPrivate = appData;
BITMASK_SET(&m_out_bm_count,i);
if (dev_use_buf(&m_pOutput_pmem[i],PORT_INDEX_OUT,i) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: dev_use_buf FAILED for o/p buf");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: All o/p buffers are allocated, invalid allocate buf call"
"for index [%d] actual: %u", i, (unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
}
}
return eRet;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mm-video-v4l2/vidc/venc/src/omx_video_base.cpp in mediaserver in Android 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allocates an incorrect amount of memory, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28816964.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix wrong nAllocLen
Set nAllocLen to the size of the opaque handle itself.
Bug: 28816964
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: Id410e324bee291d4a0018dddb97eda9bbcded099
| Medium | 173,520 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void Encoder::EncodeFrameInternal(const VideoSource &video,
const unsigned long frame_flags) {
vpx_codec_err_t res;
const vpx_image_t *img = video.img();
if (!encoder_.priv) {
cfg_.g_w = img->d_w;
cfg_.g_h = img->d_h;
cfg_.g_timebase = video.timebase();
cfg_.rc_twopass_stats_in = stats_->buf();
res = vpx_codec_enc_init(&encoder_, CodecInterface(), &cfg_,
init_flags_);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res) << EncoderError();
}
if (cfg_.g_w != img->d_w || cfg_.g_h != img->d_h) {
cfg_.g_w = img->d_w;
cfg_.g_h = img->d_h;
res = vpx_codec_enc_config_set(&encoder_, &cfg_);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res) << EncoderError();
}
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
res = vpx_codec_encode(&encoder_,
video.img(), video.pts(), video.duration(),
frame_flags, deadline_));
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res) << EncoderError();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,536 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: const BlockEntry* Cluster::GetEntry(
const Track* pTrack,
long long time_ns) const
{
assert(pTrack);
if (m_pSegment == NULL) //this is the special EOS cluster
return pTrack->GetEOS();
#if 0
LoadBlockEntries();
if ((m_entries == NULL) || (m_entries_count <= 0))
return NULL; //return EOS here?
const BlockEntry* pResult = pTrack->GetEOS();
BlockEntry** i = m_entries;
assert(i);
BlockEntry** const j = i + m_entries_count;
while (i != j)
{
const BlockEntry* const pEntry = *i++;
assert(pEntry);
assert(!pEntry->EOS());
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
if (pBlock->GetTrackNumber() != pTrack->GetNumber())
continue;
if (pTrack->VetEntry(pEntry))
{
if (time_ns < 0) //just want first candidate block
return pEntry;
const long long ns = pBlock->GetTime(this);
if (ns > time_ns)
break;
pResult = pEntry;
}
else if (time_ns >= 0)
{
const long long ns = pBlock->GetTime(this);
if (ns > time_ns)
break;
}
}
return pResult;
#else
const BlockEntry* pResult = pTrack->GetEOS();
long index = 0;
for (;;)
{
if (index >= m_entries_count)
{
long long pos;
long len;
const long status = Parse(pos, len);
assert(status >= 0);
if (status > 0) //completely parsed, and no more entries
return pResult;
if (status < 0) //should never happen
return 0;
assert(m_entries);
assert(index < m_entries_count);
}
const BlockEntry* const pEntry = m_entries[index];
assert(pEntry);
assert(!pEntry->EOS());
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
if (pBlock->GetTrackNumber() != pTrack->GetNumber())
{
++index;
continue;
}
if (pTrack->VetEntry(pEntry))
{
if (time_ns < 0) //just want first candidate block
return pEntry;
const long long ns = pBlock->GetTime(this);
if (ns > time_ns)
return pResult;
pResult = pEntry; //have a candidate
}
else if (time_ns >= 0)
{
const long long ns = pBlock->GetTime(this);
if (ns > time_ns)
return pResult;
}
++index;
}
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,315 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int perf_output_begin(struct perf_output_handle *handle,
struct perf_event *event, unsigned int size,
int nmi, int sample)
{
struct ring_buffer *rb;
unsigned long tail, offset, head;
int have_lost;
struct perf_sample_data sample_data;
struct {
struct perf_event_header header;
u64 id;
u64 lost;
} lost_event;
rcu_read_lock();
/*
* For inherited events we send all the output towards the parent.
*/
if (event->parent)
event = event->parent;
rb = rcu_dereference(event->rb);
if (!rb)
goto out;
handle->rb = rb;
handle->event = event;
handle->nmi = nmi;
handle->sample = sample;
if (!rb->nr_pages)
goto out;
have_lost = local_read(&rb->lost);
if (have_lost) {
lost_event.header.size = sizeof(lost_event);
perf_event_header__init_id(&lost_event.header, &sample_data,
event);
size += lost_event.header.size;
}
perf_output_get_handle(handle);
do {
/*
* Userspace could choose to issue a mb() before updating the
* tail pointer. So that all reads will be completed before the
* write is issued.
*/
tail = ACCESS_ONCE(rb->user_page->data_tail);
smp_rmb();
offset = head = local_read(&rb->head);
head += size;
if (unlikely(!perf_output_space(rb, tail, offset, head)))
goto fail;
} while (local_cmpxchg(&rb->head, offset, head) != offset);
if (head - local_read(&rb->wakeup) > rb->watermark)
local_add(rb->watermark, &rb->wakeup);
handle->page = offset >> (PAGE_SHIFT + page_order(rb));
handle->page &= rb->nr_pages - 1;
handle->size = offset & ((PAGE_SIZE << page_order(rb)) - 1);
handle->addr = rb->data_pages[handle->page];
handle->addr += handle->size;
handle->size = (PAGE_SIZE << page_order(rb)) - handle->size;
if (have_lost) {
lost_event.header.type = PERF_RECORD_LOST;
lost_event.header.misc = 0;
lost_event.id = event->id;
lost_event.lost = local_xchg(&rb->lost, 0);
perf_output_put(handle, lost_event);
perf_event__output_id_sample(event, handle, &sample_data);
}
return 0;
fail:
local_inc(&rb->lost);
perf_output_put_handle(handle);
out:
rcu_read_unlock();
return -ENOSPC;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,841 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void GfxIndexedColorSpace::getRGBLine(Guchar *in, unsigned int *out, int length) {
Guchar *line;
int i, j, n;
n = base->getNComps();
line = (Guchar *) gmalloc (length * n);
for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
for (j = 0; j < n; j++)
line[i * n + j] = lookup[in[i] * n + j];
base->getRGBLine(line, out, length);
gfree (line);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in Poppler 0.10.5 and earlier allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted PDF file, related to (1) glib/poppler-page.cc; (2) ArthurOutputDev.cc, (3) CairoOutputDev.cc, (4) GfxState.cc, (5) JBIG2Stream.cc, (6) PSOutputDev.cc, and (7) SplashOutputDev.cc in poppler/; and (8) SplashBitmap.cc, (9) Splash.cc, and (10) SplashFTFont.cc in splash/. NOTE: this may overlap CVE-2009-0791.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,610 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleDrawArrays(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::DrawArrays& c) {
GLenum mode = static_cast<GLenum>(c.mode);
GLint first = static_cast<GLint>(c.first);
GLsizei count = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.count);
if (!validators_->draw_mode.IsValid(mode)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "glDrawArrays: mode GL_INVALID_ENUM");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (count < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glDrawArrays: count < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!CheckFramebufferComplete("glDrawArrays")) {
return error::kNoError;
}
if (first < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glDrawArrays: first < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (count == 0) {
return error::kNoError;
}
GLuint max_vertex_accessed = first + count - 1;
if (IsDrawValid(max_vertex_accessed)) {
bool simulated_attrib_0 = SimulateAttrib0(max_vertex_accessed);
bool simulated_fixed_attribs = false;
if (SimulateFixedAttribs(max_vertex_accessed, &simulated_fixed_attribs)) {
bool textures_set = SetBlackTextureForNonRenderableTextures();
ApplyDirtyState();
glDrawArrays(mode, first, count);
if (textures_set) {
RestoreStateForNonRenderableTextures();
}
if (simulated_fixed_attribs) {
RestoreStateForSimulatedFixedAttribs();
}
}
if (simulated_attrib_0) {
RestoreStateForSimulatedAttrib0();
}
if (WasContextLost()) {
LOG(ERROR) << " GLES2DecoderImpl: Context lost during DrawArrays.";
return error::kLostContext;
}
}
return error::kNoError;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163 does not properly handle triangle arrays, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,330 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void gdImageLine (gdImagePtr im, int x1, int y1, int x2, int y2, int color)
{
int dx, dy, incr1, incr2, d, x, y, xend, yend, xdirflag, ydirflag;
int wid;
int w, wstart;
int thick = im->thick;
if (color == gdAntiAliased) {
/*
gdAntiAliased passed as color: use the much faster, much cheaper
and equally attractive gdImageAALine implementation. That
clips too, so don't clip twice.
*/
gdImageAALine(im, x1, y1, x2, y2, im->AA_color);
return;
}
/* 2.0.10: Nick Atty: clip to edges of drawing rectangle, return if no points need to be drawn */
if (!clip_1d(&x1,&y1,&x2,&y2,gdImageSX(im)) || !clip_1d(&y1,&x1,&y2,&x2,gdImageSY(im))) {
return;
}
dx = abs (x2 - x1);
dy = abs (y2 - y1);
if (dx == 0) {
gdImageVLine(im, x1, y1, y2, color);
return;
} else if (dy == 0) {
gdImageHLine(im, y1, x1, x2, color);
return;
}
if (dy <= dx) {
/* More-or-less horizontal. use wid for vertical stroke */
/* Doug Claar: watch out for NaN in atan2 (2.0.5) */
if ((dx == 0) && (dy == 0)) {
wid = 1;
} else {
/* 2.0.12: Michael Schwartz: divide rather than multiply;
TBB: but watch out for /0! */
double ac = cos (atan2 (dy, dx));
if (ac != 0) {
wid = thick / ac;
} else {
wid = 1;
}
if (wid == 0) {
wid = 1;
}
}
d = 2 * dy - dx;
incr1 = 2 * dy;
incr2 = 2 * (dy - dx);
if (x1 > x2) {
x = x2;
y = y2;
ydirflag = (-1);
xend = x1;
} else {
x = x1;
y = y1;
ydirflag = 1;
xend = x2;
}
/* Set up line thickness */
wstart = y - wid / 2;
for (w = wstart; w < wstart + wid; w++) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, x, w, color);
}
if (((y2 - y1) * ydirflag) > 0) {
while (x < xend) {
x++;
if (d < 0) {
d += incr1;
} else {
y++;
d += incr2;
}
wstart = y - wid / 2;
for (w = wstart; w < wstart + wid; w++) {
gdImageSetPixel (im, x, w, color);
}
}
} else {
while (x < xend) {
x++;
if (d < 0) {
d += incr1;
} else {
y--;
d += incr2;
}
wstart = y - wid / 2;
for (w = wstart; w < wstart + wid; w++) {
gdImageSetPixel (im, x, w, color);
}
}
}
} else {
/* More-or-less vertical. use wid for horizontal stroke */
/* 2.0.12: Michael Schwartz: divide rather than multiply;
TBB: but watch out for /0! */
double as = sin (atan2 (dy, dx));
if (as != 0) {
wid = thick / as;
} else {
wid = 1;
}
if (wid == 0) {
wid = 1;
}
d = 2 * dx - dy;
incr1 = 2 * dx;
incr2 = 2 * (dx - dy);
if (y1 > y2) {
y = y2;
x = x2;
yend = y1;
xdirflag = (-1);
} else {
y = y1;
x = x1;
yend = y2;
xdirflag = 1;
}
/* Set up line thickness */
wstart = x - wid / 2;
for (w = wstart; w < wstart + wid; w++) {
gdImageSetPixel (im, w, y, color);
}
if (((x2 - x1) * xdirflag) > 0) {
while (y < yend) {
y++;
if (d < 0) {
d += incr1;
} else {
x++;
d += incr2;
}
wstart = x - wid / 2;
for (w = wstart; w < wstart + wid; w++) {
gdImageSetPixel (im, w, y, color);
}
}
} else {
while (y < yend) {
y++;
if (d < 0) {
d += incr1;
} else {
x--;
d += incr2;
}
wstart = x - wid / 2;
for (w = wstart; w < wstart + wid; w++) {
gdImageSetPixel (im, w, y, color);
}
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the gdImageCreate function in gd.c in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) before 2.0.34RC1, as used in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted image dimensions.
