DioLiu/Test1 · Datasets at Hugging Face

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canst be charged with being rather slow and dull of comprehension,
thou must exert thyself about this also, not neglecting it nor yet
taking pleasure in thy dulness.

One man, when he has done a service to another, is ready to set it
down to his account as a favour conferred. Another is not ready to
do this, but still in his own mind he thinks of the man as his debtor,
and he knows what he has done. A third in a manner does not even know
what he has done, but he is like a vine which has produced grapes,
and seeks for nothing more after it has once produced its proper fruit.
As a horse when he has run, a dog when he has tracked the game, a
bee when it has made the honey, so a man when he has done a good act,
does not call out for others to come and see, but he goes on to another
act, as a vine goes on to produce again the grapes in season.- Must
a man then be one of these, who in a manner act thus without observing
it?- Yes.- But this very thing is necessary, the observation of what
a man is doing: for, it may be said, it is characteristic of the social
animal to perceive that he is working in a social manner, and indeed
to wish that his social partner also should perceive it.- It is true
what thou sayest, but thou dost not rightly understand what is now
said: and for this reason thou wilt become one of those of whom I
spoke before, for even they are misled by a certain show of reason.
But if thou wilt choose to understand the meaning of what is said,
do not fear that for this reason thou wilt omit any social act.

A prayer of the Athenians: Rain, rain, O dear Zeus, down on the ploughed
fields of the Athenians and on the plains.- In truth we ought not
to pray at all, or we ought to pray in this simple and noble fashion.

Just as we must understand when it is said, That Aesculapius prescribed
to this man horse-exercise, or bathing in cold water or going without
shoes; so we must understand it when it is said, That the nature of
the universe prescribed to this man disease or mutilation or loss
or anything else of the kind. For in the first case Prescribed means
something like this: he prescribed this for this man as a thing adapted
to procure health; and in the second case it means: That which happens
to (or, suits) every man is fixed in a manner for him suitably to
his destiny. For this is what we mean when we say that things are
suitable to us, as the workmen say of squared stones in walls or the
pyramids, that they are suitable, when they fit them to one another
in some kind of connexion. For there is altogether one fitness, harmony.
And as the universe is made up out of all bodies to be such a body
as it is, so out of all existing causes necessity (destiny) is made
up to be such a cause as it is. And even those who are completely
ignorant understand what I mean, for they say, It (necessity, destiny)
brought this to such a person.- This then was brought and this was
precribed to him. Let us then receive these things, as well as those
which Aesculapius prescribes. Many as a matter of course even among
his prescriptions are disagreeable, but we accept them in the hope
of health. Let the perfecting and accomplishment of the things, which
the common nature judges to be good, be judged by thee to be of the
same kind as thy health. And so accept everything which happens, even
if it seem disagreeable, because it leads to this, to the health of
the universe and to the prosperity and felicity of Zeus (the universe).
For he would not have brought on any man what he has brought, if it
were not useful for the whole. Neither does the nature of anything,
whatever it may be, cause anything which is not suitable to that which
is directed by it. For two reasons then it is right to be content
with that which happens to thee; the one, because it was done for
thee and prescribed for thee, and in a manner had reference to thee,
originally from the most ancient causes spun with thy destiny; and
the other, because even that which comes severally to every man is
to the power which administers the universe a cause of felicity and
perfection, nay even of its very continuance. For the integrity of
the whole is mutilated, if thou cuttest off anything whatever from
the conjunction and the continuity either of the parts or of the causes.
And thou dost cut off, as far as it is in thy power, when thou art
dissatisfied, and in a manner triest to put anything out of the way.

Be not disgusted, nor discouraged, nor dissatisfied, if thou dost
not succeed in doing everything according to right principles; but
when thou bast failed, return back again, and be content if the greater
part of what thou doest is consistent with man's nature, and love
this to which thou returnest; and do not return to philosophy as if
she were a master, but act like those who have sore eyes and apply
a bit of sponge and egg, or as another applies a plaster, or drenching
with water. For thus thou wilt not fail to obey reason, and thou wilt
repose in it. And remember that philosophy requires only the things
which thy nature requires; but thou wouldst have something else which
is not according to nature.- It may be objected, Why what is more
agreeable than this which I am doing?- But is not this the very reason
why pleasure deceives us? And consider if magnanimity, freedom, simplicity,
equanimity, piety, are not more agreeable. For what is more agreeable
than wisdom itself, when thou thinkest of the security and the happy
course of all things which depend on the faculty of understanding
and knowledge?

Things are in such a kind of envelopment that they have seemed to
philosophers, not a few nor those common philosophers, altogether
unintelligible; nay even to the Stoics themselves they seem difficult
to understand. And all our assent is changeable; for where is the
man who never changes? Carry thy thoughts then to the objects themselves,
and consider how short-lived they are and worthless, and that they
may be in the possession of a filthy wretch or a whore or a robber.
Then turn to the morals of those who live with thee, and it is hardly
possible to endure even the most agreeable of them, to say nothing
of a man being hardly able to endure himself. In such darkness then
and dirt and in so constant a flux both of substance and of time,
and of motion and of things moved, what there is worth being highly
prized or even an object of serious pursuit, I cannot imagine. But

canst be charged with being rather slow and dull of comprehension,

thou must exert thyself about this also, not neglecting it nor yet

taking pleasure in thy dulness.

