instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 3
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
{
EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,c);
switch (type) {
case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
gctx->key_set = 0;
gctx->iv_set = 0;
gctx->ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
gctx->iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c);
gctx->taglen = -1;
gctx->iv_gen = 0;
gctx->tls_aad_len = -1;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
if (arg <= 0)
return 0;
/* Allocate memory for IV if needed */
if ((arg > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) && (arg > gctx->ivlen)) {
if (gctx->iv != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c))
OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv);
gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(arg);
if (gctx->iv == NULL)
return 0;
}
gctx->ivlen = arg;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG:
if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c))
return 0;
memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg);
gctx->taglen = arg;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG:
if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c)
|| gctx->taglen < 0)
return 0;
memcpy(ptr, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), arg);
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED:
/* Special case: -1 length restores whole IV */
if (arg == -1) {
memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, gctx->ivlen);
gctx->iv_gen = 1;
return 1;
}
/*
* Fixed field must be at least 4 bytes and invocation field at least
* 8.
*/
if ((arg < 4) || (gctx->ivlen - arg) < 8)
return 0;
if (arg)
memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, arg);
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c)
&& RAND_bytes(gctx->iv + arg, gctx->ivlen - arg) <= 0)
return 0;
gctx->iv_gen = 1;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN:
if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0)
return 0;
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
if (arg <= 0 || arg > gctx->ivlen)
arg = gctx->ivlen;
memcpy(ptr, gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, arg);
/*
* Invocation field will be at least 8 bytes in size and so no need
* to check wrap around or increment more than last 8 bytes.
*/
ctr64_inc(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - 8);
gctx->iv_set = 1;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV:
if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0
|| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c))
return 0;
memcpy(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, ptr, arg);
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
gctx->iv_set = 1;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
/* Save the AAD for later use */
if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
return 0;
memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg);
gctx->tls_aad_len = arg;
{
unsigned int len =
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] << 8
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1];
/* Correct length for explicit IV */
len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
/* If decrypting correct for tag too */
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c))
len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1] = len & 0xff;
}
/* Extra padding: tag appended to record */
return EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr;
EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,out);
if (gctx->gcm.key) {
if (gctx->gcm.key != &gctx->ks)
return 0;
gctx_out->gcm.key = &gctx_out->ks;
}
if (gctx->iv == EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c))
gctx_out->iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(out);
else {
gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(gctx->ivlen);
if (gctx_out->iv == NULL)
return 0;
memcpy(gctx_out->iv, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
}
return 1;
}
default:
return -1;
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: If an SSL/TLS server or client is running on a 32-bit host, and a specific cipher is being used, then a truncated packet can cause that server or client to perform an out-of-bounds read, usually resulting in a crash. For OpenSSL 1.1.0, the crash can be triggered when using CHACHA20/POLY1305; users should upgrade to 1.1.0d. For Openssl 1.0.2, the crash can be triggered when using RC4-MD5; users who have not disabled that algorithm should update to 1.0.2k.
Commit Message: crypto/evp: harden AEAD ciphers.
Originally a crash in 32-bit build was reported CHACHA20-POLY1305
cipher. The crash is triggered by truncated packet and is result
of excessive hashing to the edge of accessible memory. Since hash
operation is read-only it is not considered to be exploitable
beyond a DoS condition. Other ciphers were hardened.
Thanks to Robert Święcki for report.
CVE-2017-3731
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,431 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long Segment::ParseNext(
const Cluster* pCurr,
const Cluster*& pResult,
long long& pos,
long& len)
{
assert(pCurr);
assert(!pCurr->EOS());
assert(m_clusters);
pResult = 0;
if (pCurr->m_index >= 0) //loaded (not merely preloaded)
{
assert(m_clusters[pCurr->m_index] == pCurr);
const long next_idx = pCurr->m_index + 1;
if (next_idx < m_clusterCount)
{
pResult = m_clusters[next_idx];
return 0; //success
}
const long result = LoadCluster(pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error or underflow
return result;
if (result > 0) //no more clusters
{
return 1;
}
pResult = GetLast();
return 0; //success
}
assert(m_pos > 0);
long long total, avail;
long status = m_pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
const long long segment_stop = (m_size < 0) ? -1 : m_start + m_size;
pos = pCurr->m_element_start;
if (pCurr->m_element_size >= 0)
pos += pCurr->m_element_size;
else
{
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (id != 0x0F43B675) //weird: not Cluster ID
return -1;
pos += len; //consume ID
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(size);
pos += len; //consume size field
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size == unknown_size) //TODO: should never happen
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //TODO: resolve this
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += size; //consume payload (that is, the current cluster)
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (pos <= segment_stop));
}
for (;;)
{
const long status = DoParseNext(pResult, pos, len);
if (status <= 1)
return status;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,428 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static sent_status_t send_data_to_app(int fd, BT_HDR *p_buf) {
if (p_buf->len == 0)
return SENT_ALL;
ssize_t sent = send(fd, p_buf->data + p_buf->offset, p_buf->len, MSG_DONTWAIT);
if (sent == -1) {
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EINTR)
return SENT_NONE;
LOG_ERROR("%s error writing RFCOMM data back to app: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return SENT_FAILED;
}
if (sent == 0)
return SENT_FAILED;
if (sent == p_buf->len)
return SENT_ALL;
p_buf->offset += sent;
p_buf->len -= sent;
return SENT_PARTIAL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 173,458 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void Initialized(mojo::ScopedSharedBufferHandle shared_buffer,
mojo::ScopedHandle socket_handle,
bool initially_muted) {
ASSERT_TRUE(shared_buffer.is_valid());
ASSERT_TRUE(socket_handle.is_valid());
base::PlatformFile fd;
mojo::UnwrapPlatformFile(std::move(socket_handle), &fd);
socket_ = std::make_unique<base::CancelableSyncSocket>(fd);
EXPECT_NE(socket_->handle(), base::CancelableSyncSocket::kInvalidHandle);
size_t memory_length;
base::SharedMemoryHandle shmem_handle;
bool read_only;
EXPECT_EQ(
mojo::UnwrapSharedMemoryHandle(std::move(shared_buffer), &shmem_handle,
&memory_length, &read_only),
MOJO_RESULT_OK);
EXPECT_TRUE(read_only);
buffer_ = std::make_unique<base::SharedMemory>(shmem_handle, read_only);
GotNotification(initially_muted);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Incorrect use of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle in Mojo in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to perform an out of bounds memory write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268} | Medium | 172,878 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void gdImageCopyResized (gdImagePtr dst, gdImagePtr src, int dstX, int dstY, int srcX, int srcY, int dstW, int dstH, int srcW, int srcH)
{
int c;
int x, y;
int tox, toy;
int ydest;
int i;
int colorMap[gdMaxColors];
/* Stretch vectors */
int *stx, *sty;
if (overflow2(sizeof(int), srcW)) {
return;
}
if (overflow2(sizeof(int), srcH)) {
return;
}
stx = (int *) gdMalloc (sizeof (int) * srcW);
sty = (int *) gdMalloc (sizeof (int) * srcH);
/* Fixed by Mao Morimoto 2.0.16 */
for (i = 0; (i < srcW); i++) {
stx[i] = dstW * (i+1) / srcW - dstW * i / srcW ;
}
for (i = 0; (i < srcH); i++) {
sty[i] = dstH * (i+1) / srcH - dstH * i / srcH ;
}
for (i = 0; (i < gdMaxColors); i++) {
colorMap[i] = (-1);
}
toy = dstY;
for (y = srcY; (y < (srcY + srcH)); y++) {
for (ydest = 0; (ydest < sty[y - srcY]); ydest++) {
tox = dstX;
for (x = srcX; (x < (srcX + srcW)); x++) {
int nc = 0;
int mapTo;
if (!stx[x - srcX]) {
continue;
}
if (dst->trueColor) {
/* 2.0.9: Thorben Kundinger: Maybe the source image is not a truecolor image */
if (!src->trueColor) {
int tmp = gdImageGetPixel (src, x, y);
mapTo = gdImageGetTrueColorPixel (src, x, y);
if (gdImageGetTransparent (src) == tmp) {
/* 2.0.21, TK: not tox++ */
tox += stx[x - srcX];
continue;
}
} else {
/* TK: old code follows */
mapTo = gdImageGetTrueColorPixel (src, x, y);
/* Added 7/24/95: support transparent copies */
if (gdImageGetTransparent (src) == mapTo) {
/* 2.0.21, TK: not tox++ */
tox += stx[x - srcX];
continue;
}
}
} else {
c = gdImageGetPixel (src, x, y);
/* Added 7/24/95: support transparent copies */
if (gdImageGetTransparent (src) == c) {
tox += stx[x - srcX];
continue;
}
if (src->trueColor) {
/* Remap to the palette available in the destination image. This is slow and works badly. */
mapTo = gdImageColorResolveAlpha(dst, gdTrueColorGetRed(c),
gdTrueColorGetGreen(c),
gdTrueColorGetBlue(c),
gdTrueColorGetAlpha (c));
} else {
/* Have we established a mapping for this color? */
if (colorMap[c] == (-1)) {
/* If it's the same image, mapping is trivial */
if (dst == src) {
nc = c;
} else {
/* Find or create the best match */
/* 2.0.5: can't use gdTrueColorGetRed, etc with palette */
nc = gdImageColorResolveAlpha(dst, gdImageRed(src, c),
gdImageGreen(src, c),
gdImageBlue(src, c),
gdImageAlpha(src, c));
}
colorMap[c] = nc;
}
mapTo = colorMap[c];
}
}
for (i = 0; (i < stx[x - srcX]); i++) {
gdImageSetPixel (dst, tox, toy, mapTo);
tox++;
}
}
toy++;
}
}
gdFree (stx);
gdFree (sty);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the gdImageCreate function in gd.c in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) before 2.0.34RC1, as used in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted image dimensions.
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow | Medium | 167,126 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int encode_msg(struct sip_msg *msg,char *payload,int len)
{
int i,j,k,u,request;
unsigned short int h;
struct hdr_field* hf;
struct msg_start* ms;
struct sip_uri miuri;
char *myerror=NULL;
ptrdiff_t diff;
if(len < MAX_ENCODED_MSG + MAX_MESSAGE_LEN)
return -1;
if(parse_headers(msg,HDR_EOH_F,0)<0){
myerror="in parse_headers";
goto error;
}
memset(payload,0,len);
ms=&msg->first_line;
if(ms->type == SIP_REQUEST)
request=1;
else if(ms->type == SIP_REPLY)
request=0;
else{
myerror="message is neither request nor response";
goto error;
}
if(request) {
for(h=0;h<32;j=(0x01<<h),h++)
if(j & ms->u.request.method_value)
break;
} else {
h=(unsigned short)(ms->u.reply.statuscode);
}
if(h==32){/*statuscode wont be 32...*/
myerror="unknown message type\n";
goto error;
}
h=htons(h);
/*first goes the message code type*/
memcpy(payload,&h,2);
h=htons((unsigned short int)msg->len);
/*then goes the message start idx, but we'll put it later*/
/*then goes the message length (we hope it to be less than 65535 bytes...)*/
memcpy(&payload[MSG_LEN_IDX],&h,2);
/*then goes the content start index (starting from SIP MSG START)*/
if(0>(diff=(get_body(msg)-(msg->buf)))){
myerror="body starts before the message (uh ?)";
goto error;
}else
h=htons((unsigned short int)diff);
memcpy(payload+CONTENT_IDX,&h,2);
payload[METHOD_CODE_IDX]=(unsigned char)(request?
(ms->u.request.method.s-msg->buf):
(ms->u.reply.status.s-msg->buf));
payload[METHOD_CODE_IDX+1]=(unsigned char)(request?
(ms->u.request.method.len):
(ms->u.reply.status.len));
payload[URI_REASON_IDX]=(unsigned char)(request?
(ms->u.request.uri.s-msg->buf):
(ms->u.reply.reason.s-msg->buf));
payload[URI_REASON_IDX+1]=(unsigned char)(request?
(ms->u.request.uri.len):
(ms->u.reply.reason.len));
payload[VERSION_IDX]=(unsigned char)(request?
(ms->u.request.version.s-msg->buf):
(ms->u.reply.version.s-msg->buf));
if(request){
if (parse_uri(ms->u.request.uri.s,ms->u.request.uri.len, &miuri)<0){
LM_ERR("<%.*s>\n",ms->u.request.uri.len,ms->u.request.uri.s);
myerror="while parsing the R-URI";
goto error;
}
if(0>(j=encode_uri2(msg->buf,
ms->u.request.method.s-msg->buf+ms->len,
ms->u.request.uri,&miuri,
(unsigned char*)&payload[REQUEST_URI_IDX+1])))
{
myerror="ENCODE_MSG: ERROR while encoding the R-URI";
goto error;
}
payload[REQUEST_URI_IDX]=(unsigned char)j;
k=REQUEST_URI_IDX+1+j;
}else
k=REQUEST_URI_IDX;
u=k;
k++;
for(i=0,hf=msg->headers;hf;hf=hf->next,i++);
i++;/*we do as if there was an extra header, that marks the end of
the previous header in the headers hashtable(read below)*/
j=k+3*i;
for(i=0,hf=msg->headers;hf;hf=hf->next,k+=3){
payload[k]=(unsigned char)(hf->type & 0xFF);
h=htons(j);
/*now goes a payload-based-ptr to where the header-code starts*/
memcpy(&payload[k+1],&h,2);
/*TODO fix this... fixed with k-=3?*/
if(0>(i=encode_header(msg,hf,(unsigned char*)(payload+j),MAX_ENCODED_MSG+MAX_MESSAGE_LEN-j))){
LM_ERR("encoding header %.*s\n",hf->name.len,hf->name.s);
goto error;
k-=3;
continue;
}
j+=(unsigned short int)i;
}
/*now goes the number of headers that have been found, right after the meta-msg-section*/
payload[u]=(unsigned char)((k-u-1)/3);
j=htons(j);
/*now copy the number of bytes that the headers-meta-section has occupied,right afther
* headers-meta-section(the array with ['v',[2:where],'r',[2:where],'R',[2:where],...]
* this is to know where the LAST header ends, since the length of each header-struct
* is calculated substracting the nextHeaderStart - presentHeaderStart
* the k+1 is because payload[k] is usually the letter*/
memcpy(&payload[k+1],&j,2);
k+=3;
j=ntohs(j);
/*now we copy the headers-meta-section after the msg-headers-meta-section*/
/*memcpy(&payload[k],payload2,j);*/
/*j+=k;*/
/*pkg_free(payload2);*/
/*now we copy the actual message after the headers-meta-section*/
memcpy(&payload[j],msg->buf,msg->len);
LM_DBG("msglen = %d,msg starts at %d\n",msg->len,j);
j=htons(j);
/*now we copy at the beginning, the index to where the actual message starts*/
memcpy(&payload[MSG_START_IDX],&j,2);
return GET_PAY_SIZE( payload );
error:
LM_ERR("%s\n",myerror);
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the encode_msg function in encode_msg.c in the SEAS module in Kamailio (formerly OpenSER and SER) before 4.3.5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and process crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a large SIP packet.
Commit Message: seas: safety check for target buffer size before copying message in encode_msg()
- avoid buffer overflow for large SIP messages
- reported by Stelios Tsampas | High | 167,411 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: pimv1_join_prune_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, register u_int len)
{
int ngroups, njoin, nprune;
int njp;
/* If it's a single group and a single source, use 1-line output. */
if (ND_TTEST2(bp[0], 30) && bp[11] == 1 &&
((njoin = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[20])) + EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[22])) == 1) {
int hold;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RPF %s ", ipaddr_string(ndo, bp)));
hold = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[6]);
if (hold != 180) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Hold "));
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, hold);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (%s/%d, %s", njoin ? "Join" : "Prune",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp[26]), bp[25] & 0x3f,
ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp[12])));
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[16]) != 0xffffffff)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "/%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp[16])));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ") %s%s %s",
(bp[24] & 0x01) ? "Sparse" : "Dense",
(bp[25] & 0x80) ? " WC" : "",
(bp[25] & 0x40) ? "RP" : "SPT"));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " Upstream Nbr: %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, bp)));
ND_TCHECK2(bp[6], 2);
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " Hold time: "));
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[6]));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 2)
return;
bp += 8;
len -= 8;
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4);
ngroups = bp[3];
bp += 4;
len -= 4;
while (ngroups--) {
/*
* XXX - does the address have length "addrlen" and the
* mask length "maddrlen"?
*/
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tGroup: %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, bp)));
ND_TCHECK2(bp[4], sizeof(struct in_addr));
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[4]) != 0xffffffff)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "/%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp[4])));
ND_TCHECK2(bp[8], 4);
njoin = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[8]);
nprune = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[10]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " joined: %d pruned: %d", njoin, nprune));
bp += 12;
len -= 12;
for (njp = 0; njp < (njoin + nprune); njp++) {
const char *type;
if (njp < njoin)
type = "Join ";
else
type = "Prune";
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 6);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t%s %s%s%s%s/%d", type,
(bp[0] & 0x01) ? "Sparse " : "Dense ",
(bp[1] & 0x80) ? "WC " : "",
(bp[1] & 0x40) ? "RP " : "SPT ",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp[2]), bp[1] & 0x3f));
bp += 6;
len -= 6;
}
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|pim]"));
return;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The PIM parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-pim.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13030/PIM: Redo bounds checks and add length checks.
Use ND_TCHECK macros to do bounds checking, and add length checks before
the bounds checks.
Add a bounds check that the review process found was missing.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
Update one test output file to reflect the changes. | High | 167,855 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11(ExecState* exec)
{
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
int arg(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).toInt32(exec));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
TestObj::overloadedMethod1(arg);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,580 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void Con_Dump_f (void)
{
int l, x, i;
short *line;
fileHandle_t f;
int bufferlen;
char *buffer;
char filename[MAX_QPATH];
if (Cmd_Argc() != 2)
{
Com_Printf ("usage: condump <filename>\n");
return;
}
Q_strncpyz( filename, Cmd_Argv( 1 ), sizeof( filename ) );
COM_DefaultExtension( filename, sizeof( filename ), ".txt" );
f = FS_FOpenFileWrite( filename );
if (!f)
{
Com_Printf ("ERROR: couldn't open %s.\n", filename);
return;
}
Com_Printf ("Dumped console text to %s.\n", filename );
for (l = con.current - con.totallines + 1 ; l <= con.current ; l++)
{
line = con.text + (l%con.totallines)*con.linewidth;
for (x=0 ; x<con.linewidth ; x++)
if ((line[x] & 0xff) != ' ')
break;
if (x != con.linewidth)
break;
}
#ifdef _WIN32
bufferlen = con.linewidth + 3 * sizeof ( char );
#else
bufferlen = con.linewidth + 2 * sizeof ( char );
#endif
buffer = Hunk_AllocateTempMemory( bufferlen );
buffer[bufferlen-1] = 0;
for ( ; l <= con.current ; l++)
{
line = con.text + (l%con.totallines)*con.linewidth;
for(i=0; i<con.linewidth; i++)
buffer[i] = line[i] & 0xff;
for (x=con.linewidth-1 ; x>=0 ; x--)
{
if (buffer[x] == ' ')
buffer[x] = 0;
else
break;
}
#ifdef _WIN32
Q_strcat(buffer, bufferlen, "\r\n");
#else
Q_strcat(buffer, bufferlen, "\n");
#endif
FS_Write(buffer, strlen(buffer), f);
}
Hunk_FreeTempMemory( buffer );
FS_FCloseFile( f );
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: In ioquake3 before 2017-03-14, the auto-downloading feature has insufficient content restrictions. This also affects Quake III Arena, OpenArena, OpenJK, iortcw, and other id Tech 3 (aka Quake 3 engine) forks. A malicious auto-downloaded file can trigger loading of crafted auto-downloaded files as native code DLLs. A malicious auto-downloaded file can contain configuration defaults that override the user's. Executable bytecode in a malicious auto-downloaded file can set configuration variables to values that will result in unwanted native code DLLs being loaded, resulting in sandbox escape.
Commit Message: Merge some file writing extension checks from OpenJK.
Thanks Ensiform.
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/05928a57f9e4aae15a3bd0
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/ef124fd0fc48af164581176 | High | 170,076 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void svc_rdma_xdr_encode_array_chunk(struct rpcrdma_write_array *ary,
int chunk_no,
__be32 rs_handle,
__be64 rs_offset,
u32 write_len)
{
struct rpcrdma_segment *seg = &ary->wc_array[chunk_no].wc_target;
seg->rs_handle = rs_handle;
seg->rs_offset = rs_offset;
seg->rs_length = cpu_to_be32(write_len);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
... | Medium | 168,159 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void usage_exit() {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <infile> <outfile>\n", exec_name);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,475 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int ext4_orphan_del(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode)
{
struct list_head *prev;
struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi;
__u32 ino_next;
struct ext4_iloc iloc;
int err = 0;
if (!EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_journal)
return 0;
mutex_lock(&EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_orphan_lock);
if (list_empty(&ei->i_orphan))
goto out;
ino_next = NEXT_ORPHAN(inode);
prev = ei->i_orphan.prev;
sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb);
jbd_debug(4, "remove inode %lu from orphan list\n", inode->i_ino);
list_del_init(&ei->i_orphan);
/* If we're on an error path, we may not have a valid
* transaction handle with which to update the orphan list on
* disk, but we still need to remove the inode from the linked
* list in memory. */
if (!handle)
goto out;
err = ext4_reserve_inode_write(handle, inode, &iloc);
if (err)
goto out_err;
if (prev == &sbi->s_orphan) {
jbd_debug(4, "superblock will point to %u\n", ino_next);
BUFFER_TRACE(sbi->s_sbh, "get_write_access");
err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, sbi->s_sbh);
if (err)
goto out_brelse;
sbi->s_es->s_last_orphan = cpu_to_le32(ino_next);
err = ext4_handle_dirty_super(handle, inode->i_sb);
} else {
struct ext4_iloc iloc2;
struct inode *i_prev =
&list_entry(prev, struct ext4_inode_info, i_orphan)->vfs_inode;
jbd_debug(4, "orphan inode %lu will point to %u\n",
i_prev->i_ino, ino_next);
err = ext4_reserve_inode_write(handle, i_prev, &iloc2);
if (err)
goto out_brelse;
NEXT_ORPHAN(i_prev) = ino_next;
err = ext4_mark_iloc_dirty(handle, i_prev, &iloc2);
}
if (err)
goto out_brelse;
NEXT_ORPHAN(inode) = 0;
err = ext4_mark_iloc_dirty(handle, inode, &iloc);
out_err:
ext4_std_error(inode->i_sb, err);
out:
mutex_unlock(&EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_orphan_lock);
return err;
out_brelse:
brelse(iloc.bh);
goto out_err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The ext4_orphan_del function in fs/ext4/namei.c in the Linux kernel before 3.7.3 does not properly handle orphan-list entries for non-journal filesystems, which allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted filesystem on removable media, as demonstrated by the e2fsprogs tests/f_orphan_extents_inode/image.gz test.
Commit Message: ext4: avoid hang when mounting non-journal filesystems with orphan list
When trying to mount a file system which does not contain a journal,
but which does have a orphan list containing an inode which needs to
be truncated, the mount call with hang forever in
ext4_orphan_cleanup() because ext4_orphan_del() will return
immediately without removing the inode from the orphan list, leading
to an uninterruptible loop in kernel code which will busy out one of
the CPU's on the system.
This can be trivially reproduced by trying to mount the file system
found in tests/f_orphan_extents_inode/image.gz from the e2fsprogs
source tree. If a malicious user were to put this on a USB stick, and
mount it on a Linux desktop which has automatic mounts enabled, this
could be considered a potential denial of service attack. (Not a big
deal in practice, but professional paranoids worry about such things,
and have even been known to allocate CVE numbers for such problems.)
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Zheng Liu <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] | Medium | 166,090 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long ContentEncoding::ParseContentEncodingEntry(long long start,
long long size,
IMkvReader* pReader) {
assert(pReader);
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size;
int compression_count = 0;
int encryption_count = 0;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (id == 0x1034) // ContentCompression ID
++compression_count;
if (id == 0x1035) // ContentEncryption ID
++encryption_count;
pos += size; //consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
if (compression_count <= 0 && encryption_count <= 0)
return -1;
if (compression_count > 0) {
compression_entries_ =
new (std::nothrow) ContentCompression*[compression_count];
if (!compression_entries_)
return -1;
compression_entries_end_ = compression_entries_;
}
if (encryption_count > 0) {
encryption_entries_ =
new (std::nothrow) ContentEncryption*[encryption_count];
if (!encryption_entries_) {
delete [] compression_entries_;
return -1;
}
encryption_entries_end_ = encryption_entries_;
}
pos = start;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (id == 0x1031) {
encoding_order_ = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
} else if (id == 0x1032) {
encoding_scope_ = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (encoding_scope_ < 1)
return -1;
} else if (id == 0x1033) {
encoding_type_ = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
} else if (id == 0x1034) {
ContentCompression* const compression =
new (std::nothrow) ContentCompression();
if (!compression)
return -1;
status = ParseCompressionEntry(pos, size, pReader, compression);
if (status) {
delete compression;
return status;
}
*compression_entries_end_++ = compression;
} else if (id == 0x1035) {
ContentEncryption* const encryption =
new (std::nothrow) ContentEncryption();
if (!encryption)
return -1;
status = ParseEncryptionEntry(pos, size, pReader, encryption);
if (status) {
delete encryption;
return status;
}
*encryption_entries_end_++ = encryption;
}
pos += size; //consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,419 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void DownloadFileManager::RenameInProgressDownloadFile(
DownloadId global_id,
const FilePath& full_path,
bool overwrite_existing_file,
const RenameCompletionCallback& callback) {
VLOG(20) << __FUNCTION__ << "()" << " id = " << global_id
<< " full_path = \"" << full_path.value() << "\"";
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::FILE));
DownloadFile* download_file = GetDownloadFile(global_id);
if (!download_file) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(callback, FilePath()));
return;
}
VLOG(20) << __FUNCTION__ << "()"
<< " download_file = " << download_file->DebugString();
FilePath new_path(full_path);
if (!overwrite_existing_file) {
int uniquifier =
file_util::GetUniquePathNumber(new_path, FILE_PATH_LITERAL(""));
if (uniquifier > 0) {
new_path = new_path.InsertBeforeExtensionASCII(
StringPrintf(" (%d)", uniquifier));
}
}
net::Error rename_error = download_file->Rename(new_path);
if (net::OK != rename_error) {
CancelDownloadOnRename(global_id, rename_error);
new_path.clear();
}
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(callback, new_path));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,878 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ber_parse_header(STREAM s, int tagval, int *length)
{
int tag, len;
if (tagval > 0xff)
{
in_uint16_be(s, tag);
}
else
{
in_uint8(s, tag);
}
if (tag != tagval)
{
logger(Core, Error, "ber_parse_header(), expected tag %d, got %d", tagval, tag);
return False;
}
in_uint8(s, len);
if (len & 0x80)
{
len &= ~0x80;
*length = 0;
while (len--)
next_be(s, *length);
}
else
*length = len;
return s_check(s);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: rdesktop versions up to and including v1.8.3 contain a Buffer Overflow over the global variables in the function seamless_process_line() that results in memory corruption and probably even a remote code execution.
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182 | High | 169,794 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmd, unsigned int flags)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
struct dev_pagemap *pgmap = NULL;
struct page *page;
spinlock_t *ptl;
pte_t *ptep, pte;
retry:
if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
ptep = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmd, address, &ptl);
pte = *ptep;
if (!pte_present(pte)) {
swp_entry_t entry;
/*
* KSM's break_ksm() relies upon recognizing a ksm page
* even while it is being migrated, so for that case we
* need migration_entry_wait().
*/
if (likely(!(flags & FOLL_MIGRATION)))
goto no_page;
if (pte_none(pte))
goto no_page;
entry = pte_to_swp_entry(pte);
if (!is_migration_entry(entry))
goto no_page;
pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
migration_entry_wait(mm, pmd, address);
goto retry;
}
if ((flags & FOLL_NUMA) && pte_protnone(pte))
goto no_page;
if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) && !pte_write(pte)) {
pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
return NULL;
}
page = vm_normal_page(vma, address, pte);
if (!page && pte_devmap(pte) && (flags & FOLL_GET)) {
/*
* Only return device mapping pages in the FOLL_GET case since
* they are only valid while holding the pgmap reference.
*/
pgmap = get_dev_pagemap(pte_pfn(pte), NULL);
if (pgmap)
page = pte_page(pte);
else
goto no_page;
} else if (unlikely(!page)) {
if (flags & FOLL_DUMP) {
/* Avoid special (like zero) pages in core dumps */
page = ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
goto out;
}
if (is_zero_pfn(pte_pfn(pte))) {
page = pte_page(pte);
} else {
int ret;
ret = follow_pfn_pte(vma, address, ptep, flags);
page = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto out;
}
}
if (flags & FOLL_SPLIT && PageTransCompound(page)) {
int ret;
get_page(page);
pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
lock_page(page);
ret = split_huge_page(page);
unlock_page(page);
put_page(page);
if (ret)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
goto retry;
}
if (flags & FOLL_GET) {
get_page(page);
/* drop the pgmap reference now that we hold the page */
if (pgmap) {
put_dev_pagemap(pgmap);
pgmap = NULL;
}
}
if (flags & FOLL_TOUCH) {
if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) &&
!pte_dirty(pte) && !PageDirty(page))
set_page_dirty(page);
/*
* pte_mkyoung() would be more correct here, but atomic care
* is needed to avoid losing the dirty bit: it is easier to use
* mark_page_accessed().
*/
mark_page_accessed(page);
}
if ((flags & FOLL_MLOCK) && (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)) {
/* Do not mlock pte-mapped THP */
if (PageTransCompound(page))
goto out;
/*
* The preliminary mapping check is mainly to avoid the
* pointless overhead of lock_page on the ZERO_PAGE
* which might bounce very badly if there is contention.
*
* If the page is already locked, we don't need to
* handle it now - vmscan will handle it later if and
* when it attempts to reclaim the page.
*/
if (page->mapping && trylock_page(page)) {
lru_add_drain(); /* push cached pages to LRU */
/*
* Because we lock page here, and migration is
* blocked by the pte's page reference, and we
* know the page is still mapped, we don't even
* need to check for file-cache page truncation.
*/
mlock_vma_page(page);
unlock_page(page);
}
}
out:
pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
return page;
no_page:
pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
if (!pte_none(pte))
return NULL;
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in mm/gup.c in the Linux kernel 2.x through 4.x before 4.8.3 allows local users to gain privileges by leveraging incorrect handling of a copy-on-write (COW) feature to write to a read-only memory mapping, as exploited in the wild in October 2016, aka *Dirty COW.*
Commit Message: mm: remove gup_flags FOLL_WRITE games from __get_user_pages()
This is an ancient bug that was actually attempted to be fixed once
(badly) by me eleven years ago in commit 4ceb5db9757a ("Fix
get_user_pages() race for write access") but that was then undone due to
problems on s390 by commit f33ea7f404e5 ("fix get_user_pages bug").
In the meantime, the s390 situation has long been fixed, and we can now
fix it by checking the pte_dirty() bit properly (and do it better). The
s390 dirty bit was implemented in abf09bed3cce ("s390/mm: implement
software dirty bits") which made it into v3.9. Earlier kernels will
have to look at the page state itself.
Also, the VM has become more scalable, and what used a purely
theoretical race back then has become easier to trigger.
To fix it, we introduce a new internal FOLL_COW flag to mark the "yes,
we already did a COW" rather than play racy games with FOLL_WRITE that
is very fundamental, and then use the pte dirty flag to validate that
the FOLL_COW flag is still valid.
Reported-and-tested-by: Phil "not Paul" Oester <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Cc: Nick Piggin <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg Thelen <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | High | 167,164 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void xen_netbk_tx_submit(struct xen_netbk *netbk)
{
struct gnttab_copy *gop = netbk->tx_copy_ops;
struct sk_buff *skb;
while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&netbk->tx_queue)) != NULL) {
struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp;
struct xenvif *vif;
u16 pending_idx;
unsigned data_len;
pending_idx = *((u16 *)skb->data);
vif = netbk->pending_tx_info[pending_idx].vif;
txp = &netbk->pending_tx_info[pending_idx].req;
/* Check the remap error code. */
if (unlikely(xen_netbk_tx_check_gop(netbk, skb, &gop))) {
netdev_dbg(vif->dev, "netback grant failed.\n");
skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags = 0;
kfree_skb(skb);
continue;
}
data_len = skb->len;
memcpy(skb->data,
(void *)(idx_to_kaddr(netbk, pending_idx)|txp->offset),
data_len);
if (data_len < txp->size) {
/* Append the packet payload as a fragment. */
txp->offset += data_len;
txp->size -= data_len;
} else {
/* Schedule a response immediately. */
xen_netbk_idx_release(netbk, pending_idx);
}
if (txp->flags & XEN_NETTXF_csum_blank)
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
else if (txp->flags & XEN_NETTXF_data_validated)
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
xen_netbk_fill_frags(netbk, skb);
/*
* If the initial fragment was < PKT_PROT_LEN then
* pull through some bytes from the other fragments to
* increase the linear region to PKT_PROT_LEN bytes.
*/
if (skb_headlen(skb) < PKT_PROT_LEN && skb_is_nonlinear(skb)) {
int target = min_t(int, skb->len, PKT_PROT_LEN);
__pskb_pull_tail(skb, target - skb_headlen(skb));
}
skb->dev = vif->dev;
skb->protocol = eth_type_trans(skb, skb->dev);
if (checksum_setup(vif, skb)) {
netdev_dbg(vif->dev,
"Can't setup checksum in net_tx_action\n");
kfree_skb(skb);
continue;
}
vif->dev->stats.rx_bytes += skb->len;
vif->dev->stats.rx_packets++;
xenvif_receive_skb(vif, skb);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Memory leak in drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c in the Xen netback functionality in the Linux kernel before 3.7.8 allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by triggering certain error conditions.
Commit Message: xen/netback: don't leak pages on failure in xen_netbk_tx_check_gop.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,170 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: cmsBool CMSEXPORT cmsAppendNamedColor(cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST* NamedColorList,
const char* Name,
cmsUInt16Number PCS[3], cmsUInt16Number Colorant[cmsMAXCHANNELS])
{
cmsUInt32Number i;
if (NamedColorList == NULL) return FALSE;
if (NamedColorList ->nColors + 1 > NamedColorList ->Allocated) {
if (!GrowNamedColorList(NamedColorList)) return FALSE;
}
for (i=0; i < NamedColorList ->ColorantCount; i++)
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].DeviceColorant[i] = Colorant == NULL? 0 : Colorant[i];
for (i=0; i < 3; i++)
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].PCS[i] = PCS == NULL ? 0 : PCS[i];
if (Name != NULL) {
strncpy(NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name, Name,
sizeof(NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name));
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name[cmsMAX_PATH-1] = 0;
}
else
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name[0] = 0;
NamedColorList ->nColors++;
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Little CMS (lcms2) before 2.5, as used in OpenJDK 7 and possibly other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and crash) via vectors related to (1) cmsStageAllocLabV2ToV4curves, (2) cmsPipelineDup, (3) cmsAllocProfileSequenceDescription, (4) CurvesAlloc, and (5) cmsnamed.
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes | Medium | 166,543 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ServerWrapper::OnHttpRequest(int connection_id,
const net::HttpServerRequestInfo& info) {
server_->SetSendBufferSize(connection_id, kSendBufferSizeForDevTools);
if (base::StartsWith(info.path, "/json", base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE)) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&DevToolsHttpHandler::OnJsonRequest,
handler_, connection_id, info));
return;
}
if (info.path.empty() || info.path == "/") {
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&DevToolsHttpHandler::OnDiscoveryPageRequest, handler_,
connection_id));
return;
}
if (!base::StartsWith(info.path, "/devtools/",
base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE)) {
server_->Send404(connection_id, kDevtoolsHttpHandlerTrafficAnnotation);
return;
}
std::string filename = PathWithoutParams(info.path.substr(10));
std::string mime_type = GetMimeType(filename);
if (!debug_frontend_dir_.empty()) {
base::FilePath path = debug_frontend_dir_.AppendASCII(filename);
std::string data;
base::ReadFileToString(path, &data);
server_->Send200(connection_id, data, mime_type,
kDevtoolsHttpHandlerTrafficAnnotation);
return;
}
if (bundles_resources_) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&DevToolsHttpHandler::OnFrontendResourceRequest,
handler_, connection_id, filename));
return;
}
server_->Send404(connection_id, kDevtoolsHttpHandlerTrafficAnnotation);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: A lack of host validation in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page, if the user is running a remote DevTools debugging server.
Commit Message: DevTools: check Host header for being IP or localhost when connecting over RDP.
Bug: 813540
Change-Id: I9338aa2475c15090b8a60729be25502eb866efb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/952522
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#541547} | Medium | 172,732 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static unsigned int ipv6_defrag(void *priv,
struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nf_hook_state *state)
{
int err;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK)
/* Previously seen (loopback)? */
if (skb->nfct && !nf_ct_is_template((struct nf_conn *)skb->nfct))
return NF_ACCEPT;
#endif
err = nf_ct_frag6_gather(state->net, skb,
nf_ct6_defrag_user(state->hook, skb));
/* queued */
if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
return NF_STOLEN;
return NF_ACCEPT;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: The netfilter subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.9 mishandles IPv6 reassembly, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (integer overflow, out-of-bounds write, and GPF) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted application that makes socket, connect, and writev system calls, related to net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c and net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv6_hooks.c.
Commit Message: netfilter: ipv6: nf_defrag: drop mangled skb on ream error
Dmitry Vyukov reported GPF in network stack that Andrey traced down to
negative nh offset in nf_ct_frag6_queue().
Problem is that all network headers before fragment header are pulled.
Normal ipv6 reassembly will drop the skb when errors occur further down
the line.
netfilter doesn't do this, and instead passed the original fragment
along. That was also fine back when netfilter ipv6 defrag worked with
cloned fragments, as the original, pristine fragment was passed on.
So we either have to undo the pull op, or discard such fragments.
Since they're malformed after all (e.g. overlapping fragment) it seems
preferrable to just drop them.
Same for temporary errors -- it doesn't make sense to accept (and
perhaps forward!) only some fragments of same datagram.