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow | Medium | 167,129 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_start_of_pic(dec_struct_t *ps_dec,
WORD32 i4_poc,
pocstruct_t *ps_temp_poc,
UWORD16 u2_frame_num,
dec_pic_params_t *ps_pps)
{
pocstruct_t *ps_prev_poc = &ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc;
pocstruct_t *ps_cur_poc = ps_temp_poc;
pic_buffer_t *pic_buf;
ivd_video_decode_op_t * ps_dec_output =
(ivd_video_decode_op_t *)ps_dec->pv_dec_out;
dec_slice_params_t *ps_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
dec_seq_params_t *ps_seq = ps_pps->ps_sps;
UWORD8 u1_bottom_field_flag = ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag;
UWORD8 u1_field_pic_flag = ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
/* high profile related declarations */
high_profile_tools_t s_high_profile;
WORD32 ret;
H264_MUTEX_LOCK(&ps_dec->process_disp_mutex);
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb;
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0];
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1];
ps_prev_poc->u1_bot_field = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag;
ps_prev_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst = ps_cur_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst;
ps_prev_poc->u2_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->i1_prev_mb_qp_delta = 0;
ps_dec->i1_next_ctxt_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_nmb_deblk = 0;
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 1)
ps_dec->u4_nmb_deblk = 1;
if(ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag == 1)
{
ps_dec->u4_nmb_deblk = 0;
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores > 2)
ps_dec->u4_num_cores = 2;
}
ps_dec->u4_use_intrapred_line_copy = 0;
if (ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag == 0)
{
ps_dec->u4_use_intrapred_line_copy = 1;
}
ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm = 0;
/* If degrade is enabled, set the degrade flags appropriately */
if(ps_dec->i4_degrade_type && ps_dec->i4_degrade_pics)
{
WORD32 degrade_pic;
ps_dec->i4_degrade_pic_cnt++;
degrade_pic = 0;
/* If degrade is to be done in all frames, then do not check further */
switch(ps_dec->i4_degrade_pics)
{
case 4:
{
degrade_pic = 1;
break;
}
case 3:
{
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type != I_SLICE)
degrade_pic = 1;
break;
}
case 2:
{
/* If pic count hits non-degrade interval or it is an islice, then do not degrade */
if((ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type != I_SLICE)
&& (ps_dec->i4_degrade_pic_cnt
!= ps_dec->i4_nondegrade_interval))
degrade_pic = 1;
break;
}
case 1:
{
/* Check if the current picture is non-ref */
if(0 == ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc)
{
degrade_pic = 1;
}
break;
}
}
if(degrade_pic)
{
if(ps_dec->i4_degrade_type & 0x2)
ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm = 1;
/* MC degrading is done only for non-ref pictures */
if(0 == ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc)
{
if(ps_dec->i4_degrade_type & 0x4)
ps_dec->i4_mv_frac_mask = 0;
if(ps_dec->i4_degrade_type & 0x8)
ps_dec->i4_mv_frac_mask = 0;
}
}
else
ps_dec->i4_degrade_pic_cnt = 0;
}
{
dec_err_status_t * ps_err = ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status;
if(ps_dec->u1_sl_typ_5_9
&& ((ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type == I_SLICE)
|| (ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type
== SI_SLICE)))
ps_err->u1_cur_pic_type = PIC_TYPE_I;
else
ps_err->u1_cur_pic_type = PIC_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
if(ps_err->u1_pic_aud_i == PIC_TYPE_I)
{
ps_err->u1_cur_pic_type = PIC_TYPE_I;
ps_err->u1_pic_aud_i = PIC_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
}
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL)
{
if(ps_err->u1_err_flag)
ih264d_reset_ref_bufs(ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr);
ps_err->u1_err_flag = ACCEPT_ALL_PICS;
}
}
if(ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag && ps_dec->s_prev_seq_params.u1_eoseq_pending)
{
/* Reset the decoder picture buffers */
WORD32 j;
for(j = 0; j < MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW; j++)
{
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
j,
BUF_MGR_REF);
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_id_mv_buf_id_map[j],
BUF_MGR_REF);
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
j,
BUF_MGR_IO);
}
/* reset the decoder structure parameters related to buffer handling */
ps_dec->u1_second_field = 0;
ps_dec->i4_cur_display_seq = 0;
/********************************************************************/
/* indicate in the decoder output i4_status that some frames are being */
/* dropped, so that it resets timestamp and wait for a new sequence */
/********************************************************************/
ps_dec->s_prev_seq_params.u1_eoseq_pending = 0;
}
ret = ih264d_init_pic(ps_dec, u2_frame_num, i4_poc, ps_pps);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_pic_tu_coeff_data;
ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_pic_tu_coeff_data;
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info = ps_dec->ps_frm_mb_info;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
UWORD16 pic_wd = ps_dec->u4_width_at_init;
UWORD16 pic_ht = ps_dec->u4_height_at_init;
UWORD32 num_mbs;
if((NULL != ps_dec->ps_cur_sps) && (1 == (ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_is_valid)))
{
pic_wd = ps_dec->u2_pic_wd;
pic_ht = ps_dec->u2_pic_ht;
}
num_mbs = (pic_wd * pic_ht) >> 8;
if(ps_dec->pu1_dec_mb_map)
{
memset((void *)ps_dec->pu1_dec_mb_map, 0, num_mbs);
}
if(ps_dec->pu1_recon_mb_map)
{
memset((void *)ps_dec->pu1_recon_mb_map, 0, num_mbs);
}
if(ps_dec->pu2_slice_num_map)
{
memset((void *)ps_dec->pu2_slice_num_map, 0,
(num_mbs * sizeof(UWORD16)));
}
}
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice = &(ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf[0]);
ps_dec->ps_decode_cur_slice = &(ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf[0]);
ps_dec->ps_computebs_cur_slice = &(ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf[0]);
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num = 0;
/* Initialize all the HP toolsets to zero */
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_scaling_present = 0;
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_transform8x8_present = 0;
/* Get Next Free Picture */
if(1 == ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf)
{
UWORD32 i;
/* Free any buffer that is in the queue to be freed */
for(i = 0; i < MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW; i++)
{
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_to_be_freed[i])
continue;
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr, i,
BUF_MGR_IO);
ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_to_be_freed[i] = 0;
ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[i] = 0;
}
}
if(!(u1_field_pic_flag && 0 != ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded)) //ps_dec->u1_second_field))
{
pic_buffer_t *ps_cur_pic;
WORD32 cur_pic_buf_id, cur_mv_buf_id;
col_mv_buf_t *ps_col_mv;
while(1)
{
ps_cur_pic = (pic_buffer_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free(
(buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
&cur_pic_buf_id);
if(ps_cur_pic == NULL)
{
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T;
return ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T;
}
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[cur_pic_buf_id])
{
break;
}
}
ps_col_mv = (col_mv_buf_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
&cur_mv_buf_id);
if(ps_col_mv == NULL)
{
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T;
return ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic = ps_cur_pic;
ps_dec->u1_pic_buf_id = cur_pic_buf_id;
ps_cur_pic->u4_ts = ps_dec->u4_ts;
ps_cur_pic->u1_mv_buf_id = cur_mv_buf_id;
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_id_mv_buf_id_map[cur_pic_buf_id] = cur_mv_buf_id;
ps_cur_pic->pu1_col_zero_flag = (UWORD8 *)ps_col_mv->pv_col_zero_flag;
ps_cur_pic->ps_mv = (mv_pred_t *)ps_col_mv->pv_mv;
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_ref_flag[cur_pic_buf_id] = 0;
{
/*make first entry of list0 point to cur pic,so that if first Islice is in error, ref pic struct will have valid entries*/
ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[0] = ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[0];
*(ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[0][0]) = *ps_cur_pic;
/* Initialize for field reference as well */
*(ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[0][MAX_REF_BUFS]) = *ps_cur_pic;
}
if(!ps_dec->ps_cur_pic)
{
WORD32 j;
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("------- Display Buffers Reset --------\n");
for(j = 0; j < MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW; j++)
{
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
j,
BUF_MGR_REF);
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_id_mv_buf_id_map[j],
BUF_MGR_REF);
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
j,
BUF_MGR_IO);
}
ps_dec->i4_cur_display_seq = 0;
ps_dec->i4_prev_max_display_seq = 0;
ps_dec->i4_max_poc = 0;
ps_cur_pic = (pic_buffer_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free(
(buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
&cur_pic_buf_id);
if(ps_cur_pic == NULL)
{
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T;
return ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T;
}
ps_col_mv = (col_mv_buf_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
&cur_mv_buf_id);
if(ps_col_mv == NULL)
{
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T;
return ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic = ps_cur_pic;
ps_dec->u1_pic_buf_id = cur_pic_buf_id;
ps_cur_pic->u4_ts = ps_dec->u4_ts;
ps_dec->apv_buf_id_pic_buf_map[cur_pic_buf_id] = (void *)ps_cur_pic;
ps_cur_pic->u1_mv_buf_id = cur_mv_buf_id;
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_id_mv_buf_id_map[cur_pic_buf_id] = cur_mv_buf_id;
ps_cur_pic->pu1_col_zero_flag = (UWORD8 *)ps_col_mv->pv_col_zero_flag;
ps_cur_pic->ps_mv = (mv_pred_t *)ps_col_mv->pv_mv;
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_ref_flag[cur_pic_buf_id] = 0;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u1_picturetype = u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ = SKIP_NONE;
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("got a buffer\n");
}
else
{
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("did not get a buffer\n");
}
ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got = 1;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_poc = i4_poc;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_pic_num = u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt = ps_pps->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt =
ps_pps->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_avg_poc = ps_pps->i4_avg_poc;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_time_stamp = ps_dec->u4_pts;
ps_dec->s_cur_pic = *(ps_dec->ps_cur_pic);
if(u1_field_pic_flag && u1_bottom_field_flag)
{
WORD32 i4_temp_poc;
WORD32 i4_top_field_order_poc, i4_bot_field_order_poc;
/* Point to odd lines, since it's bottom field */
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf1 += ps_dec->s_cur_pic.u2_frm_wd_y;
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf2 += ps_dec->s_cur_pic.u2_frm_wd_uv;
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf3 += ps_dec->s_cur_pic.u2_frm_wd_uv;
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv +=
((ps_dec->u2_pic_ht * ps_dec->u2_pic_wd) >> 5);
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_col_zero_flag += ((ps_dec->u2_pic_ht
* ps_dec->u2_pic_wd) >> 5);
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u1_picturetype |= BOT_FLD;
i4_top_field_order_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
i4_bot_field_order_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
i4_temp_poc = MIN(i4_top_field_order_poc,
i4_bot_field_order_poc);
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_avg_poc = i4_temp_poc;
}
ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag = ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag
&& (!u1_field_pic_flag);
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u1_picturetype |= (ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag
<< 2);
ps_dec->ps_cur_mb_row = ps_dec->ps_nbr_mb_row; //[0];
ps_dec->ps_cur_mb_row++; //Increment by 1 ,so that left mb will always be valid
ps_dec->ps_top_mb_row =
ps_dec->ps_nbr_mb_row
+ ((ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs + 1)
<< (1
- ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag));
ps_dec->ps_top_mb_row++; //Increment by 1 ,so that left mb will always be valid
ps_dec->pu1_y = ps_dec->pu1_y_scratch[0];
ps_dec->pu1_u = ps_dec->pu1_u_scratch[0];
ps_dec->pu1_v = ps_dec->pu1_v_scratch[0];
ps_dec->u1_yuv_scratch_idx = 0;
/* CHANGED CODE */
ps_dec->ps_mv_cur = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_dec->ps_mv_top = ps_dec->ps_mv_top_p[0];
/* CHANGED CODE */
ps_dec->u1_mv_top_p = 0;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = 0;
/* CHANGED CODE */
ps_dec->ps_mv_left = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_dec->pu1_yleft = 0;
ps_dec->pu1_uleft = 0;
ps_dec->pu1_vleft = 0;
ps_dec->u1_not_wait_rec = 2;
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = 0;
