jbp123/hello · Datasets at Hugging Face

instruction stringlengths 1 84	input stringlengths 1 85	output stringlengths 1 83
Despite these defects, it cannot be denied that the process has	proved to be simple and easy and has succeeded in meeting the	changed needs and conditions. The procedure is not so flexible as
to allow the ruling parties to change it according to their whims.	Nor is it so rigid as to be incapable of adopting itself to the	changing needs. It, as rightly said by K.C. Wheare, ‘strikes a good
balance between flexibility and rigidity’5. In this context, Pandit	Jawaharlal Nehru said in the Constituent Assembly, ‘While we	want this Constitution to be as solid and permanent as we can
make it, there is no permanence in a Constitution. There should	be a certain flexibility. If you make any Constitution rigid and	permanent, you stop the nation’s growth, the growth of a living,
vital, organic people’6 .	Similarly, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar observed in the Constituent	Assembly that, ‘The Assembly has not only refrained from putting
a seal of finality and infallibility upon this Constitution by denying	the people the right to amend the Constitution as in Canada or by	making the amendment of the Constitution subject to the fulfilment
of extraordinary terms and conditions as in America or Australia,	but has provided for a facile procedure for amending the	Constitution’7 .
K.C. Wheare has admired the variety of amendment	procedures contained in the Constitution of India. He said, ‘this	variety in the amending process is wise but rarely found’.
According to Granville Austin, ‘the amending process has proved	itself one of the most ably conceived aspects of the Constitution.	Although it appears complicated, it is merely diverse’.8
NOTES AND REFERENCES	1. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973).	2. The 24th Constitutional Amendment Act of 1971 made it
3. Subhas C. Kashyap, Our Parliament, National Book	Trust, 1999, P. 168.	3a. This provision was added by the 101st Amendment Act
of 2016. This is related to Article 279-A.	4. In USA, an amendment can also be proposed by a	constitutional convention called by the Congress
(American Legislature) on the petition of two-thirds of	the state legislatures.	5. K.C. Wheare, Modern Constitutions, 1966, P. 43.
6. Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VII, P. 322–23.	7. Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. IX, P. 976.	8. Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone
11 Basic Structure of the Constitution	EMERGENCE OF THE BASIC STRUCTURE	The question whether Fundamental Rights can be amended by
the Parliament under Article 368 came for consideration of the	Supreme Court within a year of the Constitution coming into force.	In the Shankari Prasad case1 (1951), the constitutional validity of
the First Amendment Act (1951), which curtailed the right to	property, was challenged. The Supreme Court ruled that the	power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution under Article
368 also includes the power to amend Fundamental Rights. The	word ‘law’ in Article 13 includes only ordinary laws and not the	constitutional amendment acts (constituent laws). Therefore, the
Parliament can abridge or take away any of the Fundamental	Rights by enacting a constitutional amendment act and such a law	will not be void under Article 13.
But in the Golak Nath case2 (1967), the Supreme Court	reversed its earlier stand. In that case, the constitutional validity of	the Seventeenth Amendment Act (1964), which inserted certain
state acts in the Ninth Schedule, was challenged. The Supreme	Court ruled that the Fundamental Rights are given a	‘transcendental and immutable’ position and hence, the
Parliament cannot abridge or take away any of these rights. A	constitutional amendment act is also a law within the meaning of	Article 13 and hence, would be void for violating any of the
Fundamental Rights.	The Parliament reacted to the Supreme Court’s judgement in	the Golak Nath case (1967) by enacting the 24th Amendment Act
(1971). This Act amended Articles 13 and 368.	It declared that the Parliament has the power to abridge or take	away any of the Fundamental Rights under Article 368 and such
However, in the Kesavananda Bharati case3 (1973), the	Supreme Court overruled its judgement in the Golak Nath case	(1967). It upheld the validity of the 24th Amendment Act (1971)
and stated that Parliament is empowered to abridge or take away	any of the Fundamental Rights. At the same time, it laid down a	new doctrine of the ‘basic structure’ (or ‘basic features’) of the
