instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
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stringclasses 3
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int64 165k
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_random_pseudo_bytes)
{
long buffer_length;
unsigned char *buffer = NULL;
zval *zstrong_result_returned = NULL;
int strong_result = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l|z", &buffer_length, &zstrong_result_returned) == FAILURE) {
return;
return;
}
if (buffer_length <= 0) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zstrong_result_returned) {
zval_dtor(zstrong_result_returned);
ZVAL_BOOL(zstrong_result_returned, 0);
}
buffer = emalloc(buffer_length + 1);
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
strong_result = 1;
/* random/urandom equivalent on Windows */
if (php_win32_get_random_bytes(buffer, (size_t) buffer_length) == FAILURE) {
efree(buffer);
if (php_win32_get_random_bytes(buffer, (size_t) buffer_length) == FAILURE) {
efree(buffer);
if (zstrong_result_returned) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
#else
if ((strong_result = RAND_pseudo_bytes(buffer, buffer_length)) < 0) {
efree(buffer);
if (zstrong_result_returned) {
ZVAL_BOOL(zstrong_result_returned, 0);
if (zstrong_result_returned) {
ZVAL_BOOL(zstrong_result_returned, 0);
}
RETURN_FALSE;
}
#endif
RETVAL_STRINGL((char *)buffer, buffer_length, 0);
if (zstrong_result_returned) {
ZVAL_BOOL(zstrong_result_returned, strong_result);
}
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: The openssl_random_pseudo_bytes function in ext/openssl/openssl.c in PHP before 5.4.44, 5.5.x before 5.5.28, and 5.6.x before 5.6.12 incorrectly relies on the deprecated RAND_pseudo_bytes function, which makes it easier for remote attackers to defeat cryptographic protection mechanisms via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,272 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell)
{
struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
char buf[256];
u_int i, envsize;
char **env, *laddr;
struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
#if !defined (HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined (HAVE_CYGWIN)
char *path = NULL;
#endif
/* Initialize the environment. */
envsize = 100;
env = xcalloc(envsize, sizeof(char *));
env[0] = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
/*
* The Windows environment contains some setting which are
* important for a running system. They must not be dropped.
*/
{
char **p;
p = fetch_windows_environment();
copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);
free_windows_environment(p);
}
#endif
#ifdef GSSAPI
/* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter
* the childs environment as they see fit
*/
ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize);
#endif
if (!options.use_login) {
/* Set basic environment. */
for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, s->env[i].name,
s->env[i].val);
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
#ifdef _AIX
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGIN", pw->pw_name);
#endif
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETPATH) < 0)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
else
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", getenv("PATH"));
#else /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
# ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
/*
* There's no standard path on Windows. The path contains
* important components pointing to the system directories,
* needed for loading shared libraries. So the path better
* remains intact here.
*/
# ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN
read_etc_default_login(&env, &envsize, pw->pw_uid);
path = child_get_env(env, "PATH");
# endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */
if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') {
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH",
s->pw->pw_uid == 0 ?
SUPERUSER_PATH : _PATH_STDPATH);
}
# endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/%.50s",
_PATH_MAILDIR, pw->pw_name);
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "MAIL", buf);
/* Normal systems set SHELL by default. */
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SHELL", shell);
}
if (getenv("TZ"))
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TZ", getenv("TZ"));
/* Set custom environment options from RSA authentication. */
if (!options.use_login) {
while (custom_environment) {
struct envstring *ce = custom_environment;
char *str = ce->s;
for (i = 0; str[i] != '=' && str[i]; i++)
;
if (str[i] == '=') {
str[i] = 0;
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, str, str + i + 1);
}
custom_environment = ce->next;
free(ce->s);
free(ce);
}
}
/* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %d",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
ssh_local_port(ssh));
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CLIENT", buf);
laddr = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in());
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %.50s %d",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh));
free(laddr);
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CONNECTION", buf);
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_TTY", s->tty);
if (s->term)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TERM", s->term);
if (s->display)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "DISPLAY", s->display);
if (original_command)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND",
original_command);
#ifdef _UNICOS
if (cray_tmpdir[0] != '\0')
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TMPDIR", cray_tmpdir);
#endif /* _UNICOS */
/*
* Since we clear KRB5CCNAME at startup, if it's set now then it
* must have been set by a native authentication method (eg AIX or
* SIA), so copy it to the child.
*/
{
char *cp;
if ((cp = getenv("KRB5CCNAME")) != NULL)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", cp);
}
#ifdef _AIX
{
char *cp;
if ((cp = getenv("AUTHSTATE")) != NULL)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "AUTHSTATE", cp);
read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, "/etc/environment");
}
#endif
#ifdef KRB5
if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
/*
* Pull in any environment variables that may have
* been set by PAM.
*/
if (options.use_pam) {
char **p;
p = fetch_pam_child_environment();
copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);
free_pam_environment(p);
p = fetch_pam_environment();
copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);
free_pam_environment(p);
}
#endif /* USE_PAM */
if (auth_sock_name != NULL)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME,
auth_sock_name);
/* read $HOME/.ssh/environment. */
if (options.permit_user_env && !options.use_login) {
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/.ssh/environment",
strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? pw->pw_dir : "");
read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf);
}
if (debug_flag) {
/* dump the environment */
fprintf(stderr, "Environment:\n");
for (i = 0; env[i]; i++)
fprintf(stderr, " %.200s\n", env[i]);
}
return env;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The do_setup_env function in session.c in sshd in OpenSSH through 7.2p2, when the UseLogin feature is enabled and PAM is configured to read .pam_environment files in user home directories, allows local users to gain privileges by triggering a crafted environment for the /bin/login program, as demonstrated by an LD_PRELOAD environment variable.
Commit Message: | High | 165,283 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool ATSParser::PSISection::isCRCOkay() const {
if (!isComplete()) {
return false;
}
uint8_t* data = mBuffer->data();
if ((data[1] & 0x80) == 0) {
return true;
}
unsigned sectionLength = U16_AT(data + 1) & 0xfff;
ALOGV("sectionLength %u, skip %u", sectionLength, mSkipBytes);
sectionLength -= mSkipBytes;
uint32_t crc = 0xffffffff;
for(unsigned i = 0; i < sectionLength + 4 /* crc */; i++) {
uint8_t b = data[i];
int index = ((crc >> 24) ^ (b & 0xff)) & 0xff;
crc = CRC_TABLE[index] ^ (crc << 8);
}
ALOGV("crc: %08x\n", crc);
return (crc == 0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mpeg2ts/ATSParser.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-07-01 does not validate a certain section length, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28333006.
Commit Message: Check section size when verifying CRC
Bug: 28333006
Change-Id: Ief7a2da848face78f0edde21e2f2009316076679
| High | 173,769 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: header_put_be_int (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int x)
{ if (psf->headindex < SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header) - 4)
{ psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 24) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 16) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = x ;
} ;
} /* header_put_be_int */
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In libsndfile before 1.0.28, an error in the *header_read()* function (common.c) when handling ID3 tags can be exploited to cause a stack-based buffer overflow via a specially crafted FLAC file.
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k. | Medium | 170,051 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: QuicPacket* ConstructDataPacket(QuicPacketSequenceNumber number,
QuicFecGroupNumber fec_group) {
header_.packet_sequence_number = number;
header_.flags = PACKET_FLAGS_NONE;
header_.fec_group = fec_group;
QuicFrames frames;
QuicFrame frame(&frame1_);
frames.push_back(frame);
QuicPacket* packet;
framer_.ConstructFragementDataPacket(header_, frames, &packet);
return packet;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.97 on Windows and Linux, and before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X, does not properly manage memory during message handling for plug-ins, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Fix uninitialized access in QuicConnectionHelperTest
BUG=159928
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11360153
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@166708 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,410 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ShowExtensionInstallDialogImpl(
ExtensionInstallPromptShowParams* show_params,
ExtensionInstallPrompt::Delegate* delegate,
scoped_refptr<ExtensionInstallPrompt::Prompt> prompt) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
ExtensionInstallDialogView* dialog =
new ExtensionInstallDialogView(show_params->profile(),
show_params->GetParentWebContents(),
delegate,
prompt);
constrained_window::CreateBrowserModalDialogViews(
dialog, show_params->GetParentWindow())->Show();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-17
Summary: The Web Store inline-installer implementation in the Extensions UI in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 does not block installations upon deletion of an installation frame, which makes it easier for remote attackers to trick a user into believing that an installation request originated from the user's next navigation target via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Make the webstore inline install dialog be tab-modal
Also clean up a few minor lint errors while I'm in here.
BUG=550047
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1496033003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#363925} | Medium | 172,208 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int key_notify_policy_flush(const struct km_event *c)
{
struct sk_buff *skb_out;
struct sadb_msg *hdr;
skb_out = alloc_skb(sizeof(struct sadb_msg) + 16, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb_out)
return -ENOBUFS;
hdr = (struct sadb_msg *) skb_put(skb_out, sizeof(struct sadb_msg));
hdr->sadb_msg_type = SADB_X_SPDFLUSH;
hdr->sadb_msg_seq = c->seq;
hdr->sadb_msg_pid = c->portid;
hdr->sadb_msg_version = PF_KEY_V2;
hdr->sadb_msg_errno = (uint8_t) 0;
hdr->sadb_msg_len = (sizeof(struct sadb_msg) / sizeof(uint64_t));
pfkey_broadcast(skb_out, GFP_ATOMIC, BROADCAST_ALL, NULL, c->net);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Info
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The key_notify_policy_flush function in net/key/af_key.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9 does not initialize a certain structure member, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel heap memory by reading a broadcast message from the notify_policy interface of an IPSec key_socket.
Commit Message: af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]> | Low | 166,073 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature,
void *asn, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
const EVP_MD *type;
unsigned char *buf_in=NULL;
int ret= -1,i,inl;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
i=OBJ_obj2nid(a->algorithm);
type=EVP_get_digestbyname(OBJ_nid2sn(i));
if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&ctx,type, NULL))
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
ret=0;
goto err;
}
inl = ASN1_item_i2d(asn, &buf_in, it);
if (buf_in == NULL)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)buf_in,inl);
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf_in,(unsigned int)inl);
OPENSSL_free(buf_in);
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&ctx,(unsigned char *)signature->data,
(unsigned int)signature->length,pkey) <= 0)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
ret=0;
goto err;
}
/* we don't need to zero the 'ctx' because we just checked
* public information */
/* memset(&ctx,0,sizeof(ctx)); */
ret=1;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return(ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: OpenSSL before 0.9.8y, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0k, and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1d does not properly perform signature verification for OCSP responses, which allows remote OCSP servers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via an invalid key.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,792 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void skcipher_release(void *private)
{
crypto_free_skcipher(private);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: crypto/algif_skcipher.c in the Linux kernel before 4.4.2 does not verify that a setkey operation has been performed on an AF_ALG socket before an accept system call is processed, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via a crafted application that does not supply a key, related to the lrw_crypt function in crypto/lrw.c.
Commit Message: crypto: algif_skcipher - Require setkey before accept(2)
Some cipher implementations will crash if you try to use them
without calling setkey first. This patch adds a check so that
the accept(2) call will fail with -ENOKEY if setkey hasn't been
done on the socket yet.
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,456 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ScriptPromise BluetoothRemoteGATTServer::getPrimaryServicesImpl(
ScriptState* scriptState,
mojom::blink::WebBluetoothGATTQueryQuantity quantity,
String servicesUUID) {
if (!connected()) {
return ScriptPromise::rejectWithDOMException(
scriptState,
DOMException::create(NetworkError, kGATTServerNotConnected));
}
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver = ScriptPromiseResolver::create(scriptState);
ScriptPromise promise = resolver->promise();
AddToActiveAlgorithms(resolver);
mojom::blink::WebBluetoothService* service = m_device->bluetooth()->service();
WTF::Optional<String> uuid = WTF::nullopt;
if (!servicesUUID.isEmpty())
uuid = servicesUUID;
service->RemoteServerGetPrimaryServices(
device()->id(), quantity, uuid,
convertToBaseCallback(
WTF::bind(&BluetoothRemoteGATTServer::GetPrimaryServicesCallback,
wrapPersistent(this), quantity, wrapPersistent(resolver))));
return promise;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The filters implementation in Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 41.0.2272.76, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger an out-of-bounds write operation.
Commit Message: Allow serialization of empty bluetooth uuids.
This change allows the passing WTF::Optional<String> types as
bluetooth.mojom.UUID optional parameter without needing to ensure the passed
object isn't empty.
BUG=None
R=juncai, dcheng
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2646613003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445809} | High | 172,022 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static size_t TrimTrailingSpaces ( char * firstChar, size_t origLen )
{
if ( origLen == 0 ) return 0;
char * lastChar = firstChar + origLen - 1;
if ( (*lastChar != ' ') && (*lastChar != 0) ) return origLen; // Nothing to do.
while ( (firstChar <= lastChar) && ((*lastChar == ' ') || (*lastChar == 0)) ) --lastChar;
XMP_Assert ( (lastChar == firstChar-1) ||
((lastChar >= firstChar) && (*lastChar != ' ') && (*lastChar != 0)) );
size_t newLen = (size_t)((lastChar+1) - firstChar);
XMP_Assert ( newLen <= origLen );
if ( newLen < origLen ) {
++lastChar;
*lastChar = 0;
}
return newLen;
} // TrimTrailingSpaces
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: An issue was discovered in Exempi before 2.4.3. It allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (invalid memcpy with resultant use-after-free) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a .pdf file containing JPEG data, related to XMPFiles/source/FormatSupport/ReconcileTIFF.cpp, XMPFiles/source/FormatSupport/TIFF_MemoryReader.cpp, and XMPFiles/source/FormatSupport/TIFF_Support.hpp.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,367 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: AppModalDialog::~AppModalDialog() {
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The extension system in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 does not properly handle modal dialogs, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Fix a Windows crash bug with javascript alerts from extension popups.
BUG=137707
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10828423
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@152716 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,755 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = desc->tfm;
struct salsa20_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(tfm);
int err;
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
err = blkcipher_walk_virt_block(desc, &walk, 64);
salsa20_ivsetup(ctx, walk.iv);
if (likely(walk.nbytes == nbytes))
{
salsa20_encrypt_bytes(ctx, walk.dst.virt.addr,
walk.src.virt.addr, nbytes);
return blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, 0);
}
while (walk.nbytes >= 64) {
salsa20_encrypt_bytes(ctx, walk.dst.virt.addr,
walk.src.virt.addr,
walk.nbytes - (walk.nbytes % 64));
err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, walk.nbytes % 64);
}
if (walk.nbytes) {
salsa20_encrypt_bytes(ctx, walk.dst.virt.addr,
walk.src.virt.addr, walk.nbytes);
err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, 0);
}
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The Salsa20 encryption algorithm in the Linux kernel before 4.14.8 does not correctly handle zero-length inputs, allowing a local attacker able to use the AF_ALG-based skcipher interface (CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER) to cause a denial of service (uninitialized-memory free and kernel crash) or have unspecified other impact by executing a crafted sequence of system calls that use the blkcipher_walk API. Both the generic implementation (crypto/salsa20_generic.c) and x86 implementation (arch/x86/crypto/salsa20_glue.c) of Salsa20 were vulnerable.
Commit Message: crypto: salsa20 - fix blkcipher_walk API usage
When asked to encrypt or decrypt 0 bytes, both the generic and x86
implementations of Salsa20 crash in blkcipher_walk_done(), either when
doing 'kfree(walk->buffer)' or 'free_page((unsigned long)walk->page)',
because walk->buffer and walk->page have not been initialized.
The bug is that Salsa20 is calling blkcipher_walk_done() even when
nothing is in 'walk.nbytes'. But blkcipher_walk_done() is only meant to
be called when a nonzero number of bytes have been provided.
The broken code is part of an optimization that tries to make only one
call to salsa20_encrypt_bytes() to process inputs that are not evenly
divisible by 64 bytes. To fix the bug, just remove this "optimization"
and use the blkcipher_walk API the same way all the other users do.
Reproducer:
#include <linux/if_alg.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main()
{
int algfd, reqfd;
struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
.salg_type = "skcipher",
.salg_name = "salsa20",
};
char key[16] = { 0 };
algfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
bind(algfd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
reqfd = accept(algfd, 0, 0);
setsockopt(algfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, sizeof(key));
read(reqfd, key, sizeof(key));
}
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Fixes: eb6f13eb9f81 ("[CRYPTO] salsa20_generic: Fix multi-page processing")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v2.6.25+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> | High | 167,652 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: struct se_portal_group *tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg(
struct se_wwn *wwn,
struct config_group *group,
const char *name)
{
struct tcm_loop_hba *tl_hba = container_of(wwn,
struct tcm_loop_hba, tl_hba_wwn);
struct tcm_loop_tpg *tl_tpg;
char *tpgt_str, *end_ptr;
int ret;
unsigned short int tpgt;
tpgt_str = strstr(name, "tpgt_");
if (!tpgt_str) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Unable to locate \"tpgt_#\" directory"
" group\n");
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
tpgt_str += 5; /* Skip ahead of "tpgt_" */
tpgt = (unsigned short int) simple_strtoul(tpgt_str, &end_ptr, 0);
if (tpgt > TL_TPGS_PER_HBA) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Passed tpgt: %hu exceeds TL_TPGS_PER_HBA:"
" %u\n", tpgt, TL_TPGS_PER_HBA);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
tl_tpg = &tl_hba->tl_hba_tpgs[tpgt];
tl_tpg->tl_hba = tl_hba;
tl_tpg->tl_tpgt = tpgt;
/*
* Register the tl_tpg as a emulated SAS TCM Target Endpoint
*/
ret = core_tpg_register(&tcm_loop_fabric_configfs->tf_ops,
wwn, &tl_tpg->tl_se_tpg, tl_tpg,
TRANSPORT_TPG_TYPE_NORMAL);
if (ret < 0)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
printk(KERN_INFO "TCM_Loop_ConfigFS: Allocated Emulated %s"
" Target Port %s,t,0x%04x\n", tcm_loop_dump_proto_id(tl_hba),
config_item_name(&wwn->wwn_group.cg_item), tpgt);
return &tl_tpg->tl_se_tpg;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 3.1, an off by one in the drivers/target/loopback/tcm_loop.c tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg() function could result in at least memory corruption.
Commit Message: loopback: off by one in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg()
This is an off by one 'tgpt' check in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg() that could result
in memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas A. Bellinger <[email protected]> | High | 169,870 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool AffiliationFetcher::ParseResponse(
AffiliationFetcherDelegate::Result* result) const {
std::string serialized_response;
if (!fetcher_->GetResponseAsString(&serialized_response)) {
NOTREACHED();
}
affiliation_pb::LookupAffiliationResponse response;
if (!response.ParseFromString(serialized_response))
return false;
result->reserve(requested_facet_uris_.size());
std::map<FacetURI, size_t> facet_uri_to_class_index;
for (int i = 0; i < response.affiliation_size(); ++i) {
const affiliation_pb::Affiliation& equivalence_class(
response.affiliation(i));
AffiliatedFacets affiliated_uris;
for (int j = 0; j < equivalence_class.facet_size(); ++j) {
const std::string& uri_spec(equivalence_class.facet(j));
FacetURI uri = FacetURI::FromPotentiallyInvalidSpec(uri_spec);
if (!uri.is_valid())
continue;
affiliated_uris.push_back(uri);
}
if (affiliated_uris.empty())
continue;
for (const FacetURI& uri : affiliated_uris) {
if (!facet_uri_to_class_index.count(uri))
facet_uri_to_class_index[uri] = result->size();
if (facet_uri_to_class_index[uri] !=
facet_uri_to_class_index[affiliated_uris[0]]) {
return false;
}
}
if (facet_uri_to_class_index[affiliated_uris[0]] == result->size())
result->push_back(affiliated_uris);
}
for (const FacetURI& uri : requested_facet_uris_) {
if (!facet_uri_to_class_index.count(uri))
result->push_back(AffiliatedFacets(1, uri));
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The DehoistArrayIndex function in hydrogen-dehoist.cc (aka hydrogen.cc) in Google V8 before 3.22.24.7, as used in Google Chrome before 31.0.1650.63, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via JavaScript code that sets a variable to the value of an array element with a crafted index.
Commit Message: Update AffiliationFetcher to use new Affiliation API wire format.
The new format is not backward compatible with the old one, therefore this CL updates the client side protobuf definitions to be in line with the API definition. However, this CL does not yet make use of any additional fields introduced in the new wire format.
BUG=437865
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/996613002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#319860} | High | 171,143 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadTGAImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PixelInfo
pixel;
Quantum
index;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
size_t
base,
flag,
offset,
real,
skip;
ssize_t
count,
y;
TGAInfo
tga_info;
unsigned char
j,
k,
pixels[4],
runlength;
unsigned int
alpha_bits;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read TGA header information.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&tga_info.id_length);
tga_info.colormap_type=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
tga_info.image_type=(TGAImageType) ReadBlobByte(image);
if ((count != 1) ||
((tga_info.image_type != TGAColormap) &&
(tga_info.image_type != TGARGB) &&
(tga_info.image_type != TGAMonochrome) &&
(tga_info.image_type != TGARLEColormap) &&
(tga_info.image_type != TGARLERGB) &&
(tga_info.image_type != TGARLEMonochrome)) ||
(((tga_info.image_type == TGAColormap) ||
(tga_info.image_type == TGARLEColormap)) &&
(tga_info.colormap_type == 0)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
tga_info.colormap_index=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
tga_info.colormap_length=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
tga_info.colormap_size=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
tga_info.x_origin=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
tga_info.y_origin=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
tga_info.width=(unsigned short) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
tga_info.height=(unsigned short) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
tga_info.bits_per_pixel=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
tga_info.attributes=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
if ((((tga_info.bits_per_pixel <= 1) || (tga_info.bits_per_pixel >= 17)) &&
(tga_info.bits_per_pixel != 24) && (tga_info.bits_per_pixel != 32)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
image->columns=tga_info.width;
image->rows=tga_info.height;
alpha_bits=(tga_info.attributes & 0x0FU);
image->alpha_trait=(alpha_bits > 0) || (tga_info.bits_per_pixel == 32) ||
(tga_info.colormap_size == 32) ? BlendPixelTrait : UndefinedPixelTrait;
if ((tga_info.image_type != TGAColormap) &&
(tga_info.image_type != TGARLEColormap))
image->depth=(size_t) ((tga_info.bits_per_pixel <= 8) ? 8 :
(tga_info.bits_per_pixel <= 16) ? 5 :
(tga_info.bits_per_pixel == 24) ? 8 :
(tga_info.bits_per_pixel == 32) ? 8 : 8);
else
image->depth=(size_t) ((tga_info.colormap_size <= 8) ? 8 :
(tga_info.colormap_size <= 16) ? 5 :
(tga_info.colormap_size == 24) ? 8 :
(tga_info.colormap_size == 32) ? 8 : 8);
if ((tga_info.image_type == TGAColormap) ||
(tga_info.image_type == TGAMonochrome) ||
(tga_info.image_type == TGARLEColormap) ||
(tga_info.image_type == TGARLEMonochrome))
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->compression=NoCompression;
if ((tga_info.image_type == TGARLEColormap) ||
(tga_info.image_type == TGARLEMonochrome) ||
(tga_info.image_type == TGARLERGB))
image->compression=RLECompression;
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
if (tga_info.colormap_type != 0)
image->colors=tga_info.colormap_index+tga_info.colormap_length;
else
{
size_t
one;
one=1;
image->colors=one << tga_info.bits_per_pixel;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
}
if (tga_info.id_length != 0)
{
char
*comment;
size_t
length;
/*
TGA image comment.