One man, when he has done a service to another, is ready to set it

down to his account as a favour conferred. Another is not ready to

do this, but still in his own mind he thinks of the man as his debtor,

and he knows what he has done. A third in a manner does not even know

what he has done, but he is like a vine which has produced grapes,

and seeks for nothing more after it has once produced its proper fruit.

As a horse when he has run, a dog when he has tracked the game, a

bee when it has made the honey, so a man when he has done a good act,

does not call out for others to come and see, but he goes on to another

act, as a vine goes on to produce again the grapes in season.- Must

a man then be one of these, who in a manner act thus without observing

it?- Yes.- But this very thing is necessary, the observation of what

a man is doing: for, it may be said, it is characteristic of the social

animal to perceive that he is working in a social manner, and indeed

to wish that his social partner also should perceive it.- It is true

what thou sayest, but thou dost not rightly understand what is now

said: and for this reason thou wilt become one of those of whom I

spoke before, for even they are misled by a certain show of reason.

But if thou wilt choose to understand the meaning of what is said,

do not fear that for this reason thou wilt omit any social act.

A prayer of the Athenians: Rain, rain, O dear Zeus, down on the ploughed

fields of the Athenians and on the plains.- In truth we ought not

to pray at all, or we ought to pray in this simple and noble fashion.

Just as we must understand when it is said, That Aesculapius prescribed

to this man horse-exercise, or bathing in cold water or going without

shoes; so we must understand it when it is said, That the nature of

the universe prescribed to this man disease or mutilation or loss

or anything else of the kind. For in the first case Prescribed means

something like this: he prescribed this for this man as a thing adapted

to procure health; and in the second case it means: That which happens

to (or, suits) every man is fixed in a manner for him suitably to

his destiny. For this is what we mean when we say that things are

suitable to us, as the workmen say of squared stones in walls or the

pyramids, that they are suitable, when they fit them to one another

in some kind of connexion. For there is altogether one fitness, harmony.

And as the universe is made up out of all bodies to be such a body

as it is, so out of all existing causes necessity (destiny) is made

up to be such a cause as it is. And even those who are completely

ignorant understand what I mean, for they say, It (necessity, destiny)

brought this to such a person.- This then was brought and this was

precribed to him. Let us then receive these things, as well as those

which Aesculapius prescribes. Many as a matter of course even among

his prescriptions are disagreeable, but we accept them in the hope

of health. Let the perfecting and accomplishment of the things, which

the common nature judges to be good, be judged by thee to be of the

same kind as thy health. And so accept everything which happens, even

if it seem disagreeable, because it leads to this, to the health of

the universe and to the prosperity and felicity of Zeus (the universe).

For he would not have brought on any man what he has brought, if it

were not useful for the whole. Neither does the nature of anything,

whatever it may be, cause anything which is not suitable to that which

is directed by it. For two reasons then it is right to be content

with that which happens to thee; the one, because it was done for

thee and prescribed for thee, and in a manner had reference to thee,

originally from the most ancient causes spun with thy destiny; and

the other, because even that which comes severally to every man is

to the power which administers the universe a cause of felicity and

perfection, nay even of its very continuance. For the integrity of

the whole is mutilated, if thou cuttest off anything whatever from

the conjunction and the continuity either of the parts or of the causes.

And thou dost cut off, as far as it is in thy power, when thou art

dissatisfied, and in a manner triest to put anything out of the way.

Be not disgusted, nor discouraged, nor dissatisfied, if thou dost

not succeed in doing everything according to right principles; but

when thou bast failed, return back again, and be content if the greater

part of what thou doest is consistent with man's nature, and love

this to which thou returnest; and do not return to philosophy as if

she were a master, but act like those who have sore eyes and apply

a bit of sponge and egg, or as another applies a plaster, or drenching

with water. For thus thou wilt not fail to obey reason, and thou wilt

repose in it. And remember that philosophy requires only the things

which thy nature requires; but thou wouldst have something else which

is not according to nature.- It may be objected, Why what is more

agreeable than this which I am doing?- But is not this the very reason

why pleasure deceives us? And consider if magnanimity, freedom, simplicity,

equanimity, piety, are not more agreeable. For what is more agreeable

than wisdom itself, when thou thinkest of the security and the happy

course of all things which depend on the faculty of understanding

and knowledge?

Things are in such a kind of envelopment that they have seemed to

philosophers, not a few nor those common philosophers, altogether

unintelligible; nay even to the Stoics themselves they seem difficult

to understand. And all our assent is changeable; for where is the

man who never changes? Carry thy thoughts then to the objects themselves,

and consider how short-lived they are and worthless, and that they

may be in the possession of a filthy wretch or a whore or a robber.

Then turn to the morals of those who live with thee, and it is hardly

possible to endure even the most agreeable of them, to say nothing

of a man being hardly able to endure himself. In such darkness then

and dirt and in so constant a flux both of substance and of time,

and of motion and of things moved, what there is worth being highly

prized or even an object of serious pursuit, I cannot imagine. But