Constitution. It ruled that the constituent power of Parliament	under Article 368 does not enable it to alter the ‘basic structure’ of	the Constitution. This means that the Parliament cannot abridge
or take away a Fundamental Right that forms a part of the ‘basic	structure’ of the Constitution.	The doctrine of basic structure of the constitution was
reaffirmed and applied by the Supreme Court in the Indira Nehru	Gandhi case3a (1975). In this case, the Supreme Court invalidated	a provision of the 39th Amendment Act (1975) which kept the
election disputes involving the Prime Minister and the Speaker of	Lok Sabha outside the jurisdiction of all courts. The court said that	this provision was beyond the amending power of Parliament as it
affected the basic structure of the constitution.	Again, the Parliament reacted to this judicially innovated	doctrine of ‘basic structure’ by enacting the 42nd Amendment Act
(1976). This Act amended Article 368 and declared that there is	no limitation on the constituent power of Parliament and no	amendment can be questioned in any court on any ground
including that of the contravention of any of the Fundamental	Rights.	However, the Supreme Court in the Minerva Mills case4 (1980)
invalidated this provision as it excluded judicial review which is a	‘basic feature’ of the Constitution. Applying the doctrine of ‘basic	structure’ with respect to Article 368, the court held that:
“Since the Constitution had conferred a limited amending power	on the Parliament, the Parliament cannot under the exercise of	that limited power enlarge that very power into an absolute power.
Indeed, a limited amending power is one of the basic features of	the Constitution and, therefore, the limitations on that power	cannot be destroyed. In other words, Parliament cannot, under
basic features. The donee of a limited power cannot by the	exercise of that power convert the limited power into an unlimited	one”.
Again in the Waman Rao case5 (1981), the Supreme Court	adhered to the doctrine of the ‘basic structure’ and further clarified	that it would apply to constitutional amendments enacted after
ELEMENTS OF THE BASIC STRUCTURE	The present position is that the Parliament under Article 368 can	amend any part of the Constitution including the Fundamental
Rights but without affecting the ‘basic structure’ of the	Constitution. However, the Supreme Court is yet to define or	clarify as to what constitutes the ‘basic structure’ of the
Constitution. From the various judgements, the following have	emerged as ‘basic features’ of the Constitution or elements of the	‘basic structure’ of the constitution:
1. Supremacy of the Constitution	2. Sovereign, democratic and republican nature of the Indian	polity
3. Secular character of the Constitution	4. Separation of powers between the legislature, the executive	and the judiciary
5. Federal character of the Constitution	6. Unity and integrity of the nation	7. Welfare state (socio-economic justice)
8. Judicial review	9. Freedom and dignity of the individual	10. Parliamentary system
11. Rule of law	12. Harmony and balance between Fundamental Rights and	Directive Principles
13. Principle of equality	14. Free and fair elections	15. Independence of Judiciary
16. Limited power of Parliament to amend the Constitution	17. Effective access to justice	18. Principles (or essence) underlying fundamental rights
19. Powers of the Supreme Court under Articles 32, 136, 141	and 1426	20. Powers of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 2277
Sl. Name of the Case (Year) Elements of the Basic	No. Structure (As Declared by	the Supreme Court)
1. Kesavananda Bharati case3 1. Supremacy of the	(1973) (popularly known as Constitution	the Fundamental Rights 2. Separation of powers
Case) between the legislature,	the executive and the	judiciary
3. Republic and	democratic form of	government
4. Secular character of the	constitution	5. Federal character of the
constitution	6. Sovereignty and unity of	India
7. Freedom and dignity of	the individual	8. Mandate to build a
welfare state	9. Parliamentary System	2. Indira Nehru Gandhi case3a 1. India as a sovereign
(1975) (popularly known as democratic republic	the Election Case) 2. Equality of status and	opportunity of an
individual	3. Secularism and	freedom of conscience
and religion	4. Government of laws	and not of men (i.e.,
Rule of Law)	5. Judicial review	6. Free and fair elections