*/
length=(size_t) tga_info.id_length;
comment=(char *) NULL;
if (~length >= (MagickPathExtent-1))
comment=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+MagickPathExtent,
sizeof(*comment));
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,tga_info.id_length,(unsigned char *) comment);
comment[tga_info.id_length]='\0';
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",comment,exception);
comment=DestroyString(comment);
}
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(image);
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&pixel,0,sizeof(pixel));
pixel.alpha=(MagickRealType) OpaqueAlpha;
if (tga_info.colormap_type != 0)
{
/*
Read TGA raster colormap.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) tga_info.colormap_index; i++)
image->colormap[i]=pixel;
for ( ; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
switch (tga_info.colormap_size)
{
case 8:
default:
{
/*
Gray scale.
*/
pixel.red=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
pixel.green=pixel.red;
pixel.blue=pixel.red;
break;
}
case 15:
case 16:
{
QuantumAny
range;
/*
5 bits each of red green and blue.
*/
j=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
k=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
range=GetQuantumRange(5UL);
pixel.red=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum(1UL*(k & 0x7c) >> 2,
range);
pixel.green=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum((1UL*(k & 0x03)
<< 3)+(1UL*(j & 0xe0) >> 5),range);
pixel.blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum(1UL*(j & 0x1f),range);
break;
}
case 24:
{
/*
8 bits each of blue, green and red.
*/
pixel.blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
pixel.green=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
pixel.red=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
break;
}
case 32:
{
/*
8 bits each of blue, green, red, and alpha.
*/
pixel.blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
pixel.green=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
pixel.red=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
pixel.alpha=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
break;
}
}
image->colormap[i]=pixel;
}
}
/*
Convert TGA pixels to pixel packets.
*/
base=0;
flag=0;
skip=MagickFalse;
real=0;
index=0;
runlength=0;
offset=0;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
real=offset;
if (((unsigned char) (tga_info.attributes & 0x20) >> 5) == 0)
real=image->rows-real-1;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,(ssize_t) real,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if ((tga_info.image_type == TGARLEColormap) ||
(tga_info.image_type == TGARLERGB) ||
(tga_info.image_type == TGARLEMonochrome))
{
if (runlength != 0)
{
runlength--;
skip=flag != 0;
}
else
{
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&runlength);
if (count != 1)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
flag=runlength & 0x80;
if (flag != 0)
runlength-=128;
skip=MagickFalse;
}
}
if (skip == MagickFalse)
switch (tga_info.bits_per_pixel)
{
case 8:
default:
{
/*
Gray scale.
*/
index=(Quantum) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (tga_info.colormap_type != 0)
pixel=image->colormap[(ssize_t) ConstrainColormapIndex(image,
(ssize_t) index,exception)];
else
{
pixel.red=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
index);
pixel.green=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
index);
pixel.blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
index);
}
break;
}
case 15:
case 16:
{
QuantumAny
range;
/*
5 bits each of RGB.
*/
if (ReadBlob(image,2,pixels) != 2)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
j=pixels[0];
k=pixels[1];
range=GetQuantumRange(5UL);
pixel.red=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum(1UL*(k & 0x7c) >> 2,
range);
pixel.green=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum((1UL*
(k & 0x03) << 3)+(1UL*(j & 0xe0) >> 5),range);
pixel.blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum(1UL*(j & 0x1f),range);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
pixel.alpha=(MagickRealType) ((k & 0x80) == 0 ? (Quantum)
TransparentAlpha : (Quantum) OpaqueAlpha);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
index=(Quantum) ConstrainColormapIndex(image,((ssize_t) (k << 8))+
j,exception);
break;
}
case 24:
{
/*
BGR pixels.
*/
if (ReadBlob(image,3,pixels) != 3)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
pixel.blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(pixels[0]);
pixel.green=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(pixels[1]);
pixel.red=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(pixels[2]);
break;
}
case 32:
{
/*
BGRA pixels.
*/
if (ReadBlob(image,4,pixels) != 4)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
pixel.blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(pixels[0]);
pixel.green=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(pixels[1]);
pixel.red=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(pixels[2]);
pixel.alpha=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(pixels[3]);
break;
}
}
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel.red),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel.green),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel.blue),q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel.alpha),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
/*
if (((unsigned char) (tga_info.attributes & 0xc0) >> 6) == 4)
offset+=4;
else
*/
if (((unsigned char) (tga_info.attributes & 0xc0) >> 6) == 2)
offset+=2;
else
offset++;
if (offset >= image->rows)
{
base++;
offset=base;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in coders/tga.c in ImageMagick 7.0.0 and later allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted tga file.
Commit Message: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/imagemagick/+bug/1490362 | Medium | 168,865 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: const Extension* ExtensionAppItem::GetExtension() const {
const ExtensionService* service =
extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile_)->extension_service();
const Extension* extension = service->GetInstalledExtension(extension_id_);
return extension;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 32.0.1700.76 on Windows and before 32.0.1700.77 on Mac OS X and Linux allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036} | High | 171,723 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void AutomationProvider::SendFindRequest(
TabContents* tab_contents,
bool with_json,
const string16& search_string,
bool forward,
bool match_case,
bool find_next,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
int request_id = FindInPageNotificationObserver::kFindInPageRequestId;
FindInPageNotificationObserver* observer =
new FindInPageNotificationObserver(this,
tab_contents,
with_json,
reply_message);
if (!with_json) {
find_in_page_observer_.reset(observer);
}
TabContentsWrapper* wrapper =
TabContentsWrapper::GetCurrentWrapperForContents(tab_contents);
if (wrapper)
wrapper->GetFindManager()->set_current_find_request_id(request_id);
tab_contents->render_view_host()->StartFinding(
FindInPageNotificationObserver::kFindInPageRequestId,
search_string,
forward,
match_case,
find_next);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 10.0.648.204 does not properly handle SVG text, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors that lead to a *stale pointer.*
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,655 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RegisterOptimizationHintsComponent(ComponentUpdateService* cus,
PrefService* profile_prefs) {
if (!previews::params::IsOptimizationHintsEnabled()) {
return;
}
bool data_saver_enabled =
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
data_reduction_proxy::switches::kEnableDataReductionProxy) ||
(profile_prefs && profile_prefs->GetBoolean(
data_reduction_proxy::prefs::kDataSaverEnabled));
if (!data_saver_enabled)
return;
auto installer = base::MakeRefCounted<ComponentInstaller>(
std::make_unique<OptimizationHintsComponentInstallerPolicy>());
installer->Register(cus, base::OnceClosure());
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: An off by one error resulting in an allocation of zero size in FFmpeg in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.98 for Mac, and 54.0.2840.99 for Windows, and 54.0.2840.100 for Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted video file.
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948} | Medium | 172,548 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static __u8 *kye_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
unsigned int *rsize)
{
switch (hdev->product) {
case USB_DEVICE_ID_KYE_ERGO_525V:
/* the fixups that need to be done:
* - change led usage page to button for extra buttons
* - report size 8 count 1 must be size 1 count 8 for button
* bitfield
* - change the button usage range to 4-7 for the extra
* buttons
*/
if (*rsize >= 74 &&
rdesc[61] == 0x05 && rdesc[62] == 0x08 &&
rdesc[63] == 0x19 && rdesc[64] == 0x08 &&
rdesc[65] == 0x29 && rdesc[66] == 0x0f &&
rdesc[71] == 0x75 && rdesc[72] == 0x08 &&
rdesc[73] == 0x95 && rdesc[74] == 0x01) {
hid_info(hdev,
"fixing up Kye/Genius Ergo Mouse "
"report descriptor\n");
rdesc[62] = 0x09;
rdesc[64] = 0x04;
rdesc[66] = 0x07;
rdesc[72] = 0x01;
rdesc[74] = 0x08;
}
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_KYE_EASYPEN_I405X:
if (*rsize == EASYPEN_I405X_RDESC_ORIG_SIZE) {
rdesc = easypen_i405x_rdesc_fixed;
*rsize = sizeof(easypen_i405x_rdesc_fixed);
}
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_KYE_MOUSEPEN_I608X:
if (*rsize == MOUSEPEN_I608X_RDESC_ORIG_SIZE) {
rdesc = mousepen_i608x_rdesc_fixed;
*rsize = sizeof(mousepen_i608x_rdesc_fixed);
}
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_KYE_EASYPEN_M610X:
if (*rsize == EASYPEN_M610X_RDESC_ORIG_SIZE) {
rdesc = easypen_m610x_rdesc_fixed;
*rsize = sizeof(easypen_m610x_rdesc_fixed);
}
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_GENIUS_GILA_GAMING_MOUSE:
rdesc = kye_consumer_control_fixup(hdev, rdesc, rsize, 104,
"Genius Gila Gaming Mouse");
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_GENIUS_GX_IMPERATOR:
rdesc = kye_consumer_control_fixup(hdev, rdesc, rsize, 83,
"Genius Gx Imperator Keyboard");
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_GENIUS_MANTICORE:
rdesc = kye_consumer_control_fixup(hdev, rdesc, rsize, 104,
"Genius Manticore Keyboard");
break;
}
return rdesc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The report_fixup functions in the HID subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.16.2 might allow physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write) via a crafted device that provides a small report descriptor, related to (1) drivers/hid/hid-cherry.c, (2) drivers/hid/hid-kye.c, (3) drivers/hid/hid-lg.c, (4) drivers/hid/hid-monterey.c, (5) drivers/hid/hid-petalynx.c, and (6) drivers/hid/hid-sunplus.c.
Commit Message: HID: fix a couple of off-by-ones
There are a few very theoretical off-by-one bugs in report descriptor size
checking when performing a pre-parsing fixup. Fix those.
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,371 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_parse_nal_unit(iv_obj_t *dec_hdl,
ivd_video_decode_op_t *ps_dec_op,
UWORD8 *pu1_buf,
UWORD32 u4_length)
{
dec_bit_stream_t *ps_bitstrm;
dec_struct_t *ps_dec = (dec_struct_t *)dec_hdl->pv_codec_handle;
ivd_video_decode_ip_t *ps_dec_in =
(ivd_video_decode_ip_t *)ps_dec->pv_dec_in;
dec_slice_params_t * ps_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
UWORD8 u1_first_byte, u1_nal_ref_idc;
UWORD8 u1_nal_unit_type;
WORD32 i_status = OK;
ps_bitstrm = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm;
if(pu1_buf)
{
if(u4_length)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ih264d_process_nal_unit(ps_dec->ps_bitstrm, pu1_buf,
u4_length);
SWITCHOFFTRACE;
u1_first_byte = ih264d_get_bits_h264(ps_bitstrm, 8);
if(NAL_FORBIDDEN_BIT(u1_first_byte))
{
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("\nForbidden bit set in Nal Unit, Let's try\n");
}
u1_nal_unit_type = NAL_UNIT_TYPE(u1_first_byte);
if ((ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found == 1)
&& (ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done != 1)
&& (u1_nal_unit_type > IDR_SLICE_NAL))
{
return ERROR_INCOMPLETE_FRAME;
}
ps_dec->u1_nal_unit_type = u1_nal_unit_type;
u1_nal_ref_idc = (UWORD8)(NAL_REF_IDC(u1_first_byte));
switch(u1_nal_unit_type)
{
case SLICE_DATA_PARTITION_A_NAL:
case SLICE_DATA_PARTITION_B_NAL:
case SLICE_DATA_PARTITION_C_NAL:
if(!ps_dec->i4_decode_header)
ih264d_parse_slice_partition(ps_dec, ps_bitstrm);
break;
case IDR_SLICE_NAL:
case SLICE_NAL:
/* ! */
DEBUG_THREADS_PRINTF("Decoding a slice NAL\n");
if(!ps_dec->i4_decode_header)
{
if(ps_dec->i4_header_decoded == 3)
{
/* ! */
ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found = 1;
ih264d_rbsp_to_sodb(ps_dec->ps_bitstrm);
i_status = ih264d_parse_decode_slice(
(UWORD8)(u1_nal_unit_type
== IDR_SLICE_NAL),
u1_nal_ref_idc, ps_dec);
if((ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic != 0)&&
((ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC) == 0))
{
/* if the first slice header was not valid set to 1 */
ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic = 1;
}
if(i_status != OK)
{
return i_status;
}
}
else
{
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT(
"\nSlice NAL Supplied but no header has been supplied\n");
}
}
break;
case SEI_NAL:
if(!ps_dec->i4_decode_header)
{
ih264d_rbsp_to_sodb(ps_dec->ps_bitstrm);
i_status = ih264d_parse_sei_message(ps_dec, ps_bitstrm);
if(i_status != OK)
return i_status;
ih264d_parse_sei(ps_dec, ps_bitstrm);
}
break;
case SEQ_PARAM_NAL:
/* ! */
ih264d_rbsp_to_sodb(ps_dec->ps_bitstrm);
i_status = ih264d_parse_sps(ps_dec, ps_bitstrm);
if(i_status == ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T)
return i_status;
if(!i_status)
ps_dec->i4_header_decoded |= 0x1;
break;
case PIC_PARAM_NAL:
/* ! */
ih264d_rbsp_to_sodb(ps_dec->ps_bitstrm);
i_status = ih264d_parse_pps(ps_dec, ps_bitstrm);
if(i_status == ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T)
return i_status;
if(!i_status)
ps_dec->i4_header_decoded |= 0x2;
break;
case ACCESS_UNIT_DELIMITER_RBSP:
if(!ps_dec->i4_decode_header)
{
ih264d_access_unit_delimiter_rbsp(ps_dec);
}
break;
case END_OF_STREAM_RBSP:
if(!ps_dec->i4_decode_header)
{
ih264d_parse_end_of_stream(ps_dec);
}
break;
case FILLER_DATA_NAL:
if(!ps_dec->i4_decode_header)
{
ih264d_parse_filler_data(ps_dec, ps_bitstrm);
}
break;
default:
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("\nUnknown NAL type %d\n", u1_nal_unit_type);
break;
}
}
}
return i_status;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in libavc in Mediaserver could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access data without permission. Product: Android. Versions: 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1. Android ID: A-33551775.
Commit Message: Decoder: Fixed initialization of first_slice_in_pic
To handle some errors, first_slice_in_pic was being set to 2.
This is now cleaned up and first_slice_in_pic is set to 1 only once per pic.
This will ensure picture level initializations are done only once even in case
of error clips
Bug: 33717589
Bug: 33551775
Bug: 33716442
Bug: 33677995
Change-Id: If341436b3cbaa724017eedddd88c2e6fac36d8ba
| Medium | 174,038 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void rose_loopback_timer(unsigned long param)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct net_device *dev;
rose_address *dest;
struct sock *sk;
unsigned short frametype;
unsigned int lci_i, lci_o;
while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&loopback_queue)) != NULL) {
lci_i = ((skb->data[0] << 8) & 0xF00) + ((skb->data[1] << 0) & 0x0FF);
frametype = skb->data[2];
dest = (rose_address *)(skb->data + 4);
lci_o = ROSE_DEFAULT_MAXVC + 1 - lci_i;
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
sk = rose_find_socket(lci_o, rose_loopback_neigh);
if (sk) {
if (rose_process_rx_frame(sk, skb) == 0)
kfree_skb(skb);
continue;
}
if (frametype == ROSE_CALL_REQUEST) {
if ((dev = rose_dev_get(dest)) != NULL) {
if (rose_rx_call_request(skb, dev, rose_loopback_neigh, lci_o) == 0)
kfree_skb(skb);
} else {
kfree_skb(skb);
}
} else {
kfree_skb(skb);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The ROSE protocol implementation in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 does not verify that certain data-length values are consistent with the amount of data sent, which might allow remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory or cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via crafted data to a ROSE socket.
Commit Message: rose: Add length checks to CALL_REQUEST parsing
Define some constant offsets for CALL_REQUEST based on the description
at <http://www.techfest.com/networking/wan/x25plp.htm> and the
definition of ROSE as using 10-digit (5-byte) addresses. Use them
consistently. Validate all implicit and explicit facilities lengths.
Validate the address length byte rather than either trusting or
assuming its value.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,670 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: crm_send_remote_msg(void *session, xmlNode * msg, gboolean encrypted)
{
if (encrypted) {
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_GNUTLS_H
cib_send_tls(session, msg);
#else
CRM_ASSERT(encrypted == FALSE);
#endif
} else {
cib_send_plaintext(GPOINTER_TO_INT(session), msg);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Pacemaker 1.1.10, when remote Cluster Information Base (CIB) configuration or resource management is enabled, does not limit the duration of connections to the blocking sockets, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (connection blocking).
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend. | Medium | 166,164 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BrowserPpapiHostImpl::DeleteInstance(PP_Instance instance) {
auto it = instance_map_.find(instance);
DCHECK(it != instance_map_.end());
for (auto& observer : it->second->observer_list)
observer.OnHostDestroyed();
instance_map_.erase(it);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient validation of untrusted input in PPAPI Plugins in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Windows allowed a remote attacker to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Validate in-process plugin instance messages.
Bug: 733548, 733549
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Ie5572c7bcafa05399b09c44425ddd5ce9b9e4cba
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/538908
Commit-Queue: Bill Budge <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480696} | Medium | 172,310 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void MaintainContentLengthPrefsForDateChange(
base::ListValue* original_update,
base::ListValue* received_update,
int days_since_last_update) {
if (days_since_last_update == -1) {
days_since_last_update = 0;
} else if (days_since_last_update < -1) {
original_update->Clear();
received_update->Clear();
days_since_last_update = kNumDaysInHistory;
//// DailyContentLengthUpdate maintains a data saving pref. The pref is a list
//// of |kNumDaysInHistory| elements of daily total content lengths for the past
//// |kNumDaysInHistory| days.
}
DCHECK_GE(days_since_last_update, 0);
for (int i = 0;
i < days_since_last_update && i < static_cast<int>(kNumDaysInHistory);
++i) {
original_update->AppendString(base::Int64ToString(0));
received_update->AppendString(base::Int64ToString(0));
}
MaintainContentLengthPrefsWindow(original_update, kNumDaysInHistory);
MaintainContentLengthPrefsWindow(received_update, kNumDaysInHistory);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the HTML5 Audio implementation in Google Chrome before 27.0.1453.110 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,325 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void V8RecursionScope::didLeaveScriptContext()
{
Microtask::performCheckpoint();
V8PerIsolateData::from(m_isolate)->runEndOfScopeTasks();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: core/loader/ImageLoader.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89, does not properly determine the V8 context of a microtask, which allows remote attackers to bypass Content Security Policy (CSP) restrictions by providing an image from an unintended source.
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,943 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RuntimeCustomBindings::GetExtensionViews(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
if (args.Length() != 2)
return;
if (!args[0]->IsInt32() || !args[1]->IsString())
return;
int browser_window_id = args[0]->Int32Value();
std::string view_type_string =
base::ToUpperASCII(*v8::String::Utf8Value(args[1]));
ViewType view_type = VIEW_TYPE_INVALID;
if (view_type_string == kViewTypeBackgroundPage) {
view_type = VIEW_TYPE_EXTENSION_BACKGROUND_PAGE;
} else if (view_type_string == kViewTypeTabContents) {
view_type = VIEW_TYPE_TAB_CONTENTS;
} else if (view_type_string == kViewTypePopup) {
view_type = VIEW_TYPE_EXTENSION_POPUP;
} else if (view_type_string == kViewTypeExtensionDialog) {
view_type = VIEW_TYPE_EXTENSION_DIALOG;
} else if (view_type_string == kViewTypeAppWindow) {
view_type = VIEW_TYPE_APP_WINDOW;
} else if (view_type_string == kViewTypeLauncherPage) {
view_type = VIEW_TYPE_LAUNCHER_PAGE;
} else if (view_type_string == kViewTypePanel) {
view_type = VIEW_TYPE_PANEL;
} else if (view_type_string != kViewTypeAll) {
return;
}
std::string extension_id = context()->GetExtensionID();
if (extension_id.empty())
return;
std::vector<content::RenderFrame*> frames =
ExtensionFrameHelper::GetExtensionFrames(extension_id, browser_window_id,
view_type);
v8::Local<v8::Array> v8_views = v8::Array::New(args.GetIsolate());
int v8_index = 0;
for (content::RenderFrame* frame : frames) {
if (frame->GetWebFrame()->top() != frame->GetWebFrame())
continue;
v8::Local<v8::Context> context =
frame->GetWebFrame()->mainWorldScriptContext();
if (!context.IsEmpty()) {
v8::Local<v8::Value> window = context->Global();
DCHECK(!window.IsEmpty());
v8_views->Set(v8::Integer::New(args.GetIsolate(), v8_index++), window);
}
}
args.GetReturnValue().Set(v8_views);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: extensions/renderer/runtime_custom_bindings.cc in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.79 does not consider side effects during creation of an array of extension views, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free) or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to extensions.
Commit Message: Create array of extension views without side effects
BUG=608104
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1935953002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#390961} | Medium | 172,260 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ContentEncoding::GetEncryptionByIndex(unsigned long idx) const {
const ptrdiff_t count = encryption_entries_end_ - encryption_entries_;
assert(count >= 0);
if (idx >= static_cast<unsigned long>(count))
return NULL;
return encryption_entries_[idx];
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,313 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void UsbDeviceImpl::OnPathAccessRequestComplete(const OpenCallback& callback,
bool success) {
if (success) {
blocking_task_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&UsbDeviceImpl::OpenOnBlockingThread, this, callback));
} else {
chromeos::PermissionBrokerClient* client =
chromeos::DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetPermissionBrokerClient();
DCHECK(client) << "Could not get permission broker client.";
client->OpenPath(
device_path_,
base::Bind(&UsbDeviceImpl::OnOpenRequestComplete, this, callback));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the WebSocketDispatcherHost::SendOrDrop function in content/browser/renderer_host/websocket_dispatcher_host.cc in the Web Sockets implementation in Google Chrome before 33.0.1750.149 might allow remote attackers to bypass the sandbox protection mechanism by leveraging an incorrect deletion in a certain failure case.
Commit Message: Remove fallback when requesting a single USB interface.
This reverts commit 2d475d0ed37bf8f19385537ad31e361f1b21624b. The
permission broker now supports opening devices that are partially
claimed through the OpenPath method and RequestPathAccess will always
fail for these devices so the fallback path from RequestPathAccess to
OpenPath is always taken.
BUG=500057
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1227313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338354} | High | 171,701 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int64_t AppCacheDatabase::GetOriginUsage(const url::Origin& origin) {
std::vector<CacheRecord> records;
if (!FindCachesForOrigin(origin, &records))
return 0;
int64_t origin_usage = 0;
for (const auto& record : records)
origin_usage += record.cache_size;
return origin_usage;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Resource size information leakage in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 75.0.3770.80 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719} | Medium | 172,978 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_code_block_enc_allocate_data(opj_tcd_cblk_enc_t *
p_code_block)
{
OPJ_UINT32 l_data_size;
l_data_size = (OPJ_UINT32)((p_code_block->x1 - p_code_block->x0) *
(p_code_block->y1 - p_code_block->y0) * (OPJ_INT32)sizeof(OPJ_UINT32));
if (l_data_size > p_code_block->data_size) {
if (p_code_block->data) {
/* We refer to data - 1 since below we incremented it */
opj_free(p_code_block->data - 1);
}
p_code_block->data = (OPJ_BYTE*) opj_malloc(l_data_size + 1);
if (! p_code_block->data) {
p_code_block->data_size = 0U;
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
p_code_block->data_size = l_data_size;
/* We reserve the initial byte as a fake byte to a non-FF value */
/* and increment the data pointer, so that opj_mqc_init_enc() */
/* can do bp = data - 1, and opj_mqc_byteout() can safely dereference */
/* it. */
p_code_block->data[0] = 0;
p_code_block->data += 1; /*why +1 ?*/
}
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability in the opj_mqc_byteout function in mqc.c in OpenJPEG before 2.2.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted bmp file.