ps_dec->i4_submb_ofst = -(SUB_BLK_SIZE);
ps_dec->u4_pred_info_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_pred_info_pkd_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_dma_buf_idx = 0;
ps_dec->ps_mv = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_dec->ps_mv_bank_cur = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_dec->pu1_col_zero_flag = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_col_zero_flag;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = -1;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = 0;
ps_dec->u2_mv_2mb[0] = 0;
ps_dec->u2_mv_2mb[1] = 0;
ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num_dec_thread = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num_bs = 0;
ps_dec->u4_intra_pred_line_ofst = 0;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_y_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_y_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_u_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_u_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_v_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_v_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_y_intra_pred_line_base = ps_dec->pu1_y_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_u_intra_pred_line_base = ps_dec->pu1_u_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_v_intra_pred_line_base = ps_dec->pu1_v_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_prev_y_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_y_intra_pred_line
+ (ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs * MB_SIZE);
ps_dec->pu1_prev_u_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_u_intra_pred_line
+ ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs * BLK8x8SIZE * YUV420SP_FACTOR;
ps_dec->pu1_prev_v_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_v_intra_pred_line
+ ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs * BLK8x8SIZE;
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic;
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn_curr = ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn;
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn_prev = ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn + ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp;
/* Initialize The Function Pointer Depending Upon the Entropy and MbAff Flag */
{
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag)
{
ps_dec->pf_compute_bs = ih264d_compute_bs_mbaff;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_mbaff;
}
else
{
ps_dec->pf_compute_bs = ih264d_compute_bs_non_mbaff;
ps_dec->u1_cur_mb_fld_dec_flag = ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
}
}
/* Set up the Parameter for DMA transfer */
{
UWORD8 u1_field_pic_flag = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
UWORD8 u1_mbaff = ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
UWORD8 uc_lastmbs = (((ps_dec->u2_pic_wd) >> 4)
% (ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp >> u1_mbaff));
UWORD16 ui16_lastmbs_widthY =
(uc_lastmbs ? (uc_lastmbs << 4) : ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp
>> u1_mbaff) << 4));
UWORD16 ui16_lastmbs_widthUV =
uc_lastmbs ? (uc_lastmbs << 3) : ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp
>> u1_mbaff) << 3);
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.pu1_dest_y = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf1;
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.pu1_dest_u = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf2;
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.pu1_dest_v = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf3;
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_frm_wd_y = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_y
<< u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_frm_wd_uv = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_uv
<< u1_field_pic_flag;
if(u1_field_pic_flag)
{
ui16_lastmbs_widthY += ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_y;
ui16_lastmbs_widthUV += ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_uv;
}
/* Normal Increment of Pointer */
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u4_inc_y[0] = ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp << 4)
>> u1_mbaff);
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u4_inc_uv[0] = ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp << 4)
>> u1_mbaff);
/* End of Row Increment */
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u4_inc_y[1] = (ui16_lastmbs_widthY
+ (PAD_LEN_Y_H << 1)
+ ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_frm_wd_y
* ((15 << u1_mbaff) + u1_mbaff));
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u4_inc_uv[1] = (ui16_lastmbs_widthUV
+ (PAD_LEN_UV_H << 2)
+ ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_frm_wd_uv
* ((15 << u1_mbaff) + u1_mbaff));
/* Assign picture numbers to each frame/field */
/* only once per picture. */
ih264d_assign_pic_num(ps_dec);
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_mv_top_left_inc = (ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp
<< 2) - 1 - (u1_mbaff << 2);
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_mv_left_inc = ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp
>> u1_mbaff) - 1) << (4 + u1_mbaff);
}
/**********************************************************************/
/* High profile related initialization at pictrue level */
/**********************************************************************/
if(ps_seq->u1_profile_idc == HIGH_PROFILE_IDC)
{
if((ps_seq->i4_seq_scaling_matrix_present_flag)
|| (ps_pps->i4_pic_scaling_matrix_present_flag))
{
ih264d_form_scaling_matrix_picture(ps_seq, ps_pps, ps_dec);
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_scaling_present = 1;
}
else
{
ih264d_form_default_scaling_matrix(ps_dec);
}
if(ps_pps->i4_transform_8x8_mode_flag)
{
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_transform8x8_present = 1;
}
}
else
{
ih264d_form_default_scaling_matrix(ps_dec);
}
/* required while reading the transform_size_8x8 u4_flag */
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag =
ps_seq->u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag;
ps_dec->s_high_profile.s_cavlc_ctxt = ps_dec->s_cavlc_ctxt;
ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag = 1;
ps_dec->ps_frame_buf_ip_recon = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
memcpy(&ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon_parse, &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon,
sizeof(tfr_ctxt_t));
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores >= 3 && ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag)
{
memcpy(&ps_dec->s_tran_iprecon, &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon,
sizeof(tfr_ctxt_t));
ps_dec->ps_frame_buf_ip_recon = &ps_dec->s_tran_iprecon;
}
}
ih264d_init_deblk_tfr_ctxt(ps_dec,&(ps_dec->s_pad_mgr), &(ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon),
ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs, 0);
ps_dec->ps_cur_deblk_mb = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic;
ps_dec->u4_cur_deblk_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->u4_deblk_mb_x = 0;
ps_dec->u4_deblk_mb_y = 0;
ps_dec->pu4_wt_ofsts = ps_dec->pu4_wts_ofsts_mat;
H264_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&ps_dec->process_disp_mutex);
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in libavc in Mediaserver could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access data without permission. Product: Android. Versions: 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1. Android ID: A-33551775.
Commit Message: Decoder: Fixed initialization of first_slice_in_pic
To handle some errors, first_slice_in_pic was being set to 2.
This is now cleaned up and first_slice_in_pic is set to 1 only once per pic.
This will ensure picture level initializations are done only once even in case
of error clips
Bug: 33717589
Bug: 33551775
Bug: 33716442
Bug: 33677995
Change-Id: If341436b3cbaa724017eedddd88c2e6fac36d8ba
| Medium | 174,041 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static struct dentry *aio_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
int flags, const char *dev_name, void *data)
{
static const struct dentry_operations ops = {
.d_dname = simple_dname,
};
return mount_pseudo(fs_type, "aio:", NULL, &ops, AIO_RING_MAGIC);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The aio_mount function in fs/aio.c in the Linux kernel before 4.7.7 does not properly restrict execute access, which makes it easier for local users to bypass intended SELinux W^X policy restrictions, and consequently gain privileges, via an io_setup system call.
Commit Message: aio: mark AIO pseudo-fs noexec
This ensures that do_mmap() won't implicitly make AIO memory mappings
executable if the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag is set. Such
behavior is problematic because the security_mmap_file LSM hook doesn't
catch this case, potentially permitting an attacker to bypass a W^X
policy enforced by SELinux.
I have tested the patch on my machine.
To test the behavior, compile and run this:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/personality.h>
#include <linux/aio_abi.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
int main(void) {
personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC);
aio_context_t ctx = 0;
if (syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx))
err(1, "io_setup");
char cmd[1000];
sprintf(cmd, "cat /proc/%d/maps | grep -F '/[aio]'",
(int)getpid());
system(cmd);
return 0;
}
In the output, "rw-s" is good, "rwxs" is bad.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | High | 168,645 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void WorkerProcessLauncher::Core::OnChannelConnected(int32 peer_pid) {
DCHECK(caller_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (ipc_enabled_)
worker_delegate_->OnChannelConnected();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving PDF fields.
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,548 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, loadPhar)
{
char *fname, *alias = NULL, *error;
size_t fname_len, alias_len = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s|s!", &fname, &fname_len, &alias, &alias_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
phar_request_initialize();
RETVAL_BOOL(phar_open_from_filename(fname, fname_len, alias, alias_len, REPORT_ERRORS, NULL, &error) == SUCCESS);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "%s", error);
efree(error);
}
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto string Phar::apiVersion()
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The Phar extension in PHP before 5.5.34, 5.6.x before 5.6.20, and 7.x before 7.0.5 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted filename, as demonstrated by mishandling of \0 characters by the phar_analyze_path function in ext/phar/phar.c.
Commit Message: | High | 165,058 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool omx_vdec::release_output_done(void)
{
bool bRet = false;
unsigned i=0,j=0;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Value of m_out_mem_ptr %p",m_inp_mem_ptr);
if (m_out_mem_ptr) {
for (; j < drv_ctx.op_buf.actualcount ; j++) {
if (BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_out_bm_count,j)) {
break;
}
}
if (j == drv_ctx.op_buf.actualcount) {
m_out_bm_count = 0;
bRet = true;
}
} else {
m_out_bm_count = 0;
bRet = true;
}
return bRet;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The mm-video-v4l2 vdec component in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 mishandles a buffer count, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27661749.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: add safety checks for freeing buffers
Allow only up to 64 buffers on input/output port (since the
allocation bitmap is only 64-wide).
Do not allow changing theactual buffer count while still
holding allocation (Client can technically negotiate
buffer count on a free/disabled port)
Add safety checks to free only as many buffers were allocated.
Fixes: Security Vulnerability - Heap Overflow and Possible Local
Privilege Escalation in MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #3)
Bug: 27532282 27661749
Change-Id: I06dd680d43feaef3efdc87311e8a6703e234b523
| High | 173,786 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void fpm_child_init(struct fpm_worker_pool_s *wp) /* {{{ */
{
fpm_globals.max_requests = wp->config->pm_max_requests;
if (0 > fpm_stdio_init_child(wp) ||
0 > fpm_log_init_child(wp) ||
0 > fpm_status_init_child(wp) ||
0 > fpm_unix_init_child(wp) ||
0 > fpm_signals_init_child() ||
0 > fpm_env_init_child(wp) ||
0 > fpm_php_init_child(wp)) {
zlog(ZLOG_ERROR, "[pool %s] child failed to initialize", wp->config->name);
exit(FPM_EXIT_SOFTWARE);
}
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: An issue was discovered in PHP 7.3.x before 7.3.0alpha3, 7.2.x before 7.2.8, and before 7.1.20. The php-fpm master process restarts a child process in an endless loop when using program execution functions (e.g., passthru, exec, shell_exec, or system) with a non-blocking STDIN stream, causing this master process to consume 100% of the CPU, and consume disk space with a large volume of error logs, as demonstrated by an attack by a customer of a shared-hosting facility.