Fixes: 029f7f3b8701cc7ac ("netfilter: ipv6: nf_defrag: avoid/free clone operations")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Debugged-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Diagnosed-by: Eric Dumazet <Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,851 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void ikev2_parent_outI1_continue(struct pluto_crypto_req_cont *pcrc,
struct pluto_crypto_req *r,
err_t ugh)
{
struct ke_continuation *ke = (struct ke_continuation *)pcrc;
struct msg_digest *md = ke->md;
struct state *const st = md->st;
stf_status e;
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("ikev2 parent outI1: calculated ke+nonce, sending I1"));
if (st == NULL) {
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
"%s: Request was disconnected from state",
__FUNCTION__);
if (ke->md)
release_md(ke->md);
return;
}
/* XXX should check out ugh */
passert(ugh == NULL);
passert(cur_state == NULL);
passert(st != NULL);
passert(st->st_suspended_md == ke->md);
set_suspended(st, NULL); /* no longer connected or suspended */
set_cur_state(st);
st->st_calculating = FALSE;
e = ikev2_parent_outI1_tail(pcrc, r);
if (ke->md != NULL) {
complete_v2_state_transition(&ke->md, e);
if (ke->md)
release_md(ke->md);
}
reset_cur_state();
reset_globals();
passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The ikev2parent_inI1outR1 function in pluto/ikev2_parent.c in libreswan before 3.7 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (restart) via an IKEv2 I1 notification without a KE payload.
Commit Message: SECURITY: Properly handle IKEv2 I1 notification packet without KE payload | Medium | 166,473 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadGROUP4Image(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
filename[MagickPathExtent];
FILE
*file;
Image
*image;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
int
c,
unique_file;
MagickBooleanType
status;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
offset,
strip_offset;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Write raw CCITT Group 4 wrapped as a TIFF image file.
*/
file=(FILE *) NULL;
unique_file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(filename);
if (unique_file != -1)
file=fdopen(unique_file,"wb");
if ((unique_file == -1) || (file == (FILE *) NULL))
ThrowImageException(FileOpenError,"UnableToCreateTemporaryFile");
length=fwrite("\111\111\052\000\010\000\000\000\016\000",1,10,file);
length=fwrite("\376\000\003\000\001\000\000\000\000\000\000\000",1,12,file);
length=fwrite("\000\001\004\000\001\000\000\000",1,8,file);
length=WriteLSBLong(file,image->columns);
length=fwrite("\001\001\004\000\001\000\000\000",1,8,file);
length=WriteLSBLong(file,image->rows);
length=fwrite("\002\001\003\000\001\000\000\000\001\000\000\000",1,12,file);
length=fwrite("\003\001\003\000\001\000\000\000\004\000\000\000",1,12,file);
length=fwrite("\006\001\003\000\001\000\000\000\000\000\000\000",1,12,file);
length=fwrite("\021\001\003\000\001\000\000\000",1,8,file);
strip_offset=10+(12*14)+4+8;
length=WriteLSBLong(file,(size_t) strip_offset);
length=fwrite("\022\001\003\000\001\000\000\000",1,8,file);
length=WriteLSBLong(file,(size_t) image_info->orientation);
length=fwrite("\025\001\003\000\001\000\000\000\001\000\000\000",1,12,file);
length=fwrite("\026\001\004\000\001\000\000\000",1,8,file);
length=WriteLSBLong(file,image->rows);
length=fwrite("\027\001\004\000\001\000\000\000\000\000\000\000",1,12,file);
offset=(ssize_t) ftell(file)-4;
length=fwrite("\032\001\005\000\001\000\000\000",1,8,file);
length=WriteLSBLong(file,(size_t) (strip_offset-8));
length=fwrite("\033\001\005\000\001\000\000\000",1,8,file);
length=WriteLSBLong(file,(size_t) (strip_offset-8));
length=fwrite("\050\001\003\000\001\000\000\000\002\000\000\000",1,12,file);
length=fwrite("\000\000\000\000",1,4,file);
length=WriteLSBLong(file,(long) image->resolution.x);
length=WriteLSBLong(file,1);
for (length=0; (c=ReadBlobByte(image)) != EOF; length++)
(void) fputc(c,file);
offset=(ssize_t) fseek(file,(ssize_t) offset,SEEK_SET);
length=WriteLSBLong(file,(unsigned int) length);
(void) fclose(file);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
image=DestroyImage(image);
/*
Read TIFF image.
*/
read_info=CloneImageInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL);
(void) FormatLocaleString(read_info->filename,MagickPathExtent,"%s",filename);
image=ReadTIFFImage(read_info,exception);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
if (image != (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(image->filename,image_info->filename,
MagickPathExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(image->magick_filename,image_info->filename,
MagickPathExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(image->magick,"GROUP4",MagickPathExtent);
}
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
return(image);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The ReadGROUP4Image function in coders/tiff.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.1-10 does not check the return value of the fputc function, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted image file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/196 | Medium | 168,627 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void AppCacheUpdateJob::HandleMasterEntryFetchCompleted(URLFetcher* fetcher,
int net_error) {
DCHECK(internal_state_ == NO_UPDATE || internal_state_ == DOWNLOADING);
UpdateURLLoaderRequest* request = fetcher->request();
const GURL& url = request->GetURL();
master_entry_fetches_.erase(url);
++master_entries_completed_;
int response_code = net_error == net::OK ? request->GetResponseCode() : -1;
auto found = pending_master_entries_.find(url);
DCHECK(found != pending_master_entries_.end());
PendingHosts& hosts = found->second;
if (response_code / 100 == 2) {
AppCache* cache = inprogress_cache_.get() ? inprogress_cache_.get()
: group_->newest_complete_cache();
DCHECK(fetcher->response_writer());
AppCacheEntry master_entry(AppCacheEntry::MASTER,
fetcher->response_writer()->response_id(),
fetcher->response_writer()->amount_written());
if (cache->AddOrModifyEntry(url, master_entry))
added_master_entries_.push_back(url);
else
duplicate_response_ids_.push_back(master_entry.response_id());
if (!inprogress_cache_.get()) {
DCHECK(cache == group_->newest_complete_cache());
for (AppCacheHost* host : hosts)
host->AssociateCompleteCache(cache);
}
} else {
HostNotifier host_notifier;
for (AppCacheHost* host : hosts) {
host_notifier.AddHost(host);
if (inprogress_cache_.get())
host->AssociateNoCache(GURL());
host->RemoveObserver(this);
}
hosts.clear();
failed_master_entries_.insert(url);
const char kFormatString[] = "Manifest fetch failed (%d) %s";
std::string message = FormatUrlErrorMessage(
kFormatString, request->GetURL(), fetcher->result(), response_code);
host_notifier.SendErrorNotifications(blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorDetails(
message, blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorReason::APPCACHE_MANIFEST_ERROR,
request->GetURL(), response_code, false /*is_cross_origin*/));
if (inprogress_cache_.get()) {
pending_master_entries_.erase(found);
--master_entries_completed_;
if (update_type_ == CACHE_ATTEMPT && pending_master_entries_.empty()) {
HandleCacheFailure(
blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorDetails(
message,
blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorReason::APPCACHE_MANIFEST_ERROR,
request->GetURL(), response_code, false /*is_cross_origin*/),
fetcher->result(), GURL());
return;
}
}
}
DCHECK(internal_state_ != CACHE_FAILURE);
FetchMasterEntries();
MaybeCompleteUpdate();
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Resource size information leakage in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 75.0.3770.80 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719} | Medium | 172,995 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: chunk_type_valid(png_uint_32 c)
/* Bit whacking approach to chunk name validation that is intended to avoid
* branches. The cost is that it uses a lot of 32-bit constants, which might
* be bad on some architectures.
*/
{
png_uint_32 t;
/* Remove bit 5 from all but the reserved byte; this means every
* 8-bit unit must be in the range 65-90 to be valid. So bit 5
* must be zero, bit 6 must be set and bit 7 zero.
*/
c &= ~PNG_U32(32,32,0,32);
t = (c & ~0x1f1f1f1f) ^ 0x40404040;
/* Subtract 65 for each 8 bit quantity, this must not overflow
* and each byte must then be in the range 0-25.
*/
c -= PNG_U32(65,65,65,65);
t |=c ;
/* Subtract 26, handling the overflow which should set the top
* three bits of each byte.
*/
c -= PNG_U32(25,25,25,26);
t |= ~c;
return (t & 0xe0e0e0e0) == 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,730 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: cifs_find_smb_ses(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, char *username)
{
struct list_head *tmp;
struct cifsSesInfo *ses;
write_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
list_for_each(tmp, &server->smb_ses_list) {
ses = list_entry(tmp, struct cifsSesInfo, smb_ses_list);
if (strncmp(ses->userName, username, MAX_USERNAME_SIZE))
continue;
++ses->ses_count;
write_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
return ses;
}
write_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The cifs_find_smb_ses function in fs/cifs/connect.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.36 does not properly determine the associations between users and sessions, which allows local users to bypass CIFS share authentication by leveraging a mount of a share by a different user.
Commit Message: cifs: clean up cifs_find_smb_ses (try #2)
This patch replaces the earlier patch by the same name. The only
difference is that MAX_PASSWORD_SIZE has been increased to attempt to
match the limits that windows enforces.
Do a better job of matching sessions by authtype. Matching by username
for a Kerberos session is incorrect, and anonymous sessions need special
handling.
Also, in the case where we do match by username, we also need to match
by password. That ensures that someone else doesn't "borrow" an existing
session without needing to know the password.
Finally, passwords can be longer than 16 bytes. Bump MAX_PASSWORD_SIZE
to 512 to match the size that the userspace mount helper allows.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]> | Low | 166,229 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SvcTest()
: codec_iface_(0),
test_file_name_("hantro_collage_w352h288.yuv"),
stats_file_name_("hantro_collage_w352h288.stat"),
codec_initialized_(false),
decoder_(0) {
memset(&svc_, 0, sizeof(svc_));
memset(&codec_, 0, sizeof(codec_));
memset(&codec_enc_, 0, sizeof(codec_enc_));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,581 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static __forceinline void draw_line(float *output, int x0, int y0, int x1, int y1, int n)
{
int dy = y1 - y0;
int adx = x1 - x0;
int ady = abs(dy);
int base;
int x=x0,y=y0;
int err = 0;
int sy;
#ifdef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDE_TABLE
if (adx < DIVTAB_DENOM && ady < DIVTAB_NUMER) {
if (dy < 0) {
base = -integer_divide_table[ady][adx];
sy = base-1;
} else {
base = integer_divide_table[ady][adx];
sy = base+1;
}
} else {
base = dy / adx;
if (dy < 0)
sy = base - 1;
else
sy = base+1;
}
#else
base = dy / adx;
if (dy < 0)
sy = base - 1;
else
sy = base+1;
#endif
ady -= abs(base) * adx;
if (x1 > n) x1 = n;
if (x < x1) {
LINE_OP(output[x], inverse_db_table[y]);
for (++x; x < x1; ++x) {
err += ady;
if (err >= adx) {
err -= adx;
y += sy;
} else
y += base;
LINE_OP(output[x], inverse_db_table[y]);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: A reachable assertion in the lookup1_values function in stb_vorbis through 2019-03-04 allows an attacker to cause a denial of service by opening a crafted Ogg Vorbis file.
Commit Message: Fix seven bugs discovered and fixed by ForAllSecure:
CVE-2019-13217: heap buffer overflow in start_decoder()
CVE-2019-13218: stack buffer overflow in compute_codewords()
CVE-2019-13219: uninitialized memory in vorbis_decode_packet_rest()
CVE-2019-13220: out-of-range read in draw_line()
CVE-2019-13221: issue with large 1D codebooks in lookup1_values()
CVE-2019-13222: unchecked NULL returned by get_window()
CVE-2019-13223: division by zero in predict_point() | Medium | 169,614 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int get_refcount(BlockDriverState *bs, int64_t cluster_index)
{
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
int refcount_table_index, block_index;
int64_t refcount_block_offset;
int ret;
uint16_t *refcount_block;
uint16_t refcount;
refcount_table_index = cluster_index >> (s->cluster_bits - REFCOUNT_SHIFT);
if (refcount_table_index >= s->refcount_table_size)
return 0;
refcount_block_offset =
s->refcount_table[refcount_table_index] & REFT_OFFSET_MASK;
if (!refcount_block_offset)
return 0;
ret = qcow2_cache_get(bs, s->refcount_block_cache, refcount_block_offset,
(void**) &refcount_block);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
block_index = cluster_index &
((1 << (s->cluster_bits - REFCOUNT_SHIFT)) - 1);
refcount = be16_to_cpu(refcount_block[block_index]);
ret = qcow2_cache_put(bs, s->refcount_block_cache,
(void**) &refcount_block);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
return refcount;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in the block drivers in QEMU, possibly before 2.0.0, allow local users to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted catalog size in (1) the parallels_open function in block/parallels.c or (2) bochs_open function in bochs.c, a large L1 table in the (3) qcow2_snapshot_load_tmp in qcow2-snapshot.c or (4) qcow2_grow_l1_table function in qcow2-cluster.c, (5) a large request in the bdrv_check_byte_request function in block.c and other block drivers, (6) crafted cluster indexes in the get_refcount function in qcow2-refcount.c, or (7) a large number of blocks in the cloop_open function in cloop.c, which trigger buffer overflows, memory corruption, large memory allocations and out-of-bounds read and writes.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,405 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long Cluster::GetNext(
const BlockEntry* pCurr,
const BlockEntry*& pNext) const
{
assert(pCurr);
assert(m_entries);
assert(m_entries_count > 0);
size_t idx = pCurr->GetIndex();
assert(idx < size_t(m_entries_count));
assert(m_entries[idx] == pCurr);
++idx;
if (idx >= size_t(m_entries_count))
{
long long pos;
long len;
const long status = Parse(pos, len);
if (status < 0) //error
{
pNext = NULL;
return status;
}
if (status > 0)
{
pNext = NULL;
return 0;
}
assert(m_entries);
assert(m_entries_count > 0);
assert(idx < size_t(m_entries_count));
}
pNext = m_entries[idx];
assert(pNext);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,345 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: delete_policy_2_svc(dpol_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
prime_arg = arg->name;
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_DELETE, NULL, NULL)) {
log_unauth("kadm5_delete_policy", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_DELETE;
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_delete_policy((void *)handle, arg->name);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_delete_policy",
((prime_arg == NULL) ? "(null)" : prime_arg), errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple memory leaks in kadmin/server/server_stubs.c in kadmind in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.13.4 and 1.14.x before 1.14.1 allow remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a request specifying a NULL principal name.
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup | Medium | 167,511 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ExtensionServiceBackend::OnExtensionInstalled(
const scoped_refptr<const Extension>& extension) {
CHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (frontend_.get())
frontend_->OnExtensionInstalled(extension);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not ensure that developer-mode NPAPI extension installations are confirmed by a browser dialog, which makes it easier for remote attackers to modify the product's functionality via a Trojan horse extension.
Commit Message: Unrevert: Show the install dialog for the initial load of an unpacked extension
with plugins.
First landing broke some browser tests.
BUG=83273
TEST=in the extensions managmenet page, with developer mode enabled, Load an unpacked extension on an extension with NPAPI plugins. You should get an install dialog.
TBR=mihaip
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87738 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,408 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: AcpiNsEvaluate (
ACPI_EVALUATE_INFO *Info)
{
ACPI_STATUS Status;
ACPI_FUNCTION_TRACE (NsEvaluate);
if (!Info)
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (AE_BAD_PARAMETER);
}
if (!Info->Node)
{
/*
* Get the actual namespace node for the target object if we
* need to. Handles these cases:
*
* 1) Null node, valid pathname from root (absolute path)
* 2) Node and valid pathname (path relative to Node)
* 3) Node, Null pathname
*/
Status = AcpiNsGetNode (Info->PrefixNode, Info->RelativePathname,
ACPI_NS_NO_UPSEARCH, &Info->Node);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
}
/*
* For a method alias, we must grab the actual method node so that
* proper scoping context will be established before execution.
*/
if (AcpiNsGetType (Info->Node) == ACPI_TYPE_LOCAL_METHOD_ALIAS)
{
Info->Node = ACPI_CAST_PTR (
ACPI_NAMESPACE_NODE, Info->Node->Object);
}
/* Complete the info block initialization */
Info->ReturnObject = NULL;
Info->NodeFlags = Info->Node->Flags;
Info->ObjDesc = AcpiNsGetAttachedObject (Info->Node);
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_NAMES, "%s [%p] Value %p\n",
Info->RelativePathname, Info->Node,
AcpiNsGetAttachedObject (Info->Node)));
/* Get info if we have a predefined name (_HID, etc.) */
Info->Predefined = AcpiUtMatchPredefinedMethod (Info->Node->Name.Ascii);
/* Get the full pathname to the object, for use in warning messages */
Info->FullPathname = AcpiNsGetNormalizedPathname (Info->Node, TRUE);
if (!Info->FullPathname)
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (AE_NO_MEMORY);
}
/* Count the number of arguments being passed in */
Info->ParamCount = 0;
if (Info->Parameters)
{
while (Info->Parameters[Info->ParamCount])
{
Info->ParamCount++;
}
/* Warn on impossible argument count */
if (Info->ParamCount > ACPI_METHOD_NUM_ARGS)
{
ACPI_WARN_PREDEFINED ((AE_INFO, Info->FullPathname, ACPI_WARN_ALWAYS,
"Excess arguments (%u) - using only %u",
Info->ParamCount, ACPI_METHOD_NUM_ARGS));
Info->ParamCount = ACPI_METHOD_NUM_ARGS;
}
}
/*
* For predefined names: Check that the declared argument count
* matches the ACPI spec -- otherwise this is a BIOS error.
*/
AcpiNsCheckAcpiCompliance (Info->FullPathname, Info->Node,
Info->Predefined);
/*
* For all names: Check that the incoming argument count for
* this method/object matches the actual ASL/AML definition.
*/
AcpiNsCheckArgumentCount (Info->FullPathname, Info->Node,
Info->ParamCount, Info->Predefined);
/* For predefined names: Typecheck all incoming arguments */
AcpiNsCheckArgumentTypes (Info);
/*
* Three major evaluation cases:
*
* 1) Object types that cannot be evaluated by definition
* 2) The object is a control method -- execute it
* 3) The object is not a method -- just return it's current value
*/
switch (AcpiNsGetType (Info->Node))
{
case ACPI_TYPE_DEVICE:
case ACPI_TYPE_EVENT:
case ACPI_TYPE_MUTEX:
case ACPI_TYPE_REGION:
case ACPI_TYPE_THERMAL:
case ACPI_TYPE_LOCAL_SCOPE:
/*
* 1) Disallow evaluation of certain object types. For these,
* object evaluation is undefined and not supported.
*/
ACPI_ERROR ((AE_INFO,
"%s: Evaluation of object type [%s] is not supported",
Info->FullPathname,
AcpiUtGetTypeName (Info->Node->Type)));
Status = AE_TYPE;
goto Cleanup;
case ACPI_TYPE_METHOD:
/*
* 2) Object is a control method - execute it
*/
/* Verify that there is a method object associated with this node */
if (!Info->ObjDesc)
{
ACPI_ERROR ((AE_INFO, "%s: Method has no attached sub-object",
Info->FullPathname));
Status = AE_NULL_OBJECT;
goto Cleanup;
}
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_EXEC,
"**** Execute method [%s] at AML address %p length %X\n",
Info->FullPathname,
Info->ObjDesc->Method.AmlStart + 1,
Info->ObjDesc->Method.AmlLength - 1));
/*
* Any namespace deletion must acquire both the namespace and
* interpreter locks to ensure that no thread is using the portion of
* the namespace that is being deleted.
*
* Execute the method via the interpreter. The interpreter is locked
* here before calling into the AML parser
*/
AcpiExEnterInterpreter ();
Status = AcpiPsExecuteMethod (Info);
AcpiExExitInterpreter ();
break;
default:
/*
* 3) All other non-method objects -- get the current object value
*/
/*
* Some objects require additional resolution steps (e.g., the Node
* may be a field that must be read, etc.) -- we can't just grab
* the object out of the node.
*
* Use ResolveNodeToValue() to get the associated value.
*
* NOTE: we can get away with passing in NULL for a walk state because
* the Node is guaranteed to not be a reference to either a method
* local or a method argument (because this interface is never called
* from a running method.)
*
* Even though we do not directly invoke the interpreter for object
* resolution, we must lock it because we could access an OpRegion.
* The OpRegion access code assumes that the interpreter is locked.
*/
AcpiExEnterInterpreter ();
/* TBD: ResolveNodeToValue has a strange interface, fix */
Info->ReturnObject = ACPI_CAST_PTR (ACPI_OPERAND_OBJECT, Info->Node);
Status = AcpiExResolveNodeToValue (ACPI_CAST_INDIRECT_PTR (
ACPI_NAMESPACE_NODE, &Info->ReturnObject), NULL);
AcpiExExitInterpreter ();
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
Info->ReturnObject = NULL;
goto Cleanup;
}
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_NAMES, "Returned object %p [%s]\n",
Info->ReturnObject,
AcpiUtGetObjectTypeName (Info->ReturnObject)));
Status = AE_CTRL_RETURN_VALUE; /* Always has a "return value" */
break;
}
/*
* For predefined names, check the return value against the ACPI
* specification. Some incorrect return value types are repaired.
*/
(void) AcpiNsCheckReturnValue (Info->Node, Info, Info->ParamCount,
Status, &Info->ReturnObject);
/* Check if there is a return value that must be dealt with */
if (Status == AE_CTRL_RETURN_VALUE)
{
/* If caller does not want the return value, delete it */
if (Info->Flags & ACPI_IGNORE_RETURN_VALUE)
{
AcpiUtRemoveReference (Info->ReturnObject);
Info->ReturnObject = NULL;
}
/* Map AE_CTRL_RETURN_VALUE to AE_OK, we are done with it */
Status = AE_OK;
}
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_NAMES,
"*** Completed evaluation of object %s ***\n",
Info->RelativePathname));
Cleanup:
/*
* Namespace was unlocked by the handling AcpiNs* function, so we
* just free the pathname and return
*/
ACPI_FREE (Info->FullPathname);
Info->FullPathname = NULL;
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The acpi_ns_evaluate() function in drivers/acpi/acpica/nseval.c in the Linux kernel through 4.12.9 does not flush the operand cache and causes a kernel stack dump, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory and bypass the KASLR protection mechanism (in the kernel through 4.9) via a crafted ACPI table.
Commit Message: acpi: acpica: fix acpi operand cache leak in nseval.c
I found an ACPI cache leak in ACPI early termination and boot continuing case.
When early termination occurs due to malicious ACPI table, Linux kernel
terminates ACPI function and continues to boot process. While kernel terminates
ACPI function, kmem_cache_destroy() reports Acpi-Operand cache leak.
Boot log of ACPI operand cache leak is as follows:
>[ 0.464168] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
>[ 0.467022] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
>[ 0.469376] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
>[ 0.471647] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
>[ 0.477997] ACPI Error: Null stack entry at ffff880215c0aad8 (20170303/exresop-174)
>[ 0.482706] ACPI Exception: AE_AML_INTERNAL, While resolving operands for [OpcodeName unavailable] (20170303/dswexec-461)
>[ 0.487503] ACPI Error: Method parse/execution failed [\DBG] (Node ffff88021710ab40), AE_AML_INTERNAL (20170303/psparse-543)
>[ 0.492136] ACPI Error: Method parse/execution failed [\_SB._INI] (Node ffff88021710a618), AE_AML_INTERNAL (20170303/psparse-543)
>[ 0.497683] ACPI: Interpreter enabled
>[ 0.499385] ACPI: (supports S0)
>[ 0.501151] ACPI: Using IOAPIC for interrupt routing
>[ 0.503342] ACPI Error: Null stack entry at ffff880215c0aad8 (20170303/exresop-174)
>[ 0.506522] ACPI Exception: AE_AML_INTERNAL, While resolving operands for [OpcodeName unavailable] (20170303/dswexec-461)
>[ 0.510463] ACPI Error: Method parse/execution failed [\DBG] (Node ffff88021710ab40), AE_AML_INTERNAL (20170303/psparse-543)
>[ 0.514477] ACPI Error: Method parse/execution failed [\_PIC] (Node ffff88021710ab18), AE_AML_INTERNAL (20170303/psparse-543)
>[ 0.518867] ACPI Exception: AE_AML_INTERNAL, Evaluating _PIC (20170303/bus-991)
>[ 0.522384] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Operand: Slab cache still has objects
>[ 0.524597] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.12.0-rc5 #26
>[ 0.526795] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
>[ 0.529668] Call Trace:
>[ 0.530811] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81
>[ 0.532240] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0
>[ 0.533905] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10
>[ 0.535497] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x3f/0x7b
>[ 0.537237] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14
>[ 0.538701] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f
>[ 0.540008] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
>[ 0.541593] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0
>[ 0.543008] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x19e/0x21f
>[ 0.546202] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
>[ 0.547513] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
>[ 0.548817] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
>[ 0.550587] vgaarb: loaded
>[ 0.551716] EDAC MC: Ver: 3.0.0
>[ 0.553744] PCI: Probing PCI hardware
>[ 0.555038] PCI host bridge to bus 0000:00
> ... Continue to boot and log is omitted ...
I analyzed this memory leak in detail and found AcpiNsEvaluate() function
only removes Info->ReturnObject in AE_CTRL_RETURN_VALUE case. But, when errors
occur, the status value is not AE_CTRL_RETURN_VALUE, and Info->ReturnObject is
also not null. Therefore, this causes acpi operand memory leak.
This cache leak causes a security threat because an old kernel (<= 4.9) shows
memory locations of kernel functions in stack dump. Some malicious users
could use this information to neutralize kernel ASLR.
I made a patch to fix ACPI operand cache leak.
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <[email protected]> | Low | 167,786 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: modifier_color_encoding_is_sRGB(PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm)
{
return pm->current_encoding != 0 && pm->current_encoding == pm->encodings &&
pm->current_encoding->gamma == pm->current_gamma;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,667 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static long bcm_char_ioctl(struct file *filp, UINT cmd, ULONG arg)
{
struct bcm_tarang_data *pTarang = filp->private_data;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
struct bcm_mini_adapter *Adapter = pTarang->Adapter;
INT Status = STATUS_FAILURE;
int timeout = 0;
struct bcm_ioctl_buffer IoBuffer;
int bytes;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Parameters Passed to control IOCTL cmd=0x%X arg=0x%lX", cmd, arg);
if (_IOC_TYPE(cmd) != BCM_IOCTL)
return -EFAULT;
if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
Status = !access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, argp, _IOC_SIZE(cmd));
else if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
Status = !access_ok(VERIFY_READ, argp, _IOC_SIZE(cmd));
else if (_IOC_NONE == (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_NONE))
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
if (Status)
return -EFAULT;
if (Adapter->device_removed)
return -EFAULT;
if (FALSE == Adapter->fw_download_done) {
switch (cmd) {
case IOCTL_MAC_ADDR_REQ:
case IOCTL_LINK_REQ:
case IOCTL_CM_REQUEST:
case IOCTL_SS_INFO_REQ:
case IOCTL_SEND_CONTROL_MESSAGE:
case IOCTL_IDLE_REQ:
case IOCTL_BCM_GPIO_SET_REQUEST:
case IOCTL_BCM_GPIO_STATUS_REQUEST:
return -EACCES;
default:
break;
}
}
Status = vendorextnIoctl(Adapter, cmd, arg);
if (Status != CONTINUE_COMMON_PATH)
return Status;
switch (cmd) {
/* Rdms for Swin Idle... */
case IOCTL_BCM_REGISTER_READ_PRIVATE: {
struct bcm_rdm_buffer sRdmBuffer = {0};
PCHAR temp_buff;
UINT Bufflen;
u16 temp_value;
/* Copy Ioctl Buffer structure */
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.InputLength > sizeof(sRdmBuffer))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&sRdmBuffer, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, IoBuffer.InputLength))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.OutputLength > USHRT_MAX ||
IoBuffer.OutputLength == 0) {
return -EINVAL;
}
Bufflen = IoBuffer.OutputLength;
temp_value = 4 - (Bufflen % 4);
Bufflen += temp_value % 4;
temp_buff = kmalloc(Bufflen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!temp_buff)
return -ENOMEM;
bytes = rdmalt(Adapter, (UINT)sRdmBuffer.Register,
(PUINT)temp_buff, Bufflen);
if (bytes > 0) {
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
if (copy_to_user(IoBuffer.OutputBuffer, temp_buff, bytes)) {
kfree(temp_buff);
return -EFAULT;
}
} else {
Status = bytes;
}
kfree(temp_buff);
break;
}
case IOCTL_BCM_REGISTER_WRITE_PRIVATE: {
struct bcm_wrm_buffer sWrmBuffer = {0};
UINT uiTempVar = 0;
/* Copy Ioctl Buffer structure */
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.InputLength > sizeof(sWrmBuffer))
return -EINVAL;
/* Get WrmBuffer structure */
if (copy_from_user(&sWrmBuffer, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, IoBuffer.InputLength))
return -EFAULT;
uiTempVar = sWrmBuffer.Register & EEPROM_REJECT_MASK;
if (!((Adapter->pstargetparams->m_u32Customize) & VSG_MODE) &&
((uiTempVar == EEPROM_REJECT_REG_1) ||
(uiTempVar == EEPROM_REJECT_REG_2) ||
(uiTempVar == EEPROM_REJECT_REG_3) ||
(uiTempVar == EEPROM_REJECT_REG_4))) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "EEPROM Access Denied, not in VSG Mode\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
Status = wrmalt(Adapter, (UINT)sWrmBuffer.Register,
(PUINT)sWrmBuffer.Data, sizeof(ULONG));
if (Status == STATUS_SUCCESS) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "WRM Done\n");
} else {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "WRM Failed\n");
Status = -EFAULT;
}
break;
}
case IOCTL_BCM_REGISTER_READ:
case IOCTL_BCM_EEPROM_REGISTER_READ: {
struct bcm_rdm_buffer sRdmBuffer = {0};
PCHAR temp_buff = NULL;
UINT uiTempVar = 0;
if ((Adapter->IdleMode == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bShutStatus == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode == TRUE)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Device in Idle Mode, Blocking Rdms\n");
return -EACCES;
}
/* Copy Ioctl Buffer structure */
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.InputLength > sizeof(sRdmBuffer))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&sRdmBuffer, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, IoBuffer.InputLength))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.OutputLength > USHRT_MAX ||
IoBuffer.OutputLength == 0) {
return -EINVAL;
}
temp_buff = kmalloc(IoBuffer.OutputLength, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!temp_buff)
return STATUS_FAILURE;
if ((((ULONG)sRdmBuffer.Register & 0x0F000000) != 0x0F000000) ||
((ULONG)sRdmBuffer.Register & 0x3)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "RDM Done On invalid Address : %x Access Denied.\n",
(int)sRdmBuffer.Register);
kfree(temp_buff);
return -EINVAL;
}
uiTempVar = sRdmBuffer.Register & EEPROM_REJECT_MASK;
bytes = rdmaltWithLock(Adapter, (UINT)sRdmBuffer.Register, (PUINT)temp_buff, IoBuffer.OutputLength);
if (bytes > 0) {
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
if (copy_to_user(IoBuffer.OutputBuffer, temp_buff, bytes)) {
kfree(temp_buff);
return -EFAULT;
}
} else {
Status = bytes;
}
kfree(temp_buff);
break;
}
case IOCTL_BCM_REGISTER_WRITE:
case IOCTL_BCM_EEPROM_REGISTER_WRITE: {
struct bcm_wrm_buffer sWrmBuffer = {0};
UINT uiTempVar = 0;
if ((Adapter->IdleMode == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bShutStatus == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode == TRUE)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Device in Idle Mode, Blocking Wrms\n");
return -EACCES;
}
/* Copy Ioctl Buffer structure */
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.InputLength > sizeof(sWrmBuffer))
return -EINVAL;
/* Get WrmBuffer structure */
if (copy_from_user(&sWrmBuffer, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, IoBuffer.InputLength))
return -EFAULT;
if ((((ULONG)sWrmBuffer.Register & 0x0F000000) != 0x0F000000) ||
((ULONG)sWrmBuffer.Register & 0x3)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "WRM Done On invalid Address : %x Access Denied.\n", (int)sWrmBuffer.Register);
return -EINVAL;
}
uiTempVar = sWrmBuffer.Register & EEPROM_REJECT_MASK;
if (!((Adapter->pstargetparams->m_u32Customize) & VSG_MODE) &&
((uiTempVar == EEPROM_REJECT_REG_1) ||
(uiTempVar == EEPROM_REJECT_REG_2) ||
(uiTempVar == EEPROM_REJECT_REG_3) ||
(uiTempVar == EEPROM_REJECT_REG_4)) &&
(cmd == IOCTL_BCM_REGISTER_WRITE)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "EEPROM Access Denied, not in VSG Mode\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
Status = wrmaltWithLock(Adapter, (UINT)sWrmBuffer.Register,
(PUINT)sWrmBuffer.Data, sWrmBuffer.Length);
if (Status == STATUS_SUCCESS) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "WRM Done\n");
} else {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "WRM Failed\n");
Status = -EFAULT;
}
break;
}
case IOCTL_BCM_GPIO_SET_REQUEST: {
UCHAR ucResetValue[4];
UINT value = 0;
UINT uiBit = 0;
UINT uiOperation = 0;
struct bcm_gpio_info gpio_info = {0};
if ((Adapter->IdleMode == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bShutStatus == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode == TRUE)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "GPIO Can't be set/clear in Low power Mode");
return -EACCES;
}
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.InputLength > sizeof(gpio_info))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&gpio_info, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, IoBuffer.InputLength))
return -EFAULT;
uiBit = gpio_info.uiGpioNumber;
uiOperation = gpio_info.uiGpioValue;
value = (1<<uiBit);
if (IsReqGpioIsLedInNVM(Adapter, value) == FALSE) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Sorry, Requested GPIO<0x%X> is not correspond to LED !!!", value);
Status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
/* Set - setting 1 */
if (uiOperation) {
/* Set the gpio output register */
Status = wrmaltWithLock(Adapter, BCM_GPIO_OUTPUT_SET_REG, (PUINT)(&value), sizeof(UINT));
if (Status == STATUS_SUCCESS) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Set the GPIO bit\n");
} else {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Failed to set the %dth GPIO\n", uiBit);
break;
}
} else {
/* Set the gpio output register */
Status = wrmaltWithLock(Adapter, BCM_GPIO_OUTPUT_CLR_REG, (PUINT)(&value), sizeof(UINT));
if (Status == STATUS_SUCCESS) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Set the GPIO bit\n");
} else {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Failed to clear the %dth GPIO\n", uiBit);
break;
}
}
bytes = rdmaltWithLock(Adapter, (UINT)GPIO_MODE_REGISTER, (PUINT)ucResetValue, sizeof(UINT));
if (bytes < 0) {
Status = bytes;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL,
"GPIO_MODE_REGISTER read failed");
break;
} else {
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
/* Set the gpio mode register to output */
*(UINT *)ucResetValue |= (1<<uiBit);
Status = wrmaltWithLock(Adapter, GPIO_MODE_REGISTER,
(PUINT)ucResetValue, sizeof(UINT));
if (Status == STATUS_SUCCESS) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Set the GPIO to output Mode\n");
} else {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Failed to put GPIO in Output Mode\n");
break;
}
}
break;
case BCM_LED_THREAD_STATE_CHANGE_REQ: {
struct bcm_user_thread_req threadReq = {0};
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "User made LED thread InActive");
if ((Adapter->IdleMode == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bShutStatus == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode == TRUE)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "GPIO Can't be set/clear in Low power Mode");
Status = -EACCES;
break;
}
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.InputLength > sizeof(threadReq))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&threadReq, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, IoBuffer.InputLength))
return -EFAULT;
/* if LED thread is running(Actively or Inactively) set it state to make inactive */
if (Adapter->LEDInfo.led_thread_running) {
if (threadReq.ThreadState == LED_THREAD_ACTIVATION_REQ) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Activating thread req");
Adapter->DriverState = LED_THREAD_ACTIVE;
} else {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "DeActivating Thread req.....");
Adapter->DriverState = LED_THREAD_INACTIVE;
}
/* signal thread. */
wake_up(&Adapter->LEDInfo.notify_led_event);
}
}
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_GPIO_STATUS_REQUEST: {
ULONG uiBit = 0;
UCHAR ucRead[4];
struct bcm_gpio_info gpio_info = {0};
if ((Adapter->IdleMode == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bShutStatus == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode == TRUE))
return -EACCES;
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.InputLength > sizeof(gpio_info))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&gpio_info, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, IoBuffer.InputLength))
return -EFAULT;
uiBit = gpio_info.uiGpioNumber;
/* Set the gpio output register */
bytes = rdmaltWithLock(Adapter, (UINT)GPIO_PIN_STATE_REGISTER,
(PUINT)ucRead, sizeof(UINT));
if (bytes < 0) {
Status = bytes;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "RDM Failed\n");
return Status;
} else {
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
}
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_GPIO_MULTI_REQUEST: {
UCHAR ucResetValue[4];
struct bcm_gpio_multi_info gpio_multi_info[MAX_IDX];
struct bcm_gpio_multi_info *pgpio_multi_info = (struct bcm_gpio_multi_info *)gpio_multi_info;
memset(pgpio_multi_info, 0, MAX_IDX * sizeof(struct bcm_gpio_multi_info));
if ((Adapter->IdleMode == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bShutStatus == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode == TRUE))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.InputLength > sizeof(gpio_multi_info))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&gpio_multi_info, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, IoBuffer.InputLength))
return -EFAULT;
if (IsReqGpioIsLedInNVM(Adapter, pgpio_multi_info[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOMask) == FALSE) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL,
"Sorry, Requested GPIO<0x%X> is not correspond to NVM LED bit map<0x%X>!!!",
pgpio_multi_info[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOMask, Adapter->gpioBitMap);
Status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
/* Set the gpio output register */
if ((pgpio_multi_info[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOMask) &
(pgpio_multi_info[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOCommand)) {
/* Set 1's in GPIO OUTPUT REGISTER */
*(UINT *)ucResetValue = pgpio_multi_info[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOMask &
pgpio_multi_info[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOCommand &
pgpio_multi_info[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOValue;
if (*(UINT *) ucResetValue)
Status = wrmaltWithLock(Adapter, BCM_GPIO_OUTPUT_SET_REG,
(PUINT)ucResetValue, sizeof(ULONG));
if (Status != STATUS_SUCCESS) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "WRM to BCM_GPIO_OUTPUT_SET_REG Failed.");
return Status;
}
/* Clear to 0's in GPIO OUTPUT REGISTER */
*(UINT *)ucResetValue = (pgpio_multi_info[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOMask &
pgpio_multi_info[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOCommand &
(~(pgpio_multi_info[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOValue)));
if (*(UINT *) ucResetValue)
Status = wrmaltWithLock(Adapter, BCM_GPIO_OUTPUT_CLR_REG, (PUINT)ucResetValue, sizeof(ULONG));
if (Status != STATUS_SUCCESS) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "WRM to BCM_GPIO_OUTPUT_CLR_REG Failed.");
return Status;
}
}
if (pgpio_multi_info[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOMask) {
bytes = rdmaltWithLock(Adapter, (UINT)GPIO_PIN_STATE_REGISTER, (PUINT)ucResetValue, sizeof(UINT));
if (bytes < 0) {
Status = bytes;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "RDM to GPIO_PIN_STATE_REGISTER Failed.");
return Status;
} else {
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
pgpio_multi_info[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOValue = (*(UINT *)ucResetValue &
pgpio_multi_info[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOMask);
}
Status = copy_to_user(IoBuffer.OutputBuffer, &gpio_multi_info, IoBuffer.OutputLength);
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0,
"Failed while copying Content to IOBufer for user space err:%d", Status);
return -EFAULT;
}
}
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_GPIO_MODE_REQUEST: {
UCHAR ucResetValue[4];
struct bcm_gpio_multi_mode gpio_multi_mode[MAX_IDX];
struct bcm_gpio_multi_mode *pgpio_multi_mode = (struct bcm_gpio_multi_mode *)gpio_multi_mode;
if ((Adapter->IdleMode == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bShutStatus == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode == TRUE))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.InputLength > sizeof(gpio_multi_mode))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&gpio_multi_mode, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, IoBuffer.InputLength))
return -EFAULT;
bytes = rdmaltWithLock(Adapter, (UINT)GPIO_MODE_REGISTER, (PUINT)ucResetValue, sizeof(UINT));