3. Minerva Mills case4 (1980) 1. Limited power of	Parliament to amend	the constitution
2. Judicial review	3. Harmony and balance	between fundamental
rights and directive	principles	4. Central Coal Fields Ltd. Effective access to justice
Case8 (1980)	5. Bhim Singhji Case9 (1981) Welfare State (Socio-	economic justice)
6. S.P. Sampath Kumar 1. Rule of law	Case10 (1987) 2. Judicial review	7. P. Sambamurthy Case11 1. Rule of law
(1987) 2. Judicial review	8. Delhi Judicial Service Powers of the Supreme	Association Case12 (1991) Court under Articles 32,
136, 141 and 142	9. Indra Sawhney Case13 Rule of law	(1992) (popularly known as
the Mandal Case)	10. Kumar Padma Prasad Independence of judiciary	Case14 (1992)
11. Kihoto Hollohon Case15 1. Free and fair elections	(1993) (popularly known as 2. Sovereign, democratic,	Defection case) republican structure
12. Raghunath Rao Case16 1. Principle of equality	(1993) 2. Unity and integrity of	India
13. S.R. Bommai Case17 (1994) 1. Federalism	2. Secularism	3. Democracy
4. Unity and integrity of	the nation	5. Social justice
6. Judicial review	14. L. Chandra Kumar Case18 Powers of the High Courts	(1997) under Articles 226 and 227
15. Indra Sawhney II Case19 Principle of equality	(2000)	16. All India Judge’s Independent judicial system
Association Case20 (2002)	17. Kuldip Nayar Case21 (2006) 1. Democracy	2. Free and fair elections
18. M. Nagaraj Case22 (2006) Principle of equality	19. I.R. Coelho Case23 (2007) 1. Rule of law	(popularly known as IX 2. Separation of powers
Schedule Case) 3. Principles (or essence)	underlying fundamental	rights
4. Judicial review	5. Principle of equality	20. Ram Jethmalani Case24 Powers of the Supreme
(2011) Court under Article 32	21. Namit Sharma Case25 Freedom and dignity of the	(2013) individual
22. Madras Bar Association 1. Judicial review	Case26 (2014) 2. Powers of the High	Courts under Articles
226 and 227	NOTES AND REFERENCES	1. Shankari Prasad v. Union of India, (1951)
3a. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975)	4. Minerva Mills v. Union of India, (1980)	5. Waman Rao v. Union of India, (1981)
6. For the subject-matter of these Articles, see Appendix-	1.	7. Ibid.
8. Central Coal Fields Ltd., v. Jaiswal Coal Co. (1980)	9. Bhim Singhji v. Union of India (1981)	10. S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India (1987)
11. P. Sambamurthy v. State of A.P. (1987)	12. Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat	(1991)
13. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992)	14. Kumar Padma Prasad v. Union of India (1992)	15. Kihoto Hollohon v. Zachilhu (1993)
16. Raghunath Rao v. Union of India (1993)	17. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994)	18. L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997)
19. Indra Sawhney II v. Union of India (2000)	20. All India Judge’s Association v. Union of India (2002)	21. Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India (2006)
22. M. Nagaraj v. Union of India (2006)	23. I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007)	24. Ram Jethmalani v. Union of India (2011)
PART-II	SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT	12. Parliamentary System
13. Federal System	14. Centre-State Relations	15. Inter-State Relations
12 Parliamentary System	T	he Constitution of India provides for a parliamentary form of
government, both at the Centre and in the states. Articles	74 and 75 deal with the parliamentary system at the Centre	and Articles 163 and 164 in the states.
Modern democratic governments are classified into	parliamentary and presidential on the basis of nature of relations	between the executive and the legislative organs of the
government. The parliamentary system of government is the one	in which the executive is responsible to the legislature for its	policies and acts. The presidential system of government, on the
other hand, is one in which the executive is not responsible to the	legislature for its policies and acts, and is constitutionally	independent of the legislature in respect of its term of office.
The parliamentary government is also known as cabinet	government or responsible government or Westminster model of	government and is prevalent in Britain, Japan, Canada, India
among others. The presidential government, on the other hand, is	also known as non-responsible or non-parliamentary or fixed	executive system of government and is prevalent in USA, Brazil,
Russia, Sri Lanka among others.	Ivor Jennings called the parliamentary system as ‘cabinet	system’ because the cabinet is the nucleus of power in a