Commit Message: Fix write heap buffer overflow in opj_mqc_byteout(). Discovered by Ke Liu of Tencent's Xuanwu LAB (#835) | Medium | 168,458 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ikev2_ID_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_, const u_char *ep _U_,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct ikev2_id id;
int id_len, idtype_len, i;
unsigned int dumpascii, dumphex;
const unsigned char *typedata;
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&id, ext, sizeof(id));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(tpay), id.h.critical);
id_len = ntohs(id.h.len);
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", id_len - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < id_len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), id_len - 4))
goto trunc;
}
idtype_len =id_len - sizeof(struct ikev2_id);
dumpascii = 0;
dumphex = 0;
typedata = (const unsigned char *)(ext)+sizeof(struct ikev2_id);
switch(id.type) {
case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ipv4:"));
dumphex=1;
break;
case ID_FQDN:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " fqdn:"));
dumpascii=1;
break;
case ID_RFC822_ADDR:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " rfc822:"));
dumpascii=1;
break;
case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ipv6:"));
dumphex=1;
break;
case ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " dn:"));
dumphex=1;
break;
case ID_DER_ASN1_GN:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " gn:"));
dumphex=1;
break;
case ID_KEY_ID:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " keyid:"));
dumphex=1;
break;
}
if(dumpascii) {
ND_TCHECK2(*typedata, idtype_len);
for(i=0; i<idtype_len; i++) {
if(ND_ISPRINT(typedata[i])) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c", typedata[i]));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "."));
}
}
}
if(dumphex) {
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)typedata, idtype_len))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + id_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(tpay)));
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IKEv2 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isakmp.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 167,796 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void destroy_server_connect(SERVER_CONNECT_REC *conn)
{
IRC_SERVER_CONNECT_REC *ircconn;
ircconn = IRC_SERVER_CONNECT(conn);
if (ircconn == NULL)
return;
g_free_not_null(ircconn->usermode);
g_free_not_null(ircconn->alternate_nick);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Irssi before 1.0.8, 1.1.x before 1.1.3, and 1.2.x before 1.2.1, when SASL is enabled, has a use after free when sending SASL login to the server.
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1058 from ailin-nemui/sasl-reconnect
copy sasl username and password values | Medium | 169,642 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PixarLogSetupDecode(TIFF* tif)
{
static const char module[] = "PixarLogSetupDecode";
TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir;
PixarLogState* sp = DecoderState(tif);
tmsize_t tbuf_size;
assert(sp != NULL);
/* Make sure no byte swapping happens on the data
* after decompression. */
tif->tif_postdecode = _TIFFNoPostDecode;
/* for some reason, we can't do this in TIFFInitPixarLog */
sp->stride = (td->td_planarconfig == PLANARCONFIG_CONTIG ?
td->td_samplesperpixel : 1);
tbuf_size = multiply_ms(multiply_ms(multiply_ms(sp->stride, td->td_imagewidth),
td->td_rowsperstrip), sizeof(uint16));
/* add one more stride in case input ends mid-stride */
tbuf_size = add_ms(tbuf_size, sizeof(uint16) * sp->stride);
if (tbuf_size == 0)
return (0); /* TODO: this is an error return without error report through TIFFErrorExt */
sp->tbuf = (uint16 *) _TIFFmalloc(tbuf_size);
if (sp->tbuf == NULL)
return (0);
if (sp->user_datafmt == PIXARLOGDATAFMT_UNKNOWN)
sp->user_datafmt = PixarLogGuessDataFmt(td);
if (sp->user_datafmt == PIXARLOGDATAFMT_UNKNOWN) {
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"PixarLog compression can't handle bits depth/data format combination (depth: %d)",
td->td_bitspersample);
return (0);
}
if (inflateInit(&sp->stream) != Z_OK) {
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module, "%s", sp->stream.msg ? sp->stream.msg : "(null)");
return (0);
} else {
sp->state |= PLSTATE_INIT;
return (1);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Buffer overflow in the PixarLogDecode function in tif_pixarlog.c in LibTIFF 4.0.6 and earlier allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted TIFF image, as demonstrated by overwriting the vgetparent function pointer with rgb2ycbcr.
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix potential buffer write overrun in
PixarLogDecode() on corrupted/unexpected images (reported by Mathias Svensson) | Medium | 169,450 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static v8::Local<v8::Value> compileAndRunPrivateScript(ScriptState* scriptState,
String scriptClassName,
const char* source,
size_t size) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = scriptState->isolate();
v8::TryCatch block(isolate);
String sourceString(source, size);
String fileName = scriptClassName + ".js";
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = scriptState->context();
v8::Local<v8::Object> global = context->Global();
v8::Local<v8::Value> privateScriptController =
global->Get(context, v8String(isolate, "privateScriptController"))
.ToLocalChecked();
RELEASE_ASSERT(privateScriptController->IsUndefined() ||
privateScriptController->IsObject());
if (privateScriptController->IsObject()) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> privateScriptControllerObject =
privateScriptController.As<v8::Object>();
v8::Local<v8::Value> importFunctionValue =
privateScriptControllerObject->Get(context, v8String(isolate, "import"))
.ToLocalChecked();
if (importFunctionValue->IsUndefined()) {
v8::Local<v8::Function> function;
if (!v8::FunctionTemplate::New(isolate, importFunction)
->GetFunction(context)
.ToLocal(&function) ||
!v8CallBoolean(privateScriptControllerObject->Set(
context, v8String(isolate, "import"), function))) {
dumpV8Message(context, block.Message());
LOG(FATAL)
<< "Private script error: Setting import function failed. (Class "
"name = "
<< scriptClassName.utf8().data() << ")";
}
}
}
v8::Local<v8::Script> script;
if (!v8Call(V8ScriptRunner::compileScript(
v8String(isolate, sourceString), fileName, String(),
TextPosition::minimumPosition(), isolate, nullptr, nullptr,
nullptr, NotSharableCrossOrigin),
script, block)) {
dumpV8Message(context, block.Message());
LOG(FATAL) << "Private script error: Compile failed. (Class name = "
<< scriptClassName.utf8().data() << ")";
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> result;
if (!v8Call(V8ScriptRunner::runCompiledInternalScript(isolate, script),
result, block)) {
dumpV8Message(context, block.Message());
LOG(FATAL) << "Private script error: installClass() failed. (Class name = "
<< scriptClassName.utf8().data() << ")";
}
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Blink in Google Chrome prior to 56.0.2924.76 for Linux, Windows and Mac, and 56.0.2924.87 for Android, allowed attacker controlled JavaScript to be run during the invocation of a private script method, which allowed a remote attacker to inject arbitrary scripts or HTML (UXSS) via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Don't touch the prototype chain to get the private script controller.
Prior to this patch, private scripts attempted to get the
"privateScriptController" property off the global object without verifying if
the property actually exists on the global. If the property hasn't been set yet,
this operation could descend into the prototype chain and potentially return
a named property from the WindowProperties object, leading to release asserts
and general confusion.
BUG=668552
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2529163002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#434627} | Medium | 172,450 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t len)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_un *, sunaddr, msg->msg_name);
struct sock *other = NULL;
int namelen = 0; /* fake GCC */
int err;
unsigned int hash;
struct sk_buff *skb;
long timeo;
struct scm_cookie scm;
int max_level;
int data_len = 0;
wait_for_unix_gc();
err = scm_send(sock, msg, &scm, false);
if (err < 0)
return err;
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (msg->msg_flags&MSG_OOB)
goto out;
if (msg->msg_namelen) {
err = unix_mkname(sunaddr, msg->msg_namelen, &hash);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
namelen = err;
} else {
sunaddr = NULL;
err = -ENOTCONN;
other = unix_peer_get(sk);
if (!other)
goto out;
}
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags) && !u->addr
&& (err = unix_autobind(sock)) != 0)
goto out;
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (len > sk->sk_sndbuf - 32)
goto out;
if (len > SKB_MAX_ALLOC) {
data_len = min_t(size_t,
len - SKB_MAX_ALLOC,
MAX_SKB_FRAGS * PAGE_SIZE);
data_len = PAGE_ALIGN(data_len);
BUILD_BUG_ON(SKB_MAX_ALLOC < PAGE_SIZE);
}
skb = sock_alloc_send_pskb(sk, len - data_len, data_len,
msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err,
PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER);
if (skb == NULL)
goto out;
err = unix_scm_to_skb(&scm, skb, true);
if (err < 0)
goto out_free;
max_level = err + 1;
skb_put(skb, len - data_len);
skb->data_len = data_len;
skb->len = len;
err = skb_copy_datagram_from_iter(skb, 0, &msg->msg_iter, len);
if (err)
goto out_free;
timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
restart:
if (!other) {
err = -ECONNRESET;
if (sunaddr == NULL)
goto out_free;
other = unix_find_other(net, sunaddr, namelen, sk->sk_type,
hash, &err);
if (other == NULL)
goto out_free;
}
if (sk_filter(other, skb) < 0) {
/* Toss the packet but do not return any error to the sender */
err = len;
goto out_free;
}
unix_state_lock(other);
err = -EPERM;
if (!unix_may_send(sk, other))
goto out_unlock;
if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD)) {
/*
* Check with 1003.1g - what should
* datagram error
*/
unix_state_unlock(other);
sock_put(other);
err = 0;
unix_state_lock(sk);
if (unix_peer(sk) == other) {
unix_peer(sk) = NULL;
unix_state_unlock(sk);
unix_dgram_disconnected(sk, other);
sock_put(other);
err = -ECONNREFUSED;
} else {
unix_state_unlock(sk);
}
other = NULL;
if (err)
goto out_free;
goto restart;
}
err = -EPIPE;
if (other->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
goto out_unlock;
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET) {
err = security_unix_may_send(sk->sk_socket, other->sk_socket);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
}
if (unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other)) {
if (!timeo) {
err = -EAGAIN;
goto out_unlock;
}
timeo = unix_wait_for_peer(other, timeo);
err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
if (signal_pending(current))
goto out_free;
goto restart;
}
if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP))
__net_timestamp(skb);
maybe_add_creds(skb, sock, other);
skb_queue_tail(&other->sk_receive_queue, skb);
if (max_level > unix_sk(other)->recursion_level)
unix_sk(other)->recursion_level = max_level;
unix_state_unlock(other);
other->sk_data_ready(other);
sock_put(other);
scm_destroy(&scm);
return len;
out_unlock:
unix_state_unlock(other);
out_free:
kfree_skb(skb);
out:
if (other)
sock_put(other);
scm_destroy(&scm);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in net/unix/af_unix.c in the Linux kernel before 4.3.3 allows local users to bypass intended AF_UNIX socket permissions or cause a denial of service (panic) via crafted epoll_ctl calls.
Commit Message: unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue
Rainer Weikusat <[email protected]> writes:
An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with
some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the
receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog
datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go
to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server
receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be
woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll
routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue
of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake
up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently
problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive
for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the
connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic
in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the
polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the
corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a
wait queue with epoll.
Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such
that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the
peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full
condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the
peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client
socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again
dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client
socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is
itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from
unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring
that no blocked writer sleeps forever.
Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <[email protected]>
Fixes: ec0d215f9420 ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets")
Reviewed-by: Jason Baron <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,836 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool GDataCache::CreateCacheDirectories(
const std::vector<FilePath>& paths_to_create) {
bool success = true;
for (size_t i = 0; i < paths_to_create.size(); ++i) {
if (file_util::DirectoryExists(paths_to_create[i]))
continue;
if (!file_util::CreateDirectory(paths_to_create[i])) {
success = false;
PLOG(ERROR) << "Error creating directory " << paths_to_create[i].value();
} else {
DVLOG(1) << "Created directory " << paths_to_create[i].value();
}
}
return success;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
[email protected]
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,861 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: juniper_atm1_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
int llc_hdrlen;
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_ATM1;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
if (l2info.cookie[0] == 0x80) { /* OAM cell ? */
oam_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, ATM_OAM_NOHEC);
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xfefe03 || /* NLPID encaps ? */
EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xaaaa03) { /* SNAP encaps ? */
llc_hdrlen = llc_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, l2info.caplen, NULL, NULL);
if (llc_hdrlen > 0)
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (p[0] == 0x03) { /* Cisco style NLPID encaps ? */
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, l2info.length - 1, l2info.caplen - 1);
/* FIXME check if frame was recognized */
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (ip_heuristic_guess(ndo, p, l2info.length) != 0) /* last try - vcmux encaps ? */
return l2info.header_len;
return l2info.header_len;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ISO CLNS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isoclns.c:isoclns_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 167,948 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadSTEGANOImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define GetBit(alpha,i) MagickMin((((size_t) (alpha) >> (size_t) \
(i)) & 0x01),16)
#define SetBit(indexes,i,set) SetPixelIndex(indexes,((set) != 0 ? \
(size_t) GetPixelIndex(indexes) | (one << (size_t) (i)) : (size_t) \
GetPixelIndex(indexes) & ~(one << (size_t) (i))))
Image
*image,
*watermark;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
int
c;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PixelPacket
pixel;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
x;
size_t
depth,
one;
ssize_t
i,
j,
k,
y;
/*
Initialize Image structure.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
one=1;
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(OptionError,"MustSpecifyImageSize");
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
SetImageInfoBlob(read_info,(void *) NULL,0);
*read_info->magick='\0';
watermark=ReadImage(read_info,exception);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
if (watermark == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
watermark->depth=MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,MaxColormapSize) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
/*
Get hidden watermark from low-order bits of image.
*/
c=0;
i=0;
j=0;
i=(ssize_t) (watermark->depth-1);
depth=watermark->depth;
for (k=image->offset; (i >= 0) && (j < (ssize_t) depth); i--)
{
for (y=0; (y < (ssize_t) image->rows) && (j < (ssize_t) depth); y++)
{
x=0;
for ( ; (x < (ssize_t) image->columns) && (j < (ssize_t) depth); x++)
{
if ((k/(ssize_t) watermark->columns) >= (ssize_t) watermark->rows)
break;
(void) GetOneVirtualPixel(watermark,k % (ssize_t) watermark->columns,
k/(ssize_t) watermark->columns,&pixel,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,x,y,1,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
switch (c)
{
case 0:
{
SetBit(indexes,i,GetBit(pixel.red,j));
break;
}
case 1:
{
SetBit(indexes,i,GetBit(pixel.green,j));
break;
}
case 2:
{
SetBit(indexes,i,GetBit(pixel.blue,j));
break;
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
c++;
if (c == 3)
c=0;
k++;
if (k == (ssize_t) (watermark->columns*watermark->columns))
k=0;
if (k == image->offset)
j++;
}
}
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,(MagickOffsetType) i,depth);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
watermark=DestroyImage(watermark);
(void) SyncImage(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 168,605 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void WallpaperManagerBase::GetCustomWallpaperInternal(
const AccountId& account_id,
const WallpaperInfo& info,
const base::FilePath& wallpaper_path,
bool update_wallpaper,
const scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner>& reply_task_runner,
MovableOnDestroyCallbackHolder on_finish,
base::WeakPtr<WallpaperManagerBase> weak_ptr) {
base::FilePath valid_path = wallpaper_path;
if (!base::PathExists(wallpaper_path)) {
valid_path = GetCustomWallpaperDir(kOriginalWallpaperSubDir);
valid_path = valid_path.Append(info.location);
}
if (!base::PathExists(valid_path)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to load custom wallpaper from its original fallback "
"file path: " << valid_path.value();
const std::string& old_path = account_id.GetUserEmail(); // Migrated
valid_path = GetCustomWallpaperPath(kOriginalWallpaperSubDir,
WallpaperFilesId::FromString(old_path),
info.location);
}
if (!base::PathExists(valid_path)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to load previously selected custom wallpaper. "
<< "Fallback to default wallpaper. Expected wallpaper path: "
<< wallpaper_path.value();
reply_task_runner->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&WallpaperManagerBase::DoSetDefaultWallpaper, weak_ptr,
account_id, base::Passed(std::move(on_finish))));
} else {
reply_task_runner->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&WallpaperManagerBase::StartLoad, weak_ptr,
account_id, info, update_wallpaper, valid_path,
base::Passed(std::move(on_finish))));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The XSSAuditor::canonicalize function in core/html/parser/XSSAuditor.cpp in the XSS auditor in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89, does not properly choose a truncation point, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via an unspecified linear-time attack.
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
[email protected], [email protected]
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <[email protected]>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982} | Medium | 171,972 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline int may_ptrace_stop(void)
{
if (!likely(current->ptrace))
return 0;
/*
* Are we in the middle of do_coredump?
* If so and our tracer is also part of the coredump stopping
* is a deadlock situation, and pointless because our tracer
* is dead so don't allow us to stop.
* If SIGKILL was already sent before the caller unlocked
* ->siglock we must see ->core_state != NULL. Otherwise it
* is safe to enter schedule().
*/
if (unlikely(current->mm->core_state) &&
unlikely(current->mm == current->parent->mm))
return 0;
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the ptrace functionality in the Linux kernel before 3.7.5 allows local users to gain privileges via a PTRACE_SETREGS ptrace system call in a crafted application, as demonstrated by ptrace_death.
Commit Message: ptrace: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL
putreg() assumes that the tracee is not running and pt_regs_access() can
safely play with its stack. However a killed tracee can return from
ptrace_stop() to the low-level asm code and do RESTORE_REST, this means
that debugger can actually read/modify the kernel stack until the tracee
does SAVE_REST again.
set_task_blockstep() can race with SIGKILL too and in some sense this
race is even worse, the very fact the tracee can be woken up breaks the
logic.
As Linus suggested we can clear TASK_WAKEKILL around the arch_ptrace()
call, this ensures that nobody can ever wakeup the tracee while the
debugger looks at it. Not only this fixes the mentioned problems, we
can do some cleanups/simplifications in arch_ptrace() paths.
Probably ptrace_unfreeze_traced() needs more callers, for example it
makes sense to make the tracee killable for oom-killer before
access_process_vm().
While at it, add the comment into may_ptrace_stop() to explain why
ptrace_stop() still can't rely on SIGKILL and signal_pending_state().
Reported-by: Salman Qazi <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Suleiman Souhlal <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,139 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
struct sk_buff *skb = chunk->skb;
sctp_chunkhdr_t *ch;
sctp_errhdr_t *err;
__u8 *ch_end;
int ootb_shut_ack = 0;
int ootb_cookie_ack = 0;
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_OUTOFBLUES);
ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) chunk->chunk_hdr;
do {
/* Report violation if the chunk is less then minimal */
if (ntohs(ch->length) < sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
/* Now that we know we at least have a chunk header,
* do things that are type appropriate.
*/
if (SCTP_CID_SHUTDOWN_ACK == ch->type)
ootb_shut_ack = 1;
/* RFC 2960, Section 3.3.7
* Moreover, under any circumstances, an endpoint that
* receives an ABORT MUST NOT respond to that ABORT by
* sending an ABORT of its own.
*/
if (SCTP_CID_ABORT == ch->type)
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* RFC 8.4, 7) If the packet contains a "Stale cookie" ERROR
* or a COOKIE ACK the SCTP Packet should be silently
* discarded.
*/
if (SCTP_CID_COOKIE_ACK == ch->type)
ootb_cookie_ack = 1;
if (SCTP_CID_ERROR == ch->type) {
sctp_walk_errors(err, ch) {
if (SCTP_ERROR_STALE_COOKIE == err->cause) {
ootb_cookie_ack = 1;
break;
}
}
}
/* Report violation if chunk len overflows */
ch_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(ch->length));
if (ch_end > skb_tail_pointer(skb))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) ch_end;
} while (ch_end < skb_tail_pointer(skb));
if (ootb_shut_ack)
return sctp_sf_shut_8_4_5(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
else if (ootb_cookie_ack)
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
else
return sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The sctp_sf_ootb function in net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c in the Linux kernel before 4.8.8 lacks chunk-length checking for the first chunk, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds slab access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted SCTP data.
Commit Message: sctp: validate chunk len before actually using it
Andrey Konovalov reported that KASAN detected that SCTP was using a slab
beyond the boundaries. It was caused because when handling out of the
blue packets in function sctp_sf_ootb() it was checking the chunk len
only after already processing the first chunk, validating only for the
2nd and subsequent ones.
The fix is to just move the check upwards so it's also validated for the
1st chunk.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 166,861 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void EncoderTest::InitializeConfig() {
const vpx_codec_err_t res = codec_->DefaultEncoderConfig(&cfg_, 0);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,538 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int megasas_alloc_cmds(struct megasas_instance *instance)
{
int i;
int j;
u16 max_cmd;
struct megasas_cmd *cmd;
max_cmd = instance->max_mfi_cmds;
/*
* instance->cmd_list is an array of struct megasas_cmd pointers.
* Allocate the dynamic array first and then allocate individual
* commands.
*/
instance->cmd_list = kcalloc(max_cmd, sizeof(struct megasas_cmd*), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!instance->cmd_list) {
dev_printk(KERN_DEBUG, &instance->pdev->dev, "out of memory\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
memset(instance->cmd_list, 0, sizeof(struct megasas_cmd *) *max_cmd);
for (i = 0; i < max_cmd; i++) {
instance->cmd_list[i] = kmalloc(sizeof(struct megasas_cmd),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!instance->cmd_list[i]) {
for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
kfree(instance->cmd_list[j]);
kfree(instance->cmd_list);
instance->cmd_list = NULL;
return -ENOMEM;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < max_cmd; i++) {
cmd = instance->cmd_list[i];
memset(cmd, 0, sizeof(struct megasas_cmd));
cmd->index = i;
cmd->scmd = NULL;
cmd->instance = instance;
list_add_tail(&cmd->list, &instance->cmd_pool);
}
/*
* Create a frame pool and assign one frame to each cmd
*/
if (megasas_create_frame_pool(instance)) {
dev_printk(KERN_DEBUG, &instance->pdev->dev, "Error creating frame DMA pool\n");
megasas_free_cmds(instance);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 5.0.7. A NULL pointer dereference can occur when megasas_create_frame_pool() fails in megasas_alloc_cmds() in drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c. This causes a Denial of Service, related to a use-after-free.
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> | High | 169,683 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PageRequestSummary::UpdateOrAddToOrigins(
const content::mojom::ResourceLoadInfo& resource_load_info) {
for (const auto& redirect_info : resource_load_info.redirect_info_chain)
UpdateOrAddToOrigins(redirect_info->url, redirect_info->network_info);
UpdateOrAddToOrigins(resource_load_info.url, resource_load_info.network_info);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Insufficient validation of untrusted input in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.86 for Linux, Windows, and Mac, and 59.0.3071.92 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311} | Medium | 172,367 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats(struct sock *sk, int len,
char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen)
{
struct sctp_assoc_stats sas;
struct sctp_association *asoc = NULL;
/* User must provide at least the assoc id */
if (len < sizeof(sctp_assoc_t))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&sas, optval, len))
return -EFAULT;
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, sas.sas_assoc_id);
if (!asoc)
return -EINVAL;
sas.sas_rtxchunks = asoc->stats.rtxchunks;
sas.sas_gapcnt = asoc->stats.gapcnt;
sas.sas_outofseqtsns = asoc->stats.outofseqtsns;
sas.sas_osacks = asoc->stats.osacks;
sas.sas_isacks = asoc->stats.isacks;
sas.sas_octrlchunks = asoc->stats.octrlchunks;
sas.sas_ictrlchunks = asoc->stats.ictrlchunks;
sas.sas_oodchunks = asoc->stats.oodchunks;
sas.sas_iodchunks = asoc->stats.iodchunks;
sas.sas_ouodchunks = asoc->stats.ouodchunks;
sas.sas_iuodchunks = asoc->stats.iuodchunks;
sas.sas_idupchunks = asoc->stats.idupchunks;
sas.sas_opackets = asoc->stats.opackets;
sas.sas_ipackets = asoc->stats.ipackets;
/* New high max rto observed, will return 0 if not a single
* RTO update took place. obs_rto_ipaddr will be bogus
* in such a case
*/
sas.sas_maxrto = asoc->stats.max_obs_rto;
memcpy(&sas.sas_obs_rto_ipaddr, &asoc->stats.obs_rto_ipaddr,
sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage));
/* Mark beginning of a new observation period */
asoc->stats.max_obs_rto = asoc->rto_min;
/* Allow the struct to grow and fill in as much as possible */
len = min_t(size_t, len, sizeof(sas));
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stat(%d): %d\n",
len, sas.sas_assoc_id);
if (copy_to_user(optval, &sas, len))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats function in net/sctp/socket.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.4 does not validate a size value before proceeding to a copy_from_user operation, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted application that contains an SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS getsockopt system call.