if (bytes < 0) {
Status = bytes;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Read of GPIO_MODE_REGISTER failed");
return Status;
} else {
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
/* Validating the request */
if (IsReqGpioIsLedInNVM(Adapter, pgpio_multi_mode[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOMask) == FALSE) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL,
"Sorry, Requested GPIO<0x%X> is not correspond to NVM LED bit map<0x%X>!!!",
pgpio_multi_mode[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOMask, Adapter->gpioBitMap);
Status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (pgpio_multi_mode[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOMask) {
/* write all OUT's (1's) */
*(UINT *) ucResetValue |= (pgpio_multi_mode[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOMode &
pgpio_multi_mode[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOMask);
/* write all IN's (0's) */
*(UINT *) ucResetValue &= ~((~pgpio_multi_mode[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOMode) &
pgpio_multi_mode[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOMask);
/* Currently implemented return the modes of all GPIO's
* else needs to bit AND with mask
*/
pgpio_multi_mode[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOMode = *(UINT *)ucResetValue;
Status = wrmaltWithLock(Adapter, GPIO_MODE_REGISTER, (PUINT)ucResetValue, sizeof(ULONG));
if (Status == STATUS_SUCCESS) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL,
"WRM to GPIO_MODE_REGISTER Done");
} else {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0,
"WRM to GPIO_MODE_REGISTER Failed");
Status = -EFAULT;
break;
}
} else {
/* if uiGPIOMask is 0 then return mode register configuration */
pgpio_multi_mode[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOMode = *(UINT *)ucResetValue;
}
Status = copy_to_user(IoBuffer.OutputBuffer, &gpio_multi_mode, IoBuffer.OutputLength);
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0,
"Failed while copying Content to IOBufer for user space err:%d", Status);
return -EFAULT;
}
}
break;
case IOCTL_MAC_ADDR_REQ:
case IOCTL_LINK_REQ:
case IOCTL_CM_REQUEST:
case IOCTL_SS_INFO_REQ:
case IOCTL_SEND_CONTROL_MESSAGE:
case IOCTL_IDLE_REQ: {
PVOID pvBuffer = NULL;
/* Copy Ioctl Buffer structure */
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.InputLength < sizeof(struct bcm_link_request))
return -EINVAL;
if (IoBuffer.InputLength > MAX_CNTL_PKT_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
pvBuffer = memdup_user(IoBuffer.InputBuffer,
IoBuffer.InputLength);
if (IS_ERR(pvBuffer))
return PTR_ERR(pvBuffer);
down(&Adapter->LowPowerModeSync);
Status = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(Adapter->lowpower_mode_wait_queue,
!Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode,
(1 * HZ));
if (Status == -ERESTARTSYS)
goto cntrlEnd;
if (Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL,
"Preparing Idle Mode is still True - Hence Rejecting control message\n");
Status = STATUS_FAILURE;
goto cntrlEnd;
}
Status = CopyBufferToControlPacket(Adapter, (PVOID)pvBuffer);
cntrlEnd:
up(&Adapter->LowPowerModeSync);
kfree(pvBuffer);
break;
}
case IOCTL_BCM_BUFFER_DOWNLOAD_START: {
if (down_trylock(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL,
"IOCTL_BCM_CHIP_RESET not allowed as EEPROM Read/Write is in progress\n");
return -EACCES;
}
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0,
"Starting the firmware download PID =0x%x!!!!\n", current->pid);
if (down_trylock(&Adapter->fw_download_sema))
return -EBUSY;
Adapter->bBinDownloaded = FALSE;
Adapter->fw_download_process_pid = current->pid;
Adapter->bCfgDownloaded = FALSE;
Adapter->fw_download_done = FALSE;
netif_carrier_off(Adapter->dev);
netif_stop_queue(Adapter->dev);
Status = reset_card_proc(Adapter);
if (Status) {
pr_err(PFX "%s: reset_card_proc Failed!\n", Adapter->dev->name);
up(&Adapter->fw_download_sema);
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
return Status;
}
mdelay(10);
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
return Status;
}
case IOCTL_BCM_BUFFER_DOWNLOAD: {
struct bcm_firmware_info *psFwInfo = NULL;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Starting the firmware download PID =0x%x!!!!\n", current->pid);
if (!down_trylock(&Adapter->fw_download_sema)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0,
"Invalid way to download buffer. Use Start and then call this!!!\n");
up(&Adapter->fw_download_sema);
Status = -EINVAL;
return Status;
}
/* Copy Ioctl Buffer structure */
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer))) {
up(&Adapter->fw_download_sema);
return -EFAULT;
}
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0,
"Length for FW DLD is : %lx\n", IoBuffer.InputLength);
if (IoBuffer.InputLength > sizeof(struct bcm_firmware_info)) {
up(&Adapter->fw_download_sema);
return -EINVAL;
}
psFwInfo = kmalloc(sizeof(*psFwInfo), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!psFwInfo) {
up(&Adapter->fw_download_sema);
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (copy_from_user(psFwInfo, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, IoBuffer.InputLength)) {
up(&Adapter->fw_download_sema);
kfree(psFwInfo);
return -EFAULT;
}
if (!psFwInfo->pvMappedFirmwareAddress ||
(psFwInfo->u32FirmwareLength == 0)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Something else is wrong %lu\n",
psFwInfo->u32FirmwareLength);
up(&Adapter->fw_download_sema);
kfree(psFwInfo);
Status = -EINVAL;
return Status;
}
Status = bcm_ioctl_fw_download(Adapter, psFwInfo);
if (Status != STATUS_SUCCESS) {
if (psFwInfo->u32StartingAddress == CONFIG_BEGIN_ADDR)
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "IOCTL: Configuration File Upload Failed\n");
else
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "IOCTL: Firmware File Upload Failed\n");
/* up(&Adapter->fw_download_sema); */
if (Adapter->LEDInfo.led_thread_running & BCM_LED_THREAD_RUNNING_ACTIVELY) {
Adapter->DriverState = DRIVER_INIT;
Adapter->LEDInfo.bLedInitDone = FALSE;
wake_up(&Adapter->LEDInfo.notify_led_event);
}
}
if (Status != STATUS_SUCCESS)
up(&Adapter->fw_download_sema);
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "IOCTL: Firmware File Uploaded\n");
kfree(psFwInfo);
return Status;
}
case IOCTL_BCM_BUFFER_DOWNLOAD_STOP: {
if (!down_trylock(&Adapter->fw_download_sema)) {
up(&Adapter->fw_download_sema);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (down_trylock(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0,
"FW download blocked as EEPROM Read/Write is in progress\n");
up(&Adapter->fw_download_sema);
return -EACCES;
}
Adapter->bBinDownloaded = TRUE;
Adapter->bCfgDownloaded = TRUE;
atomic_set(&Adapter->CurrNumFreeTxDesc, 0);
Adapter->CurrNumRecvDescs = 0;
Adapter->downloadDDR = 0;
/* setting the Mips to Run */
Status = run_card_proc(Adapter);
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Firm Download Failed\n");
up(&Adapter->fw_download_sema);
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
return Status;
} else {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG,
DBG_LVL_ALL, "Firm Download Over...\n");
}
mdelay(10);
/* Wait for MailBox Interrupt */
if (StartInterruptUrb((struct bcm_interface_adapter *)Adapter->pvInterfaceAdapter))
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Unable to send interrupt...\n");
timeout = 5*HZ;
Adapter->waiting_to_fw_download_done = FALSE;
wait_event_timeout(Adapter->ioctl_fw_dnld_wait_queue,
Adapter->waiting_to_fw_download_done, timeout);
Adapter->fw_download_process_pid = INVALID_PID;
Adapter->fw_download_done = TRUE;
atomic_set(&Adapter->CurrNumFreeTxDesc, 0);
Adapter->CurrNumRecvDescs = 0;
Adapter->PrevNumRecvDescs = 0;
atomic_set(&Adapter->cntrlpktCnt, 0);
Adapter->LinkUpStatus = 0;
Adapter->LinkStatus = 0;
if (Adapter->LEDInfo.led_thread_running & BCM_LED_THREAD_RUNNING_ACTIVELY) {
Adapter->DriverState = FW_DOWNLOAD_DONE;
wake_up(&Adapter->LEDInfo.notify_led_event);
}
if (!timeout)
Status = -ENODEV;
up(&Adapter->fw_download_sema);
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
return Status;
}
case IOCTL_BE_BUCKET_SIZE:
Status = 0;
if (get_user(Adapter->BEBucketSize, (unsigned long __user *)arg))
Status = -EFAULT;
break;
case IOCTL_RTPS_BUCKET_SIZE:
Status = 0;
if (get_user(Adapter->rtPSBucketSize, (unsigned long __user *)arg))
Status = -EFAULT;
break;
case IOCTL_CHIP_RESET: {
INT NVMAccess = down_trylock(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
if (NVMAccess) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, " IOCTL_BCM_CHIP_RESET not allowed as EEPROM Read/Write is in progress\n");
return -EACCES;
}
down(&Adapter->RxAppControlQueuelock);
Status = reset_card_proc(Adapter);
flushAllAppQ();
up(&Adapter->RxAppControlQueuelock);
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
ResetCounters(Adapter);
break;
}
case IOCTL_QOS_THRESHOLD: {
USHORT uiLoopIndex;
Status = 0;
for (uiLoopIndex = 0; uiLoopIndex < NO_OF_QUEUES; uiLoopIndex++) {
if (get_user(Adapter->PackInfo[uiLoopIndex].uiThreshold,
(unsigned long __user *)arg)) {
Status = -EFAULT;
break;
}
}
break;
}
case IOCTL_DUMP_PACKET_INFO:
DumpPackInfo(Adapter);
DumpPhsRules(&Adapter->stBCMPhsContext);
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
break;
case IOCTL_GET_PACK_INFO:
if (copy_to_user(argp, &Adapter->PackInfo, sizeof(struct bcm_packet_info)*NO_OF_QUEUES))
return -EFAULT;
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_SWITCH_TRANSFER_MODE: {
UINT uiData = 0;
if (copy_from_user(&uiData, argp, sizeof(UINT)))
return -EFAULT;
if (uiData) {
/* Allow All Packets */
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "IOCTL_BCM_SWITCH_TRANSFER_MODE: ETH_PACKET_TUNNELING_MODE\n");
Adapter->TransferMode = ETH_PACKET_TUNNELING_MODE;
} else {
/* Allow IP only Packets */
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "IOCTL_BCM_SWITCH_TRANSFER_MODE: IP_PACKET_ONLY_MODE\n");
Adapter->TransferMode = IP_PACKET_ONLY_MODE;
}
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
break;
}
case IOCTL_BCM_GET_DRIVER_VERSION: {
ulong len;
/* Copy Ioctl Buffer structure */
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
len = min_t(ulong, IoBuffer.OutputLength, strlen(DRV_VERSION) + 1);
if (copy_to_user(IoBuffer.OutputBuffer, DRV_VERSION, len))
return -EFAULT;
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
break;
}
case IOCTL_BCM_GET_CURRENT_STATUS: {
struct bcm_link_state link_state;
/* Copy Ioctl Buffer structure */
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer))) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "copy_from_user failed..\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
if (IoBuffer.OutputLength != sizeof(link_state)) {
Status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
memset(&link_state, 0, sizeof(link_state));
link_state.bIdleMode = Adapter->IdleMode;
link_state.bShutdownMode = Adapter->bShutStatus;
link_state.ucLinkStatus = Adapter->LinkStatus;
if (copy_to_user(IoBuffer.OutputBuffer, &link_state, min_t(size_t, sizeof(link_state), IoBuffer.OutputLength))) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Copy_to_user Failed..\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
break;
}
case IOCTL_BCM_SET_MAC_TRACING: {
UINT tracing_flag;
/* copy ioctl Buffer structure */
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&tracing_flag, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, sizeof(UINT)))
return -EFAULT;
if (tracing_flag)
Adapter->pTarangs->MacTracingEnabled = TRUE;
else
Adapter->pTarangs->MacTracingEnabled = FALSE;
break;
}
case IOCTL_BCM_GET_DSX_INDICATION: {
ULONG ulSFId = 0;
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.OutputLength < sizeof(struct bcm_add_indication_alt)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0,
"Mismatch req: %lx needed is =0x%zx!!!",
IoBuffer.OutputLength, sizeof(struct bcm_add_indication_alt));
return -EINVAL;
}
if (copy_from_user(&ulSFId, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, sizeof(ulSFId)))
return -EFAULT;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Get DSX Data SF ID is =%lx\n", ulSFId);
get_dsx_sf_data_to_application(Adapter, ulSFId, IoBuffer.OutputBuffer);
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_GET_HOST_MIBS: {
PVOID temp_buff;
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.OutputLength != sizeof(struct bcm_host_stats_mibs)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0,
"Length Check failed %lu %zd\n",
IoBuffer.OutputLength, sizeof(struct bcm_host_stats_mibs));
return -EINVAL;
}
/* FIXME: HOST_STATS are too big for kmalloc (122048)! */
temp_buff = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bcm_host_stats_mibs), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!temp_buff)
return STATUS_FAILURE;
Status = ProcessGetHostMibs(Adapter, temp_buff);
GetDroppedAppCntrlPktMibs(temp_buff, pTarang);
if (Status != STATUS_FAILURE)
if (copy_to_user(IoBuffer.OutputBuffer, temp_buff, sizeof(struct bcm_host_stats_mibs))) {
kfree(temp_buff);
return -EFAULT;
}
kfree(temp_buff);
break;
}
case IOCTL_BCM_WAKE_UP_DEVICE_FROM_IDLE:
if ((FALSE == Adapter->bTriedToWakeUpFromlowPowerMode) && (TRUE == Adapter->IdleMode)) {
Adapter->usIdleModePattern = ABORT_IDLE_MODE;
Adapter->bWakeUpDevice = TRUE;
wake_up(&Adapter->process_rx_cntrlpkt);
}
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_BULK_WRM: {
struct bcm_bulk_wrm_buffer *pBulkBuffer;
UINT uiTempVar = 0;
PCHAR pvBuffer = NULL;
if ((Adapter->IdleMode == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bShutStatus == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode == TRUE)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT (Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Device in Idle/Shutdown Mode, Blocking Wrms\n");
Status = -EACCES;
break;
}
/* Copy Ioctl Buffer structure */
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.InputLength < sizeof(ULONG) * 2)
return -EINVAL;
pvBuffer = memdup_user(IoBuffer.InputBuffer,
IoBuffer.InputLength);
if (IS_ERR(pvBuffer))
return PTR_ERR(pvBuffer);
pBulkBuffer = (struct bcm_bulk_wrm_buffer *)pvBuffer;
if (((ULONG)pBulkBuffer->Register & 0x0F000000) != 0x0F000000 ||
((ULONG)pBulkBuffer->Register & 0x3)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT (Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "WRM Done On invalid Address : %x Access Denied.\n", (int)pBulkBuffer->Register);
kfree(pvBuffer);
Status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
uiTempVar = pBulkBuffer->Register & EEPROM_REJECT_MASK;
if (!((Adapter->pstargetparams->m_u32Customize)&VSG_MODE) &&
((uiTempVar == EEPROM_REJECT_REG_1) ||
(uiTempVar == EEPROM_REJECT_REG_2) ||
(uiTempVar == EEPROM_REJECT_REG_3) ||
(uiTempVar == EEPROM_REJECT_REG_4)) &&
(cmd == IOCTL_BCM_REGISTER_WRITE)) {
kfree(pvBuffer);
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT (Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "EEPROM Access Denied, not in VSG Mode\n");
Status = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (pBulkBuffer->SwapEndian == FALSE)
Status = wrmWithLock(Adapter, (UINT)pBulkBuffer->Register, (PCHAR)pBulkBuffer->Values, IoBuffer.InputLength - 2*sizeof(ULONG));
else
Status = wrmaltWithLock(Adapter, (UINT)pBulkBuffer->Register, (PUINT)pBulkBuffer->Values, IoBuffer.InputLength - 2*sizeof(ULONG));
if (Status != STATUS_SUCCESS)
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "WRM Failed\n");
kfree(pvBuffer);
break;
}
case IOCTL_BCM_GET_NVM_SIZE:
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (Adapter->eNVMType == NVM_EEPROM || Adapter->eNVMType == NVM_FLASH) {
if (copy_to_user(IoBuffer.OutputBuffer, &Adapter->uiNVMDSDSize, sizeof(UINT)))
return -EFAULT;
}
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_CAL_INIT: {
UINT uiSectorSize = 0 ;
if (Adapter->eNVMType == NVM_FLASH) {
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&uiSectorSize, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, sizeof(UINT)))
return -EFAULT;
if ((uiSectorSize < MIN_SECTOR_SIZE) || (uiSectorSize > MAX_SECTOR_SIZE)) {
if (copy_to_user(IoBuffer.OutputBuffer, &Adapter->uiSectorSize,
sizeof(UINT)))
return -EFAULT;
} else {
if (IsFlash2x(Adapter)) {
if (copy_to_user(IoBuffer.OutputBuffer, &Adapter->uiSectorSize, sizeof(UINT)))
return -EFAULT;
} else {
if ((TRUE == Adapter->bShutStatus) || (TRUE == Adapter->IdleMode)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Device is in Idle/Shutdown Mode\n");
return -EACCES;
}
Adapter->uiSectorSize = uiSectorSize;
BcmUpdateSectorSize(Adapter, Adapter->uiSectorSize);
}
}
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
} else {
Status = STATUS_FAILURE;
}
}
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_SET_DEBUG:
#ifdef DEBUG
{
struct bcm_user_debug_state sUserDebugState;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "In SET_DEBUG ioctl\n");
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&sUserDebugState, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, sizeof(struct bcm_user_debug_state)))
return -EFAULT;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT (Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "IOCTL_BCM_SET_DEBUG: OnOff=%d Type = 0x%x ",
sUserDebugState.OnOff, sUserDebugState.Type);
/* sUserDebugState.Subtype <<= 1; */
sUserDebugState.Subtype = 1 << sUserDebugState.Subtype;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT (Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "actual Subtype=0x%x\n", sUserDebugState.Subtype);
/* Update new 'DebugState' in the Adapter */
Adapter->stDebugState.type |= sUserDebugState.Type;
/* Subtype: A bitmap of 32 bits for Subtype per Type.
* Valid indexes in 'subtype' array: 1,2,4,8
* corresponding to valid Type values. Hence we can use the 'Type' field
* as the index value, ignoring the array entries 0,3,5,6,7 !
*/
if (sUserDebugState.OnOff)
Adapter->stDebugState.subtype[sUserDebugState.Type] |= sUserDebugState.Subtype;
else
Adapter->stDebugState.subtype[sUserDebugState.Type] &= ~sUserDebugState.Subtype;
BCM_SHOW_DEBUG_BITMAP(Adapter);
}
#endif
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_NVM_READ:
case IOCTL_BCM_NVM_WRITE: {
struct bcm_nvm_readwrite stNVMReadWrite;
PUCHAR pReadData = NULL;
ULONG ulDSDMagicNumInUsrBuff = 0;
struct timeval tv0, tv1;
memset(&tv0, 0, sizeof(struct timeval));
memset(&tv1, 0, sizeof(struct timeval));
if ((Adapter->eNVMType == NVM_FLASH) && (Adapter->uiFlashLayoutMajorVersion == 0)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "The Flash Control Section is Corrupted. Hence Rejection on NVM Read/Write\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
if (IsFlash2x(Adapter)) {
if ((Adapter->eActiveDSD != DSD0) &&
(Adapter->eActiveDSD != DSD1) &&
(Adapter->eActiveDSD != DSD2)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "No DSD is active..hence NVM Command is blocked");
return STATUS_FAILURE;
}
}
/* Copy Ioctl Buffer structure */
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&stNVMReadWrite,
(IOCTL_BCM_NVM_READ == cmd) ? IoBuffer.OutputBuffer : IoBuffer.InputBuffer,
sizeof(struct bcm_nvm_readwrite)))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* Deny the access if the offset crosses the cal area limit.
*/
if (stNVMReadWrite.uiNumBytes > Adapter->uiNVMDSDSize)
return STATUS_FAILURE;
if (stNVMReadWrite.uiOffset > Adapter->uiNVMDSDSize - stNVMReadWrite.uiNumBytes) {
/* BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter,DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0,"Can't allow access beyond NVM Size: 0x%x 0x%x\n", stNVMReadWrite.uiOffset, stNVMReadWrite.uiNumBytes); */
return STATUS_FAILURE;
}
pReadData = memdup_user(stNVMReadWrite.pBuffer,
stNVMReadWrite.uiNumBytes);
if (IS_ERR(pReadData))
return PTR_ERR(pReadData);
do_gettimeofday(&tv0);
if (IOCTL_BCM_NVM_READ == cmd) {
down(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
if ((Adapter->IdleMode == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bShutStatus == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode == TRUE)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Device is in Idle/Shutdown Mode\n");
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
kfree(pReadData);
return -EACCES;
}
Status = BeceemNVMRead(Adapter, (PUINT)pReadData, stNVMReadWrite.uiOffset, stNVMReadWrite.uiNumBytes);
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
if (Status != STATUS_SUCCESS) {
kfree(pReadData);
return Status;
}
if (copy_to_user(stNVMReadWrite.pBuffer, pReadData, stNVMReadWrite.uiNumBytes)) {
kfree(pReadData);
return -EFAULT;
}
} else {
down(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
if ((Adapter->IdleMode == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bShutStatus == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode == TRUE)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Device is in Idle/Shutdown Mode\n");
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
kfree(pReadData);
return -EACCES;
}
Adapter->bHeaderChangeAllowed = TRUE;
if (IsFlash2x(Adapter)) {
/*
* New Requirement:-
* DSD section updation will be allowed in two case:-
* 1. if DSD sig is present in DSD header means dongle is ok and updation is fruitfull
* 2. if point 1 failes then user buff should have DSD sig. this point ensures that if dongle is
* corrupted then user space program first modify the DSD header with valid DSD sig so
* that this as well as further write may be worthwhile.
*
* This restriction has been put assuming that if DSD sig is corrupted, DSD
* data won't be considered valid.
*/
Status = BcmFlash2xCorruptSig(Adapter, Adapter->eActiveDSD);
if (Status != STATUS_SUCCESS) {
if (((stNVMReadWrite.uiOffset + stNVMReadWrite.uiNumBytes) != Adapter->uiNVMDSDSize) ||
(stNVMReadWrite.uiNumBytes < SIGNATURE_SIZE)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "DSD Sig is present neither in Flash nor User provided Input..");
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
kfree(pReadData);
return Status;
}
ulDSDMagicNumInUsrBuff = ntohl(*(PUINT)(pReadData + stNVMReadWrite.uiNumBytes - SIGNATURE_SIZE));
if (ulDSDMagicNumInUsrBuff != DSD_IMAGE_MAGIC_NUMBER) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "DSD Sig is present neither in Flash nor User provided Input..");
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
kfree(pReadData);
return Status;
}
}
}
Status = BeceemNVMWrite(Adapter, (PUINT)pReadData, stNVMReadWrite.uiOffset, stNVMReadWrite.uiNumBytes, stNVMReadWrite.bVerify);
if (IsFlash2x(Adapter))
BcmFlash2xWriteSig(Adapter, Adapter->eActiveDSD);
Adapter->bHeaderChangeAllowed = FALSE;
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
if (Status != STATUS_SUCCESS) {
kfree(pReadData);
return Status;
}
}
do_gettimeofday(&tv1);
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, " timetaken by Write/read :%ld msec\n", (tv1.tv_sec - tv0.tv_sec)*1000 + (tv1.tv_usec - tv0.tv_usec)/1000);
kfree(pReadData);
return STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
case IOCTL_BCM_FLASH2X_SECTION_READ: {
struct bcm_flash2x_readwrite sFlash2xRead = {0};
PUCHAR pReadBuff = NULL ;
UINT NOB = 0;
UINT BuffSize = 0;
UINT ReadBytes = 0;
UINT ReadOffset = 0;
void __user *OutPutBuff;
if (IsFlash2x(Adapter) != TRUE) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Flash Does not have 2.x map");
return -EINVAL;
}
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "IOCTL_BCM_FLASH2X_SECTION_READ Called");
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
/* Reading FLASH 2.x READ structure */
if (copy_from_user(&sFlash2xRead, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, sizeof(struct bcm_flash2x_readwrite)))
return -EFAULT;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "\nsFlash2xRead.Section :%x", sFlash2xRead.Section);
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "\nsFlash2xRead.offset :%x", sFlash2xRead.offset);
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "\nsFlash2xRead.numOfBytes :%x", sFlash2xRead.numOfBytes);
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "\nsFlash2xRead.bVerify :%x\n", sFlash2xRead.bVerify);
/* This was internal to driver for raw read. now it has ben exposed to user space app. */
if (validateFlash2xReadWrite(Adapter, &sFlash2xRead) == FALSE)
return STATUS_FAILURE;
NOB = sFlash2xRead.numOfBytes;
if (NOB > Adapter->uiSectorSize)
BuffSize = Adapter->uiSectorSize;
else
BuffSize = NOB;
ReadOffset = sFlash2xRead.offset ;
OutPutBuff = IoBuffer.OutputBuffer;
pReadBuff = (PCHAR)kzalloc(BuffSize , GFP_KERNEL);
if (pReadBuff == NULL) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Memory allocation failed for Flash 2.x Read Structure");
return -ENOMEM;
}
down(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
if ((Adapter->IdleMode == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bShutStatus == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode == TRUE)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Device is in Idle/Shutdown Mode\n");
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
kfree(pReadBuff);
return -EACCES;
}
while (NOB) {
if (NOB > Adapter->uiSectorSize)
ReadBytes = Adapter->uiSectorSize;
else
ReadBytes = NOB;
/* Reading the data from Flash 2.x */
Status = BcmFlash2xBulkRead(Adapter, (PUINT)pReadBuff, sFlash2xRead.Section, ReadOffset, ReadBytes);
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Flash 2x read err with Status :%d", Status);
break;
}
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT_BUFFER(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, pReadBuff, ReadBytes);
Status = copy_to_user(OutPutBuff, pReadBuff, ReadBytes);
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Copy to use failed with status :%d", Status);
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
kfree(pReadBuff);
return -EFAULT;
}
NOB = NOB - ReadBytes;
if (NOB) {
ReadOffset = ReadOffset + ReadBytes;
OutPutBuff = OutPutBuff + ReadBytes ;
}
}
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
kfree(pReadBuff);
}
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_FLASH2X_SECTION_WRITE: {
struct bcm_flash2x_readwrite sFlash2xWrite = {0};
PUCHAR pWriteBuff;
void __user *InputAddr;
UINT NOB = 0;
UINT BuffSize = 0;
UINT WriteOffset = 0;
UINT WriteBytes = 0;
if (IsFlash2x(Adapter) != TRUE) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Flash Does not have 2.x map");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* First make this False so that we can enable the Sector Permission Check in BeceemFlashBulkWrite */
Adapter->bAllDSDWriteAllow = FALSE;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "IOCTL_BCM_FLASH2X_SECTION_WRITE Called");
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
/* Reading FLASH 2.x READ structure */
if (copy_from_user(&sFlash2xWrite, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, sizeof(struct bcm_flash2x_readwrite)))
return -EFAULT;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "\nsFlash2xRead.Section :%x", sFlash2xWrite.Section);
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "\nsFlash2xRead.offset :%d", sFlash2xWrite.offset);
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "\nsFlash2xRead.numOfBytes :%x", sFlash2xWrite.numOfBytes);
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "\nsFlash2xRead.bVerify :%x\n", sFlash2xWrite.bVerify);
if ((sFlash2xWrite.Section != VSA0) && (sFlash2xWrite.Section != VSA1) && (sFlash2xWrite.Section != VSA2)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Only VSA write is allowed");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (validateFlash2xReadWrite(Adapter, &sFlash2xWrite) == FALSE)
return STATUS_FAILURE;
InputAddr = sFlash2xWrite.pDataBuff;
WriteOffset = sFlash2xWrite.offset;
NOB = sFlash2xWrite.numOfBytes;
if (NOB > Adapter->uiSectorSize)
BuffSize = Adapter->uiSectorSize;
else
BuffSize = NOB ;
pWriteBuff = kmalloc(BuffSize, GFP_KERNEL);
if (pWriteBuff == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
/* extracting the remainder of the given offset. */
WriteBytes = Adapter->uiSectorSize;
if (WriteOffset % Adapter->uiSectorSize)
WriteBytes = Adapter->uiSectorSize - (WriteOffset % Adapter->uiSectorSize);
if (NOB < WriteBytes)
WriteBytes = NOB;
down(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
if ((Adapter->IdleMode == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bShutStatus == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode == TRUE)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Device is in Idle/Shutdown Mode\n");
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
kfree(pWriteBuff);
return -EACCES;
}
BcmFlash2xCorruptSig(Adapter, sFlash2xWrite.Section);
do {
Status = copy_from_user(pWriteBuff, InputAddr, WriteBytes);
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Copy to user failed with status :%d", Status);
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
kfree(pWriteBuff);
return -EFAULT;
}
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT_BUFFER(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, pWriteBuff, WriteBytes);
/* Writing the data from Flash 2.x */
Status = BcmFlash2xBulkWrite(Adapter, (PUINT)pWriteBuff, sFlash2xWrite.Section, WriteOffset, WriteBytes, sFlash2xWrite.bVerify);
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Flash 2x read err with Status :%d", Status);
break;
}
NOB = NOB - WriteBytes;
if (NOB) {
WriteOffset = WriteOffset + WriteBytes;
InputAddr = InputAddr + WriteBytes;
if (NOB > Adapter->uiSectorSize)
WriteBytes = Adapter->uiSectorSize;
else
WriteBytes = NOB;
}
} while (NOB > 0);
BcmFlash2xWriteSig(Adapter, sFlash2xWrite.Section);
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
kfree(pWriteBuff);
}
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_GET_FLASH2X_SECTION_BITMAP: {
struct bcm_flash2x_bitmap *psFlash2xBitMap;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "IOCTL_BCM_GET_FLASH2X_SECTION_BITMAP Called");
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.OutputLength != sizeof(struct bcm_flash2x_bitmap))
return -EINVAL;
psFlash2xBitMap = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bcm_flash2x_bitmap), GFP_KERNEL);
if (psFlash2xBitMap == NULL) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Memory is not available");
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* Reading the Flash Sectio Bit map */
down(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
if ((Adapter->IdleMode == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bShutStatus == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode == TRUE)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Device is in Idle/Shutdown Mode\n");
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
kfree(psFlash2xBitMap);
return -EACCES;
}
BcmGetFlash2xSectionalBitMap(Adapter, psFlash2xBitMap);
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
if (copy_to_user(IoBuffer.OutputBuffer, psFlash2xBitMap, sizeof(struct bcm_flash2x_bitmap))) {
kfree(psFlash2xBitMap);
return -EFAULT;
}
kfree(psFlash2xBitMap);
}
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_SET_ACTIVE_SECTION: {
enum bcm_flash2x_section_val eFlash2xSectionVal = 0;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "IOCTL_BCM_SET_ACTIVE_SECTION Called");
if (IsFlash2x(Adapter) != TRUE) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Flash Does not have 2.x map");
return -EINVAL;
}
Status = copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer));
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Copy of IOCTL BUFFER failed");
return -EFAULT;
}
Status = copy_from_user(&eFlash2xSectionVal, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, sizeof(INT));
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Copy of flash section val failed");
return -EFAULT;
}
down(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
if ((Adapter->IdleMode == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bShutStatus == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode == TRUE)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Device is in Idle/Shutdown Mode\n");
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
return -EACCES;
}
Status = BcmSetActiveSection(Adapter, eFlash2xSectionVal);
if (Status)
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Failed to make it's priority Highest. Status %d", Status);
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
}
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_IDENTIFY_ACTIVE_SECTION: {
/* Right Now we are taking care of only DSD */
Adapter->bAllDSDWriteAllow = FALSE;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "IOCTL_BCM_IDENTIFY_ACTIVE_SECTION called");
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_COPY_SECTION: {
struct bcm_flash2x_copy_section sCopySectStrut = {0};
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "IOCTL_BCM_COPY_SECTION Called");
Adapter->bAllDSDWriteAllow = FALSE;
if (IsFlash2x(Adapter) != TRUE) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Flash Does not have 2.x map");
return -EINVAL;
}
Status = copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer));
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Copy of IOCTL BUFFER failed Status :%d", Status);
return -EFAULT;
}
Status = copy_from_user(&sCopySectStrut, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, sizeof(struct bcm_flash2x_copy_section));
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Copy of Copy_Section_Struct failed with Status :%d", Status);
return -EFAULT;
}
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Source SEction :%x", sCopySectStrut.SrcSection);
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Destination SEction :%x", sCopySectStrut.DstSection);
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "offset :%x", sCopySectStrut.offset);
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "NOB :%x", sCopySectStrut.numOfBytes);
if (IsSectionExistInFlash(Adapter, sCopySectStrut.SrcSection) == FALSE) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Source Section<%x> does not exixt in Flash ", sCopySectStrut.SrcSection);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (IsSectionExistInFlash(Adapter, sCopySectStrut.DstSection) == FALSE) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Destinatio Section<%x> does not exixt in Flash ", sCopySectStrut.DstSection);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (sCopySectStrut.SrcSection == sCopySectStrut.DstSection) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Source and Destination section should be different");
return -EINVAL;
}
down(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
if ((Adapter->IdleMode == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bShutStatus == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode == TRUE)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Device is in Idle/Shutdown Mode\n");
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
return -EACCES;
}
if (sCopySectStrut.SrcSection == ISO_IMAGE1 || sCopySectStrut.SrcSection == ISO_IMAGE2) {
if (IsNonCDLessDevice(Adapter)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Device is Non-CDLess hence won't have ISO !!");
Status = -EINVAL;
} else if (sCopySectStrut.numOfBytes == 0) {
Status = BcmCopyISO(Adapter, sCopySectStrut);
} else {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Partial Copy of ISO section is not Allowed..");
Status = STATUS_FAILURE;
}
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
return Status;
}
Status = BcmCopySection(Adapter, sCopySectStrut.SrcSection,
sCopySectStrut.DstSection, sCopySectStrut.offset, sCopySectStrut.numOfBytes);
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
}
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_GET_FLASH_CS_INFO: {
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, " IOCTL_BCM_GET_FLASH_CS_INFO Called");
Status = copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer));
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Copy of IOCTL BUFFER failed");
return -EFAULT;
}
if (Adapter->eNVMType != NVM_FLASH) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Connected device does not have flash");
Status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (IsFlash2x(Adapter) == TRUE) {
if (IoBuffer.OutputLength < sizeof(struct bcm_flash2x_cs_info))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_to_user(IoBuffer.OutputBuffer, Adapter->psFlash2xCSInfo, sizeof(struct bcm_flash2x_cs_info)))
return -EFAULT;
} else {
if (IoBuffer.OutputLength < sizeof(struct bcm_flash_cs_info))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_to_user(IoBuffer.OutputBuffer, Adapter->psFlashCSInfo, sizeof(struct bcm_flash_cs_info)))
return -EFAULT;
}
}
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_SELECT_DSD: {
UINT SectOfset = 0;
enum bcm_flash2x_section_val eFlash2xSectionVal;
eFlash2xSectionVal = NO_SECTION_VAL;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "IOCTL_BCM_SELECT_DSD Called");
if (IsFlash2x(Adapter) != TRUE) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Flash Does not have 2.x map");
return -EINVAL;
}
Status = copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer));
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Copy of IOCTL BUFFER failed");
return -EFAULT;
}
Status = copy_from_user(&eFlash2xSectionVal, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, sizeof(INT));
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Copy of flash section val failed");
return -EFAULT;
}
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Read Section :%d", eFlash2xSectionVal);
if ((eFlash2xSectionVal != DSD0) &&
(eFlash2xSectionVal != DSD1) &&
(eFlash2xSectionVal != DSD2)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Passed section<%x> is not DSD section", eFlash2xSectionVal);
return STATUS_FAILURE;
}
SectOfset = BcmGetSectionValStartOffset(Adapter, eFlash2xSectionVal);
if (SectOfset == INVALID_OFFSET) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Provided Section val <%d> does not exixt in Flash 2.x", eFlash2xSectionVal);
return -EINVAL;
}
Adapter->bAllDSDWriteAllow = TRUE;
Adapter->ulFlashCalStart = SectOfset;
Adapter->eActiveDSD = eFlash2xSectionVal;
}
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_NVM_RAW_READ: {
struct bcm_nvm_readwrite stNVMRead;
INT NOB ;
INT BuffSize ;
INT ReadOffset = 0;
UINT ReadBytes = 0 ;
PUCHAR pReadBuff;
void __user *OutPutBuff;
if (Adapter->eNVMType != NVM_FLASH) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "NVM TYPE is not Flash");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* Copy Ioctl Buffer structure */
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer))) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "copy_from_user 1 failed\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
if (copy_from_user(&stNVMRead, IoBuffer.OutputBuffer, sizeof(struct bcm_nvm_readwrite)))
return -EFAULT;
NOB = stNVMRead.uiNumBytes;
/* In Raw-Read max Buff size : 64MB */
if (NOB > DEFAULT_BUFF_SIZE)
BuffSize = DEFAULT_BUFF_SIZE;
else
BuffSize = NOB;
ReadOffset = stNVMRead.uiOffset;
OutPutBuff = stNVMRead.pBuffer;
pReadBuff = kzalloc(BuffSize , GFP_KERNEL);
if (pReadBuff == NULL) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Memory allocation failed for Flash 2.x Read Structure");
Status = -ENOMEM;
break;
}
down(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
if ((Adapter->IdleMode == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bShutStatus == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode == TRUE)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Device is in Idle/Shutdown Mode\n");
kfree(pReadBuff);
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
return -EACCES;
}
Adapter->bFlashRawRead = TRUE;
while (NOB) {
if (NOB > DEFAULT_BUFF_SIZE)
ReadBytes = DEFAULT_BUFF_SIZE;
else
ReadBytes = NOB;
/* Reading the data from Flash 2.x */
Status = BeceemNVMRead(Adapter, (PUINT)pReadBuff, ReadOffset, ReadBytes);
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Flash 2x read err with Status :%d", Status);
break;
}
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT_BUFFER(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, pReadBuff, ReadBytes);
Status = copy_to_user(OutPutBuff, pReadBuff, ReadBytes);
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Copy to use failed with status :%d", Status);
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
kfree(pReadBuff);
return -EFAULT;
}
NOB = NOB - ReadBytes;
if (NOB) {
ReadOffset = ReadOffset + ReadBytes;
OutPutBuff = OutPutBuff + ReadBytes;
}
}
Adapter->bFlashRawRead = FALSE;
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
kfree(pReadBuff);
break;
}
case IOCTL_BCM_CNTRLMSG_MASK: {
ULONG RxCntrlMsgBitMask = 0;
/* Copy Ioctl Buffer structure */
Status = copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer));
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "copy of Ioctl buffer is failed from user space");
return -EFAULT;
}
if (IoBuffer.InputLength != sizeof(unsigned long)) {
Status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
Status = copy_from_user(&RxCntrlMsgBitMask, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, IoBuffer.InputLength);
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "copy of control bit mask failed from user space");
return -EFAULT;
}
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "\n Got user defined cntrl msg bit mask :%lx", RxCntrlMsgBitMask);
pTarang->RxCntrlMsgBitMask = RxCntrlMsgBitMask;
}
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_GET_DEVICE_DRIVER_INFO: {
struct bcm_driver_info DevInfo;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Called IOCTL_BCM_GET_DEVICE_DRIVER_INFO\n");
DevInfo.MaxRDMBufferSize = BUFFER_4K;
DevInfo.u32DSDStartOffset = EEPROM_CALPARAM_START;
DevInfo.u32RxAlignmentCorrection = 0;
DevInfo.u32NVMType = Adapter->eNVMType;
DevInfo.u32InterfaceType = BCM_USB;
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.OutputLength < sizeof(DevInfo))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_to_user(IoBuffer.OutputBuffer, &DevInfo, sizeof(DevInfo)))
return -EFAULT;
}
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_TIME_SINCE_NET_ENTRY: {
struct bcm_time_elapsed stTimeElapsedSinceNetEntry = {0};
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "IOCTL_BCM_TIME_SINCE_NET_ENTRY called");
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.OutputLength < sizeof(struct bcm_time_elapsed))
return -EINVAL;
stTimeElapsedSinceNetEntry.ul64TimeElapsedSinceNetEntry = get_seconds() - Adapter->liTimeSinceLastNetEntry;
if (copy_to_user(IoBuffer.OutputBuffer, &stTimeElapsedSinceNetEntry, sizeof(struct bcm_time_elapsed)))
return -EFAULT;
}
break;
case IOCTL_CLOSE_NOTIFICATION:
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "IOCTL_CLOSE_NOTIFICATION");
break;
default:
pr_info(DRV_NAME ": unknown ioctl cmd=%#x\n", cmd);
Status = STATUS_FAILURE;
break;
}
return Status;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The bcm_char_ioctl function in drivers/staging/bcm/Bcmchar.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12 does not initialize a certain data structure, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via an IOCTL_BCM_GET_DEVICE_DRIVER_INFO ioctl call.