Commit Message: Fixed bug #73342
Directly listen on socket, instead of duping it to STDIN and
listening on that. | Medium | 169,451 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int dccp_v6_send_response(const struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req)
{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct in6_addr *final_p, final;
struct flowi6 fl6;
int err = -1;
struct dst_entry *dst;
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_DCCP;
fl6.daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr;
fl6.saddr = ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr;
fl6.flowlabel = 0;
fl6.flowi6_oif = ireq->ir_iif;
fl6.fl6_dport = ireq->ir_rmt_port;
fl6.fl6_sport = htons(ireq->ir_num);
security_req_classify_flow(req, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final);
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
err = PTR_ERR(dst);
dst = NULL;
goto done;
}
skb = dccp_make_response(sk, dst, req);
if (skb != NULL) {
struct dccp_hdr *dh = dccp_hdr(skb);
dh->dccph_checksum = dccp_v6_csum_finish(skb,
&ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr,
&ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr);
fl6.daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr;
err = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, &fl6, np->opt, np->tclass);
err = net_xmit_eval(err);
}
done:
dst_release(dst);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The IPv6 stack in the Linux kernel before 4.3.3 mishandles options data, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) via a crafted sendmsg system call.
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 167,326 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
int off, i, slot, spi;
if (regs[regno].type != PTR_TO_STACK) {
/* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */
if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 &&
register_is_null(regs[regno]))
return 0;
verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno,
reg_type_str[regs[regno].type],
reg_type_str[PTR_TO_STACK]);
return -EACCES;
}
/* Only allow fixed-offset stack reads */
if (!tnum_is_const(regs[regno].var_off)) {
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), regs[regno].var_off);
verbose(env, "invalid variable stack read R%d var_off=%s\n",
regno, tn_buf);
}
off = regs[regno].off + regs[regno].var_off.value;
if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 ||
access_size < 0 || (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed)) {
verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n",
regno, off, access_size);
return -EACCES;
}
if (env->prog->aux->stack_depth < -off)
env->prog->aux->stack_depth = -off;
if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
meta->access_size = access_size;
meta->regno = regno;
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < access_size; i++) {
slot = -(off + i) - 1;
spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
if (state->allocated_stack <= slot ||
state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE] !=
STACK_MISC) {
verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
off, i, access_size);
return -EACCES;
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The check_stack_boundary function in kernel/bpf/verifier.c in the Linux kernel through 4.14.8 allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging mishandling of invalid variable stack read operations.
Commit Message: bpf: fix missing error return in check_stack_boundary()
Prevent indirect stack accesses at non-constant addresses, which would
permit reading and corrupting spilled pointers.
Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> | High | 167,640 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadSUNImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define RMT_EQUAL_RGB 1
#define RMT_NONE 0
#define RMT_RAW 2
#define RT_STANDARD 1
#define RT_ENCODED 2
#define RT_FORMAT_RGB 3
typedef struct _SUNInfo
{
unsigned int
magic,
width,
height,
depth,
length,
type,
maptype,
maplength;
} SUNInfo;
Image
*image;
int
bit;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bytes_per_line,
extent,
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
SUNInfo
sun_info;
unsigned char
*sun_data,
*sun_pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read SUN raster header.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&sun_info,0,sizeof(sun_info));
sun_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
do
{
/*
Verify SUN identifier.
*/
if (sun_info.magic != 0x59a66a95)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
sun_info.width=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.height=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.depth=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.type=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.maptype=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.maplength=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
extent=sun_info.height*sun_info.width;
if ((sun_info.height != 0) && (sun_info.width != extent/sun_info.height))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.type != RT_STANDARD) && (sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) &&
(sun_info.type != RT_FORMAT_RGB))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.maptype == RMT_NONE) && (sun_info.maplength != 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.depth == 0) || (sun_info.depth > 32))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.maptype != RMT_NONE) && (sun_info.maptype != RMT_EQUAL_RGB) &&
(sun_info.maptype != RMT_RAW))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
image->columns=sun_info.width;
image->rows=sun_info.height;
image->depth=sun_info.depth <= 8 ? sun_info.depth :
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH;
if (sun_info.depth < 24)
{
size_t
one;
image->colors=sun_info.maplength;
one=1;
if (sun_info.maptype == RMT_NONE)
image->colors=one << sun_info.depth;
if (sun_info.maptype == RMT_EQUAL_RGB)
image->colors=sun_info.maplength/3;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
switch (sun_info.maptype)
{
case RMT_NONE:
break;
case RMT_EQUAL_RGB:
{
unsigned char
*sun_colormap;
/*
Read SUN raster colormap.
*/
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,
sizeof(*sun_colormap));
if (sun_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_colormap);
break;
}
case RMT_RAW:
{
unsigned char
*sun_colormap;
/*
Read SUN raster colormap.
*/
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(sun_info.maplength,
sizeof(*sun_colormap));
if (sun_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,sun_info.maplength,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) sun_info.maplength)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_colormap);
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
}
image->alpha_trait=sun_info.depth == 32 ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
image->columns=sun_info.width;
image->rows=sun_info.height;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if ((sun_info.length*sizeof(*sun_data))/sizeof(*sun_data) !=
sun_info.length || !sun_info.length)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if ((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) &&
((number_pixels*sun_info.depth) > (8*sun_info.length)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
bytes_per_line=sun_info.width*sun_info.depth;
sun_data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) MagickMax(
sun_info.length,bytes_per_line*sun_info.width),sizeof(*sun_data));
if (sun_data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlob(image,sun_info.length,sun_data);
if (count != (ssize_t) sun_info.length)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
sun_pixels=sun_data;
bytes_per_line=0;
if (sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED)
{
size_t
height;
/*
Read run-length encoded raster pixels.
*/
height=sun_info.height;
if ((height == 0) || (sun_info.width == 0) || (sun_info.depth == 0) ||
((bytes_per_line/sun_info.depth) != sun_info.width))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
bytes_per_line+=15;
bytes_per_line<<=1;
if ((bytes_per_line >> 1) != (sun_info.width*sun_info.depth+15))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
bytes_per_line>>=4;
sun_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(height,
bytes_per_line*sizeof(*sun_pixels));
if (sun_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) DecodeImage(sun_data,sun_info.length,sun_pixels,bytes_per_line*
height);
sun_data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_data);
}
/*
Convert SUN raster image to pixel packets.
*/
p=sun_pixels;
if (sun_info.depth == 1)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= 0; bit--)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x00 : 0x01),
q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= (int) (8-(image->columns % 8)); bit--)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x00 :
0x01),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((((image->columns/8)+(image->columns % 8 ? 1 : 0)) % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
if (bytes_per_line == 0)
bytes_per_line=image->columns;
length=image->rows*(image->columns+image->columns % 2);
if (((sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED) &&
(length > (bytes_per_line*image->rows))) ||
((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (length > sun_info.length)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,*p++,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
{
size_t
bytes_per_pixel;
bytes_per_pixel=3;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
bytes_per_pixel++;
if (bytes_per_line == 0)
bytes_per_line=bytes_per_pixel*image->columns;
length=image->rows*(bytes_per_line+bytes_per_line % 2);
if (((sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED) &&
(length > (bytes_per_line*image->rows))) ||
((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (length > sun_info.length)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
if (sun_info.type == RT_STANDARD)
{
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
}
else
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
}
if (image->colors != 0)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelRed(image,q)].red),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelGreen(image,q)].green),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelBlue(image,q)].blue),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (((bytes_per_pixel*image->columns) % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
sun_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_pixels);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
sun_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (sun_info.magic == 0x59a66a95)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (sun_info.magic == 0x59a66a95);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: coders/sun.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.0-4 Beta allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and application crash) via a crafted SUN file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 170,124 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BrowserContextDestroyer::FinishDestroyContext() {
DCHECK_EQ(pending_hosts_, 0U);
delete context_;
context_ = nullptr;
delete this;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: A malicious webview could install long-lived unload handlers that re-use an incognito BrowserContext that is queued for destruction in versions of Oxide before 1.18.3.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,420 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: icmp6_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, u_int length, const u_char *bp2, int fragmented)
{
const struct icmp6_hdr *dp;
const struct ip6_hdr *ip;
const struct ip6_hdr *oip;
const struct udphdr *ouh;
int dport;
const u_char *ep;
u_int prot;
dp = (const struct icmp6_hdr *)bp;
ip = (const struct ip6_hdr *)bp2;
oip = (const struct ip6_hdr *)(dp + 1);
/* 'ep' points to the end of available data. */
ep = ndo->ndo_snapend;
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp6_cksum);
if (ndo->ndo_vflag && !fragmented) {
uint16_t sum, udp_sum;
if (ND_TTEST2(bp[0], length)) {
udp_sum = EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp6_cksum);
sum = icmp6_cksum(ndo, ip, dp, length);
if (sum != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"[bad icmp6 cksum 0x%04x -> 0x%04x!] ",
udp_sum,
in_cksum_shouldbe(udp_sum, sum)));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo,"[icmp6 sum ok] "));
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,"ICMP6, %s", tok2str(icmp6_type_values,"unknown icmp6 type (%u)",dp->icmp6_type)));
/* display cosmetics: print the packet length for printer that use the vflag now */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag && (dp->icmp6_type == ND_ROUTER_SOLICIT ||
dp->icmp6_type == ND_ROUTER_ADVERT ||
dp->icmp6_type == ND_NEIGHBOR_ADVERT ||
dp->icmp6_type == ND_NEIGHBOR_SOLICIT ||
dp->icmp6_type == ND_REDIRECT ||
dp->icmp6_type == ICMP6_HADISCOV_REPLY ||
dp->icmp6_type == ICMP6_MOBILEPREFIX_ADVERT ))
ND_PRINT((ndo,", length %u", length));
switch (dp->icmp6_type) {
case ICMP6_DST_UNREACH:
ND_TCHECK(oip->ip6_dst);
ND_PRINT((ndo,", %s", tok2str(icmp6_dst_unreach_code_values,"unknown unreach code (%u)",dp->icmp6_code)));
switch (dp->icmp6_code) {
