DioLiu/Test1 · Datasets at Hugging Face

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How many pleasures have been enjoyed by robbers, patricides, tyrants.

Dost thou not see how the handicraftsmen accommodate themselves up
to a certain point to those who are not skilled in their craft- nevertheless
they cling to the reason (the principles) of their art and do not
endure to depart from it? Is it not strange if the architect and the
physician shall have more respect to the reason (the principles) of
their own arts than man to his own reason, which is common to him
and the gods?

Asia, Europe are corners of the universe: all the sea a drop in the
universe; Athos a little clod of the universe: all the present time
is a point in eternity. All things are little, changeable, perishable.
All things come from thence, from that universal ruling power either
directly proceeding or by way of sequence. And accordingly the lion's
gaping jaws, and that which is poisonous, and every harmful thing,
as a thorn, as mud, are after-products of the grand and beautiful.
Do not then imagine that they are of another kind from that which
thou dost venerate, but form a just opinion of the source of all.

He who has seen present things has seen all, both everything which
has taken place from all eternity and everything which will be for
time without end; for all things are of one kin and of one form.

Frequently consider the connexion of all things in the universe and
their relation to one another. For in a manner all things are implicated
with one another, and all in this way are friendly to one another;
for one thing comes in order after another, and this is by virtue
of the active movement and mutual conspiration and the unity of the
substance.

Adapt thyself to the things with which thy lot has been cast: and
the men among whom thou hast received thy portion, love them, but
do it truly, sincerely.

Every instrument, tool, vessel, if it does that for which it has been
made, is well, and yet he who made it is not there. But in the things
which are held together by nature there is within and there abides
in them the power which made them; wherefore the more is it fit to
reverence this power, and to think, that, if thou dost live and act
according to its will, everything in thee is in conformity to intelligence.
And thus also in the universe the things which belong to it are in
conformity to intelligence.

Whatever of the things which are not within thy power thou shalt suppose
to be good for thee or evil, it must of necessity be that, if such
a bad thing befall thee or the loss of such a good thing, thou wilt
blame the gods, and hate men too, those who are the cause of the misfortune
or the loss, or those who are suspected of being likely to be the
cause; and indeed we do much injustice, because we make a difference
between these things. But if we judge only those things which are
in our power to be good or bad, there remains no reason either for
finding fault with God or standing in a hostile attitude to man.

We are all working together to one end, some with knowledge and design,
and others without knowing what they do; as men also when they are
asleep, of whom it is Heraclitus, I think, who says that they are
labourers and co-operators in the things which take place in the universe.
But men co-operate after different fashions: and even those co-operate
abundantly, who find fault with what happens and those who try to
oppose it and to hinder it; for the universe had need even of such
men as these. It remains then for thee to understand among what kind
of workmen thou placest thyself; for he who rules all things will
certainly make a right use of thee, and he will receive thee among
some part of the co-operators and of those whose labours conduce to
one end. But be not thou such a part as the mean and ridiculous verse
in the play, which Chrysippus speaks of.

Does the sun undertake to do the work of the rain, or Aesculapius
the work of the Fruit-bearer (the earth)? And how is it with respect
to each of the stars, are they not different and yet they work together
to the same end?

If the gods have determined about me and about the things which must
happen to me, they have determined well, for it is not easy even to
imagine a deity without forethought; and as to doing me harm, why
should they have any desire towards that? For what advantage would
result to them from this or to the whole, which is the special object
of their providence? But if they have not determined about me individually,
they have certainly determined about the whole at least, and the things
which happen by way of sequence in this general arrangement I ought
to accept with pleasure and to be content with them. But if they determine
about nothing- which it is wicked to believe, or if we do believe
it, let us neither sacrifice nor pray nor swear by them nor do anything
else which we do as if the gods were present and lived with us- but
if however the gods determine about none of the things which concern
us, I am able to determine about myself, and I can inquire about that
which is useful; and that is useful to every man which is conformable
to his own constitution and nature. But my nature is rational and
social; and my city and country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome,
but so far as I am a man, it is the world. The things then which are
useful to these cities are alone useful to me. Whatever happens to
every man, this is for the interest of the universal: this might be
sufficient. But further thou wilt observe this also as a general truth,
if thou dost observe, that whatever is profitable to any man is profitable
also to other men. But let the word profitable be taken here in the
common sense as said of things of the middle kind, neither good nor
bad.