Commit Message: net/sctp: Validate parameter size for SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS
Building sctp may fail with:
In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats’ at
net/sctp/socket.c:5656:20:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct
if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation
before the call to copy_from_user.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,111 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int flakey_ioctl(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct flakey_c *fc = ti->private;
return __blkdev_driver_ioctl(fc->dev->bdev, fc->dev->mode, cmd, arg);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Linux kernel before 3.2.2 does not properly restrict SG_IO ioctl calls, which allows local users to bypass intended restrictions on disk read and write operations by sending a SCSI command to (1) a partition block device or (2) an LVM volume.
Commit Message: dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,722 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: virtual size_t GetNumActiveInputMethods() {
scoped_ptr<InputMethodDescriptors> input_methods(GetActiveInputMethods());
return input_methods->size();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,490 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ExternalProtocolHandler::LaunchUrlWithDelegate(
const GURL& url,
int render_process_host_id,
int render_view_routing_id,
ui::PageTransition page_transition,
bool has_user_gesture,
Delegate* delegate) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
std::string escaped_url_string = net::EscapeExternalHandlerValue(url.spec());
GURL escaped_url(escaped_url_string);
content::WebContents* web_contents = tab_util::GetWebContentsByID(
render_process_host_id, render_view_routing_id);
Profile* profile = nullptr;
if (web_contents) // Maybe NULL during testing.
profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext());
BlockState block_state =
GetBlockStateWithDelegate(escaped_url.scheme(), delegate, profile);
if (block_state == BLOCK) {
if (delegate)
delegate->BlockRequest();
return;
}
g_accept_requests = false;
shell_integration::DefaultWebClientWorkerCallback callback = base::Bind(
&OnDefaultProtocolClientWorkerFinished, url, render_process_host_id,
render_view_routing_id, block_state == UNKNOWN, page_transition,
has_user_gesture, delegate);
CreateShellWorker(callback, escaped_url.scheme(), delegate)
->StartCheckIsDefault();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient data validation in External Protocol Handler in Google Chrome prior to 64.0.3282.119 allowed a remote attacker to potentially execute arbitrary programs on user machine via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Reland "Launching an external protocol handler now escapes the URL."
This is a reland of 2401e58572884b3561e4348d64f11ac74667ef02
Original change's description:
> Launching an external protocol handler now escapes the URL.
>
> Fixes bug introduced in r102449.
>
> Bug: 785809
> Change-Id: I9e6dd1031dd7e7b8d378b138ab151daefdc0c6dc
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/778747
> Commit-Queue: Matt Giuca <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Eric Lawrence <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#518848}
Bug: 785809
Change-Id: Ib8954584004ff5681654398db76d48cdf4437df7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/788551
Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Matt Giuca <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#519203} | Medium | 172,687 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: header_put_le_short (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int x)
{ if (psf->headindex < SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header) - 2)
{ psf->header [psf->headindex++] = x ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 8) ;
} ;
} /* header_put_le_short */
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In libsndfile before 1.0.28, an error in the *header_read()* function (common.c) when handling ID3 tags can be exploited to cause a stack-based buffer overflow via a specially crafted FLAC file.
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k. | Medium | 170,058 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void MaybeChangeCurrentKeyboardLayout(const std::string& section,
const std::string& config_name,
const ImeConfigValue& value) {
if (section == language_prefs::kGeneralSectionName &&
config_name == language_prefs::kPreloadEnginesConfigName &&
ContainOnlyOneKeyboardLayout(value)) {
ChangeCurrentInputMethodFromId(value.string_list_value[0]);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,498 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: videobuf_vm_open(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct videobuf_mapping *map = vma->vm_private_data;
dprintk(2,"vm_open %p [count=%d,vma=%08lx-%08lx]\n",map,
map->count,vma->vm_start,vma->vm_end);
map->count++;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: drivers/media/video/videobuf-vmalloc.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.24 does not initialize videobuf_mapping data structures, which allows local users to trigger an incorrect count value and videobuf leak via unspecified vectors, a different vulnerability than CVE-2010-5321.
Commit Message: V4L/DVB (6751): V4L: Memory leak! Fix count in videobuf-vmalloc mmap
This is pretty serious bug. map->count is never initialized after the
call to kmalloc making the count start at some random trash value. The
end result is leaking videobufs.
Also, fix up the debug statements to print unsigned values.
Pushed to http://ifup.org/hg/v4l-dvb too
Signed-off-by: Brandon Philips <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,919 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void do_perf_sw_event(enum perf_type_id type, u32 event_id,
u64 nr, int nmi,
struct perf_sample_data *data,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct swevent_htable *swhash = &__get_cpu_var(swevent_htable);
struct perf_event *event;
struct hlist_node *node;
struct hlist_head *head;
rcu_read_lock();
head = find_swevent_head_rcu(swhash, type, event_id);
if (!head)
goto end;
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(event, node, head, hlist_entry) {
if (perf_swevent_match(event, type, event_id, data, regs))
perf_swevent_event(event, nr, nmi, data, regs);
}
end:
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,828 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: png_get_uint_32(png_bytep buf)
{
png_uint_32 i = ((png_uint_32)(*buf) << 24) +
((png_uint_32)(*(buf + 1)) << 16) +
((png_uint_32)(*(buf + 2)) << 8) +
(png_uint_32)(*(buf + 3));
return (i);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in the (1) png_set_PLTE and (2) png_get_PLTE functions in libpng before 1.0.64, 1.1.x and 1.2.x before 1.2.54, 1.3.x and 1.4.x before 1.4.17, 1.5.x before 1.5.24, and 1.6.x before 1.6.19 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a small bit-depth value in an IHDR (aka image header) chunk in a PNG image.
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
[email protected]
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298} | High | 172,176 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool HTMLFormElement::prepareForSubmission(Event* event)
{
Frame* frame = document().frame();
if (m_isSubmittingOrPreparingForSubmission || !frame)
return m_isSubmittingOrPreparingForSubmission;
m_isSubmittingOrPreparingForSubmission = true;
m_shouldSubmit = false;
if (!validateInteractively(event)) {
m_isSubmittingOrPreparingForSubmission = false;
return false;
}
StringPairVector controlNamesAndValues;
getTextFieldValues(controlNamesAndValues);
RefPtr<FormState> formState = FormState::create(this, controlNamesAndValues, &document(), NotSubmittedByJavaScript);
frame->loader()->client()->dispatchWillSendSubmitEvent(formState.release());
if (dispatchEvent(Event::createCancelableBubble(eventNames().submitEvent)))
m_shouldSubmit = true;
m_isSubmittingOrPreparingForSubmission = false;
if (m_shouldSubmit)
submit(event, true, true, NotSubmittedByJavaScript);
return m_shouldSubmit;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the HTMLFormElement::prepareForSubmission function in core/html/HTMLFormElement.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 30.0.1599.101, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to submission for FORM elements.
Commit Message: Fix a crash in HTMLFormElement::prepareForSubmission.
BUG=297478
TEST=automated with ASAN.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24910003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158428 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,171 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: horizontalDifference8(unsigned char *ip, int n, int stride,
unsigned short *wp, uint16 *From8)
{
register int r1, g1, b1, a1, r2, g2, b2, a2, mask;
#undef CLAMP
#define CLAMP(v) (From8[(v)])
mask = CODE_MASK;
if (n >= stride) {
if (stride == 3) {
r2 = wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]); g2 = wp[1] = CLAMP(ip[1]);
b2 = wp[2] = CLAMP(ip[2]);
n -= 3;
while (n > 0) {
n -= 3;
r1 = CLAMP(ip[3]); wp[3] = (uint16)((r1-r2) & mask); r2 = r1;
g1 = CLAMP(ip[4]); wp[4] = (uint16)((g1-g2) & mask); g2 = g1;
b1 = CLAMP(ip[5]); wp[5] = (uint16)((b1-b2) & mask); b2 = b1;
wp += 3;
ip += 3;
}
} else if (stride == 4) {
r2 = wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]); g2 = wp[1] = CLAMP(ip[1]);
b2 = wp[2] = CLAMP(ip[2]); a2 = wp[3] = CLAMP(ip[3]);
n -= 4;
while (n > 0) {
n -= 4;
r1 = CLAMP(ip[4]); wp[4] = (uint16)((r1-r2) & mask); r2 = r1;
g1 = CLAMP(ip[5]); wp[5] = (uint16)((g1-g2) & mask); g2 = g1;
b1 = CLAMP(ip[6]); wp[6] = (uint16)((b1-b2) & mask); b2 = b1;
a1 = CLAMP(ip[7]); wp[7] = (uint16)((a1-a2) & mask); a2 = a1;
wp += 4;
ip += 4;
}
} else {
wp += n + stride - 1; /* point to last one */
ip += n + stride - 1; /* point to last one */
n -= stride;
while (n > 0) {
REPEAT(stride, wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]);
wp[stride] -= wp[0];
wp[stride] &= mask;
wp--; ip--)
n -= stride;
}
REPEAT(stride, wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]); wp--; ip--)
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: tools/tiffcrop.c in libtiff 4.0.6 has out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093, MSVR 35096, and MSVR 35097.
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix various out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap or stack allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093,
MSVR 35096 and MSVR 35097. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal
Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* tools/tiff2pdf.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in
heap allocate buffer in t2p_process_jpeg_strip(). Reported as MSVR
35098. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC
Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35094. Discovered by
Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_write.c: fix issue in error code path of TIFFFlushData1()
that didn't reset the tif_rawcc and tif_rawcp members. I'm not
completely sure if that could happen in practice outside of the odd
behaviour of t2p_seekproc() of tiff2pdf). The report points that a
better fix could be to check the return value of TIFFFlushData1() in
places where it isn't done currently, but it seems this patch is enough.
Reported as MSVR 35095. Discovered by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan &
Suha Can from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team. | High | 166,869 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int __ref online_pages(unsigned long pfn, unsigned long nr_pages)
{
unsigned long onlined_pages = 0;
struct zone *zone;
int need_zonelists_rebuild = 0;
int nid;
int ret;
struct memory_notify arg;
lock_memory_hotplug();
arg.start_pfn = pfn;
arg.nr_pages = nr_pages;
arg.status_change_nid = -1;
nid = page_to_nid(pfn_to_page(pfn));
if (node_present_pages(nid) == 0)
arg.status_change_nid = nid;
ret = memory_notify(MEM_GOING_ONLINE, &arg);
ret = notifier_to_errno(ret);
if (ret) {
memory_notify(MEM_CANCEL_ONLINE, &arg);
unlock_memory_hotplug();
return ret;
}
/*
* This doesn't need a lock to do pfn_to_page().
* The section can't be removed here because of the
* memory_block->state_mutex.
*/
zone = page_zone(pfn_to_page(pfn));
/*
* If this zone is not populated, then it is not in zonelist.
* This means the page allocator ignores this zone.
* So, zonelist must be updated after online.
*/
mutex_lock(&zonelists_mutex);
if (!populated_zone(zone))
need_zonelists_rebuild = 1;
ret = walk_system_ram_range(pfn, nr_pages, &onlined_pages,
online_pages_range);
if (ret) {
mutex_unlock(&zonelists_mutex);
printk(KERN_DEBUG "online_pages [mem %#010llx-%#010llx] failed\n",
(unsigned long long) pfn << PAGE_SHIFT,
(((unsigned long long) pfn + nr_pages)
<< PAGE_SHIFT) - 1);
memory_notify(MEM_CANCEL_ONLINE, &arg);
unlock_memory_hotplug();
return ret;
}
zone->present_pages += onlined_pages;
zone->zone_pgdat->node_present_pages += onlined_pages;
if (need_zonelists_rebuild)
build_all_zonelists(NULL, zone);
else
zone_pcp_update(zone);
mutex_unlock(&zonelists_mutex);
init_per_zone_wmark_min();
if (onlined_pages) {
kswapd_run(zone_to_nid(zone));
node_set_state(zone_to_nid(zone), N_HIGH_MEMORY);
}
vm_total_pages = nr_free_pagecache_pages();
writeback_set_ratelimit();
if (onlined_pages)
memory_notify(MEM_ONLINE, &arg);
unlock_memory_hotplug();
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The online_pages function in mm/memory_hotplug.c in the Linux kernel before 3.6 allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact in opportunistic circumstances by using memory that was hot-added by an administrator.
Commit Message: mm/hotplug: correctly add new zone to all other nodes' zone lists
When online_pages() is called to add new memory to an empty zone, it
rebuilds all zone lists by calling build_all_zonelists(). But there's a
bug which prevents the new zone to be added to other nodes' zone lists.
online_pages() {
build_all_zonelists()
.....
node_set_state(zone_to_nid(zone), N_HIGH_MEMORY)
}
Here the node of the zone is put into N_HIGH_MEMORY state after calling
build_all_zonelists(), but build_all_zonelists() only adds zones from
nodes in N_HIGH_MEMORY state to the fallback zone lists.
build_all_zonelists()
->__build_all_zonelists()
->build_zonelists()
->find_next_best_node()
->for_each_node_state(n, N_HIGH_MEMORY)
So memory in the new zone will never be used by other nodes, and it may
cause strange behavor when system is under memory pressure. So put node
into N_HIGH_MEMORY state before calling build_all_zonelists().
Signed-off-by: Jianguo Wu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiang Liu <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Minchan Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <[email protected]>
Cc: Tony Luck <[email protected]>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <[email protected]>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Keping Chen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,529 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd_in, unsigned long arg)
{
void __user *p = (void __user *)arg;
int __user *ip = p;
int result, val, read_only;
Sg_device *sdp;
Sg_fd *sfp;
Sg_request *srp;
unsigned long iflags;
if ((!(sfp = (Sg_fd *) filp->private_data)) || (!(sdp = sfp->parentdp)))
return -ENXIO;
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(3, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, sdp,
"sg_ioctl: cmd=0x%x\n", (int) cmd_in));
read_only = (O_RDWR != (filp->f_flags & O_ACCMODE));
switch (cmd_in) {
case SG_IO:
if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching))
return -ENODEV;
if (!scsi_block_when_processing_errors(sdp->device))
return -ENXIO;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, p, SZ_SG_IO_HDR))
return -EFAULT;
result = sg_new_write(sfp, filp, p, SZ_SG_IO_HDR,
1, read_only, 1, &srp);
if (result < 0)
return result;
result = wait_event_interruptible(sfp->read_wait,
(srp_done(sfp, srp) || atomic_read(&sdp->detaching)));
if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching))
return -ENODEV;
write_lock_irq(&sfp->rq_list_lock);
if (srp->done) {
srp->done = 2;
write_unlock_irq(&sfp->rq_list_lock);
result = sg_new_read(sfp, p, SZ_SG_IO_HDR, srp);
return (result < 0) ? result : 0;
}
srp->orphan = 1;
write_unlock_irq(&sfp->rq_list_lock);
return result; /* -ERESTARTSYS because signal hit process */
case SG_SET_TIMEOUT:
result = get_user(val, ip);
if (result)
return result;
if (val < 0)
return -EIO;
if (val >= mult_frac((s64)INT_MAX, USER_HZ, HZ))
val = min_t(s64, mult_frac((s64)INT_MAX, USER_HZ, HZ),
INT_MAX);
sfp->timeout_user = val;
sfp->timeout = mult_frac(val, HZ, USER_HZ);
return 0;
case SG_GET_TIMEOUT: /* N.B. User receives timeout as return value */
/* strange ..., for backward compatibility */
return sfp->timeout_user;
case SG_SET_FORCE_LOW_DMA:
/*
* N.B. This ioctl never worked properly, but failed to
* return an error value. So returning '0' to keep compability
* with legacy applications.
*/
return 0;
case SG_GET_LOW_DMA:
return put_user((int) sdp->device->host->unchecked_isa_dma, ip);
case SG_GET_SCSI_ID:
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, p, sizeof (sg_scsi_id_t)))
return -EFAULT;
else {
sg_scsi_id_t __user *sg_idp = p;
if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching))
return -ENODEV;
__put_user((int) sdp->device->host->host_no,
&sg_idp->host_no);
__put_user((int) sdp->device->channel,
&sg_idp->channel);
__put_user((int) sdp->device->id, &sg_idp->scsi_id);
__put_user((int) sdp->device->lun, &sg_idp->lun);
__put_user((int) sdp->device->type, &sg_idp->scsi_type);
__put_user((short) sdp->device->host->cmd_per_lun,
&sg_idp->h_cmd_per_lun);
__put_user((short) sdp->device->queue_depth,
&sg_idp->d_queue_depth);
__put_user(0, &sg_idp->unused[0]);
__put_user(0, &sg_idp->unused[1]);
return 0;
}
case SG_SET_FORCE_PACK_ID:
result = get_user(val, ip);
if (result)
return result;
sfp->force_packid = val ? 1 : 0;
return 0;
case SG_GET_PACK_ID:
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, ip, sizeof (int)))
return -EFAULT;
read_lock_irqsave(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
list_for_each_entry(srp, &sfp->rq_list, entry) {
if ((1 == srp->done) && (!srp->sg_io_owned)) {
read_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock,
iflags);
__put_user(srp->header.pack_id, ip);
return 0;
}
}
read_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
__put_user(-1, ip);
return 0;
case SG_GET_NUM_WAITING:
read_lock_irqsave(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
val = 0;
list_for_each_entry(srp, &sfp->rq_list, entry) {
if ((1 == srp->done) && (!srp->sg_io_owned))
++val;
}
read_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
return put_user(val, ip);
case SG_GET_SG_TABLESIZE:
return put_user(sdp->sg_tablesize, ip);
case SG_SET_RESERVED_SIZE:
result = get_user(val, ip);
if (result)
return result;
if (val < 0)
return -EINVAL;
val = min_t(int, val,
max_sectors_bytes(sdp->device->request_queue));
mutex_lock(&sfp->f_mutex);
if (val != sfp->reserve.bufflen) {
if (sfp->mmap_called ||
sfp->res_in_use) {
mutex_unlock(&sfp->f_mutex);
return -EBUSY;
}
sg_remove_scat(sfp, &sfp->reserve);
sg_build_reserve(sfp, val);
}
mutex_unlock(&sfp->f_mutex);
return 0;
case SG_GET_RESERVED_SIZE:
val = min_t(int, sfp->reserve.bufflen,
max_sectors_bytes(sdp->device->request_queue));
return put_user(val, ip);
case SG_SET_COMMAND_Q:
result = get_user(val, ip);
if (result)
return result;
sfp->cmd_q = val ? 1 : 0;
return 0;
case SG_GET_COMMAND_Q:
return put_user((int) sfp->cmd_q, ip);
case SG_SET_KEEP_ORPHAN:
result = get_user(val, ip);
if (result)
return result;
sfp->keep_orphan = val;
return 0;
case SG_GET_KEEP_ORPHAN:
return put_user((int) sfp->keep_orphan, ip);
case SG_NEXT_CMD_LEN:
result = get_user(val, ip);
if (result)
return result;
if (val > SG_MAX_CDB_SIZE)
return -ENOMEM;
sfp->next_cmd_len = (val > 0) ? val : 0;
return 0;
case SG_GET_VERSION_NUM:
return put_user(sg_version_num, ip);
case SG_GET_ACCESS_COUNT:
/* faked - we don't have a real access count anymore */
val = (sdp->device ? 1 : 0);
return put_user(val, ip);
case SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE:
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, p, SZ_SG_REQ_INFO * SG_MAX_QUEUE))
return -EFAULT;
else {
sg_req_info_t *rinfo;
rinfo = kmalloc(SZ_SG_REQ_INFO * SG_MAX_QUEUE,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rinfo)
return -ENOMEM;
read_lock_irqsave(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
sg_fill_request_table(sfp, rinfo);
read_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
result = __copy_to_user(p, rinfo,
SZ_SG_REQ_INFO * SG_MAX_QUEUE);
result = result ? -EFAULT : 0;
kfree(rinfo);
return result;
}
case SG_EMULATED_HOST:
if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching))
return -ENODEV;
return put_user(sdp->device->host->hostt->emulated, ip);
case SCSI_IOCTL_SEND_COMMAND:
if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching))
return -ENODEV;
if (read_only) {
unsigned char opcode = WRITE_6;
Scsi_Ioctl_Command __user *siocp = p;
if (copy_from_user(&opcode, siocp->data, 1))
return -EFAULT;
if (sg_allow_access(filp, &opcode))
return -EPERM;
}
return sg_scsi_ioctl(sdp->device->request_queue, NULL, filp->f_mode, p);
case SG_SET_DEBUG:
result = get_user(val, ip);
if (result)
return result;
sdp->sgdebug = (char) val;
return 0;
case BLKSECTGET:
return put_user(max_sectors_bytes(sdp->device->request_queue),
ip);
case BLKTRACESETUP:
return blk_trace_setup(sdp->device->request_queue,
sdp->disk->disk_name,
MKDEV(SCSI_GENERIC_MAJOR, sdp->index),
NULL, p);
case BLKTRACESTART:
return blk_trace_startstop(sdp->device->request_queue, 1);
case BLKTRACESTOP:
return blk_trace_startstop(sdp->device->request_queue, 0);
case BLKTRACETEARDOWN:
return blk_trace_remove(sdp->device->request_queue);
case SCSI_IOCTL_GET_IDLUN:
case SCSI_IOCTL_GET_BUS_NUMBER:
case SCSI_IOCTL_PROBE_HOST:
case SG_GET_TRANSFORM:
case SG_SCSI_RESET:
if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching))
return -ENODEV;
break;
default:
if (read_only)
return -EPERM; /* don't know so take safe approach */
break;
}
result = scsi_ioctl_block_when_processing_errors(sdp->device,
cmd_in, filp->f_flags & O_NDELAY);
if (result)
return result;
return scsi_ioctl(sdp->device, cmd_in, p);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The sg_ioctl function in drivers/scsi/sg.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13.4 allows local users to obtain sensitive information from uninitialized kernel heap-memory locations via an SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE ioctl call for /dev/sg0.