Despite these defects, it cannot be denied that the process has

proved to be simple and easy and has succeeded in meeting the

changed needs and conditions. The procedure is not so flexible as

to allow the ruling parties to change it according to their whims.

Nor is it so rigid as to be incapable of adopting itself to the

changing needs. It, as rightly said by K.C. Wheare, ‘strikes a good

balance between flexibility and rigidity’5. In this context, Pandit

Jawaharlal Nehru said in the Constituent Assembly, ‘While we

want this Constitution to be as solid and permanent as we can

make it, there is no permanence in a Constitution. There should

be a certain flexibility. If you make any Constitution rigid and

permanent, you stop the nation’s growth, the growth of a living,

vital, organic people’6 .

Similarly, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar observed in the Constituent

Assembly that, ‘The Assembly has not only refrained from putting

a seal of finality and infallibility upon this Constitution by denying

the people the right to amend the Constitution as in Canada or by

making the amendment of the Constitution subject to the fulfilment

of extraordinary terms and conditions as in America or Australia,

but has provided for a facile procedure for amending the

Constitution’7 .

K.C. Wheare has admired the variety of amendment

procedures contained in the Constitution of India. He said, ‘this

variety in the amending process is wise but rarely found’.

According to Granville Austin, ‘the amending process has proved

itself one of the most ably conceived aspects of the Constitution.

Although it appears complicated, it is merely diverse’.8

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973).

2. The 24th Constitutional Amendment Act of 1971 made it

3. Subhas C. Kashyap, Our Parliament, National Book

Trust, 1999, P. 168.

3a. This provision was added by the 101st Amendment Act

of 2016. This is related to Article 279-A.

4. In USA, an amendment can also be proposed by a

constitutional convention called by the Congress

(American Legislature) on the petition of two-thirds of

the state legislatures.

5. K.C. Wheare, Modern Constitutions, 1966, P. 43.

6. Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VII, P. 322–23.

7. Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. IX, P. 976.

8. Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone

11 Basic Structure of the Constitution

EMERGENCE OF THE BASIC STRUCTURE

The question whether Fundamental Rights can be amended by

the Parliament under Article 368 came for consideration of the

Supreme Court within a year of the Constitution coming into force.

In the Shankari Prasad case1 (1951), the constitutional validity of

the First Amendment Act (1951), which curtailed the right to

property, was challenged. The Supreme Court ruled that the

power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution under Article

368 also includes the power to amend Fundamental Rights. The

word ‘law’ in Article 13 includes only ordinary laws and not the

constitutional amendment acts (constituent laws). Therefore, the

Parliament can abridge or take away any of the Fundamental

Rights by enacting a constitutional amendment act and such a law

will not be void under Article 13.

But in the Golak Nath case2 (1967), the Supreme Court

reversed its earlier stand. In that case, the constitutional validity of

the Seventeenth Amendment Act (1964), which inserted certain

state acts in the Ninth Schedule, was challenged. The Supreme

Court ruled that the Fundamental Rights are given a

‘transcendental and immutable’ position and hence, the

Parliament cannot abridge or take away any of these rights. A

constitutional amendment act is also a law within the meaning of

Article 13 and hence, would be void for violating any of the

Fundamental Rights.

The Parliament reacted to the Supreme Court’s judgement in

the Golak Nath case (1967) by enacting the 24th Amendment Act

(1971). This Act amended Articles 13 and 368.

It declared that the Parliament has the power to abridge or take

away any of the Fundamental Rights under Article 368 and such

However, in the Kesavananda Bharati case3 (1973), the

Supreme Court overruled its judgement in the Golak Nath case

(1967). It upheld the validity of the 24th Amendment Act (1971)

and stated that Parliament is empowered to abridge or take away

any of the Fundamental Rights. At the same time, it laid down a

new doctrine of the ‘basic structure’ (or ‘basic features’) of the

Constitution. It ruled that the constituent power of Parliament

under Article 368 does not enable it to alter the ‘basic structure’ of

the Constitution. This means that the Parliament cannot abridge

or take away a Fundamental Right that forms a part of the ‘basic

structure’ of the Constitution.

