DioLiu/Test1 · Datasets at Hugging Face

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on the contrary it is a man's duty to comfort himself, and to wait
for the

natural dissolution and not to be vexed at the delay, but to rest
in these principles only: the one, that nothing will happen to me
which is not conformable to the nature of the universe; and the other,
that it is in my power never to act contrary to my god and daemon:
for there is no man who will compel me to this.

About what am I now employing my own soul? On every occasion I must
ask myself this question, and inquire, what have I now in this part
of me which they call the ruling principle? And whose soul have I
now? That of a child, or of a young man, or of a feeble woman, or
of a tyrant, or of a domestic animal, or of a wild beast?

What kind of things those are which appear good to the many, we may
learn even from this. For if any man should conceive certain things
as being really good, such as prudence, temperance, justice, fortitude,
he would not after having first conceived these endure to listen to
anything which should not be in harmony with what is really good.
But if a man has first conceived as good the things which appear to
the many to be good, he will listen and readily receive as very applicable
that which was said by the comic writer. Thus even the many perceive
the difference. For were it not so, this saying would not offend and
would not be rejected in the first case, while we receive it when
it is said of wealth, and of the means which further luxury and fame,
as said fitly and wittily. Go on then and ask if we should value and
think those things to be good, to which after their first conception
in the mind the words of the comic writer might be aptly applied-
that he who has them, through pure abundance has not a place to ease
himself in.

I am composed of the formal and the material; and neither of them
will perish into non-existence, as neither of them came into existence
out of non-existence. Every part of me then will be reduced by change
into some part of the universe, and that again will change into another
part of the universe, and so on for ever. And by consequence of such
a change I too exist, and those who begot me, and so on for ever in
the other direction. For nothing hinders us from saying so, even if
the universe is administered according to definite periods of revolution.

Reason and the reasoning art (philosophy) are powers which are sufficient
for themselves and for their own works. They move then from a first
principle which is their own, and they make their way to the end which
is proposed to them; and this is the reason why such acts are named
catorthoseis or right acts, which word signifies that they proceed
by the right road.

None of these things ought to be called a man's, which do not belong
to a man, as man. They are not required of a man, nor does man's nature
promise them, nor are they the means of man's nature attaining its
end. Neither then does the end of man lie in these things, nor yet
that which aids to the accomplishment of this end, and that which
aids towards this end is that which is good. Besides, if any of these
things did belong to man, it would not be right for a man to despise
them and to set himself against them; nor would a man be worthy of
praise who showed that he did not want these things, nor would he
who stinted himself in any of them be good, if indeed these things
were good. But now the more of these things a man deprives himself
of, or of other things like them, or even when he is deprived of any
of them, the more patiently he endures the loss, just in the same
degree he is a better man.

Such as are thy habitual thoughts, such also will be the character
of thy mind; for the soul is dyed by the thoughts. Dye it then with
a continuous series of such thoughts as these: for instance, that
where a man can live, there he can also live well. But he must live
in a palace;- well then, he can also live well in a palace. And again,
consider that for whatever purpose each thing has been constituted,
for this it has been constituted, and towards this it is carried;
and its end is in that towards which it is carried; and where the
end is, there also is the advantage and the good of each thing. Now
the good for the reasonable animal is society; for that we are made
for society has been shown above. Is it not plain that the inferior
exist for the sake of the superior? But the things which have life
are superior to those which have not life, and of those which have
life the superior are those which have reason.

To seek what is impossible is madness: and it is impossible that the
bad should not do something of this kind.

Nothing happens to any man which he is not formed by nature to bear.
The same things happen to another, and either because he does not
see that they have happened or because he would show a great spirit
he is firm and remains unharmed. It is a shame then that ignorance
and conceit should be stronger than wisdom.

Things themselves touch not the soul, not in the least degree; nor
have they admission to the soul, nor can they turn or move the soul:
but the soul turns and moves itself alone, and whatever judgements
it may think proper to make, such it makes for itself the things which
present themselves to it.