case ICMP6_DST_UNREACH_NOROUTE: /* fall through */
case ICMP6_DST_UNREACH_ADMIN:
case ICMP6_DST_UNREACH_ADDR:
ND_PRINT((ndo," %s",ip6addr_string(ndo, &oip->ip6_dst)));
break;
case ICMP6_DST_UNREACH_BEYONDSCOPE:
ND_PRINT((ndo," %s, source address %s",
ip6addr_string(ndo, &oip->ip6_dst),
ip6addr_string(ndo, &oip->ip6_src)));
break;
case ICMP6_DST_UNREACH_NOPORT:
if ((ouh = get_upperlayer(ndo, (const u_char *)oip, &prot))
== NULL)
goto trunc;
dport = EXTRACT_16BITS(&ouh->uh_dport);
switch (prot) {
case IPPROTO_TCP:
ND_PRINT((ndo,", %s tcp port %s",
ip6addr_string(ndo, &oip->ip6_dst),
tcpport_string(ndo, dport)));
break;
case IPPROTO_UDP:
ND_PRINT((ndo,", %s udp port %s",
ip6addr_string(ndo, &oip->ip6_dst),
udpport_string(ndo, dport)));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo,", %s protocol %d port %d unreachable",
ip6addr_string(ndo, &oip->ip6_dst),
oip->ip6_nxt, dport));
break;
}
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) {
print_unknown_data(ndo, bp,"\n\t",length);
return;
}
break;
}
break;
case ICMP6_PACKET_TOO_BIG:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp6_mtu);
ND_PRINT((ndo,", mtu %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp6_mtu)));
break;
case ICMP6_TIME_EXCEEDED:
ND_TCHECK(oip->ip6_dst);
switch (dp->icmp6_code) {
case ICMP6_TIME_EXCEED_TRANSIT:
ND_PRINT((ndo," for %s",
ip6addr_string(ndo, &oip->ip6_dst)));
break;
case ICMP6_TIME_EXCEED_REASSEMBLY:
ND_PRINT((ndo," (reassembly)"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo,", unknown code (%u)", dp->icmp6_code));
break;
}
break;
case ICMP6_PARAM_PROB:
ND_TCHECK(oip->ip6_dst);
switch (dp->icmp6_code) {
case ICMP6_PARAMPROB_HEADER:
ND_PRINT((ndo,", erroneous - octet %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp6_pptr)));
break;
case ICMP6_PARAMPROB_NEXTHEADER:
ND_PRINT((ndo,", next header - octet %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp6_pptr)));
break;
case ICMP6_PARAMPROB_OPTION:
ND_PRINT((ndo,", option - octet %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp6_pptr)));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo,", code-#%d",
dp->icmp6_code));
break;
}
break;
case ICMP6_ECHO_REQUEST:
case ICMP6_ECHO_REPLY:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp6_seq);
ND_PRINT((ndo,", seq %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp6_seq)));
break;
case ICMP6_MEMBERSHIP_QUERY:
if (length == MLD_MINLEN) {
mld6_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp);
} else if (length >= MLDV2_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," v2"));
mldv2_query_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp, length);
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo," unknown-version (len %u) ", length));
}
break;
case ICMP6_MEMBERSHIP_REPORT:
mld6_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp);
break;
case ICMP6_MEMBERSHIP_REDUCTION:
mld6_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp);
break;
case ND_ROUTER_SOLICIT:
#define RTSOLLEN 8
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
icmp6_opt_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp + RTSOLLEN,
length - RTSOLLEN);
}
break;
case ND_ROUTER_ADVERT:
#define RTADVLEN 16
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
const struct nd_router_advert *p;
p = (const struct nd_router_advert *)dp;
ND_TCHECK(p->nd_ra_retransmit);
ND_PRINT((ndo,"\n\thop limit %u, Flags [%s]" \
", pref %s, router lifetime %us, reachable time %ums, retrans timer %ums",
(u_int)p->nd_ra_curhoplimit,
bittok2str(icmp6_opt_ra_flag_values,"none",(p->nd_ra_flags_reserved)),
get_rtpref(p->nd_ra_flags_reserved),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&p->nd_ra_router_lifetime),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&p->nd_ra_reachable),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&p->nd_ra_retransmit)));
icmp6_opt_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp + RTADVLEN,
length - RTADVLEN);
}
break;
case ND_NEIGHBOR_SOLICIT:
{
const struct nd_neighbor_solicit *p;
p = (const struct nd_neighbor_solicit *)dp;
ND_TCHECK(p->nd_ns_target);
ND_PRINT((ndo,", who has %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &p->nd_ns_target)));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
#define NDSOLLEN 24
icmp6_opt_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp + NDSOLLEN,
length - NDSOLLEN);
}
}
break;
case ND_NEIGHBOR_ADVERT:
{
const struct nd_neighbor_advert *p;
p = (const struct nd_neighbor_advert *)dp;
ND_TCHECK(p->nd_na_target);
ND_PRINT((ndo,", tgt is %s",
ip6addr_string(ndo, &p->nd_na_target)));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,", Flags [%s]",
bittok2str(icmp6_nd_na_flag_values,
"none",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&p->nd_na_flags_reserved))));
#define NDADVLEN 24
icmp6_opt_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp + NDADVLEN,
length - NDADVLEN);
#undef NDADVLEN
}
}
break;
case ND_REDIRECT:
#define RDR(i) ((const struct nd_redirect *)(i))
ND_TCHECK(RDR(dp)->nd_rd_dst);
ND_PRINT((ndo,", %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &RDR(dp)->nd_rd_dst)));
ND_TCHECK(RDR(dp)->nd_rd_target);
ND_PRINT((ndo," to %s",
ip6addr_string(ndo, &RDR(dp)->nd_rd_target)));
#define REDIRECTLEN 40
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
icmp6_opt_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp + REDIRECTLEN,
length - REDIRECTLEN);
}
break;
#undef REDIRECTLEN
#undef RDR
case ICMP6_ROUTER_RENUMBERING:
icmp6_rrenum_print(ndo, bp, ep);
break;
case ICMP6_NI_QUERY:
case ICMP6_NI_REPLY:
icmp6_nodeinfo_print(ndo, length, bp, ep);
break;
case IND_SOLICIT:
case IND_ADVERT:
break;
case ICMP6_V2_MEMBERSHIP_REPORT:
mldv2_report_print(ndo, (const u_char *) dp, length);
break;
case ICMP6_MOBILEPREFIX_SOLICIT: /* fall through */
case ICMP6_HADISCOV_REQUEST:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp6_data16[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo,", id 0x%04x", EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp6_data16[0])));
break;
case ICMP6_HADISCOV_REPLY:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
const struct in6_addr *in6;
const u_char *cp;
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp6_data16[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo,", id 0x%04x", EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp6_data16[0])));
cp = (const u_char *)dp + length;
in6 = (const struct in6_addr *)(dp + 1);
for (; (const u_char *)in6 < cp; in6++) {
ND_TCHECK(*in6);
ND_PRINT((ndo,", %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, in6)));
}
}
break;
case ICMP6_MOBILEPREFIX_ADVERT:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp6_data16[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo,", id 0x%04x", EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp6_data16[0])));
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp6_data16[1]);
if (dp->icmp6_data16[1] & 0xc0)
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (dp->icmp6_data16[1] & 0x80)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"M"));
if (dp->icmp6_data16[1] & 0x40)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"O"));
#define MPADVLEN 8
icmp6_opt_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp + MPADVLEN,
length - MPADVLEN);
}
break;
case ND_RPL_MESSAGE:
/* plus 4, because struct icmp6_hdr contains 4 bytes of icmp payload */
rpl_print(ndo, dp, &dp->icmp6_data8[0], length-sizeof(struct icmp6_hdr)+4);
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo,", length %u", length));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, bp,"\n\t", length);
return;
}
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,", length %u", length));
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|icmp6]"));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ICMPv6 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-icmp6.c.
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14882/ICMP6 RPL: Add a missing bounds check
Moreover:
Add and use *_tstr[] strings.
Update four tests outputs accordingly.
Fix a space.
Wang Junjie of 360 ESG Codesafe Team had independently identified this
vulnerability in 2018 by means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture
file for the test. | High | 169,824 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int sctp_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sock *sk;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
struct sctp_endpoint *ep = NULL;
struct sctp_ep_common *rcvr;
struct sctp_transport *transport = NULL;
struct sctp_chunk *chunk;
struct sctphdr *sh;
union sctp_addr src;
union sctp_addr dest;
int family;
struct sctp_af *af;
if (skb->pkt_type!=PACKET_HOST)
goto discard_it;
SCTP_INC_STATS_BH(SCTP_MIB_INSCTPPACKS);
if (skb_linearize(skb))
goto discard_it;
sh = sctp_hdr(skb);
/* Pull up the IP and SCTP headers. */
__skb_pull(skb, skb_transport_offset(skb));
if (skb->len < sizeof(struct sctphdr))
goto discard_it;
if (!skb_csum_unnecessary(skb) && sctp_rcv_checksum(skb) < 0)
goto discard_it;
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(struct sctphdr));
/* Make sure we at least have chunk headers worth of data left. */
if (skb->len < sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))
goto discard_it;
family = ipver2af(ip_hdr(skb)->version);
af = sctp_get_af_specific(family);
if (unlikely(!af))
goto discard_it;
/* Initialize local addresses for lookups. */
af->from_skb(&src, skb, 1);
af->from_skb(&dest, skb, 0);
/* If the packet is to or from a non-unicast address,
* silently discard the packet.
*
* This is not clearly defined in the RFC except in section
* 8.4 - OOTB handling. However, based on the book "Stream Control
* Transmission Protocol" 2.1, "It is important to note that the
* IP address of an SCTP transport address must be a routable
* unicast address. In other words, IP multicast addresses and
* IP broadcast addresses cannot be used in an SCTP transport
* address."
*/
if (!af->addr_valid(&src, NULL, skb) ||
!af->addr_valid(&dest, NULL, skb))
goto discard_it;
asoc = __sctp_rcv_lookup(skb, &src, &dest, &transport);
if (!asoc)
ep = __sctp_rcv_lookup_endpoint(&dest);
/* Retrieve the common input handling substructure. */
rcvr = asoc ? &asoc->base : &ep->base;
sk = rcvr->sk;
/*
* If a frame arrives on an interface and the receiving socket is
* bound to another interface, via SO_BINDTODEVICE, treat it as OOTB
*/
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if && (sk->sk_bound_dev_if != af->skb_iif(skb)))
{
if (asoc) {
sctp_association_put(asoc);
asoc = NULL;
} else {
sctp_endpoint_put(ep);
ep = NULL;
}
sk = sctp_get_ctl_sock();
ep = sctp_sk(sk)->ep;
sctp_endpoint_hold(ep);
rcvr = &ep->base;
}
/*
* RFC 2960, 8.4 - Handle "Out of the blue" Packets.
* An SCTP packet is called an "out of the blue" (OOTB)
* packet if it is correctly formed, i.e., passed the
* receiver's checksum check, but the receiver is not
* able to identify the association to which this
* packet belongs.
*/
if (!asoc) {
if (sctp_rcv_ootb(skb)) {
SCTP_INC_STATS_BH(SCTP_MIB_OUTOFBLUES);
goto discard_release;
}
}
if (!xfrm_policy_check(sk, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb, family))
goto discard_release;
nf_reset(skb);
if (sk_filter(sk, skb))
goto discard_release;
/* Create an SCTP packet structure. */
chunk = sctp_chunkify(skb, asoc, sk);
if (!chunk)
goto discard_release;
SCTP_INPUT_CB(skb)->chunk = chunk;
/* Remember what endpoint is to handle this packet. */
chunk->rcvr = rcvr;
/* Remember the SCTP header. */
chunk->sctp_hdr = sh;
/* Set the source and destination addresses of the incoming chunk. */
sctp_init_addrs(chunk, &src, &dest);
/* Remember where we came from. */
chunk->transport = transport;
/* Acquire access to the sock lock. Note: We are safe from other
* bottom halves on this lock, but a user may be in the lock too,
* so check if it is busy.
*/
sctp_bh_lock_sock(sk);
if (sock_owned_by_user(sk)) {
SCTP_INC_STATS_BH(SCTP_MIB_IN_PKT_BACKLOG);
sctp_add_backlog(sk, skb);
} else {
SCTP_INC_STATS_BH(SCTP_MIB_IN_PKT_SOFTIRQ);
sctp_inq_push(&chunk->rcvr->inqueue, chunk);
}
sctp_bh_unlock_sock(sk);
/* Release the asoc/ep ref we took in the lookup calls. */
if (asoc)
sctp_association_put(asoc);
else
sctp_endpoint_put(ep);
return 0;
discard_it:
SCTP_INC_STATS_BH(SCTP_MIB_IN_PKT_DISCARDS);
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
discard_release:
/* Release the asoc/ep ref we took in the lookup calls. */
if (asoc)
sctp_association_put(asoc);
else
sctp_endpoint_put(ep);
goto discard_it;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the sctp_rcv function in net/sctp/input.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.29 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (system hang) via SCTP packets. NOTE: in some environments, this issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2011-2482.
Commit Message: sctp: Fix another socket race during accept/peeloff
There is a race between sctp_rcv() and sctp_accept() where we
have moved the association from the listening socket to the
accepted socket, but sctp_rcv() processing cached the old
socket and continues to use it.
The easy solution is to check for the socket mismatch once we've
grabed the socket lock. If we hit a mis-match, that means
that were are currently holding the lock on the listening socket,
but the association is refrencing a newly accepted socket. We need
to drop the lock on the old socket and grab the lock on the new one.