Commit Message: scsi: sg: fixup infoleak when using SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE
When calling SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE ioctl only a half-filled table is
returned; the remaining part will then contain stale kernel memory
information. This patch zeroes out the entire table to avoid this
issue.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> | Low | 167,741 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ext2_xattr_delete_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
struct mb_cache_entry *ce;
down_write(&EXT2_I(inode)->xattr_sem);
if (!EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl)
goto cleanup;
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
if (!bh) {
ext2_error(inode->i_sb, "ext2_xattr_delete_inode",
"inode %ld: block %d read error", inode->i_ino,
EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
goto cleanup;
}
ea_bdebug(bh, "b_count=%d", atomic_read(&(bh->b_count)));
if (HDR(bh)->h_magic != cpu_to_le32(EXT2_XATTR_MAGIC) ||
HDR(bh)->h_blocks != cpu_to_le32(1)) {
ext2_error(inode->i_sb, "ext2_xattr_delete_inode",
"inode %ld: bad block %d", inode->i_ino,
EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
goto cleanup;
}
ce = mb_cache_entry_get(ext2_xattr_cache, bh->b_bdev, bh->b_blocknr);
lock_buffer(bh);
if (HDR(bh)->h_refcount == cpu_to_le32(1)) {
if (ce)
mb_cache_entry_free(ce);
ext2_free_blocks(inode, EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl, 1);
get_bh(bh);
bforget(bh);
unlock_buffer(bh);
} else {
le32_add_cpu(&HDR(bh)->h_refcount, -1);
if (ce)
mb_cache_entry_release(ce);
ea_bdebug(bh, "refcount now=%d",
le32_to_cpu(HDR(bh)->h_refcount));
unlock_buffer(bh);
mark_buffer_dirty(bh);
if (IS_SYNC(inode))
sync_dirty_buffer(bh);
dquot_free_block_nodirty(inode, 1);
}
EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl = 0;
cleanup:
brelse(bh);
up_write(&EXT2_I(inode)->xattr_sem);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: The mbcache feature in the ext2 and ext4 filesystem implementations in the Linux kernel before 4.6 mishandles xattr block caching, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (soft lockup) via filesystem operations in environments that use many attributes, as demonstrated by Ceph and Samba.
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> | Low | 169,979 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int crypto_aead_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct crypto_report_aead raead;
struct aead_alg *aead = &alg->cra_aead;
snprintf(raead.type, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s", "aead");
snprintf(raead.geniv, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s",
aead->geniv ?: "<built-in>");
raead.blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
raead.maxauthsize = aead->maxauthsize;
raead.ivsize = aead->ivsize;
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_AEAD,
sizeof(struct crypto_report_aead), &raead))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: The crypto_report_one function in crypto/crypto_user.c in the report API in the crypto user configuration API in the Linux kernel through 3.8.2 uses an incorrect length value during a copy operation, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability.
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> | Low | 166,063 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SQLWCHAR* _multi_string_alloc_and_expand( LPCSTR in )
{
SQLWCHAR *chr;
int len = 0;
if ( !in )
{
return in;
}
while ( in[ len ] != 0 || in[ len + 1 ] != 0 )
{
len ++;
}
chr = malloc(sizeof( SQLWCHAR ) * ( len + 2 ));
len = 0;
while ( in[ len ] != 0 || in[ len + 1 ] != 0 )
{
chr[ len ] = in[ len ];
len ++;
}
chr[ len ++ ] = 0;
chr[ len ++ ] = 0;
return chr;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The SQLWriteFileDSN function in odbcinst/SQLWriteFileDSN.c in unixODBC 2.3.5 has strncpy arguments in the wrong order, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact.
Commit Message: New Pre Source | High | 169,314 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int dmarc_process() {
int sr, origin; /* used in SPF section */
int dmarc_spf_result = 0; /* stores spf into dmarc conn ctx */
pdkim_signature *sig = NULL;
BOOL has_dmarc_record = TRUE;
u_char **ruf; /* forensic report addressees, if called for */
/* ACLs have "control=dmarc_disable_verify" */
if (dmarc_disable_verify == TRUE)
{
dmarc_ar_header = dmarc_auth_results_header(from_header, NULL);
return OK;
}
/* Store the header From: sender domain for this part of DMARC.
* If there is no from_header struct, then it's likely this message
* is locally generated and relying on fixups to add it. Just skip
* the entire DMARC system if we can't find a From: header....or if
* there was a previous error.
*/
if (from_header == NULL || dmarc_abort == TRUE)
dmarc_abort = TRUE;
else
{
/* I strongly encourage anybody who can make this better to contact me directly!
* <cannonball> Is this an insane way to extract the email address from the From: header?
* <jgh_hm> it's sure a horrid layer-crossing....
* <cannonball> I'm not denying that :-/
* <jgh_hm> there may well be no better though
*/
header_from_sender = expand_string(
string_sprintf("${domain:${extract{1}{:}{${addresses:%s}}}}",
from_header->text) );
/* The opendmarc library extracts the domain from the email address, but
* only try to store it if it's not empty. Otherwise, skip out of DMARC. */
if (strcmp( CCS header_from_sender, "") == 0)
dmarc_abort = TRUE;
libdm_status = (dmarc_abort == TRUE) ?
DMARC_PARSE_OKAY :
opendmarc_policy_store_from_domain(dmarc_pctx, header_from_sender);
if (libdm_status != DMARC_PARSE_OKAY)
{
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failure to store header From: in DMARC: %s, header was '%s'",
opendmarc_policy_status_to_str(libdm_status), from_header->text);
dmarc_abort = TRUE;
}
}
/* Use the envelope sender domain for this part of DMARC */
spf_sender_domain = expand_string(US"$sender_address_domain");
if ( spf_response == NULL )
{
/* No spf data means null envelope sender so generate a domain name
* from the sender_helo_name */
if (spf_sender_domain == NULL)
{
spf_sender_domain = sender_helo_name;
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "DMARC using synthesized SPF sender domain = %s\n",
spf_sender_domain);
DEBUG(D_receive)
debug_printf("DMARC using synthesized SPF sender domain = %s\n", spf_sender_domain);
}
dmarc_spf_result = DMARC_POLICY_SPF_OUTCOME_NONE;
dmarc_spf_ares_result = ARES_RESULT_UNKNOWN;
origin = DMARC_POLICY_SPF_ORIGIN_HELO;
spf_human_readable = US"";
}
else
{
sr = spf_response->result;
dmarc_spf_result = (sr == SPF_RESULT_NEUTRAL) ? DMARC_POLICY_SPF_OUTCOME_NONE :
(sr == SPF_RESULT_PASS) ? DMARC_POLICY_SPF_OUTCOME_PASS :
(sr == SPF_RESULT_FAIL) ? DMARC_POLICY_SPF_OUTCOME_FAIL :
(sr == SPF_RESULT_SOFTFAIL) ? DMARC_POLICY_SPF_OUTCOME_TMPFAIL :
DMARC_POLICY_SPF_OUTCOME_NONE;
dmarc_spf_ares_result = (sr == SPF_RESULT_NEUTRAL) ? ARES_RESULT_NEUTRAL :
(sr == SPF_RESULT_PASS) ? ARES_RESULT_PASS :
(sr == SPF_RESULT_FAIL) ? ARES_RESULT_FAIL :
(sr == SPF_RESULT_SOFTFAIL) ? ARES_RESULT_SOFTFAIL :
(sr == SPF_RESULT_NONE) ? ARES_RESULT_NONE :
(sr == SPF_RESULT_TEMPERROR) ? ARES_RESULT_TEMPERROR :
(sr == SPF_RESULT_PERMERROR) ? ARES_RESULT_PERMERROR :
ARES_RESULT_UNKNOWN;
origin = DMARC_POLICY_SPF_ORIGIN_MAILFROM;
spf_human_readable = (uschar *)spf_response->header_comment;
DEBUG(D_receive)
debug_printf("DMARC using SPF sender domain = %s\n", spf_sender_domain);
}
if (strcmp( CCS spf_sender_domain, "") == 0)
dmarc_abort = TRUE;
if (dmarc_abort == FALSE)
{
libdm_status = opendmarc_policy_store_spf(dmarc_pctx, spf_sender_domain,
dmarc_spf_result, origin, spf_human_readable);
if (libdm_status != DMARC_PARSE_OKAY)
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failure to store spf for DMARC: %s",
opendmarc_policy_status_to_str(libdm_status));
}
/* Now we cycle through the dkim signature results and put into
* the opendmarc context, further building the DMARC reply. */
sig = dkim_signatures;
dkim_history_buffer = US"";
while (sig != NULL)
{
int dkim_result, dkim_ares_result, vs, ves;
vs = sig->verify_status;
ves = sig->verify_ext_status;
dkim_result = ( vs == PDKIM_VERIFY_PASS ) ? DMARC_POLICY_DKIM_OUTCOME_PASS :
( vs == PDKIM_VERIFY_FAIL ) ? DMARC_POLICY_DKIM_OUTCOME_FAIL :
( vs == PDKIM_VERIFY_INVALID ) ? DMARC_POLICY_DKIM_OUTCOME_TMPFAIL :
DMARC_POLICY_DKIM_OUTCOME_NONE;
libdm_status = opendmarc_policy_store_dkim(dmarc_pctx, (uschar *)sig->domain,
dkim_result, US"");
DEBUG(D_receive)
debug_printf("DMARC adding DKIM sender domain = %s\n", sig->domain);
if (libdm_status != DMARC_PARSE_OKAY)
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failure to store dkim (%s) for DMARC: %s",
sig->domain, opendmarc_policy_status_to_str(libdm_status));
dkim_ares_result = ( vs == PDKIM_VERIFY_PASS ) ? ARES_RESULT_PASS :
( vs == PDKIM_VERIFY_FAIL ) ? ARES_RESULT_FAIL :
( vs == PDKIM_VERIFY_NONE ) ? ARES_RESULT_NONE :
( vs == PDKIM_VERIFY_INVALID ) ?
( ves == PDKIM_VERIFY_INVALID_PUBKEY_UNAVAILABLE ? ARES_RESULT_PERMERROR :
ves == PDKIM_VERIFY_INVALID_BUFFER_SIZE ? ARES_RESULT_PERMERROR :
ves == PDKIM_VERIFY_INVALID_PUBKEY_PARSING ? ARES_RESULT_PERMERROR :
ARES_RESULT_UNKNOWN ) :
ARES_RESULT_UNKNOWN;
dkim_history_buffer = string_sprintf("%sdkim %s %d\n", dkim_history_buffer,
sig->domain, dkim_ares_result);
sig = sig->next;
}
libdm_status = opendmarc_policy_query_dmarc(dmarc_pctx, US"");
switch (libdm_status)
{
case DMARC_DNS_ERROR_NXDOMAIN:
case DMARC_DNS_ERROR_NO_RECORD:
DEBUG(D_receive)
debug_printf("DMARC no record found for %s\n", header_from_sender);
has_dmarc_record = FALSE;
break;
case DMARC_PARSE_OKAY:
DEBUG(D_receive)
debug_printf("DMARC record found for %s\n", header_from_sender);
break;
case DMARC_PARSE_ERROR_BAD_VALUE:
DEBUG(D_receive)
debug_printf("DMARC record parse error for %s\n", header_from_sender);
has_dmarc_record = FALSE;
break;
default:
/* everything else, skip dmarc */
DEBUG(D_receive)
debug_printf("DMARC skipping (%d), unsure what to do with %s",
libdm_status, from_header->text);
has_dmarc_record = FALSE;
break;
}
/* Can't use exim's string manipulation functions so allocate memory
* for libopendmarc using its max hostname length definition. */
uschar *dmarc_domain = (uschar *)calloc(DMARC_MAXHOSTNAMELEN, sizeof(uschar));
libdm_status = opendmarc_policy_fetch_utilized_domain(dmarc_pctx, dmarc_domain,
DMARC_MAXHOSTNAMELEN-1);
dmarc_used_domain = string_copy(dmarc_domain);
free(dmarc_domain);
if (libdm_status != DMARC_PARSE_OKAY)
{
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failure to read domainname used for DMARC lookup: %s",
opendmarc_policy_status_to_str(libdm_status));
}
libdm_status = opendmarc_get_policy_to_enforce(dmarc_pctx);
dmarc_policy = libdm_status;
switch(libdm_status)
{
case DMARC_POLICY_ABSENT: /* No DMARC record found */
dmarc_status = US"norecord";
dmarc_pass_fail = US"none";
dmarc_status_text = US"No DMARC record";
action = DMARC_RESULT_ACCEPT;
break;
case DMARC_FROM_DOMAIN_ABSENT: /* No From: domain */
dmarc_status = US"nofrom";
dmarc_pass_fail = US"temperror";
dmarc_status_text = US"No From: domain found";
action = DMARC_RESULT_ACCEPT;
break;
case DMARC_POLICY_NONE: /* Accept and report */
dmarc_status = US"none";
dmarc_pass_fail = US"none";
dmarc_status_text = US"None, Accept";
action = DMARC_RESULT_ACCEPT;
break;
case DMARC_POLICY_PASS: /* Explicit accept */
dmarc_status = US"accept";
dmarc_pass_fail = US"pass";
dmarc_status_text = US"Accept";
action = DMARC_RESULT_ACCEPT;
break;
case DMARC_POLICY_REJECT: /* Explicit reject */
dmarc_status = US"reject";
dmarc_pass_fail = US"fail";
dmarc_status_text = US"Reject";
action = DMARC_RESULT_REJECT;
break;
case DMARC_POLICY_QUARANTINE: /* Explicit quarantine */
dmarc_status = US"quarantine";
dmarc_pass_fail = US"fail";
dmarc_status_text = US"Quarantine";
action = DMARC_RESULT_QUARANTINE;
break;
default:
dmarc_status = US"temperror";
dmarc_pass_fail = US"temperror";
dmarc_status_text = US"Internal Policy Error";
action = DMARC_RESULT_TEMPFAIL;
break;
}
libdm_status = opendmarc_policy_fetch_alignment(dmarc_pctx, &da, &sa);
if (libdm_status != DMARC_PARSE_OKAY)
{
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failure to read DMARC alignment: %s",
opendmarc_policy_status_to_str(libdm_status));
}
if (has_dmarc_record == TRUE)
{
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "DMARC results: spf_domain=%s dmarc_domain=%s "
"spf_align=%s dkim_align=%s enforcement='%s'",
spf_sender_domain, dmarc_used_domain,
(sa==DMARC_POLICY_SPF_ALIGNMENT_PASS) ?"yes":"no",
(da==DMARC_POLICY_DKIM_ALIGNMENT_PASS)?"yes":"no",
dmarc_status_text);
history_file_status = dmarc_write_history_file();
/* Now get the forensic reporting addresses, if any */
ruf = opendmarc_policy_fetch_ruf(dmarc_pctx, NULL, 0, 1);
dmarc_send_forensic_report(ruf);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The dmarc_process function in dmarc.c in Exim before 4.82.1, when EXPERIMENTAL_DMARC is enabled, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via the From header in an email, which is passed to the expand_string function.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,193 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(locale_filter_matches)
{
char* lang_tag = NULL;
int lang_tag_len = 0;
const char* loc_range = NULL;
int loc_range_len = 0;
int result = 0;
char* token = 0;
char* chrcheck = NULL;
char* can_lang_tag = NULL;
char* can_loc_range = NULL;
char* cur_lang_tag = NULL;
char* cur_loc_range = NULL;
zend_bool boolCanonical = 0;
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
intl_error_reset( NULL TSRMLS_CC );
if(zend_parse_parameters( ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ss|b",
&lang_tag, &lang_tag_len , &loc_range , &loc_range_len ,
&boolCanonical) == FAILURE)
{
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR,
"locale_filter_matches: unable to parse input params", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if(loc_range_len == 0) {
loc_range = intl_locale_get_default(TSRMLS_C);
}
if( strcmp(loc_range,"*")==0){
RETURN_TRUE;
}
if( boolCanonical ){
/* canonicalize loc_range */
can_loc_range=get_icu_value_internal( loc_range , LOC_CANONICALIZE_TAG , &result , 0);
if( result ==0) {
intl_error_set( NULL, status,
"locale_filter_matches : unable to canonicalize loc_range" , 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* canonicalize lang_tag */
can_lang_tag = get_icu_value_internal( lang_tag , LOC_CANONICALIZE_TAG , &result , 0);
if( result ==0) {
intl_error_set( NULL, status,
"locale_filter_matches : unable to canonicalize lang_tag" , 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* Convert to lower case for case-insensitive comparison */
cur_lang_tag = ecalloc( 1, strlen(can_lang_tag) + 1);
/* Convert to lower case for case-insensitive comparison */
result = strToMatch( can_lang_tag , cur_lang_tag);
if( result == 0) {
efree( cur_lang_tag );
efree( can_lang_tag );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
cur_loc_range = ecalloc( 1, strlen(can_loc_range) + 1);
result = strToMatch( can_loc_range , cur_loc_range );
if( result == 0) {
efree( cur_lang_tag );
efree( can_lang_tag );
efree( cur_loc_range );
efree( can_loc_range );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* check if prefix */
token = strstr( cur_lang_tag , cur_loc_range );
if( token && (token==cur_lang_tag) ){
/* check if the char. after match is SEPARATOR */
chrcheck = token + (strlen(cur_loc_range));
if( isIDSeparator(*chrcheck) || isEndOfTag(*chrcheck) ){
if( cur_lang_tag){
efree( cur_lang_tag );
}
if( cur_loc_range){
efree( cur_loc_range );
}
if( can_lang_tag){
efree( can_lang_tag );
}
if( can_loc_range){
efree( can_loc_range );
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
}
/* No prefix as loc_range */
if( cur_lang_tag){
efree( cur_lang_tag );
}
if( cur_loc_range){
efree( cur_loc_range );
}
if( can_lang_tag){
efree( can_lang_tag );
}
if( can_loc_range){
efree( can_loc_range );
}
RETURN_FALSE;
} /* end of if isCanonical */
else{
/* Convert to lower case for case-insensitive comparison */
cur_lang_tag = ecalloc( 1, strlen(lang_tag ) + 1);
result = strToMatch( lang_tag , cur_lang_tag);
if( result == 0) {
efree( cur_lang_tag );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
cur_loc_range = ecalloc( 1, strlen(loc_range ) + 1);
result = strToMatch( loc_range , cur_loc_range );
if( result == 0) {
efree( cur_lang_tag );
efree( cur_loc_range );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* check if prefix */
token = strstr( cur_lang_tag , cur_loc_range );
if( token && (token==cur_lang_tag) ){
/* check if the char. after match is SEPARATOR */
chrcheck = token + (strlen(cur_loc_range));
if( isIDSeparator(*chrcheck) || isEndOfTag(*chrcheck) ){
if( cur_lang_tag){
efree( cur_lang_tag );
}
if( cur_loc_range){
efree( cur_loc_range );
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
}
/* No prefix as loc_range */
if( cur_lang_tag){
efree( cur_lang_tag );
}
if( cur_loc_range){
efree( cur_loc_range );
}
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The get_icu_value_internal function in ext/intl/locale/locale_methods.c in PHP before 5.5.36, 5.6.x before 5.6.22, and 7.x before 7.0.7 does not ensure the presence of a '0' character, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted locale_get_primary_language call.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read | High | 167,193 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
{
int ssl_major,ssl_minor;
int i,n;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
unsigned char *p = NULL;
unsigned short version;
DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
unsigned int is_next_epoch;
rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
/* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
* pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
dtls1_process_buffered_records(s);
/* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
return 1;
/* get something from the wire */
again:
/* check if we have the header */
if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
(s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
{
n=ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
/* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
p=s->packet;
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
/* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
rr->type= *(p++);
ssl_major= *(p++);
ssl_minor= *(p++);
version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
/* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
n2s(p,rr->epoch);
memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
p+=6;
n2s(p,rr->length);
/* Lets check version */
if (!s->first_packet)
{
if (version != s->version)
{
/* unexpected version, silently discard */
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
}
if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00))
{
/* wrong version, silently discard record */
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
{
/* record too long, silently discard it */
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
/* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
}
/* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
if (rr->length > s->packet_length-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
/* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
i=rr->length;
n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
if ( n != i)
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
/* now n == rr->length,
* and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
}
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
/* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
if ( bitmap == NULL)
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
{
#endif
/* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record.
* Don't check if we're listening and this message is
* a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed,
* since they arrive from different connections and
* would be dropped unnecessarily.
*/
if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH &&
s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
}
#endif
/* just read a 0 length packet */
if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
/* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT),
* and a handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it
* cannot be processed at this time. However, do not buffer
* anything while listening.
*/
if (is_next_epoch)
{
if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen)
{
dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num);
}
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
return(1);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Memory leak in the dtls1_buffer_record function in d1_pkt.c in OpenSSL 1.0.0 before 1.0.0p and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1k allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by sending many duplicate records for the next epoch, leading to failure of replay detection.
Commit Message: A memory leak can occur in dtls1_buffer_record if either of the calls to
ssl3_setup_buffers or pqueue_insert fail. The former will fail if there is a
malloc failure, whilst the latter will fail if attempting to add a duplicate
record to the queue. This should never happen because duplicate records should
be detected and dropped before any attempt to add them to the queue.
Unfortunately records that arrive that are for the next epoch are not being
recorded correctly, and therefore replays are not being detected.
Additionally, these "should not happen" failures that can occur in
dtls1_buffer_record are not being treated as fatal and therefore an attacker
could exploit this by sending repeated replay records for the next epoch,
eventually causing a DoS through memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue and providing initial
analysis and a patch. Further analysis and the final patch was performed by
Matt Caswell from the OpenSSL development team.
CVE-2015-0206
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,746 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SharedWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::WorkerRestarted(
SharedWorkerHost* worker_host) {
DCHECK_EQ(WORKER_TERMINATED, state_);
DCHECK(!worker_host_);
state_ = WORKER_NOT_READY;
worker_host_ = worker_host;
for (DevToolsSession* session : sessions())
session->SetRenderer(GetProcess(), nullptr);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157} | Medium | 172,791 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void locationReplaceableAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* proxyImp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
TestNode* imp = WTF::getPtr(proxyImp->locationReplaceable());
if (!imp)
return;
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setHref(cppValue);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the AttributeSetter function in bindings/templates/attributes.cpp in the bindings in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 33.0.1750.152 on OS X and Linux and before 33.0.1750.154 on Windows, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving the document.location value.