Commit Message: Staging: bcm: info leak in ioctl
The DevInfo.u32Reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks kernel
information to user space.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,962 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void swizzleImageData(unsigned char* srcAddr,
size_t height,
size_t bytesPerRow,
bool flipY) {
if (flipY) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < height / 2; i++) {
size_t topRowStartPosition = i * bytesPerRow;
size_t bottomRowStartPosition = (height - 1 - i) * bytesPerRow;
if (kN32_SkColorType == kBGRA_8888_SkColorType) { // needs to swizzle
for (size_t j = 0; j < bytesPerRow; j += 4) {
std::swap(srcAddr[topRowStartPosition + j],
srcAddr[bottomRowStartPosition + j + 2]);
std::swap(srcAddr[topRowStartPosition + j + 1],
srcAddr[bottomRowStartPosition + j + 1]);
std::swap(srcAddr[topRowStartPosition + j + 2],
srcAddr[bottomRowStartPosition + j]);
std::swap(srcAddr[topRowStartPosition + j + 3],
srcAddr[bottomRowStartPosition + j + 3]);
}
} else {
std::swap_ranges(srcAddr + topRowStartPosition,
srcAddr + topRowStartPosition + bytesPerRow,
srcAddr + bottomRowStartPosition);
}
}
} else {
if (kN32_SkColorType == kBGRA_8888_SkColorType) // needs to swizzle
for (size_t i = 0; i < height * bytesPerRow; i += 4)
std::swap(srcAddr[i], srcAddr[i + 2]);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Bad casting in bitmap manipulation in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936} | Medium | 172,506 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: IW_IMPL(unsigned int) iw_get_ui16be(const iw_byte *b)
{
return (b[0]<<8) | b[1];
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-682
Summary: libimageworsener.a in ImageWorsener before 1.3.1 has *left shift cannot be represented in type int* undefined behavior issues, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted image, related to imagew-bmp.c and imagew-util.c.
Commit Message: Trying to fix some invalid left shift operations
Fixes issue #16 | Medium | 168,197 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int sfgets(void)
{
struct pollfd pfd;
int pollret;
ssize_t readnb;
signed char seen_r = 0;
static size_t scanned;
static size_t readnbd;
if (scanned > (size_t) 0U) { /* support pipelining */
readnbd -= scanned;
memmove(cmd, cmd + scanned, readnbd); /* safe */
scanned = (size_t) 0U;
}
pfd.fd = clientfd;
#ifdef __APPLE_CC__
pfd.events = POLLIN | POLLERR | POLLHUP;
#else
pfd.events = POLLIN | POLLPRI | POLLERR | POLLHUP;
#endif
while (scanned < cmdsize) {
if (scanned >= readnbd) { /* nothing left in the buffer */
pfd.revents = 0;
while ((pollret = poll(&pfd, 1U, idletime * 1000UL)) < 0 &&
errno == EINTR);
if (pollret == 0) {
return -1;
}
if (pollret <= 0 ||
(pfd.revents & (POLLERR | POLLHUP | POLLNVAL)) != 0) {
return -2;
}
if ((pfd.revents & (POLLIN | POLLPRI)) == 0) {
continue;
}
if (readnbd >= cmdsize) {
break;
}
#ifdef WITH_TLS
if (tls_cnx != NULL) {
while ((readnb = SSL_read
(tls_cnx, cmd + readnbd, cmdsize - readnbd))
< (ssize_t) 0 && errno == EINTR);
} else
#endif
{
while ((readnb = read(clientfd, cmd + readnbd,
cmdsize - readnbd)) < (ssize_t) 0 &&
errno == EINTR);
}
if (readnb <= (ssize_t) 0) {
return -2;
}
readnbd += readnb;
if (readnbd > cmdsize) {
return -2;
}
}
#ifdef RFC_CONFORMANT_LINES
if (seen_r != 0) {
#endif
if (cmd[scanned] == '\n') {
#ifndef RFC_CONFORMANT_LINES
if (seen_r != 0) {
#endif
cmd[scanned - 1U] = 0;
#ifndef RFC_CONFORMANT_LINES
} else {
cmd[scanned] = 0;
}
#endif
if (++scanned >= readnbd) { /* non-pipelined command */
scanned = readnbd = (size_t) 0U;
}
return 0;
}
seen_r = 0;
#ifdef RFC_CONFORMANT_LINES
}
#endif
if (ISCTRLCODE(cmd[scanned])) {
if (cmd[scanned] == '\r') {
seen_r = 1;
}
#ifdef RFC_CONFORMANT_PARSER /* disabled by default, intentionnaly */
else if (cmd[scanned] == 0) {
cmd[scanned] = '\n';
}
#else
/* replace control chars with _ */
cmd[scanned] = '_';
#endif
}
scanned++;
}
die(421, LOG_WARNING, MSG_LINE_TOO_LONG); /* don't remove this */
return 0; /* to please GCC */
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The STARTTLS implementation in ftp_parser.c in Pure-FTPd before 1.0.30 does not properly restrict I/O buffering, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to insert commands into encrypted FTP sessions by sending a cleartext command that is processed after TLS is in place, related to a *plaintext command injection* attack, a similar issue to CVE-2011-0411.
Commit Message: Flush the command buffer after switching to TLS.
Fixes a flaw similar to CVE-2011-0411. | Medium | 165,526 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: LockScreenMediaControlsView::LockScreenMediaControlsView(
service_manager::Connector* connector,
const Callbacks& callbacks)
: connector_(connector),
hide_controls_timer_(new base::OneShotTimer()),
media_controls_enabled_(callbacks.media_controls_enabled),
hide_media_controls_(callbacks.hide_media_controls),
show_media_controls_(callbacks.show_media_controls) {
DCHECK(callbacks.media_controls_enabled);
DCHECK(callbacks.hide_media_controls);
DCHECK(callbacks.show_media_controls);
Shell::Get()->media_controller()->SetMediaControlsDismissed(false);
middle_spacing_ = std::make_unique<NonAccessibleView>();
middle_spacing_->set_owned_by_client();
set_notify_enter_exit_on_child(true);
contents_view_ = AddChildView(std::make_unique<views::View>());
contents_view_->SetLayoutManager(std::make_unique<views::BoxLayout>(
views::BoxLayout::Orientation::kVertical));
contents_view_->SetBackground(views::CreateRoundedRectBackground(
kMediaControlsBackground, kMediaControlsCornerRadius));
contents_view_->SetPaintToLayer(); // Needed for opacity animation.
contents_view_->layer()->SetFillsBoundsOpaquely(false);
auto close_button_row = std::make_unique<NonAccessibleView>();
views::GridLayout* close_button_layout =
close_button_row->SetLayoutManager(std::make_unique<views::GridLayout>());
views::ColumnSet* columns = close_button_layout->AddColumnSet(0);
columns->AddPaddingColumn(0, kCloseButtonOffset);
columns->AddColumn(views::GridLayout::CENTER, views::GridLayout::CENTER, 0,
views::GridLayout::USE_PREF, 0, 0);
close_button_layout->StartRowWithPadding(
0, 0, 0, 5 /* padding between close button and top of view */);
auto close_button = CreateVectorImageButton(this);
SetImageFromVectorIcon(close_button.get(), vector_icons::kCloseRoundedIcon,
kCloseButtonIconSize, gfx::kGoogleGrey700);
close_button->SetPreferredSize(kCloseButtonSize);
close_button->SetFocusBehavior(View::FocusBehavior::ALWAYS);
base::string16 close_button_label(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_ASH_LOCK_SCREEN_MEDIA_CONTROLS_CLOSE));
close_button->SetAccessibleName(close_button_label);
close_button_ = close_button_layout->AddView(std::move(close_button));
close_button_->SetVisible(false);
contents_view_->AddChildView(std::move(close_button_row));
header_row_ =
contents_view_->AddChildView(std::make_unique<MediaControlsHeaderView>());
auto session_artwork = std::make_unique<views::ImageView>();
session_artwork->SetPreferredSize(
gfx::Size(kArtworkViewWidth, kArtworkViewHeight));
session_artwork->SetBorder(views::CreateEmptyBorder(kArtworkInsets));
session_artwork_ = contents_view_->AddChildView(std::move(session_artwork));
progress_ = contents_view_->AddChildView(
std::make_unique<media_message_center::MediaControlsProgressView>(
base::BindRepeating(&LockScreenMediaControlsView::SeekTo,
base::Unretained(this))));
auto button_row = std::make_unique<NonAccessibleView>();
auto* button_row_layout =
button_row->SetLayoutManager(std::make_unique<views::BoxLayout>(
views::BoxLayout::Orientation::kHorizontal, kButtonRowInsets,
kMediaButtonRowSeparator));
button_row_layout->set_cross_axis_alignment(
views::BoxLayout::CrossAxisAlignment::kCenter);
button_row_layout->set_main_axis_alignment(
views::BoxLayout::MainAxisAlignment::kCenter);
button_row->SetPreferredSize(kMediaControlsButtonRowSize);
button_row_ = contents_view_->AddChildView(std::move(button_row));
CreateMediaButton(
kChangeTrackIconSize, MediaSessionAction::kPreviousTrack,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_ASH_LOCK_SCREEN_MEDIA_CONTROLS_ACTION_PREVIOUS_TRACK));
CreateMediaButton(
kSeekingIconsSize, MediaSessionAction::kSeekBackward,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_ASH_LOCK_SCREEN_MEDIA_CONTROLS_ACTION_SEEK_BACKWARD));
auto play_pause_button = views::CreateVectorToggleImageButton(this);
play_pause_button->set_tag(static_cast<int>(MediaSessionAction::kPause));
play_pause_button->SetPreferredSize(kMediaButtonSize);
play_pause_button->SetFocusBehavior(views::View::FocusBehavior::ALWAYS);
play_pause_button->SetTooltipText(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_ASH_LOCK_SCREEN_MEDIA_CONTROLS_ACTION_PAUSE));
play_pause_button->SetToggledTooltipText(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_ASH_LOCK_SCREEN_MEDIA_CONTROLS_ACTION_PLAY));
play_pause_button_ = button_row_->AddChildView(std::move(play_pause_button));
views::SetImageFromVectorIcon(
play_pause_button_,
GetVectorIconForMediaAction(MediaSessionAction::kPause),
kPlayPauseIconSize, kMediaButtonColor);
views::SetToggledImageFromVectorIcon(
play_pause_button_,
GetVectorIconForMediaAction(MediaSessionAction::kPlay),
kPlayPauseIconSize, kMediaButtonColor);
CreateMediaButton(
kSeekingIconsSize, MediaSessionAction::kSeekForward,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_ASH_LOCK_SCREEN_MEDIA_CONTROLS_ACTION_SEEK_FORWARD));
CreateMediaButton(kChangeTrackIconSize, MediaSessionAction::kNextTrack,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_ASH_LOCK_SCREEN_MEDIA_CONTROLS_ACTION_NEXT_TRACK));
MediaSessionMetadataChanged(base::nullopt);
MediaSessionPositionChanged(base::nullopt);
MediaControllerImageChanged(
media_session::mojom::MediaSessionImageType::kSourceIcon, SkBitmap());
SetArtwork(base::nullopt);
if (!connector_)
return;
mojo::Remote<media_session::mojom::MediaControllerManager>
controller_manager_remote;
connector_->Connect(media_session::mojom::kServiceName,
controller_manager_remote.BindNewPipeAndPassReceiver());
controller_manager_remote->CreateActiveMediaController(
media_controller_remote_.BindNewPipeAndPassReceiver());
media_controller_remote_->AddObserver(
observer_receiver_.BindNewPipeAndPassRemote());
media_controller_remote_->ObserveImages(
media_session::mojom::MediaSessionImageType::kArtwork,
kMinimumArtworkSize, kDesiredArtworkSize,
artwork_observer_receiver_.BindNewPipeAndPassRemote());
media_controller_remote_->ObserveImages(
media_session::mojom::MediaSessionImageType::kSourceIcon,
kMinimumIconSize, kDesiredIconSize,
icon_observer_receiver_.BindNewPipeAndPassRemote());
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: A timing attack in SVG rendering in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Linux, Windows, and Mac allowed a remote attacker to extract pixel values from a cross-origin page being iframe'd via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253} | Low | 172,339 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)
{
struct key *keyring;
keyring = keyring_alloc("_tid", new->uid, new->gid, new,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW,
KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN,
NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring))
return PTR_ERR(keyring);
new->thread_keyring = keyring;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.10.13 allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a series of KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring calls.
Commit Message: KEYS: fix keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring() to not leak thread keyrings
This fixes CVE-2017-7472.
Running the following program as an unprivileged user exhausts kernel
memory by leaking thread keyrings:
#include <keyutils.h>
int main()
{
for (;;)
keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING);
}
Fix it by only creating a new thread keyring if there wasn't one before.
To make things more consistent, make install_thread_keyring_to_cred()
and install_process_keyring_to_cred() both return 0 if the corresponding
keyring is already present.
Fixes: d84f4f992cbd ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Cc: [email protected] # 2.6.29+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,277 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: gss_wrap_size_limit(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int conf_req_flag,
gss_qop_t qop_req, OM_uint32 req_output_size, OM_uint32 *max_input_size)
{
gss_union_ctx_id_t ctx;
gss_mechanism mech;
OM_uint32 major_status;
if (minor_status == NULL)
return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE);
*minor_status = 0;
if (context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ | GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
if (max_input_size == NULL)
return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE);
/*
* select the approprate underlying mechanism routine and
* call it.
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
if (!mech)
return (GSS_S_BAD_MECH);
if (mech->gss_wrap_size_limit)
major_status = mech->gss_wrap_size_limit(minor_status,
ctx->internal_ctx_id,
conf_req_flag, qop_req,
req_output_size, max_input_size);
else if (mech->gss_wrap_iov_length)
major_status = gssint_wrap_size_limit_iov_shim(mech, minor_status,
ctx->internal_ctx_id,
conf_req_flag, qop_req,
req_output_size, max_input_size);
else
major_status = GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
if (major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
map_error(minor_status, mech);
return major_status;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) allows attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors involving automatic deletion of security contexts on error.
Commit Message: Preserve GSS context on init/accept failure
After gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() has created a
context, don't delete the mechglue context on failures from subsequent
calls, even if the mechanism deletes the mech-specific context (which
is allowed by RFC 2744 but not preferred). Check for union contexts
with no mechanism context in each GSS function which accepts a
gss_ctx_id_t.
CVE-2017-11462:
RFC 2744 permits a GSS-API implementation to delete an existing
security context on a second or subsequent call to
gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() if the call results
in an error. This API behavior has been found to be dangerous,
leading to the possibility of memory errors in some callers. For
safety, GSS-API implementations should instead preserve existing
security contexts on error until the caller deletes them.
All versions of MIT krb5 prior to this change may delete acceptor
contexts on error. Versions 1.13.4 through 1.13.7, 1.14.1 through
1.14.5, and 1.15 through 1.15.1 may also delete initiator contexts on
error.
ticket: 8598 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup | High | 168,021 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: check(FILE *fp, int argc, const char **argv, png_uint_32p flags/*out*/,
display *d, int set_callback)
{
int i, npasses, ipass;
png_uint_32 height;
d->keep = PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_AS_DEFAULT;
d->before_IDAT = 0;
d->after_IDAT = 0;
/* Some of these errors are permanently fatal and cause an exit here, others
* are per-test and cause an error return.
*/
d->png_ptr = png_create_read_struct(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING, d, error,
warning);
if (d->png_ptr == NULL)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s(%s): could not allocate png struct\n", d->file,
d->test);
/* Terminate here, this error is not test specific. */
exit(1);
}
d->info_ptr = png_create_info_struct(d->png_ptr);
d->end_ptr = png_create_info_struct(d->png_ptr);
if (d->info_ptr == NULL || d->end_ptr == NULL)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s(%s): could not allocate png info\n", d->file,
d->test);
clean_display(d);
exit(1);
}
png_init_io(d->png_ptr, fp);
# ifdef PNG_READ_USER_CHUNKS_SUPPORTED
/* This is only done if requested by the caller; it interferes with the
* standard store/save mechanism.
*/
if (set_callback)
png_set_read_user_chunk_fn(d->png_ptr, d, read_callback);
# else
UNUSED(set_callback)
# endif
/* Handle each argument in turn; multiple settings are possible for the same
* chunk and multiple calls will occur (the last one should override all
* preceding ones).
*/
for (i=0; i<argc; ++i)
{
const char *equals = strchr(argv[i], '=');
if (equals != NULL)
{
int chunk, option;
if (strcmp(equals+1, "default") == 0)
option = PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_AS_DEFAULT;
else if (strcmp(equals+1, "discard") == 0)
option = PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_NEVER;
else if (strcmp(equals+1, "if-safe") == 0)
option = PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_IF_SAFE;
else if (strcmp(equals+1, "save") == 0)
option = PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_ALWAYS;
else
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s(%s): %s: unrecognized chunk option\n", d->file,
d->test, argv[i]);
display_exit(d);
}
switch (equals - argv[i])
{
case 4: /* chunk name */
chunk = find(argv[i]);
if (chunk >= 0)
{
/* These #if tests have the effect of skipping the arguments
* if SAVE support is unavailable - we can't do a useful test
* in this case, so we just check the arguments! This could
* be improved in the future by using the read callback.
*/
png_byte name[5];
memcpy(name, chunk_info[chunk].name, 5);
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(d->png_ptr, option, name, 1);
chunk_info[chunk].keep = option;
continue;
}
break;
case 7: /* default */
if (memcmp(argv[i], "default", 7) == 0)
{
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(d->png_ptr, option, NULL, 0);
d->keep = option;
continue;
}
break;
case 3: /* all */
if (memcmp(argv[i], "all", 3) == 0)
{
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(d->png_ptr, option, NULL, -1);
d->keep = option;
for (chunk = 0; chunk < NINFO; ++chunk)
if (chunk_info[chunk].all)
chunk_info[chunk].keep = option;
continue;
}
break;
default: /* some misplaced = */
break;
}
}
fprintf(stderr, "%s(%s): %s: unrecognized chunk argument\n", d->file,
d->test, argv[i]);
display_exit(d);
}
png_read_info(d->png_ptr, d->info_ptr);
switch (png_get_interlace_type(d->png_ptr, d->info_ptr))
{
case PNG_INTERLACE_NONE:
npasses = 1;
break;
case PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7:
npasses = PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7_PASSES;
break;
default:
/* Hard error because it is not test specific */
fprintf(stderr, "%s(%s): invalid interlace type\n", d->file, d->test);
clean_display(d);
exit(1);
}
/* Skip the image data, if IDAT is not being handled then don't do this
* because it will cause a CRC error.
*/
if (chunk_info[0/*IDAT*/].keep == PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_AS_DEFAULT)
{
png_start_read_image(d->png_ptr);
height = png_get_image_height(d->png_ptr, d->info_ptr);
if (npasses > 1)
{
png_uint_32 width = png_get_image_width(d->png_ptr, d->info_ptr);
for (ipass=0; ipass<npasses; ++ipass)
{
png_uint_32 wPass = PNG_PASS_COLS(width, ipass);
if (wPass > 0)
{
png_uint_32 y;
for (y=0; y<height; ++y) if (PNG_ROW_IN_INTERLACE_PASS(y, ipass))
png_read_row(d->png_ptr, NULL, NULL);
}
}
} /* interlaced */
else /* not interlaced */
{
png_uint_32 y;
for (y=0; y<height; ++y)
png_read_row(d->png_ptr, NULL, NULL);
}
}
png_read_end(d->png_ptr, d->end_ptr);
flags[0] = get_valid(d, d->info_ptr);
flags[1] = get_unknown(d, d->info_ptr, 0/*before IDAT*/);
/* Only png_read_png sets PNG_INFO_IDAT! */
flags[chunk_info[0/*IDAT*/].keep != PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_AS_DEFAULT] |=
PNG_INFO_IDAT;
flags[2] = get_valid(d, d->end_ptr);
flags[3] = get_unknown(d, d->end_ptr, 1/*after IDAT*/);
clean_display(d);
return d->keep;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,598 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: sp<MediaSource> MPEG4Extractor::getTrack(size_t index) {
status_t err;
if ((err = readMetaData()) != OK) {
return NULL;
}
Track *track = mFirstTrack;
while (index > 0) {
if (track == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
track = track->next;
--index;
}
if (track == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
Trex *trex = NULL;
int32_t trackId;
if (track->meta->findInt32(kKeyTrackID, &trackId)) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < mTrex.size(); i++) {
Trex *t = &mTrex.editItemAt(index);
if (t->track_ID == (uint32_t) trackId) {
trex = t;
break;
}
}
}
ALOGV("getTrack called, pssh: %zu", mPssh.size());
return new MPEG4Source(this,
track->meta, mDataSource, track->timescale, track->sampleTable,
mSidxEntries, trex, mMoofOffset);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: media/libmediaplayerservice/nuplayer/GenericSource.cpp in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 does not validate certain track data, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28799341.
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
| High | 173,764 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void __udf_read_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
struct fileEntry *fe;
struct extendedFileEntry *efe;
uint16_t ident;
struct udf_inode_info *iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
struct udf_sb_info *sbi = UDF_SB(inode->i_sb);
unsigned int link_count;
/*
* Set defaults, but the inode is still incomplete!
* Note: get_new_inode() sets the following on a new inode:
* i_sb = sb
* i_no = ino
* i_flags = sb->s_flags
* i_state = 0
* clean_inode(): zero fills and sets
* i_count = 1
* i_nlink = 1
* i_op = NULL;
*/
bh = udf_read_ptagged(inode->i_sb, &iinfo->i_location, 0, &ident);
if (!bh) {
udf_err(inode->i_sb, "(ino %ld) failed !bh\n", inode->i_ino);
make_bad_inode(inode);
return;
}
if (ident != TAG_IDENT_FE && ident != TAG_IDENT_EFE &&
ident != TAG_IDENT_USE) {
udf_err(inode->i_sb, "(ino %ld) failed ident=%d\n",
inode->i_ino, ident);
brelse(bh);
make_bad_inode(inode);
return;
}
fe = (struct fileEntry *)bh->b_data;
efe = (struct extendedFileEntry *)bh->b_data;
if (fe->icbTag.strategyType == cpu_to_le16(4096)) {
struct buffer_head *ibh;
ibh = udf_read_ptagged(inode->i_sb, &iinfo->i_location, 1,
&ident);
if (ident == TAG_IDENT_IE && ibh) {
struct buffer_head *nbh = NULL;
struct kernel_lb_addr loc;
struct indirectEntry *ie;
ie = (struct indirectEntry *)ibh->b_data;
loc = lelb_to_cpu(ie->indirectICB.extLocation);
if (ie->indirectICB.extLength &&
(nbh = udf_read_ptagged(inode->i_sb, &loc, 0,
&ident))) {
if (ident == TAG_IDENT_FE ||
ident == TAG_IDENT_EFE) {
memcpy(&iinfo->i_location,
&loc,
sizeof(struct kernel_lb_addr));
brelse(bh);
brelse(ibh);
brelse(nbh);
__udf_read_inode(inode);
return;
}
brelse(nbh);
}
}
brelse(ibh);
} else if (fe->icbTag.strategyType != cpu_to_le16(4)) {
udf_err(inode->i_sb, "unsupported strategy type: %d\n",
le16_to_cpu(fe->icbTag.strategyType));
brelse(bh);
make_bad_inode(inode);
return;
}
if (fe->icbTag.strategyType == cpu_to_le16(4))
iinfo->i_strat4096 = 0;
else /* if (fe->icbTag.strategyType == cpu_to_le16(4096)) */
iinfo->i_strat4096 = 1;
iinfo->i_alloc_type = le16_to_cpu(fe->icbTag.flags) &
ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_MASK;
iinfo->i_unique = 0;
iinfo->i_lenEAttr = 0;
iinfo->i_lenExtents = 0;
iinfo->i_lenAlloc = 0;
iinfo->i_next_alloc_block = 0;
iinfo->i_next_alloc_goal = 0;
if (fe->descTag.tagIdent == cpu_to_le16(TAG_IDENT_EFE)) {
iinfo->i_efe = 1;
iinfo->i_use = 0;
if (udf_alloc_i_data(inode, inode->i_sb->s_blocksize -
sizeof(struct extendedFileEntry))) {
make_bad_inode(inode);
return;
}
memcpy(iinfo->i_ext.i_data,
bh->b_data + sizeof(struct extendedFileEntry),
inode->i_sb->s_blocksize -
sizeof(struct extendedFileEntry));
} else if (fe->descTag.tagIdent == cpu_to_le16(TAG_IDENT_FE)) {
iinfo->i_efe = 0;
iinfo->i_use = 0;
if (udf_alloc_i_data(inode, inode->i_sb->s_blocksize -
sizeof(struct fileEntry))) {
make_bad_inode(inode);
return;
}
memcpy(iinfo->i_ext.i_data,
bh->b_data + sizeof(struct fileEntry),
inode->i_sb->s_blocksize - sizeof(struct fileEntry));
} else if (fe->descTag.tagIdent == cpu_to_le16(TAG_IDENT_USE)) {
iinfo->i_efe = 0;
iinfo->i_use = 1;
iinfo->i_lenAlloc = le32_to_cpu(
((struct unallocSpaceEntry *)bh->b_data)->
lengthAllocDescs);
if (udf_alloc_i_data(inode, inode->i_sb->s_blocksize -
sizeof(struct unallocSpaceEntry))) {
make_bad_inode(inode);
return;
}
memcpy(iinfo->i_ext.i_data,
bh->b_data + sizeof(struct unallocSpaceEntry),
inode->i_sb->s_blocksize -
sizeof(struct unallocSpaceEntry));
return;
}
read_lock(&sbi->s_cred_lock);
i_uid_write(inode, le32_to_cpu(fe->uid));
if (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) ||
UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_UID_IGNORE) ||
UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_UID_SET))
inode->i_uid = UDF_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_uid;
i_gid_write(inode, le32_to_cpu(fe->gid));
if (!gid_valid(inode->i_gid) ||
UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_GID_IGNORE) ||
UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_GID_SET))
inode->i_gid = UDF_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_gid;
if (fe->icbTag.fileType != ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_DIRECTORY &&
sbi->s_fmode != UDF_INVALID_MODE)
inode->i_mode = sbi->s_fmode;
else if (fe->icbTag.fileType == ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_DIRECTORY &&
sbi->s_dmode != UDF_INVALID_MODE)
inode->i_mode = sbi->s_dmode;
else
inode->i_mode = udf_convert_permissions(fe);
inode->i_mode &= ~sbi->s_umask;
read_unlock(&sbi->s_cred_lock);
link_count = le16_to_cpu(fe->fileLinkCount);
if (!link_count)
link_count = 1;
set_nlink(inode, link_count);
inode->i_size = le64_to_cpu(fe->informationLength);
iinfo->i_lenExtents = inode->i_size;
if (iinfo->i_efe == 0) {
inode->i_blocks = le64_to_cpu(fe->logicalBlocksRecorded) <<
(inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits - 9);
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_atime, fe->accessTime))
inode->i_atime = sbi->s_record_time;
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_mtime,
fe->modificationTime))
inode->i_mtime = sbi->s_record_time;
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_ctime, fe->attrTime))
inode->i_ctime = sbi->s_record_time;
iinfo->i_unique = le64_to_cpu(fe->uniqueID);
iinfo->i_lenEAttr = le32_to_cpu(fe->lengthExtendedAttr);
iinfo->i_lenAlloc = le32_to_cpu(fe->lengthAllocDescs);
iinfo->i_checkpoint = le32_to_cpu(fe->checkpoint);
} else {
inode->i_blocks = le64_to_cpu(efe->logicalBlocksRecorded) <<
(inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits - 9);
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_atime, efe->accessTime))
inode->i_atime = sbi->s_record_time;
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_mtime,
efe->modificationTime))
inode->i_mtime = sbi->s_record_time;
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&iinfo->i_crtime, efe->createTime))
iinfo->i_crtime = sbi->s_record_time;
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_ctime, efe->attrTime))
inode->i_ctime = sbi->s_record_time;
iinfo->i_unique = le64_to_cpu(efe->uniqueID);
iinfo->i_lenEAttr = le32_to_cpu(efe->lengthExtendedAttr);
iinfo->i_lenAlloc = le32_to_cpu(efe->lengthAllocDescs);
iinfo->i_checkpoint = le32_to_cpu(efe->checkpoint);
}
switch (fe->icbTag.fileType) {
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_DIRECTORY:
inode->i_op = &udf_dir_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &udf_dir_operations;
inode->i_mode |= S_IFDIR;
inc_nlink(inode);
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_REALTIME:
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_REGULAR:
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_UNDEF:
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_VAT20:
if (iinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB)
inode->i_data.a_ops = &udf_adinicb_aops;
else
inode->i_data.a_ops = &udf_aops;
inode->i_op = &udf_file_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &udf_file_operations;
inode->i_mode |= S_IFREG;
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_BLOCK:
inode->i_mode |= S_IFBLK;
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_CHAR:
inode->i_mode |= S_IFCHR;
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_FIFO:
init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode | S_IFIFO, 0);
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_SOCKET:
init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode | S_IFSOCK, 0);
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_SYMLINK:
inode->i_data.a_ops = &udf_symlink_aops;
inode->i_op = &udf_symlink_inode_operations;
inode->i_mode = S_IFLNK | S_IRWXUGO;
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_MAIN:
udf_debug("METADATA FILE-----\n");
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_MIRROR:
udf_debug("METADATA MIRROR FILE-----\n");
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_BITMAP:
udf_debug("METADATA BITMAP FILE-----\n");
break;
default:
udf_err(inode->i_sb, "(ino %ld) failed unknown file type=%d\n",
inode->i_ino, fe->icbTag.fileType);
make_bad_inode(inode);
return;
}
if (S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) || S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode)) {
struct deviceSpec *dsea =
(struct deviceSpec *)udf_get_extendedattr(inode, 12, 1);
if (dsea) {
init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode,
MKDEV(le32_to_cpu(dsea->majorDeviceIdent),
le32_to_cpu(dsea->minorDeviceIdent)));
/* Developer ID ??? */
} else
make_bad_inode(inode);
}
brelse(bh);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The __udf_read_inode function in fs/udf/inode.c in the Linux kernel through 3.16.3 does not restrict the amount of ICB indirection, which allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop or stack consumption) via a UDF filesystem with a crafted inode.
Commit Message: udf: Avoid infinite loop when processing indirect ICBs
We did not implement any bound on number of indirect ICBs we follow when
loading inode. Thus corrupted medium could cause kernel to go into an
infinite loop, possibly causing a stack overflow.