A more proper solution might be to create accepted sockets when
the new association is established, similar to TCP. That would
eliminate the race for 1-to-1 style sockets, but it would still
existing for 1-to-many sockets where a user wished to peeloff an
association. For now, we'll live with this easy solution as
it addresses the problem.
Reported-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 166,208 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: extern "C" int EffectCreate(const effect_uuid_t *uuid,
int32_t sessionId,
int32_t ioId,
effect_handle_t *pHandle){
int ret;
int i;
int length = sizeof(gDescriptors) / sizeof(const effect_descriptor_t *);
const effect_descriptor_t *desc;
ALOGV("\t\nEffectCreate start");
if (pHandle == NULL || uuid == NULL){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : EffectCreate() called with NULL pointer");
return -EINVAL;
}
for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
desc = gDescriptors[i];
if (memcmp(uuid, &desc->uuid, sizeof(effect_uuid_t))
== 0) {
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate - UUID matched Reverb type %d, UUID = %x", i, desc->uuid.timeLow);
break;
}
}
if (i == length) {
return -ENOENT;
}
ReverbContext *pContext = new ReverbContext;
pContext->itfe = &gReverbInterface;
pContext->hInstance = NULL;
pContext->auxiliary = false;
if ((desc->flags & EFFECT_FLAG_TYPE_MASK) == EFFECT_FLAG_TYPE_AUXILIARY){
pContext->auxiliary = true;
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate - AUX");
}else{
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate - INS");
}
pContext->preset = false;
if (memcmp(&desc->type, SL_IID_PRESETREVERB, sizeof(effect_uuid_t)) == 0) {
pContext->preset = true;
pContext->curPreset = REVERB_PRESET_LAST + 1;
pContext->nextPreset = REVERB_DEFAULT_PRESET;
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate - PRESET");
}else{
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate - ENVIRONMENTAL");
}
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate - Calling Reverb_init");
ret = Reverb_init(pContext);
if (ret < 0){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : EffectCreate() init failed");
delete pContext;
return ret;
}
*pHandle = (effect_handle_t)pContext;
#ifdef LVM_PCM
pContext->PcmInPtr = NULL;
pContext->PcmOutPtr = NULL;
pContext->PcmInPtr = fopen("/data/tmp/reverb_pcm_in.pcm", "w");
pContext->PcmOutPtr = fopen("/data/tmp/reverb_pcm_out.pcm", "w");
if((pContext->PcmInPtr == NULL)||
(pContext->PcmOutPtr == NULL)){
return -EINVAL;
}
#endif
pContext->InFrames32 = (LVM_INT32 *)malloc(LVREV_MAX_FRAME_SIZE * sizeof(LVM_INT32) * 2);
pContext->OutFrames32 = (LVM_INT32 *)malloc(LVREV_MAX_FRAME_SIZE * sizeof(LVM_INT32) * 2);
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate %p, size %zu", pContext, sizeof(ReverbContext));
ALOGV("\tEffectCreate end\n");
return 0;
} /* end EffectCreate */
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in libeffects in the Audio Policy Service in mediaserver in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48I allow attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted application, aka internal bug 21953516.
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
| High | 173,349 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool ChromeRenderMessageFilter::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& message,
bool* message_was_ok) {
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP_EX(ChromeRenderMessageFilter, message, *message_was_ok)
#if !defined(DISABLE_NACL)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(ChromeViewHostMsg_LaunchNaCl, OnLaunchNaCl)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(ChromeViewHostMsg_GetReadonlyPnaclFD,
OnGetReadonlyPnaclFd)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(ChromeViewHostMsg_NaClCreateTemporaryFile,
OnNaClCreateTemporaryFile)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_DnsPrefetch, OnDnsPrefetch)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_ResourceTypeStats,
OnResourceTypeStats)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_UpdatedCacheStats,
OnUpdatedCacheStats)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_FPS, OnFPS)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_V8HeapStats, OnV8HeapStats)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_OpenChannelToExtension,
OnOpenChannelToExtension)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_OpenChannelToTab, OnOpenChannelToTab)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(ExtensionHostMsg_GetMessageBundle,
OnGetExtensionMessageBundle)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_AddListener, OnExtensionAddListener)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_RemoveListener,
OnExtensionRemoveListener)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_AddLazyListener,
OnExtensionAddLazyListener)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_RemoveLazyListener,
OnExtensionRemoveLazyListener)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_AddFilteredListener,
OnExtensionAddFilteredListener)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_RemoveFilteredListener,
OnExtensionRemoveFilteredListener)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_CloseChannel, OnExtensionCloseChannel)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_RequestForIOThread,
OnExtensionRequestForIOThread)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_ShouldUnloadAck,
OnExtensionShouldUnloadAck)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_GenerateUniqueID,
OnExtensionGenerateUniqueID)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_UnloadAck, OnExtensionUnloadAck)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_ResumeRequests,
OnExtensionResumeRequests);
#if defined(USE_TCMALLOC)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_WriteTcmallocHeapProfile_ACK,
OnWriteTcmallocHeapProfile)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_AllowDatabase, OnAllowDatabase)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_AllowDOMStorage, OnAllowDOMStorage)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_AllowFileSystem, OnAllowFileSystem)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_AllowIndexedDB, OnAllowIndexedDB)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_CanTriggerClipboardRead,
OnCanTriggerClipboardRead)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_CanTriggerClipboardWrite,
OnCanTriggerClipboardWrite)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
#if defined(ENABLE_AUTOMATION)
if ((message.type() == ChromeViewHostMsg_GetCookies::ID ||
message.type() == ChromeViewHostMsg_SetCookie::ID) &&
AutomationResourceMessageFilter::ShouldFilterCookieMessages(
render_process_id_, message.routing_id())) {
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP_EX(ChromeRenderMessageFilter, message,
*message_was_ok)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(ChromeViewHostMsg_GetCookies,
OnGetCookies)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_SetCookie, OnSetCookie)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
handled = true;
}
#endif
return handled;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the SVG implementation in WebKit, as used in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.94, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Disable tcmalloc profile files.
BUG=154983
[email protected]
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11087041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@161048 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,663 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: mwifiex_set_wmm_params(struct mwifiex_private *priv,
struct mwifiex_uap_bss_param *bss_cfg,
struct cfg80211_ap_settings *params)
{
const u8 *vendor_ie;
const u8 *wmm_ie;
u8 wmm_oui[] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xf2, 0x02};
vendor_ie = cfg80211_find_vendor_ie(WLAN_OUI_MICROSOFT,
WLAN_OUI_TYPE_MICROSOFT_WMM,
params->beacon.tail,
params->beacon.tail_len);
if (vendor_ie) {
wmm_ie = vendor_ie;
memcpy(&bss_cfg->wmm_info, wmm_ie +
sizeof(struct ieee_types_header), *(wmm_ie + 1));
priv->wmm_enabled = 1;
} else {
memset(&bss_cfg->wmm_info, 0, sizeof(bss_cfg->wmm_info));
memcpy(&bss_cfg->wmm_info.oui, wmm_oui, sizeof(wmm_oui));
bss_cfg->wmm_info.subtype = MWIFIEX_WMM_SUBTYPE;
bss_cfg->wmm_info.version = MWIFIEX_WMM_VERSION;
priv->wmm_enabled = 0;
}
bss_cfg->qos_info = 0x00;
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-120
Summary: There is heap-based buffer overflow in kernel, all versions up to, excluding 5.3, in the marvell wifi chip driver in Linux kernel, that allows local users to cause a denial of service(system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code.
Commit Message: mwifiex: Fix three heap overflow at parsing element in cfg80211_ap_settings
mwifiex_update_vs_ie(),mwifiex_set_uap_rates() and
mwifiex_set_wmm_params() call memcpy() without checking
the destination size.Since the source is given from
user-space, this may trigger a heap buffer overflow.
Fix them by putting the length check before performing memcpy().
This fix addresses CVE-2019-14814,CVE-2019-14815,CVE-2019-14816.
Signed-off-by: Wen Huang <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ganapathi Bhat <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]> | High | 169,577 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int m_authenticate(struct Client* cptr, struct Client* sptr, int parc, char* parv[])
{
struct Client* acptr;
int first = 0;
char realhost[HOSTLEN + 3];
char *hoststr = (cli_sockhost(cptr) ? cli_sockhost(cptr) : cli_sock_ip(cptr));
if (!CapActive(cptr, CAP_SASL))
return 0;
if (parc < 2) /* have enough parameters? */
return need_more_params(cptr, "AUTHENTICATE");
if (strlen(parv[1]) > 400)
return send_reply(cptr, ERR_SASLTOOLONG);
if (IsSASLComplete(cptr))
return send_reply(cptr, ERR_SASLALREADY);
/* Look up the target server */
if (!(acptr = cli_saslagent(cptr))) {
if (strcmp(feature_str(FEAT_SASL_SERVER), "*"))
acptr = find_match_server((char *)feature_str(FEAT_SASL_SERVER));
else
acptr = NULL;
}
if (!acptr && strcmp(feature_str(FEAT_SASL_SERVER), "*"))
return send_reply(cptr, ERR_SASLFAIL, ": service unavailable");
/* If it's to us, do nothing; otherwise, forward the query */
if (acptr && IsMe(acptr))
return 0;
/* Generate an SASL session cookie if not already generated */
if (!cli_saslcookie(cptr)) {
do {
cli_saslcookie(cptr) = ircrandom() & 0x7fffffff;
} while (!cli_saslcookie(cptr));
first = 1;
}
if (strchr(hoststr, ':') != NULL)
ircd_snprintf(0, realhost, sizeof(realhost), "[%s]", hoststr);
else
ircd_strncpy(realhost, hoststr, sizeof(realhost));
if (acptr) {
if (first) {
if (!EmptyString(cli_sslclifp(cptr)))
sendcmdto_one(&me, CMD_SASL, acptr, "%C %C!%u.%u S %s :%s", acptr, &me,
cli_fd(cptr), cli_saslcookie(cptr),
parv[1], cli_sslclifp(cptr));
else
sendcmdto_one(&me, CMD_SASL, acptr, "%C %C!%u.%u S :%s", acptr, &me,
cli_fd(cptr), cli_saslcookie(cptr), parv[1]);
if (feature_bool(FEAT_SASL_SENDHOST))
sendcmdto_one(&me, CMD_SASL, acptr, "%C %C!%u.%u H :%s@%s:%s", acptr, &me,
cli_fd(cptr), cli_saslcookie(cptr), cli_username(cptr),
realhost, cli_sock_ip(cptr));
} else {
sendcmdto_one(&me, CMD_SASL, acptr, "%C %C!%u.%u C :%s", acptr, &me,
cli_fd(cptr), cli_saslcookie(cptr), parv[1]);
}
} else {
if (first) {
if (!EmptyString(cli_sslclifp(cptr)))
sendcmdto_serv_butone(&me, CMD_SASL, cptr, "* %C!%u.%u S %s :%s", &me,
cli_fd(cptr), cli_saslcookie(cptr),
parv[1], cli_sslclifp(cptr));
else
sendcmdto_serv_butone(&me, CMD_SASL, cptr, "* %C!%u.%u S :%s", &me,
cli_fd(cptr), cli_saslcookie(cptr), parv[1]);
if (feature_bool(FEAT_SASL_SENDHOST))
sendcmdto_serv_butone(&me, CMD_SASL, cptr, "* %C!%u.%u H :%s@%s:%s", &me,
cli_fd(cptr), cli_saslcookie(cptr), cli_username(cptr),
realhost, cli_sock_ip(cptr));
} else {
sendcmdto_serv_butone(&me, CMD_SASL, cptr, "* %C!%u.%u C :%s", &me,
cli_fd(cptr), cli_saslcookie(cptr), parv[1]);
}
}
if (!t_active(&cli_sasltimeout(cptr)))
timer_add(timer_init(&cli_sasltimeout(cptr)), sasl_timeout_callback, (void*) cptr,
TT_RELATIVE, feature_int(FEAT_SASL_TIMEOUT));
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-287
Summary: The m_authenticate function in ircd/m_authenticate.c in nefarious2 allows remote attackers to spoof certificate fingerprints and consequently log in as another user via a crafted AUTHENTICATE parameter.