As it happens to thee in the amphitheatre and such places, that the

How many pleasures have been enjoyed by robbers, patricides, tyrants.

Dost thou not see how the handicraftsmen accommodate themselves up

to a certain point to those who are not skilled in their craft- nevertheless

they cling to the reason (the principles) of their art and do not

endure to depart from it? Is it not strange if the architect and the

physician shall have more respect to the reason (the principles) of

their own arts than man to his own reason, which is common to him

and the gods?

Asia, Europe are corners of the universe: all the sea a drop in the

universe; Athos a little clod of the universe: all the present time

is a point in eternity. All things are little, changeable, perishable.

All things come from thence, from that universal ruling power either

directly proceeding or by way of sequence. And accordingly the lion's

gaping jaws, and that which is poisonous, and every harmful thing,

as a thorn, as mud, are after-products of the grand and beautiful.

Do not then imagine that they are of another kind from that which

thou dost venerate, but form a just opinion of the source of all.

He who has seen present things has seen all, both everything which

has taken place from all eternity and everything which will be for

time without end; for all things are of one kin and of one form.

Frequently consider the connexion of all things in the universe and

their relation to one another. For in a manner all things are implicated

with one another, and all in this way are friendly to one another;

for one thing comes in order after another, and this is by virtue

of the active movement and mutual conspiration and the unity of the

substance.

Adapt thyself to the things with which thy lot has been cast: and

the men among whom thou hast received thy portion, love them, but

do it truly, sincerely.

Every instrument, tool, vessel, if it does that for which it has been

made, is well, and yet he who made it is not there. But in the things

which are held together by nature there is within and there abides

in them the power which made them; wherefore the more is it fit to

reverence this power, and to think, that, if thou dost live and act

according to its will, everything in thee is in conformity to intelligence.

And thus also in the universe the things which belong to it are in

conformity to intelligence.

Whatever of the things which are not within thy power thou shalt suppose

to be good for thee or evil, it must of necessity be that, if such

a bad thing befall thee or the loss of such a good thing, thou wilt

blame the gods, and hate men too, those who are the cause of the misfortune

or the loss, or those who are suspected of being likely to be the

cause; and indeed we do much injustice, because we make a difference

between these things. But if we judge only those things which are

in our power to be good or bad, there remains no reason either for

finding fault with God or standing in a hostile attitude to man.

We are all working together to one end, some with knowledge and design,

and others without knowing what they do; as men also when they are

asleep, of whom it is Heraclitus, I think, who says that they are

labourers and co-operators in the things which take place in the universe.

But men co-operate after different fashions: and even those co-operate

abundantly, who find fault with what happens and those who try to

oppose it and to hinder it; for the universe had need even of such

men as these. It remains then for thee to understand among what kind

of workmen thou placest thyself; for he who rules all things will

certainly make a right use of thee, and he will receive thee among

some part of the co-operators and of those whose labours conduce to

one end. But be not thou such a part as the mean and ridiculous verse

in the play, which Chrysippus speaks of.

Does the sun undertake to do the work of the rain, or Aesculapius

the work of the Fruit-bearer (the earth)? And how is it with respect

to each of the stars, are they not different and yet they work together

to the same end?

If the gods have determined about me and about the things which must

happen to me, they have determined well, for it is not easy even to

imagine a deity without forethought; and as to doing me harm, why

should they have any desire towards that? For what advantage would

result to them from this or to the whole, which is the special object

of their providence? But if they have not determined about me individually,

they have certainly determined about the whole at least, and the things

which happen by way of sequence in this general arrangement I ought

to accept with pleasure and to be content with them. But if they determine

about nothing- which it is wicked to believe, or if we do believe

it, let us neither sacrifice nor pray nor swear by them nor do anything

else which we do as if the gods were present and lived with us- but

if however the gods determine about none of the things which concern

us, I am able to determine about myself, and I can inquire about that

which is useful; and that is useful to every man which is conformable

to his own constitution and nature. But my nature is rational and

social; and my city and country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome,

but so far as I am a man, it is the world. The things then which are

useful to these cities are alone useful to me. Whatever happens to

every man, this is for the interest of the universal: this might be

sufficient. But further thou wilt observe this also as a general truth,

if thou dost observe, that whatever is profitable to any man is profitable

also to other men. But let the word profitable be taken here in the

common sense as said of things of the middle kind, neither good nor

bad.

As it happens to thee in the amphitheatre and such places, that the