The doctrine of basic structure of the constitution was

reaffirmed and applied by the Supreme Court in the Indira Nehru

Gandhi case3a (1975). In this case, the Supreme Court invalidated

a provision of the 39th Amendment Act (1975) which kept the

election disputes involving the Prime Minister and the Speaker of

Lok Sabha outside the jurisdiction of all courts. The court said that

this provision was beyond the amending power of Parliament as it

affected the basic structure of the constitution.

Again, the Parliament reacted to this judicially innovated

doctrine of ‘basic structure’ by enacting the 42nd Amendment Act

(1976). This Act amended Article 368 and declared that there is

no limitation on the constituent power of Parliament and no

amendment can be questioned in any court on any ground

including that of the contravention of any of the Fundamental

Rights.

However, the Supreme Court in the Minerva Mills case4 (1980)

invalidated this provision as it excluded judicial review which is a

‘basic feature’ of the Constitution. Applying the doctrine of ‘basic

structure’ with respect to Article 368, the court held that:

“Since the Constitution had conferred a limited amending power

on the Parliament, the Parliament cannot under the exercise of

that limited power enlarge that very power into an absolute power.

Indeed, a limited amending power is one of the basic features of

the Constitution and, therefore, the limitations on that power

cannot be destroyed. In other words, Parliament cannot, under

basic features. The donee of a limited power cannot by the

exercise of that power convert the limited power into an unlimited

one”.

Again in the Waman Rao case5 (1981), the Supreme Court

adhered to the doctrine of the ‘basic structure’ and further clarified

that it would apply to constitutional amendments enacted after

ELEMENTS OF THE BASIC STRUCTURE

The present position is that the Parliament under Article 368 can

amend any part of the Constitution including the Fundamental

Rights but without affecting the ‘basic structure’ of the

Constitution. However, the Supreme Court is yet to define or

clarify as to what constitutes the ‘basic structure’ of the

Constitution. From the various judgements, the following have

emerged as ‘basic features’ of the Constitution or elements of the

‘basic structure’ of the constitution:

1. Supremacy of the Constitution

2. Sovereign, democratic and republican nature of the Indian

polity

3. Secular character of the Constitution

4. Separation of powers between the legislature, the executive

and the judiciary

5. Federal character of the Constitution

6. Unity and integrity of the nation

7. Welfare state (socio-economic justice)

8. Judicial review

9. Freedom and dignity of the individual

10. Parliamentary system

11. Rule of law

12. Harmony and balance between Fundamental Rights and

Directive Principles

13. Principle of equality

14. Free and fair elections

15. Independence of Judiciary

16. Limited power of Parliament to amend the Constitution

17. Effective access to justice

18. Principles (or essence) underlying fundamental rights

19. Powers of the Supreme Court under Articles 32, 136, 141

and 1426

20. Powers of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 2277

Sl. Name of the Case (Year) Elements of the Basic

No. Structure (As Declared by

the Supreme Court)

1. Kesavananda Bharati case3 1. Supremacy of the

(1973) (popularly known as Constitution

the Fundamental Rights 2. Separation of powers

Case) between the legislature,

the executive and the

judiciary

3. Republic and

democratic form of

government

4. Secular character of the

constitution

5. Federal character of the

constitution

6. Sovereignty and unity of

India

7. Freedom and dignity of

the individual

8. Mandate to build a

welfare state

9. Parliamentary System

2. Indira Nehru Gandhi case3a 1. India as a sovereign

(1975) (popularly known as democratic republic

the Election Case) 2. Equality of status and

opportunity of an

individual

3. Secularism and

freedom of conscience

and religion

4. Government of laws

and not of men (i.e.,

Rule of Law)

5. Judicial review

6. Free and fair elections

3. Minerva Mills case4 (1980) 1. Limited power of

Parliament to amend

the constitution

2. Judicial review

3. Harmony and balance

between fundamental

rights and directive

principles

4. Central Coal Fields Ltd. Effective access to justice

Case8 (1980)