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 171,686 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void Cues::Init() const {
if (m_cue_points)
return;
assert(m_count == 0);
assert(m_preload_count == 0);
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
const long long stop = m_start + m_size;
long long pos = m_start;
long cue_points_size = 0;
while (pos < stop) {
const long long idpos = pos;
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(id >= 0); // TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0);
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume Size field
assert((pos + size) <= stop);
if (id == 0x3B) // CuePoint ID
PreloadCuePoint(cue_points_size, idpos);
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
| High | 173,827 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int phar_parse_zipfile(php_stream *fp, char *fname, int fname_len, char *alias, int alias_len, phar_archive_data** pphar, char **error) /* {{{ */
{
phar_zip_dir_end locator;
char buf[sizeof(locator) + 65536];
zend_long size;
php_uint16 i;
phar_archive_data *mydata = NULL;
phar_entry_info entry = {0};
char *p = buf, *ext, *actual_alias = NULL;
char *metadata = NULL;
size = php_stream_tell(fp);
if (size > sizeof(locator) + 65536) {
/* seek to max comment length + end of central directory record */
size = sizeof(locator) + 65536;
if (FAILURE == php_stream_seek(fp, -size, SEEK_END)) {
php_stream_close(fp);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: unable to search for end of central directory in zip-based phar \"%s\"", fname);
}
return FAILURE;
}
} else {
php_stream_seek(fp, 0, SEEK_SET);
}
if (!php_stream_read(fp, buf, size)) {
php_stream_close(fp);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: unable to read in data to search for end of central directory in zip-based phar \"%s\"", fname);
}
return FAILURE;
}
while ((p=(char *) memchr(p + 1, 'P', (size_t) (size - (p + 1 - buf)))) != NULL) {
if ((p - buf) + sizeof(locator) <= size && !memcmp(p + 1, "K\5\6", 3)) {
memcpy((void *)&locator, (void *) p, sizeof(locator));
if (PHAR_GET_16(locator.centraldisk) != 0 || PHAR_GET_16(locator.disknumber) != 0) {
/* split archives not handled */
php_stream_close(fp);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: split archives spanning multiple zips cannot be processed in zip-based phar \"%s\"", fname);
}
return FAILURE;
}
if (PHAR_GET_16(locator.counthere) != PHAR_GET_16(locator.count)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: corrupt zip archive, conflicting file count in end of central directory record in zip-based phar \"%s\"", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
return FAILURE;
}
mydata = pecalloc(1, sizeof(phar_archive_data), PHAR_G(persist));
mydata->is_persistent = PHAR_G(persist);
/* read in archive comment, if any */
if (PHAR_GET_16(locator.comment_len)) {
metadata = p + sizeof(locator);
if (PHAR_GET_16(locator.comment_len) != size - (metadata - buf)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: corrupt zip archive, zip file comment truncated in zip-based phar \"%s\"", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
pefree(mydata, mydata->is_persistent);
return FAILURE;
}
mydata->metadata_len = PHAR_GET_16(locator.comment_len);
if (phar_parse_metadata(&metadata, &mydata->metadata, PHAR_GET_16(locator.comment_len)) == FAILURE) {
mydata->metadata_len = 0;
/* if not valid serialized data, it is a regular string */
ZVAL_NEW_STR(&mydata->metadata, zend_string_init(metadata, PHAR_GET_16(locator.comment_len), mydata->is_persistent));
}
} else {
ZVAL_UNDEF(&mydata->metadata);
}
goto foundit;
}
}
php_stream_close(fp);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: end of central directory not found in zip-based phar \"%s\"", fname);
}
return FAILURE;
foundit:
mydata->fname = pestrndup(fname, fname_len, mydata->is_persistent);
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
phar_unixify_path_separators(mydata->fname, fname_len);
#endif
mydata->is_zip = 1;
mydata->fname_len = fname_len;
ext = strrchr(mydata->fname, '/');
if (ext) {
mydata->ext = memchr(ext, '.', (mydata->fname + fname_len) - ext);
if (mydata->ext == ext) {
mydata->ext = memchr(ext + 1, '.', (mydata->fname + fname_len) - ext - 1);
}
if (mydata->ext) {
mydata->ext_len = (mydata->fname + fname_len) - mydata->ext;
}
}
/* clean up on big-endian systems */
/* seek to central directory */
php_stream_seek(fp, PHAR_GET_32(locator.cdir_offset), SEEK_SET);
/* read in central directory */
zend_hash_init(&mydata->manifest, PHAR_GET_16(locator.count),
zend_get_hash_value, destroy_phar_manifest_entry, (zend_bool)mydata->is_persistent);
zend_hash_init(&mydata->mounted_dirs, 5,
zend_get_hash_value, NULL, (zend_bool)mydata->is_persistent);
zend_hash_init(&mydata->virtual_dirs, PHAR_GET_16(locator.count) * 2,
zend_get_hash_value, NULL, (zend_bool)mydata->is_persistent);
entry.phar = mydata;
entry.is_zip = 1;
entry.fp_type = PHAR_FP;
entry.is_persistent = mydata->is_persistent;
#define PHAR_ZIP_FAIL_FREE(errmsg, save) \
zend_hash_destroy(&mydata->manifest); \
mydata->manifest.u.flags = 0; \
zend_hash_destroy(&mydata->mounted_dirs); \
mydata->mounted_dirs.u.flags = 0; \
zend_hash_destroy(&mydata->virtual_dirs); \
mydata->virtual_dirs.u.flags = 0; \
php_stream_close(fp); \
zval_dtor(&mydata->metadata); \
if (mydata->signature) { \
efree(mydata->signature); \
} \
if (error) { \
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: %s in zip-based phar \"%s\"", errmsg, mydata->fname); \
} \
pefree(mydata->fname, mydata->is_persistent); \
if (mydata->alias) { \
pefree(mydata->alias, mydata->is_persistent); \
} \
pefree(mydata, mydata->is_persistent); \
efree(save); \
return FAILURE;
#define PHAR_ZIP_FAIL(errmsg) \
zend_hash_destroy(&mydata->manifest); \
mydata->manifest.u.flags = 0; \
zend_hash_destroy(&mydata->mounted_dirs); \
mydata->mounted_dirs.u.flags = 0; \
zend_hash_destroy(&mydata->virtual_dirs); \
mydata->virtual_dirs.u.flags = 0; \
php_stream_close(fp); \
zval_dtor(&mydata->metadata); \
if (mydata->signature) { \
efree(mydata->signature); \
} \
if (error) { \
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: %s in zip-based phar \"%s\"", errmsg, mydata->fname); \
} \
pefree(mydata->fname, mydata->is_persistent); \
if (mydata->alias) { \
pefree(mydata->alias, mydata->is_persistent); \
} \
pefree(mydata, mydata->is_persistent); \
return FAILURE;
/* add each central directory item to the manifest */
for (i = 0; i < PHAR_GET_16(locator.count); ++i) {
phar_zip_central_dir_file zipentry;
zend_off_t beforeus = php_stream_tell(fp);
if (sizeof(zipentry) != php_stream_read(fp, (char *) &zipentry, sizeof(zipentry))) {
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unable to read central directory entry, truncated");
}
/* clean up for bigendian systems */
if (memcmp("PK\1\2", zipentry.signature, 4)) {
/* corrupted entry */
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("corrupted central directory entry, no magic signature");
}
if (entry.is_persistent) {
entry.manifest_pos = i;
}
entry.compressed_filesize = PHAR_GET_32(zipentry.compsize);
entry.uncompressed_filesize = PHAR_GET_32(zipentry.uncompsize);
entry.crc32 = PHAR_GET_32(zipentry.crc32);
/* do not PHAR_GET_16 either on the next line */
entry.timestamp = phar_zip_d2u_time(zipentry.timestamp, zipentry.datestamp);
entry.flags = PHAR_ENT_PERM_DEF_FILE;
entry.header_offset = PHAR_GET_32(zipentry.offset);
entry.offset = entry.offset_abs = PHAR_GET_32(zipentry.offset) + sizeof(phar_zip_file_header) + PHAR_GET_16(zipentry.filename_len) +
PHAR_GET_16(zipentry.extra_len);
if (PHAR_GET_16(zipentry.flags) & PHAR_ZIP_FLAG_ENCRYPTED) {
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("Cannot process encrypted zip files");
}
if (!PHAR_GET_16(zipentry.filename_len)) {
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("Cannot process zips created from stdin (zero-length filename)");
}
entry.filename_len = PHAR_GET_16(zipentry.filename_len);
entry.filename = (char *) pemalloc(entry.filename_len + 1, entry.is_persistent);
if (entry.filename_len != php_stream_read(fp, entry.filename, entry.filename_len)) {
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unable to read in filename from central directory, truncated");
}
entry.filename[entry.filename_len] = '\0';
if (entry.filename[entry.filename_len - 1] == '/') {
entry.is_dir = 1;
if(entry.filename_len > 1) {
entry.filename_len--;
}
entry.flags |= PHAR_ENT_PERM_DEF_DIR;
} else {
entry.is_dir = 0;
}
if (entry.filename_len == sizeof(".phar/signature.bin")-1 && !strncmp(entry.filename, ".phar/signature.bin", sizeof(".phar/signature.bin")-1)) {
size_t read;
php_stream *sigfile;
zend_off_t now;
char *sig;
now = php_stream_tell(fp);
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
sigfile = php_stream_fopen_tmpfile();
if (!sigfile) {
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("couldn't open temporary file");
}
php_stream_seek(fp, 0, SEEK_SET);
/* copy file contents + local headers and zip comment, if any, to be hashed for signature */
php_stream_copy_to_stream_ex(fp, sigfile, entry.header_offset, NULL);
/* seek to central directory */
php_stream_seek(fp, PHAR_GET_32(locator.cdir_offset), SEEK_SET);
/* copy central directory header */
php_stream_copy_to_stream_ex(fp, sigfile, beforeus - PHAR_GET_32(locator.cdir_offset), NULL);
if (metadata) {
php_stream_write(sigfile, metadata, PHAR_GET_16(locator.comment_len));
}
php_stream_seek(fp, sizeof(phar_zip_file_header) + entry.header_offset + entry.filename_len + PHAR_GET_16(zipentry.extra_len), SEEK_SET);
sig = (char *) emalloc(entry.uncompressed_filesize);
read = php_stream_read(fp, sig, entry.uncompressed_filesize);
if (read != entry.uncompressed_filesize) {
php_stream_close(sigfile);
efree(sig);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("signature cannot be read");
}
mydata->sig_flags = PHAR_GET_32(sig);
if (FAILURE == phar_verify_signature(sigfile, php_stream_tell(sigfile), mydata->sig_flags, sig + 8, entry.uncompressed_filesize - 8, fname, &mydata->signature, &mydata->sig_len, error)) {
efree(sig);
if (error) {
char *save;
php_stream_close(sigfile);
spprintf(&save, 4096, "signature cannot be verified: %s", *error);
efree(*error);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL_FREE(save, save);
} else {
php_stream_close(sigfile);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("signature cannot be verified");
}
}
php_stream_close(sigfile);
efree(sig);
/* signature checked out, let's ensure this is the last file in the phar */
if (i != PHAR_GET_16(locator.count) - 1) {
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("entries exist after signature, invalid phar");
}
continue;
}
phar_add_virtual_dirs(mydata, entry.filename, entry.filename_len);
if (PHAR_GET_16(zipentry.extra_len)) {
zend_off_t loc = php_stream_tell(fp);
if (FAILURE == phar_zip_process_extra(fp, &entry, PHAR_GET_16(zipentry.extra_len))) {
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("Unable to process extra field header for file in central directory");
}
php_stream_seek(fp, loc + PHAR_GET_16(zipentry.extra_len), SEEK_SET);
}
switch (PHAR_GET_16(zipentry.compressed)) {
case PHAR_ZIP_COMP_NONE :
/* compression flag already set */
break;
case PHAR_ZIP_COMP_DEFLATE :
entry.flags |= PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSED_GZ;
if (!PHAR_G(has_zlib)) {
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("zlib extension is required");
}
break;
case PHAR_ZIP_COMP_BZIP2 :
entry.flags |= PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSED_BZ2;
if (!PHAR_G(has_bz2)) {
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("bzip2 extension is required");
}
break;
case 1 :
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unsupported compression method (Shrunk) used in this zip");
case 2 :
case 3 :
case 4 :
case 5 :
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unsupported compression method (Reduce) used in this zip");
case 6 :
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unsupported compression method (Implode) used in this zip");
case 7 :
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unsupported compression method (Tokenize) used in this zip");
case 9 :
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unsupported compression method (Deflate64) used in this zip");
case 10 :
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unsupported compression method (PKWare Implode/old IBM TERSE) used in this zip");
case 14 :
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unsupported compression method (LZMA) used in this zip");
case 18 :
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unsupported compression method (IBM TERSE) used in this zip");
case 19 :
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unsupported compression method (IBM LZ77) used in this zip");
case 97 :
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unsupported compression method (WavPack) used in this zip");
case 98 :
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unsupported compression method (PPMd) used in this zip");
default :
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unsupported compression method (unknown) used in this zip");
}
/* get file metadata */
if (PHAR_GET_16(zipentry.comment_len)) {
if (PHAR_GET_16(zipentry.comment_len) != php_stream_read(fp, buf, PHAR_GET_16(zipentry.comment_len))) {
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unable to read in file comment, truncated");
}
p = buf;
entry.metadata_len = PHAR_GET_16(zipentry.comment_len);
if (phar_parse_metadata(&p, &(entry.metadata), PHAR_GET_16(zipentry.comment_len)) == FAILURE) {
entry.metadata_len = 0;
/* if not valid serialized data, it is a regular string */
ZVAL_NEW_STR(&entry.metadata, zend_string_init(buf, PHAR_GET_16(zipentry.comment_len), entry.is_persistent));
}
} else {
ZVAL_UNDEF(&entry.metadata);
}
if (!actual_alias && entry.filename_len == sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1 && !strncmp(entry.filename, ".phar/alias.txt", sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1)) {
php_stream_filter *filter;
zend_off_t saveloc;
/* verify local file header */
phar_zip_file_header local;
/* archive alias found */
saveloc = php_stream_tell(fp);
php_stream_seek(fp, PHAR_GET_32(zipentry.offset), SEEK_SET);
if (sizeof(local) != php_stream_read(fp, (char *) &local, sizeof(local))) {
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("phar error: internal corruption of zip-based phar (cannot read local file header for alias)");
}
/* verify local header */
if (entry.filename_len != PHAR_GET_16(local.filename_len) || entry.crc32 != PHAR_GET_32(local.crc32) || entry.uncompressed_filesize != PHAR_GET_32(local.uncompsize) || entry.compressed_filesize != PHAR_GET_32(local.compsize)) {
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("phar error: internal corruption of zip-based phar (local header of alias does not match central directory)");
}
/* construct actual offset to file start - local extra_len can be different from central extra_len */
entry.offset = entry.offset_abs =
sizeof(local) + entry.header_offset + PHAR_GET_16(local.filename_len) + PHAR_GET_16(local.extra_len);
php_stream_seek(fp, entry.offset, SEEK_SET);
/* these next lines should be for php < 5.2.6 after 5.3 filters are fixed */
fp->writepos = 0;
fp->readpos = 0;
php_stream_seek(fp, entry.offset, SEEK_SET);
fp->writepos = 0;
fp->readpos = 0;
/* the above lines should be for php < 5.2.6 after 5.3 filters are fixed */
mydata->alias_len = entry.uncompressed_filesize;
if (entry.flags & PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSED_GZ) {
filter = php_stream_filter_create("zlib.inflate", NULL, php_stream_is_persistent(fp));
if (!filter) {
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unable to decompress alias, zlib filter creation failed");
}
php_stream_filter_append(&fp->readfilters, filter);
{
zend_string *str = php_stream_copy_to_mem(fp, entry.uncompressed_filesize, 0);
if (str) {
entry.uncompressed_filesize = ZSTR_LEN(str);
actual_alias = estrndup(ZSTR_VAL(str), ZSTR_LEN(str));
zend_string_release(str);
} else {
actual_alias = NULL;
entry.uncompressed_filesize = 0;
}
}
if (!entry.uncompressed_filesize || !actual_alias) {
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unable to read in alias, truncated");
}
php_stream_filter_flush(filter, 1);
php_stream_filter_remove(filter, 1);
} else if (entry.flags & PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSED_BZ2) {
filter = php_stream_filter_create("bzip2.decompress", NULL, php_stream_is_persistent(fp));
if (!filter) {
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unable to read in alias, bzip2 filter creation failed");
}
php_stream_filter_append(&fp->readfilters, filter);
{
zend_string *str = php_stream_copy_to_mem(fp, entry.uncompressed_filesize, 0);
if (str) {
entry.uncompressed_filesize = ZSTR_LEN(str);
actual_alias = estrndup(ZSTR_VAL(str), ZSTR_LEN(str));
zend_string_release(str);
} else {
actual_alias = NULL;
entry.uncompressed_filesize = 0;
}
}
if (!entry.uncompressed_filesize || !actual_alias) {
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unable to read in alias, truncated");
}
php_stream_filter_flush(filter, 1);
php_stream_filter_remove(filter, 1);
} else {
{
zend_string *str = php_stream_copy_to_mem(fp, entry.uncompressed_filesize, 0);
if (str) {
entry.uncompressed_filesize = ZSTR_LEN(str);
actual_alias = estrndup(ZSTR_VAL(str), ZSTR_LEN(str));
zend_string_release(str);
} else {
actual_alias = NULL;
entry.uncompressed_filesize = 0;
}
}
if (!entry.uncompressed_filesize || !actual_alias) {
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
PHAR_ZIP_FAIL("unable to read in alias, truncated");
}
}
/* return to central directory parsing */
php_stream_seek(fp, saveloc, SEEK_SET);
}
phar_set_inode(&entry);
zend_hash_str_add_mem(&mydata->manifest, entry.filename, entry.filename_len, (void *)&entry, sizeof(phar_entry_info));
}
mydata->fp = fp;
if (zend_hash_str_exists(&(mydata->manifest), ".phar/stub.php", sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1)) {
mydata->is_data = 0;
} else {
mydata->is_data = 1;
}
zend_hash_str_add_ptr(&(PHAR_G(phar_fname_map)), mydata->fname, fname_len, mydata);
if (actual_alias) {
phar_archive_data *fd_ptr;
if (!phar_validate_alias(actual_alias, mydata->alias_len)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: invalid alias \"%s\" in zip-based phar \"%s\"", actual_alias, fname);
}
efree(actual_alias);
zend_hash_str_del(&(PHAR_G(phar_fname_map)), mydata->fname, fname_len);
return FAILURE;
}
mydata->is_temporary_alias = 0;
if (NULL != (fd_ptr = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&(PHAR_G(phar_alias_map)), actual_alias, mydata->alias_len))) {
if (SUCCESS != phar_free_alias(fd_ptr, actual_alias, mydata->alias_len)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: Unable to add zip-based phar \"%s\" with implicit alias, alias is already in use", fname);
}
efree(actual_alias);
zend_hash_str_del(&(PHAR_G(phar_fname_map)), mydata->fname, fname_len);
return FAILURE;
}
}
mydata->alias = entry.is_persistent ? pestrndup(actual_alias, mydata->alias_len, 1) : actual_alias;
if (entry.is_persistent) {
efree(actual_alias);
}
zend_hash_str_add_ptr(&(PHAR_G(phar_alias_map)), actual_alias, mydata->alias_len, mydata);
} else {
phar_archive_data *fd_ptr;
if (alias_len) {
if (NULL != (fd_ptr = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&(PHAR_G(phar_alias_map)), alias, alias_len))) {
if (SUCCESS != phar_free_alias(fd_ptr, alias, alias_len)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: Unable to add zip-based phar \"%s\" with explicit alias, alias is already in use", fname);
}
zend_hash_str_del(&(PHAR_G(phar_fname_map)), mydata->fname, fname_len);
return FAILURE;
}
}
zend_hash_str_add_ptr(&(PHAR_G(phar_alias_map)), actual_alias, mydata->alias_len, mydata);
mydata->alias = pestrndup(alias, alias_len, mydata->is_persistent);
mydata->alias_len = alias_len;
} else {
mydata->alias = pestrndup(mydata->fname, fname_len, mydata->is_persistent);
mydata->alias_len = fname_len;
}
mydata->is_temporary_alias = 1;
}
if (pphar) {
*pphar = mydata;
}
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The ZIP signature-verification feature in PHP before 5.6.26 and 7.x before 7.0.11 does not ensure that the uncompressed_filesize field is large enough, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted PHAR archive, related to ext/phar/util.c and ext/phar/zip.c.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72928 - Out of bound when verify signature of zip phar in phar_parse_zipfile
(cherry picked from commit 19484ab77466f99c78fc0e677f7e03da0584d6a2) | High | 166,935 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableRequireCSSExtensionForFile(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetRequireCSSExtensionForFileEnabled(enable);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Insufficient file type enforcement in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to obtain local file data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329} | Low | 173,187 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ServiceWorkerContainer* NavigatorServiceWorker::serviceWorker(Navigator& navigator, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
return NavigatorServiceWorker::from(navigator).serviceWorker(exceptionState);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The NavigatorServiceWorker::serviceWorker function in modules/serviceworkers/NavigatorServiceWorker.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 45.0.2454.85, allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy by accessing a Service Worker.
Commit Message: Add ASSERT() to avoid accidental leaking ServiceWorkerContainer to cross origin context.
BUG=522791
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1305903007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@201889 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,862 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void usb_serial_console_disconnect(struct usb_serial *serial)
{
if (serial->port[0] == usbcons_info.port) {
usb_serial_console_exit();
usb_serial_put(serial);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The usb_serial_console_disconnect function in drivers/usb/serial/console.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13.8 allows local users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted USB device, related to disconnection and failed setup.
Commit Message: USB: serial: console: fix use-after-free on disconnect
A clean-up patch removing two redundant NULL-checks from the console
disconnect handler inadvertently also removed a third check. This could
lead to the struct usb_serial being prematurely freed by the console
code when a driver accepts but does not register any ports for an
interface which also lacks endpoint descriptors.
Fixes: 0e517c93dc02 ("USB: serial: console: clean up sanity checks")
Cc: stable <[email protected]> # 4.11
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]> | High | 170,012 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void array_cleanup( char* arr[] , int arr_size)
{
int i=0;
for( i=0; i< arr_size; i++ ){
if( arr[i*2] ){
efree( arr[i*2]);
}
}
efree(arr);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The get_icu_value_internal function in ext/intl/locale/locale_methods.c in PHP before 5.5.36, 5.6.x before 5.6.22, and 7.x before 7.0.7 does not ensure the presence of a '0' character, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted locale_get_primary_language call.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read | High | 167,200 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int _our_safe_pcap_next_ex(pcap_t *pcap, struct pcap_pkthdr **pkthdr,
const u_char **pktdata, const char *funcname,
const int line, const char *file)
{
int res = pcap_next_ex(pcap, pkthdr, pktdata);
if (*pktdata && *pkthdr) {
if ((*pkthdr)->len > MAXPACKET) {
fprintf(stderr, "safe_pcap_next_ex ERROR: Invalid packet length in %s:%s() line %d: %u is greater than maximum %u\n",
file, funcname, line, (*pkthdr)->len, MAXPACKET);
exit(-1);
}
if ((*pkthdr)->len < (*pkthdr)->caplen) {
fprintf(stderr, "safe_pcap_next_ex ERROR: Invalid packet length in %s:%s() line %d: packet length %u is less than capture length %u\n",
file, funcname, line, (*pkthdr)->len, (*pkthdr)->caplen);
exit(-1);
}
}
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Tcpreplay before 4.3.1 has a heap-based buffer over-read in get_l2len in common/get.c.
Commit Message: Bug #520 Fix heap overflow on zero or 0xFFFF packet length
Add check for packets that report zero packet length. Example
of fix:
src/tcpprep --auto=bridge --pcap=poc16-get_l2len-heapoverflow --cachefile=/dev/null
Warning: poc16-get_l2len-heapoverflow was captured using a snaplen of 17 bytes. This may mean you have truncated packets.
safe_pcap_next ERROR: Invalid packet length in tcpprep.c:process_raw_packets() line 334: packet length=0 capture length=0 | Medium | 168,947 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void perf_event_reset(struct perf_event *event)
{
(void)perf_event_read(event);
local64_set(&event->count, 0);
perf_event_update_userpage(event);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: kernel/events/core.c in the performance subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.0 mismanages locks during certain migrations, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka Android internal bug 31095224.
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,988 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: gss_get_mic (minor_status,
context_handle,
qop_req,
message_buffer,
msg_token)
OM_uint32 * minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
gss_qop_t qop_req;
gss_buffer_t message_buffer;
gss_buffer_t msg_token;
{
OM_uint32 status;
gss_union_ctx_id_t ctx;
gss_mechanism mech;
status = val_get_mic_args(minor_status, context_handle,
qop_req, message_buffer, msg_token);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return (status);
/*
* select the approprate underlying mechanism routine and
* call it.
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
if (mech) {
if (mech->gss_get_mic) {
status = mech->gss_get_mic(
minor_status,
ctx->internal_ctx_id,
qop_req,
message_buffer,
msg_token);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
map_error(minor_status, mech);
} else
status = GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
return(status);
}
return (GSS_S_BAD_MECH);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) allows attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors involving automatic deletion of security contexts on error.