Fix the possible stack overflow by removing recursion from
__udf_read_inode() and limit number of indirect ICBs we follow to avoid
infinite loops.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,266 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: Mac_Read_POST_Resource( FT_Library library,
FT_Stream stream,
FT_Long *offsets,
FT_Long resource_cnt,
FT_Long face_index,
FT_Face *aface )
{
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Cannot_Open_Resource;
FT_Memory memory = library->memory;
FT_Byte* pfb_data;
int i, type, flags;
FT_Long len;
FT_Long pfb_len, pfb_pos, pfb_lenpos;
FT_Long rlen, temp;
if ( face_index == -1 )
face_index = 0;
if ( face_index != 0 )
return error;
/* Find the length of all the POST resources, concatenated. Assume */
/* worst case (each resource in its own section). */
pfb_len = 0;
for ( i = 0; i < resource_cnt; ++i )
{
error = FT_Stream_Seek( stream, offsets[i] );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
if ( FT_READ_LONG( temp ) )
goto Exit;
pfb_len += temp + 6;
}
if ( FT_ALLOC( pfb_data, (FT_Long)pfb_len + 2 ) )
goto Exit;
pfb_data[0] = 0x80;
pfb_data[1] = 1; /* Ascii section */
pfb_data[2] = 0; /* 4-byte length, fill in later */
pfb_data[3] = 0;
pfb_data[4] = 0;
pfb_data[5] = 0;
pfb_pos = 6;
pfb_lenpos = 2;
len = 0;
type = 1;
for ( i = 0; i < resource_cnt; ++i )
{
error = FT_Stream_Seek( stream, offsets[i] );
if ( error )
goto Exit2;
if ( FT_READ_LONG( rlen ) )
goto Exit;
if ( FT_READ_USHORT( flags ) )
goto Exit;
rlen -= 2; /* the flags are part of the resource */
if ( ( flags >> 8 ) == type )
len += rlen;
else
{
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos ] = (FT_Byte)( len );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 1] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 8 );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 2] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 16 );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 3] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 24 );
if ( ( flags >> 8 ) == 5 ) /* End of font mark */
break;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0x80;
type = flags >> 8;
len = rlen;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = (FT_Byte)type;
pfb_lenpos = pfb_pos;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0; /* 4-byte length, fill in later */
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0;
}
error = FT_Stream_Read( stream, (FT_Byte *)pfb_data + pfb_pos, rlen );
pfb_pos += rlen;
}
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos ] = (FT_Byte)( len );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 1] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 8 );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 2] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 16 );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 3] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 24 );
return open_face_from_buffer( library,
pfb_data,
pfb_pos,
face_index,
"type1",
aface );
Exit2:
FT_FREE( pfb_data );
Exit:
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the Mac_Read_POST_Resource function in base/ftobjs.c in FreeType before 2.4.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted LaserWriter PS font file with an embedded PFB fragment.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,006 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_kexdh_init){
int rc;
(void)type;
(void)user;
SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PACKET,"Received SSH_MSG_KEXDH_INIT");
if(session->dh_handshake_state != DH_STATE_INIT){
SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_RARE,"Invalid state for SSH_MSG_KEXDH_INIT");
goto error;
}
switch(session->next_crypto->kex_type){
case SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP1_SHA1:
case SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP14_SHA1:
rc=ssh_server_kexdh_init(session, packet);
break;
#ifdef HAVE_ECDH
case SSH_KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256:
rc = ssh_server_ecdh_init(session, packet);
break;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_CURVE25519
case SSH_KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256_LIBSSH_ORG:
rc = ssh_server_curve25519_init(session, packet);
break;
#endif
default:
ssh_set_error(session,SSH_FATAL,"Wrong kex type in ssh_packet_kexdh_init");
rc = SSH_ERROR;
}
if (rc == SSH_ERROR)
session->session_state = SSH_SESSION_STATE_ERROR;
error:
return SSH_PACKET_USED;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The (1) SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS and (2) SSH_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY packet handlers in package_cb.c in libssh before 0.6.5 do not properly validate state, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and crash) via a crafted SSH packet.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,325 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int qcow2_grow_l1_table(BlockDriverState *bs, uint64_t min_size,
bool exact_size)
{
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
int new_l1_size2, ret, i;
uint64_t *new_l1_table;
int64_t old_l1_table_offset, old_l1_size;
int64_t new_l1_table_offset, new_l1_size;
uint8_t data[12];
if (min_size <= s->l1_size)
return 0;
if (exact_size) {
new_l1_size = min_size;
} else {
/* Bump size up to reduce the number of times we have to grow */
new_l1_size = s->l1_size;
if (new_l1_size == 0) {
new_l1_size = 1;
}
while (min_size > new_l1_size) {
new_l1_size = (new_l1_size * 3 + 1) / 2;
}
}
if (new_l1_size > INT_MAX) {
return -EFBIG;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ALLOC2
fprintf(stderr, "grow l1_table from %d to %" PRId64 "\n",
s->l1_size, new_l1_size);
#endif
new_l1_size2 = sizeof(uint64_t) * new_l1_size;
new_l1_table = g_malloc0(align_offset(new_l1_size2, 512));
memcpy(new_l1_table, s->l1_table, s->l1_size * sizeof(uint64_t));
/* write new table (align to cluster) */
BLKDBG_EVENT(bs->file, BLKDBG_L1_GROW_ALLOC_TABLE);
new_l1_table_offset = qcow2_alloc_clusters(bs, new_l1_size2);
if (new_l1_table_offset < 0) {
g_free(new_l1_table);
return new_l1_table_offset;
}
ret = qcow2_cache_flush(bs, s->refcount_block_cache);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
/* the L1 position has not yet been updated, so these clusters must
* indeed be completely free */
ret = qcow2_pre_write_overlap_check(bs, 0, new_l1_table_offset,
new_l1_size2);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
BLKDBG_EVENT(bs->file, BLKDBG_L1_GROW_WRITE_TABLE);
for(i = 0; i < s->l1_size; i++)
new_l1_table[i] = cpu_to_be64(new_l1_table[i]);
ret = bdrv_pwrite_sync(bs->file, new_l1_table_offset, new_l1_table, new_l1_size2);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
for(i = 0; i < s->l1_size; i++)
new_l1_table[i] = be64_to_cpu(new_l1_table[i]);
/* set new table */
BLKDBG_EVENT(bs->file, BLKDBG_L1_GROW_ACTIVATE_TABLE);
cpu_to_be32w((uint32_t*)data, new_l1_size);
stq_be_p(data + 4, new_l1_table_offset);
ret = bdrv_pwrite_sync(bs->file, offsetof(QCowHeader, l1_size), data,sizeof(data));
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
g_free(s->l1_table);
old_l1_table_offset = s->l1_table_offset;
s->l1_table_offset = new_l1_table_offset;
s->l1_table = new_l1_table;
old_l1_size = s->l1_size;
s->l1_size = new_l1_size;
qcow2_free_clusters(bs, old_l1_table_offset, old_l1_size * sizeof(uint64_t),
QCOW2_DISCARD_OTHER);
return 0;
fail:
g_free(new_l1_table);
qcow2_free_clusters(bs, new_l1_table_offset, new_l1_size2,
QCOW2_DISCARD_OTHER);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in the block drivers in QEMU, possibly before 2.0.0, allow local users to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted catalog size in (1) the parallels_open function in block/parallels.c or (2) bochs_open function in bochs.c, a large L1 table in the (3) qcow2_snapshot_load_tmp in qcow2-snapshot.c or (4) qcow2_grow_l1_table function in qcow2-cluster.c, (5) a large request in the bdrv_check_byte_request function in block.c and other block drivers, (6) crafted cluster indexes in the get_refcount function in qcow2-refcount.c, or (7) a large number of blocks in the cloop_open function in cloop.c, which trigger buffer overflows, memory corruption, large memory allocations and out-of-bounds read and writes.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,409 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: InternalWebIntentsDispatcherTest() {
replied_ = 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allow remote attackers to have an unknown impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Fix uninitialized member in ctor.
[email protected]
[email protected]
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10377180
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137606 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,761 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: daemon_msg_open_req(uint8 ver, struct daemon_slpars *pars, uint32 plen,
char *source, size_t sourcelen)
{
char errbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE]; // buffer for network errors
char errmsgbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE]; // buffer for errors to send to the client
pcap_t *fp; // pcap_t main variable
int nread;
char sendbuf[RPCAP_NETBUF_SIZE]; // temporary buffer in which data to be sent is buffered
int sendbufidx = 0; // index which keeps the number of bytes currently buffered
struct rpcap_openreply *openreply; // open reply message
if (plen > sourcelen - 1)
{
pcap_snprintf(errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Source string too long");
goto error;
}
nread = sock_recv(pars->sockctrl, source, plen,
SOCK_RECEIVEALL_YES|SOCK_EOF_IS_ERROR, errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE);
if (nread == -1)
{
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "Read from client failed: %s", errbuf);
return -1;
}
source[nread] = '\0';
plen -= nread;
if ((fp = pcap_open_live(source,
1500 /* fake snaplen */,
0 /* no promis */,
1000 /* fake timeout */,
errmsgbuf)) == NULL)
goto error;
if (sock_bufferize(NULL, sizeof(struct rpcap_header), NULL, &sendbufidx,
RPCAP_NETBUF_SIZE, SOCKBUF_CHECKONLY, errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
goto error;
rpcap_createhdr((struct rpcap_header *) sendbuf, ver,
RPCAP_MSG_OPEN_REPLY, 0, sizeof(struct rpcap_openreply));
openreply = (struct rpcap_openreply *) &sendbuf[sendbufidx];
if (sock_bufferize(NULL, sizeof(struct rpcap_openreply), NULL, &sendbufidx,
RPCAP_NETBUF_SIZE, SOCKBUF_CHECKONLY, errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
goto error;
memset(openreply, 0, sizeof(struct rpcap_openreply));
openreply->linktype = htonl(pcap_datalink(fp));
openreply->tzoff = 0; /* This is always 0 for live captures */
pcap_close(fp);
if (sock_send(pars->sockctrl, sendbuf, sendbufidx, errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
{
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "Send to client failed: %s", errbuf);
return -1;
}
return 0;
error:
if (rpcap_senderror(pars->sockctrl, ver, PCAP_ERR_OPEN,
errmsgbuf, errbuf) == -1)
{
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "Send to client failed: %s", errbuf);
return -1;
}
if (rpcapd_discard(pars->sockctrl, plen) == -1)
{
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-918
Summary: rpcapd/daemon.c in libpcap before 1.9.1 allows SSRF because a URL may be provided as a capture source.
Commit Message: In the open request, reject capture sources that are URLs.
You shouldn't be able to ask a server to open a remote device on some
*other* server; just open it yourself.
This addresses Include Security issue F13: [libpcap] Remote Packet
Capture Daemon Allows Opening Capture URLs. | Medium | 169,540 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int __kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem,
int user_alloc)
{
int r;
gfn_t base_gfn;
unsigned long npages;
unsigned long i;
struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
struct kvm_memory_slot old, new;
struct kvm_memslots *slots, *old_memslots;
r = -EINVAL;
/* General sanity checks */
if (mem->memory_size & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
goto out;
if (mem->guest_phys_addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
goto out;
/* We can read the guest memory with __xxx_user() later on. */
if (user_alloc &&
((mem->userspace_addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) ||
!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE,
(void __user *)(unsigned long)mem->userspace_addr,
mem->memory_size)))
goto out;
if (mem->slot >= KVM_MEM_SLOTS_NUM)
goto out;
if (mem->guest_phys_addr + mem->memory_size < mem->guest_phys_addr)
goto out;
memslot = id_to_memslot(kvm->memslots, mem->slot);
base_gfn = mem->guest_phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
npages = mem->memory_size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
r = -EINVAL;
if (npages > KVM_MEM_MAX_NR_PAGES)
goto out;
if (!npages)
mem->flags &= ~KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES;
new = old = *memslot;
new.id = mem->slot;
new.base_gfn = base_gfn;
new.npages = npages;
new.flags = mem->flags;
/* Disallow changing a memory slot's size. */
r = -EINVAL;
if (npages && old.npages && npages != old.npages)
goto out_free;
/* Check for overlaps */
r = -EEXIST;
for (i = 0; i < KVM_MEMORY_SLOTS; ++i) {
struct kvm_memory_slot *s = &kvm->memslots->memslots[i];
if (s == memslot || !s->npages)
continue;
if (!((base_gfn + npages <= s->base_gfn) ||
(base_gfn >= s->base_gfn + s->npages)))
goto out_free;
}
/* Free page dirty bitmap if unneeded */
if (!(new.flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES))
new.dirty_bitmap = NULL;
r = -ENOMEM;
/* Allocate if a slot is being created */
#ifndef CONFIG_S390
if (npages && !new.rmap) {
new.rmap = vzalloc(npages * sizeof(*new.rmap));
if (!new.rmap)
goto out_free;
new.user_alloc = user_alloc;
new.userspace_addr = mem->userspace_addr;
}
if (!npages)
goto skip_lpage;
for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_PAGE_SIZES - 1; ++i) {
unsigned long ugfn;
unsigned long j;
int lpages;
int level = i + 2;
/* Avoid unused variable warning if no large pages */
(void)level;
if (new.lpage_info[i])
continue;
lpages = 1 + ((base_gfn + npages - 1)
>> KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(level));
lpages -= base_gfn >> KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(level);
new.lpage_info[i] = vzalloc(lpages * sizeof(*new.lpage_info[i]));
if (!new.lpage_info[i])
goto out_free;
if (base_gfn & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1))
new.lpage_info[i][0].write_count = 1;
if ((base_gfn+npages) & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1))
new.lpage_info[i][lpages - 1].write_count = 1;
ugfn = new.userspace_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
/*
* If the gfn and userspace address are not aligned wrt each
* other, or if explicitly asked to, disable large page
* support for this slot
*/
if ((base_gfn ^ ugfn) & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1) ||
!largepages_enabled)
for (j = 0; j < lpages; ++j)
new.lpage_info[i][j].write_count = 1;
}
skip_lpage:
/* Allocate page dirty bitmap if needed */
if ((new.flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES) && !new.dirty_bitmap) {
if (kvm_create_dirty_bitmap(&new) < 0)
goto out_free;
/* destroy any largepage mappings for dirty tracking */
}
#else /* not defined CONFIG_S390 */
new.user_alloc = user_alloc;
if (user_alloc)
new.userspace_addr = mem->userspace_addr;
#endif /* not defined CONFIG_S390 */
if (!npages) {
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
r = -ENOMEM;
slots = kmemdup(kvm->memslots, sizeof(struct kvm_memslots),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!slots)
goto out_free;
slot = id_to_memslot(slots, mem->slot);
slot->flags |= KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID;
update_memslots(slots, NULL);
old_memslots = kvm->memslots;
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->memslots, slots);
synchronize_srcu_expedited(&kvm->srcu);
/* From this point no new shadow pages pointing to a deleted
* memslot will be created.
*
* validation of sp->gfn happens in:
* - gfn_to_hva (kvm_read_guest, gfn_to_pfn)
* - kvm_is_visible_gfn (mmu_check_roots)
*/
kvm_arch_flush_shadow(kvm);
kfree(old_memslots);
}
r = kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region(kvm, &new, old, mem, user_alloc);
if (r)
goto out_free;
/* map the pages in iommu page table */
if (npages) {
r = kvm_iommu_map_pages(kvm, &new);
if (r)
goto out_free;
}
r = -ENOMEM;
slots = kmemdup(kvm->memslots, sizeof(struct kvm_memslots),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!slots)
goto out_free;
/* actual memory is freed via old in kvm_free_physmem_slot below */
if (!npages) {
new.rmap = NULL;
new.dirty_bitmap = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_PAGE_SIZES - 1; ++i)
new.lpage_info[i] = NULL;
}
update_memslots(slots, &new);
old_memslots = kvm->memslots;
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->memslots, slots);
synchronize_srcu_expedited(&kvm->srcu);
kvm_arch_commit_memory_region(kvm, mem, old, user_alloc);
/*
* If the new memory slot is created, we need to clear all
* mmio sptes.
*/
if (npages && old.base_gfn != mem->guest_phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT)
kvm_arch_flush_shadow(kvm);
kvm_free_physmem_slot(&old, &new);
kfree(old_memslots);
return 0;
out_free:
kvm_free_physmem_slot(&new, &old);
out:
return r;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The KVM implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.3.4 does not properly manage the relationships between memory slots and the iommu, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (memory leak and host OS crash) by leveraging administrative access to the guest OS to conduct hotunplug and hotplug operations on devices.
Commit Message: KVM: unmap pages from the iommu when slots are removed
commit 32f6daad4651a748a58a3ab6da0611862175722f upstream.
We've been adding new mappings, but not destroying old mappings.
This can lead to a page leak as pages are pinned using
get_user_pages, but only unpinned with put_page if they still
exist in the memslots list on vm shutdown. A memslot that is
destroyed while an iommu domain is enabled for the guest will
therefore result in an elevated page reference count that is
never cleared.
Additionally, without this fix, the iommu is only programmed
with the first translation for a gpa. This can result in
peer-to-peer errors if a mapping is destroyed and replaced by a
new mapping at the same gpa as the iommu will still be pointing
to the original, pinned memory address.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,618 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int get_task_ioprio(struct task_struct *p)
{
int ret;
ret = security_task_getioprio(p);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_NONE, IOPRIO_NORM);
if (p->io_context)
ret = p->io_context->ioprio;
out:
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Race condition in the get_task_ioprio function in block/ioprio.c in the Linux kernel before 4.6.6 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free) via a crafted ioprio_get system call.
Commit Message: block: fix use-after-free in sys_ioprio_get()
get_task_ioprio() accesses the task->io_context without holding the task
lock and thus can race with exit_io_context(), leading to a
use-after-free. The reproducer below hits this within a few seconds on
my 4-core QEMU VM:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <assert.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
pid_t pid, child;
long nproc, i;
/* ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS, 0, IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_IDLE, 0)); */
syscall(SYS_ioprio_set, 1, 0, 0x6000);
nproc = sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN);
for (i = 0; i < nproc; i++) {
pid = fork();
assert(pid != -1);
if (pid == 0) {
for (;;) {
pid = fork();
assert(pid != -1);
if (pid == 0) {
_exit(0);
} else {
child = wait(NULL);
assert(child == pid);
}
}
}
pid = fork();
assert(pid != -1);
if (pid == 0) {
for (;;) {
/* ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PGRP, 0); */
syscall(SYS_ioprio_get, 2, 0);
}
}
}
for (;;) {
/* ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PGRP, 0); */
syscall(SYS_ioprio_get, 2, 0);
}
return 0;
}
This gets us KASAN dumps like this:
[ 35.526914] ==================================================================
[ 35.530009] BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in get_task_ioprio+0x7b/0x90 at addr ffff880066f34e6c
[ 35.530009] Read of size 2 by task ioprio-gpf/363
[ 35.530009] =============================================================================
[ 35.530009] BUG blkdev_ioc (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
[ 35.530009] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[ 35.530009] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[ 35.530009] INFO: Allocated in create_task_io_context+0x2b/0x370 age=0 cpu=0 pid=360
[ 35.530009] ___slab_alloc+0x55d/0x5a0
[ 35.530009] __slab_alloc.isra.20+0x2b/0x40
[ 35.530009] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x84/0x200
[ 35.530009] create_task_io_context+0x2b/0x370
[ 35.530009] get_task_io_context+0x92/0xb0
[ 35.530009] copy_process.part.8+0x5029/0x5660
[ 35.530009] _do_fork+0x155/0x7e0
[ 35.530009] SyS_clone+0x19/0x20
[ 35.530009] do_syscall_64+0x195/0x3a0
[ 35.530009] return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
[ 35.530009] INFO: Freed in put_io_context+0xe7/0x120 age=0 cpu=0 pid=1060
[ 35.530009] __slab_free+0x27b/0x3d0
[ 35.530009] kmem_cache_free+0x1fb/0x220
[ 35.530009] put_io_context+0xe7/0x120
[ 35.530009] put_io_context_active+0x238/0x380
[ 35.530009] exit_io_context+0x66/0x80
[ 35.530009] do_exit+0x158e/0x2b90
[ 35.530009] do_group_exit+0xe5/0x2b0
[ 35.530009] SyS_exit_group+0x1d/0x20
[ 35.530009] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa4
[ 35.530009] INFO: Slab 0xffffea00019bcd00 objects=20 used=4 fp=0xffff880066f34ff0 flags=0x1fffe0000004080
[ 35.530009] INFO: Object 0xffff880066f34e58 @offset=3672 fp=0x0000000000000001
[ 35.530009] ==================================================================
Fix it by grabbing the task lock while we poke at the io_context.
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> | High | 166,925 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q,md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
unsigned char *param,*p;
int al,j,ok;
long i,param_len,n,alg_k,alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa=NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh=NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
int curve_nid = 0;
int encoded_pt_len = 0;
#endif
/* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request()
* as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
-1,
s->max_cert_list,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be
omitted if no identity hint is sent. Set
session->sess_cert anyway to avoid problems
later.*/
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
{
s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
}
#endif
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
return(1);
}
param=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
{
RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp)
{
DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp)
{
EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=NULL;
}
#endif
}
else
{
s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
}
/* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
param_len=0;
alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
{
char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p,i);
/* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used
* in ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the
* maximum length of a PSK identity hint can be as
* long as the maximum length of a PSK identity. */
if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
/* If received PSK identity hint contains NULL
* characters, the hint is truncated from the first
* NULL. p may not be ending with NULL, so create a
* NULL-terminated string. */
memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i);
memset(tmp_id_hint+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
p+=i;
n-=param_len;
}
else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
{
param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(s->srp_ctx.N=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
if (2 > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(s->srp_ctx.g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
if (1 > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 1;
i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
p++;
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(s->srp_ctx.s=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
if (2 > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(s->srp_ctx.B=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
n-=param_len;
if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
/* We must check if there is a certificate */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
#else
if (0)
;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509);
#endif
}
else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
{
if ((rsa=RSA_new()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(rsa->n=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->n)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
if (2 > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(rsa->e=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->e)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
n-=param_len;
/* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
else
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=rsa;
rsa=NULL;
}
#else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
if (0)
;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
{
if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(dh->p=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
if (2 > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(dh->g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
if (2 > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(dh->pub_key=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
n-=param_len;
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh))
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
#else
if (0)
;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509);
#endif
/* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=dh;
dh=NULL;
}
else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd))
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
{
EC_GROUP *ngroup;
const EC_GROUP *group;
if ((ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the
* server's ephemeral ECDH public key.
* Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
* param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
*/
/* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves
* and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We
* also need one byte for the length of the encoded point
*/
param_len=4;
if (param_len > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
/* Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has
* sent an invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
*/
if (!tls1_check_curve(s, p, 3))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
goto f_err;
}
if ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
if (ngroup == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
(EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
{
al=SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
p+=3;
/* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
p+=1;
if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) ||
(EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += encoded_pt_len;
n-=param_len;
p+=encoded_pt_len;
/* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention
* the use of DSA to sign ECParameters in the server
* key exchange message. We do support RSA and ECDSA.
*/
if (0) ;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
#endif
/* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=ecdh;
ecdh=NULL;
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
bn_ctx = NULL;
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
}
else if (alg_k)
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
/* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
/* if it was signed, check the signature */
if (pkey != NULL)
{
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
{
int rv;
if (2 > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
if (rv == -1)
goto err;
else if (rv == 0)
{
goto f_err;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
p += 2;
n -= 2;
}
else
md = EVP_sha1();
if (2 > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p,i);
n-=2;
j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
/* Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty */
if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
{
/* wrong packet length */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
{
int num;
unsigned int size;
j=0;
q=md_buf;
for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
{
EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,&size);
q+=size;
j+=size;
}
i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n,
pkey->pkey.rsa);
if (i < 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
goto f_err;
}
if (i == 0)
{
/* bad signature */
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
#endif
{
EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0)
{
/* bad signature */
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
}
else
{
/* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
{
/* Might be wrong key type, check it */
if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
/* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* still data left over */
if (n != 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return(1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (rsa != NULL)
RSA_free(rsa);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (dh != NULL)
DH_free(dh);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
if (ecdh != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return(-1);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: The ssl3_get_key_exchange function in s3_clnt.c in OpenSSL before 0.9.8zd, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0p, and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1k allows remote SSL servers to conduct ECDHE-to-ECDH downgrade attacks and trigger a loss of forward secrecy by omitting the ServerKeyExchange message.
Commit Message: ECDH downgrade bug fix.
Fix bug where an OpenSSL client would accept a handshake using an
ephemeral ECDH ciphersuites with the server key exchange message omitted.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
CVE-2014-3572
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,826 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: setup_arch (char **cmdline_p)
{
unw_init();
ia64_patch_vtop((u64) __start___vtop_patchlist, (u64) __end___vtop_patchlist);
*cmdline_p = __va(ia64_boot_param->command_line);
strlcpy(boot_command_line, *cmdline_p, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
efi_init();
io_port_init();
#ifdef CONFIG_IA64_GENERIC
/* machvec needs to be parsed from the command line
* before parse_early_param() is called to ensure
* that ia64_mv is initialised before any command line
* settings may cause console setup to occur
*/
machvec_init_from_cmdline(*cmdline_p);
#endif
parse_early_param();
if (early_console_setup(*cmdline_p) == 0)
mark_bsp_online();
#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
/* Initialize the ACPI boot-time table parser */
acpi_table_init();
# ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_NUMA
acpi_numa_init();
per_cpu_scan_finalize((cpus_weight(early_cpu_possible_map) == 0 ?
32 : cpus_weight(early_cpu_possible_map)), additional_cpus);
# endif
#else
# ifdef CONFIG_SMP
smp_build_cpu_map(); /* happens, e.g., with the Ski simulator */
# endif
#endif /* CONFIG_APCI_BOOT */
find_memory();
/* process SAL system table: */
ia64_sal_init(__va(efi.sal_systab));
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
cpu_physical_id(0) = hard_smp_processor_id();
#endif
cpu_init(); /* initialize the bootstrap CPU */
mmu_context_init(); /* initialize context_id bitmap */
check_sal_cache_flush();
#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
acpi_boot_init();
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_VT
if (!conswitchp) {
# if defined(CONFIG_DUMMY_CONSOLE)
conswitchp = &dummy_con;
# endif
# if defined(CONFIG_VGA_CONSOLE)
/*
* Non-legacy systems may route legacy VGA MMIO range to system
* memory. vga_con probes the MMIO hole, so memory looks like
* a VGA device to it. The EFI memory map can tell us if it's
* memory so we can avoid this problem.
*/
if (efi_mem_type(0xA0000) != EFI_CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY)
conswitchp = &vga_con;
# endif
}
#endif
/* enable IA-64 Machine Check Abort Handling unless disabled */
if (!nomca)
ia64_mca_init();
platform_setup(cmdline_p);
paging_init();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The ia64 subsystem in the Linux kernel before 2.6.26 allows local users to cause a denial of service (stack consumption and system crash) via a crafted application that leverages the mishandling of invalid Register Stack Engine (RSE) state.
Commit Message: [IA64] Workaround for RSE issue
Problem: An application violating the architectural rules regarding
operation dependencies and having specific Register Stack Engine (RSE)
state at the time of the violation, may result in an illegal operation
fault and invalid RSE state. Such faults may initiate a cascade of
repeated illegal operation faults within OS interruption handlers.
The specific behavior is OS dependent.
Implication: An application causing an illegal operation fault with
specific RSE state may result in a series of illegal operation faults
and an eventual OS stack overflow condition.
Workaround: OS interruption handlers that switch to kernel backing
store implement a check for invalid RSE state to avoid the series
of illegal operation faults.
The core of the workaround is the RSE_WORKAROUND code sequence
inserted into each invocation of the SAVE_MIN_WITH_COVER and
SAVE_MIN_WITH_COVER_R19 macros. This sequence includes hard-coded
constants that depend on the number of stacked physical registers
being 96. The rest of this patch consists of code to disable this
workaround should this not be the case (with the presumption that
if a future Itanium processor increases the number of registers, it
would also remove the need for this patch).
Move the start of the RBS up to a mod32 boundary to avoid some
corner cases.
The dispatch_illegal_op_fault code outgrew the spot it was
squatting in when built with this patch and CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING=y
Move it out to the end of the ivt.
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,921 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void LinkChangeSerializerMarkupAccumulator::appendElement(StringBuilder& result, Element* element, Namespaces* namespaces)
{
if (element->hasTagName(HTMLNames::baseTag)) {
result.append("<!--");
} else if (element->hasTagName(HTMLNames::htmlTag)) {
result.append(String::format("\n<!-- saved from url=(%04d)%s -->\n",
static_cast<int>(m_document->url().string().utf8().length()),
m_document->url().string().utf8().data()));
}
SerializerMarkupAccumulator::appendElement(result, element, namespaces);
if (element->hasTagName(HTMLNames::baseTag)) {
result.appendLiteral("-->");
result.appendLiteral("<base href=\".\"");
if (!m_document->baseTarget().isEmpty()) {
result.appendLiteral(" target=\"");
result.append(m_document->baseTarget());
result.append('"');
}
if (m_document->isXHTMLDocument())
result.appendLiteral(" />");
else
result.appendLiteral(">");
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly handle image data in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> [email protected]
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,568 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: size_t jsuGetFreeStack() {
#ifdef ARM
void *frame = __builtin_frame_address(0);
size_t stackPos = (size_t)((char*)frame);
size_t stackEnd = (size_t)((char*)&LINKER_END_VAR);
if (stackPos < stackEnd) return 0; // should never happen, but just in case of overflow!
return stackPos - stackEnd;
#elif defined(LINUX)
char ptr; // this is on the stack
extern void *STACK_BASE;
uint32_t count = (uint32_t)((size_t)STACK_BASE - (size_t)&ptr);
return 1000000 - count; // give it 1 megabyte of stack
#else
return 1000000; // no stack depth check on this platform
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Espruino before 1.99 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) with a user crafted input file via an integer overflow during syntax parsing. This was addressed by fixing stack size detection on Linux in jsutils.c.
Commit Message: Fix stack size detection on Linux (fix #1427) | Medium | 169,218 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void gdImageGifCtx(gdImagePtr im, gdIOCtxPtr out)
{
gdImagePtr pim = 0, tim = im;
int interlace, BitsPerPixel;
interlace = im->interlace;
if (im->trueColor) {
/* Expensive, but the only way that produces an
acceptable result: mix down to a palette
based temporary image. */
pim = gdImageCreatePaletteFromTrueColor(im, 1, 256);
if (!pim) {
return;
}
tim = pim;
}
BitsPerPixel = colorstobpp(tim->colorsTotal);
/* All set, let's do it. */
GIFEncode(
out, tim->sx, tim->sy, tim->interlace, 0, tim->transparent, BitsPerPixel,
tim->red, tim->green, tim->blue, tim);
if (pim) {
/* Destroy palette based temporary image. */
gdImageDestroy( pim);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: The GD Graphics Library (aka LibGD) 2.2.5 has a double free in the gdImage*Ptr() functions in gd_gif_out.c, gd_jpeg.c, and gd_wbmp.c. NOTE: PHP is unaffected.
Commit Message: Sync with upstream
Even though libgd/libgd#492 is not a relevant bug fix for PHP, since
the binding doesn't use the `gdImage*Ptr()` functions at all, we're
porting the fix to stay in sync here. | High | 169,733 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int btrfs_search_slot(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans, struct btrfs_root
*root, struct btrfs_key *key, struct btrfs_path *p, int
ins_len, int cow)
{
struct extent_buffer *b;
int slot;
int ret;
int err;
int level;
int lowest_unlock = 1;
int root_lock;
/* everything at write_lock_level or lower must be write locked */
int write_lock_level = 0;
u8 lowest_level = 0;
int min_write_lock_level;
int prev_cmp;
lowest_level = p->lowest_level;
WARN_ON(lowest_level && ins_len > 0);
WARN_ON(p->nodes[0] != NULL);
BUG_ON(!cow && ins_len);
if (ins_len < 0) {
lowest_unlock = 2;
/* when we are removing items, we might have to go up to level
* two as we update tree pointers Make sure we keep write
* for those levels as well
*/
write_lock_level = 2;
} else if (ins_len > 0) {
/*
* for inserting items, make sure we have a write lock on
* level 1 so we can update keys
*/
write_lock_level = 1;
}
if (!cow)
write_lock_level = -1;
if (cow && (p->keep_locks || p->lowest_level))
write_lock_level = BTRFS_MAX_LEVEL;
min_write_lock_level = write_lock_level;
again:
prev_cmp = -1;
/*
* we try very hard to do read locks on the root
*/
root_lock = BTRFS_READ_LOCK;
level = 0;
if (p->search_commit_root) {
/*
* the commit roots are read only
* so we always do read locks
*/
if (p->need_commit_sem)
down_read(&root->fs_info->commit_root_sem);
b = root->commit_root;
extent_buffer_get(b);
level = btrfs_header_level(b);
if (p->need_commit_sem)
up_read(&root->fs_info->commit_root_sem);
if (!p->skip_locking)
btrfs_tree_read_lock(b);
} else {
if (p->skip_locking) {
b = btrfs_root_node(root);
level = btrfs_header_level(b);
} else {
/* we don't know the level of the root node
* until we actually have it read locked
*/
b = btrfs_read_lock_root_node(root);
level = btrfs_header_level(b);
if (level <= write_lock_level) {
/* whoops, must trade for write lock */
btrfs_tree_read_unlock(b);
free_extent_buffer(b);
b = btrfs_lock_root_node(root);
root_lock = BTRFS_WRITE_LOCK;
/* the level might have changed, check again */
level = btrfs_header_level(b);
}
}
}
p->nodes[level] = b;
if (!p->skip_locking)
p->locks[level] = root_lock;
while (b) {
level = btrfs_header_level(b);
/*
* setup the path here so we can release it under lock
* contention with the cow code
*/
if (cow) {
/*
* if we don't really need to cow this block
* then we don't want to set the path blocking,
* so we test it here
*/
if (!should_cow_block(trans, root, b))
goto cow_done;
/*
* must have write locks on this node and the
* parent
*/
if (level > write_lock_level ||
(level + 1 > write_lock_level &&
level + 1 < BTRFS_MAX_LEVEL &&
p->nodes[level + 1])) {
write_lock_level = level + 1;
btrfs_release_path(p);
goto again;
}
btrfs_set_path_blocking(p);
err = btrfs_cow_block(trans, root, b,
p->nodes[level + 1],
p->slots[level + 1], &b);
if (err) {
ret = err;
goto done;
}
}
cow_done:
p->nodes[level] = b;
btrfs_clear_path_blocking(p, NULL, 0);
/*
* we have a lock on b and as long as we aren't changing
* the tree, there is no way to for the items in b to change.
* It is safe to drop the lock on our parent before we
* go through the expensive btree search on b.
*
* If we're inserting or deleting (ins_len != 0), then we might
* be changing slot zero, which may require changing the parent.
* So, we can't drop the lock until after we know which slot
* we're operating on.
*/
if (!ins_len && !p->keep_locks) {
int u = level + 1;
if (u < BTRFS_MAX_LEVEL && p->locks[u]) {
btrfs_tree_unlock_rw(p->nodes[u], p->locks[u]);
p->locks[u] = 0;
}
}
ret = key_search(b, key, level, &prev_cmp, &slot);
if (level != 0) {
int dec = 0;
if (ret && slot > 0) {
dec = 1;
slot -= 1;
}
p->slots[level] = slot;
err = setup_nodes_for_search(trans, root, p, b, level,
ins_len, &write_lock_level);
if (err == -EAGAIN)
goto again;
if (err) {
ret = err;
goto done;
}
b = p->nodes[level];
slot = p->slots[level];
/*
* slot 0 is special, if we change the key
* we have to update the parent pointer
* which means we must have a write lock
* on the parent
*/
if (slot == 0 && ins_len &&
write_lock_level < level + 1) {
write_lock_level = level + 1;
btrfs_release_path(p);
goto again;
}
unlock_up(p, level, lowest_unlock,
min_write_lock_level, &write_lock_level);
if (level == lowest_level) {
if (dec)
p->slots[level]++;
goto done;
}
err = read_block_for_search(trans, root, p,
&b, level, slot, key, 0);
if (err == -EAGAIN)
goto again;
if (err) {
ret = err;
goto done;
}
if (!p->skip_locking) {
level = btrfs_header_level(b);
if (level <= write_lock_level) {
err = btrfs_try_tree_write_lock(b);
if (!err) {
btrfs_set_path_blocking(p);
btrfs_tree_lock(b);
btrfs_clear_path_blocking(p, b,
BTRFS_WRITE_LOCK);
}
p->locks[level] = BTRFS_WRITE_LOCK;
} else {
err = btrfs_try_tree_read_lock(b);
if (!err) {
btrfs_set_path_blocking(p);
btrfs_tree_read_lock(b);
btrfs_clear_path_blocking(p, b,
BTRFS_READ_LOCK);
}
p->locks[level] = BTRFS_READ_LOCK;
}
p->nodes[level] = b;
}
} else {
p->slots[level] = slot;
if (ins_len > 0 &&
btrfs_leaf_free_space(root, b) < ins_len) {
if (write_lock_level < 1) {
write_lock_level = 1;
btrfs_release_path(p);
goto again;
}
btrfs_set_path_blocking(p);
err = split_leaf(trans, root, key,
p, ins_len, ret == 0);
btrfs_clear_path_blocking(p, NULL, 0);
BUG_ON(err > 0);
if (err) {
ret = err;
goto done;
}
}
if (!p->search_for_split)
unlock_up(p, level, lowest_unlock,
min_write_lock_level, &write_lock_level);
goto done;
}
}
ret = 1;
done:
/*
* we don't really know what they plan on doing with the path
* from here on, so for now just mark it as blocking
*/
if (!p->leave_spinning)
btrfs_set_path_blocking(p);
if (ret < 0)
btrfs_release_path(p);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: The Btrfs implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.19 does not ensure that the visible xattr state is consistent with a requested replacement, which allows local users to bypass intended ACL settings and gain privileges via standard filesystem operations (1) during an xattr-replacement time window, related to a race condition, or (2) after an xattr-replacement attempt that fails because the data does not fit.
Commit Message: Btrfs: make xattr replace operations atomic
Replacing a xattr consists of doing a lookup for its existing value, delete
the current value from the respective leaf, release the search path and then
finally insert the new value. This leaves a time window where readers (getxattr,
listxattrs) won't see any value for the xattr. Xattrs are used to store ACLs,
so this has security implications.
This change also fixes 2 other existing issues which were:
*) Deleting the old xattr value without verifying first if the new xattr will
fit in the existing leaf item (in case multiple xattrs are packed in the
same item due to name hash collision);
*) Returning -EEXIST when the flag XATTR_CREATE is given and the xattr doesn't
exist but we have have an existing item that packs muliple xattrs with
the same name hash as the input xattr. In this case we should return ENOSPC.
A test case for xfstests follows soon.
Thanks to Alexandre Oliva for reporting the non-atomicity of the xattr replace
implementation.
Reported-by: Alexandre Oliva <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,763 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void DownloadItemImpl::OnDownloadRenamedToFinalName(
DownloadFileManager* file_manager,
const FilePath& full_path) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
VLOG(20) << __FUNCTION__ << "()"
<< " full_path = \"" << full_path.value() << "\""
<< " needed rename = " << NeedsRename()
<< " " << DebugString(false);
DCHECK(NeedsRename());
if (!full_path.empty()) {
target_path_ = full_path;
SetFullPath(full_path);
delegate_->DownloadRenamedToFinalName(this);
if (delegate_->ShouldOpenDownload(this))
Completed();
else
delegate_delayed_complete_ = true;
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&DownloadFileManager::CompleteDownload,
file_manager, GetGlobalId()));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,883 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void _xml_characterDataHandler(void *userData, const XML_Char *s, int len)
{
xml_parser *parser = (xml_parser *)userData;
if (parser) {
zval *retval, *args[2];
if (parser->characterDataHandler) {
args[0] = _xml_resource_zval(parser->index);
args[1] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(s, len, parser->target_encoding);
if ((retval = xml_call_handler(parser, parser->characterDataHandler, parser->characterDataPtr, 2, args))) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
if (parser->data) {
int i;
int doprint = 0;
char *decoded_value;
int decoded_len;
decoded_value = xml_utf8_decode(s,len,&decoded_len,parser->target_encoding);
for (i = 0; i < decoded_len; i++) {
switch (decoded_value[i]) {
case ' ':
case '\t':
case '\n':
continue;
default:
doprint = 1;
break;
}
if (doprint) {
break;
}
}
if (doprint || (! parser->skipwhite)) {
if (parser->lastwasopen) {
zval **myval;
/* check if the current tag already has a value - if yes append to that! */
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(parser->ctag),"value",sizeof("value"),(void **) &myval) == SUCCESS) {
int newlen = Z_STRLEN_PP(myval) + decoded_len;
Z_STRVAL_PP(myval) = erealloc(Z_STRVAL_PP(myval),newlen+1);
strncpy(Z_STRVAL_PP(myval) + Z_STRLEN_PP(myval), decoded_value, decoded_len + 1);
Z_STRLEN_PP(myval) += decoded_len;
efree(decoded_value);
} else {
add_assoc_string(*(parser->ctag),"value",decoded_value,0);
}
} else {
zval *tag;
zval **curtag, **mytype, **myval;
HashPosition hpos=NULL;
zend_hash_internal_pointer_end_ex(Z_ARRVAL_P(parser->data), &hpos);
if (hpos && (zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(Z_ARRVAL_P(parser->data), (void **) &curtag, &hpos) == SUCCESS)) {
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(curtag),"type",sizeof("type"),(void **) &mytype) == SUCCESS) {
if (!strcmp(Z_STRVAL_PP(mytype), "cdata")) {
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(curtag),"value",sizeof("value"),(void **) &myval) == SUCCESS) {
int newlen = Z_STRLEN_PP(myval) + decoded_len;
Z_STRVAL_PP(myval) = erealloc(Z_STRVAL_PP(myval),newlen+1);
strncpy(Z_STRVAL_PP(myval) + Z_STRLEN_PP(myval), decoded_value, decoded_len + 1);
Z_STRLEN_PP(myval) += decoded_len;
efree(decoded_value);
return;
}
}
}
}
if (parser->level <= XML_MAXLEVEL) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tag);
array_init(tag);
_xml_add_to_info(parser,parser->ltags[parser->level-1] + parser->toffset);
add_assoc_string(tag,"tag",parser->ltags[parser->level-1] + parser->toffset,1);
add_assoc_string(tag,"value",decoded_value,0);
add_assoc_string(tag,"type","cdata",1);
add_assoc_long(tag,"level",parser->level);
zend_hash_next_index_insert(Z_ARRVAL_P(parser->data),&tag,sizeof(zval*),NULL);
} else if (parser->level == (XML_MAXLEVEL + 1)) {
TSRMLS_FETCH();
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Maximum depth exceeded - Results truncated");
}
}
} else {
efree(decoded_value);
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The xml_parse_into_struct function in ext/xml/xml.c in PHP before 5.5.35, 5.6.x before 5.6.21, and 7.x before 7.0.6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer under-read and segmentation fault) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted XML data in the second argument, leading to a parser level of zero.