Commit Message: Fix to prevent SASL security vulnerability | High | 168,813 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t BnHDCP::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel &data, Parcel *reply, uint32_t flags) {
switch (code) {
case HDCP_SET_OBSERVER:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IHDCP, data, reply);
sp<IHDCPObserver> observer =
interface_cast<IHDCPObserver>(data.readStrongBinder());
reply->writeInt32(setObserver(observer));
return OK;
}
case HDCP_INIT_ASYNC:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IHDCP, data, reply);
const char *host = data.readCString();
unsigned port = data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(initAsync(host, port));
return OK;
}
case HDCP_SHUTDOWN_ASYNC:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IHDCP, data, reply);
reply->writeInt32(shutdownAsync());
return OK;
}
case HDCP_GET_CAPS:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IHDCP, data, reply);
reply->writeInt32(getCaps());
return OK;
}
case HDCP_ENCRYPT:
{
size_t size = data.readInt32();
size_t bufSize = 2 * size;
if (bufSize > size) {
inData = malloc(bufSize);
}
if (inData == NULL) {
reply->writeInt32(ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE);
return OK;
}
void *outData = (uint8_t *)inData + size;
data.read(inData, size);
uint32_t streamCTR = data.readInt32();
uint64_t inputCTR;
status_t err = encrypt(inData, size, streamCTR, &inputCTR, outData);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt64(inputCTR);
reply->write(outData, size);
}
free(inData);
inData = outData = NULL;
return OK;
}
case HDCP_ENCRYPT_NATIVE:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IHDCP, data, reply);
sp<GraphicBuffer> graphicBuffer = new GraphicBuffer();
data.read(*graphicBuffer);
size_t offset = data.readInt32();
size_t size = data.readInt32();
uint32_t streamCTR = data.readInt32();
void *outData = malloc(size);
uint64_t inputCTR;
status_t err = encryptNative(graphicBuffer, offset, size,
streamCTR, &inputCTR, outData);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt64(inputCTR);
reply->write(outData, size);
}
free(outData);
outData = NULL;
return OK;
}
case HDCP_DECRYPT:
{
size_t size = data.readInt32();
size_t bufSize = 2 * size;
void *inData = NULL;
if (bufSize > size) {
inData = malloc(bufSize);
}
if (inData == NULL) {
reply->writeInt32(ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE);
return OK;
}
void *outData = (uint8_t *)inData + size;
data.read(inData, size);
uint32_t streamCTR = data.readInt32();
uint64_t inputCTR = data.readInt64();
status_t err = decrypt(inData, size, streamCTR, inputCTR, outData);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->write(outData, size);
}
free(inData);
inData = outData = NULL;
return OK;
}
default:
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in libmedia in Mediaserver could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as High because it is a general bypass for operating system protections that isolate application data from other applications. Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1. Android ID: A-33861560.
Commit Message: Fix overflow check and check read result
Bug: 33861560
Test: build
Change-Id: Ia85519766e19a6e37237166f309750b3e8323c4e
| Medium | 174,047 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: gs_main_init1(gs_main_instance * minst)
{
if (minst->init_done < 1) {
gs_dual_memory_t idmem;
int code =
ialloc_init(&idmem, minst->heap,
minst->memory_clump_size, gs_have_level2());
if (code < 0)
return code;
code = gs_lib_init1((gs_memory_t *)idmem.space_system);
if (code < 0)
return code;
alloc_save_init(&idmem);
{
gs_memory_t *mem = (gs_memory_t *)idmem.space_system;
name_table *nt = names_init(minst->name_table_size,
idmem.space_system);
if (nt == 0)
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
mem->gs_lib_ctx->gs_name_table = nt;
code = gs_register_struct_root(mem, NULL,
(void **)&mem->gs_lib_ctx->gs_name_table,
"the_gs_name_table");
"the_gs_name_table");
if (code < 0)
return code;
}
code = obj_init(&minst->i_ctx_p, &idmem); /* requires name_init */
if (code < 0)
if (code < 0)
return code;
code = i_iodev_init(minst->i_ctx_p);
if (code < 0)
return code;
minst->init_done = 1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The PS Interpreter in Ghostscript 9.18 and 9.20 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via crafted userparams.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,267 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: sctp_chunk_length_valid(struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
__u16 required_length)
{
__u16 chunk_length = ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length);
if (unlikely(chunk_length < required_length))
return 0;
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The SCTP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.17.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by triggering a large number of chunks in an association's output queue, as demonstrated by ASCONF probes, related to net/sctp/inqueue.c and net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c.
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix remote memory pressure from excessive queueing
This scenario is not limited to ASCONF, just taken as one
example triggering the issue. When receiving ASCONF probes
in the form of ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
---- ASCONF_a; [ASCONF_b; ...; ASCONF_n;] JUNK ------>
[...]
---- ASCONF_m; [ASCONF_o; ...; ASCONF_z;] JUNK ------>
... where ASCONF_a, ASCONF_b, ..., ASCONF_z are good-formed
ASCONFs and have increasing serial numbers, we process such
ASCONF chunk(s) marked with !end_of_packet and !singleton,
since we have not yet reached the SCTP packet end. SCTP does
only do verification on a chunk by chunk basis, as an SCTP
packet is nothing more than just a container of a stream of
chunks which it eats up one by one.
We could run into the case that we receive a packet with a
malformed tail, above marked as trailing JUNK. All previous
chunks are here goodformed, so the stack will eat up all
previous chunks up to this point. In case JUNK does not fit
into a chunk header and there are no more other chunks in
the input queue, or in case JUNK contains a garbage chunk
header, but the encoded chunk length would exceed the skb
tail, or we came here from an entirely different scenario
and the chunk has pdiscard=1 mark (without having had a flush
point), it will happen, that we will excessively queue up
the association's output queue (a correct final chunk may
then turn it into a response flood when flushing the
queue ;)): I ran a simple script with incremental ASCONF
serial numbers and could see the server side consuming
excessive amount of RAM [before/after: up to 2GB and more].
The issue at heart is that the chunk train basically ends
with !end_of_packet and !singleton markers and since commit
2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding
with 1 packet") therefore preventing an output queue flush
point in sctp_do_sm() -> sctp_cmd_interpreter() on the input
chunk (chunk = event_arg) even though local_cork is set,
but its precedence has changed since then. In the normal
case, the last chunk with end_of_packet=1 would trigger the
queue flush to accommodate possible outgoing bundling.
In the input queue, sctp_inq_pop() seems to do the right thing
in terms of discarding invalid chunks. So, above JUNK will
not enter the state machine and instead be released and exit
the sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() chunk processing loop. It's simply
the flush point being missing at loop exit. Adding a try-flush
approach on the output queue might not work as the underlying
infrastructure might be long gone at this point due to the
side-effect interpreter run.
One possibility, albeit a bit of a kludge, would be to defer
invalid chunk freeing into the state machine in order to
possibly trigger packet discards and thus indirectly a queue
flush on error. It would surely be better to discard chunks
as in the current, perhaps better controlled environment, but
going back and forth, it's simply architecturally not possible.
I tried various trailing JUNK attack cases and it seems to
look good now.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,331 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
c* (toc(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->convert3();
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,585 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int do_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, pte_t *page_table, pmd_t *pmd,
unsigned int flags, pte_t orig_pte)
{
pgoff_t pgoff = (((address & PAGE_MASK)
- vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT) + vma->vm_pgoff;
pte_unmap(page_table);
if (!(flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE))
return do_read_fault(mm, vma, address, pmd, pgoff, flags,
orig_pte);
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED))
return do_cow_fault(mm, vma, address, pmd, pgoff, flags,
orig_pte);
return do_shared_fault(mm, vma, address, pmd, pgoff, flags, orig_pte);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: mm/memory.c in the Linux kernel before 4.1.4 mishandles anonymous pages, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (page tainting) via a crafted application that triggers writing to page zero.
Commit Message: mm: avoid setting up anonymous pages into file mapping
Reading page fault handler code I've noticed that under right
circumstances kernel would map anonymous pages into file mappings: if
the VMA doesn't have vm_ops->fault() and the VMA wasn't fully populated
on ->mmap(), kernel would handle page fault to not populated pte with
do_anonymous_page().
Let's change page fault handler to use do_anonymous_page() only on
anonymous VMA (->vm_ops == NULL) and make sure that the VMA is not
shared.
For file mappings without vm_ops->fault() or shred VMA without vm_ops,
page fault on pte_none() entry would lead to SIGBUS.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | High | 167,568 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void UsbDeviceImpl::OpenInterface(int interface_id,
const OpenCallback& callback) {
chromeos::PermissionBrokerClient* client =
chromeos::DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetPermissionBrokerClient();
DCHECK(client) << "Could not get permission broker client.";
client->RequestPathAccess(
device_path_, interface_id,
base::Bind(&UsbDeviceImpl::OnPathAccessRequestComplete, this, callback));
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the WebSocketDispatcherHost::SendOrDrop function in content/browser/renderer_host/websocket_dispatcher_host.cc in the Web Sockets implementation in Google Chrome before 33.0.1750.149 might allow remote attackers to bypass the sandbox protection mechanism by leveraging an incorrect deletion in a certain failure case.
Commit Message: Remove fallback when requesting a single USB interface.
This reverts commit 2d475d0ed37bf8f19385537ad31e361f1b21624b. The
permission broker now supports opening devices that are partially
claimed through the OpenPath method and RequestPathAccess will always
fail for these devices so the fallback path from RequestPathAccess to
OpenPath is always taken.
BUG=500057
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1227313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338354} | High | 171,702 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SMB2_sess_establish_session(struct SMB2_sess_data *sess_data)
{
int rc = 0;
struct cifs_ses *ses = sess_data->ses;
mutex_lock(&ses->server->srv_mutex);
if (ses->server->sign && ses->server->ops->generate_signingkey) {
rc = ses->server->ops->generate_signingkey(ses);
kfree(ses->auth_key.response);
ses->auth_key.response = NULL;
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(FYI,
"SMB3 session key generation failed\n");
mutex_unlock(&ses->server->srv_mutex);
goto keygen_exit;
}
}
if (!ses->server->session_estab) {
ses->server->sequence_number = 0x2;
ses->server->session_estab = true;
}
mutex_unlock(&ses->server->srv_mutex);
cifs_dbg(FYI, "SMB2/3 session established successfully\n");
spin_lock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
ses->status = CifsGood;
ses->need_reconnect = false;
spin_unlock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
keygen_exit:
if (!ses->server->sign) {
kfree(ses->auth_key.response);
ses->auth_key.response = NULL;
}
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The Linux kernel before version 4.11 is vulnerable to a NULL pointer dereference in fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c:setup_ntlmv2_rsp() that allows an attacker controlling a CIFS server to kernel panic a client that has this server mounted, because an empty TargetInfo field in an NTLMSSP setup negotiation response is mishandled during session recovery.