Commit Message: Preserve GSS context on init/accept failure
After gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() has created a
context, don't delete the mechglue context on failures from subsequent
calls, even if the mechanism deletes the mech-specific context (which
is allowed by RFC 2744 but not preferred). Check for union contexts
with no mechanism context in each GSS function which accepts a
gss_ctx_id_t.
CVE-2017-11462:
RFC 2744 permits a GSS-API implementation to delete an existing
security context on a second or subsequent call to
gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() if the call results
in an error. This API behavior has been found to be dangerous,
leading to the possibility of memory errors in some callers. For
safety, GSS-API implementations should instead preserve existing
security contexts on error until the caller deletes them.
All versions of MIT krb5 prior to this change may delete acceptor
contexts on error. Versions 1.13.4 through 1.13.7, 1.14.1 through
1.14.5, and 1.15 through 1.15.1 may also delete initiator contexts on
error.
ticket: 8598 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup | High | 168,022 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PreconnectManager::Start(const GURL& url,
std::vector<PreconnectRequest> requests) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
const std::string host = url.host();
if (preresolve_info_.find(host) != preresolve_info_.end())
return;
auto iterator_and_whether_inserted = preresolve_info_.emplace(
host, std::make_unique<PreresolveInfo>(url, requests.size()));
PreresolveInfo* info = iterator_and_whether_inserted.first->second.get();
for (auto request_it = requests.begin(); request_it != requests.end();
++request_it) {
DCHECK(request_it->origin.GetOrigin() == request_it->origin);
PreresolveJobId job_id = preresolve_jobs_.Add(
std::make_unique<PreresolveJob>(std::move(*request_it), info));
queued_jobs_.push_back(job_id);
}
TryToLaunchPreresolveJobs();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Insufficient validation of untrusted input in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.86 for Linux, Windows, and Mac, and 59.0.3071.92 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311} | Medium | 172,377 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8TestInterface::constructorCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestInterface.Constructor");
if (!args.IsConstructCall())
return V8Proxy::throwTypeError("DOM object constructor cannot be called as a function.");
if (ConstructorMode::current() == ConstructorMode::WrapExistingObject)
return args.Holder();
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, str1, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined));
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, str2, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 1, DefaultIsUndefined));
ScriptExecutionContext* context = getScriptExecutionContext();
if (!context)
return V8Proxy::throwError(V8Proxy::ReferenceError, "TestInterface constructor's associated context is not available", args.GetIsolate());
RefPtr<TestInterface> impl = TestInterface::create(context, str1, str2, ec);
v8::Handle<v8::Object> wrapper = args.Holder();
if (ec)
goto fail;
V8DOMWrapper::setDOMWrapper(wrapper, &info, impl.get());
V8DOMWrapper::setJSWrapperForActiveDOMObject(impl.release(), v8::Persistent<v8::Object>::New(wrapper), args.GetIsolate());
return args.Holder();
fail:
return throwError(ec, args.GetIsolate());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,072 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net, struct file *file, struct ifreq *ifr)
{
struct tun_struct *tun;
struct tun_file *tfile = file->private_data;
struct net_device *dev;
int err;
if (tfile->detached)
return -EINVAL;
dev = __dev_get_by_name(net, ifr->ifr_name);
if (dev) {
if (ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TUN_EXCL)
return -EBUSY;
if ((ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TUN) && dev->netdev_ops == &tun_netdev_ops)
tun = netdev_priv(dev);
else if ((ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TAP) && dev->netdev_ops == &tap_netdev_ops)
tun = netdev_priv(dev);
else
return -EINVAL;
if (!!(ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_MULTI_QUEUE) !=
!!(tun->flags & IFF_MULTI_QUEUE))
return -EINVAL;
if (tun_not_capable(tun))
return -EPERM;
err = security_tun_dev_open(tun->security);
if (err < 0)
return err;
err = tun_attach(tun, file, ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_NOFILTER);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (tun->flags & IFF_MULTI_QUEUE &&
(tun->numqueues + tun->numdisabled > 1)) {
/* One or more queue has already been attached, no need
* to initialize the device again.
*/
return 0;
}
}
else {
char *name;
unsigned long flags = 0;
int queues = ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_MULTI_QUEUE ?
MAX_TAP_QUEUES : 1;
if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
err = security_tun_dev_create();
if (err < 0)
return err;
/* Set dev type */
if (ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TUN) {
/* TUN device */
flags |= IFF_TUN;
name = "tun%d";
} else if (ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TAP) {
/* TAP device */
flags |= IFF_TAP;
name = "tap%d";
} else
return -EINVAL;
if (*ifr->ifr_name)
name = ifr->ifr_name;
dev = alloc_netdev_mqs(sizeof(struct tun_struct), name,
NET_NAME_UNKNOWN, tun_setup, queues,
queues);
if (!dev)
return -ENOMEM;
dev_net_set(dev, net);
dev->rtnl_link_ops = &tun_link_ops;
dev->ifindex = tfile->ifindex;
dev->sysfs_groups[0] = &tun_attr_group;
tun = netdev_priv(dev);
tun->dev = dev;
tun->flags = flags;
tun->txflt.count = 0;
tun->vnet_hdr_sz = sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr);
tun->align = NET_SKB_PAD;
tun->filter_attached = false;
tun->sndbuf = tfile->socket.sk->sk_sndbuf;
tun->rx_batched = 0;
tun->pcpu_stats = netdev_alloc_pcpu_stats(struct tun_pcpu_stats);
if (!tun->pcpu_stats) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_dev;
}
spin_lock_init(&tun->lock);
err = security_tun_dev_alloc_security(&tun->security);
if (err < 0)
goto err_free_stat;
tun_net_init(dev);
tun_flow_init(tun);
dev->hw_features = NETIF_F_SG | NETIF_F_FRAGLIST |
TUN_USER_FEATURES | NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX |
NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_TX;
dev->features = dev->hw_features | NETIF_F_LLTX;
dev->vlan_features = dev->features &
~(NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX |
NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_TX);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tun->disabled);
err = tun_attach(tun, file, false);
if (err < 0)
goto err_free_flow;
err = register_netdevice(tun->dev);
if (err < 0)
goto err_detach;
}
netif_carrier_on(tun->dev);
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun, "tun_set_iff\n");
tun->flags = (tun->flags & ~TUN_FEATURES) |
(ifr->ifr_flags & TUN_FEATURES);
/* Make sure persistent devices do not get stuck in
* xoff state.
*/
if (netif_running(tun->dev))
netif_tx_wake_all_queues(tun->dev);
strcpy(ifr->ifr_name, tun->dev->name);
return 0;
err_detach:
tun_detach_all(dev);
/* register_netdevice() already called tun_free_netdev() */
goto err_free_dev;
err_free_flow:
tun_flow_uninit(tun);
security_tun_dev_free_security(tun->security);
err_free_stat:
free_percpu(tun->pcpu_stats);
err_free_dev:
free_netdev(dev);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: In the tun subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.14, dev_get_valid_name is not called before register_netdevice. This allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and panic) via an ioctl(TUNSETIFF) call with a dev name containing a / character. This is similar to CVE-2013-4343.
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,854 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SoftHEVC::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 portIndex) {
UNUSED(portIndex);
if (mSignalledError) {
return;
}
if (mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
if (NULL == mCodecCtx) {
if (OK != initDecoder()) {
return;
}
}
if (outputBufferWidth() != mStride) {
/* Set the run-time (dynamic) parameters */
mStride = outputBufferWidth();
setParams(mStride);
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(kInputPortIndex);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(kOutputPortIndex);
/* If input EOS is seen and decoder is not in flush mode,
* set the decoder in flush mode.
* There can be a case where EOS is sent along with last picture data
* In that case, only after decoding that input data, decoder has to be
* put in flush. This case is handled here */
if (mReceivedEOS && !mIsInFlush) {
setFlushMode();
}
while (!outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader;
BufferInfo *outInfo;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader;
size_t timeStampIx;
inInfo = NULL;
inHeader = NULL;
if (!mIsInFlush) {
if (!inQueue.empty()) {
inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
} else {
break;
}
}
outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = 0;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
if (inHeader != NULL && (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS)) {
mReceivedEOS = true;
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
setFlushMode();
}
}
/* Get a free slot in timestamp array to hold input timestamp */
{
size_t i;
timeStampIx = 0;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_TIME_STAMPS; i++) {
if (!mTimeStampsValid[i]) {
timeStampIx = i;
break;
}
}
if (inHeader != NULL) {
mTimeStampsValid[timeStampIx] = true;
mTimeStamps[timeStampIx] = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
}
}
{
ivd_video_decode_ip_t s_dec_ip;
ivd_video_decode_op_t s_dec_op;
WORD32 timeDelay, timeTaken;
size_t sizeY, sizeUV;
if (!setDecodeArgs(&s_dec_ip, &s_dec_op, inHeader, outHeader, timeStampIx)) {
ALOGE("Decoder arg setup failed");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
GETTIME(&mTimeStart, NULL);
/* Compute time elapsed between end of previous decode()
* to start of current decode() */
TIME_DIFF(mTimeEnd, mTimeStart, timeDelay);
IV_API_CALL_STATUS_T status;
status = ivdec_api_function(mCodecCtx, (void *)&s_dec_ip, (void *)&s_dec_op);
bool resChanged = (IVD_RES_CHANGED == (s_dec_op.u4_error_code & 0xFF));
GETTIME(&mTimeEnd, NULL);
/* Compute time taken for decode() */
TIME_DIFF(mTimeStart, mTimeEnd, timeTaken);
ALOGV("timeTaken=%6d delay=%6d numBytes=%6d", timeTaken, timeDelay,
s_dec_op.u4_num_bytes_consumed);
if (s_dec_op.u4_frame_decoded_flag && !mFlushNeeded) {
mFlushNeeded = true;
}
if ((inHeader != NULL) && (1 != s_dec_op.u4_frame_decoded_flag)) {
/* If the input did not contain picture data, then ignore
* the associated timestamp */
mTimeStampsValid[timeStampIx] = false;
}
if (mChangingResolution && !s_dec_op.u4_output_present) {
mChangingResolution = false;
resetDecoder();
resetPlugin();
continue;
}
if (resChanged) {
mChangingResolution = true;
if (mFlushNeeded) {
setFlushMode();
}
continue;
}
if ((0 < s_dec_op.u4_pic_wd) && (0 < s_dec_op.u4_pic_ht)) {
uint32_t width = s_dec_op.u4_pic_wd;
uint32_t height = s_dec_op.u4_pic_ht;
bool portWillReset = false;
handlePortSettingsChange(&portWillReset, width, height);
if (portWillReset) {
resetDecoder();
return;
}
}
if (s_dec_op.u4_output_present) {
outHeader->nFilledLen = (outputBufferWidth() * outputBufferHeight() * 3) / 2;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = mTimeStamps[s_dec_op.u4_ts];
mTimeStampsValid[s_dec_op.u4_ts] = false;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
} else {
/* If in flush mode and no output is returned by the codec,
* then come out of flush mode */
mIsInFlush = false;
/* If EOS was recieved on input port and there is no output
* from the codec, then signal EOS on output port */
if (mReceivedEOS) {
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags |= OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
resetPlugin();
}
}
}
if (inHeader != NULL) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-172
Summary: codecs/hevcdec/SoftHEVC.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 6.0.1 before 2016-08-01 mishandles decoder errors, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device hang or reboot) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28816956.
Commit Message: SoftHEVC: Exit gracefully in case of decoder errors
Exit for error in allocation and unsupported resolutions
Bug: 28816956
Change-Id: Ieb830bedeb3a7431d1d21a024927df630f7eda1e
| High | 173,517 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE1(timer_getoverrun, timer_t, timer_id)
{
struct k_itimer *timr;
int overrun;
unsigned long flags;
timr = lock_timer(timer_id, &flags);
if (!timr)
return -EINVAL;
overrun = timr->it_overrun_last;
unlock_timer(timr, flags);
return overrun;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel through 4.17.3. An Integer Overflow in kernel/time/posix-timers.c in the POSIX timer code is caused by the way the overrun accounting works. Depending on interval and expiry time values, the overrun can be larger than INT_MAX, but the accounting is int based. This basically makes the accounting values, which are visible to user space via timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun, random. For example, a local user can cause a denial of service (signed integer overflow) via crafted mmap, futex, timer_create, and timer_settime system calls.
Commit Message: posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.
Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: John Stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] | Low | 169,178 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static MagickBooleanType SyncExifProfile(Image *image, StringInfo *profile)
{
#define MaxDirectoryStack 16
#define EXIF_DELIMITER "\n"
#define EXIF_NUM_FORMATS 12
#define TAG_EXIF_OFFSET 0x8769
#define TAG_INTEROP_OFFSET 0xa005
typedef struct _DirectoryInfo
{
unsigned char
*directory;
size_t
entry;
} DirectoryInfo;
DirectoryInfo
directory_stack[MaxDirectoryStack];
EndianType
endian;
size_t
entry,
length,
number_entries;
SplayTreeInfo
*exif_resources;
ssize_t
id,
level,
offset;
static int
format_bytes[] = {0, 1, 1, 2, 4, 8, 1, 1, 2, 4, 8, 4, 8};
unsigned char
*directory,
*exif;
/*
Set EXIF resolution tag.
*/
length=GetStringInfoLength(profile);
exif=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
if (length < 16)
return(MagickFalse);
id=(ssize_t) ReadProfileShort(LSBEndian,exif);
if ((id != 0x4949) && (id != 0x4D4D))
{
while (length != 0)
{
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x45)
continue;
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x78)
continue;
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x69)
continue;
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x66)
continue;
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x00)
continue;
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x00)
continue;
break;
}
if (length < 16)
return(MagickFalse);
id=(ssize_t) ReadProfileShort(LSBEndian,exif);
}
endian=LSBEndian;
if (id == 0x4949)
endian=LSBEndian;
else
if (id == 0x4D4D)
endian=MSBEndian;
else
return(MagickFalse);
if (ReadProfileShort(endian,exif+2) != 0x002a)
return(MagickFalse);
/*
This the offset to the first IFD.
*/
offset=(ssize_t) ReadProfileLong(endian,exif+4);
if ((offset < 0) || ((size_t) offset >= length))
return(MagickFalse);
directory=exif+offset;
level=0;
entry=0;
exif_resources=NewSplayTree((int (*)(const void *,const void *)) NULL,
(void *(*)(void *)) NULL,(void *(*)(void *)) NULL);
do
{
if (level > 0)
{
level--;
directory=directory_stack[level].directory;
entry=directory_stack[level].entry;
}
if ((directory < exif) || (directory > (exif+length-2)))
break;
/*
Determine how many entries there are in the current IFD.
*/
number_entries=ReadProfileShort(endian,directory);
for ( ; entry < number_entries; entry++)
{
register unsigned char
*p,
*q;
size_t
number_bytes;
ssize_t
components,
format,
tag_value;
q=(unsigned char *) (directory+2+(12*entry));
if (q > (exif+length-12))
break; /* corrupt EXIF */
if (GetValueFromSplayTree(exif_resources,q) == q)
break;
(void) AddValueToSplayTree(exif_resources,q,q);
tag_value=(ssize_t) ReadProfileShort(endian,q);
format=(ssize_t) ReadProfileShort(endian,q+2);
if ((format < 0) || ((format-1) >= EXIF_NUM_FORMATS))
break;
components=(ssize_t) ReadProfileLong(endian,q+4);
if (components < 0)
break; /* corrupt EXIF */
number_bytes=(size_t) components*format_bytes[format];
if ((ssize_t) number_bytes < components)
break; /* prevent overflow */
if (number_bytes <= 4)
p=q+8;
else
{
/*
The directory entry contains an offset.
*/
offset=(ssize_t) ReadProfileLong(endian,q+8);
if ((ssize_t) (offset+number_bytes) < offset)
continue; /* prevent overflow */
if ((size_t) (offset+number_bytes) > length)
continue;
p=(unsigned char *) (exif+offset);
}
switch (tag_value)
{
case 0x011a:
{
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,(size_t) (image->x_resolution+0.5),p);
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,1UL,p+4);
break;
}
case 0x011b:
{
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,(size_t) (image->y_resolution+0.5),p);
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,1UL,p+4);
break;
}
case 0x0112:
{
if (number_bytes == 4)
{
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,(size_t) image->orientation,p);
break;
}
(void) WriteProfileShort(endian,(unsigned short) image->orientation,
p);
break;
}
case 0x0128:
{
if (number_bytes == 4)
{
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,(size_t) (image->units+1),p);
break;
}
(void) WriteProfileShort(endian,(unsigned short) (image->units+1),p);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if ((tag_value == TAG_EXIF_OFFSET) || (tag_value == TAG_INTEROP_OFFSET))
{
offset=(ssize_t) ReadProfileLong(endian,p);
if (((size_t) offset < length) && (level < (MaxDirectoryStack-2)))
{
directory_stack[level].directory=directory;
entry++;
directory_stack[level].entry=entry;
level++;
directory_stack[level].directory=exif+offset;
directory_stack[level].entry=0;
level++;
if ((directory+2+(12*number_entries)) > (exif+length))
break;
offset=(ssize_t) ReadProfileLong(endian,directory+2+(12*
number_entries));
if ((offset != 0) && ((size_t) offset < length) &&
(level < (MaxDirectoryStack-2)))
{
directory_stack[level].directory=exif+offset;
directory_stack[level].entry=0;
level++;
}
}
break;
}
}
} while (level > 0);
exif_resources=DestroySplayTree(exif_resources);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in magick/profile.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via a crafted file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/354 | Medium | 168,409 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int hmac_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
{
struct shash_instance *inst;
struct crypto_alg *alg;
struct shash_alg *salg;
int err;
int ds;
int ss;
err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH);
if (err)
return err;
salg = shash_attr_alg(tb[1], 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(salg))
return PTR_ERR(salg);
err = -EINVAL;
ds = salg->digestsize;
ss = salg->statesize;
alg = &salg->base;
if (ds > alg->cra_blocksize ||
ss < alg->cra_blocksize)
goto out_put_alg;
inst = shash_alloc_instance("hmac", alg);
err = PTR_ERR(inst);
if (IS_ERR(inst))
goto out_put_alg;
err = crypto_init_shash_spawn(shash_instance_ctx(inst), salg,
shash_crypto_instance(inst));
if (err)
goto out_free_inst;
inst->alg.base.cra_priority = alg->cra_priority;
inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask = alg->cra_alignmask;
ss = ALIGN(ss, alg->cra_alignmask + 1);
inst->alg.digestsize = ds;
inst->alg.statesize = ss;
inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct hmac_ctx) +
ALIGN(ss * 2, crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment());
inst->alg.base.cra_init = hmac_init_tfm;
inst->alg.base.cra_exit = hmac_exit_tfm;
inst->alg.init = hmac_init;
inst->alg.update = hmac_update;
inst->alg.final = hmac_final;
inst->alg.finup = hmac_finup;
inst->alg.export = hmac_export;
inst->alg.import = hmac_import;
inst->alg.setkey = hmac_setkey;
err = shash_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
if (err) {
out_free_inst:
shash_free_instance(shash_crypto_instance(inst));
}
out_put_alg:
crypto_mod_put(alg);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: The HMAC implementation (crypto/hmac.c) in the Linux kernel before 4.14.8 does not validate that the underlying cryptographic hash algorithm is unkeyed, allowing a local attacker able to use the AF_ALG-based hash interface (CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_HASH) and the SHA-3 hash algorithm (CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA3) to cause a kernel stack buffer overflow by executing a crafted sequence of system calls that encounter a missing SHA-3 initialization.
Commit Message: crypto: hmac - require that the underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed
Because the HMAC template didn't check that its underlying hash
algorithm is unkeyed, trying to use "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))"
through AF_ALG or through KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE resulted in the inner HMAC
being used without having been keyed, resulting in sha3_update() being
called without sha3_init(), causing a stack buffer overflow.
This is a very old bug, but it seems to have only started causing real
problems when SHA-3 support was added (requires CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA3)
because the innermost hash's state is ->import()ed from a zeroed buffer,
and it just so happens that other hash algorithms are fine with that,
but SHA-3 is not. However, there could be arch or hardware-dependent
hash algorithms also affected; I couldn't test everything.
Fix the bug by introducing a function crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey()
which tests whether a shash algorithm is keyed. Then update the HMAC
template to require that its underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed.
Here is a reproducer:
#include <linux/if_alg.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int main()
{
int algfd;
struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
.salg_type = "hash",
.salg_name = "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))",
};
char key[4096] = { 0 };
algfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
bind(algfd, (const struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
setsockopt(algfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, sizeof(key));
}
Here was the KASAN report from syzbot:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161
Write of size 4096 at addr ffff8801cca07c40 by task syzkaller076574/3044
CPU: 1 PID: 3044 Comm: syzkaller076574 Not tainted 4.14.0-mm1+ #25
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53
print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
kasan_report+0x25b/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline]
check_memory_region+0x137/0x190 mm/kasan/kasan.c:267
memcpy+0x37/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:303
memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline]
sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161
crypto_shash_update+0xcb/0x220 crypto/shash.c:109
shash_finup_unaligned+0x2a/0x60 crypto/shash.c:151
crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165
hmac_finup+0x182/0x330 crypto/hmac.c:152
crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165
shash_digest_unaligned+0x9e/0xd0 crypto/shash.c:172
crypto_shash_digest+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:186
hmac_setkey+0x36a/0x690 crypto/hmac.c:66
crypto_shash_setkey+0xad/0x190 crypto/shash.c:64
shash_async_setkey+0x47/0x60 crypto/shash.c:207
crypto_ahash_setkey+0xaf/0x180 crypto/ahash.c:200
hash_setkey+0x40/0x90 crypto/algif_hash.c:446
alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:221 [inline]
alg_setsockopt+0x2a1/0x350 crypto/af_alg.c:254
SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1851 [inline]
SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1830
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> | High | 167,649 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ssize_t socket_write_and_transfer_fd(const socket_t *socket, const void *buf, size_t count, int fd) {
assert(socket != NULL);
assert(buf != NULL);
if (fd == INVALID_FD)
return socket_write(socket, buf, count);
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
char control_buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
iov.iov_base = (void *)buf;
iov.iov_len = count;
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_control = control_buf;
msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(control_buf);
msg.msg_name = NULL;
msg.msg_namelen = 0;
struct cmsghdr *header = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
header->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
header->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
header->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
*(int *)CMSG_DATA(header) = fd;
ssize_t ret = sendmsg(socket->fd, &msg, MSG_DONTWAIT);
close(fd);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 173,488 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int verify_source_vc(char **ret_path, const char *src_vc) {
_cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
char *path;
int r;
fd = open_terminal(src_vc, O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY);
if (fd < 0)
return log_error_errno(fd, "Failed to open %s: %m", src_vc);
r = verify_vc_device(fd);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Device %s is not a virtual console: %m", src_vc);
r = verify_vc_allocation_byfd(fd);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Virtual console %s is not allocated: %m", src_vc);
r = verify_vc_kbmode(fd);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Virtual console %s is not in K_XLATE or K_UNICODE: %m", src_vc);
path = strdup(src_vc);
if (!path)
return log_oom();
*ret_path = path;
return TAKE_FD(fd);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-255
Summary: systemd 242 changes the VT1 mode upon a logout, which allows attackers to read cleartext passwords in certain circumstances, such as watching a shutdown, or using Ctrl-Alt-F1 and Ctrl-Alt-F2. This occurs because the KDGKBMODE (aka current keyboard mode) check is mishandled.