Commit Message: | High | 165,040 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: hstoreArrayToPairs(ArrayType *a, int *npairs)
{
Datum *key_datums;
bool *key_nulls;
int key_count;
Pairs *key_pairs;
int bufsiz;
int i,
j;
deconstruct_array(a,
TEXTOID, -1, false, 'i',
&key_datums, &key_nulls, &key_count);
if (key_count == 0)
{
*npairs = 0;
return NULL;
}
key_pairs = palloc(sizeof(Pairs) * key_count);
for (i = 0, j = 0; i < key_count; i++)
{
if (!key_nulls[i])
{
key_pairs[j].key = VARDATA(key_datums[i]);
key_pairs[j].keylen = VARSIZE(key_datums[i]) - VARHDRSZ;
key_pairs[j].val = NULL;
key_pairs[j].vallen = 0;
key_pairs[j].needfree = 0;
key_pairs[j].isnull = 1;
j++;
}
}
*npairs = hstoreUniquePairs(key_pairs, j, &bufsiz);
return key_pairs;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in contrib/hstore/hstore_io.c in PostgreSQL 9.0.x before 9.0.16, 9.1.x before 9.1.12, 9.2.x before 9.2.7, and 9.3.x before 9.3.3 allow remote authenticated users to have unspecified impact via vectors related to the (1) hstore_recv, (2) hstore_from_arrays, and (3) hstore_from_array functions in contrib/hstore/hstore_io.c; and the (4) hstoreArrayToPairs function in contrib/hstore/hstore_op.c, which triggers a buffer overflow. NOTE: this issue was SPLIT from CVE-2014-0064 because it has a different set of affected versions.
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064 | Medium | 166,400 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int cipso_v4_req_setattr(struct request_sock *req,
const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
const struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
{
int ret_val = -EPERM;
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
u32 buf_len;
u32 opt_len;
struct ip_options *opt = NULL;
struct inet_request_sock *req_inet;
/* We allocate the maximum CIPSO option size here so we are probably
* being a little wasteful, but it makes our life _much_ easier later
* on and after all we are only talking about 40 bytes. */
buf_len = CIPSO_V4_OPT_LEN_MAX;
buf = kmalloc(buf_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (buf == NULL) {
ret_val = -ENOMEM;
goto req_setattr_failure;
}
ret_val = cipso_v4_genopt(buf, buf_len, doi_def, secattr);
if (ret_val < 0)
goto req_setattr_failure;
buf_len = ret_val;
/* We can't use ip_options_get() directly because it makes a call to
* ip_options_get_alloc() which allocates memory with GFP_KERNEL and
* we won't always have CAP_NET_RAW even though we _always_ want to
* set the IPOPT_CIPSO option. */
opt_len = (buf_len + 3) & ~3;
opt = kzalloc(sizeof(*opt) + opt_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (opt == NULL) {
ret_val = -ENOMEM;
goto req_setattr_failure;
}
memcpy(opt->__data, buf, buf_len);
opt->optlen = opt_len;
opt->cipso = sizeof(struct iphdr);
kfree(buf);
buf = NULL;
req_inet = inet_rsk(req);
opt = xchg(&req_inet->opt, opt);
kfree(opt);
return 0;
req_setattr_failure:
kfree(buf);
kfree(opt);
return ret_val;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the IP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.0 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (slab corruption and system crash) by sending packets to an application that sets socket options during the handling of network traffic.
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,548 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void WtsSessionProcessDelegate::Core::KillProcess(DWORD exit_code) {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
channel_.reset();
if (launch_elevated_) {
if (job_.IsValid()) {
TerminateJobObject(job_, exit_code);
}
} else {
if (worker_process_.IsValid()) {
TerminateProcess(worker_process_, exit_code);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving PDF fields.
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,559 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: cdf_read_short_sector(const cdf_stream_t *sst, void *buf, size_t offs,
size_t len, const cdf_header_t *h, cdf_secid_t id)
{
size_t ss = CDF_SHORT_SEC_SIZE(h);
size_t pos = CDF_SHORT_SEC_POS(h, id);
assert(ss == len);
if (pos > CDF_SEC_SIZE(h) * sst->sst_len) {
DPRINTF(("Out of bounds read %" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u > %"
SIZE_T_FORMAT "u\n",
pos, CDF_SEC_SIZE(h) * sst->sst_len));
return -1;
}
(void)memcpy(((char *)buf) + offs,
((const char *)sst->sst_tab) + pos, len);
return len;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The cdf_read_short_sector function in cdf.c in file before 5.19, as used in the Fileinfo component in PHP before 5.4.30 and 5.5.x before 5.5.14, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (assertion failure and application exit) via a crafted CDF file.
Commit Message: Apply patches from file-CVE-2012-1571.patch
From Francisco Alonso Espejo:
file < 5.18/git version can be made to crash when checking some
corrupt CDF files (Using an invalid cdf_read_short_sector size)
The problem I found here, is that in most situations (if
h_short_sec_size_p2 > 8) because the blocksize is 512 and normal
values are 06 which means reading 64 bytes.As long as the check
for the block size copy is not checked properly (there's an assert
that makes wrong/invalid assumptions) | Medium | 166,444 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int handle(int s, unsigned char* data, int len, struct sockaddr_in *s_in)
{
char buf[2048];
unsigned short *cmd = (unsigned short *)buf;
int plen;
struct in_addr *addr = &s_in->sin_addr;
unsigned short *pid = (unsigned short*) data;
/* inet check */
if (len == S_HELLO_LEN && memcmp(data, "sorbo", 5) == 0) {
unsigned short *id = (unsigned short*) (data+5);
int x = 2+4+2;
*cmd = htons(S_CMD_INET_CHECK);
memcpy(cmd+1, addr, 4);
memcpy(cmd+1+2, id, 2);
printf("Inet check by %s %d\n",
inet_ntoa(*addr), ntohs(*id));
if (send(s, buf, x, 0) != x)
return 1;
return 0;
}
*cmd++ = htons(S_CMD_PACKET);
*cmd++ = *pid;
plen = len - 2;
last_id = ntohs(*pid);
if (last_id > 20000)
wrap = 1;
if (wrap && last_id < 100) {
wrap = 0;
memset(ids, 0, sizeof(ids));
}
printf("Got packet %d %d", last_id, plen);
if (is_dup(last_id)) {
printf(" (DUP)\n");
return 0;
}
printf("\n");
*cmd++ = htons(plen);
memcpy(cmd, data+2, plen);
plen += 2 + 2 + 2;
assert(plen <= (int) sizeof(buf));
if (send(s, buf, plen, 0) != plen)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: buddy-ng.c in Aircrack-ng before 1.2 Beta 3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (segmentation fault) via a response with a crafted length parameter.
Commit Message: Buddy-ng: Fixed segmentation fault (Closes #15 on GitHub).
git-svn-id: http://svn.aircrack-ng.org/trunk@2418 28c6078b-6c39-48e3-add9-af49d547ecab | Medium | 168,913 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int pop_fetch_headers(struct Context *ctx)
{
struct PopData *pop_data = (struct PopData *) ctx->data;
struct Progress progress;
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
header_cache_t *hc = pop_hcache_open(pop_data, ctx->path);
#endif
time(&pop_data->check_time);
pop_data->clear_cache = false;
for (int i = 0; i < ctx->msgcount; i++)
ctx->hdrs[i]->refno = -1;
const int old_count = ctx->msgcount;
int ret = pop_fetch_data(pop_data, "UIDL\r\n", NULL, fetch_uidl, ctx);
const int new_count = ctx->msgcount;
ctx->msgcount = old_count;
if (pop_data->cmd_uidl == 2)
{
if (ret == 0)
{
pop_data->cmd_uidl = 1;
mutt_debug(1, "set UIDL capability\n");
}
if (ret == -2 && pop_data->cmd_uidl == 2)
{
pop_data->cmd_uidl = 0;
mutt_debug(1, "unset UIDL capability\n");
snprintf(pop_data->err_msg, sizeof(pop_data->err_msg), "%s",
_("Command UIDL is not supported by server."));
}
}
if (!ctx->quiet)
{
mutt_progress_init(&progress, _("Fetching message headers..."),
MUTT_PROGRESS_MSG, ReadInc, new_count - old_count);
}
if (ret == 0)
{
int i, deleted;
for (i = 0, deleted = 0; i < old_count; i++)
{
if (ctx->hdrs[i]->refno == -1)
{
ctx->hdrs[i]->deleted = true;
deleted++;
}
}
if (deleted > 0)
{
mutt_error(
ngettext("%d message has been lost. Try reopening the mailbox.",
"%d messages have been lost. Try reopening the mailbox.", deleted),
deleted);
}
bool hcached = false;
for (i = old_count; i < new_count; i++)
{
if (!ctx->quiet)
mutt_progress_update(&progress, i + 1 - old_count, -1);
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
void *data = mutt_hcache_fetch(hc, ctx->hdrs[i]->data, strlen(ctx->hdrs[i]->data));
if (data)
{
char *uidl = mutt_str_strdup(ctx->hdrs[i]->data);
int refno = ctx->hdrs[i]->refno;
int index = ctx->hdrs[i]->index;
/*
* - POP dynamically numbers headers and relies on h->refno
* to map messages; so restore header and overwrite restored
* refno with current refno, same for index
* - h->data needs to a separate pointer as it's driver-specific
* data freed separately elsewhere
* (the old h->data should point inside a malloc'd block from
* hcache so there shouldn't be a memleak here)
*/
struct Header *h = mutt_hcache_restore((unsigned char *) data);
mutt_hcache_free(hc, &data);
mutt_header_free(&ctx->hdrs[i]);
ctx->hdrs[i] = h;
ctx->hdrs[i]->refno = refno;
ctx->hdrs[i]->index = index;
ctx->hdrs[i]->data = uidl;
ret = 0;
hcached = true;
}
else
#endif
if ((ret = pop_read_header(pop_data, ctx->hdrs[i])) < 0)
break;
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
else
{
mutt_hcache_store(hc, ctx->hdrs[i]->data, strlen(ctx->hdrs[i]->data),
ctx->hdrs[i], 0);
}
#endif
/*
* faked support for flags works like this:
* - if 'hcached' is true, we have the message in our hcache:
* - if we also have a body: read
* - if we don't have a body: old
* (if $mark_old is set which is maybe wrong as
* $mark_old should be considered for syncing the
* folder and not when opening it XXX)
* - if 'hcached' is false, we don't have the message in our hcache:
* - if we also have a body: read
* - if we don't have a body: new
*/
const bool bcached =
(mutt_bcache_exists(pop_data->bcache, ctx->hdrs[i]->data) == 0);
ctx->hdrs[i]->old = false;
ctx->hdrs[i]->read = false;
if (hcached)
{
if (bcached)
ctx->hdrs[i]->read = true;
else if (MarkOld)
ctx->hdrs[i]->old = true;
}
else
{
if (bcached)
ctx->hdrs[i]->read = true;
}
ctx->msgcount++;
}
if (i > old_count)
mx_update_context(ctx, i - old_count);
}
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
mutt_hcache_close(hc);
#endif
if (ret < 0)
{
for (int i = ctx->msgcount; i < new_count; i++)
mutt_header_free(&ctx->hdrs[i]);
return ret;
}
/* after putting the result into our structures,
* clean up cache, i.e. wipe messages deleted outside
* the availability of our cache
*/
if (MessageCacheClean)
mutt_bcache_list(pop_data->bcache, msg_cache_check, (void *) ctx);
mutt_clear_error();
return (new_count - old_count);
}
Vulnerability Type: Dir. Trav.
CWE ID: CWE-22
Summary: An issue was discovered in NeoMutt before 2018-07-16. newsrc.c does not properly restrict '/' characters that may have unsafe interaction with cache pathnames.
Commit Message: sanitise cache paths
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,121 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::Abandon() {
texture_holder_->Abandon();
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Incorrect, thread-unsafe use of SkImage in Canvas in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427} | Medium | 172,587 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void FragmentPaintPropertyTreeBuilder::UpdateOutOfFlowContext() {
if (!object_.IsBoxModelObject() && !properties_)
return;
if (object_.IsLayoutBlock())
context_.paint_offset_for_float = context_.current.paint_offset;
if (object_.CanContainAbsolutePositionObjects()) {
context_.absolute_position = context_.current;
}
if (object_.IsLayoutView()) {
const auto* initial_fixed_transform = context_.fixed_position.transform;
const auto* initial_fixed_scroll = context_.fixed_position.scroll;
context_.fixed_position = context_.current;
context_.fixed_position.fixed_position_children_fixed_to_root = true;
context_.fixed_position.transform = initial_fixed_transform;
context_.fixed_position.scroll = initial_fixed_scroll;
} else if (object_.CanContainFixedPositionObjects()) {
context_.fixed_position = context_.current;
context_.fixed_position.fixed_position_children_fixed_to_root = false;
} else if (properties_ && properties_->CssClip()) {
auto* css_clip = properties_->CssClip();
if (context_.fixed_position.clip == css_clip->Parent()) {
context_.fixed_position.clip = css_clip;
} else {
if (NeedsPaintPropertyUpdate()) {
OnUpdate(properties_->UpdateCssClipFixedPosition(
context_.fixed_position.clip,
ClipPaintPropertyNode::State{css_clip->LocalTransformSpace(),
css_clip->ClipRect()}));
}
if (properties_->CssClipFixedPosition())
context_.fixed_position.clip = properties_->CssClipFixedPosition();
return;
}
}
if (NeedsPaintPropertyUpdate() && properties_)
OnClear(properties_->ClearCssClipFixedPosition());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930} | High | 171,799 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ps_parser_skip_PS_token( PS_Parser parser )
{
/* Note: PostScript allows any non-delimiting, non-whitespace */
/* character in a name (PS Ref Manual, 3rd ed, p31). */
/* PostScript delimiters are (, ), <, >, [, ], {, }, /, and %. */
FT_Byte* cur = parser->cursor;
FT_Byte* limit = parser->limit;
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Ok;
skip_spaces( &cur, limit ); /* this also skips comments */
if ( cur >= limit )
goto Exit;
/* self-delimiting, single-character tokens */
if ( *cur == '[' || *cur == ']' )
{
cur++;
goto Exit;
}
/* skip balanced expressions (procedures and strings) */
if ( *cur == '{' ) /* {...} */
{
error = skip_procedure( &cur, limit );
goto Exit;
}
if ( *cur == '(' ) /* (...) */
{
error = skip_literal_string( &cur, limit );
goto Exit;
}
if ( *cur == '<' ) /* <...> */
{
if ( cur + 1 < limit && *(cur + 1) == '<' ) /* << */
{
cur++;
cur++;
}
else
error = skip_string( &cur, limit );
goto Exit;
}
if ( *cur == '>' )
{
cur++;
if ( cur >= limit || *cur != '>' ) /* >> */
{
FT_ERROR(( "ps_parser_skip_PS_token:"
" unexpected closing delimiter `>'\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Exit;
}
cur++;
goto Exit;
}
if ( *cur == '/' )
cur++;
/* anything else */
while ( cur < limit )
{
/* *cur might be invalid (e.g., ')' or '}'), but this */
/* is handled by the test `cur == parser->cursor' below */
if ( IS_PS_DELIM( *cur ) )
break;
cur++;
}
Exit:
if ( cur < limit && cur == parser->cursor )
{
FT_ERROR(( "ps_parser_skip_PS_token:"
" current token is `%c' which is self-delimiting\n"
" "
" but invalid at this point\n",
*cur ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
}
parser->error = error;
parser->cursor = cur;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: FreeType before 2.6.1 has a buffer over-read in skip_comment in psaux/psobjs.c because ps_parser_skip_PS_token is mishandled in an FT_New_Memory_Face operation.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,427 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadMATImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image *image, *image2=NULL,
*rotated_image;
PixelPacket *q;
unsigned int status;
MATHeader MATLAB_HDR;
size_t size;
size_t CellType;
QuantumInfo *quantum_info;
ImageInfo *clone_info;
int i;
ssize_t ldblk;
unsigned char *BImgBuff = NULL;
double MinVal, MaxVal;
size_t Unknown6;
unsigned z, z2;
unsigned Frames;
int logging;
int sample_size;
MagickOffsetType filepos=0x80;
BlobInfo *blob;
size_t one;
unsigned int (*ReadBlobXXXLong)(Image *image);
unsigned short (*ReadBlobXXXShort)(Image *image);
void (*ReadBlobDoublesXXX)(Image * image, size_t len, double *data);
void (*ReadBlobFloatsXXX)(Image * image, size_t len, float *data);
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
logging = LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"enter");
/*
Open image file.
*/
image = AcquireImage(image_info);
status = OpenBlob(image_info, image, ReadBinaryBlobMode, exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read MATLAB image.
*/
clone_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
if(ReadBlob(image,124,(unsigned char *) &MATLAB_HDR.identific) != 124)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.identific,"MATLAB",6) != 0)
{
image2=ReadMATImageV4(image_info,image,exception);
if (image2 == NULL)
goto MATLAB_KO;
image=image2;
goto END_OF_READING;
}
MATLAB_HDR.Version = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) &MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator) != 2)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," Endian %c%c",
MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator[0],MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator[1]);
if (!strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator, "IM", 2))
{
ReadBlobXXXLong = ReadBlobLSBLong;
ReadBlobXXXShort = ReadBlobLSBShort;
ReadBlobDoublesXXX = ReadBlobDoublesLSB;
ReadBlobFloatsXXX = ReadBlobFloatsLSB;
image->endian = LSBEndian;
}
else if (!strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator, "MI", 2))
{
ReadBlobXXXLong = ReadBlobMSBLong;
ReadBlobXXXShort = ReadBlobMSBShort;
ReadBlobDoublesXXX = ReadBlobDoublesMSB;
ReadBlobFloatsXXX = ReadBlobFloatsMSB;
image->endian = MSBEndian;
}
else
goto MATLAB_KO; /* unsupported endian */
if (strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.identific, "MATLAB", 6))
MATLAB_KO: ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
filepos = TellBlob(image);
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
Frames = 1;
(void) SeekBlob(image,filepos,SEEK_SET);
/* printf("pos=%X\n",TellBlob(image)); */
MATLAB_HDR.DataType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image);
if(EOFBlob(image)) break;
MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize = ReadBlobXXXLong(image);
if(EOFBlob(image)) break;
filepos += MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize + 4 + 4;
image2 = image;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if(MATLAB_HDR.DataType == miCOMPRESSED)
{
image2 = DecompressBlock(image,MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize,clone_info,exception);
if(image2==NULL) continue;
MATLAB_HDR.DataType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* replace compressed object type. */
}
#endif
if(MATLAB_HDR.DataType!=miMATRIX) continue; /* skip another objects. */
MATLAB_HDR.unknown1 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.unknown2 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.unknown5 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass = MATLAB_HDR.unknown5 & 0xFF;
MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag = (MATLAB_HDR.unknown5>>8) & 0xFF;
MATLAB_HDR.unknown3 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
if(image!=image2)
MATLAB_HDR.unknown4 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* ??? don't understand why ?? */
MATLAB_HDR.unknown4 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.SizeX = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.SizeY = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
switch(MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag)
{
case 8: z2=z=1; break; /* 2D matrix*/
case 12: z2=z = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* 3D matrix RGB*/
Unknown6 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
(void) Unknown6;
if(z!=3) ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
break;
case 16: z2=z = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* 4D matrix animation */
if(z!=3 && z!=1)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
Frames = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
if (Frames == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
break;
default: ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
}
MATLAB_HDR.Flag1 = ReadBlobXXXShort(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.NameFlag = ReadBlobXXXShort(image2);
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass %d",MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass);
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxCHAR_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxSINGLE_CLASS && /* float + complex float */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxDOUBLE_CLASS && /* double + complex double */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT8_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT8_CLASS && /* uint8 + uint8 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT16_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT16_CLASS && /* uint16 + uint16 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT32_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT32_CLASS && /* uint32 + uint32 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT64_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT64_CLASS) /* uint64 + uint64 3D */
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnsupportedCellTypeInTheMatrix");
switch (MATLAB_HDR.NameFlag)
{
case 0:
size = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Object name string size */
size = 4 * (ssize_t) ((size + 3 + 1) / 4);
(void) SeekBlob(image2, size, SEEK_CUR);
break;
case 1:
case 2:
case 3:
case 4:
(void) ReadBlob(image2, 4, (unsigned char *) &size); /* Object name string */
break;
default:
goto MATLAB_KO;
}
CellType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Additional object type */
if (logging)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"MATLAB_HDR.CellType: %.20g",(double) CellType);
(void) ReadBlob(image2, 4, (unsigned char *) &size); /* data size */
NEXT_FRAME:
switch (CellType)
{
case miINT8:
case miUINT8:
sample_size = 8;
if(MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_LOGICAL)
image->depth = 1;
else
image->depth = 8; /* Byte type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeX;
break;
case miINT16:
case miUINT16:
sample_size = 16;
image->depth = 16; /* Word type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (2 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miINT32:
case miUINT32:
sample_size = 32;
image->depth = 32; /* Dword type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (4 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miINT64:
case miUINT64:
sample_size = 64;
image->depth = 64; /* Qword type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (8 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miSINGLE:
sample_size = 32;
image->depth = 32; /* double type cell */
(void) SetImageOption(clone_info,"quantum:format","floating-point");
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* complex float type cell */
}
ldblk = (ssize_t) (4 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miDOUBLE:
sample_size = 64;
image->depth = 64; /* double type cell */
(void) SetImageOption(clone_info,"quantum:format","floating-point");
DisableMSCWarning(4127)
if (sizeof(double) != 8)
RestoreMSCWarning
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "IncompatibleSizeOfDouble");
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* complex double type cell */
}
ldblk = (ssize_t) (8 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
default:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "UnsupportedCellTypeInTheMatrix");
}
(void) sample_size;
image->columns = MATLAB_HDR.SizeX;
image->rows = MATLAB_HDR.SizeY;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(clone_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
one=1;
image->colors = one << image->depth;
if (image->columns == 0 || image->rows == 0)
goto MATLAB_KO;
/* Image is gray when no complex flag is set and 2D Matrix */
if ((MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag == 8) &&
((MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX) == 0))
{
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
image->type=GrayscaleType;
}
/*
If ping is true, then only set image size and colors without
reading any image data.
*/
if (image_info->ping)
{
size_t temp = image->columns;
image->columns = image->rows;
image->rows = temp;
goto done_reading; /* !!!!!! BAD !!!! */
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
/* ----- Load raster data ----- */
BImgBuff = (unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) (ldblk),sizeof(double)); /* Ldblk was set in the check phase */
if (BImgBuff == NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ResetMagickMemory(BImgBuff,0,ldblk*sizeof(double));
MinVal = 0;
MaxVal = 0;
if (CellType==miDOUBLE || CellType==miSINGLE) /* Find Min and Max Values for floats */
{
CalcMinMax(image2, image_info->endian, MATLAB_HDR.SizeX, MATLAB_HDR.SizeY, CellType, ldblk, BImgBuff, &quantum_info->minimum, &quantum_info->maximum);
}
/* Main loop for reading all scanlines */
if(z==1) z=0; /* read grey scanlines */
/* else read color scanlines */
do
{
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT set image pixels returns unexpected NULL on a row %u.", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto done_reading; /* Skip image rotation, when cannot set image pixels */
}
if(ReadBlob(image2,ldblk,(unsigned char *)BImgBuff) != (ssize_t) ldblk)
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT cannot read scanrow %u from a file.", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto ExitLoop;
}
if((CellType==miINT8 || CellType==miUINT8) && (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_LOGICAL))
{
FixLogical((unsigned char *)BImgBuff,ldblk);
if(ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,z2qtype[z],BImgBuff,exception) <= 0)
{
ImportQuantumPixelsFailed:
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT failed to ImportQuantumPixels for a row %u", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
break;
}
}
else
{
if(ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,z2qtype[z],BImgBuff,exception) <= 0)
goto ImportQuantumPixelsFailed;
if (z<=1 && /* fix only during a last pass z==0 || z==1 */
(CellType==miINT8 || CellType==miINT16 || CellType==miINT32 || CellType==miINT64))
FixSignedValues(q,MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
}
if (!SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception))
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT failed to sync image pixels for a row %u", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto ExitLoop;
}
}
} while(z-- >= 2);
ExitLoop:
/* Read complex part of numbers here */
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* Find Min and Max Values for complex parts of floats */
CellType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Additional object type */
i = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* size of a complex part - toss away*/
if (CellType==miDOUBLE || CellType==miSINGLE)
{
CalcMinMax(image2, image_info->endian, MATLAB_HDR.SizeX, MATLAB_HDR.SizeY, CellType, ldblk, BImgBuff, &MinVal, &MaxVal);
}
if (CellType==miDOUBLE)
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
ReadBlobDoublesXXX(image2, ldblk, (double *)BImgBuff);
InsertComplexDoubleRow((double *)BImgBuff, i, image, MinVal, MaxVal);
}
if (CellType==miSINGLE)
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
ReadBlobFloatsXXX(image2, ldblk, (float *)BImgBuff);
InsertComplexFloatRow((float *)BImgBuff, i, image, MinVal, MaxVal);
}
}
/* Image is gray when no complex flag is set and 2D Matrix AGAIN!!! */
if ((MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag == 8) &&
((MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX) == 0))
image->type=GrayscaleType;
if (image->depth == 1)
image->type=BilevelType;
if(image2==image)
image2 = NULL; /* Remove shadow copy to an image before rotation. */
/* Rotate image. */
rotated_image = RotateImage(image, 90.0, exception);
if (rotated_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
/* Remove page offsets added by RotateImage */
rotated_image->page.x=0;
rotated_image->page.y=0;
blob = rotated_image->blob;
rotated_image->blob = image->blob;
rotated_image->colors = image->colors;
image->blob = blob;
AppendImageToList(&image,rotated_image);
DeleteImageFromList(&image);
}
done_reading:
if(image2!=NULL)
if(image2!=image)
{
DeleteImageFromList(&image2);
if(clone_info)
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) remove_utf8(clone_info->filename);
}
}
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL) break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=0;
image->colors=0;
/* row scan buffer is no longer needed */
RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
BImgBuff = NULL;
if(--Frames>0)
{
z = z2;
if(image2==NULL) image2 = image;
goto NEXT_FRAME;
}
if(image2!=NULL)
if(image2!=image) /* Does shadow temporary decompressed image exist? */
{
/* CloseBlob(image2); */
DeleteImageFromList(&image2);
if(clone_info)
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) unlink(clone_info->filename);
}
}
}
}
RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
END_OF_READING:
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
CloseBlob(image);
{
Image *p;
ssize_t scene=0;
/*
Rewind list, removing any empty images while rewinding.
*/
p=image;
image=NULL;
while (p != (Image *) NULL)
{
Image *tmp=p;
if ((p->rows == 0) || (p->columns == 0)) {
p=p->previous;
DeleteImageFromList(&tmp);
} else {
image=p;
p=p->previous;
}
}
/*
Fix scene numbers
*/
for (p=image; p != (Image *) NULL; p=p->next)
p->scene=scene++;
}
if(clone_info != NULL) /* cleanup garbage file from compression */
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) remove_utf8(clone_info->filename);
}
DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
clone_info = NULL;
}
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"return");
if(image==NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
return (image);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: In ImageMagick before 6.9.8-5 and 7.x before 7.0.5-6, there is a memory leak in the ReadMATImage function in coders/mat.c.
Commit Message: ... | Medium | 167,808 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int perf_event_task_disable(void)
{
struct perf_event *event;
mutex_lock(¤t->perf_event_mutex);
list_for_each_entry(event, ¤t->perf_event_list, owner_entry)
perf_event_for_each_child(event, perf_event_disable);
mutex_unlock(¤t->perf_event_mutex);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: kernel/events/core.c in the performance subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.0 mismanages locks during certain migrations, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka Android internal bug 31095224.
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,989 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadSUNImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define RMT_EQUAL_RGB 1
#define RMT_NONE 0
#define RMT_RAW 2
#define RT_STANDARD 1
#define RT_ENCODED 2
#define RT_FORMAT_RGB 3
typedef struct _SUNInfo
{
unsigned int
magic,
width,
height,
depth,
length,
type,
maptype,
maplength;
} SUNInfo;
Image
*image;
int
bit;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bytes_per_line,
extent,
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
SUNInfo
sun_info;
unsigned char
*sun_data,
*sun_pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read SUN raster header.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&sun_info,0,sizeof(sun_info));
sun_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
do
{
/*
Verify SUN identifier.
*/
if (sun_info.magic != 0x59a66a95)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
sun_info.width=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.height=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.depth=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.type=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.maptype=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.maplength=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
extent=sun_info.height*sun_info.width;
if ((sun_info.height != 0) && (sun_info.width != extent/sun_info.height))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.type != RT_STANDARD) && (sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) &&
(sun_info.type != RT_FORMAT_RGB))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.maptype == RMT_NONE) && (sun_info.maplength != 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.depth == 0) || (sun_info.depth > 32))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.maptype != RMT_NONE) && (sun_info.maptype != RMT_EQUAL_RGB) &&
(sun_info.maptype != RMT_RAW))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
image->columns=sun_info.width;
image->rows=sun_info.height;
image->depth=sun_info.depth <= 8 ? sun_info.depth :
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH;
if (sun_info.depth < 24)
{
size_t
one;
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->colors=sun_info.maplength;
one=1;
if (sun_info.maptype == RMT_NONE)
image->colors=one << sun_info.depth;
if (sun_info.maptype == RMT_EQUAL_RGB)
image->colors=sun_info.maplength/3;
}
switch (sun_info.maptype)
{
case RMT_NONE:
{
if (sun_info.depth < 24)
{
/*
Create linear color ramp.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
break;
}
case RMT_EQUAL_RGB:
{
unsigned char
*sun_colormap;
/*
Read SUN raster colormap.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,
sizeof(*sun_colormap));
if (sun_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_colormap);
break;
}
case RMT_RAW:
{
unsigned char
*sun_colormap;
/*
Read SUN raster colormap.
*/
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(sun_info.maplength,
sizeof(*sun_colormap));
if (sun_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,sun_info.maplength,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) sun_info.maplength)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_colormap);
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
}
image->alpha_trait=sun_info.depth == 32 ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
image->columns=sun_info.width;
image->rows=sun_info.height;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if ((sun_info.length*sizeof(*sun_data))/sizeof(*sun_data) !=
sun_info.length || !sun_info.length)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if ((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (sun_info.depth >= 8) &&
((number_pixels*((sun_info.depth+7)/8)) > sun_info.length))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
sun_data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) sun_info.length,
sizeof(*sun_data));
if (sun_data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlob(image,sun_info.length,sun_data);
if (count != (ssize_t) sun_info.length)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
sun_pixels=sun_data;
bytes_per_line=0;
if (sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED)
{
size_t
height;
/*
Read run-length encoded raster pixels.
*/
height=sun_info.height;
bytes_per_line=sun_info.width*sun_info.depth;
if ((height == 0) || (sun_info.width == 0) || (sun_info.depth == 0) ||
((bytes_per_line/sun_info.depth) != sun_info.width))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
bytes_per_line+=15;
bytes_per_line<<=1;
if ((bytes_per_line >> 1) != (sun_info.width*sun_info.depth+15))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
bytes_per_line>>=4;
sun_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(height,
bytes_per_line*sizeof(*sun_pixels));
if (sun_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) DecodeImage(sun_data,sun_info.length,sun_pixels,bytes_per_line*
height);
sun_data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_data);
}
/*
Convert SUN raster image to pixel packets.
*/
p=sun_pixels;
if (sun_info.depth == 1)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= 0; bit--)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x00 : 0x01),
q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= (int) (8-(image->columns % 8)); bit--)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x00 :
0x01),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((((image->columns/8)+(image->columns % 8 ? 1 : 0)) % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
if (bytes_per_line == 0)
bytes_per_line=image->columns;
length=image->rows*(image->columns+image->columns % 2);
if (((sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED) &&
(length > (bytes_per_line*image->rows))) ||
((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (length > sun_info.length)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,*p++,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
{
size_t
bytes_per_pixel;
bytes_per_pixel=3;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
bytes_per_pixel++;
if (bytes_per_line == 0)
bytes_per_line=bytes_per_pixel*image->columns;
length=image->rows*(bytes_per_line+image->columns % 2);
if (((sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED) &&
(length > (bytes_per_line*image->rows))) ||
((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (length > sun_info.length)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
if (sun_info.type == RT_STANDARD)
{
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
}
else
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
}
if (image->colors != 0)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelRed(image,q)].red),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelGreen(image,q)].green),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelBlue(image,q)].blue),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (((bytes_per_pixel*image->columns) % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
sun_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_pixels);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
sun_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (sun_info.magic == 0x59a66a95)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (sun_info.magic == 0x59a66a95);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in ImageMagick before 6.9.0-4 Beta allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted SUN file.
Commit Message: http://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=26838 | Medium | 170,126 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: rar_read_ahead(struct archive_read *a, size_t min, ssize_t *avail)
{
struct rar *rar = (struct rar *)(a->format->data);
const void *h = __archive_read_ahead(a, min, avail);
int ret;
if (avail)
{
if (a->archive.read_data_is_posix_read && *avail > (ssize_t)a->archive.read_data_requested)
*avail = a->archive.read_data_requested;
if (*avail > rar->bytes_remaining)
*avail = (ssize_t)rar->bytes_remaining;
if (*avail < 0)
return NULL;
else if (*avail == 0 && rar->main_flags & MHD_VOLUME &&
rar->file_flags & FHD_SPLIT_AFTER)
{
ret = archive_read_format_rar_read_header(a, a->entry);
if (ret == (ARCHIVE_EOF))
{
rar->has_endarc_header = 1;
ret = archive_read_format_rar_read_header(a, a->entry);
}
if (ret != (ARCHIVE_OK))
return NULL;
return rar_read_ahead(a, min, avail);
}
}
return h;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: libarchive version commit 416694915449219d505531b1096384f3237dd6cc onwards (release v3.1.0 onwards) contains a CWE-416: Use After Free vulnerability in RAR decoder - libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c that can result in Crash/DoS - it is unknown if RCE is possible. This attack appear to be exploitable via the victim must open a specially crafted RAR archive.
Commit Message: rar: file split across multi-part archives must match
Fuzzing uncovered some UAF and memory overrun bugs where a file in a
single file archive reported that it was split across multiple
volumes. This was caused by ppmd7 operations calling
rar_br_fillup. This would invoke rar_read_ahead, which would in some
situations invoke archive_read_format_rar_read_header. That would
check the new file name against the old file name, and if they didn't
match up it would free the ppmd7 buffer and allocate a new
one. However, because the ppmd7 decoder wasn't actually done with the
buffer, it would continue to used the freed buffer. Both reads and
writes to the freed region can be observed.
This is quite tricky to solve: once the buffer has been freed it is
too late, as the ppmd7 decoder functions almost universally assume
success - there's no way for ppmd_read to signal error, nor are there
good ways for functions like Range_Normalise to propagate them. So we
can't detect after the fact that we're in an invalid state - e.g. by
checking rar->cursor, we have to prevent ourselves from ever ending up
there. So, when we are in the dangerous part or rar_read_ahead that
assumes a valid split, we set a flag force read_header to either go
down the path for split files or bail. This means that the ppmd7
decoder keeps a valid buffer and just runs out of data.
Found with a combination of AFL, afl-rb and qsym. | Medium | 168,930 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int send_write_chunks(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt,
struct rpcrdma_write_array *wr_ary,
struct rpcrdma_msg *rdma_resp,
struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
struct svc_rdma_req_map *vec)
{
u32 xfer_len = rqstp->rq_res.page_len;
int write_len;
u32 xdr_off;
int chunk_off;
int chunk_no;
int nchunks;
struct rpcrdma_write_array *res_ary;
int ret;
res_ary = (struct rpcrdma_write_array *)
&rdma_resp->rm_body.rm_chunks[1];
/* Write chunks start at the pagelist */
nchunks = be32_to_cpu(wr_ary->wc_nchunks);
for (xdr_off = rqstp->rq_res.head[0].iov_len, chunk_no = 0;
xfer_len && chunk_no < nchunks;
chunk_no++) {
struct rpcrdma_segment *arg_ch;
u64 rs_offset;
arg_ch = &wr_ary->wc_array[chunk_no].wc_target;
write_len = min(xfer_len, be32_to_cpu(arg_ch->rs_length));
/* Prepare the response chunk given the length actually
* written */
xdr_decode_hyper((__be32 *)&arg_ch->rs_offset, &rs_offset);
svc_rdma_xdr_encode_array_chunk(res_ary, chunk_no,
arg_ch->rs_handle,
arg_ch->rs_offset,
write_len);
chunk_off = 0;
while (write_len) {
ret = send_write(xprt, rqstp,
be32_to_cpu(arg_ch->rs_handle),
rs_offset + chunk_off,
xdr_off,
write_len,
vec);
if (ret <= 0)
goto out_err;
chunk_off += ret;
xdr_off += ret;
xfer_len -= ret;
write_len -= ret;
}
}
/* Update the req with the number of chunks actually used */
svc_rdma_xdr_encode_write_list(rdma_resp, chunk_no);
return rqstp->rq_res.page_len;
out_err:
pr_err("svcrdma: failed to send write chunks, rc=%d\n", ret);
return -EIO;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
... | Medium | 168,170 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int ff_amf_get_field_value(const uint8_t *data, const uint8_t *data_end,
const uint8_t *name, uint8_t *dst, int dst_size)
{
int namelen = strlen(name);
int len;
while (*data != AMF_DATA_TYPE_OBJECT && data < data_end) {
len = ff_amf_tag_size(data, data_end);
if (len < 0)
len = data_end - data;
data += len;
}
if (data_end - data < 3)
return -1;
data++;
for (;;) {
int size = bytestream_get_be16(&data);
if (!size)
break;
if (size < 0 || size >= data_end - data)
return -1;
data += size;
if (size == namelen && !memcmp(data-size, name, namelen)) {
switch (*data++) {
case AMF_DATA_TYPE_NUMBER:
snprintf(dst, dst_size, "%g", av_int2double(AV_RB64(data)));
break;
case AMF_DATA_TYPE_BOOL:
snprintf(dst, dst_size, "%s", *data ? "true" : "false");
break;
case AMF_DATA_TYPE_STRING:
len = bytestream_get_be16(&data);
av_strlcpy(dst, data, FFMIN(len+1, dst_size));
break;
default:
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
len = ff_amf_tag_size(data, data_end);
if (len < 0 || len >= data_end - data)
return -1;
data += len;
}
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The ff_amf_get_field_value function in libavformat/rtmppkt.c in FFmpeg 3.3.2 allows remote RTMP servers to cause a denial of service (Segmentation Violation and application crash) via a crafted stream.