5. Bhim Singhji Case9 (1981) Welfare State (Socio-

economic justice)

6. S.P. Sampath Kumar 1. Rule of law

Case10 (1987) 2. Judicial review

7. P. Sambamurthy Case11 1. Rule of law

(1987) 2. Judicial review

8. Delhi Judicial Service Powers of the Supreme

Association Case12 (1991) Court under Articles 32,

136, 141 and 142

9. Indra Sawhney Case13 Rule of law

(1992) (popularly known as

the Mandal Case)

10. Kumar Padma Prasad Independence of judiciary

Case14 (1992)

11. Kihoto Hollohon Case15 1. Free and fair elections

(1993) (popularly known as 2. Sovereign, democratic,

Defection case) republican structure

12. Raghunath Rao Case16 1. Principle of equality

(1993) 2. Unity and integrity of

India

13. S.R. Bommai Case17 (1994) 1. Federalism

2. Secularism

3. Democracy

4. Unity and integrity of

the nation

5. Social justice

6. Judicial review

14. L. Chandra Kumar Case18 Powers of the High Courts

(1997) under Articles 226 and 227

15. Indra Sawhney II Case19 Principle of equality

(2000)

16. All India Judge’s Independent judicial system

Association Case20 (2002)

17. Kuldip Nayar Case21 (2006) 1. Democracy

2. Free and fair elections

18. M. Nagaraj Case22 (2006) Principle of equality

19. I.R. Coelho Case23 (2007) 1. Rule of law

(popularly known as IX 2. Separation of powers

Schedule Case) 3. Principles (or essence)

underlying fundamental

rights

4. Judicial review

5. Principle of equality

20. Ram Jethmalani Case24 Powers of the Supreme

(2011) Court under Article 32

21. Namit Sharma Case25 Freedom and dignity of the

(2013) individual

22. Madras Bar Association 1. Judicial review

Case26 (2014) 2. Powers of the High

Courts under Articles

226 and 227

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Shankari Prasad v. Union of India, (1951)

3a. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975)

4. Minerva Mills v. Union of India, (1980)

5. Waman Rao v. Union of India, (1981)

6. For the subject-matter of these Articles, see Appendix-

1.

7. Ibid.

8. Central Coal Fields Ltd., v. Jaiswal Coal Co. (1980)

9. Bhim Singhji v. Union of India (1981)

10. S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India (1987)

11. P. Sambamurthy v. State of A.P. (1987)

12. Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat

(1991)

13. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992)

14. Kumar Padma Prasad v. Union of India (1992)

15. Kihoto Hollohon v. Zachilhu (1993)

16. Raghunath Rao v. Union of India (1993)

17. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994)

18. L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997)

19. Indra Sawhney II v. Union of India (2000)

20. All India Judge’s Association v. Union of India (2002)

21. Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India (2006)

22. M. Nagaraj v. Union of India (2006)

23. I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007)

24. Ram Jethmalani v. Union of India (2011)

PART-II

SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

12. Parliamentary System

13. Federal System

14. Centre-State Relations

15. Inter-State Relations

12 Parliamentary System

T

he Constitution of India provides for a parliamentary form of

government, both at the Centre and in the states. Articles

74 and 75 deal with the parliamentary system at the Centre

and Articles 163 and 164 in the states.

Modern democratic governments are classified into

parliamentary and presidential on the basis of nature of relations

between the executive and the legislative organs of the

government. The parliamentary system of government is the one

in which the executive is responsible to the legislature for its

policies and acts. The presidential system of government, on the

other hand, is one in which the executive is not responsible to the

legislature for its policies and acts, and is constitutionally

independent of the legislature in respect of its term of office.

The parliamentary government is also known as cabinet

government or responsible government or Westminster model of

government and is prevalent in Britain, Japan, Canada, India

among others. The presidential government, on the other hand, is

also known as non-responsible or non-parliamentary or fixed

executive system of government and is prevalent in USA, Brazil,

Russia, Sri Lanka among others.

Ivor Jennings called the parliamentary system as ‘cabinet

system’ because the cabinet is the nucleus of power in a