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check | Medium | 169,780 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void jas_stream_initbuf(jas_stream_t *stream, int bufmode, char *buf,
int bufsize)
{
/* If this function is being called, the buffer should not have been
initialized yet. */
assert(!stream->bufbase_);
if (bufmode != JAS_STREAM_UNBUF) {
/* The full- or line-buffered mode is being employed. */
if (!buf) {
/* The caller has not specified a buffer to employ, so allocate
one. */
if ((stream->bufbase_ = jas_malloc(JAS_STREAM_BUFSIZE +
JAS_STREAM_MAXPUTBACK))) {
stream->bufmode_ |= JAS_STREAM_FREEBUF;
stream->bufsize_ = JAS_STREAM_BUFSIZE;
} else {
/* The buffer allocation has failed. Resort to unbuffered
operation. */
stream->bufbase_ = stream->tinybuf_;
stream->bufsize_ = 1;
}
} else {
/* The caller has specified a buffer to employ. */
/* The buffer must be large enough to accommodate maximum
putback. */
assert(bufsize > JAS_STREAM_MAXPUTBACK);
stream->bufbase_ = JAS_CAST(uchar *, buf);
stream->bufsize_ = bufsize - JAS_STREAM_MAXPUTBACK;
}
} else {
/* The unbuffered mode is being employed. */
/* A buffer should not have been supplied by the caller. */
assert(!buf);
/* Use a trivial one-character buffer. */
stream->bufbase_ = stream->tinybuf_;
stream->bufsize_ = 1;
}
stream->bufstart_ = &stream->bufbase_[JAS_STREAM_MAXPUTBACK];
stream->ptr_ = stream->bufstart_;
stream->cnt_ = 0;
stream->bufmode_ |= bufmode & JAS_STREAM_BUFMODEMASK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now. | Medium | 168,712 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void WallpaperManager::DoSetDefaultWallpaper(
const AccountId& account_id,
MovableOnDestroyCallbackHolder on_finish) {
if (user_manager::UserManager::Get()->IsLoggedInAsKioskApp())
return;
wallpaper_cache_.erase(account_id);
WallpaperResolution resolution = GetAppropriateResolution();
const bool use_small = (resolution == WALLPAPER_RESOLUTION_SMALL);
const base::FilePath* file = NULL;
const user_manager::User* user =
user_manager::UserManager::Get()->FindUser(account_id);
if (user_manager::UserManager::Get()->IsLoggedInAsGuest()) {
file =
use_small ? &guest_small_wallpaper_file_ : &guest_large_wallpaper_file_;
} else if (user && user->GetType() == user_manager::USER_TYPE_CHILD) {
file =
use_small ? &child_small_wallpaper_file_ : &child_large_wallpaper_file_;
} else {
file = use_small ? &default_small_wallpaper_file_
: &default_large_wallpaper_file_;
}
wallpaper::WallpaperLayout layout =
use_small ? wallpaper::WALLPAPER_LAYOUT_CENTER
: wallpaper::WALLPAPER_LAYOUT_CENTER_CROPPED;
DCHECK(file);
if (!default_wallpaper_image_.get() ||
default_wallpaper_image_->file_path() != *file) {
default_wallpaper_image_.reset();
if (!file->empty()) {
loaded_wallpapers_for_test_++;
StartLoadAndSetDefaultWallpaper(*file, layout, std::move(on_finish),
&default_wallpaper_image_);
return;
}
CreateSolidDefaultWallpaper();
}
if (default_wallpaper_image_->image().width() == 1 &&
default_wallpaper_image_->image().height() == 1)
layout = wallpaper::WALLPAPER_LAYOUT_STRETCH;
WallpaperInfo info(default_wallpaper_image_->file_path().value(), layout,
wallpaper::DEFAULT, base::Time::Now().LocalMidnight());
SetWallpaper(default_wallpaper_image_->image(), info);
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The XSSAuditor::canonicalize function in core/html/parser/XSSAuditor.cpp in the XSS auditor in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89, does not properly choose a truncation point, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via an unspecified linear-time attack.
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
[email protected], [email protected]
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <[email protected]>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982} | Medium | 171,966 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int do_zfs_load(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv[])
{
char *filename = NULL;
int dev;
int part;
ulong addr = 0;
disk_partition_t info;
struct blk_desc *dev_desc;
char buf[12];
unsigned long count;
const char *addr_str;
struct zfs_file zfile;
struct device_s vdev;
if (argc < 3)
return CMD_RET_USAGE;
count = 0;
addr = simple_strtoul(argv[3], NULL, 16);
filename = env_get("bootfile");
switch (argc) {
case 3:
addr_str = env_get("loadaddr");
if (addr_str != NULL)
addr = simple_strtoul(addr_str, NULL, 16);
else
addr = CONFIG_SYS_LOAD_ADDR;
break;
case 4:
break;
case 5:
filename = argv[4];
break;
case 6:
filename = argv[4];
count = simple_strtoul(argv[5], NULL, 16);
break;
default:
return cmd_usage(cmdtp);
}
if (!filename) {
puts("** No boot file defined **\n");
return 1;
}
part = blk_get_device_part_str(argv[1], argv[2], &dev_desc, &info, 1);
if (part < 0)
return 1;
dev = dev_desc->devnum;
printf("Loading file \"%s\" from %s device %d%c%c\n",
filename, argv[1], dev,
part ? ':' : ' ', part ? part + '0' : ' ');
zfs_set_blk_dev(dev_desc, &info);
vdev.part_length = info.size;
memset(&zfile, 0, sizeof(zfile));
zfile.device = &vdev;
if (zfs_open(&zfile, filename)) {
printf("** File not found %s **\n", filename);
return 1;
}
if ((count < zfile.size) && (count != 0))
zfile.size = (uint64_t)count;
if (zfs_read(&zfile, (char *)addr, zfile.size) != zfile.size) {
printf("** Unable to read \"%s\" from %s %d:%d **\n",
filename, argv[1], dev, part);
zfs_close(&zfile);
return 1;
}
zfs_close(&zfile);
/* Loading ok, update default load address */
image_load_addr = addr;
printf("%llu bytes read\n", zfile.size);
env_set_hex("filesize", zfile.size);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Das U-Boot versions 2016.09 through 2019.07-rc4 can memset() too much data while reading a crafted ext4 filesystem, which results in a stack buffer overflow and likely code execution.
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes | High | 169,638 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void DownloadManagerImpl::CreateNewDownloadItemToStart(
std::unique_ptr<download::DownloadCreateInfo> info,
const download::DownloadUrlParameters::OnStartedCallback& on_started,
download::InProgressDownloadManager::StartDownloadItemCallback callback,
uint32_t id) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
download::DownloadItemImpl* download = CreateActiveItem(id, *info);
std::move(callback).Run(std::move(info), download,
should_persist_new_download_);
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.OnDownloadCreated(this, download);
OnNewDownloadCreated(download);
OnDownloadStarted(download, on_started);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Integer overflow in download manager in Google Chrome prior to 75.0.3770.80 allowed a remote attacker to potentially perform out of bounds memory access via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Early return if a download Id is already used when creating a download
This is protect against download Id overflow and use-after-free
issue.
BUG=958533
Change-Id: I2c183493cb09106686df9822b3987bfb95bcf720
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1591485
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Min Qin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#656910} | Medium | 172,966 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle8_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
OPJ_UINT32 stride, OPJ_UINT32 width, OPJ_UINT32 height)
{
OPJ_UINT32 x, y;
OPJ_UINT8 *pix;
const OPJ_UINT8 *beyond;
beyond = pData + stride * height;
pix = pData;
x = y = 0U;
while (y < height) {
int c = getc(IN);
if (c == EOF) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
if (c) {
int j, c1_int;
OPJ_UINT8 c1;
c1_int = getc(IN);
if (c1_int == EOF) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)c1_int;
for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) &&
((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) {
*pix = c1;
}
} else {
c = getc(IN);
if (c == EOF) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
if (c == 0x00) { /* EOL */
x = 0;
++y;
pix = pData + y * stride + x;
} else if (c == 0x01) { /* EOP */
break;
} else if (c == 0x02) { /* MOVE by dxdy */
c = getc(IN);
if (c == EOF) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
x += (OPJ_UINT32)c;
c = getc(IN);
if (c == EOF) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
y += (OPJ_UINT32)c;
pix = pData + y * stride + x;
} else { /* 03 .. 255 */
int j;
for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) &&
((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) {
int c1_int;
OPJ_UINT8 c1;
c1_int = getc(IN);
if (c1_int == EOF) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)c1_int;
*pix = c1;
}
if ((OPJ_UINT32)c & 1U) { /* skip padding byte */
c = getc(IN);
if (c == EOF) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
}
}
}
}/* while() */
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: In OpenJPEG 2.3.1, there is excessive iteration in the opj_t1_encode_cblks function of openjp2/t1.c. Remote attackers could leverage this vulnerability to cause a denial of service via a crafted bmp file. This issue is similar to CVE-2018-6616.
Commit Message: convertbmp: detect invalid file dimensions early
width/length dimensions read from bmp headers are not necessarily
valid. For instance they may have been maliciously set to very large
values with the intention to cause DoS (large memory allocation, stack
overflow). In these cases we want to detect the invalid size as early
as possible.
This commit introduces a counter which verifies that the number of
written bytes corresponds to the advertized width/length.
Fixes #1059 (CVE-2018-6616). | Medium | 169,649 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int ext4_collapse_range(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, loff_t len)
{
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
ext4_lblk_t punch_start, punch_stop;
handle_t *handle;
unsigned int credits;
loff_t new_size, ioffset;
int ret;
/*
* We need to test this early because xfstests assumes that a
* collapse range of (0, 1) will return EOPNOTSUPP if the file
* system does not support collapse range.
*/
if (!ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* Collapse range works only on fs block size aligned offsets. */
if (offset & (EXT4_CLUSTER_SIZE(sb) - 1) ||
len & (EXT4_CLUSTER_SIZE(sb) - 1))
return -EINVAL;
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return -EINVAL;
trace_ext4_collapse_range(inode, offset, len);
punch_start = offset >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
punch_stop = (offset + len) >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
/* Call ext4_force_commit to flush all data in case of data=journal. */
if (ext4_should_journal_data(inode)) {
ret = ext4_force_commit(inode->i_sb);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
/*
* Need to round down offset to be aligned with page size boundary
* for page size > block size.
*/
ioffset = round_down(offset, PAGE_SIZE);
/* Write out all dirty pages */
ret = filemap_write_and_wait_range(inode->i_mapping, ioffset,
LLONG_MAX);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* Take mutex lock */
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
/*
* There is no need to overlap collapse range with EOF, in which case
* it is effectively a truncate operation
*/
if (offset + len >= i_size_read(inode)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_mutex;
}
/* Currently just for extent based files */
if (!ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)) {
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out_mutex;
}
truncate_pagecache(inode, ioffset);
/* Wait for existing dio to complete */
ext4_inode_block_unlocked_dio(inode);
inode_dio_wait(inode);
credits = ext4_writepage_trans_blocks(inode);
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_TRUNCATE, credits);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
goto out_dio;
}
down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
ext4_discard_preallocations(inode);
ret = ext4_es_remove_extent(inode, punch_start,
EXT_MAX_BLOCKS - punch_start);
if (ret) {
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
goto out_stop;
}
ret = ext4_ext_remove_space(inode, punch_start, punch_stop - 1);
if (ret) {
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
goto out_stop;
}
ext4_discard_preallocations(inode);
ret = ext4_ext_shift_extents(inode, handle, punch_stop,
punch_stop - punch_start, SHIFT_LEFT);
if (ret) {
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
goto out_stop;
}
new_size = i_size_read(inode) - len;
i_size_write(inode, new_size);
EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize = new_size;
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
if (IS_SYNC(inode))
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
out_stop:
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
out_dio:
ext4_inode_resume_unlocked_dio(inode);
out_mutex:
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Multiple race conditions in the ext4 filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel before 4.5 allow local users to cause a denial of service (disk corruption) by writing to a page that is associated with a different user's file after unsynchronized hole punching and page-fault handling.
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> | Low | 167,483 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int semctl_main(struct ipc_namespace *ns, int semid, int semnum,
int cmd, void __user *p)
{
struct sem_array *sma;
struct sem* curr;
int err, nsems;
ushort fast_sem_io[SEMMSL_FAST];
ushort* sem_io = fast_sem_io;
struct list_head tasks;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tasks);
rcu_read_lock();
sma = sem_obtain_object_check(ns, semid);
if (IS_ERR(sma)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return PTR_ERR(sma);
}
nsems = sma->sem_nsems;
err = -EACCES;
if (ipcperms(ns, &sma->sem_perm,
cmd == SETALL ? S_IWUGO : S_IRUGO)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
goto out_wakeup;
}
err = security_sem_semctl(sma, cmd);
if (err) {
rcu_read_unlock();
goto out_wakeup;
}
err = -EACCES;
switch (cmd) {
case GETALL:
{
ushort __user *array = p;
int i;
if(nsems > SEMMSL_FAST) {
sem_getref(sma);
sem_io = ipc_alloc(sizeof(ushort)*nsems);
if(sem_io == NULL) {
sem_putref(sma);
return -ENOMEM;
}
sem_lock_and_putref(sma);
if (sma->sem_perm.deleted) {
sem_unlock(sma);
err = -EIDRM;
goto out_free;
}
}
spin_lock(&sma->sem_perm.lock);
for (i = 0; i < sma->sem_nsems; i++)
sem_io[i] = sma->sem_base[i].semval;
sem_unlock(sma);
err = 0;
if(copy_to_user(array, sem_io, nsems*sizeof(ushort)))
err = -EFAULT;
goto out_free;
}
case SETALL:
{
int i;
struct sem_undo *un;
ipc_rcu_getref(sma);
rcu_read_unlock();
if(nsems > SEMMSL_FAST) {
sem_io = ipc_alloc(sizeof(ushort)*nsems);
if(sem_io == NULL) {
sem_putref(sma);
return -ENOMEM;
}
}
if (copy_from_user (sem_io, p, nsems*sizeof(ushort))) {
sem_putref(sma);
err = -EFAULT;
goto out_free;
}
for (i = 0; i < nsems; i++) {
if (sem_io[i] > SEMVMX) {
sem_putref(sma);
err = -ERANGE;
goto out_free;
}
}
sem_lock_and_putref(sma);
if (sma->sem_perm.deleted) {
sem_unlock(sma);
err = -EIDRM;
goto out_free;
}
for (i = 0; i < nsems; i++)
sma->sem_base[i].semval = sem_io[i];
assert_spin_locked(&sma->sem_perm.lock);
list_for_each_entry(un, &sma->list_id, list_id) {
for (i = 0; i < nsems; i++)
un->semadj[i] = 0;
}
sma->sem_ctime = get_seconds();
/* maybe some queued-up processes were waiting for this */
do_smart_update(sma, NULL, 0, 0, &tasks);
err = 0;
goto out_unlock;
}
/* GETVAL, GETPID, GETNCTN, GETZCNT: fall-through */
}
err = -EINVAL;
if (semnum < 0 || semnum >= nsems) {
rcu_read_unlock();
goto out_wakeup;
}
spin_lock(&sma->sem_perm.lock);
curr = &sma->sem_base[semnum];
switch (cmd) {
case GETVAL:
err = curr->semval;
goto out_unlock;
case GETPID:
err = curr->sempid;
goto out_unlock;
case GETNCNT:
err = count_semncnt(sma,semnum);
goto out_unlock;
case GETZCNT:
err = count_semzcnt(sma,semnum);
goto out_unlock;
}
out_unlock:
sem_unlock(sma);
out_wakeup:
wake_up_sem_queue_do(&tasks);
out_free:
if(sem_io != fast_sem_io)
ipc_free(sem_io, sizeof(ushort)*nsems);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The ipc_rcu_putref function in ipc/util.c in the Linux kernel before 3.10 does not properly manage a reference count, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption or system crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[[email protected]: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[[email protected]: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Low <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Hurley <[email protected]>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,980 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void WebContentsAndroid::OpenURL(JNIEnv* env,
jobject obj,
jstring url,
jboolean user_gesture,
jboolean is_renderer_initiated) {
GURL gurl(base::android::ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, url));
OpenURLParams open_params(gurl,
Referrer(),
CURRENT_TAB,
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK,
is_renderer_initiated);
open_params.user_gesture = user_gesture;
web_contents_->OpenURL(open_params);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the editing implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 31.0.1650.63, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via JavaScript code that triggers removal of a node during processing of the DOM tree, related to CompositeEditCommand.cpp and ReplaceSelectionCommand.cpp.
Commit Message: Revert "Load web contents after tab is created."
This reverts commit 4c55f398def3214369aefa9f2f2e8f5940d3799d.
BUG=432562
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/894003005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#314469} | Medium | 171,138 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static RList *r_bin_wasm_get_global_entries (RBinWasmObj *bin, RBinWasmSection *sec) {
RList *ret = NULL;
RBinWasmGlobalEntry *ptr = NULL;
int buflen = bin->buf->length;
if (sec->payload_data + 32 > buflen) {
return NULL;
}
if (!(ret = r_list_newf ((RListFree)free))) {
return NULL;
}
ut8* buf = bin->buf->buf + (ut32)sec->payload_data;
ut32 len = sec->payload_len;
ut32 count = sec->count;
ut32 i = 0, r = 0;
while (i < len && len < buflen && r < count) {
if (!(ptr = R_NEW0 (RBinWasmGlobalEntry))) {
return ret;
}
if (len + 8 > buflen || !(consume_u8 (buf + i, buf + len, (ut8*)&ptr->content_type, &i))) {
goto beach;
}
if (len + 8 > buflen || !(consume_u8 (buf + i, buf + len, &ptr->mutability, &i))) {
goto beach;
}
if (len + 8 > buflen || !(consume_init_expr (buf + i, buf + len, R_BIN_WASM_END_OF_CODE, NULL, &i))) {
goto beach;
}
r_list_append (ret, ptr);
r++;
}
return ret;
beach:
free (ptr);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The consume_init_expr function in wasm.c in radare2 1.3.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read and application crash) via a crafted Web Assembly file.
Commit Message: Fix crash in fuzzed wasm r2_hoobr_consume_init_expr | Medium | 168,253 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: XSLStyleSheet::XSLStyleSheet(Node* parentNode, const String& originalURL, const KURL& finalURL, bool embedded)
: m_ownerNode(parentNode)
, m_originalURL(originalURL)
, m_finalURL(finalURL)
, m_isDisabled(false)
, m_embedded(embedded)
, m_processed(true) // The root sheet starts off processed.
, m_stylesheetDoc(0)
, m_stylesheetDocTaken(false)
, m_parentStyleSheet(0)
{
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the XSLStyleSheet::compileStyleSheet function in core/xml/XSLStyleSheetLibxslt.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 30.0.1599.66, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging improper handling of post-failure recompilation in unspecified libxslt versions.
Commit Message: Avoid reparsing an XSLT stylesheet after the first failure.
Certain libxslt versions appear to leave the doc in an invalid state when parsing fails. We should cache this result and avoid re-parsing.
(The test cannot be converted to text-only due to its invalid stylesheet).
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
BUG=271939
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23103007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@156248 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,184 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static size_t consume_init_expr (ut8 *buf, ut8 *max, ut8 eoc, void *out, ut32 *offset) {
ut32 i = 0;
while (buf + i < max && buf[i] != eoc) {
i += 1;
}
if (buf[i] != eoc) {
return 0;
}
if (offset) {
*offset += i + 1;
}
return i + 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The consume_init_expr function in wasm.c in radare2 1.3.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read and application crash) via a crafted Web Assembly file.
Commit Message: Fix crash in fuzzed wasm r2_hoobr_consume_init_expr | Medium | 168,250 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: fgetwln(FILE *stream, size_t *lenp)
{
struct filewbuf *fb;
wint_t wc;
size_t wused = 0;
/* Try to diminish the possibility of several fgetwln() calls being
* used on different streams, by using a pool of buffers per file. */
fb = &fb_pool[fb_pool_cur];
if (fb->fp != stream && fb->fp != NULL) {
fb_pool_cur++;
fb_pool_cur %= FILEWBUF_POOL_ITEMS;
fb = &fb_pool[fb_pool_cur];
}
fb->fp = stream;
while ((wc = fgetwc(stream)) != WEOF) {
if (!fb->len || wused > fb->len) {
wchar_t *wp;
if (fb->len)
fb->len *= 2;
else
fb->len = FILEWBUF_INIT_LEN;
wp = reallocarray(fb->wbuf, fb->len, sizeof(wchar_t));
if (wp == NULL) {
wused = 0;
break;
}
fb->wbuf = wp;
}
fb->wbuf[wused++] = wc;
if (wc == L'\n')
break;
}
*lenp = wused;
return wused ? fb->wbuf : NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Off-by-one vulnerability in the fgetwln function in libbsd before 0.8.2 allows attackers to have unspecified impact via unknown vectors, which trigger a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: | High | 165,350 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: client_x11_display_valid(const char *display)
{
size_t i, dlen;
dlen = strlen(display);
for (i = 0; i < dlen; i++) {
if (!isalnum((u_char)display[i]) &&
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: The client in OpenSSH before 7.2 mishandles failed cookie generation for untrusted X11 forwarding and relies on the local X11 server for access-control decisions, which allows remote X11 clients to trigger a fallback and obtain trusted X11 forwarding privileges by leveraging configuration issues on this X11 server, as demonstrated by lack of the SECURITY extension on this X11 server.
Commit Message: | High | 165,351 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> overloadedMethod2Callback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.overloadedMethod2");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(TestObj*, objArg, V8TestObj::HasInstance(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)) ? V8TestObj::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined))) : 0);
if (args.Length() <= 1) {
imp->overloadedMethod(objArg);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(int, intArg, toInt32(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 1, DefaultIsUndefined)));
imp->overloadedMethod(objArg, intArg);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,098 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: dophn_core(struct magic_set *ms, int clazz, int swap, int fd, off_t off,
int num, size_t size, off_t fsize, int *flags)
{
Elf32_Phdr ph32;
Elf64_Phdr ph64;
size_t offset, len;
unsigned char nbuf[BUFSIZ];
ssize_t bufsize;
if (size != xph_sizeof) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", corrupted program header size") == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
/*
* Loop through all the program headers.
*/
for ( ; num; num--) {
if (pread(fd, xph_addr, xph_sizeof, off) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
off += size;
if (fsize != SIZE_UNKNOWN && xph_offset > fsize) {
/* Perhaps warn here */
continue;
}
if (xph_type != PT_NOTE)
continue;
/*
* This is a PT_NOTE section; loop through all the notes
* in the section.
*/
len = xph_filesz < sizeof(nbuf) ? xph_filesz : sizeof(nbuf);
if ((bufsize = pread(fd, nbuf, len, xph_offset)) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
offset = 0;
for (;;) {
if (offset >= (size_t)bufsize)
break;
offset = donote(ms, nbuf, offset, (size_t)bufsize,
clazz, swap, 4, flags);
if (offset == 0)
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: readelf.c in file before 5.22, as used in the Fileinfo component in PHP before 5.4.37, 5.5.x before 5.5.21, and 5.6.x before 5.6.5, does not consider that pread calls sometimes read only a subset of the available data, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (uninitialized memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted ELF file.
Commit Message: Bail out on partial reads, from Alexander Cherepanov | High | 166,767 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool GetURLRowForAutocompleteMatch(Profile* profile,
const AutocompleteMatch& match,
history::URLRow* url_row) {
DCHECK(url_row);
HistoryService* history_service =
profile->GetHistoryService(Profile::EXPLICIT_ACCESS);
if (!history_service)
return false;
history::URLDatabase* url_db = history_service->InMemoryDatabase();
return url_db && (url_db->GetRowForURL(match.destination_url, url_row) != 0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 does not properly implement SVG filters, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Removing dead code from NetworkActionPredictor.
BUG=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9358062
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@121926 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,958 |
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