Commit Message: avformat/rtmppkt: Convert ff_amf_get_field_value() to bytestream2
Fixes: out of array accesses
Found-by: JunDong Xie of Ant-financial Light-Year Security Lab
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,001 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int TS_OBJ_print_bio(BIO *bio, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj)
{
char obj_txt[128];
int len = OBJ_obj2txt(obj_txt, sizeof(obj_txt), obj, 0);
BIO_write(bio, obj_txt, len);
BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1);
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The TS_OBJ_print_bio function in crypto/ts/ts_lib.c in the X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP) implementation in OpenSSL through 1.0.2h allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and application crash) via a crafted time-stamp file that is mishandled by the *openssl ts* command.
Commit Message: Fix OOB read in TS_OBJ_print_bio().
TS_OBJ_print_bio() misuses OBJ_txt2obj: it should print the result
as a null terminated buffer. The length value returned is the total
length the complete text reprsentation would need not the amount of
data written.
CVE-2016-2180
Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,435 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::allocateBufferWithBackup(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<IMemory> ¶ms,
OMX::buffer_id *buffer, OMX_U32 allottedSize) {
if (params == NULL || buffer == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (allottedSize > params->size() || portIndex >= NELEM(mNumPortBuffers)) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
bool copy = mMetadataType[portIndex] == kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
BufferMeta *buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(
params, portIndex,
(portIndex == kPortIndexInput) && copy /* copyToOmx */,
(portIndex == kPortIndexOutput) && copy /* copyFromOmx */,
NULL /* data */);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_AllocateBuffer(
mHandle, &header, portIndex, buffer_meta, allottedSize);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(allocateBufferWithBackup, err,
SIMPLE_BUFFER(portIndex, (size_t)allottedSize, params->pointer()));
delete buffer_meta;
buffer_meta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, buffer_meta);
memset(header->pBuffer, 0, header->nAllocLen);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL && portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
bufferSource->addCodecBuffer(header);
}
CLOG_BUFFER(allocateBufferWithBackup, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(*buffer, portIndex, "%zu@%p :> %u@%p",
params->size(), params->pointer(), allottedSize, header->pBuffer));
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-11-01, and 7.0 before 2016-11-01 could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Android ID: A-29422020.
Commit Message: IOMX: do not clear buffer if it's allocated by component
The component might depends on their buffers to be initialized
in certain ways to work. Don't clear unless we're allocating it.
bug: 31586647
Change-Id: Ia0a125797e414998ef0cd8ce03672f5b1e0bbf7a
(cherry picked from commit ea76573aa276f51950007217a97903c4fe64f685)
| Medium | 174,144 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnSelectPopupMenuItem(int selected_index) {
if (external_popup_menu_ == NULL)
return;
blink::WebScopedUserGesture gesture(frame_);
external_popup_menu_->DidSelectItem(selected_index);
external_popup_menu_.reset();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Incorrect lifetime handling in HTML select elements in Google Chrome on Android and Mac prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix crashes in RenderFrameImpl::OnSelectPopupMenuItem(s)
ExternalPopupMenu::DidSelectItem(s) can delete the RenderFrameImpl.
We need to reset external_popup_menu_ before calling it.
Bug: 912211
Change-Id: Ia9a628e144464a2ebb14ab77d3a693fd5cead6fc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381325
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618026} | Medium | 173,072 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void FragmentPaintPropertyTreeBuilder::UpdateCssClip() {
DCHECK(properties_);
if (NeedsPaintPropertyUpdate()) {
if (NeedsCssClip(object_)) {
DCHECK(object_.CanContainAbsolutePositionObjects());
OnUpdateClip(properties_->UpdateCssClip(
context_.current.clip,
ClipPaintPropertyNode::State{context_.current.transform,
ToClipRect(ToLayoutBox(object_).ClipRect(
context_.current.paint_offset))}));
} else {
OnClearClip(properties_->ClearCssClip());
}
}
if (properties_->CssClip())
context_.current.clip = properties_->CssClip();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930} | High | 171,794 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ut64 MACH0_(get_main)(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
ut64 addr = 0LL;
struct symbol_t *symbols;
int i;
if (!(symbols = MACH0_(get_symbols) (bin))) {
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; !symbols[i].last; i++) {
if (!strcmp (symbols[i].name, "_main")) {
addr = symbols[i].addr;
break;
}
}
free (symbols);
if (!addr && bin->main_cmd.cmd == LC_MAIN) {
addr = bin->entry + bin->baddr;
}
if (!addr) {
ut8 b[128];
ut64 entry = addr_to_offset(bin, bin->entry);
if (entry > bin->size || entry + sizeof (b) > bin->size)
return 0;
i = r_buf_read_at (bin->b, entry, b, sizeof (b));
if (i < 1) {
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
if (b[i] == 0xe8 && !b[i+3] && !b[i+4]) {
int delta = b[i+1] | (b[i+2] << 8) | (b[i+3] << 16) | (b[i+4] << 24);
return bin->entry + i + 5 + delta;
}
}
}
return addr;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The get_relocs_64 function in libr/bin/format/mach0/mach0.c in radare2 1.3.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and application crash) via a crafted Mach0 file.
Commit Message: Fix null deref and uaf in mach0 parser | Medium | 168,235 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool IsTraceEventArgsWhitelisted(const char* category_group_name,
const char* event_name) {
base::CStringTokenizer category_group_tokens(
category_group_name, category_group_name + strlen(category_group_name),
",");
while (category_group_tokens.GetNext()) {
const std::string& category_group_token = category_group_tokens.token();
for (int i = 0; kEventArgsWhitelist[i][0] != NULL; ++i) {
DCHECK(kEventArgsWhitelist[i][1]);
if (base::MatchPattern(category_group_token.c_str(),
kEventArgsWhitelist[i][0]) &&
base::MatchPattern(event_name, kEventArgsWhitelist[i][1])) {
return true;
}
}
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the FrameSelection::updateAppearance function in core/editing/FrameSelection.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 34.0.1847.137, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging improper RenderObject handling.
Commit Message: Tracing: Add support for PII whitelisting of individual trace event arguments
R=dsinclair,shatch
BUG=546093
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1415013003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356690} | High | 171,680 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: float AudioParam::finalValue()
{
float value;
calculateFinalValues(&value, 1, false);
return value;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: modules/webaudio/BiquadDSPKernel.cpp in the Web Audio API implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 37.0.2062.94, does not properly consider concurrent threads during attempts to update biquad filter coefficients, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (read of uninitialized memory) via crafted API calls.
Commit Message: Initialize value since calculateFinalValues may fail to do so.
Fix threading issue where updateCoefficientsIfNecessary was not always
called from the audio thread. This causes the value not to be
initialized.
Thus,
o Initialize the variable to some value, just in case.
o Split updateCoefficientsIfNecessary into two functions with the code
that sets the coefficients pulled out in to the new function
updateCoefficients.
o Simplify updateCoefficientsIfNecessary since useSmoothing was always
true, and forceUpdate is not longer needed.
o Add process lock to prevent the audio thread from updating the
coefficients while they are being read in the main thread. The audio
thread will update them the next time around.
o Make getFrequencyResponse set the lock while reading the
coefficients of the biquad in preparation for computing the
frequency response.
BUG=389219
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/354213002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@177250 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,659 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: matchCurrentInput(
const InString *input, int pos, const widechar *passInstructions, int passIC) {
int k;
int kk = pos;
for (k = passIC + 2; k < passIC + 2 + passInstructions[passIC + 1]; k++)
if (input->chars[kk] == ENDSEGMENT || passInstructions[k] != input->chars[kk++])
return 0;
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The matchCurrentInput function inside lou_translateString.c of Liblouis prior to 3.7 does not check the input string's length, allowing attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash via out-of-bounds read) by crafting an input file with certain translation dictionaries.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow
Fixes #635
Thanks to HongxuChen for reporting it | Medium | 169,022 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void MaybeStartInputMethodDaemon(const std::string& section,
const std::string& config_name,
const ImeConfigValue& value) {
if (section == language_prefs::kGeneralSectionName &&
config_name == language_prefs::kPreloadEnginesConfigName &&
value.type == ImeConfigValue::kValueTypeStringList &&
!value.string_list_value.empty()) {
if (ContainOnlyOneKeyboardLayout(value) || defer_ime_startup_) {
return;
}
const bool just_started = StartInputMethodDaemon();
if (!just_started) {
return;
}
if (tentative_current_input_method_id_.empty()) {
tentative_current_input_method_id_ = current_input_method_.id;
}
if (std::find(value.string_list_value.begin(),
value.string_list_value.end(),
tentative_current_input_method_id_)
== value.string_list_value.end()) {
tentative_current_input_method_id_.clear();
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,499 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool AXLayoutObject::elementAttributeValue(
const QualifiedName& attributeName) const {
if (!m_layoutObject)
return false;
return equalIgnoringCase(getAttribute(attributeName), "true");
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that the auto-open list omits all dangerous file types, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by providing a crafted file and leveraging a user's previous *Always open files of this type* choice, related to download_commands.cc and download_prefs.cc.
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858} | Medium | 171,904 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: std::string SanitizeRevision(const std::string& revision) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < revision.length(); i++) {
if (!(revision[i] == '@' && i == 0)
&& !(revision[i] >= '0' && revision[i] <= '9')
&& !(revision[i] >= 'a' && revision[i] <= 'z')
&& !(revision[i] >= 'A' && revision[i] <= 'Z')) {
return std::string();
}
}
return revision;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Google Chrome prior to 56.0.2924.76 for Windows insufficiently sanitized DevTools URLs, which allowed a remote attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to read filesystem contents via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926} | Medium | 172,464 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int vp8_lossy_decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx, AVFrame *p,
int *got_frame, uint8_t *data_start,
unsigned int data_size)
{
WebPContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
AVPacket pkt;
int ret;
if (!s->initialized) {
ff_vp8_decode_init(avctx);
s->initialized = 1;
if (s->has_alpha)
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA420P;
}
s->lossless = 0;
if (data_size > INT_MAX) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "unsupported chunk size\n");
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
av_init_packet(&pkt);
pkt.data = data_start;
pkt.size = data_size;
ret = ff_vp8_decode_frame(avctx, p, got_frame, &pkt);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
update_canvas_size(avctx, avctx->width, avctx->height);
if (s->has_alpha) {
ret = vp8_lossy_decode_alpha(avctx, p, s->alpha_data,
s->alpha_data_size);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libavcodec/webp.c in FFmpeg before 2.8.12, 3.0.x before 3.0.8, 3.1.x before 3.1.8, 3.2.x before 3.2.5, and 3.3.x before 3.3.1 does not ensure that pix_fmt is set, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted file, related to the vp8_decode_mb_row_no_filter and pred8x8_128_dc_8_c functions.
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,072 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void LauncherView::Init() {
ResourceBundle& rb = ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance();
model_->AddObserver(this);
const LauncherItems& items(model_->items());
for (LauncherItems::const_iterator i = items.begin(); i != items.end(); ++i) {
views::View* child = CreateViewForItem(*i);
child->SetPaintToLayer(true);
view_model_->Add(child, static_cast<int>(i - items.begin()));
AddChildView(child);
}
UpdateFirstButtonPadding();
overflow_button_ = new views::ImageButton(this);
overflow_button_->set_accessibility_focusable(true);
overflow_button_->SetImage(
views::CustomButton::BS_NORMAL,
rb.GetImageNamed(IDR_AURA_LAUNCHER_OVERFLOW).ToImageSkia());
overflow_button_->SetImage(
views::CustomButton::BS_HOT,
rb.GetImageNamed(IDR_AURA_LAUNCHER_OVERFLOW_HOT).ToImageSkia());
overflow_button_->SetImage(
views::CustomButton::BS_PUSHED,
rb.GetImageNamed(IDR_AURA_LAUNCHER_OVERFLOW_PUSHED).ToImageSkia());
overflow_button_->SetAccessibleName(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_AURA_LAUNCHER_OVERFLOW_NAME));
overflow_button_->set_context_menu_controller(this);
ConfigureChildView(overflow_button_);
AddChildView(overflow_button_);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,890 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int res_inverse(vorbis_dsp_state *vd,vorbis_info_residue *info,
ogg_int32_t **in,int *nonzero,int ch){
int i,j,k,s,used=0;
codec_setup_info *ci=(codec_setup_info *)vd->vi->codec_setup;
codebook *phrasebook=ci->book_param+info->groupbook;
int samples_per_partition=info->grouping;
int partitions_per_word=phrasebook->dim;
int pcmend=ci->blocksizes[vd->W];
if(info->type<2){
int max=pcmend>>1;
int end=(info->end<max?info->end:max);
int n=end-info->begin;
if(n>0){
int partvals=n/samples_per_partition;
int partwords=(partvals+partitions_per_word-1)/partitions_per_word;
for(i=0;i<ch;i++)
if(nonzero[i])
in[used++]=in[i];
ch=used;
if(used){
char **partword=(char **)alloca(ch*sizeof(*partword));
for(j=0;j<ch;j++)
partword[j]=(char *)alloca(partwords*partitions_per_word*
sizeof(*partword[j]));
for(s=0;s<info->stages;s++){
for(i=0;i<partvals;){
if(s==0){
/* fetch the partition word for each channel */
partword[0][i+partitions_per_word-1]=1;
for(k=partitions_per_word-2;k>=0;k--)
partword[0][i+k]=partword[0][i+k+1]*info->partitions;
for(j=1;j<ch;j++)
for(k=partitions_per_word-1;k>=0;k--)
partword[j][i+k]=partword[j-1][i+k];
for(j=0;j<ch;j++){
int temp=vorbis_book_decode(phrasebook,&vd->opb);
if(temp==-1)goto eopbreak;
/* this can be done quickly in assembly due to the quotient
always being at most six bits */
for(k=0;k<partitions_per_word;k++){
ogg_uint32_t div=partword[j][i+k];
partword[j][i+k]=temp/div;
temp-=partword[j][i+k]*div;
}
}
}
/* now we decode residual values for the partitions */
for(k=0;k<partitions_per_word && i<partvals;k++,i++)
for(j=0;j<ch;j++){
long offset=info->begin+i*samples_per_partition;
if(info->stagemasks[(int)partword[j][i]]&(1<<s)){
codebook *stagebook=ci->book_param+
info->stagebooks[(partword[j][i]<<3)+s];
if(info->type){
if(vorbis_book_decodev_add(stagebook,in[j]+offset,&vd->opb,
samples_per_partition,-8)==-1)
goto eopbreak;
}else{
if(vorbis_book_decodevs_add(stagebook,in[j]+offset,&vd->opb,
samples_per_partition,-8)==-1)
goto eopbreak;
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}else{
int max=(pcmend*ch)>>1;
int end=(info->end<max?info->end:max);
int n=end-info->begin;
if(n>0){
int partvals=n/samples_per_partition;
int partwords=(partvals+partitions_per_word-1)/partitions_per_word;
char *partword=
(char *)alloca(partwords*partitions_per_word*sizeof(*partword));
int beginoff=info->begin/ch;
for(i=0;i<ch;i++)if(nonzero[i])break;
if(i==ch)return(0); /* no nonzero vectors */
samples_per_partition/=ch;
for(s=0;s<info->stages;s++){
for(i=0;i<partvals;){
if(s==0){
int temp;
partword[i+partitions_per_word-1]=1;
for(k=partitions_per_word-2;k>=0;k--)
partword[i+k]=partword[i+k+1]*info->partitions;
/* fetch the partition word */
temp=vorbis_book_decode(phrasebook,&vd->opb);
if(temp==-1)goto eopbreak;
/* this can be done quickly in assembly due to the quotient
always being at most six bits */
for(k=0;k<partitions_per_word;k++){
ogg_uint32_t div=partword[i+k];
partword[i+k]=temp/div;
temp-=partword[i+k]*div;
}
}
/* now we decode residual values for the partitions */
for(k=0;k<partitions_per_word && i<partvals;k++,i++)
if(info->stagemasks[(int)partword[i]]&(1<<s)){
codebook *stagebook=ci->book_param+
info->stagebooks[(partword[i]<<3)+s];
if(vorbis_book_decodevv_add(stagebook,in,
i*samples_per_partition+beginoff,ch,
&vd->opb,
samples_per_partition,-8)==-1)
goto eopbreak;
}
}
}
}
}
eopbreak:
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Tremolo/res012.c in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 does not validate the number of partitions, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device hang or reboot) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28556125.
Commit Message: Check partword is in range for # of partitions
and reformat tabs->spaces for readability.
Bug: 28556125
Change-Id: Id02819a6a5bcc24ba4f8a502081e5cb45272681c
| High | 173,561 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: const CuePoint* Cues::GetNext(const CuePoint* pCurr) const {
if (pCurr == NULL)
return NULL;
assert(pCurr->GetTimeCode() >= 0);
assert(m_cue_points);
assert(m_count >= 1);
#if 0
const size_t count = m_count + m_preload_count;
size_t index = pCurr->m_index;
assert(index < count);
CuePoint* const* const pp = m_cue_points;
assert(pp);
assert(pp[index] == pCurr);
++index;
if (index >= count)
return NULL;
CuePoint* const pNext = pp[index];
assert(pNext);
pNext->Load(m_pSegment->m_pReader);
#else
long index = pCurr->m_index;
assert(index < m_count);
CuePoint* const* const pp = m_cue_points;
assert(pp);
assert(pp[index] == pCurr);
++index;
if (index >= m_count)
return NULL;
CuePoint* const pNext = pp[index];
assert(pNext);
assert(pNext->GetTimeCode() >= 0);
#endif
return pNext;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
| High | 173,821 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_start_of_pic(dec_struct_t *ps_dec,
WORD32 i4_poc,
pocstruct_t *ps_temp_poc,
UWORD16 u2_frame_num,
dec_pic_params_t *ps_pps)
{
pocstruct_t *ps_prev_poc = &ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc;
pocstruct_t *ps_cur_poc = ps_temp_poc;
pic_buffer_t *pic_buf;
ivd_video_decode_op_t * ps_dec_output =
(ivd_video_decode_op_t *)ps_dec->pv_dec_out;
dec_slice_params_t *ps_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
dec_seq_params_t *ps_seq = ps_pps->ps_sps;
UWORD8 u1_bottom_field_flag = ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag;
UWORD8 u1_field_pic_flag = ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
/* high profile related declarations */
high_profile_tools_t s_high_profile;
WORD32 ret;
H264_MUTEX_LOCK(&ps_dec->process_disp_mutex);
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb;
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0];
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1];
ps_prev_poc->u1_bot_field = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag;
ps_prev_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst = ps_cur_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst;
ps_prev_poc->u2_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->i1_prev_mb_qp_delta = 0;
ps_dec->i1_next_ctxt_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_nmb_deblk = 0;
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 1)
ps_dec->u4_nmb_deblk = 1;
if(ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag == 1)
{
ps_dec->u4_nmb_deblk = 0;
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores > 2)
ps_dec->u4_num_cores = 2;
}
ps_dec->u4_use_intrapred_line_copy = 0;
if (ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag == 0)
{
ps_dec->u4_use_intrapred_line_copy = 1;
}
ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm = 0;
/* If degrade is enabled, set the degrade flags appropriately */
if(ps_dec->i4_degrade_type && ps_dec->i4_degrade_pics)
{
WORD32 degrade_pic;
ps_dec->i4_degrade_pic_cnt++;
degrade_pic = 0;
/* If degrade is to be done in all frames, then do not check further */
switch(ps_dec->i4_degrade_pics)
{
case 4:
{
degrade_pic = 1;
break;
}
case 3:
{
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type != I_SLICE)
degrade_pic = 1;
break;
}
case 2:
{
/* If pic count hits non-degrade interval or it is an islice, then do not degrade */
if((ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type != I_SLICE)
&& (ps_dec->i4_degrade_pic_cnt
!= ps_dec->i4_nondegrade_interval))
degrade_pic = 1;
break;
}
case 1:
{
/* Check if the current picture is non-ref */
if(0 == ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc)
{
degrade_pic = 1;
}
break;
}
}
if(degrade_pic)
{
if(ps_dec->i4_degrade_type & 0x2)
ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm = 1;
/* MC degrading is done only for non-ref pictures */
if(0 == ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc)
{
if(ps_dec->i4_degrade_type & 0x4)
ps_dec->i4_mv_frac_mask = 0;
if(ps_dec->i4_degrade_type & 0x8)
ps_dec->i4_mv_frac_mask = 0;
}
}
else
ps_dec->i4_degrade_pic_cnt = 0;
}
{
dec_err_status_t * ps_err = ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status;
if(ps_dec->u1_sl_typ_5_9
&& ((ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type == I_SLICE)
|| (ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type
== SI_SLICE)))
ps_err->u1_cur_pic_type = PIC_TYPE_I;
else
ps_err->u1_cur_pic_type = PIC_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
if(ps_err->u1_pic_aud_i == PIC_TYPE_I)
{
ps_err->u1_cur_pic_type = PIC_TYPE_I;
ps_err->u1_pic_aud_i = PIC_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
}
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL)
{
if(ps_err->u1_err_flag)
ih264d_reset_ref_bufs(ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr);
ps_err->u1_err_flag = ACCEPT_ALL_PICS;
}
}
if(ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag && ps_dec->s_prev_seq_params.u1_eoseq_pending)
{
/* Reset the decoder picture buffers */
WORD32 j;
for(j = 0; j < MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW; j++)
{
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
j,
BUF_MGR_REF);
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_id_mv_buf_id_map[j],
BUF_MGR_REF);
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
j,
BUF_MGR_IO);
}
/* reset the decoder structure parameters related to buffer handling */
ps_dec->u1_second_field = 0;
ps_dec->i4_cur_display_seq = 0;
/********************************************************************/
/* indicate in the decoder output i4_status that some frames are being */
/* dropped, so that it resets timestamp and wait for a new sequence */
/********************************************************************/
ps_dec->s_prev_seq_params.u1_eoseq_pending = 0;
}
ret = ih264d_init_pic(ps_dec, u2_frame_num, i4_poc, ps_pps);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_pic_tu_coeff_data;
ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_pic_tu_coeff_data;
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info = ps_dec->ps_frm_mb_info;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
UWORD16 pic_wd;
UWORD16 pic_ht;
UWORD32 num_mbs;
pic_wd = ps_dec->u2_pic_wd;
pic_ht = ps_dec->u2_pic_ht;
num_mbs = (pic_wd * pic_ht) >> 8;
if(ps_dec->pu1_dec_mb_map)
{
memset((void *)ps_dec->pu1_dec_mb_map, 0, num_mbs);
}
if(ps_dec->pu1_recon_mb_map)
{
memset((void *)ps_dec->pu1_recon_mb_map, 0, num_mbs);
}
if(ps_dec->pu2_slice_num_map)
{
memset((void *)ps_dec->pu2_slice_num_map, 0,
(num_mbs * sizeof(UWORD16)));
}
}
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice = &(ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf[0]);
ps_dec->ps_decode_cur_slice = &(ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf[0]);
ps_dec->ps_computebs_cur_slice = &(ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf[0]);
/* Initialize all the HP toolsets to zero */
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_scaling_present = 0;
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_transform8x8_present = 0;
/* Get Next Free Picture */
if(1 == ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf)
{
UWORD32 i;
/* Free any buffer that is in the queue to be freed */
for(i = 0; i < MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW; i++)
{
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_to_be_freed[i])
continue;
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr, i,
BUF_MGR_IO);
ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_to_be_freed[i] = 0;
ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[i] = 0;
}
}
if(!(u1_field_pic_flag && 0 != ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded)) //ps_dec->u1_second_field))
{
pic_buffer_t *ps_cur_pic;
WORD32 cur_pic_buf_id, cur_mv_buf_id;
col_mv_buf_t *ps_col_mv;
while(1)
{
ps_cur_pic = (pic_buffer_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free(
(buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
&cur_pic_buf_id);
if(ps_cur_pic == NULL)
{
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T;
return ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T;
}
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[cur_pic_buf_id])
{
break;
}
}
ps_col_mv = (col_mv_buf_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
&cur_mv_buf_id);
if(ps_col_mv == NULL)
{
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T;
return ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic = ps_cur_pic;
ps_dec->u1_pic_buf_id = cur_pic_buf_id;
ps_cur_pic->u4_ts = ps_dec->u4_ts;
ps_cur_pic->u1_mv_buf_id = cur_mv_buf_id;
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_id_mv_buf_id_map[cur_pic_buf_id] = cur_mv_buf_id;
ps_cur_pic->pu1_col_zero_flag = (UWORD8 *)ps_col_mv->pv_col_zero_flag;
ps_cur_pic->ps_mv = (mv_pred_t *)ps_col_mv->pv_mv;
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_ref_flag[cur_pic_buf_id] = 0;
if(ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream)
{
/*make first entry of list0 point to cur pic,so that if first Islice is in error, ref pic struct will have valid entries*/
ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[0] = ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[0];
*(ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[0][0]) = *ps_cur_pic;
}
if(!ps_dec->ps_cur_pic)
{
WORD32 j;
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("------- Display Buffers Reset --------\n");
for(j = 0; j < MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW; j++)
{
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
j,
BUF_MGR_REF);
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_id_mv_buf_id_map[j],
BUF_MGR_REF);
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
j,
BUF_MGR_IO);
}
ps_dec->i4_cur_display_seq = 0;
ps_dec->i4_prev_max_display_seq = 0;
ps_dec->i4_max_poc = 0;
ps_cur_pic = (pic_buffer_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free(
(buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
&cur_pic_buf_id);
if(ps_cur_pic == NULL)
{
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T;
return ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T;
}
ps_col_mv = (col_mv_buf_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
&cur_mv_buf_id);
if(ps_col_mv == NULL)
{
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T;
return ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic = ps_cur_pic;
ps_dec->u1_pic_buf_id = cur_pic_buf_id;
ps_cur_pic->u4_ts = ps_dec->u4_ts;
ps_dec->apv_buf_id_pic_buf_map[cur_pic_buf_id] = (void *)ps_cur_pic;
ps_cur_pic->u1_mv_buf_id = cur_mv_buf_id;
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_id_mv_buf_id_map[cur_pic_buf_id] = cur_mv_buf_id;
ps_cur_pic->pu1_col_zero_flag = (UWORD8 *)ps_col_mv->pv_col_zero_flag;
ps_cur_pic->ps_mv = (mv_pred_t *)ps_col_mv->pv_mv;
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_ref_flag[cur_pic_buf_id] = 0;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u1_picturetype = u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ = SKIP_NONE;
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("got a buffer\n");
}
else
{
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("did not get a buffer\n");
}
ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got = 1;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_poc = i4_poc;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_pic_num = u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt = ps_pps->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt =
ps_pps->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_avg_poc = ps_pps->i4_avg_poc;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_time_stamp = ps_dec->u4_pts;
ps_dec->s_cur_pic = *(ps_dec->ps_cur_pic);
if(u1_field_pic_flag && u1_bottom_field_flag)
{
WORD32 i4_temp_poc;
WORD32 i4_top_field_order_poc, i4_bot_field_order_poc;
/* Point to odd lines, since it's bottom field */
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf1 += ps_dec->s_cur_pic.u2_frm_wd_y;
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf2 += ps_dec->s_cur_pic.u2_frm_wd_uv;
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf3 += ps_dec->s_cur_pic.u2_frm_wd_uv;
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv +=
((ps_dec->u2_pic_ht * ps_dec->u2_pic_wd) >> 5);
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_col_zero_flag += ((ps_dec->u2_pic_ht
* ps_dec->u2_pic_wd) >> 5);
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u1_picturetype |= BOT_FLD;
i4_top_field_order_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
i4_bot_field_order_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
i4_temp_poc = MIN(i4_top_field_order_poc,
i4_bot_field_order_poc);
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_avg_poc = i4_temp_poc;
}
ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag = ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag
&& (!u1_field_pic_flag);
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u1_picturetype |= (ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag
<< 2);
ps_dec->ps_cur_mb_row = ps_dec->ps_nbr_mb_row; //[0];
ps_dec->ps_cur_mb_row += 2;
ps_dec->ps_top_mb_row = ps_dec->ps_nbr_mb_row;
ps_dec->ps_top_mb_row += ((ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs + 2) << (1 - ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag));
ps_dec->ps_top_mb_row += 2;
/* CHANGED CODE */
ps_dec->ps_mv_cur = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_dec->ps_mv_top = ps_dec->ps_mv_top_p[0];
/* CHANGED CODE */
ps_dec->u1_mv_top_p = 0;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = 0;
/* CHANGED CODE */
ps_dec->ps_mv_left = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = 0;
ps_dec->i4_submb_ofst = -(SUB_BLK_SIZE);
ps_dec->u4_pred_info_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_pred_info_pkd_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_dma_buf_idx = 0;
ps_dec->ps_mv = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_dec->ps_mv_bank_cur = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_dec->pu1_col_zero_flag = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_col_zero_flag;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = -1;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = 0;
ps_dec->u2_mv_2mb[0] = 0;
ps_dec->u2_mv_2mb[1] = 0;
ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num_dec_thread = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num_bs = 0;
ps_dec->u4_intra_pred_line_ofst = 0;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_y_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_y_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_u_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_u_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_v_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_v_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_y_intra_pred_line_base = ps_dec->pu1_y_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_u_intra_pred_line_base = ps_dec->pu1_u_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_v_intra_pred_line_base = ps_dec->pu1_v_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_prev_y_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_y_intra_pred_line
+ (ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs * MB_SIZE);
ps_dec->pu1_prev_u_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_u_intra_pred_line
+ ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs * BLK8x8SIZE * YUV420SP_FACTOR;
ps_dec->pu1_prev_v_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_v_intra_pred_line
+ ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs * BLK8x8SIZE;
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic;
/* Initialize The Function Pointer Depending Upon the Entropy and MbAff Flag */
{
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag)
{
ps_dec->pf_compute_bs = ih264d_compute_bs_mbaff;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_mbaff;
}
else
{
ps_dec->pf_compute_bs = ih264d_compute_bs_non_mbaff;
ps_dec->u1_cur_mb_fld_dec_flag = ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
}
}
/* Set up the Parameter for DMA transfer */
{
UWORD8 u1_field_pic_flag = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
UWORD8 u1_mbaff = ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
UWORD8 uc_lastmbs = (((ps_dec->u2_pic_wd) >> 4)
% (ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp >> u1_mbaff));
UWORD16 ui16_lastmbs_widthY =
(uc_lastmbs ? (uc_lastmbs << 4) : ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp
>> u1_mbaff) << 4));
UWORD16 ui16_lastmbs_widthUV =
uc_lastmbs ? (uc_lastmbs << 3) : ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp
>> u1_mbaff) << 3);
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.pu1_dest_y = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf1;
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.pu1_dest_u = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf2;
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.pu1_dest_v = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf3;
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_frm_wd_y = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_y
<< u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_frm_wd_uv = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_uv
<< u1_field_pic_flag;
if(u1_field_pic_flag)
{
ui16_lastmbs_widthY += ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_y;
ui16_lastmbs_widthUV += ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_uv;
}
/* Normal Increment of Pointer */
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u4_inc_y[0] = ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp << 4)
>> u1_mbaff);
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u4_inc_uv[0] = ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp << 4)
>> u1_mbaff);
/* End of Row Increment */
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u4_inc_y[1] = (ui16_lastmbs_widthY
+ (PAD_LEN_Y_H << 1)
+ ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_frm_wd_y
* ((15 << u1_mbaff) + u1_mbaff));
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u4_inc_uv[1] = (ui16_lastmbs_widthUV
+ (PAD_LEN_UV_H << 2)
+ ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_frm_wd_uv
* ((15 << u1_mbaff) + u1_mbaff));
/* Assign picture numbers to each frame/field */
/* only once per picture. */
ih264d_assign_pic_num(ps_dec);
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_mv_top_left_inc = (ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp
<< 2) - 1 - (u1_mbaff << 2);
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_mv_left_inc = ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp
>> u1_mbaff) - 1) << (4 + u1_mbaff);
}
/**********************************************************************/
/* High profile related initialization at pictrue level */
/**********************************************************************/
if(ps_seq->u1_profile_idc == HIGH_PROFILE_IDC)
{
if((ps_seq->i4_seq_scaling_matrix_present_flag)
|| (ps_pps->i4_pic_scaling_matrix_present_flag))
{
ih264d_form_scaling_matrix_picture(ps_seq, ps_pps, ps_dec);
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_scaling_present = 1;
}
else
{
ih264d_form_default_scaling_matrix(ps_dec);
}
if(ps_pps->i4_transform_8x8_mode_flag)
{
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_transform8x8_present = 1;
}
}
else
{
ih264d_form_default_scaling_matrix(ps_dec);
}
/* required while reading the transform_size_8x8 u4_flag */
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag =
ps_seq->u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag;
ps_dec->s_high_profile.s_cavlc_ctxt = ps_dec->s_cavlc_ctxt;
ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag = 1;
ps_dec->ps_frame_buf_ip_recon = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
memcpy(&ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon_parse, &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon,
sizeof(tfr_ctxt_t));
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores >= 3 && ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag)
{
memcpy(&ps_dec->s_tran_iprecon, &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon,
sizeof(tfr_ctxt_t));
ps_dec->ps_frame_buf_ip_recon = &ps_dec->s_tran_iprecon;
}
}
ih264d_init_deblk_tfr_ctxt(ps_dec,&(ps_dec->s_pad_mgr), &(ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon),
ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs, 0);
ps_dec->ps_cur_deblk_mb = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic;
ps_dec->u4_cur_deblk_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->u4_deblk_mb_x = 0;
ps_dec->u4_deblk_mb_y = 0;
ps_dec->pu4_wt_ofsts = ps_dec->pu4_wts_ofsts_mat;
H264_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&ps_dec->process_disp_mutex);
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The ih264d decoder in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-08-01 mishandles slice numbers, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28673410.
Commit Message: Decoder: Fix slice number increment for error clips
Bug: 28673410
| High | 173,545 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long Track::ParseContentEncodingsEntry(long long start, long long size) {
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
assert(pReader);
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size;
int count = 0;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x2240) // ContentEncoding ID
++count;
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
if (count <= 0)
return -1;
content_encoding_entries_ = new (std::nothrow) ContentEncoding* [count];
if (!content_encoding_entries_)
return -1;
content_encoding_entries_end_ = content_encoding_entries_;
pos = start;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x2240) { // ContentEncoding ID
ContentEncoding* const content_encoding =
new (std::nothrow) ContentEncoding();
if (!content_encoding)
return -1;
status = content_encoding->ParseContentEncodingEntry(pos, size, pReader);
if (status) {
delete content_encoding;
return status;
}
*content_encoding_entries_end_++ = content_encoding;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
| High | 173,851 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(grapheme_strpos)
{
unsigned char *haystack, *needle;
int haystack_len, needle_len;
unsigned char *found;
long loffset = 0;
int32_t offset = 0;
int ret_pos;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ss|l", (char **)&haystack, &haystack_len, (char **)&needle, &needle_len, &loffset) == FAILURE) {
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR,
"grapheme_strpos: unable to parse input param", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if ( OUTSIDE_STRING(loffset, haystack_len) ) {
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR, "grapheme_strpos: Offset not contained in string", 1 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* we checked that it will fit: */
offset = (int32_t) loffset;
/* the offset is 'grapheme count offset' so it still might be invalid - we'll check it later */
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR, "grapheme_strpos: Empty delimiter", 1 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The grapheme_strpos function in ext/intl/grapheme/grapheme_string.c in PHP before 5.5.35, 5.6.x before 5.6.21, and 7.x before 7.0.6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a negative offset.
Commit Message: | High | 165,034 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool PrintWebViewHelper::InitPrintSettings(WebKit::WebFrame* frame,
WebKit::WebNode* node,
bool is_preview) {
DCHECK(frame);
PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params settings;
Send(new PrintHostMsg_GetDefaultPrintSettings(routing_id(),
&settings.params));
bool result = true;
if (PrintMsg_Print_Params_IsEmpty(settings.params)) {
if (!is_preview) {
render_view()->runModalAlertDialog(
frame,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_PRINT_PREVIEW_INVALID_PRINTER_SETTINGS));
}
result = false;
}
if (result &&
(settings.params.dpi < kMinDpi || settings.params.document_cookie == 0)) {
NOTREACHED();
result = false;
}
settings.pages.clear();
print_pages_params_.reset(new PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params(settings));
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 15.0.874.120 allows user-assisted remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to editing.