In one respect man is the nearest thing to me, so far as I must do
good to men and endure them. But so far as some men make themselves
obstacles to my proper acts, man becomes to me one of the things which
are indifferent, no less than the sun or wind or a wild beast. Now
it is true that these may impede my action, but they are no impediments
to my affects and disposition, which have the power of acting conditionally
and changing: for the mind converts and changes every hindrance to

on the contrary it is a man's duty to comfort himself, and to wait

for the

natural dissolution and not to be vexed at the delay, but to rest

in these principles only: the one, that nothing will happen to me

which is not conformable to the nature of the universe; and the other,

that it is in my power never to act contrary to my god and daemon:

for there is no man who will compel me to this.

About what am I now employing my own soul? On every occasion I must

ask myself this question, and inquire, what have I now in this part

of me which they call the ruling principle? And whose soul have I

now? That of a child, or of a young man, or of a feeble woman, or

of a tyrant, or of a domestic animal, or of a wild beast?

What kind of things those are which appear good to the many, we may

learn even from this. For if any man should conceive certain things

as being really good, such as prudence, temperance, justice, fortitude,

he would not after having first conceived these endure to listen to

anything which should not be in harmony with what is really good.

But if a man has first conceived as good the things which appear to

the many to be good, he will listen and readily receive as very applicable

that which was said by the comic writer. Thus even the many perceive

the difference. For were it not so, this saying would not offend and

would not be rejected in the first case, while we receive it when

it is said of wealth, and of the means which further luxury and fame,

as said fitly and wittily. Go on then and ask if we should value and

think those things to be good, to which after their first conception

in the mind the words of the comic writer might be aptly applied-

that he who has them, through pure abundance has not a place to ease

himself in.

I am composed of the formal and the material; and neither of them

will perish into non-existence, as neither of them came into existence

out of non-existence. Every part of me then will be reduced by change

into some part of the universe, and that again will change into another

part of the universe, and so on for ever. And by consequence of such

a change I too exist, and those who begot me, and so on for ever in

the other direction. For nothing hinders us from saying so, even if

the universe is administered according to definite periods of revolution.

Reason and the reasoning art (philosophy) are powers which are sufficient

for themselves and for their own works. They move then from a first

principle which is their own, and they make their way to the end which

is proposed to them; and this is the reason why such acts are named

catorthoseis or right acts, which word signifies that they proceed

by the right road.

None of these things ought to be called a man's, which do not belong

to a man, as man. They are not required of a man, nor does man's nature

promise them, nor are they the means of man's nature attaining its

end. Neither then does the end of man lie in these things, nor yet

that which aids to the accomplishment of this end, and that which

aids towards this end is that which is good. Besides, if any of these

things did belong to man, it would not be right for a man to despise

them and to set himself against them; nor would a man be worthy of

praise who showed that he did not want these things, nor would he

who stinted himself in any of them be good, if indeed these things

were good. But now the more of these things a man deprives himself

of, or of other things like them, or even when he is deprived of any

of them, the more patiently he endures the loss, just in the same

degree he is a better man.

Such as are thy habitual thoughts, such also will be the character

of thy mind; for the soul is dyed by the thoughts. Dye it then with

a continuous series of such thoughts as these: for instance, that

where a man can live, there he can also live well. But he must live

in a palace;- well then, he can also live well in a palace. And again,

consider that for whatever purpose each thing has been constituted,

for this it has been constituted, and towards this it is carried;

and its end is in that towards which it is carried; and where the

end is, there also is the advantage and the good of each thing. Now

the good for the reasonable animal is society; for that we are made

for society has been shown above. Is it not plain that the inferior

exist for the sake of the superior? But the things which have life

are superior to those which have not life, and of those which have

life the superior are those which have reason.

To seek what is impossible is madness: and it is impossible that the

bad should not do something of this kind.

Nothing happens to any man which he is not formed by nature to bear.

The same things happen to another, and either because he does not

see that they have happened or because he would show a great spirit

he is firm and remains unharmed. It is a shame then that ignorance

and conceit should be stronger than wisdom.

Things themselves touch not the soul, not in the least degree; nor

have they admission to the soul, nor can they turn or move the soul:

but the soul turns and moves itself alone, and whatever judgements

it may think proper to make, such it makes for itself the things which

present themselves to it.

In one respect man is the nearest thing to me, so far as I must do

good to men and endure them. But so far as some men make themselves

obstacles to my proper acts, man becomes to me one of the things which

are indifferent, no less than the sun or wind or a wild beast. Now

it is true that these may impede my action, but they are no impediments

to my affects and disposition, which have the power of acting conditionally

and changing: for the mind converts and changes every hindrance to