Commit Message: CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]> | High | 169,361 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: frag6_print(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *bp, register const u_char *bp2)
{
register const struct ip6_frag *dp;
register const struct ip6_hdr *ip6;
dp = (const struct ip6_frag *)bp;
ip6 = (const struct ip6_hdr *)bp2;
ND_TCHECK(dp->ip6f_offlg);
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "frag (0x%08x:%d|%ld)",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->ip6f_ident),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->ip6f_offlg) & IP6F_OFF_MASK,
sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) + EXTRACT_16BITS(&ip6->ip6_plen) -
(long)(bp - bp2) - sizeof(struct ip6_frag)));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "frag (%d|%ld)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->ip6f_offlg) & IP6F_OFF_MASK,
sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) + EXTRACT_16BITS(&ip6->ip6_plen) -
(long)(bp - bp2) - sizeof(struct ip6_frag)));
}
/* it is meaningless to decode non-first fragment */
if ((EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->ip6f_offlg) & IP6F_OFF_MASK) != 0)
return -1;
else
{
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
return sizeof(struct ip6_frag);
}
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|frag]"));
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IPv6 fragmentation header parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-frag6.c:frag6_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13031/Check for the presence of the entire IPv6 fragment header.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
Clean up some whitespace in tests/TESTLIST while we're at it. | High | 167,852 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int sysMapFD(int fd, MemMapping* pMap)
{
off_t start;
size_t length;
void* memPtr;
assert(pMap != NULL);
if (getFileStartAndLength(fd, &start, &length) < 0)
return -1;
memPtr = mmap(NULL, length, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, start);
if (memPtr == MAP_FAILED) {
LOGW("mmap(%d, R, PRIVATE, %d, %d) failed: %s\n", (int) length,
fd, (int) start, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
pMap->addr = memPtr;
pMap->length = length;
pMap->range_count = 1;
pMap->ranges = malloc(sizeof(MappedRange));
pMap->ranges[0].addr = memPtr;
pMap->ranges[0].length = length;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in minzip/SysUtil.c in the Recovery Procedure in Android 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 allow attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 26960931.
Commit Message: Fix integer overflows in recovery procedure.
Bug: 26960931
Change-Id: Ieae45caccfb4728fcf514f0d920976585d8e6caf
(cherry picked from commit 4f2df162c6ab4a71ca86e4b38735b681729c353b)
| High | 173,904 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
BN_GENCB *cb)
{
BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *r3 = NULL, *tmp;
BIGNUM local_r0, local_d, local_p;
BIGNUM *pr0, *d, *p;
int bitsp, bitsq, ok = -1, n = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
unsigned long error = 0;
/*
* When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck
* continually regenerating the same prime values.
*/
if (bits < 16) {
ok = 0; /* we set our own err */
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
goto err;
}
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (r3 == NULL)
goto err;
bitsp = (bits + 1) / 2;
bitsq = bits - bitsp;
/* We need the RSA components non-NULL */
if (!rsa->n && ((rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
if (!rsa->d && ((rsa->d = BN_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
if (!rsa->e && ((rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
if (!rsa->p && ((rsa->p = BN_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
if (!rsa->q && ((rsa->q = BN_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
if (!rsa->dmp1 && ((rsa->dmp1 = BN_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
if (!rsa->dmq1 && ((rsa->dmq1 = BN_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
if (!rsa->iqmp && ((rsa->iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
if (BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value) == NULL)
goto err;
BN_set_flags(r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
/* generate p and q */
for (;;) {
if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->p, BN_value_one()))
goto err;
ERR_set_mark();
if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) {
/* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */
break;
}
error = ERR_peek_last_error();
if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN
&& ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) {
/* GCD != 1 */
ERR_pop_to_mark();
} else {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
goto err;
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0))
goto err;
for (;;) {
do {
if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->q, bitsq, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
goto err;
} while (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) == 0);
if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()))
goto err;
ERR_set_mark();
if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) {
/* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */
break;
}
error = ERR_peek_last_error();
if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN
&& ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) {
/* GCD != 1 */
ERR_pop_to_mark();
} else {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
goto err;
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1))
goto err;
if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) {
tmp = rsa->p;
rsa->p = rsa->q;
rsa->q = tmp;
}
/* calculate n */
if (!BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx))
goto err;
/* calculate d */
if (!BN_sub(r1, rsa->p, BN_value_one()))
goto err; /* p-1 */
if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()))
goto err; /* q-1 */
if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx))
goto err; /* (p-1)(q-1) */
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
pr0 = &local_r0;
BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
} else
pr0 = r0;
if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, rsa->e, pr0, ctx))
goto err; /* d */
/* set up d for correct BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
d = &local_d;
BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
} else
d = rsa->d;
/* calculate d mod (p-1) */
if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, d, r1, ctx))
goto err;
/* calculate d mod (q-1) */
if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, d, r2, ctx))
goto err;
/* calculate inverse of q mod p */
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
p = &local_p;
BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
} else
p = rsa->p;
if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, p, ctx))
goto err;
ok = 1;
err:
if (ok == -1) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, ERR_LIB_BN);
ok = 0;
}
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
return ok;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-327
Summary: The OpenSSL RSA Key generation algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to a cache timing side channel attack. An attacker with sufficient access to mount cache timing attacks during the RSA key generation process could recover the private key. Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.0i-dev (Affected 1.1.0-1.1.0h). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2p-dev (Affected 1.0.2b-1.0.2o).
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,328 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void CoordinatorImpl::GetVmRegionsForHeapProfiler(
const GetVmRegionsForHeapProfilerCallback& callback) {
RequestGlobalMemoryDump(
MemoryDumpType::EXPLICITLY_TRIGGERED,
MemoryDumpLevelOfDetail::VM_REGIONS_ONLY_FOR_HEAP_PROFILER, {}, callback);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: Lack of access control checks in Instrumentation in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to obtain memory metadata from privileged processes .
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059} | Medium | 172,914 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool initiate_stratum(struct pool *pool)
{
bool ret = false, recvd = false, noresume = false, sockd = false;
char s[RBUFSIZE], *sret = NULL, *nonce1, *sessionid;
json_t *val = NULL, *res_val, *err_val;
json_error_t err;
int n2size;
resend:
if (!setup_stratum_socket(pool)) {
/* FIXME: change to LOG_DEBUG when issue #88 resolved */
applog(LOG_INFO, "setup_stratum_socket() on %s failed", get_pool_name(pool));
sockd = false;
goto out;
}
sockd = true;
if (recvd) {
/* Get rid of any crap lying around if we're resending */
clear_sock(pool);
sprintf(s, "{\"id\": %d, \"method\": \"mining.subscribe\", \"params\": []}", swork_id++);
} else {
if (pool->sessionid)
sprintf(s, "{\"id\": %d, \"method\": \"mining.subscribe\", \"params\": [\""PACKAGE"/"VERSION"\", \"%s\"]}", swork_id++, pool->sessionid);
else
sprintf(s, "{\"id\": %d, \"method\": \"mining.subscribe\", \"params\": [\""PACKAGE"/"VERSION"\"]}", swork_id++);
}
if (__stratum_send(pool, s, strlen(s)) != SEND_OK) {
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Failed to send s in initiate_stratum");
goto out;
}
if (!socket_full(pool, DEFAULT_SOCKWAIT)) {
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Timed out waiting for response in initiate_stratum");
goto out;
}
sret = recv_line(pool);
if (!sret)
goto out;
recvd = true;
val = JSON_LOADS(sret, &err);
free(sret);
if (!val) {
applog(LOG_INFO, "JSON decode failed(%d): %s", err.line, err.text);
goto out;
}
res_val = json_object_get(val, "result");
err_val = json_object_get(val, "error");
if (!res_val || json_is_null(res_val) ||
(err_val && !json_is_null(err_val))) {
char *ss;
if (err_val)
ss = json_dumps(err_val, JSON_INDENT(3));
else
ss = strdup("(unknown reason)");
applog(LOG_INFO, "JSON-RPC decode failed: %s", ss);
free(ss);
goto out;
}
sessionid = get_sessionid(res_val);
if (!sessionid)
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Failed to get sessionid in initiate_stratum");
nonce1 = json_array_string(res_val, 1);
if (!nonce1) {
applog(LOG_INFO, "Failed to get nonce1 in initiate_stratum");
free(sessionid);
goto out;
}
n2size = json_integer_value(json_array_get(res_val, 2));
if (!n2size) {
applog(LOG_INFO, "Failed to get n2size in initiate_stratum");
free(sessionid);
free(nonce1);
goto out;
}
cg_wlock(&pool->data_lock);
pool->sessionid = sessionid;
pool->nonce1 = nonce1;
pool->n1_len = strlen(nonce1) / 2;
free(pool->nonce1bin);
pool->nonce1bin = (unsigned char *)calloc(pool->n1_len, 1);
if (unlikely(!pool->nonce1bin))
quithere(1, "Failed to calloc pool->nonce1bin");
hex2bin(pool->nonce1bin, pool->nonce1, pool->n1_len);
pool->n2size = n2size;
cg_wunlock(&pool->data_lock);
if (sessionid)
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "%s stratum session id: %s", get_pool_name(pool), pool->sessionid);
ret = true;
out:
if (ret) {
if (!pool->stratum_url)
pool->stratum_url = pool->sockaddr_url;
pool->stratum_active = true;
pool->swork.diff = 1;
if (opt_protocol) {
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "%s confirmed mining.subscribe with extranonce1 %s extran2size %d",
get_pool_name(pool), pool->nonce1, pool->n2size);
}
} else {
if (recvd && !noresume) {
/* Reset the sessionid used for stratum resuming in case the pool
* does not support it, or does not know how to respond to the
* presence of the sessionid parameter. */
cg_wlock(&pool->data_lock);
free(pool->sessionid);
free(pool->nonce1);
pool->sessionid = pool->nonce1 = NULL;
cg_wunlock(&pool->data_lock);
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Failed to resume stratum, trying afresh");
noresume = true;
json_decref(val);
goto resend;
}
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Initiating stratum failed on %s", get_pool_name(pool));
if (sockd) {
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Suspending stratum on %s", get_pool_name(pool));
suspend_stratum(pool);
}
}
json_decref(val);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in the parse_notify function in sgminer before 4.2.2, cgminer before 4.3.5, and BFGMiner before 4.1.0 allow remote pool servers to have unspecified impact via a (1) large or (2) negative value in the Extranonc2_size parameter in a mining.subscribe response and a crafted mining.notify request.
Commit Message: Bugfix: initiate_stratum: Ensure extranonce2 size is not negative (which could lead to exploits later as too little memory gets allocated)
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <[email protected]> for finding this! | High | 169,906 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: fpDiff(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
tmsize_t stride = PredictorState(tif)->stride;
uint32 bps = tif->tif_dir.td_bitspersample / 8;
tmsize_t wc = cc / bps;
tmsize_t count;
uint8 *cp = (uint8 *) cp0;
uint8 *tmp = (uint8 *)_TIFFmalloc(cc);
if((cc%(bps*stride))!=0)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, "fpDiff",
"%s", "(cc%(bps*stride))!=0");
return 0;
}
if (!tmp)
return 0;
_TIFFmemcpy(tmp, cp0, cc);
for (count = 0; count < wc; count++) {
uint32 byte;
for (byte = 0; byte < bps; byte++) {
#if WORDS_BIGENDIAN
cp[byte * wc + count] = tmp[bps * count + byte];
#else
cp[(bps - byte - 1) * wc + count] =
tmp[bps * count + byte];
#endif
}
}
_TIFFfree(tmp);
cp = (uint8 *) cp0;
cp += cc - stride - 1;
for (count = cc; count > stride; count -= stride)
REPEAT4(stride, cp[stride] = (unsigned char)((cp[stride] - cp[0])&0xff); cp--)
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: tif_predict.h and tif_predict.c in libtiff 4.0.6 have assertions that can lead to assertion failures in debug mode, or buffer overflows in release mode, when dealing with unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105, aka *Predictor heap-buffer-overflow.*
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predic.c: fix memory leaks in error code paths added in
previous commit (fix for MSVR 35105) | High | 169,939 |
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