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,259 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: t1_decoder_parse_charstrings( T1_Decoder decoder,
FT_Byte* charstring_base,
FT_UInt charstring_len )
{
FT_Error error;
T1_Decoder_Zone zone;
FT_Byte* ip;
FT_Byte* limit;
T1_Builder builder = &decoder->builder;
FT_Pos x, y, orig_x, orig_y;
FT_Int known_othersubr_result_cnt = 0;
FT_Int unknown_othersubr_result_cnt = 0;
FT_Bool large_int;
FT_Fixed seed;
T1_Hints_Funcs hinter;
#ifdef FT_DEBUG_LEVEL_TRACE
FT_Bool bol = TRUE;
#endif
/* compute random seed from stack address of parameter */
seed = (FT_Fixed)( ( (FT_Offset)(char*)&seed ^
(FT_Offset)(char*)&decoder ^
(FT_Offset)(char*)&charstring_base ) &
FT_ULONG_MAX );
seed = ( seed ^ ( seed >> 10 ) ^ ( seed >> 20 ) ) & 0xFFFFL;
if ( seed == 0 )
seed = 0x7384;
/* First of all, initialize the decoder */
decoder->top = decoder->stack;
decoder->zone = decoder->zones;
zone = decoder->zones;
builder->parse_state = T1_Parse_Start;
hinter = (T1_Hints_Funcs)builder->hints_funcs;
/* a font that reads BuildCharArray without setting */
/* its values first is buggy, but ... */
FT_ASSERT( ( decoder->len_buildchar == 0 ) ==
( decoder->buildchar == NULL ) );
if ( decoder->buildchar && decoder->len_buildchar > 0 )
FT_ARRAY_ZERO( decoder->buildchar, decoder->len_buildchar );
FT_TRACE4(( "\n"
"Start charstring\n" ));
zone->base = charstring_base;
limit = zone->limit = charstring_base + charstring_len;
ip = zone->cursor = zone->base;
error = FT_Err_Ok;
x = orig_x = builder->pos_x;
y = orig_y = builder->pos_y;
/* begin hints recording session, if any */
if ( hinter )
hinter->open( hinter->hints );
large_int = FALSE;
/* now, execute loop */
while ( ip < limit )
{
FT_Long* top = decoder->top;
T1_Operator op = op_none;
FT_Int32 value = 0;
FT_ASSERT( known_othersubr_result_cnt == 0 ||
unknown_othersubr_result_cnt == 0 );
#ifdef FT_DEBUG_LEVEL_TRACE
if ( bol )
{
FT_TRACE5(( " (%d)", decoder->top - decoder->stack ));
bol = FALSE;
}
#endif
/*********************************************************************/
/* */
/* Decode operator or operand */
/* */
/* */
/* first of all, decompress operator or value */
switch ( *ip++ )
{
case 1:
op = op_hstem;
break;
case 3:
op = op_vstem;
break;
case 4:
op = op_vmoveto;
break;
case 5:
op = op_rlineto;
break;
case 6:
op = op_hlineto;
break;
case 7:
op = op_vlineto;
break;
case 8:
op = op_rrcurveto;
break;
case 9:
op = op_closepath;
break;
case 10:
op = op_callsubr;
break;
case 11:
op = op_return;
break;
case 13:
op = op_hsbw;
break;
case 14:
op = op_endchar;
break;
case 15: /* undocumented, obsolete operator */
op = op_unknown15;
break;
case 21:
op = op_rmoveto;
break;
case 22:
op = op_hmoveto;
break;
case 30:
op = op_vhcurveto;
break;
case 31:
op = op_hvcurveto;
break;
case 12:
if ( ip >= limit )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:"
" invalid escape (12+EOF)\n" ));
goto Syntax_Error;
}
switch ( *ip++ )
{
case 0:
op = op_dotsection;
break;
case 1:
op = op_vstem3;
break;
case 2:
op = op_hstem3;
break;
case 6:
op = op_seac;
break;
case 7:
op = op_sbw;
break;
case 12:
op = op_div;
break;
case 16:
op = op_callothersubr;
break;
case 17:
op = op_pop;
break;
case 33:
op = op_setcurrentpoint;
break;
default:
FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:"
" invalid escape (12+%d)\n",
ip[-1] ));
goto Syntax_Error;
}
break;
case 255: /* four bytes integer */
if ( ip + 4 > limit )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:"
" unexpected EOF in integer\n" ));
goto Syntax_Error;
}
value = (FT_Int32)( ( (FT_UInt32)ip[0] << 24 ) |
( (FT_UInt32)ip[1] << 16 ) |
( (FT_UInt32)ip[2] << 8 ) |
(FT_UInt32)ip[3] );
ip += 4;
/* According to the specification, values > 32000 or < -32000 must */
/* be followed by a `div' operator to make the result be in the */
/* range [-32000;32000]. We expect that the second argument of */
/* `div' is not a large number. Additionally, we don't handle */
/* stuff like `<large1> <large2> <num> div <num> div' or */
/* <large1> <large2> <num> div div'. This is probably not allowed */
/* anyway. */
if ( value > 32000 || value < -32000 )
{
if ( large_int )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:"
" no `div' after large integer\n" ));
}
else
large_int = TRUE;
}
else
{
if ( !large_int )
value = (FT_Int32)( (FT_UInt32)value << 16 );
}
break;
default:
if ( ip[-1] >= 32 )
{
if ( ip[-1] < 247 )
value = (FT_Int32)ip[-1] - 139;
else
{
if ( ++ip > limit )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:"
" unexpected EOF in integer\n" ));
goto Syntax_Error;
}
if ( ip[-2] < 251 )
value = ( ( ip[-2] - 247 ) * 256 ) + ip[-1] + 108;
else
value = -( ( ( ip[-2] - 251 ) * 256 ) + ip[-1] + 108 );
}
if ( !large_int )
value = (FT_Int32)( (FT_UInt32)value << 16 );
}
else
{
FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:"
" invalid byte (%d)\n", ip[-1] ));
goto Syntax_Error;
}
}
if ( unknown_othersubr_result_cnt > 0 )
{
switch ( op )
{
case op_callsubr:
case op_return:
case op_none:
case op_pop:
break;
default:
/* all operands have been transferred by previous pops */
unknown_othersubr_result_cnt = 0;
break;
}
}
if ( large_int && !( op == op_none || op == op_div ) )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:"
" no `div' after large integer\n" ));
large_int = FALSE;
}
/*********************************************************************/
/* */
/* Push value on stack, or process operator */
/* */
/* */
if ( op == op_none )
{
if ( top - decoder->stack >= T1_MAX_CHARSTRINGS_OPERANDS )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings: stack overflow\n" ));
goto Syntax_Error;
}
#ifdef FT_DEBUG_LEVEL_TRACE
if ( large_int )
FT_TRACE4(( " %d", value ));
else
FT_TRACE4(( " %d", value / 65536 ));
#endif
*top++ = value;
decoder->top = top;
}
else if ( op == op_callothersubr ) /* callothersubr */
{
FT_Int subr_no;
FT_Int arg_cnt;
#ifdef FT_DEBUG_LEVEL_TRACE
FT_TRACE4(( " callothersubr\n" ));
bol = TRUE;
#endif
if ( top - decoder->stack < 2 )
goto Stack_Underflow;
top -= 2;
subr_no = Fix2Int( top[1] );
arg_cnt = Fix2Int( top[0] );
/***********************************************************/
/* */
/* remove all operands to callothersubr from the stack */
/* */
/* for handled othersubrs, where we know the number of */
/* arguments, we increase the stack by the value of */
/* known_othersubr_result_cnt */
/* */
/* for unhandled othersubrs the following pops adjust the */
/* stack pointer as necessary */
if ( arg_cnt > top - decoder->stack )
goto Stack_Underflow;
top -= arg_cnt;
known_othersubr_result_cnt = 0;
unknown_othersubr_result_cnt = 0;
/* XXX TODO: The checks to `arg_count == <whatever>' */
/* might not be correct; an othersubr expects a certain */
/* number of operands on the PostScript stack (as opposed */
/* to the T1 stack) but it doesn't have to put them there */
/* by itself; previous othersubrs might have left the */
/* operands there if they were not followed by an */
/* appropriate number of pops */
/* */
/* On the other hand, Adobe Reader 7.0.8 for Linux doesn't */
/* accept a font that contains charstrings like */
/* */
/* 100 200 2 20 callothersubr */
/* 300 1 20 callothersubr pop */
/* */
/* Perhaps this is the reason why BuildCharArray exists. */
switch ( subr_no )
{
case 0: /* end flex feature */
if ( arg_cnt != 3 )
goto Unexpected_OtherSubr;
if ( !decoder->flex_state ||
decoder->num_flex_vectors != 7 )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:"
" unexpected flex end\n" ));
goto Syntax_Error;
}
/* the two `results' are popped by the following setcurrentpoint */
top[0] = x;
top[1] = y;
known_othersubr_result_cnt = 2;
break;
case 1: /* start flex feature */
if ( arg_cnt != 0 )
goto Unexpected_OtherSubr;
if ( FT_SET_ERROR( t1_builder_start_point( builder, x, y ) ) ||
FT_SET_ERROR( t1_builder_check_points( builder, 6 ) ) )
goto Fail;
decoder->flex_state = 1;
decoder->num_flex_vectors = 0;
break;
case 2: /* add flex vectors */
{
FT_Int idx;
if ( arg_cnt != 0 )
goto Unexpected_OtherSubr;
if ( !decoder->flex_state )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:"
" missing flex start\n" ));
goto Syntax_Error;
}
/* note that we should not add a point for index 0; */
/* this will move our current position to the flex */
/* point without adding any point to the outline */
idx = decoder->num_flex_vectors++;
if ( idx > 0 && idx < 7 )
t1_builder_add_point( builder,
x,
y,
(FT_Byte)( idx == 3 || idx == 6 ) );
}
break;
break;
case 12:
case 13:
/* counter control hints, clear stack */
top = decoder->stack;
break;
case 14:
case 15:
case 16:
case 17:
case 18: /* multiple masters */
{
PS_Blend blend = decoder->blend;
FT_UInt num_points, nn, mm;
FT_Long* delta;
FT_Long* values;
if ( !blend )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:"
" unexpected multiple masters operator\n" ));
goto Syntax_Error;
}
num_points = (FT_UInt)subr_no - 13 + ( subr_no == 18 );
if ( arg_cnt != (FT_Int)( num_points * blend->num_designs ) )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:"
" incorrect number of multiple masters arguments\n" ));
goto Syntax_Error;
}
/* We want to compute */
/* */
/* a0*w0 + a1*w1 + ... + ak*wk */
/* */
/* but we only have a0, a1-a0, a2-a0, ..., ak-a0. */
/* */
/* However, given that w0 + w1 + ... + wk == 1, we can */
/* rewrite it easily as */
/* */
/* a0 + (a1-a0)*w1 + (a2-a0)*w2 + ... + (ak-a0)*wk */
/* */
/* where k == num_designs-1. */
/* */
/* I guess that's why it's written in this `compact' */
/* form. */
/* */
delta = top + num_points;
values = top;
for ( nn = 0; nn < num_points; nn++ )
{
FT_Long tmp = values[0];
for ( mm = 1; mm < blend->num_designs; mm++ )
tmp += FT_MulFix( *delta++, blend->weight_vector[mm] );
*values++ = tmp;
}
known_othersubr_result_cnt = (FT_Int)num_points;
break;
}
case 19:
/* <idx> 1 19 callothersubr */
/* => replace elements starting from index cvi( <idx> ) */
/* of BuildCharArray with WeightVector */
{
FT_Int idx;
PS_Blend blend = decoder->blend;
if ( arg_cnt != 1 || !blend )
goto Unexpected_OtherSubr;
idx = Fix2Int( top[0] );
if ( idx < 0 ||
(FT_UInt)idx + blend->num_designs > decoder->len_buildchar )
goto Unexpected_OtherSubr;
ft_memcpy( &decoder->buildchar[idx],
blend->weight_vector,
blend->num_designs *
sizeof ( blend->weight_vector[0] ) );
}
break;
case 20:
/* <arg1> <arg2> 2 20 callothersubr pop */
/* ==> push <arg1> + <arg2> onto T1 stack */
if ( arg_cnt != 2 )
goto Unexpected_OtherSubr;
top[0] += top[1]; /* XXX (over|under)flow */
known_othersubr_result_cnt = 1;
break;
case 21:
/* <arg1> <arg2> 2 21 callothersubr pop */
/* ==> push <arg1> - <arg2> onto T1 stack */
if ( arg_cnt != 2 )
goto Unexpected_OtherSubr;
top[0] -= top[1]; /* XXX (over|under)flow */
known_othersubr_result_cnt = 1;
break;
case 22:
/* <arg1> <arg2> 2 22 callothersubr pop */
/* ==> push <arg1> * <arg2> onto T1 stack */
if ( arg_cnt != 2 )
goto Unexpected_OtherSubr;
top[0] = FT_MulFix( top[0], top[1] );
known_othersubr_result_cnt = 1;
break;
case 23:
/* <arg1> <arg2> 2 23 callothersubr pop */
/* ==> push <arg1> / <arg2> onto T1 stack */
if ( arg_cnt != 2 || top[1] == 0 )
goto Unexpected_OtherSubr;
top[0] = FT_DivFix( top[0], top[1] );
known_othersubr_result_cnt = 1;
break;
case 24:
/* <val> <idx> 2 24 callothersubr */
/* ==> set BuildCharArray[cvi( <idx> )] = <val> */
{
FT_Int idx;
PS_Blend blend = decoder->blend;
if ( arg_cnt != 2 || !blend )
goto Unexpected_OtherSubr;
idx = Fix2Int( top[1] );
if ( idx < 0 || (FT_UInt) idx >= decoder->len_buildchar )
goto Unexpected_OtherSubr;
decoder->buildchar[idx] = top[0];
}
break;
case 25:
/* <idx> 1 25 callothersubr pop */
/* ==> push BuildCharArray[cvi( idx )] */
/* onto T1 stack */
{
FT_Int idx;
PS_Blend blend = decoder->blend;
if ( arg_cnt != 1 || !blend )
goto Unexpected_OtherSubr;
idx = Fix2Int( top[0] );
if ( idx < 0 || (FT_UInt) idx >= decoder->len_buildchar )
goto Unexpected_OtherSubr;
top[0] = decoder->buildchar[idx];
}
known_othersubr_result_cnt = 1;
break;
#if 0
case 26:
/* <val> mark <idx> ==> set BuildCharArray[cvi( <idx> )] = <val>, */
/* leave mark on T1 stack */
/* <val> <idx> ==> set BuildCharArray[cvi( <idx> )] = <val> */
XXX which routine has left its mark on the (PostScript) stack?;
break;
#endif
case 27:
/* <res1> <res2> <val1> <val2> 4 27 callothersubr pop */
/* ==> push <res1> onto T1 stack if <val1> <= <val2>, */
/* otherwise push <res2> */
if ( arg_cnt != 4 )
goto Unexpected_OtherSubr;
if ( top[2] > top[3] )
top[0] = top[1];
known_othersubr_result_cnt = 1;
break;
case 28:
/* 0 28 callothersubr pop */
/* => push random value from interval [0, 1) onto stack */
if ( arg_cnt != 0 )
goto Unexpected_OtherSubr;
{
FT_Fixed Rand;
Rand = seed;
if ( Rand >= 0x8000L )
Rand++;
top[0] = Rand;
seed = FT_MulFix( seed, 0x10000L - seed );
if ( seed == 0 )
seed += 0x2873;
}
known_othersubr_result_cnt = 1;
break;
default:
if ( arg_cnt >= 0 && subr_no >= 0 )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:"
" unknown othersubr [%d %d], wish me luck\n",
arg_cnt, subr_no ));
unknown_othersubr_result_cnt = arg_cnt;
break;
}
/* fall through */
Unexpected_OtherSubr:
FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:"
" invalid othersubr [%d %d]\n", arg_cnt, subr_no ));
goto Syntax_Error;
}
top += known_othersubr_result_cnt;
decoder->top = top;
}
else /* general operator */
{
FT_Int num_args = t1_args_count[op];
FT_ASSERT( num_args >= 0 );
if ( top - decoder->stack < num_args )
goto Stack_Underflow;
/* XXX Operators usually take their operands from the */
/* bottom of the stack, i.e., the operands are */
/* decoder->stack[0], ..., decoder->stack[num_args - 1]; */
/* only div, callsubr, and callothersubr are different. */
/* In practice it doesn't matter (?). */
#ifdef FT_DEBUG_LEVEL_TRACE
switch ( op )
{
case op_callsubr:
case op_div:
case op_callothersubr:
case op_pop:
case op_return:
break;
default:
if ( top - decoder->stack != num_args )
FT_TRACE0(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:"
" too much operands on the stack"
" (seen %d, expected %d)\n",
top - decoder->stack, num_args ));
break;
}
#endif /* FT_DEBUG_LEVEL_TRACE */
top -= num_args;
switch ( op )
{
case op_endchar:
FT_TRACE4(( " endchar\n" ));
t1_builder_close_contour( builder );
/* close hints recording session */
if ( hinter )
{
if ( hinter->close( hinter->hints,
(FT_UInt)builder->current->n_points ) )
goto Syntax_Error;
/* apply hints to the loaded glyph outline now */
error = hinter->apply( hinter->hints,
builder->current,
(PSH_Globals)builder->hints_globals,
decoder->hint_mode );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
}
/* add current outline to the glyph slot */
FT_GlyphLoader_Add( builder->loader );
/* the compiler should optimize away this empty loop but ... */
#ifdef FT_DEBUG_LEVEL_TRACE
if ( decoder->len_buildchar > 0 )
{
FT_UInt i;
FT_TRACE4(( "BuildCharArray = [ " ));
for ( i = 0; i < decoder->len_buildchar; i++ )
FT_TRACE4(( "%d ", decoder->buildchar[i] ));
FT_TRACE4(( "]\n" ));
}
#endif /* FT_DEBUG_LEVEL_TRACE */
FT_TRACE4(( "\n" ));
/* return now! */
return FT_Err_Ok;
case op_hsbw:
FT_TRACE4(( " hsbw" ));
builder->parse_state = T1_Parse_Have_Width;
builder->left_bearing.x += top[0];
builder->advance.x = top[1];
builder->advance.y = 0;
orig_x = x = builder->pos_x + top[0];
orig_y = y = builder->pos_y;
FT_UNUSED( orig_y );
/* the `metrics_only' indicates that we only want to compute */
/* the glyph's metrics (lsb + advance width), not load the */
/* rest of it; so exit immediately */
if ( builder->metrics_only )
return FT_Err_Ok;
break;
case op_seac:
return t1operator_seac( decoder,
top[0],
top[1],
top[2],
Fix2Int( top[3] ),
Fix2Int( top[4] ) );
case op_sbw:
FT_TRACE4(( " sbw" ));
builder->parse_state = T1_Parse_Have_Width;
builder->left_bearing.x += top[0];
builder->left_bearing.y += top[1];
builder->advance.x = top[2];
builder->advance.y = top[3];
x = builder->pos_x + top[0];
y = builder->pos_y + top[1];
/* the `metrics_only' indicates that we only want to compute */
/* the glyph's metrics (lsb + advance width), not load the */
/* rest of it; so exit immediately */
if ( builder->metrics_only )
return FT_Err_Ok;
break;
case op_closepath:
FT_TRACE4(( " closepath" ));
/* if there is no path, `closepath' is a no-op */
if ( builder->parse_state == T1_Parse_Have_Path ||
builder->parse_state == T1_Parse_Have_Moveto )
t1_builder_close_contour( builder );
builder->parse_state = T1_Parse_Have_Width;
break;
case op_hlineto:
FT_TRACE4(( " hlineto" ));
if ( FT_SET_ERROR( t1_builder_start_point( builder, x, y ) ) )
goto Fail;
x += top[0];
goto Add_Line;
case op_hmoveto:
FT_TRACE4(( " hmoveto" ));
x += top[0];
if ( !decoder->flex_state )
{
if ( builder->parse_state == T1_Parse_Start )
goto Syntax_Error;
builder->parse_state = T1_Parse_Have_Moveto;
}
break;
case op_hvcurveto:
FT_TRACE4(( " hvcurveto" ));
if ( FT_SET_ERROR( t1_builder_start_point( builder, x, y ) ) ||
FT_SET_ERROR( t1_builder_check_points( builder, 3 ) ) )
goto Fail;
x += top[0];
t1_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 );
x += top[1];
y += top[2];
t1_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 );
y += top[3];
t1_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 1 );
break;
case op_rlineto:
FT_TRACE4(( " rlineto" ));
if ( FT_SET_ERROR( t1_builder_start_point( builder, x, y ) ) )
goto Fail;
x += top[0];
y += top[1];
Add_Line:
if ( FT_SET_ERROR( t1_builder_add_point1( builder, x, y ) ) )
goto Fail;
break;
case op_rmoveto:
FT_TRACE4(( " rmoveto" ));
x += top[0];
y += top[1];
if ( !decoder->flex_state )
{
if ( builder->parse_state == T1_Parse_Start )
goto Syntax_Error;
builder->parse_state = T1_Parse_Have_Moveto;
}
break;
case op_rrcurveto:
FT_TRACE4(( " rrcurveto" ));
if ( FT_SET_ERROR( t1_builder_start_point( builder, x, y ) ) ||
FT_SET_ERROR( t1_builder_check_points( builder, 3 ) ) )
goto Fail;
x += top[0];
y += top[1];
t1_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 );
x += top[2];
y += top[3];
t1_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 );
x += top[4];
y += top[5];
t1_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 1 );
break;
case op_vhcurveto:
FT_TRACE4(( " vhcurveto" ));
if ( FT_SET_ERROR( t1_builder_start_point( builder, x, y ) ) ||
FT_SET_ERROR( t1_builder_check_points( builder, 3 ) ) )
goto Fail;
y += top[0];
t1_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 );
x += top[1];
y += top[2];
t1_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 );
x += top[3];
t1_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 1 );
break;
case op_vlineto:
FT_TRACE4(( " vlineto" ));
if ( FT_SET_ERROR( t1_builder_start_point( builder, x, y ) ) )
goto Fail;
y += top[0];
goto Add_Line;
case op_vmoveto:
FT_TRACE4(( " vmoveto" ));
y += top[0];
if ( !decoder->flex_state )
{
if ( builder->parse_state == T1_Parse_Start )
goto Syntax_Error;
builder->parse_state = T1_Parse_Have_Moveto;
}
break;
case op_div:
FT_TRACE4(( " div" ));
/* if `large_int' is set, we divide unscaled numbers; */
/* otherwise, we divide numbers in 16.16 format -- */
/* in both cases, it is the same operation */
*top = FT_DivFix( top[0], top[1] );
top++;
large_int = FALSE;
break;
case op_callsubr:
{
FT_Int idx;
FT_TRACE4(( " callsubr" ));
idx = Fix2Int( top[0] );
if ( decoder->subrs_hash )
{
size_t* val = ft_hash_num_lookup( idx,
decoder->subrs_hash );
if ( val )
idx = *val;
else
idx = -1;
}
if ( idx < 0 || idx >= decoder->num_subrs )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:"
" invalid subrs index\n" ));
goto Syntax_Error;
}
if ( zone - decoder->zones >= T1_MAX_SUBRS_CALLS )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:"
" too many nested subrs\n" ));
goto Syntax_Error;
}
zone->cursor = ip; /* save current instruction pointer */
zone++;
/* The Type 1 driver stores subroutines without the seed bytes. */
/* The CID driver stores subroutines with seed bytes. This */
/* case is taken care of when decoder->subrs_len == 0. */
zone->base = decoder->subrs[idx];
if ( decoder->subrs_len )
zone->limit = zone->base + decoder->subrs_len[idx];
else
{
/* We are using subroutines from a CID font. We must adjust */
/* for the seed bytes. */
zone->base += ( decoder->lenIV >= 0 ? decoder->lenIV : 0 );
zone->limit = decoder->subrs[idx + 1];
}
zone->cursor = zone->base;
if ( !zone->base )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:"
" invoking empty subrs\n" ));
goto Syntax_Error;
}
decoder->zone = zone;
ip = zone->base;
limit = zone->limit;
break;
}
case op_pop:
FT_TRACE4(( " pop" ));
if ( known_othersubr_result_cnt > 0 )
{
known_othersubr_result_cnt--;
/* ignore, we pushed the operands ourselves */
break;
}
if ( unknown_othersubr_result_cnt == 0 )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:"
" no more operands for othersubr\n" ));
goto Syntax_Error;
}
unknown_othersubr_result_cnt--;
top++; /* `push' the operand to callothersubr onto the stack */
break;
case op_return:
FT_TRACE4(( " return" ));
if ( zone <= decoder->zones )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:"
" unexpected return\n" ));
goto Syntax_Error;
}
zone--;
ip = zone->cursor;
limit = zone->limit;
decoder->zone = zone;
break;
case op_dotsection:
FT_TRACE4(( " dotsection" ));
break;
case op_hstem:
FT_TRACE4(( " hstem" ));
/* record horizontal hint */
if ( hinter )
{
/* top[0] += builder->left_bearing.y; */
hinter->stem( hinter->hints, 1, top );
}
break;
case op_hstem3:
FT_TRACE4(( " hstem3" ));
/* record horizontal counter-controlled hints */
if ( hinter )
hinter->stem3( hinter->hints, 1, top );
break;
case op_vstem:
FT_TRACE4(( " vstem" ));
/* record vertical hint */
if ( hinter )
{
top[0] += orig_x;
hinter->stem( hinter->hints, 0, top );
}
break;
case op_vstem3:
FT_TRACE4(( " vstem3" ));
/* record vertical counter-controlled hints */
if ( hinter )
{
FT_Pos dx = orig_x;
top[0] += dx;
top[2] += dx;
top[4] += dx;
hinter->stem3( hinter->hints, 0, top );
}
break;
case op_setcurrentpoint:
FT_TRACE4(( " setcurrentpoint" ));
/* From the T1 specification, section 6.4: */
/* */
/* The setcurrentpoint command is used only in */
/* conjunction with results from OtherSubrs procedures. */
/* known_othersubr_result_cnt != 0 is already handled */
/* above. */
/* Note, however, that both Ghostscript and Adobe */
/* Distiller handle this situation by silently ignoring */
/* the inappropriate `setcurrentpoint' instruction. So */
/* we do the same. */
#if 0
if ( decoder->flex_state != 1 )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:"
" unexpected `setcurrentpoint'\n" ));
goto Syntax_Error;
}
else
...
#endif
x = top[0];
y = top[1];
decoder->flex_state = 0;
break;
case op_unknown15:
FT_TRACE4(( " opcode_15" ));
/* nothing to do except to pop the two arguments */
break;
default:
FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:"
" unhandled opcode %d\n", op ));
goto Syntax_Error;
}
/* XXX Operators usually clear the operand stack; */
/* only div, callsubr, callothersubr, pop, and */
/* return are different. */
/* In practice it doesn't matter (?). */
decoder->top = top;
#ifdef FT_DEBUG_LEVEL_TRACE
FT_TRACE4(( "\n" ));
bol = TRUE;
#endif
} /* general operator processing */
} /* while ip < limit */
FT_TRACE4(( "..end..\n\n" ));
Fail:
return error;
Syntax_Error:
return FT_THROW( Syntax_Error );
Stack_Underflow:
return FT_THROW( Stack_Underflow );
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: FreeType 2 before 2017-03-24 has an out-of-bounds write caused by a heap-based buffer overflow related to the t1_decoder_parse_charstrings function in psaux/t1decode.c.
Commit Message: | High | 164,884 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int __load_segment_descriptor(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
u16 selector, int seg, u8 cpl,
enum x86_transfer_type transfer,
struct desc_struct *desc)
{
struct desc_struct seg_desc, old_desc;
u8 dpl, rpl;
unsigned err_vec = GP_VECTOR;
u32 err_code = 0;
bool null_selector = !(selector & ~0x3); /* 0000-0003 are null */
ulong desc_addr;
int ret;
u16 dummy;
u32 base3 = 0;
memset(&seg_desc, 0, sizeof seg_desc);
if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_REAL) {
/* set real mode segment descriptor (keep limit etc. for
* unreal mode) */
ctxt->ops->get_segment(ctxt, &dummy, &seg_desc, NULL, seg);
set_desc_base(&seg_desc, selector << 4);
goto load;
} else if (seg <= VCPU_SREG_GS && ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_VM86) {
/* VM86 needs a clean new segment descriptor */
set_desc_base(&seg_desc, selector << 4);
set_desc_limit(&seg_desc, 0xffff);
seg_desc.type = 3;
seg_desc.p = 1;
seg_desc.s = 1;
seg_desc.dpl = 3;
goto load;
}
rpl = selector & 3;
/* NULL selector is not valid for TR, CS and SS (except for long mode) */
if ((seg == VCPU_SREG_CS
|| (seg == VCPU_SREG_SS
&& (ctxt->mode != X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64 || rpl != cpl))
|| seg == VCPU_SREG_TR)
&& null_selector)
goto exception;
/* TR should be in GDT only */
if (seg == VCPU_SREG_TR && (selector & (1 << 2)))
goto exception;
if (null_selector) /* for NULL selector skip all following checks */
goto load;
ret = read_segment_descriptor(ctxt, selector, &seg_desc, &desc_addr);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
err_code = selector & 0xfffc;
err_vec = (transfer == X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH) ? TS_VECTOR :
GP_VECTOR;
/* can't load system descriptor into segment selector */
if (seg <= VCPU_SREG_GS && !seg_desc.s) {
if (transfer == X86_TRANSFER_CALL_JMP)
return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
goto exception;
}
if (!seg_desc.p) {
err_vec = (seg == VCPU_SREG_SS) ? SS_VECTOR : NP_VECTOR;
goto exception;
}
dpl = seg_desc.dpl;
switch (seg) {
case VCPU_SREG_SS:
/*
* segment is not a writable data segment or segment
* selector's RPL != CPL or segment selector's RPL != CPL
*/
if (rpl != cpl || (seg_desc.type & 0xa) != 0x2 || dpl != cpl)
goto exception;
break;
case VCPU_SREG_CS:
if (!(seg_desc.type & 8))
goto exception;
if (seg_desc.type & 4) {
/* conforming */
if (dpl > cpl)
goto exception;
} else {
/* nonconforming */
if (rpl > cpl || dpl != cpl)
goto exception;
}
/* in long-mode d/b must be clear if l is set */
if (seg_desc.d && seg_desc.l) {
u64 efer = 0;
ctxt->ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_EFER, &efer);
if (efer & EFER_LMA)
goto exception;
}
/* CS(RPL) <- CPL */
selector = (selector & 0xfffc) | cpl;
break;
case VCPU_SREG_TR:
if (seg_desc.s || (seg_desc.type != 1 && seg_desc.type != 9))
goto exception;
old_desc = seg_desc;
seg_desc.type |= 2; /* busy */
ret = ctxt->ops->cmpxchg_emulated(ctxt, desc_addr, &old_desc, &seg_desc,
sizeof(seg_desc), &ctxt->exception);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
break;
case VCPU_SREG_LDTR:
if (seg_desc.s || seg_desc.type != 2)
goto exception;
break;
default: /* DS, ES, FS, or GS */
/*
* segment is not a data or readable code segment or
* ((segment is a data or nonconforming code segment)
* and (both RPL and CPL > DPL))
*/
if ((seg_desc.type & 0xa) == 0x8 ||
(((seg_desc.type & 0xc) != 0xc) &&
(rpl > dpl && cpl > dpl)))
goto exception;
break;
}
if (seg_desc.s) {
/* mark segment as accessed */
if (!(seg_desc.type & 1)) {
seg_desc.type |= 1;
ret = write_segment_descriptor(ctxt, selector,
&seg_desc);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
}
} else if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64) {
ret = ctxt->ops->read_std(ctxt, desc_addr+8, &base3,
sizeof(base3), &ctxt->exception);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
if (is_noncanonical_address(get_desc_base(&seg_desc) |
((u64)base3 << 32)))
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
}
load:
ctxt->ops->set_segment(ctxt, selector, &seg_desc, base3, seg);
if (desc)
*desc = seg_desc;
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
exception:
return emulate_exception(ctxt, err_vec, err_code, true);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: The load_segment_descriptor implementation in arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c in the Linux kernel before 4.9.5 improperly emulates a *MOV SS, NULL selector* instruction, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (guest OS crash) or gain guest OS privileges via a crafted application.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix emulation of "MOV SS, null selector"
This is CVE-2017-2583. On Intel this causes a failed vmentry because
SS's type is neither 3 nor 7 (even though the manual says this check is
only done for usable SS, and the dmesg splat says that SS is unusable!).
On AMD it's worse: svm.c is confused and sets CPL to 0 in the vmcb.
The fix fabricates a data segment descriptor when SS is set to a null
selector, so that CPL and SS.DPL are set correctly in the VMCS/vmcb.
Furthermore, only allow setting SS to a NULL selector if SS.RPL < 3;
this in turn ensures CPL < 3 because RPL must be equal to CPL.
Thanks to Andy Lutomirski and Willy Tarreau for help in analyzing
the bug and deciphering the manuals.
Reported-by: Xiaohan Zhang <[email protected]>
Fixes: 79d5b4c3cd809c770d4bf9812635647016c56011
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,447 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void TaskManagerView::Init() {
table_model_.reset(new TaskManagerTableModel(model_));
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_TASK_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::LEFT, -1, 1));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_PROFILE_NAME_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::LEFT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_PHYSICAL_MEM_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_SHARED_MEM_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_PRIVATE_MEM_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_CPU_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_NET_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_PROCESS_ID_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(
IDS_TASK_MANAGER_WEBCORE_IMAGE_CACHE_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(
IDS_TASK_MANAGER_WEBCORE_SCRIPTS_CACHE_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_WEBCORE_CSS_CACHE_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_FPS_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_SQLITE_MEMORY_USED_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
columns_.push_back(
ui::TableColumn(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_JAVASCRIPT_MEMORY_ALLOCATED_COLUMN,
ui::TableColumn::RIGHT, -1, 0));
columns_.back().sortable = true;
tab_table_ = new BackgroundColorGroupTableView(
table_model_.get(), columns_, highlight_background_resources_);
tab_table_->SetColumnVisibility(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_PROFILE_NAME_COLUMN, false);
tab_table_->SetColumnVisibility(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_PROCESS_ID_COLUMN, false);
tab_table_->SetColumnVisibility(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_SHARED_MEM_COLUMN, false);
tab_table_->SetColumnVisibility(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_PRIVATE_MEM_COLUMN, false);
tab_table_->SetColumnVisibility(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_WEBCORE_IMAGE_CACHE_COLUMN,
false);
tab_table_->SetColumnVisibility(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_WEBCORE_SCRIPTS_CACHE_COLUMN,
false);
tab_table_->SetColumnVisibility(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_WEBCORE_CSS_CACHE_COLUMN,
false);
tab_table_->SetColumnVisibility(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_SQLITE_MEMORY_USED_COLUMN,
false);
tab_table_->SetColumnVisibility(
IDS_TASK_MANAGER_JAVASCRIPT_MEMORY_ALLOCATED_COLUMN, false);
tab_table_->SetColumnVisibility(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_GOATS_TELEPORTED_COLUMN,
false);
UpdateStatsCounters();
tab_table_->SetObserver(this);
tab_table_->set_context_menu_controller(this);
set_context_menu_controller(this);
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kPurgeMemoryButton)) {
purge_memory_button_ = new views::NativeTextButton(this,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_PURGE_MEMORY));
}
kill_button_ = new views::NativeTextButton(
this, l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_KILL));
kill_button_->AddAccelerator(ui::Accelerator(ui::VKEY_E, false, false,
false));
kill_button_->SetAccessibleKeyboardShortcut(L"E");
kill_button_->set_prefix_type(views::TextButtonBase::PREFIX_SHOW);
about_memory_link_ = new views::Link(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_ABOUT_MEMORY_LINK));
about_memory_link_->set_listener(this);
OnSelectionChanged();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 21.0.1180.75 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: accelerators: Remove deprecated Accelerator ctor that takes booleans.
BUG=128242
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10399085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137957 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,906 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, fgets)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (spl_filesystem_file_read(intern, 0 TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->u.file.current_line, intern->u.file.current_line_len, 1);
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto string SplFileObject::current()
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int | High | 167,054 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: uint8_t* FAST_FUNC udhcp_get_option32(struct dhcp_packet *packet, int code)
{
uint8_t *r = udhcp_get_option(packet, code);
if (r) {
if (r[-1] != 4)
r = NULL;
}
return r;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An issue was discovered in BusyBox through 1.30.0. An out of bounds read in udhcp components (consumed by the DHCP server, client, and/or relay) might allow a remote attacker to leak sensitive information from the stack by sending a crafted DHCP message. This is related to assurance of a 4-byte length when decoding DHCP_SUBNET. NOTE: this issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2018-20679.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,942 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: chpass_principal_2_svc(chpass_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ)) {
ret.code = chpass_principal_wrapper_3((void *)handle, arg->princ,
FALSE, 0, NULL, arg->pass);
} else if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_CHANGEPW, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_chpass_principal((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->pass);
} else {
log_unauth("kadm5_chpass_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW;
}
if (ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW) {
if (ret.code != 0)
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_chpass_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple memory leaks in kadmin/server/server_stubs.c in kadmind in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.13.4 and 1.14.x before 1.14.1 allow remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a request specifying a NULL principal name.
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup | Medium | 167,505 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void * calloc(size_t n, size_t lb)
{
if (lb && n > GC_SIZE_MAX / lb)
return NULL;
# if defined(GC_LINUX_THREADS) /* && !defined(USE_PROC_FOR_LIBRARIES) */
/* libpthread allocated some memory that is only pointed to by */
/* mmapped thread stacks. Make sure it's not collectable. */
{
static GC_bool lib_bounds_set = FALSE;
ptr_t caller = (ptr_t)__builtin_return_address(0);
/* This test does not need to ensure memory visibility, since */
/* the bounds will be set when/if we create another thread. */
if (!EXPECT(lib_bounds_set, TRUE)) {
GC_init_lib_bounds();
lib_bounds_set = TRUE;
}
if (((word)caller >= (word)GC_libpthread_start
&& (word)caller < (word)GC_libpthread_end)
|| ((word)caller >= (word)GC_libld_start
&& (word)caller < (word)GC_libld_end))
return GC_malloc_uncollectable(n*lb);
/* The two ranges are actually usually adjacent, so there may */
/* be a way to speed this up. */
}
# endif
return((void *)REDIRECT_MALLOC(n*lb));
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in the (1) GC_generic_malloc and (2) calloc functions in malloc.c, and the (3) GC_generic_malloc_ignore_off_page function in mallocx.c in Boehm-Demers-Weiser GC (libgc) before 7.2 make it easier for context-dependent attackers to perform memory-related attacks such as buffer overflows via a large size value, which causes less memory to be allocated than expected.
Commit Message: Speedup calloc size overflow check by preventing division if small values
* malloc.c (GC_SQRT_SIZE_MAX): New macro.
* malloc.c (calloc): Add fast initial size overflow check to avoid
integer division for reasonably small values passed. | Medium | 169,881 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void unix_copy_addr(struct msghdr *msg, struct sock *sk)
{
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
if (u->addr) {
msg->msg_namelen = u->addr->len;
memcpy(msg->msg_name, u->addr->name, u->addr->len);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The x25_recvmsg function in net/x25/af_x25.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,519 |
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